CAPT. WILFREDO G. ROQUERO, Petitioner, v.

THE CHANCELLOR OF UP-MANILA

FACTS: Petitioner is an employee of UP-Manila assigned at the PGH Security Division as Special Police
Captain. Private respondent Imelda O. Abutal is a Lady Guard of Ex-Bataan Security Agency who was
applying for a position in the security force assigned at UP-PGH.

Private respondent Abutal filed a complaint with then Chancellor of UP-Manila for Grave Misconduct
against petitioner Capt. Roquero.

An Administrative Disciplinary Tribunal (ADT), was organized to hear the instant case.

The Prosecution presented its only witness, private respondent Abutal. After the completion of the
cross-examination on the prosecutions only witness, the prosecution agreed to submit its Formal Offer
of Evidence.

Later, petitioner filed a Motion through counsel praying that complainant (private respondent herein) be
declared to have waived her rights to formally offer her exhibits since complainant was not able to file
her Formal Offer within the given period of fifteen (15) days.

The ADT was not able to act on the said motion for almost 5 years. Due to the unreasonable delay,
petitioner filed another motion asking for the dismissal of the administrative case against him.

The motion to dismiss was anchored with the following reasons; prosecution had not formally offer its
evidence, that the ADT failed to act on the said motion, unfounded charges in the administrative
complaint was used to harass him and that he is entitled of a just and speedy disposition of his case.

Issue:

Whether or not the failure of the ADT to resolve Roquero's Motion resolved after 5 years violated the
constitutional right of Requero to speedy disposition of cases.

Ruling:

YES ,Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that all person shall have the right to a
speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.The
constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases is not limited to the accused in criminal
proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and administrative cases, and in all
proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings.

The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed violated only
when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when
unjustified postponements or even without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is
allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.
Hence, the doctrinal rule is that in the determination of whether that right
has been violated, the factors that may be considered and balanced are as
follows:

[1] the length of delay;

[2] the reasons for the delay;
[3] the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and
[4] the prejudice caused by the delay.

Applying the doctrinal rulings in the case at bar, the violation of the right to
a speedy disposition of the case against petitioner is clear for the following
reasons:
(1) the delay of almost five (5) years on the part of ADT in resolving the
motion of petitioner
(2) the unreasonableness of the delay
(3) the timely assertions by petitioner of the right to an early disposition
which he did through a motion to dismiss.

The delay was prejudicial to petitioners cause as he was under preventive

suspension for ninety (90) days, and during the interregnum of almost five
years, the trial of the accusation against him remained stagnant at the
prosecution stage.

Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine whether a defendant has been denied his
right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which the conduct of both the
prosecution and the defendant is weighed, and such factors as the length of the delay, the reasons for
such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the
delay. The concept of a speedy disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.
Galman vs. Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA 43

Facts:

There was an investigating committee created to determine the facts on the case involving the
assassination of Ninoy Aquino. It appears that majority and minority reports showed that they are
unconvinced on the participation of Galman as the assassin of late Sen. Aquino and branded him instead
as the fall guy as opposed to the military reports. Majority reports recommended the 26 military
respondents for the premeditated killing of Aquino and Galman which the Sandiganbayan did not give
due consideration.

The office of the Tanod Bayan was preparing a resolution charging the 26 military accused as
principal to the crime against Aquino but was reminded upon the intervention of President Marcos who
insist on the innocence of the accused. Marcos however recommended the filing of murder charge and
to implement the acquittal as planned so that double jeopardy may be invoked later on.

The petitioners filed an action for miscarriage of justice against the Sandiganbayan and gross violation of
constitutional rights of the petitioners for failure to exert genuine efforts in allowing the prosecution to
present vital documentary evidence and prayed for nullifying the bias proceedings before the
Sandiganbayan and ordering a re-trial before an impartial tribunal.

Issue:

Whether or not there was due process in the acquittal of the accused from the charges against them.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held that the prosecution was deprived of due process and fair opportunity to
prosecute and prove their case which grossly violates the due process clause.

There could be no double jeopardy since legal jeopardy attaches only;

(a) upon a valid indictment,

(b) before a competent court,
(c) after arraignment,
(d) a valid plea having been entered; and
(e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused

The lower court that rendered the judgment of acquittal was not competent as it was ousted of its
jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution to due process.
In effect the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the criminal case for further
hearing and/or trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and
does not expose the accused to a second jeopardy.

The court further contends that the previous trial was a mock trial where the authoritarian President
ordered the Sandiganbayan and Tanod Bayan to rig and closely monitor the trial which was
undertaken with due pressure to the judiciary. The court’s decision of acquittal is one void of
jurisdiction owing to its failure in observing due process during the trial therefore the judgment was
also deemed void and double jeopardy cannot be invoked. More so the trial was one vitiated with
lack of due process on the account of collusion between the lower court and Sandiganbayan for the
rendition of a pre-determined verdict of the accused.

The denial on the motion for reconsideration of the petitioners by the court was set aside and rendered
the decision of acquittal of the accused null and void. An order for a re-trial was granted.
EQUAL PROTECTION

Sec. 1, Article III, 1987 Constitution

I. US Cases

Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857)

Brief Fact Summary. A slave sought his freedom under the Missouri Compromise.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Slaves are not citizens under the United States Constitution.

Facts. Dred Scott (Plaintiff) was a slave living in the slave state of Missouri. His owner took him
to Illinois and then to Minnesota, which were both free states under the Missouri Compromise.
Plaintiff and his owner returned to Missouri, and Plaintiff was sold to Sanford (Defendant).
Plaintiff sued Defendant for his freedom, claiming to be a citizen of Missouri, based on having
obtained freedom by domicile for a long period in a free state.

Issue. Can a slave be considered a citizen and as such become entitled to all the rights,
privileges and immunities granted to citizens under the United States Constitution?

Held. No.  Slaves were not intended to be included under the word ‘citizens’ in the
Constitution. At the time the Constitution was written, slaves were considered an inferior
and subordinate class. No state can introduce a new member into the political community
created by the Constitution.  The Declaration of Independence clearly never intended to include
slaves.

The Constitution never intended to confer on slaves or their posterity the blessings of
liberty, or any of the personal rights so carefully provided for the citizen. Plaintiff is clearly
not a citizen and not entitled to sue.  An act of Congress, which deprives a citizen of his
property merely because he brought his property into a particular part of the United States does
not comport with due process of law. The right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly
affirmed in the Constitution. An act of Congress, which prohibits a citizen from owning slaves
in any territory in the United States is void. So Plaintiff b
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)

Facts:

Louisiana enacted the Separate Car Act, which required separate railway cars for blacks and
whites.

Homer Plessy – who was seven-eighths Caucasian – agreed to participate in a test to challenge
the Act. He was solicited by Committee of Citizens, a group of New Orleans residents who
sought to repeal the Act.

They asked Plessy, who was technically black under Louisiana law, to sit in a "whites only" car
of a Louisiana train. 

The railroad cooperated because it thought the Act imposed unnecessary costs via the purchase
of additional railroad cars. When Plessy was told to vacate the whites-only car, he refused and
was arrested. 

At trial, Plessy’s lawyers argued that the Separate Car Act violated the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments. The judge found that Louisiana could enforce this law insofar as it
affected railroads within its boundaries. Plessy was convicted.

Issue. 

Was the statute requiring separate, but equal accommodations on railroad transportation
consistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution?

Held. 

Yes. The State Supreme Court is affirmed. Justice Henry Brown (J. Brown) stated that
although the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution was designed to enforce the
equality between the races, it was not intended to abolish distinctions based on color, or to
enforce a commingling of the races in a way unsatisfactory to either. Laws requiring the
separation of the races do not imply the inferiority of either.

If the law “stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority,” it is because the colored race
chooses to put that construction upon it.

Therefore, the statute constitutes a valid exercise of the States’ police powers.The Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution does, however, require that the exercise of a State’s police
powers be reasonable. Laws enacted in good faith, for the promotion of the public good and
not for the annoyance or oppression of another race are reasonable. As such, the statute was
reasonable.

The words of the amendment, it is true, are prohibitory, but they contain a necessary
implication of a positive immunity, or right, most valuable to the colored race, -- the right to
exemption from unfriendly legislation against them distinctively as colored, -- exemption from
legal discriminations, implying inferiority in civil society, lessening the security of their
enjoyment of the rights which others enjoy, and discriminations which are steps towards
reducing them to the condition of a subject race.
Goesart v. Cleary,

FACTS:

 As part of the Michigan system for controlling the sale of liquor, bartenders were
required, to be licensed in all cities having a population of 50,000 or more, but no female
could be licensed unless she was the wife or daughter of the male owner of a licensed
liquor establishment.

 The female bartenders sought to enjoin enforcement of the statute, claiming that it
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. When a three-judge
district court denied the injunction, the female bartenders appealed.

ISSUE:

Was the Michigan statute forbidding women from being licensed as bartenders and at the same
time making an exception in favor of the wives and daughters of the owners of liquor
establishments violative of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

RULING:

No, The Court held that the classification made as between wives and daughters of
liquor establishment owners and wives and daughters of non-owners was not without a
reasonable basis and that Michigan could deny to all women opportunities for bartending .
The Court stated bartending by women might give rise to moral and social problems against
which the statute devised preventive measures, and the legislature evidently believed that
the oversight assured through ownership of a bar by a barmaid's husband or father
minimized hazards that might confront a barmaid without the protection.
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)

Facts:

 The plaintiff parents in this case attempted to enroll their children in the nearest public
elementary schools to their homes—white schools which were blocks away—rather than
the African-American schools which were far away.
 The schools denied the plaintiffs’ children access to the schools based on their race. The
schools were acting in accordance with Kansas
 The parents alleged that the “facilities” of the African-American schools were not
“equal” to those of the white schools.
 They filed a lawsuit based on an equal protection argument in the District Court of
Kansas, demanding that the court enjoin the state’s active segregation of the elementary
schools.

ISSUE:

Is segregation in schools a violation of the  equal protection clause of the

Constitution?

RULING:

YES, The Court held that to separate them from others of similar age and
qualifications solely because of their race generated a feeling of inferiority as to their
status in the community. Segregation also had the tendency to retard the educational
and mental development of African-American children and to deprive them of some of
the benefits they would receive in a racially integrated school system.As a result,
segregation is a denial of the equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
*Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)

Facts:

 Appellant Griswold is an Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of

Connecticut and Appellant Buxton is a licensed physician who served as Medical
Director for the League at its Center in New Haven, were arrested and charged with
giving information, instruction, and medical advice to married persons on means of
preventing conception.

 Appellants were found guilty as accessories and fined $100 each. Appellants appealed
on the theory that the accessory statute as applied violated the 14th Amendment to the
United States Constitution. Appellants claimed standing based on their professional
relationship with the married people they advised.

Issue:

Does the Constitution provide for a privacy right for married couples?

Held:

The First Amendment has a penumbra (implied power; group of rights) where privacy is
protected from governmental intrusion, which although not expressly included in the
Amendment, is necessary to make the express guarantees meaningful. The association of
marriage is a privacy right older than the Bill of Rights, and the State’s effort to control marital
activities in this case is unnecessarily broad and therefore impinges on protected Constitutional
freedoms.
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)

Facts:

 In 1958, two residents of Virginia, Mildred Jeter, a black woman, and Richard Loving,
a white man, were married in the District of Columbia.

 The Lovings returned to Virginia shortly thereafter. The couple was then charged
with violating the state's antimiscegenation statute, which banned inter-racial
marriages.

 The Lovings were found guilty and sentenced to a year in jail (the trial judge agreed to
suspend the sentence if the Lovings would leave Virginia and not return for 25 years).

Issue

Did Virginia's antimiscegenation law violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment?

Yes. A state law making the criminality of an act depend upon the race of the actor is
invalid. It is the very purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment to uphold one’s free will to marry,
as well as eliminate racial discrimination and the Virginia statute clearly violated these
principles."

Marriage is one of the "basic civil rights of man," fundamental to existence and survival.
The Fourteenth Amendment requires that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by
invidious racial discriminations. Under the United States Constitution, the freedom to marry, or
not marry, a person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the
state.
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)

Facts:

 Appellee William Baird was convicted under a Massachusetts State law for exhibiting
contraceptive articles and for giving a woman a package of Emko vaginal foam.
 The Massachusetts Supreme Court set aside the conviction for exhibiting contraceptives
on the grounds that it violated Appellee’s First Amendment rights, but sustained the
conviction for giving away the foam.
 The law permitted married persons to obtain contraceptives to prevent pregnancy, but
forbid single persons from obtaining them.

Issue:

Is there a rational ground for the different treatment of married and unmarried persons under
the Massachusetts State law?

Held: 

The dissimilar treatment of married and unmarried persons under the Massachusetts law
violates the Equal Protection Clause.

First, the prevention of premarital sex cannot be reasonably regarded as the purpose of the
law, because the ban has at best a marginal relating to the proffered objective.

Second, if health is the rationale of the law, it is both discriminatory and overbroad.

Third, the right to obtain contraceptives must be the same for married and unmarried
individuals.

The constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a state to forbid or
proscribe advocacy of the use of force or law violation except where such advocacy is directed
to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)

Facts:

 Houston police entered John Lawrence's apartment and saw him and another
adult man, Tyron Garner, engaging in a private, consensual sexual act.

 Lawrence and Garner were arrested and convicted of deviate sexual intercourse
in violation of a Texas statute forbidding two persons of the same sex to engage
in certain intimate sexual conduct.

Question

Do the criminal convictions of John Lawrence and Tyron Garner under the Texas "Homosexual
Conduct" law, which criminalizes sexual intimacy by same-sex couples, but not identical
behavior by different-sex couples, violate the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal
protection of laws?

RULING

No, "Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage
in their conduct without intervention of the government," wrote by Justice Kennedy. "The
Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the
personal and private life of the individual,"
US v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013)

Facts:

 The State of New York recognized the marriage of New York residents, respondent and
the decedent, who had their wedding in Canada.
 When the decedent died in 2009, she left her entire estate to respondent. Respondent
sought to claim the federal estate tax exemption for surviving spouses, but was barred
from doing so the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which amended the
Dictionary Act--a law providing rules of construction for over 1,000 federal laws and the
whole realm of federal regulations--to define “marriage” and “spouse” as excluding same-
sex partners.

Issue:

Does Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act defines “marriage” and “spouse” to exclude
same-sex couples violate the Fifth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause?

Held:

Yes. Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act’s definitions of “marriage” and

“spouse” that excludes same-sex couples violates the Fifth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause.

New York’s actions in recognizing Plaintiff’s marriage were a proper exercise of its
authority. DOMA violates due process and equal protection rights when it seeks to injure a
class New York seeks to protect. A congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group
cannot justify unequal treatment of that group. DOMA’s unusual deviation from the historical
practice of recognizing state definitions of marriage deprives same-sex couples of the
benefits and responsibilities that come with federal recognition of marriage. DOMA’s stated
purpose and practical effect are to create a separate status upon those who enter same-sex
marriages where those marriages are legal within that state. It deprives a subset of couples
married within a state of rights and responsibilities. DOMA makes the marriages between
same-sex couples second-tier. DOMA is unconstitutional as a deprivation of liberty
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment as to lawful same-sex marriages recognized under state
law.
*Obergefell v. Hodges, 57 U.S. 644 (2015)

Facts:

 Obergefell, the named appellant, traveled to Maryland to marry his ailing partner
who was suffering from ALS (Amyotrophic lateral sclerosis-nervous system disease
affect nerve cell in spinal and brain).
 His partner died in Ohio, the couple’s home state, shortly after they were married;
but, because the laws of Ohio did not allow for same-sex marriage, Obergefell could
not be listed as his partner’s surviving spouse on Obergefell’s death certificate.
Obergefell sued with the co-plaintiffs to have his Maryland marriage recognized in
Ohio so that his name could appear on his dead husband’s death certificate.
 Other co-plaintiffs sued for adoption rights as well as for the right not to have their
“marriage stripped from them whenever” they moved between states.

Issue:

Whether the laws making same-sex marriage illegal violated both the Due Process Clause
and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Held:
YES, under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment, same-sex couples have a fundamental right to marry. Moreover, same-sex couples
can exercise the fundamental right to marry in all states. Thus, it follows that there is no lawful
basis for a state to refuse to recognize a lawful same-sex marriage performed in another state on
the ground of its same-sex character.

*Philippine Association of Service Exporters v. Drilon, G.R. No. L-81958, 30 June 1988.

FACTS:

 The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for short), a firm
"engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for
overseas placement," challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1,
 Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of
"GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF
FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS,"
 Through petition for certiorari and prohibition. Specifically, the measure is assailed for
"discrimination against males or females;" that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers
but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills;" and that it is violative of
the right to travel. It is held likewise to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power,
police power being legislative, and not executive, in character.

ISSUE:

WON the assailed department order violated equal protection clause of the constiturion.

RULING:

NO. There is no question that the Department Order No 1 applies only to female contract
workers but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between sexes. There is
strong evidence that women domestic workers are being ill treated abroad in massive
instances. Such is not the case for male workers.

Unquestionably , it is the avowed objective of Department Order No. 1 to “ enhance the

protection of Filipino female Overseas Workers.” This court has no quarrel that in the midst
of the terrible mistreatment Filipina workers have suffered abroad, a ban on deployment
will be for their own good and welfare.PETITION IS DISMISSED

Yrasuegui v. Philippine Airlines, G.R. No. 168801, October 17, 2008

FACTS: This case portrays the peculiar story of an international flight steward who was
dismissed because of his failure to adhere to the weight standards of the airline company.
The proper weight for a man of his height and body structure is from 147 to 166 pounds, the
ideal weight being 166 pounds, as mandated by the Cabin and Crew Administration Manual of
PAL.

In 1984, the weight problem started, which prompted PAL to send him to an extended vacation
until November 1985. He was allowed to return to work once he lost all the excess weight. But
the problem recurred. He again went on leave without pay from October 17, 1988 to February
1989.

Despite the lapse of a ninety-day period given him to reach his ideal weight, petitioner
remained overweight. On January 3, 1990, he was informed of the PAL decision for him to
remain grounded until such time that he satisfactorily complies with the weight standards.
Again, he was directed to report every two weeks for weight checks, which he failed to comply
with.

On April 17, 1990, petitioner was formally warned that a repeated refusal to report for weight
check would be dealt with accordingly. He was given another set of weight check dates, which
he did not report to.
On November 13, 1992, PAL finally served petitioner a Notice of Administrative Charge for
violation of company standards on weight requirements. Petitioner insists that he is being
discriminated as those similarly situated were not treated the same.

On June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that due to his inability to attain his
ideal weight, “and considering the utmost leniency” extended to him “which spanned a period
covering a total of almost five (5) years,” his services were considered terminated “effective
immediately.”

LABOR ARBITER: held that the weight standards of PAL are reasonable in view of the nature
of the job of petitioner. However, the weight standards need not be complied with under pain
of dismissal since his weight did not hamper the performance of his duties.

NLRC affirmed.

CA: the weight standards of PAL are reasonable. Thus, petitioner was legally dismissed because
he repeatedly failed to meet the prescribed weight standards. It is obvious that the issue of
discrimination was only invoked by petitioner for purposes of escaping the result of his
dismissal for being overweight.

ISSUE: WON he was validly dismissed.

HELD: YES
A reading of the weight standards of PAL would lead to no other conclusion than that they
constitute a continuing qualification of an employee in order to keep the job. The dismissal of
the employee would thus fall under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code.

In the case at bar, the evidence on record militates against petitioner’s claims that obesity is a
disease. That he was able to reduce his weight from 1984 to 1992 clearly shows that it is possible
for him to lose weight given the proper attitude, determination, and self-discipline. Indeed,
during the clarificatory hearing on December 8, 1992, petitioner himself claimed that “[t]he
issue is could I bring my weight down to ideal weight which is 172, then the answer is yes. I can
do it now.”

Petitioner has only himself to blame. He could have easily availed the assistance of the company
physician, per the advice of PAL.

In fine, We hold that the obesity of petitioner, when placed in the context of his work as flight
attendant, becomes an analogous cause under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code that justifies his
dismissal from the service. His obesity may not be unintended, but is nonetheless voluntary. As
the CA correctly puts it, “[v]oluntariness basically means that the just cause is solely
attributable to the employee without any external force influencing or controlling his actions.
This element runs through all just causes under Article 282, whether they be in the nature of a
wrongful action or omission. Gross and habitual neglect, a recognized just cause, is considered
voluntary although it lacks the element of intent found in Article 282(a), (c), and (d).”

NOTES:

The dismissal of petitioner can be predicated on the bona fide occupational qualification
defense. Employment in particular jobs may not be limited to persons of a particular sex,
religion, or national origin unless the employer can show that sex, religion, or national origin is
an actual qualification for performing the job. The qualification is called a bona fide
occupational qualification (BFOQ). In short, the test of reasonableness of the company policy is
used because it is parallel to BFOQ. BFOQ is valid “provided it reflects an inherent quality
reasonably necessary for satisfactory job performance.”

The business of PAL is air transportation. As such, it has committed itself to safely transport its
passengers. In order to achieve this, it must necessarily rely on its employees, most particularly
the cabin flight deck crew who are on board the aircraft. The weight standards of PAL should
be viewed as imposing strict norms of discipline upon its employees.

The primary objective of PAL in the imposition of the weight standards for cabin crew is flight
safety.
Separation pay, however, should be awarded in favor of the employee as an act of social justice
or based on equity. This is so because his dismissal is not for serious misconduct. Neither is it
reflective of his moral character

People v. Cayat, G.R. No. L-45987, May 5, 1939

DOCTRINE: Protection of laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. The

classification to be reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the
purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; (4) must apply equally to all
members of the same class.                      

FACTS:
1. Respondent Cayat, native of Baguio, Benguet and a member of the non-Christian tribe
was found guilty of violating sections 2 and 3 of Act No. 1639 for possessing an
intoxicating liquor (one bottle of gin) which is not a native wine.
2. Section 2 of the said act prohibits any native of the Philippines who is a member of the
non-Christian tribe to buy, receive and possess any intoxicating liquor other than their
so-called native wines. Consequently, Section 3 thereof provides for its punishment.
3. Cayat challenges the constitutionality of Act No. 1639 on the grounds that it is
discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws, violative of the due
process and it is an improper exercise of police power.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Act No. 1639 violates the equal protection clause?
RULING:
  No, the Act No. 1639 is not violative of the equal protection clause.
  Equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable
classifications.
 The classification to be reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must
be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing
conditions only; (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.

 Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements . On the first requisite, the classification rests
on real and substantial distinctions. The non-Christian tribes refer not to the religious
belief, but in a way to the geographical and more directly to the natives of the
Philippines of a low grade of civilization. Second, Act No. 1639 was designed to
insure peace and order among the non-Christian tribes. The experience of the past and
the lower court observed that the use of highly intoxicating liquors by the non-
Christian tribes often resulted in lawlessness and crimes, which hamper the efforts of
the Government to raise their standard of life and civilization. Third, the said act is
intended to apply for all times as long as the conditions exist. Legislature
understood that civilization of a people is a slow process and that hand in hand with
it must go measures of protection and security. Fourth, the act applies equally to all
members of same class.

Ormoc Sugar Company v. Treasurer of Ormoc City, G.R. No. L-23794, February 17, 1968

FACTS
Doctrine: For a classification to be valid, it should be applicable to future conditions as well.
1. The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1964, imposing
“on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in
Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to 1% per export sale to the United States of America
and other foreign countries.”
2. Payments for said tax were made, under protest, by Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc.
3. Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed a complaint against the City of Ormoc as well as its
Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor, alleging that the ordinance is unconstitutional for
being violative of the equal protection clause.
4. On the other hand, the defendants asserted that the tax ordinance was within defendant
city’s power to enact under the Local Autonomy Act and that the same did not violate the
afore-cited constitutional limitations.

Issue:
WON the ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of equal protection clause.


RULING:
 Yes, the ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of equal protection clause.
 The equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and
does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification is
reasonable where (1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2)
these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies not only to present
conditions but also to future conditions which are substantially identical to those of the
present; (4) the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class.
 The questioned ordinance does not meet the requisites for a reasonable classification.
 The ordinace taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar
Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing ordinance’s enactment, Ormoc
Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc.
 To be reasonable, it should be applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing
ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established
sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, for the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if
later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance
expressly points only to Ormoc City Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.

Himagan v. People, G.R. No. 113811, October 7, 1994

FACTS: 

 Himagan is a policeman assigned in Camp Catititgan, Davao City.

 He was charged for the murder of and attempted murder. Pursuant to Sec 47 of RA
6975,
 Himagan was placed into suspension pending the murder case. The law provides that
“Upon the filing of a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance against a
member of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years
and one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office
until the case is terminated.
 Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90)
days from arraignment of the accused. Himagan assailed the suspension averring that 
Sec 42 of PD 807 of the Civil Service Decree, that his suspension should be limited to
ninety (90) days. He claims that an imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days
is contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be a violation of his constitutional right to
equal protection of laws.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 47, RA 6975 violates equal protection guaranteed by the
Constitution.
HELD:  No. 
The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of persons
charged criminally or administratively, the application of the rule on preventive suspension
is concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to
harass or intimidate witnesses against them.  
If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post
while his case is pending, his victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to
constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform
and armed. The imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days under Sec 47 of RA
6975 does not violate the suspended policeman’s constitutional right to equal protection of
the laws.

Cruz v. NCIP, G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000

Facts: 

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens
and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions the Indigenous People’s
Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR). The petitioners
assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these amount to an
unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as
minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in
section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

Issue:
Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional.

Held:

As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case
was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same.
Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is
DISMISSED.(Cruz vs Secretary of DENR, GR. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000)

Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, G.R. No. L-25246, September 12, 1974

FACTS:

Victoriano was an employee of the Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. He was a member of the Elizalde
Rope Workers’ Union which had a closed shop agreement with the Company that membership
in the Union shall be required as a condition of employment for all its permanent employees.

Prior to its amendment, Section 4(a)(4) of Republic Act No. 875 allows the employer to require
as a condition of employment membership in a labor organization, if such organization is the
representative of the employees. However, the provision was later amended by the enactment
of Republic Act No. 3350, which reads: … “but such agreement shall not cover members of any
religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization”.

Being a member of a religious sect that prohibits the affiliation of its members with any labor
organization, Victoriano presented his resignation to the Union. In turn, the Union asked the
Company to dismiss Victoriano  from the service in view of the fact that he was resigning from
the Union as a member. This prompted Victoriano to file an action to enjoin the Company and
the Union from dismissing him. The Union assails the constitutionality of RA No. 3350,
contending that it infringes on the fundamental right to form lawful associations guaranteed by
the Bill of Rights. 

ISSUE:

Whether or not RA No. 3550 is unconstitutional for infringing on the fundamental freedom to
form associations.

RULING:

No. As ruled by the Supreme Court:

“RA No. 3350 merely excludes ipso jure  from the application and coverage of the closed shop
agreement the employees belonging to any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their
members with any labor organization. What the exception provides, therefore, is that members
of said religious sects cannot be compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when said
unions have closed shop agreements with the employers; that in spite of any closed shop
agreement, members of said religious sects cannot be refused employment or dismissed from
their jobs on the sole ground that they are not members of the collective bargaining union. It is
clear, therefore, that the assailed Act, far from infringing the constitutional provision on
freedom of association, upholds and reinforces it. It does not prohibit the members of said
religious sects from affiliating with labor unions. It still leaves to said members the liberty and
the power to affiliate, or not to affiliate, with labor unions. If, notwithstanding their religious
beliefs, the members of said religious sects prefer to sign up with the labor union, they can do
so. If in deference and fealty to their religious faith, they refuse to sign up, they can do so; the
law does not coerce them to join; neither does the law prohibit them from joining; and neither
may the employer or labor union compel them to join. Republic Act No. 3350, therefore, does
not violate the constitutional provision on freedom of association.”

International School Alliance of Educators v. Quisumbing, G.R. No. 128845, June 1, 2000

FACTS: International School Alliance of Educators (the School) hires both foreign and local
teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-
hires.

In which, the School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires including
housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, home leave travel allowance and  a salary rate
25% more than local hires based on “significant economic disadvantages”

The labor union and the collective bargaining representative of all faculty members of the
School, contested the difference in salary rates between foreign and local-hires. 

The Union claims that the point-of-hire classification employed by the School is discriminatory
to Filipinos and that the grant of higher salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial
discrimination.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Union can invoke the equal protection clause to justify its claim of
parity.

RULING: Yes. Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and
responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries.

If an employer accords employees the same position and rank, the presumption is that these
employees perform equal work. If the employer pays one employee less than the rest, it is not
for that employee to explain why he receives less or why the others receive more. That would
be adding insult to injury.

The employer in this case has failed to discharge this burden. There is no evidence here that
foreign-hires perform 25% more efficiently or effectively than the local-hires. Both groups
have similar functions and responsibilities, which they perform under similar working
conditions.

The Court finds the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the
distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification .
There is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-
hires.

Estrada v. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001

FACTS:  Petitioner Joseph Estrada was prosecuted under RA 7080 (Plunder Law). He assailed,
however, that the Plunder Law does not constitute an indictable offense because of its failure to
provide for the statutory definition of the terms "combination" and "series" in the key phrase "a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts", and the word "pattern".

These omissions, according to Estrada, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being
impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him, hence, violative of his fundamental right to due process. 

ISSUE:  Whether or not RA 7080 is unconstitutional for being vague 

DECISION:No   

   The Plunder Law is not unconstitutional for being vague. Congress is not restricted in
the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define the words employed in a
statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the
legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly
expressed in the Plunder Law.

The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that a statute which either forbids or requires the
doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law. The
overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that "a governmental purpose may not be
achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of
protected freedoms. The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines apply only to free speech cases,
but not to penal statutes. 

Central Bank Employees v. Bangko Sentral, G.R. No. 148208, December 15, 2004

Facts: The New Central Bank Act abolished the old Central Bank and created the new BSP on
RA No 7653. Central Bank Employees Association assailed the provision of RA No 7653, Art II
Sec 15(c). They contend that it makes an unconstitutional cut between two classes of employees
in the BSP, viz:
(1) the BSP officers as exempt class of Salary Standardization Law (RA 6758) and
(2) the rank-and-file non-exempt class.
BSP contends that the exemption of officers (SG 20 and above) from the SSL was intended to
address the BSP’s lack of competitiveness in terms of attracting competent officers and
executives. It was not intended to discriminate against the rank-and-file.
Issue: Whether or not Section 15(c) violates equal protection right of the BSP r&f employees?
Decision: Sec 15(c) unconstitutional. Judicial notice that other Govt Financial Institution
undertook amendment of their charters from 1995 to 2004 – a blanket provision for all
employees to be covered by SSL. The said subsequent enactments constitute significant changes
in circumstance that considerably alter the reasonability of the continued operation of the last
proviso of Section 15(c). Legal history shows that GFIs have long been recognized as comprising
one distinct class, separate from other governmental entities. There is no substantial distinctions
so as to differentiate, the BSP rank-and-file from the other rank-and-file of the seven GFIs. The
equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality but it requires that all persons shall
be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced. Those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion;
whatever restrictions cast on some in the group is equally binding on the rest. It is clear that the
enactment of the seven subsequent charters has rendered the continued application of the
challenged proviso anathema to the equal protection of the law, and the same should be
declared as an outlaw.

Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., G.R. No. 167614, March 24, 2009

FACTS:

Antonio Serrano (petitioner), a Filipino seafarer, was hired by Gallant Maritime Services, Inc.
and Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd. (respondents) under a Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA)-approved Contract of Employment.

During the petitioner’s departure for work, he was constrained to accept a downgraded
employment contract for the position of Second Officer with a monthly salary of US$1,000.00,
upon the assurance and representation of respondents that he would be made Chief Officer

Respondent did not deliver on their promise to make Serrano as a Chief Officer

The Arguments of Petitioner

Petitioner contends that the subject clause is unconstitutional because

(2) It also impinges on the equal protection clause, for it treats OFWs differently from local
Filipino workers (local workers) by putting a cap on the amount of lump-sum salary to which
OFWs are entitled in case of illegal dismissal, while setting no limit to the same monetary award
for local workers when their dismissal is declared illegal; that the disparate treatment

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the subject clause violate Section 1,Article III of the Constitution, and Section
18,Article II and Section 3, Article XIII on labor as a protected sector

HELD:

2. YES. Section 1, Article III of the Constitution guarantees:

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law nor shall
any person be denied the equal protection of the law.

Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII accord all members of the labor sector, without
distinction as to place of deployment, full protection of their rights and welfare.

Such rights are not absolute. To be valid, the classification must comply with these
requirements: 1) it is based on substantial distinctions; 2) it is germane to the purposes of the
law; 3) it is not limited to existing conditions only; and 4) it applies equally to all members of
the class.

To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional provisions
translate to economic security and parity: all monetary benefits should be equally enjoyed by
workers of similar category, while all monetary obligations should be borne by them in
equal degree; none should be denied the protection of the laws which is enjoyed by, or
spared the burden imposed on, others in like circumstances.