Dynamic Research Journals

Journal of Economics and Finance (DRJ-JEF)

Volume 6 ~ Issue 1 (January, 2021) pp: 17-23
ISSN (Online): 2520-7490
www.dynamicresearchjournals.org

Exploring the Impact of Neopatrimonialism Dominance in Africa

Wellington G. Bonga
Department of Banking & Finance, Great Zimbabwe University, Zimbabwe.

Abstract: States in Africa have registered insignificant prosperity in the post-colonisation era. External and
internal factors have been blamed for development path registered by many nations. Among the cited internal
factors, little has been said about neopatrimonial regimes dominating Africa. Well, the probable reason may be
that existing political rulers may never criticise their actions, as it comes from their inside agenda.
Neopatrimonialism has dominated many African states, though at varying degrees. The regime has diverted from
the much needed democracy to a patrimonial regime blended in modern state. Neopatrimonialism takes many
forms for different nations, and has differing impacts as well. Neopatrimonialism as a concept can be applied to
a number of different regime types whether they be multi-party democracies, single-party systems, personal
dictatorships, “plebiscitary”, or military oligarchies. Neopatrimonialism is regarded as a dominant feature of
the developing countries of Africa, being seen as a core feature of local politics in Sub-Saharan Africa. Latin
America, the Middle East and Southern Europe has also registered neopatrimonialism, but its use has never
achieved such unanimity as in Africa. The foundation of neopatrimonialism in Africa derived from the experiences
of colonialism combined with the precolonial style of administration. Neopatrimonialism has the capacity of
diverting public resources to serve private interests rather than enlightened interests. Resource distribution in
neopatrimonial systems is always motivated by the patron’s incentive to ensure incumbency. Neopatrimonialism
is directly linked to corruption and damage the long term culture of democracy. The study showed the dominance
of neopatrimonialism in Africa, its impact to revenue collection, income distribution, rule of law, weakening of
institutions, investment promotion, human rights, information access, public sector performance among other
social and economic concerns. The study explains that no meaningful development will be achieved in Africa
when strong form of neopatrimonialism exist. The study suggest genuine political and economic reforms to be
undertaken. Power have to be taken out of the hands of the state and given to the people, where it belongs. The
reforms comes in the form of democratization, market liberalization, decentralization or diffusion of power, and
the adoption of power-sharing arrangements. Given variations in neopatrimonialism across African countries, it
is very crucial that policy makers and practitioners should not equate all institutions to be functioning in a
neopatrimonial way.
Key words: Africa, Clientelism, Colonialism, Corruption, Democracy, Imperialism, Neopatrimonialism,
Patrimonialism, Politics, Post-colonialism, Rent-seeking.
JEL Codes: D63, D72, D73, E21, E22, F51, F54, H53, H62, J71, K42, N47, P16, P48, P51.

Introduction
Africa's deteriorating economic situation is baffling (Ayittey, 2018). Economic performance for the
continent remains dismal and prospects for future are bleak. A continent with natural resource abundance and
potential is inexorably mired in steaming squalor, misery, deprivation, and chaos (Ayittey, 2018). Most of the
economic and social challenges bedevilling the continent are blamed on soaring corruption levels, which exist in
many forms and varying degrees. Millions of dollars are lost each day through corrupt activities, yet such amounts
if channelled to productive use could yield a lot for the betterment of respective states (Bonga, 2021).
From the past decades after the end of colonialism era the common form of corruption in Africa is
neopatrimonialism. Neopatrimonialism is often used as a synonym for corruption, clientelism, patronage,
cronyism, nepotism, the “big man” syndrome, godfatherism, warlordism, capture, predation, kleptocracy,
prebendal regime, etc (Peter, 1992). Some researchers would however, argue equating neopatrimonialism to
corruption as synonyms. Essentially neopatrimonialism refers to patrimonial practices taking place in the context
of a ‘modern’ state (Hyden, 2000). Due to its dominance in Africa, Spirin and Lührmann (2018) defined
neopatrimonialism as form of rule commonly associated with ineffective governance in Africa.
Neopatrimonialism is said to account for trade policies, hyperinflation, economic stagnation, low
investment in infrastructure, urban bias, and ultimately, the lack of economic development in Africa (Mkandawire,
2015). Neopatrimonialism is decorated corruption related to patrons and their allies. Patrons are typically office-
holders who use public funds or their position of power to build a personal following (Phiri and Edriss, 2013).
The dynamics and prevalence of neopatrimonialism in Africa at the end of colonialism has been well documented
(Boas, 2001; deGrassi, 2008; Erdmann & Engel, 2006; Hansen, 2003; Mamdani, 1996). Neopatrimonialism takes

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 Exploring the Impact of Neopatrimonialism Dominance in Africa

many forms and exist in various scales for different countries. The concept of neopatrimonialism is
multidimensional because it is multidisciplinary (Laruelle, 2012).
The end of colonialism was to mark the birth of democracy in Africa. Notable democracy was never
attained in the post-colonial era in African states. The neopatrimonial clientelism that has dominated post-colonial
Africa is deeply incompatible with democratic politics (Van de Walle, 2007). Corruption levels started to rise and
bad politics later emerged instead, thereby impacting the respective economies’ growth paths. The African Union
Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption was adopted in Maputo (11 July 2003) to fight booming
political corruption in Africa. According to Bonga (2014), the convention represented regional consent on what
countries should do in the areas of preventing corruption, criminalization corrupt individuals, international
collaboration and asset retrieval. The national economic development in Africa is therefore dependent on Africans
‘getting their politics right’ (Fritz and Rocha, 2006). As indicated by Francisco (2010), the significance of
neopatrimonialism and the extent to which it has permeated African politics requires deep exploration.

Birth of Neopatrimonialism in Africa

There is a preponderant view among scholars, individuals, professionals, and business interests that
corruption is responsible for an array of socioeconomic development failures, political instability, infrastructure
decay, institutional fragility, low investment, and poor democratic consolidation in many postcolonial African
states (Szeftel, 2000). During colonialism/imperialism there was believed to exist leadership that refused to take
responsibility for their own failures, being the colonisers. According to Ayittey (2018), a new and angry generation
of Africans emerged, who engineered a paradigm shift toward internal factors: misguided leadership,
misgovernance, systemic corruption, capital flight, economic mismanagement, declining investment, collapsed
infrastructure, decayed institutions, senseless civil wars, political tyranny, flagrant violations of human rights, and
military vandalism, among others. The new generation was successful in ending colonialism in Africa, though at
different dates. Since the end of the colonial era, successive governments in Africa have expressed great concern
about anticorruption, and this was reflected in the promises in their inaugural broadcasts, speeches, and programs
to tackle corruption, and in their genuine or perfunctory attempts to implement anticorruption policy (Oarhe,
2013). By the look of things, decades after end of colonial rule, the objective is yet to be achieved. It has taken
long, and it seems very hard to attain. Among the reasons, there lies neopatrimonialism which may never be talked
of by the participants of the regime. The blame is given to other factors, which on their own are less significant
than those brought about by neopatrimonial rule prevailing.
The post-colonial leadership, with few exceptions, established defective political and economic systems
in which enormous power was concentrated in the hands of the state and ultimately one individual (Ayittey, 2018).
Colonialism can no longer suffice alone as a scapegoat to point a finger at for our stagnation (Mahuni, Taru and
Bonga, 2020). The agenda of ending the colonial rule was to protect the African nation against foreign
exploitation, and hence attaining independence. This motive was never met as it led to the emerging of vampire
states in Africa, where the government is totally divorced from the people and there exist politics of exclusion.
Because of the focus on exploitation, no attention was paid to how to make the colony self-sufficient after
independence (Vlavonou, 2016). Ayittey (2018) indicated that what exists in many African countries is a
“vampire" or "pirate state" -- a government hijacked by a phalanx of gangsters, thugs and crooks who use the
instruments of the state to enrich themselves, their cronies and tribesmen. Cammack (2007) added that
governments tend to be unresponsive to their citizens in these sorts of states – i.e., there is little accountability or
transparency. Attempts to hinder corruption by donor reforms have proved unsuccessful (Szeftel, 2007). However,
post-colonial Africa has continued to be an arena of external assistance and paternalism (Mahuni, et. al, 2020).

Components of Neopatrimonialism
Van de Walle (2007) supported that neopatrimonialism have three constituent components. The
components are presented in Figure 1 below;
Figure 1: Components of Neopatrimonialism

From Figure 1 above the constituent components of neopatrimonialism are presidentialism, systematic
clientelism and fiscal resources. Presidentialism means that the regimes places one man, the president, largely

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 Exploring the Impact of Neopatrimonialism Dominance in Africa

above the law and never subject to checks and balances. In mature democracies executives are subject to checks
and balances. In stable polities, complementary formal and informal institutions usually govern the political rules
of the game (O’Neil, 2007).
Systematic clientelism – the regime relies on the clientelism by the president and his immediate followers
so as to uphold the status quo and safeguard political stability. The neopatrimonial systems depend on on the fiscal
resources of a modern state to provide the resources that are distributed following a clientelist logic.
Neopatrimonial continuity in the country is evidenced by three factors; the concentration of political
power, the award of personal favours and the misuse of state resources (Von Soest, 2006). Sigman and Lindberg
(2017), however, have a view that there is a large amount of variation in neopatrimonialism across African
political regimes both in terms of the level of neopatrimonialism across countries and the specific configurations
of the three main dimensions of neopatrimonial rule.

Enhanced Neopatrimonialism: Fiscal Capacity and Regulatory Capacity

Clientelism exist more when political actors have the ability to use the preferential allocation of resources
over which they have discretion for political advantage. According to Van de Walle (2007), state structures with
any degree of either fiscal or regulatory capacity will have discretionary resources at their disposal. However,
neopatrimonial states are distinguished by the presence of multiple and contradictory rules or institutions (O’Neil,
2007).
The fiscal capacity will provide state agents with resources to redistribute. Phiri and Edriss (2013)
observed that a neopatrimonial regime makes the government a transfer pump through which those in government
leadership collect government resources and distribute them to their supporters. Resource distribution in
neopatrimonial systems is always motivated by the patron’s incentive to ensure incumbency (Nawaz, 2008).
The regulatory capacity allows the regime the ability to regulate the provision of goods and services and
this gives them discretion over the allocation of those goods and services. A peculiar system of governance now
pervades Africa, where the primordial instinct of the ruling elite is to loot the national treasury, perpetuate
themselves in power and brutally suppress all dissent and opposition (Ayittey, 2018).
By having both the fiscal capacity and the regulatory capacity the neopatrimonial regime will be very
strong. Ruling parties in African states have such capacities hence they rule above the law with little worry as
they determine the path of the economy. Pressures from the Western institutions like the World Bank causes the
African states to adhere to democratic practices, but the pressures have limited influence.

Neopatrimonialism and public sector capacity and performance

The public sector is a crucial sector for development of the economy. The public sector is pivotal both
to the day-to-day operation of the state and to its ability to effectively manage development processes and provide
universal public goods and services (O’Neil, 2007). Government workers partake important roles as gatekeepers,
policy-makers, implementers and distributors. Civil servant are intermediaries between politicians and the general
population in the country. Allocation and distribution of resources and enforcement of rules is the work of civil
servants.
The core physiognomies of neopatrimonialism have fundamental repercussions for the association
between civil servants and political elites for public resources use. Due to the effect of politics certain bad practices
become systemic and accepted. Observed in neopatrimonial regimes are political and patronage based
appointments in critical public positions with no merit considered. When corrupt custodians of state power give
preference to members of their own tribe in recruitment for strategic positions and awarding of contracts, in order
to remain relevant and to realize their personal interests, an anticorruption drive is undermined (Oarhe, 2013).
Neopatrimonial systems are known for undermining the capacity of the civil servants to make and
implement policies, to manage the economy and to undertake routine tasks. The efficiency of the public sector is
heavily affected by political interference. There will be no independence of the bureaucrats hence no efficiency.
In support of the facts, O’Neil (2007) indicated that the social and political conditions that have necessitated
neopatrimonial forms of governance in Africa have therefore also meant that the public sector is vulnerable to
informal institutions and practices in ways that have undermined the development of a professional bureaucratic
culture and ethic.
The public sector in African states has become microcosms of hybridity. Bureaucratic rules, procedures
and codes of practice are there but informal pressures cause them to act in ways that violate the set standards.
There exist gaps between official regulations and daily practices.

Neopatrimonialism and Tax Administration

Tax is one source of revenue for African states. Neopatrimonialism leads to political interference in tax
administration, which in conjunction with other factors reduces state revenue (Von Soest, Bechle and Korte,
2011). In a separate study Von Soest (2006) indicated that informal politics of the rulers infringe on the collection
of taxes and in turn reduce state revenues. Where influence exist, the efficient flow of activities will be greatly

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affected. Inefficiency may come from the placement of unqualified tax officers, who fill patronage positions. This
is related to the militarization which is very common in Africa. When someone who is not professionally qualified
for a post is allowed to take the position it becomes a challenge from incompetent decisions, implementation of
appropriate tasks, relationship with other professionals, hence demotivation of other staff members among other
challenges.
The executives of many Revenue Authorities, just like other institutions of influence, in Africa are linked
to the ruling elites, have leaders being appointed to the posts by the president or where there is no appointment
they are employed through recommendations from the elites. Revenue loss will also come from neopatrimonial
interference with the tax administration’s day‐to‐day business, and this may be done in order to prevent audits at
businesses that enjoy political protection or to harass opponents of the dominating political elite (Von Soest et.
al, 2011). Due to such influences tax revenues in African states remain lower than what should be collected when
states are free from neopatrimonialism regimes.

Anti-Corruption Efforts and Neopatrimonialism

Given that neopatrimonialism is one form of corruption with effects to economic growth and stability, it
has to be addressed. Corruption is a logical outcome of neopatrimonialism (O’Neil, 2007). Many nations in Africa
has set an anti-corruption body whose mandate is to address issues of corruption in the respective economies. The
eight recognized regional blocs by the African Union has corruption reduction as one of the agenda, indicating
the need to address corruption for a better Africa. Regional integration has been expected to bring benefits to
member states (Bonga, 2021). In a separate study Bonga and Mahuni (2018) narrated that many countries have
formed regional as well as international trading blocs in an attempt to enhance economic growth and maximise
welfare of each member state.
Anticorruption efforts are based on clearly articulated rules governing official conduct (Oarhe, 2013).
However, corruption pointers, like Corruption Perception Index (CPI) reported annually by Transparency
International shows high prevalence of corruption in African states, having it hard to harness. African political
elites now use anti-corruption campaigns as a device to legitimise their own corrupt practices (Soest, 2007).
Successive governments have only used the quest to address corruption as a trump card to gain majority for
nomination into office (Mahuni et. al, 2020). One issue why this may be so is the presence of neopatrimonial
regimes in the African economies.
With neopatrimonial regimes, institutions like the Anti-corruption bodies are ineffective to address grand
corruption as it is done by patrons and their allies. Bonga (2021) indicated that embezzlement and grand corruption
comes from networks of big people in the society, and these are more damaging to economic development and
resource allocation. A number of solidarity networks exist for the allies making corruption more spread. This has
led corruption to become both generalised and banalised in Africa (O’Neil, 2007). Powerful politicians paralyses
the anti-corruption institutions and overally they are never autonomous. Anti-corruption in this case concentrate
on petty corruption living the more damaging acts of corruption.
Also the institutions are militarized to ensure that they work to the requirements of the political regime.
To achieve their nefarious objectives of self-aggrandizement and self-perpetuation in power, the ruling elite take
over and subvert every key institution of government: the civil service, judiciary, military, media, banking and
even various commissions with lofty ideals that are supposed to be non-partisan and neutral -- press/media
commission, human rights commission, and commission on civic education (Ayittey, 2018).
The public no longer have faith in the Anti-corruption institutions to undertake their mandate. Lack of
transparency in an anticorruption drive is likely to result in public ignorance, loss of credibility, and popular
perception of it as merely impressionistic (Oarhe, 2013). Neopatrimonialism weakens institutions heavily.
According to Masenya (2017), South Africa is stuck in corruption, although it has many anticorruption laws,
commissions, and agencies that seeks to curb transgression, misuse of state resources, looting and using state
resources for personal gain. South Africa, has a constitutional democracy that is globally celebrated more than
many other states in Africa, but within it state elites are openly accused of crony capitalism and tenderpreneurship.

Private Investment and Neopatrimonialism

Private investment is a contributor to economic growth, and this enables a country to address issues of
poverty to improve lives of its citizens, among other benefits. The quality of governance directly affects the level
and nature of private investment in a country (Emery, 2003). For significant investment benefits a positive
investment climate is necessary to attract huge flows of investment as well as maintaining high growth rates that
are consistent. According to Bonga and Mahuni (2018) the ‘toxic’ business environments prevailing in Africa
have resulted in major investments favouring other regions in the world where environments are much conducive.
Neopatrimonialism shrinks “economic opportunities” through “exclusionary” patronage systems and clientelism
while rent-seeking often has further negative effects on the economy, making it less attractive for investment
(Bratton and Van de Walle, 1994; Chabal, 2009).

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Because of neopatrimonial regimes dominating Africa the cost of doing business is high due to
corruption. There exist corruption in the granting of licenses and permits. Emery (2003) also observed that
corruption or favoritism is found in the collection of tax revenues from business, and also there exist corruption
or arbitrary enforcement of business regulations, such as labor, environmental, and other standards.
Neopatrimonialism has greatly affected the investment climate in Africa. Naturally, investors shy away
from states where they have no recourse to honest police or fair courts to protect their interests; lack of investment
completes the vicious politics-economy circle by keeping the nation from progressing economically (Cammack,
2007). Genuine investors rank Africa as a high risk area for investments especially in the longer term.

Neopatrimonialism and Society Organisations

Where neopatrimonialism exist governments will go out of their way to crush civil society organisations
(NGOs, church groups, trade unions, etc.) and their initiatives if they are seen as threatening (Cammack, 2007).
To silence and weaken society organisations, they are forced to register with government, and to declare formally
not to be political or to accept donor funding. In many cases in Africa, NGO leaders are often viewed as political
rivals.
Neopatrimonial regimes have gone as far as forming their own NGOs; in this case loyalists are employed
and the funding comes from state coffers. Similarly there exist refusal to register new broadcasters, independent
radio stations, and independent media. In many African states privately owned and truly independent media are
few and weak.

Neopatrimonialism and “The Parliament”

Parliament make laws for the peace, order and good government of respective states. The role of
Parliament is to legislate, to scrutinize the policies and activities of the Executive, to hold the Executive to account
for its actions and to act as a forum for democratic participation by all members of society. These core functions
have evolved over millennia and in their present form; they chiefly comprise legislation, consent to taxation and
control of public expenditure, debate on government policy and scrutiny of government administration.
Parliaments in neopatrimonial states of Africa are generally weak. Parliaments are weak because real
decision making is done outside formal institutions, though some individual member of parliaments, because of
their familiarity with the president, may be exceptionally powerful (Cammack, 2007). Cammack (2007) further
indicated that parliaments in Africa rarely initiate independent-minded legislation or reject policies coming from
the president; instead they tend to rubber-stamp the initiatives. Parliamentary weakness also comes from the fact
that politicians largely account upwards rather than downwards to their constituents.

Rule of Law and Human Rights, Income Equality in Neopatrimonial States

Cromwell and Chintedza (2005) in their study narrated that the authority of the ruling regime depends
on the distribution of socio-economic resources to clients, rather than on “legal-rational” mechanisms such as the
rule of law, meritocracy and political accountability. In a well functional democracy the judiciary is chief to the
rule of law. In hybrid states of Africa judicial independence is under threat as courts are deliberately
underresourced, judges’ wages and pensions are at risk, individual justices are threatened with dismissal or worse,
and tame judges are appointed to key positions (Cammack, 2007).
The judiciary is not autonomous from politics, they cannot act independently. In support Nawaz (2008)
indicated that neopatrimonialism damages long-term development of democratic accountability in a country by
eroding the effectiveness and credibility of democratic institutions. In many African states workers in public
prosecutors’ and attorney generals’ offices, as well as in law commissions and ombudsmen’s offices, are also
threatened and have to submit hence losing independence.
Human rights abuse is a serious challenge in neopatrimonial states of Africa. Common in Africa are
arrests without warrants, detentions and physical attacks and threats of political opponents. The most targeted
suffering abuse are newspaper editors, opposition politicians, NGO leaders and staff belonging to these groups
among others.
There is no objective of income equality in neopatrimonial states. A notable feature of neopatrimonial
systems is high income inequality, where the "ins" of the system benefit disproportionately compared to the "outs"
(Nawaz, 2008).

Access to Information
Access to information in neopatrimonial systems is severely curtailed. Nawaz (2008) narrated that the
constituents are often not even aware of how much right to resources they have, which constrains their ability to
demand their fair share from their leaders. The state owned media in the countries usually staffed by cronies of
the ruling party are dedicated to circulating propaganda on behalf of leaders leaving issues such as corruption in
the executives and resource distribution inequalities. Moreover, due to lack of information the public are
convinced by the voting criteria by neopatrimonial system. The truth is that neopatrimonial systems weaken

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political opposition and thereby limit voter choices at election time. As supported by Masenya (2017) voting is
not an effective accountability mechanism in the long run. According to Sigman and Lindberg (2017)
neopatrimonial democracy has been (controversially) associated with a range of (mostly undesirable) social,
political and economic outcomes. Those that do not belong to clientelist networks suffer a significant lack of voice
in policy processes (Cromwell and Chintedza, 2005).

Conclusion
Africa is a continent full of potential from many decades ago. Resource utilisation for the economic and
social benefits of the natives has never been fully administered. Both internal and external factors have been
identified to have a cause in the failure of Africa to prosper in a more stable manner. The current study
concentrated on the factor that is usually left unmentioned as a cause of development stagnation due to political
reasons, neopatrimonialism. The study provide an answer to the question; why are some government
bureaucracies staffed by public servants, while others are packed with cronies, bosses, and rent-seekers?
Neopatrimonial states prevail in Africa, though with differing degrees, some states being worse than others.
Neopatrimonialism is found in many forms and changes shapes with time depending on variables of effect.
Pressures do exist from institutions like the World Bank, IMF, African Union for African states to adhere to
democratic principles. Several reforms have been recommended to ensure human exploitation is minimised within
these neopatrimonial regimes. In some cases economic sanctions are imposed on some leaders who are not
implementing appropriate reforms for the benefit of the respective socities. However, economic sanctions have
proved to impact the citizens more than the ruling elites.
Having identified neopatrimonialism as an impediment to Africa’s prosperity, a solution should be
suggested. Genuine political reforms are the solution. Africa's gangster state must be reformed. Power have to be
taken out of the hands of the state and given to the people, where it belongs. To attain favourable results, both
political and economic reform should be effected. The reforms comes in the form of democratization, market
liberalization, decentralization or diffusion of power, and the adoption of power-sharing arrangements.
Exclusion politics have to substitute inclusion politics. Unjustified civil wars in Africa must end. Weak
state institutions should be appropriately granted autonomy, transparency, accountability and professionalism
should prevail in them.
If these reforms are successful, they will help establish in Africa an environment conductive to
investment and economic activity. Genuine, long lasting Investment is the way out of Africa’s economic miasma
or the key to economic growth and poverty reduction. As observed by Ayittey (2018), the current Africa’s
environment of chaos, famine, diseases, civil wars, coups, dictatorships, social disorder, corruption and collapsed
infrastructure repels foreign investment.
The study has generalised Africa, however, it has to be mentioned that some states are better performing
than others. Some nations have weaker institutions than others, corruption levels as measured by Transparency
International differs significantly among other nations. Some nations in Africa have changed leadership more than
others, hence are on different phases of neopatrimonialism than others within Africa.
Given variations in neopatrimonialism across African countries, it is very crucial that policy makers and
practitioners should not equate all institutions to be functioning in a neopatrimonial way. There is greater need to
develop a nuanced understanding of when, where and how neopatrimonialism manifests itself within a state.
Important to note is that democracy can persist and advance, where clientelism, corruption and strong presidents
prevail. However, as indicated by Mahuni et al, (2020), countries would not develop much given, alarming
corruption levels, regional inequalities, poverty and unemployment despite exhibiting much potential.

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