Philippine Airlines v.

Savillo
G.R. No. 149547, July 4, 2008

FACTS:
Savillo was a judge of the RTC of Iloilo. He was invited to participate in the 1993 ASEAN Seniors Annual Golf
Tournament in Jakarta Indonesia. So, in order to take part in such event, he purchased a ticket from PAL with the
following itinerary: Manila-Singapore-Jakarta-Singapore-Manila. PAL would take them from Manila to Singapore,
while Singapore Airlines would take them from Singapore to Jakarta. When they arrived in Singapore, Singapore
Airlines rejected the tickets of Savillo because they were not endorsed by PAL. It was explained that if Singapore
Airlines honoured the tickets without PALS’ endorsement, PAL would not pay Singapore Airlines for their passage.
Savillo demanded compensation from both PAL and Singapore Airlines, but his efforts were futile.

He then sued PAL after 3 years, demanding moral damages. PAL, in its MTD, claimed that the cause of action
has already prescribed invoking the Warsaw Convention (providing for a 2 year prescriptive period). Both RTC and
CA ruled against PAL.

ISSUE:
What is the applicable law, the Civil Code or the Warsaw Convention? Has the action prescribed?

RULING:
The Civil Code is applicable. Therefore the action has not yet prescribed for the prescription period is 4 years. If
cause of action claims moral damages, not covered by Warsaw Convention. Article 19 of the Warsaw Convention
provides for liability on the part of a carrier for “damages occasioned by delay in the transportation by air of
passengers, baggage or goods. Article 24 excludes other remedies by further providing that “(1) in the cases covered by
articles 18 and 19, any action for damages, however founded, can only be brought subject to the conditions and limits
set out in this convention.” Therefore, a claim covered by the Warsaw Convention can no longer be recovered under
local law, if the statute of limitations of two years has elapsed.

Nevertheless, this Court notes that jurisprudence in the Philippines and the United States also recognizes that
the Warsaw Convention does not “exclusively regulate” the relationship between passenger and carrier on an
international flight.

In U.S. v. Uy, this Court distinguished between the (1) damage to the passenger’s baggage and (2) humiliation
he suffered at the hands of the airline’s employees. The First cause of action was covered by the Warsaw Convention
which prescribes in two years, while the second was covered by the provisions of the Civil Code on torts, which
prescribes in four years.

In the Petition at bar, Savillo’s Complaint alleged that both PAL and Singapore Airlines were guilty of gross
negligence, which resulted in his being subjected to “humiliation, embarrassment, mental anguish, serious anxiety, fear
and distress” therefore this case is not covered by the Warsaw Convention. When the negligence happened before the
performance of the contract of carriage, not covered by the Warsaw Convention. Also, this case is comparable to
Lathigra v. British Airways. In that case, it was held that the airlines’ negligent act of reconfirming the passenger’s
reservation days before departure and failing to inform the latter that the flight had already been discontinued is not
among the acts covered by the Warsaw Convention, since the alleged negligence did not occur during the performance
of the contract of carriage but, rather, days before the scheduled flight.

In the case at hand, Singapore Airlines barred Savillo from boarding the Singapore Airlines flight because PAL
allegedly failed to endorse the tickets of private respondent and his companions, despite PAL’s assurances to Savillo
that Singapore Airlines had already confirmed their passage. While this fact still needs to heard and established by
adequate proof before the RTC, an action based on these allegations will not fall under the Warsaw Convention, since
the purported negligence on the party of PAL did not occur during the performance of the contract of carriage but days
before the scheduled flight. Thus, the present action cannot be dismissed based on the Statue of Limitations provided
under Article 29 of the Warsaw Convention.

AMERICAN AIRLINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND SALAS

G.R No. 116044-45, March 9, 2000
FACTS:
Private respondent purchased from Singapore Airlines in Manila conjunction tickets from Manila-Singapore-
Athens-Larnaca-Rome-Turin-Zurich-Geneva-Copenhagen-New York. In Geneva, he decided to forego his trip
to Copenhagen and go straight to New York. In the absence of a direct flight under his conjunction tickets from Geneva
to New York, he exchanged the unused portion of the conjunction ticket for a one way ticket from Geneva to New York
from American Airlines, which issued its own ticket to respondent in Geneva and claimed the value of the unused
portion of the conjunction ticket from the International Air Transport Association (IATA) clearing house in Geneva. In
September, 1989, respondent filed an action for damages before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu for the alleged
embarrassment and mental anguish he suffered at the Geneva Airport when American Airline’s security officers
prevented him from boarding the plane.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the issuance of American Airlines of a new ticket in exchange of the conjunction ticket the
respondent purchased in Manila bar him from seeking recourse in Philippine courts.

RULING:
The petitioner contends that under Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention, action for damages may only be brought
upon the following courts:
a.) Domicile of the carrier
b.) Carrier’s principal place of business
c.) Place where carrier has a place of business
d.) Place of destination

Since neither of these elements is present in the case, the petitioner contends that plaintiff cannot file the case in the
Philippines. He further posits that the second contract cannot be deemed as an extension of the first as the
petitioner airline is not a participating airline in any of the destinations under the first contract.

Respondent on the other hand contends that the second contract she entered into at Geneva is part and parcel of the
first contract, thus the third option under Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention would apply to him. He further pointed
out that petitioner cannot deny the contract of agency with Singapore Airlines after it honored the conjunction tickets
issued by the latter.

The court ruled that petitioner’s argument is void of merit with reference to Article 1(3) of the Warsaw Convention.
According to the said article, transportation to be performed by several carriers shall be deemed as one and undivided.
The number of tickets issued does not detract from the oneness of the contract of carriage. Hence, the third option of
the plaintiff under Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention is clothed with jurisdiction.

UNITED AIRLINES vs. UY

G.R. No. 127768, November 19, 1999

FACTS:
On October 13, 1989, respondent, a passenger of United Airlines, checked in together with his luggage one
piece of which was found to be overweight at the airline counter. To his utter humiliation, an employee of petitioner
rebuked him saying that he should have known the maximum weight allowance per bag and that he should have
packed his things accordingly. Then, in a loud voice in front of the milling crowd, she told respondent to repair his
things and transfer some of them to the light ones. Respondent acceded but his luggage was still overweight. Petitioner
billed him overweight charges but its employee reused to honor the miscellaneous charges under MCD which he
offered to pay with. Not wanting to leave without his luggage, he paid with his credit card.

Upon arrival in manila, he discovered that one of his bags had been slashed and its contents stolen. In a letter
dated October 16, 1989, he notified petitioner of his loss and requested reimbursement. Petitioner paid for his loss
based on the maximum liability per pound. Respondent considered the amount grossly inadequate. He sent two more
letters to petition but to no avail. On June 9, 1992, respondent filed a complaint for damages against petitioner Airline.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint invoking the provisions of Article 29 of the Warsaw Convention.
Respondent countered that according to par. 2 of Article 29, “the method of calculating the period of limitation shall be
determined by the law of the court to which the case is submitted.”
ISSUES:
1) Does the Warsaw Convention preclude the operation of the Civil Code and other pertinent laws?
2) Has the respondent’s cause of action prescribed?

RULING:
NO. Within our jurisdiction we have held that the Warsaw Convention can be applied, or ignored, depending
on the peculiar facts presented by each case. Convention provisions do not regulate or exclude liabilities for other
breaches of contract by the carrier or misconduct of its officers and employees, or for some particular or exceptional
type of damage. Neither may the Convention be invoked to justify the disregard of some extraordinary type of
damage. Neither may the Convention be invoked to justify the disregard of some extraordinary sort of damage
resulting to a passenger and preclude recovery therefore3 beyond the limits et by said convention. Likewise, we have
held that the Convention does not preclude the operation of the Civil Code and other pertinent laws. It does not
regulate, much less exempt, the carrier from liability for damages for violating the rights of its passengers under the
contract of carriage, especially if willful misconduct on the part of the carriers employees is found or established.

NO. While his 2nd cause of action (an action for damages arising from theft or damage to property or goods) is
well within the bounds of the Warsaw convention, his 1st cause of action (an action for damages arising from the
misconduct of the airline employees and the violation of respondent’s rights as passengers) clearly is not.

The 2-yr limitation incorporated in Art. 29 of the Warsaw Convention as an absolute bar to suit and not to be
made subject to the various tolling provisions of the laws of the forum, forecloses the application of our own rules on
interruption of prescriptive periods. Since, it is indisputable that respondent filed the present action beyond the 2-yr
time frame his 2nd cause of action must be barred.

However, it is obvious that respondent was forestalled from immediately filing an action because petitioner
gave him the runaround, answering his letters but not giving in to his demands. True, respondent should have already
filed an action at the first instance when petitioner denied his claims but the same could only be due to his desire to
make an out-of-court settlement for which he cannot be faulted. Hence, despite the express mandate of Article 29 of the
Warsaw Convention that an action for damages should be filed within 2 years from the arrival at the place of
destination, such rule shall not be applied in the instant case because of the delaying tactics employed by petitioner
airlines itself. Thus, respondent’s 2nd cause of action cannot be considered as time barred.

ALITALIA v. IAC
G.R. No. 71929, December 4, 1990

FACTS:
Dr. Felipa Pablo, a professor, was invited to take part at a meeting in Ispra, Italy. To fulfill this engagement, Dr.
Pablo booked passage on petitioner airline, ALITALIA. She arrived in Milan on the day before the meeting in
accordance with the itinerary and time table set for her by ALITALIA. She was however told by the ALITALIA
personnel there at Milan that her luggage was “delayed inasmuch as the same (was) in one of the succeeding flights
from Rome to Milan.” But the other flights arriving from Rome did not have her baggage on board. She returned to
Manila without attending the meeting in Ispra, Italy.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Warsaw Convention can restrict compensation for the injury suffered by Dr. Pablo.

RULING:
The Convention does not thus operate as an exclusive enumeration of the instances of an airline’s liability, or as
an absolute limit of the extent of that liability. Such a proposition is not borne out by the language of the Convention, as
this Court has now, and at an earlier time, pointed out. Certainly, the compensation for the injury suffered by Dr. Pablo
cannot under the circumstances be restricted to that prescribed by the Warsaw Convention for delay in the transport of
baggage.