G.R. No. 100835, October 26, 1993
Husband and wife must jointly adopt,
REPUBLIC vs. CA and HUGHES
FACTS:
James Anthony Hughes, a natural born citizen of the
United States of America, married Lenita Mabunay
Hughes, a Filipino Citizen, who herself was later
naturalized as a citizen of that country. On 29 June
1990, the spouses jointly filed a petition with the
RTC of Angeles City to adopt Ma. Cecilia, Neil and
Maria, all surnamed Mabunay, minor niece and
nephews of Lenita, who had been living with the
couple even prior to the filing of the petition. The
minors, as well as their parents, gave consent to the
adoption. On 29 November 1990, the RTC rendered
a decision granting the petition. A petition for
Review onCertiorari was filed with this Court,
assailing the trial court's decision. This Court
referred the case to the Court of Appeals which, on
09 July 1991, affirmed the trial court's decision.
ISSUE: W/N the spouses Anthony and Lenita
Hughes are qualified to adopt the minor niece and
nephews of Lenita under Philippine law
HELD:
No, it is clear that James Anthony Hughes is not
qualified to adopt under Article 184 of the Family
Code because he does not fall under any of the
following exceptions enumerated in paragraph (3):
(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a
relative by consanguinity; (b) One who seeks to
adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino
spouse; or (c) One who is married to a Filipino
citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her
Filipino spouse a relative by consanguinity of the
latter. While James Anthony unquestionably is not
permitted to adopt, Lenita, however, can qualify
pursuant to paragraph (3)(a). The problem in her case
lies, instead, with Article 185 of the Code,
expressing as follows:
Art. 185.
except in the following cases:
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own
illegitimate child; or
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate
child of the other.
Lenita may not thus adopt alone since Article 185
requires a joint adoption by the husband and the
wife, a condition that must be read along together
with Article 184.
Executive Order No. 91, dated 17 December 1986, of
President Corazon C. Aquino amended Article 29 of
PD 603 and is expressed as follows —
Art. 29. Husband and wife may
jointly adopt. In such case, parental
authority shall be exercised as if the
child were their own by nature.
If one of the spouses is an alien,
both husband and wife shall jointly
adopt. Otherwise, the adoption
shall not be allowed.
As amended by Executive Order 91, Presidential
Decree No. 603, had thus made it mandatory for both
the spouses to jointly adopt when one of them was an
alien. The law was silent when both spouses were of
the same nationality.
The Family Code has resolved any possible
uncertainty. Article 185 thereof now expresses the
necessity for joint adoption by the spouses except in
only two instances —
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt
his own legitimate child; or
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt
the legitimate child of the other.
The respondent court, in affirming the grant of
adoption by the lower court, has theorized that James
Anthony should merely be considered a "nominal or
formal party" in the proceedings. This view of the
appellate court cannot be sustained. Adoption
creates a status that is closely assimilated to
legitimate paternity and filiation with
corresponding rights and duties that necessarily
flow from adoption, such as, but not necessarily
confined to, the exercise of parental authority, use
of surname of the adopter by the adopted, as well
as support and successional rights. These are
matters that obviously cannot be considered
inconsequential to the parties.
We are not unmindful of the possible benefits,
particularly in this instance, that an adoption can
bring not so much for the prospective adopting
parents as for the adopted children themselves. We
also realize that in proceedings of this nature,
paramount consideration is given to the physical,
moral, social and intellectual welfare of the
adopted for whom the law on adoption has in the
first place been designed.
G.R. No. 94147 Republic v. Toledano, et. al. June
8, 1994
Facts:
A verified petition was filed before the RTC of Iba,
Zambales by spouses Alvin A. Clouse and Evelyn A.
Clouse, both aliens, seeking to adopt the minor,
Solomon Joseph Alcala, the younger brother of
Evelyn who has been under their care and custody
for quite a time.
Alvin is a natural born US citizen. He married
Evelyn, a Filipino, who thereafter became a
naturalized citizen of the US in Guam. They are
physically, mentally, morally, and financially
capable of adopting Solomon, a twelve (12) year old
minor.
Solomon gave his consent to the adoption, and so did
his mother Nery Alcala, a widow, due to poverty and
inability to support and educate her son.
Mrs. Nila Corazon Pronda, the social worker
assigned to conduct the Home and Child Study,
favorably recommended the granting of the petition
for adoption.
Consequently, respondent judge rendered a decision
granting the petition for adoption and decreeing that
said minor be considered as their child by adoption.
To this effect, the Court gives the minor the rights
and duties as the legitimate child of the petitioners.
Also, it dissolves parental authority bestowed upon
his natural parents and vests parental authority to the
spouses and makes him their legal heir.
Petitioner, through the OSG appealed for relief via a
Petition for review on certiorari of the decision  of
the lower court, contending that it erred in granting
the petition for adoption because spouses Clouse are
not qualified to adopt under Philippine law.
Both spouses are American citizens at the time of the
filing of petition for adoption.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the spouses, both aliens, have
the right or are qualified to adopt under Philippine
law.
2. Whether or not joint adoption by spouses is
mandatory.
Ruling:
Under Articles 184 and 185 of E.O. No. 209,
otherwise known as “The Family Code of the
Philippines”, spouses Clouse are clearly barred from
adopting Solomon.
Article 184, paragraph (3) of E.O. No. 209 expressly
enumerates the persons who are not qualified to
adopt, viz.:
(3) An alien, except:
(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a
relative by consanguinity;
(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of
his or her Filipino spouse; or
(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and
seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a
relative by consanguinity of the latter.
Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may
adopt Filipino children in accordance with the rules
on inter-country adoption as may be provided by
law.
There can be no question that Alvin is not qualified
to adopt Solomon under any of the exceptional cases
in the aforequoted provision. Firstly, he is not a
former Filipino citizen but a natural born US citizen .
Secondly, Solomon is neither his relative by
consanguinity nor the legitimate child of his spouse.
Lastly, when spouses Clouse jointly filed the petition
to adopt Solomon, Evelyn was no longer a Filipino
citizen. She lost her Filipino citizenship when she
was naturalized as a US citizen.
Evelyn on the other hand, may appear to qualify
pursuant to paragraph 3(a) of Article 184 of E.O.
209. She was a former Filipino citizen. She sought to
adopt her younger brother. Unfortunately, the
petition for adoption cannot be granted in her favor
alone without violating Article 185 which mandates
a joint adoption by the husband and wife. It reads:
Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt,
except in the following cases:
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own
illegitimate child; or
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate
child of the other.
Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband
and wife, a condition that must be read along
together with Article 184.
Today, this case is applicable only insofar as the
mandatory nature of a joint adoption by husband
and wife is concerned. As to the qualification or
non-qualification of an alien adopter, RA
8552 (enacted on February 25, 1998) is applicable.
Republic v. Vergara
G.R. No. 95551. March 20, 1997
Facts:
The spouses Samuel R. Dye, Jr. and Rosalina Due
Dye filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court
of Angeles City to adopt Maricel R. Due and Alvin
R. Due, ages 13 and 12 years old, younger siblings of
Rosalina. Samuel R. Dye, Jr, a member of the United
States Air Force, is an American citizen who resided
at the Clark Air Base in Pampanga. His wife
Rosalina is a former Filipino who became a
naturalized American.
Issue:
Whether or not the spouses Dye may legally adopt
Maricel and Alvin Due
Held:
No. As a general rule, aliens cannot adopt Filipino
citizens as this is proscribed under Article 184 of the
Family Code. The law here does not provide for an
alien who is married to a former Filipino citizen
seeking to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a This is in consonance with the concept of joint
relative by consanguinity, as an exception to the parental authority since the child to be adopted is
general rule that aliens may not adopt. elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but
natural to require spouses to adopt jointly.  The
Rosalina Dye cannot adopt her brother and sister for affidavit of consent given by Olario will not suffice
the law mandates joint adoption by husband and wife since there are certain requirements that he must
under Article 185 of the Family Code. comply as an American Citizen.  He must meet the
qualifications set forth in Sec7 of RA8552.  The
requirements on residency and certification of the
In Re Petition for Adoption of Michelle Lim and alien’s qualification to adopt cannot likewise be
Michael Jude Lim waived pursuant to Sec 7.  Parental authority is
GR No. 168992-93, May 21, 2009 merely just one of the effects of legal adoption.  It
includes caring and rearing the children for civic
FACTS: consciousness and efficiency and development of
their moral mental and physical character and well-
Monina Lim, petitioner, who was an optometrist was being.
married with Primo Lim but were childless.  Minor
children, were entrusted to them by Lucia, whose
parents were unknown as shown by a certification of
DSWD.  The spouses registered the children making
it appears as if they were the parents.  Unfortunately,
in 1998, Primo died.  She then married an American
Citizen, Angel Olario in December 2000.  Petitioner
decided to adopt the children by availing of the
amnesty given under RA 8552 to individuals who
simulated the birth of a child.  In 2002, she filed
separate petitions for adoption of Michelle and
Michael before the trial court.  Michelle was then 25
years old and already married and Michael was 18
years and seven months old.  Michelle and her
husband including Michael and Olario gave their
consent to the adoption executed in an affidavit.

ISSUE: WON petitioner who has remarried can

singly adopt.

HELD:

Petition was denied.  The time the petitions were

filed, petitioner had already remarried.  Husband and
wife shall jointly adopt except in 3 instances which
was not present in the case at bar.  In case spouses
jointly adopts, they shall jointly exercised parental
authority.  The use of the word “shall” signifies that
joint adoption of husband and wife is mandatory. 
Landingin vs. Republic
GR No. 164948, June 27, 2006
(Special Proceedings – Adoption: Consent and
Abandonment)
Facts: Diwata Ramos Landingin, a US citizen of
Filipino parentage filed a petition for the adoption of
3 minors, natural children of Manuel Ramos, the
former’s brother, and Amelia Ramos. She alleged in
her petition that when her brother died, the children
were left to their paternal grandmother for their
biological mother went to Italy, re-married there and
now has 2 children by her second marriage and no
longer communicates from the time she left up to the
institution of the adoption. After the paternal
grandmother passed away, the minors were being
supported by the petitioner and her children abroad
and gave their written consent for their adoption.
A Social Worker of the DSWD submitted a Report
recommending for the adoption and narrated that
Amelia, the biological mother was consulted with the
adoption plan and after weighing the benefits of
adoption to her children, she voluntarily consented.
However, petitioner failed to present the said social
worker as witness and offer in evidence the
voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption.
Petitioner also failed to present any documentary
evidence to prove that Amelia assent to the adoption.
Issue: WON a petition for adoption be granted
without the written consent of the adoptee’s
biological mother.
Held:  No. Section 9, par (b) of RA 8552, provides
that the consent of the biological parent(s) of the
child, if known is necessary to the adoption. The
written consent of the legal guardian will suffice if
the written consent of the biological parents cannot
be obtained.
The general requirement of consent and notice to the
natural parents is intended to protect the natural
parental relationship from unwarranted interference
by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to
safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner
of the proposed adoption.
The written consent of the biological parents is
indispensable for the validity of the decree of
adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his
child requires that his consent must be obtained
before his parental rights and duties may be
terminated and re-establish in adoptive parents. In
this case, petitioner failed to submit the written
consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption.
Moreover, abandonment means neglect and refusal
to perform the filial and legal obligations of love and
support. Merely permitting the child to remain for a
time undisturbed in the care of others is not such
abandonment. To dispense with the requirements of
consent, the abandonment must be shown to have
existed at the time of adoption.
Herbert Cang, petitioner, vs. Court of Appeals
and Spouses Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara
Clavano, respondents.
 
Facts:
Petitioner and Ana Marie Clavano were married and
begot three children. Ana Marie upon learning of her
husband's illicit liaison file a petition for legal
separation with alimony pendente lite which was
approved. Petitioner then left for the United States
where he sought a divorce from Ana Marie. He was
issued a divorce decree and granted sole custody of
the children to Ana Marie, reserving rights of
visitation at all reasonable times and places to
petitioner. Private respondents who were the brother
and sister-in-law of Ana Marie filed a petition for
adoption of the three minor Cang children. The trial
court granted the petition for adoption. Ana Marie
was the only parent who gives consent to the
adoption of their children. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court's decision.
Issue:
Whether petitioner has abandoned his children,
thereby making his consent to the adoption
necessary.

Ruling:
The law is clear that either parent may lose parental
authority over the child only for a valid reason. No
such reason was established in the legal separation
case. Deprivation of parental authority is one of the
effects of a decree of adoption. But there cannot be a
valid decree of adoption in this case precisely
because the findings of the lower courts on the issue
of abandonment of facts on record. The petition for
adoption must be denied as it was filed without the
required consent of their father who, by law and
under the facts of the case at bar, has not abandoned
them.
Castro vs Gregorio
GR No 188801 15 October 2014
Facts: This is a petition for review on Certiorari
assailing the decision of the CA which denied the
petition for annulment of judgment filed by
petitioners. The petition before the appellate court
sought to annul the judgment of the trial court that
granted Rs’ decree of adoption.
Atty. Castro was allegedly married to Rosario Castro
(Petitioner). Unfortunately, they separated later on
due to their incompatibilities and Jose’s alleged
homosexual tendencies. Their marriage bore two
daughters: Rose Marie, who succumbed to death
after nine days from birth due to congenital heart
disease, and Joanne Benedicta Charissima Castro
(Petitioner).
On August 2000, A petition for adoption of Jose
Maria Jed Gregorio (Jed) and Ana Maria Regina
Gregorio (Regina) was instituted by Atty. Jose
Castro. Atty. Castro alleged that Jed and Regina
were his illegitimate children with Lilibeth Gregorio
(Rosario’s housekeeper). After a Home Study Report
conducted by the Social Welfare Officer of the TC,
the petition was granted.
A disbarment complaint was filed against Atty.
Castro by Rosario. She alleged that Jose had been
remiss in providing support to his daughter Joanne
for the past 36 year; that she single-handedly raised
and provided financial support to Joanne while Jose
had been showering gifts to his driver and allege
lover, Larry, and even went to the extent of adopting
Larry’s two children, Jed and Regina, without her
and Joanne knowledge and consent. Atty. Castro
denied the allegation that he had remiss his fatherly
duties to Joanne. He alleged that he always offered
help but it was often declined. He also alleged that
Jed and Regina were his illegitimate children that’s
why he adopted them.  Later on Atty. Castro died.
Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for annulment of
judgment seeking to annul the decision of the TC
approving Jed and Regina’s adoption.
Petitioner allege that Rosario’s consent was not
obtained and the document purporting as Rosario’s
affidavit of consent was fraudulent. P also allege that
Jed and Regina’s birth certificates shows disparity.
One set shows that the father to is Jose, while
another set of NSO certificates shows the father to be
Larry.  P further alleged that Jed and Regina are not
actually Jose’s illegitimate children but the
legitimate children of Lilibeth and Larry who were
married at the time of their birth. CA denied the
petition.
CA held that while no notice was given by the TC to
Rosario and Joanne of the adoption, it ruled that
there is “no explicit provision in the rules that
spouses and legitimate child of the adopter. . . should
be personally notified of the hearing.”
CA also ruled that the alleged fraudulent information
contained in the different sets of birth certificates
required the determination of the identities of the
persons stated therein and was, therefore, beyond the
scope of the action for annulment of judgment. The
alleged fraud could not be classified as extrinsic
fraud, which is required in an action for annulment
of judgment.
Issues:
1. Whether extrinsic fraud exist in the instant
case?
2. Whether consent of the spouse and legitimate
children 10 years or over of the adopter is
required?
Decision:
1. The grant of adoption over R should be
annulled as the trial court did not validly acquire
jurisdiction over the proceedings, and the
favorable decision was obtained through extrinsic
fraud.
When fraud is employed by a party precisely to
prevent the participation of any other interested
party, as in this case, then the fraud is extrinsic,
regardless of whether the fraud was committed
through the use of forged documents or perjured
testimony during the trial.
Jose’s actions prevented Rosario and Joanne from
having a reasonable opportunity to contest the
adoption. Had Rosario and Joanne been allowed to
participate, the trial court would have hesitated to
grant Jose’s petition since he failed to fulfill the
necessary requirements under the law. There can be
no other conclusion than that because of Jose’s acts,
the trial court granted the decree of adoption under
fraudulent circumstances.
2. RA 8552 requires that the adoption by the
father of a child born out of wedlock obtain not
only the consent of his wife but also the consent
of his legitimate children. (Art. III, Sec. 7, RA
8552)
 
As a rule, the husband and wife must file a joint
petition for adoption. The law, however, provides for
several exceptions to the general rule, as in a
situation where a spouse seeks to adopt his or her
own children born out of wedlock. In this instance,
joint adoption is not necessary. But, the spouse
seeking to adopt must first obtain the consent of his
or her spouse.
In the absence of any decree of legal separation or
annulment, Jose and Rosario remained legally
married despite their de facto separation. For Jose to
be eligible to adopt Jed and Regina, Rosario must
first signify her consent to the adoption. Since her
consent was not obtained, Jose was ineligible to
adopt.
The law also requires the written consent of the
adopter’s children if they are 10 years old or older
(ART. III, Sec. 9, RA 8552).
For the adoption to be valid, petitioners’ consent was
required by Republic Act No. 8552. Personal service
of summons should have been effected on the spouse
and all legitimate children to ensure that their
substantive rights are protected. It is not enough to
rely on constructive notice as in this case.
Surreptitious use of procedural technicalities cannot
be privileged over substantive statutory rights.
Since the trial court failed to personally serve notice
on Rosario and Joanne of the proceedings, it never
validly acquired jurisdiction.
DSWD v. Belen
Facts:
The spouses Desiderio Soriano and Aurora
Bernardo-Soriano, both of whom are naturalized
American citizens, filed a verified petition for
adoption of their niece, the minor Zhedell Bernardo
Ibea, which was docketed as Special Proceeding No.
5830 of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen,
Pangasinan, and assigned to Branch 38 thereof. In
due time, respondent Judge Belen granted the
petition in a decision dated June 25, 1992, after
finding that petitioner spouses were highly qualified
to adopt the child as their own. However, when the
minor Zhedell Bernardo Ibea sought to obtain the
requisite travel clearance from the DSWD in order to
join her adoptive parents in the United States, the
department uncovered what it considered as an
anomalous adoption decree regarding said minor. It
turned out that the DSWD did not have any record in
its files regarding the adoption and that there was
never any order from respondent judge for the
DSWD to conduct a Home and Child Study Report
in the case. Furthermore, there was no directive from
respondent judge for the social welfare officer of the
lower court to coordinate with the DSWD on the
matter of the required reports for said minors
adoption.
As the adoption never passed through the DSWD, it
filed the present administrative complaint against
respondent judge charging him with violating Article
33 of Presidential Decree No. 603 which
requires, inter alia, that petitions for adoption shall
be granted only after the DSWD has conducted and
submitted a case study of the adoptee, the natural
parents and the adoptive parents. 
Issue: Won the repondent judge is guilty with
violating Article 33 of Presidential Decree No. 603
otherwise known as The Child and Youth Welfare
Code, and the corresponding Supreme Court circular.
Held
Yes.
By respondents failure to do so, he may well have
wittingly or unwittingly placed in jeopardy the
welfare and future of the child whose adoption was
under consideration. Adoption, after all, is in a large
measure a legal device by which a better future may
be accorded an unfortunate child like Zhedell
Bernardo Ibea in this case. the proper course that
respondent judge should have taken was to notify the
DSWD at the outset about the commencement of
Special Proceeding No. 5830 so that the
corresponding case study could have been
accordingly conducted by said department which
undoubtedly has the necessary competence, more
than that possessed by the court social welfare
officer, to make the proper
recommendation. Moreover, respondent judge
should never have merely presumed that it was
routinary for the social welfare officer to coordinate
with the DSWD regarding the adoption.
Republic vs. Hernandez, GR No. 117209,
February 9, 1996
(Special Proceedings – Adoption: Change of Name)
Facts: The RTC granted the petition for adoption of
Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran and simultaneously
granted the prayer therein for the change of the first
name of said adoptee to Aaron Joseph, to
complement the surname Munson y Andrade which
he acquired consequent to his adoption.
Petitioner opposed the inclusion of the relief for
change of name in the same petition for adoption
objecting to the joinder of the petition for adoption
and the petitions for the change of name in a single
proceeding, arguing that these petition should be
conducted and pursued as two separate proceedings.
Petitioner argues that a petition for adoption and a
petition for change of name are two special
proceedings which, in substance and purpose, are
different from and are not related to each other,
being respectively governed by distinct sets of law
and rules. Petitioner further contends that what the
law allows is the change of the surname of the
adoptee, as a matter of right, to conform with that of
the adopter and as a natural consequence of the
adoption thus granted. If what is sought is the change
of the registered given or proper name, and since this
would involve a substantial change of one’s legal
name, a petition for change of name under Rule 103
should accordingly be instituted, with the substantive
and adjective requisites therefor being conformably
satisfied.
Private respondents, on the contrary, admittedly filed
the petition for adoption with a prayer for change of
name predicated upon Section 5, Rule 2 which
allows permissive joinder of causes of action in order
to avoid multiplicity of suits and in line with the
policy of discouraging protracted and vexatious
litigations. It is argued that there is no prohibition in
the Rules against the joinder of adoption and change
of name being pleaded as two separate but related
causes of action in a single petition.
Issue: WON respondent judge erred in granting
prayer for the change of the given or proper name if
the adoptee in a petition for adoption.
Held: No.
Par (1), Art. 189 of the Family Code provides one of
the legal effect of adoption:
(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed
to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall
acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising
from the relationship of parent and child, including
the right of the adopted to use the surname of the
adopters;
The law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and
obligation, to bear the surname of the adopter, upon
issuance of the decree of adoption. It is the change of
the adoptee’s surname  to follow that of the adopter
which is the natural and necessary consequence of a
grant of adoption and must specifically be contained
in the order of the court, in fact, even if not prayed
for by petitioner.
However, the given or proper name, also known as
the first or Christian name, of the adoptee must
remain as it was originally registered in the civil
register. The creation of an adoptive relationship
does not confer upon the adopter a license to change
the adoptee’s registered Christian or first name. The
automatic change thereof, premised solely upon the
adoption thus granted, is beyond the purview of a
decree of adoption. Neither is it a mere incident in
nor an adjunct of an adoption proceeding, such that a
prayer therefor furtively inserted in a petition for
adoption, as in this case, cannot properly be granted.
The official name of a person whose birth is
registered in the civil register is the name appearing
therein. If a change in one’s name is desired, this can
only be done by filing and strictly complying with
the substantive and procedural requirements for a
special proceeding for change of name under Rule
103 of the Rules of Court, wherein the sufficiency of
the reasons or grounds therefor can be threshed out
and accordingly determined.
A petition for change of name being a proceeding in
rem, strict compliance with all the requirements
therefor is indispensable in order to vest the court
with jurisdiction for its adjudication. It is an
independent and discrete special proceeding, in and
by itself, governed by its own set of rules. A fortiori,
it cannot be granted by means of any other
proceeding. To consider it as a mere incident or an
offshoot of another special proceeding would be to
denigrate its role and significance as the appropriate
remedy available under our remedial law system.
Republic v. CA | G.R. No. 103695
Facts: This is a petition for review on certiorari of
the decision of the CA which affirmed in toto the
decision of the RTC of Cavite granting private
respondent’s petition for the adoption of Midael C.
Mazon with prayer for the correction of the minors
first name Midael to Michael.
A petition for adoption was filed by spouses Caranto
for the adoption of Midael Mazon, then 15 yrs old,
who had been living with private respondent since he
was 7 yrs old. When private respondent later on got
married, Midael stayed with them under their care
and custody.
RTC set the case for hearing and giving notice
thereof by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Province of Cavite and by the
service of the order upon the DSWD and the
Solicitor General.
Solicitor General opposed the petition insofar as it
sought the correction of the name of the child from
Midael to Michael. He argued that although the
correction sought concerned only a clerical and
innocuous error, it could not be granted because the
petition was basically for adoption, not the correction
of an entry in the civil registry under the Rule 108 of
the Rules.
RTC rendered its decision. It dismissed the
opposition of the Solicitor General on the ground
that Rule 108 applies only to the correction of entries
concerning the civil status of persons. The correction
of names in the civil registry is not one of the matters
enumerated in Rule 108. Further, the Trial Court
held that the error could be corrected in the same
proceeding for adoption to prevent multiplicity of
actions, and inconvenience to the petitioners.
Therefore, it granted the adoption of Midael Mazon
and the change of his name from Midael to Michael.
CA affirmed in toto the decision of the Trial Court.
Here Republic added that RTC did not acquired
jurisdiction over the case because in the notice
published in the newspaper, the name given was
Michael, instead of Midael, which is the name of the
minor given in his Certificate of Live Birth.
ISSUES:
1. Whether TC did not acquire jurisdiction over
the PR’s petition for adoption.
2. Whether correction of names can be affected
in the proceeding for adoption.
Decision:
1. IT HAD ACQUIRED JURISDISCTION.
Solicitor General in proving its contention invoked
the ruling in Cruz vs. Republic. There the petition for
adoption was dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction
because the name of the adoptee used in the
publication was the child’s baptispmal name
(Rosanna E. Cruz) instead of her name in the record
of Birth (Rosanna E. Bucoy). The court held there
that there was a substantial defect in the petition and
the published order of hearing.
The instant case, however, is different. It involves an
obvious clerical error in the name of the child sought
to be adopted. In this case the correction involves
merely the substitution of the letters “CH” for the
letter “D”, so that what appears as MIDAEL as given
name would read as MICHAEL. Even the Solicitor
General admits that the error is a plainly clerical one.
Changing the name of the child from Midael C.
Mazon to Michael C. Mazon cannot possibly cause
any confusion, because both names can be read and
pronounced with the same rhyme and tone. The
purpose of the publication requirement is to give
notice so that those who have any objection to the
adoption can make their objection known.
2. TC and CA erred in granting the prayer for
correction of the name of the child in the civil
registry.
Contrary to what the Trial Court thought, Rule 108
applies to this case and because its provisions were
not complied with, the decision of the TC, insofar as
it ordered the correction of the name of the minor, is
void and without force and effect.
This case falls under letter “O” (Changes of name) of
Section 2 of Rule 108. Indeed, it has been the
uniform ruling of this Court that Art. 412 of the Civil
Code covers those harmless and innocuous changes,
such as correction of a name that is clearly
misspelled.
Rule 108, thus applies to the present proceeding.
Section 3 of said Rule, requires the Local Civil
Registrar to be made a party to the proceeding. He is
an indispensable party, without whom no final
determination of the case can be had. As he was not
impleaded in this case much less given notice of the
proceeding, the decision of the trial court, insofar as
it granted the prayer for the correction of entry, is
void. The absence of an indispensable party in a case
renders ineffectual all the proceeding subsequent to
the filing of the complaint including the judgment.
Section 4 (Notice and publication) of said Rule,
also, was not followed. While there was notice given
by publication in this case, it was notice of the
petition for adoption made in compliance with Rule
99, 4 (Adoption procedural law before). In that
notice ONLY the prayer for adoption of the minor
was stated.  Nothing was mentioned that in addition
the correction of his name in the civil registry was
also being sought. The local civil registrar was thus
deprived of notice and, consequently, of the
opportunity to be heard.
 In Re: Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga
Garcia
GR 148311, March 31, 2005
FACTS:
Petitioner HonoratoCatindig filed a petition to adopt
his minor illegitimate child Stephanie, and that
Stephanie has been using her mother’s middle and
surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified
to her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie’s
middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her
mother’s surname, and that her surname Garcia
be changed to Catindig, his surname.
ISSUE:
May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her
natural father, use the surname of her natural mother
as her middle name?
RULING:
YES. Being a legitimate child by virtue of her
adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all
the rights provided by law to a legitimate child
without discrimination of any kind, including the
right to bear surname of her father and her mother.
Stephanie’s continued use of her mother’s surname
as her middle name will maintain her
maternal lineage. The Adoption Act and the Family
Code provide that the adoptee remains an intestate
heir of his/her biological parent. Hence, Stephanie
can assert her hereditary rights from her natural
mother in the future.
Teotico vs Del Val
GR No. L18753, March 26, 1965
FACTS:
Maria Mortera died on July 1955 leaving properties
worth P600,000.  She executed a will written in
Spanish, affixed her signature and acknowledged
before Notary Public by her and the witnesses.  adoption is limited solely to the adopter and adopted
Among the legacies made in the will was the  and does not extend to the relatives of the adopting
P20,000 for Rene Teotico who was married to the
testatrix’s niece, Josefina Mortera.  The usufruct of
Maria’s interest in the Calvo Building were left to
the said spouses and the ownership thereof was left
in equal parts to her grandchildren, the legitimate
children of said spouses.  Josefina was likewise
instituted, as sole and universal heir to all the
remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed
by will.  Vicente Teotico filed a petition for the
probate of the will but was opposed by Ana del Val
Chan, claiming that she was an adopted child of
Francisca (deceased sister of Maria) and an
acknowledged natural child of Jose (deceased
brother of Maria), that  said will was not executed as
required by law and that Maria as physically and
mentally incapable to execute the will at the time of
its execution and was executed under duress, threat,
or influence of fear.
ISSUE: WON defendant has right to intervene in
this proceeding.
HELD:
It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may
be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding is
that he must have an interest in the estate, will or in
the property to be affected by either as executor or as
a claimant of the estate and be benefited by such as
an heir or one who has a claim against it as creditor. 
Under the terms of the will, defendant has no right to
intervene because she has no such interest in the
estate either as heir, executor or administrator
because it did not appear therein any provision
designating her as heir/ legatee in any portion of the
estate.  She could have acquired such right if she was
a legal heir of the deceased but she is not under the
CIVIL CODE.  Even if her allegations were true, the
law does not give her any right to succeed the estate
of the deceased sister of both Jose and Francisca
because being an illegitimate child she is prohibited
by law from succeeding to the legitimate relatives of
her natural father and that relationship established by
 parents except only as expressly provided by law.   FIRST ISSUE: Yes.
As a consequence, she is an heir of the adopter but
not of the relatives of the adopter.                  The Court ruled that John’s minority at the
time of his adopter’s death is a significant factor in
Hence, defendant has no right to intervene either as the case at bar. Under such circumstance, parental
testamentary or as legal heir in the probate authority should be deemed to have reverted in favor
proceeding. of the biological parents. Otherwise, taking
into account Our consistent ruling that adoption is a
personal relationship and that there are no collateral
Bartolome v SSS relatives by virtue of adoption, who was then left to
care for the minor adopted child if the adopter passed
TOPIC: Civil status of adopted upon death away?
of adopter, biological parent of adoptee as
beneficiary                 The Court also applied by analogy,  insofar
as the restoration of custody is concerned, the
 FACTS: provisions of law on rescission of adoption wherein
if said petition is granted, the parental authority of
                John Colcol was employed as electrician the adoptee’s biological parents shall be restored if
by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc. He was enrolled the adoptee is still a minor or incapacitated.
under the government’s Employees’ Compensation
Program (ECP). He died due to an accident while                 The manner herein of terminating the
on board the vessel. John was, at the time of his adopter’s parental authority, unlike the grounds for
death, childless and unmarried. Thus, petitioner rescission, justifies the retention of vested rights and
Bernardina P. Bartolome, John’s biological mother obligations between the adopter and the adoptee,
and, allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a while the consequent restoration of parental authority
claim for death benefits. in favor of the biological parents, simultaneously,
ensures that the adoptee, who is still a minor, is not
                SSS denied the claim on the ground that left to fend for himself at such a tender age.
Bernardina was no longer considered as the parent of
John since the latter was legally adopted by Cornelio                 From the foregoing, it is apparent that the
Colcol. As such, it is Cornelio who qualifies as biological parents retain their rights of succession
John’s primary beneficiary, not petitioner. tothe estate of their child who was the subject of
adoption. While the benefits arising from the death
                According to the records, Cornelio died of an SSS covered employee do not form part of the
during John’s minority. estate of the adopted child, the pertinent provision on
legal or intestate succession at least reveals the
ISSUES: policy on the rights of the biological parents and
those by adoption vis-à-vis the right to receive
1. Whether or not the death of
benefits from the adopted. In the same way that
the adopter during the adoptee’s minority results to
certain rights still attach by virtue of the blood
the restoration of the parental authority to the
relation, so too should certain obligations, which, the
biological parents of the latter.
Court ruled, include the exercise of parental
2. Whether or not Bernardina is considered as a
authority, in the event of the untimely passing of
legal beneficiary of John.
their minor offspring’s adoptive parent.
 HELD:
SECOND ISSUE: Yes.
                The Court held that Cornelio’s adoption of
John, without more, does not deprive petitioner of
the right to receive the benefits stemming from
John’s death as a dependent parent given Cornelio’s
untimely demise during John’s minority. Since the
parent by adoption already died, then the death
benefits under the Employees’ Compensation
Program shall accrue solely to herein petitioner,
John’s sole remaining beneficiary.
LAHOM VS SIBULO
Posted by kaye lee on 7:49 PM
G.R. No. 143989  July 14, 2003
FACTS:
A childless couple adopted  the wife's nephew and
brought him up as their own. In 1972, the trial court
granted the petition for adoption, and ordered the
Civil Registrar to change the name Jose Melvin
Sibulo to Jose Melvin Lahom. Mrs. Lahom
commenced a petition to rescind the decree of
adoption, in which she averred, that, despite the her
pleas and that of her husband, their adopted son
refused to use their surname Lahom and continue to
use Sibulo in all his dealing and activities.  Prior to
the institution of the case, in 1998, RA No. 8552
went into effect. The new statute deleted from the
law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of
adoption (Section 19 of Article VI).
These turn of events revealing Jose's callous
indifference, ingratitude and lack of care and concern
prompted Lahom to file a petition in Court in
December 1999 to rescind the decree of adoption
previously issued way back on May 5, 1972. When
Lahom filed said petition there was already a new
law on adoption, specifically R.A. 8552 also known
as the Domestic Adoption Act passed on March
22,1998, wherein it was provided that: "Adoption,
being in the interest of the child, shall not be subject
to rescission by the adopter(s). However the
adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes
provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code" (Section
19).
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject adoption still be revoked
or rescinded by an adopter after the effectivity of
R.A. No. 8552, and if in the affirmative, whether or
not the adopter’s action prescribed.
RULING:
Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute
in force at the time of the commencement of the
action. The controversy should be resolved in the
light of the law governing at the time the petition
was filed. In this case, it was months after the
effectivity of RA 8552 that Lahom filed an action to
revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1972. By
then the new law had already abrogated and repealed
the right of the adopter under the Civil Code and the
family Code to rescind a decree of adoption. So the
rescission of the adoption decree, having been
initiated by Lahom after RA 8552 had come into
force, could no longer be pursued.
Besides, even before the passage of RA8552, an
action to set aside the adoption is subject to the five
year bar rule under Rule 100 of the Rules of Court
and that the adopter would lose the right to revoke
the adoption decree after the lapse of that period. The
exercise of the right within a prescriptive period is a
condition that could not fulfill the requirements of a
vested right entitled to protection. Rights are
considered vested when the right to the enjoyment is
a present interest, absolute, unconditional and perfect
or fixed and irrefutable. The concept of a "vested
right" is a consequence of the constitutional
guarantee of due process that expresses a present
fixed interest which in right reason and natural
justice is protected against arbitrary state action.
While adoption has often been referred to in the
context of a "right", it is not naturally innate or
fundamental but rather a right merely created by
statute. It is more of a privilege that is governed by
the state's determination on what it may deem to be
for the best interest and welfare of the child. Matters
relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of the
right of the adopter to nullify the adoption decree,
are subject to State regulation. Concomitantly, a right
of action given by a statute may be taken away at any
time before it has been exercised.

But an adopter, while barred from severing the legal

ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons cause
the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing
to an undeserving child, like denying him his
legitime, and by will and testament, may expressly
exclude him from having a share in the disposable
portion of his estate.

Categories: Adoption, G.R. No. 143989, Persons and

Family Relations, Philippine Civil Code