1NR

Taiwan
Extend 1NC #( ) no Taiwan Invasion two warrants
A. Hurts Public Perception by forcefully taking over
Taiwan, China would be perceived as a forever-malicious
nation that hurts their strategy to be the hegemon
B. Uncertainty of True Unification theres a difference
between beating a nations army and pacifying the
country resistance to unification spurs defiance on the
mainland, which outweighs thats Keck
C. It isnt technologically feasible for them to invade they
know they dont have the military power and any war
would be short and wouldnt escalate thats Babones
D. Chinas goal is for the KMT to win back Taiwans
Presidency in 2020 theyre putting pressure on voters,
not planning an invasion.
Kastner 16 Jens Kastner, Taiwan Correspondent for the Asia Sentinel, 2016
(Expect More China-Taiwan Tensions, Asia Sentinel, May 23rd, Available Online at
http://www.asiasentinel.com/politics/china-taiwan-tensions-to-increase/, Accessed 0711-2016)
With newly-sworn Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen wriggling around a Beijing demand that she
verbally acknowledge the 1992 Consensus, a cryptic version of the One China principle agreed by her Chinafriendly Kuomintang predecessors, China is likely to wage a four-year campaign to convince the
island of the folly of voting for the mainland-wary Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). There will be no
honeymoon. The government faces multiple challenges, many emanating from
China. There have been military exercises in the South China Sea as a warning to the Tsai
regime to abide by the 1992 Consensus. There undoubtedly will be additional indirect
military pressure on Taiwans 23.4 million people and the government although military action is unlikely
while Beijing continues to concentrate on united-front work in order to rally more
segments of Taiwanese society, including those dissatisfied with the DPP or with a
vested interest in doing more business with China. Beijing has already sought to
bring Taiwan back into line by cutting tourism numbers and making it more difficult
for Taiwanese to do business on the mainland. It is likely to be a futile strategy, if
the past is any prologue. Young Taiwanese have increasingly resisted Beijings
blandishments, with antipathy to the mainland playing a major role in Tsais solid 56
percent majority win over two opposing candidates in the January 2016 general election. In her inaugural address on May 20, the
scrappy 60-year-old former law professor concentrated on a center-left agenda focusing on the concerns of the younger generations and the
need to put history aside by launching a truth and conciliation process in order to heal the wounds of Taiwans autocratic past. Chinas

Xi Jinping earlier upped the ante by proclaiming that the earth will move and the
mountains will shake if the 1992 Consensus was is not accepted. But Tsai didnt do
him the favor mentioning it by name, let alone acknowledge that there is One
China. Instead, she said, Taiwan and China in 1992 only agreed to set aside differences to seek common ground. She indirectly gave
President

something of a nod to a blurry version of One China, referring to the existing Republic of Chinas constitutional order as well as Taiwans Act
on the relations between peoples of both sides of the Strait, a hint to her adherence to the idea that the ROC includes both Taiwan and
mainland China. Great speech, quite different from Chen Shui-bians [who as Taiwans first DPP president governed from 2000-2008], as she
did not say anything negative, such as no future for One China, noted Jean-Pierre Cabestan, Professor and head of the Department of

it wont be enough
for China since she did neither mention One China nor the 1992 Consensus. Cabestans
predictions are downbeat. He believes that Beijing will now go about downgrading meetings between
Chinas and Taiwans bodies for cross-straits negations (ARATS and SEF respectively); narrow
Taiwan international space; and continue reducing the number of Chinese tourists
visiting Taiwan. But at the same time, Cabestan said, Beijing will not cut all links with Taiwan
because it wants Taiwan to become more dependent on China and not the
opposite, given that it wants to lay the ground for a return of the KMT to power .
Government and International Studies at Hong Kong Baptist University, in an interview with Asia Sentinel. But

Extend 1NC #( ) Taiwan Straits conflict doesnt escalate two

warrants
A. Their escalation scenario is based off of an
epistemologically bankrupt interpretation of Chinese
leadership their pragmatic not irrational nihilists
B. The CCP policy is rooted in self-preservation they wont
sacrifice everything created since 1949 for an island
thats Cole
Prefer our evidence Cole is a Senior Fellow at Nottinghams
China Policy Institute specifically indicting the underlying
assumptions of the AFF it a meta-question
Its economy outweighs China will not sacrifice growth for the
annexation of Taiwan
Cole 15 (J. Michael, is a senior fellow at the University of Nottingham's China Policy Institute, If the Unthinkable
Occurred: America Should Stand Up to China over Taiwan, The National Interest, 5/7/15, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/ifthe-unthinkable-occured-america-should-stand-china-over-12825?page=show)

Ironically, White seems almost convinced that China would be willing to engage in
nuclear war over Taiwan, an assumption that is both untested and portrays the
leadership in Beijing as a bunch of deranged nihilists. For all its faults, and despite
the official rhetoric depicting Taiwan as a core issue, it is in my view unlikely that
the Chinese Communist Party would unleash its nuclear arsenal over the matter of
Taiwan; in fact, I would advance that it is probably unwilling to gamble Chinas
economy over Taiwan by launching major military operationsall the more so if
there is a promise that such a course of action would result in a concerted response
on the part of the international community. The logic of deterrence is that it
diminishes the likelihood that the international community would be faced with the
maximalist options given us by White. (The bluster only works if we believe itand
Beijing wants us to believe it just like the good professor seems to doas winning
without a fight is a foundational element of Chinese military strategy.)

Solvency
China says no to the grand bargain a few warrants from
Lingwall
A) Its a bad offer China believes its claim over Taiwan
is indisputable they already think they own it and
economic unification has already occurred effectively
they know the threat of Chinese military forces
dissuade Taiwan from independence which means
they think unification is inevitable if not already
happening in the squo Taiwan fails as a bargaining
chip because China is already an influential power
means they see no reason to make concessions over
something they own
B) The accept US presence quo China is moving
towards assertive diplomacy in the status quo
accepting US presence directly counters that
tensions in the SCS and ECS prove that they are
unwilling to compromise when US forces get involved
outweighs the benefits because China has
prioritizes countering US hegemony
C) The resolve territorial disputes quo its difficult
to enforce because China is overwhelmed with claims
in Japan, Vietnam, and the Philippines there are too
many to concede China doesnt want to undermine
its rep as a maritime power is comparably more
symbolically important than Taiwan even if they say
yes it induces CCP officials to take unpredictable
and aggressive strategies concessions cant be
verified
Extend 1NC Lingwall China cheats a couple of reasons
A) China hates US interference and hegemony
B) Could rollback the conditions of the agreement
whenever
C) China hates to look weak and appeasing to US
demands in front of China
D)Its unenforceable

An 15 David An was formerly a tenured US diplomat who covered China,

Taiwan and East Asia in the State Department, Political-Military Bureau
between 2009 and 2014. He helped coordinate several US-China Strategic
and Economic Dialogues and worked out of the US Embassy in Beijing and
throughout East Asia. (David, "Glasers Simple Idea: Trade Taiwan for China,"
Ketagalan Media, 7/15/15,
http://www.ketagalanmedia.com/2015/07/15/glasers-simple-idea-tradetaiwan-china/)\\BPS
The concept of anarchy in international relations theory provides the rationale. States exist in anarchy,
which does not mean utter chaos, but rather means that the world lacks an overarching world government

If the US backs away from Taiwan, international

relations theory maintains that there is little to nothing that the rest of the
world could do to prevent China from imposing whatever will it has toward
Taiwan, despite any previous agreement or promise. The United Nations, International
to enforce agreements or promises.

Criminal Court and other institutions cannot effectively punish states or sitting heads of state as effectively

world government does not

exist with jurisdiction to resolve disagreements or enforce rule of law ; therefore
China could promise one thing and do another . Glasers theory simply assumes
a grand bargain with China will, somehow, be kept by China. Neither does Glasers
as domestic institutions could with their full sovereignty to rule. A

theory address the reverberating effects of the US abandoning Taiwan for US partners and allies in the

The safest course of action for Taiwan is to maintain its freedom to

choose its own political, social, and economic future for the longest extent
possible. The so-called 1992 Consensus has allowed both sides of the Taiwan Strait their respective
region.

interpretations of the cross-Strait status quo under the rubric of One Chinawith China saying One China
is under the Peoples Republic of China, and Taiwan saying the two sides are unified under its Republic of
China. This kind of ambiguous policy constructs have allowed the Chinese Communist Party and the
Kuomintang to sidestep the issue of sovereignty, while Taiwan has so far grasped onto enough leeway to
choose its own direction. Taiwans political choices have allowed it to blossom into a mature democracy,

Taiwans future is its own to decide

only if it continues to enjoy the USs support and commitment. Though I highly
which is something that is typically not allowed in China.

respect and admire much of Glasers academic work, I cannot support his provocative conclusions. A more
humanistic and historical theoretical framework would show the value of continued US support for a loyal
partner, more than a rational theory that embodies much thinking but little heart.

E) Pre-bargain activities thump

Roy, 15 - Senior Fellow and Supervisor of POSCO Fellowship Program,
Research Program at the East-West Institute; PhD in Political Science at the
University of Chicago (Denny, The Impossible Price of a U.S.-China Grand
Bargain: Dumping Taiwan 6/24, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/theimpossible-price-us-china-grand-bargain-dumping-taiwan-13177
The grand bargain idea probably resonates less with Beijing than Washington.
From Beijings point of view, this would be asking it to trade something it
believes it already owns for something else it believes it already owns . If they
did agree, how the bargain would be operationalized is unclear. What would it mean for China
to officially accept U.S. alliances and military bases in the Asia-Pacific? This
would seem to require Beijing to renounce its proudly principled opposition
to any country having Cold War era alliances and foreign bases. At the same time, it
is easy to foresee China continuing its pre-bargain activities (military buildup,
maneuvers with Russia, naval patrols in the East and South China Sea , etc.)

while claiming these were not attempts to drive U.S. influence out of the
region.

F) China thinks that they already own Taiwan if it aint

broke, then dont fix it
Lingwall 15 (Noah, Intern to the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army
War College and Student at the Shreyer Honors College of the Pennsylvania
State University, "The Taiwan Problem: If It Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It," The
Diplomat, 8/8/15, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/content/opinion-taiwanproblem-if-it-aint-broke-dont-fix-it)\\BPS
The effectiveness of a bargaining chip is predicated on whether or not the
other party fears losing control of that bargaining chip . From Chinas point of
view, its claim over Taiwan is indisputable. So why would China make
concessions over a bargaining chip it believes it already owns? China already
has a powerful economic hold over Taiwan. In addition to economic interdependence, the
past several years have also witnessed an increase in direct flights and sea transportation between the
two nations. Businesspeople commonly make one-day trips across the Taiwan Strait. An effective
unification is already well underway in the economic realm.

Let our Glaser indicts frame your evidence comparison

notice that hes 70% of the evidence theyve read Glaser
is wrong about East Asia
A) Hes new to the topic he only recently switched to
studying China previously he studied Russia and
European countries which are fundamentally
different Glaser takes opposite positions from more
established and lifelong researchers of East Asia who
advocate for containment like Tellis, Blackwell, and
Swaine internal link turns the aff because it means
competition is better than cooperation [filters their
offense on the appeasement disad]
B) Glasers theory is ahistorical he uses the grand
bargain as an example of engagement not as an
actual policy option
An 15 David An, former U.S. diplomat who covered China, Taiwan, and
East Asia in the State Departments Political-Military Bureau between 2009
and 2014 where he helped coordinate several US-China Strategic and
Economic Dialogues and worked out of the U.S. Embassy in Beijing and
throughout East Asia, 2015 (Glasers Simple Idea: Trade Taiwan for China,
Ketagalan Media, July 15th, Available Online at
http://www.ketagalanmedia.com/2015/07/15/glasers-simple-idea-tradetaiwan-china/, Accessed 06-28-2016)

Third, Glaser seems to use Taiwan as no more than a convenient rhetorical

specimen for illustrating his theory, than a serious case study. Why just
Taiwan? Rational theorys logical implication of the US backing away from a
single smaller partner to prevent conflict with that partners adversary is also
analogous of Israel versus Arab states. Why didnt Glaser make the bold claim
that the US should abandon Israel, and thereby improve relations with the
Arab states, based on the logic of his rational theory? I am not advocating for
this course of action, but merely pointing out that such an idea is borderline
taboo since it would be career suicide to pick a fight against Israel and its
backers. His colleagues John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt caught much
flak for examining what they concluded was an overly influential Israel lobby
in the United States, far less than suggesting that the US break off support for
Israel.
Instead, Glaser targets Taiwan.
In short, Glaser, himself not an expert in the intricate histories and
personalities of the China and Taiwan conflict, tries to fit the case of Taiwan
neatly into a theory that has traded applicability for elegance. American
policymakers and academics should find that there is no need to think about
giving up support for Taiwan, because doing so will incur grave implications in
exchange for little to no benefit of possibly improving US-China relations.

Three implications to this

1. You start risk calc of their advantages at 0% because
he faces a higher burden of proof - even if Glaser is
right about 40% of his defensive realism theories
40% of his theories about engagement and 70%
about the importance of Taiwan thats a 0.112% risk
of the scenario let alone impact defense and other
solvency deficits
2. You prefer our evidence over theirs on the disad
even if Glaser is right about some things hes
wrong about fundamental aspects of the US and
Chinas positions in IR means you default to our
authors because theyve studied China their entire
professional career let Glaser act as an analytic
analysis instead of definitive evidence
3. You prefer the thesis of the DA over the aff Glaser
uses the bargain as an example while our authors
advocate for specific action towards Taiwan pretend
the aff doesnt have a solvency advocate