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ENGR. AHSAN ALI ABBASI
TOPIC #1 TAIWAN ISSUE: AT A GLANCE

INTRODUCTION
Taiwan, officially known as the Republic of China (ROC), is an island separated from China by
the Taiwan Strait. It has been governed independently of mainland China, officially the People’s
Republic of China (PRC), since 1949. The PRC views the island as a renegade province and vows
to eventually “unify” Taiwan with the mainland. In Taiwan, which has its own democratically
elected government and is home to twenty-three million people, political leaders have differing
views on the island’s status and relations with the mainland. Cross-strait tensions have escalated
since the election of Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen in 2016. Tsai has refused to accept a
formula that her predecessor, Ma Ying-jeou, endorsed to allow for increased cross-strait ties.
Meanwhile, Beijing has taken increasingly aggressive actions, including by flying fighter jets near
the island. Some analysts fear a Chinese attack on Taiwan has the potential to draw the United
States into a war with China.

WHAT IS THE UNITED STATES’ RELATIONSHIP WITH TAIWAN?

In 1979, the United States established formal diplomatic relations with the PRC. At the same time,
it severed its diplomatic ties and abrogated its mutual defense treaty with the ROC. But the United
States maintains a robust unofficial relationship with the island and continues to sell defense
equipment to its military. Beijing has repeatedly urged Washington to stop selling weapons to and
cease contact with Taipei.

TRACE THE HISTORY

The U.S. approach is governed by its One-China policy. It is based on several documents, such as
three U.S.-China communiqués reached in 1972, 1978, and 1982; the Taiwan Relations Act,
passed by the U.S. Congress in 1979; and the recently declassified “Six Assurances”, which
President Ronald Reagan conveyed to Taiwan in 1982. These documents lay out that the United
States: “acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of
China” and that the PRC is the “sole legal government of China” (some U.S. officials have
emphasized that the use of the word “acknowledge” implies that the United States doesn’t
necessarily accept the Chinese position);
➢ rejects any use of force to settle the dispute;
➢ maintains cultural, commercial, and other ties with Taiwan, carried out through the
American Institute in Taiwan (AIT);
➢ commits to selling arms to Taiwan for self-defense; and
➢ will maintain the ability to come to Taiwan’s defense, while not actually committing to
doing so—a policy known as strategic ambiguity.
The United States’ chief goal is to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, and it has
implored both Beijing and Taipei to maintain the status quo. It says it does not support Taiwanese
independence.
Through its policy of strategic ambiguity, the United States has for decades attempted to maintain
a delicate balance between supporting Taiwan and preventing a war with China. But President Joe
Biden has seemingly rejected the policy, stating several times that the United States would come
to Taiwan’s defense if China attacked. White House officials have walked back his comments,
saying the policy has not changed, but ultimately, the president gets to decide how to respond.
Some experts, such as CFR’s Richard Haass and David Sacks, and several members of Congress
have welcomed Biden’s statements, arguing that China’s increased aggression necessitates clarity.
Other experts have disagreed with this position.

HOW HAVE RECENT U.S. ADMINISTRATIONS APPROACHED TAIWAN?

Under President Donald Trump, the United States deepened ties with Taiwan over Chinese
objections, including by selling more than $18 billion worth of arms to the military and unveiling
a $250 million complex for its de facto embassy in Taipei. Trump spoke with Tsai by telephone
ahead of his inauguration, the highest level of contact between the two sides since 1979. He also
sent several senior administration officials—including a cabinet member—to Taipei, and during
his last days in office, the State Department eliminated long-held restrictions governing where and
how U.S. officials can meet with their Taiwanese counterparts.
The Biden administration has taken a similar approach, continuing arms sales and affirming the
Trump administration’s decision to allow U.S. officials to meet more freely with Taiwanese
officials. Biden was the first U.S. president to invite Taiwanese representatives to attend the
presidential inauguration. The United States participates in military training and dialogues with
Taiwan, regularly sails ships through the Taiwan Strait to demonstrate its military presence in the
region, and has encouraged Taiwan to increase its defense spending.
Also, Taiwan has received bipartisan support in Congress over the years, with lawmakers
proposing and passing legislation to boost U.S.-Taiwan relations, bolster the island’s defenses, and
encourage its participation in international organizations. The latest proposed legislation, the
Taiwan Policy Act of 2022 , includes designating Taiwan as a major non–North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) ally. In August 2022, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) visited Taipei—
the first speaker to do so since Newt Gingrich (R-GA) in 1997—and met with Tsai. Beijing
strongly condemned the visit and in response planned military exercises that effectively surround
the island and banned imports of some fruit and fish from Taiwan, among other actions.

HOW HAS CHINA TRIED TO INTIMIDATE TAIWAN?

China has employed a variety of coercive tactics short of armed conflict, and it has ramped up
these measures since Tsai’s election in 2016. Its objective is to wear down Taiwan and prompt the
island’s people to conclude that their best option is unification with the mainland.
To that end, China has increased the frequency and scale of patrols of PLA bombers, fighter jets,
and surveillance aircraft over and around Taiwan. It has also increasingly sailed its warships and
aircraft carriers through the Taiwan Strait in shows of force.

Taiwan has reported that thousands of cyberattacks from China target its government agencies
every day. These attacks have soared in recent years. In 2020, Taipei accused four Chinese groups
of hacking into at least ten Taiwanese government agencies and six thousand official email
accounts since 2018 to try to access government data and personal information.
Beijing has also used nonmilitary measures to pressure Taiwan. In 2016, China suspended a cross-
strait communication mechanism with the main Taiwan liaison office. It restricted tourism to
Taiwan, and the number of mainland tourists visiting Taiwan fell from a high of over 4 million in
2015 to 2.7 million in 2019. China has also pressured global corporations, including airlines and
hotel chains, to list Taiwan as a Chinese province. In addition, China has intimidated countries that
have ties with Taiwan: in 2021, China cut off trade with Lithuania for opening a Taiwanese
representative office in its capital.

COULD WAR ERUPT OVER TAIWAN?

A top concern among U.S. analysts is that China’s growing military capabilities and assertiveness,
as well as the deterioration in cross-strait relations, could spark a conflict. Such a conflict has the
potential to lead to a U.S.-China confrontation. That’s because China hasn’t ruled out using force
to achieve Taiwan’s “reunification” and the United States hasn’t ruled out defending Taiwan if
China attacks. The U.S. Department of Defense said in a 2021 report that China’s military, the
People’s Liberation Army (PLA), is “likely preparing for a contingency to unify Taiwan with the
PRC by force, while simultaneously deterring, delaying, or denying any third-party intervention,
such as the United States.”

However, experts disagree about the likelihood and timing of a Chinese invasion. The top U.S.
military commander in the Indo-Pacific warned in 2021 that China could try to invade Taiwan
within the next decade while some experts believe that such an invasion is further off. Others
believe 2049 is a critical date; Xi has emphasized that unification with Taiwan is essential to
achieving what he calls the Chinese Dream, which sees China’s great-power status restored by
2049.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in early 2022 reignited the debate, with some analysts arguing that
Moscow’s moves could embolden Beijing to similarly invade Taiwan and others saying that
Beijing could become more cautious after witnessing Russia’s challenges. CFR’s Sacks writes that
Russia’s actions won’t influence China’s willingness to use force, but that “Chinese leaders will
examine Russia’s failures and adapt their operational plans to avoid making similar mistakes.”

Regardless, the PLA has made preparing for a Taiwan contingency one of its top priorities, and
Taiwan has been a major catalyst for China’s military modernization. In a 2019 defense white
paper, the PLA said it would “resolutely defeat anyone attempting to separate Taiwan from China.”

Taiwan likely doesn’t have the capabilities to defend against a Chinese attack without external
support, analysts say. Even though Tsai and the DPP have prioritized increasing defense spending,
with a record budget of nearly $17 billion for 2022, China’s spending is still estimated to be around
twenty-two times Taiwan’s. In 2022, Taiwanese lawmakers approved the Tsai government’s plan
to spend an extra $8.6 billion on defense over the next five years. Part of this expanded military
budget will go toward acquiring cruise missiles, naval mines, and advanced surveillance systems
to defend Taiwan’s coasts.
TOPIC #02 QUADRILATERAL SECURITY DIALOGUE

WHAT DOES THE QUAD DO?

The Quad, officially the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, is a group of four countries: the United
States, Australia, India, and Japan. Maritime cooperation among them began after the Indian Ocean
tsunami of 2004. But today the countries—all democracies and vibrant economies—work on a far
broader agenda, which includes tackling security, economic, and health issues.
Over the years, the Quad’s diplomacy has waxed and waned. It is a loose grouping rather than a
formal alliance. Japan initially emphasized the democratic identity of the four nations, whereas
India seemed more comfortable emphasizing functional cooperation. Australian leaders have been
reluctant about creating the impression that the group is a formal alliance.
As of 2021, leaders in all four countries have become more aligned in their shared concerns about
China’s increasingly assertive behavior in the region and are more willing to define a constructive
agenda of cooperation. All four navies participated in their first joint exercise in over a decade in
November 2020. And in March 2021, U.S. President Joe Biden convened a virtual Quad meeting
attended by Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and
Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga. They formed working groups on COVID-19 vaccines,
climate change, and technological innovation and supply-chain resilience.

WHAT ARE U.S. INTERESTS IN THE QUAD?

Working closely with these countries is natural for the United States. Australia and Japan are U.S.
treaty allies, and India is an important strategic partner. The Donald Trump administration worked
closely with these countries, and the Biden administration is expanding the Quad’s agenda.
The Indo-Pacific spans two oceans and several continents, making it important to U.S. maritime
interests. In 2019, $1.9 trillion [PDF] worth of U.S. trade passed through the region. This year, 42
percent of the world’s exports and 38 percent of global imports are expected to pass through,
according to a UN report.
China’s growing willingness to challenge the regional status quo worries Washington, and
Beijing’s challenging of democratic values over the past year has deepened other Quad partners’
concerns as well. China’s pursuit of its regional interests—including its crackdown on Hong
Kong’s freedoms and criticism of nations that take issue with its actions—has not been slowed by
the COVID-19 pandemic. However, the Quad’s agenda is not all about China. Leaders of the four
nations also see a need for a more proactive approach to solving humanitarian and economic
challenges caused by COVID-19.
WHAT ARE JAPAN’S AIMS FOR THE QUAD?
Former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was a strong believer in the Quad’s power to ensure
a “free and open Indo-Pacific.” Abe worked to persuade the Trump administration of the value of
this coalition approach across the Indo-Pacific.
Japan depends heavily on open sea lanes for its trade with the world. The U.S. and Japanese
militaries already work closely across the region, and Japan’s Self-Defense Forces have slowly
built relationships with their Australian and Indian counterparts. Similarly, Japan has played an
important role in supporting investment in manufacturing, trade, and infrastructure development
across the region.
Japan and its Quad partners share concerns about China’s role in the region and Beijing’s
challenges to the rule of law. Beijing’s assertion of its sovereignty in the South China Sea, as well
as Chinese provocations toward islands China and Japan both claim in the East China Sea, has
made Tokyo wary of China’s military build-up. Strategic consultations with other Quad partners
are vital.
Similarly, Japan is watching carefully as China imposes economic conditionality on countries in
the Indo-Pacific, and it wants to offer Southeast Asian countries alternative sources of assistance
and commerce to offset China’s growing influence. Tokyo has joined with Washington and
Canberra to deepen the funds available for quality infrastructure. Bolstering the resilience of the
Quad nations, especially for critical supply chains for goods such as semiconductors, will also be
a Japanese priority.

HOW HAS CHINA RESPONDED?

China’s relations with each of the Quad members have become more tense during the pandemic.
U.S.-China tensions remain high; Beijing’s frustration was conspicuous when the new Biden
foreign policy team had its first meeting with its Chinese counterpart in Alaska in March. Australia
continues to bear the brunt of Chinese economic sanctions after suggesting a World Health
Organization investigation into the origins of COVID-19 last year. India and Japan have clashed
with China over territorial disputes. China’s ambassador to Tokyo has publicly criticized Prime
Minister Suga, claiming that the new Quad diplomacy reflects a “Cold War mentality” and that it
is “100 percent outdated.” In addition, recent polls have shown negative views of China have
soared among publics across the region.

Yet, few policymakers in the Quad countries see an advantage in trying to contain Chinese
influence militarily. Instead, the Quad leaders have emphasized cooperation across areas of shared
interest to bolster confidence in the democracies’ ability to counter China’s assertion of regional
influence. As long as tensions with China remain, the Quad’s agenda is likely to expand as the
democracies of the Indo-Pacific seek to balance China’s growing power.
TOPIC #03 NEW GLOBAL POLITICAL ORDER

INTRODUCTION :
Those who watch global politics agree that a new global order is emerging. It would replace the
one that came about after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and survived until the arrival
of President Donald Trump in January 2017 in the White House. The start of the old order was
brought about by the defeat in Afghanistan of what was then the Soviet Union. It followed the
withdrawal of its troops from the country it had invaded decades earlier. It ended when the newly
elected US president who proclaimed that he would make America great again by going alone.
The new order is bringing about a significant change in the way nations around the world are
organised. The question as to who would lead the emerging global order is now engaging several
thinkers the world over. There are two obvious candidates to lead the new system: the US and
China. However, the democratic system the US shaped after gaining independence from Britain in
1776 is now threatened by forces that are internal.

DEBATES OVER POST COLD WAR CHANGING WORLD ORDER

There is a growing debate among experts about the future of democracy not only in the US but
also in several other parts of the world. Today, I will focus on the possible role of China in global
politics and also on the direction the country is likely to take in the decades to come. What is
perhaps of greater significance is the global move away from democracy and western liberalism
towards greater autocracy. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, several political scientists
were convinced that the world had moved towards liberal democracy as the model of governance.

Forty years later, led by the US, the world has begun to rely on other political systems. President
Biden is attempting to take back the country to the old position. “It is the element of President
Biden’s foreign policy that overlaps most significantly with his domestic agenda: defending
democracy,” wrote Edward Wong in an essay published by The New York Times on Sept 6, 2022.
“His drive to buttress democracy at home and abroad has taken on more urgency as Russia wages
war in Ukraine, China expands its power and former President Donald J. Trump and his
Republican supporters attack American democratic norms and fair elections.”

In a speech in Philadelphia on Sept 1, 2022, Biden warned about the threat to democracy in the
US and said that American citizens were in a ‘battle for the soul of the nation’. Biden’s efforts to
bolster democracy abroad are about to come into sharper focus. The White House is expected to
announce a second multinational Summit for Democracy. The National Security Strategy could be
released in early Oct 2022. It will highlight reinforcement of democracies at home and abroad as
a policy priority. In focusing on building and strengthening democracies abroad, Biden and his
team in the White House were concerned about the challenge posed by emerging China.

As Dexter Roberts wrote for The New York Times, “in just over 40 years, the People’s Republic
of China has risen from the political chaos and poverty of the Mao Zedong era to become a
powerhouse on the world stage. Its unmistakable clout is intensifying its rivalry with the United
States over which country will dominate the global order and, crucially, which system will stand
as the world’s political and economic model: the authoritarianism and state capitalism of China,
or the liberal democracy and marketoriented economy of the United States.” The contest between
the two surviving superpowers poses the most consequential challenge in foreign affairs as we
approach the end of 2022.

China’s rise and the belief of its current set of leaders that their political system is better than the
West’s — it was better since it was able to deliver to the citizenry the goods and services they
wanted. This sense of confidence was not expected by some of the important scholars who studied
the country and predicted its evolution. About 20 years ago, Columbia University political scientist
Andrew J Nathan argued in an influential essay that according to a thesis in international relations
called “regime theory” authoritarian states are “inherently fragile” because of “weak legitimacy,
overreliance on coercion, over-centralization of decisions making, and the predominance of
personal power over institutional norms.”

Nathan’s prediction about the longevity of authoritarian regime proved to be inaccurate. This has
been the case in particular with the Communist regime in China. Why the Chinese system has
proved to be durable — the Chinese Communist Party celebrated the 100th year of its birth in 2021
— is investigated in a recent book by Harvard University’s Steven Levitsky and University of
Toronto’s Lucan Way titled Revolution and Dictatorship: The Violent Origins of Durable
Authoritarianism. It is a sweeping historical analysis of 13 revolutionary regimes including the
Soviet Union, Iran, Vietnam, Algeria and Cuba.

In their analysis, they find all revolutionary regimes that survive a long time “fostered the
emergence of a tight-knit core of leaders. Violent struggle also fostered an intense two-front siege
mentality rooted in fears of enemies from within and abroad.” Two German journalists, Stefan
Aust and Adrian Geiges, have added another book to the growing literature on China. Their book,
Xi Jinping: The Most Powerful Man in the World, argues that prosperity is a goal of both
Confucianism and Marxism. Xi extols the long history of China’s civilisation as far back as the
earliest philosophers and calls for the great “rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”.

The Western leaders who have reacted with the Chinese leadership have always been intrigued by
the Chinese reference to history when they are discussing modern world affairs. Henry Kissinger
put emphasis on this aspect of the Chinese political culture in his book, On China. A third book
by two Wall Street Journalists of Chinese origin, Josh Chin and Liza Lin, is titled Surveillance
State: Inside China’s Quest to Launch a New Era of Social Control. It examines the instruments
of state policy being used to keep citizens in line with the thinking and working of the state. China’s
authoritarian leaders are playing the long game and so far, it has worked.

Dexter Roberts in his review of the books referred to above concludes his analysis as follows: “If
the tensions of the Cold War with the Soviet Union served as any preview, the years ahead for
China and the United States will pose an array of geopolitical potholes as two superpowers with
vastly different political and economic systems vie for domination. Does Xi Jinping aspire to rule
the world?” Aust and Geiges ask at the end of their book. Their conclusion: “Xi Jinping is no
longer interested in following examples set by others.

He wants to put his own mark on China — and on the world. Whether he will ultimately succeed,
and what that mark might look like are questions that would ring throughout the corridors of the
White House, Congress and government capitals across the world for years to come.” They will
also ring in the government corridors in Rawalpindi and Islamabad. Ignored by Washington,
Pakistan has drawn closer to China and placed itself in Beijing’s orbit.
TOPIC #04 THE US AND EUROPE: FRIENDS OR FOE ?

The US is going through an intriguing historical time where structural requisites engender friction
with domestic demands. Internationally, the US is pursuing multi-spectrum competition with
China, and war withal returned to Europe after decenniums of relative tranquility. The US wanted
to engender a coalition to deter China and Russia. At equipollent, the US is pursuing policies such
as the green energy bill and other economic policies engendering friction with its European allies.
As a result of these policies, the European allies can become vulnerable and susceptible to hybrid
threats.

US President Joe Biden signed an immense package of green subsidies. Inflation Abbreviation Act
will dole out 396 in cooperating bungs as early as January, engendering rifts between Europe and
the US. This act gives subsidies and tax breaks to the products made in North America, or countries
such as Mexico and Canada will get a subsidy of $ 7500. In contrast, those electric cars whose
components are even made will not get these subsidies. The European politicians are limpidly
saying that Europe is not facing challenges just because of Russia, but they are facing challenges
due to the policies of Uncle Sam. The EU has listed 9 points in the Biden Inflation abbreviation
act that can breach World Trade Organizations Rules.

THIS COALITION WILL CHALLENGE DUE TO THE ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

According to the economist, due to the energy shortage in Europe, 100000 extra people can die.
European companies are reacting positively to the American subsidies. Northvolt, a Swedish
Battery Company, showed its inclination to expand its business in the US. In addition, Iberdrola,
a Spanish energy company, doubled its investment in the US compared to the EU. Basf, a German
chemicals giant, recently gave an orchestration for shrinking their business in Europe. Multiple
CEOs of European companies admonished that the EU can face mass deindustrialization.

The EU is additionally facing the challenge of an energy crisis. The European bellwethers are
going to pay the price of it. French President Emmanuel Macron won the last election; however,
they lost the majority in parliament. Many European bellwethers and he faces a winter of
discontent because of the low energy prices and looming recession. Albeit there was palliation in
inflation this month, inflation remains in double digits. Ukraine’s war showed that relying on
Russian gas is not a reliable concept for the EU.
First, the US wants Europe to take challenges on China, and concurrently, conflict with Russia is
threatening the security of Europe. The US is additionally pursuing policies that are nationalistic,
which are compulsory for domestic political stability. The US and Europe need to be more aligned
on significant strategic and economic issues. Furthermore, it will emasculate the US facility to
deter complex security challenges and engender a cumulated front against China. The US
additionally wants Europe to take a truculent stance against China. Europe remained reluctant to
follow the US when it came to China thoroughly. Days afore Biden came to puissance, China
secured a critical trade deal with European Amalgamation.

Albeit the Biden administration even endeavored to stall the deal till the last moment, the EU went
ahead with the trade deal. Albeit the US is fortifying Ukraine in the war against Russia and withal
NATO countries have joined hands against conventional and nuclear threats; however, deterrence
against hybrid threats becomes more impuissant. Recently, Wall Street Journal published an
exclusive story in which they verbalized Russia’s head of a propaganda agency verbalized utilizing
information warfare. The US also incriminates Russia of interfering in the anterior election and
spreading misinformation in the EU.
It can have a negative perspective on the security of Europe. First, resentment against the political
elite can spread out of hand. Furthermore, it can engender political instability against the political
elite in Europe. Other countries, such as Russia, can facilely weaponize the instability. If it
engenders political instability in Europe, then information warfare becomes facile. Secondly, the
EU has recently faced challenges cognate to populism, and France additionally faced yellow jacket
protests.

All these aspects will debilitate the trans-Atlantic coalition at a critical juncture when the continent
is facing war, and concurrently, the US is envisioning a coalition of democracies against China.
Facing threats domestically, the EU countries might intenerate their stance on China and withal
collaborate to truncate reliance on the US. The policy space for the US is additionally shrinking
because it needs to increment magnify its economy to abbreviate the possibility of returning Trump
or any other hardliner.

Before the Ukraine war, European institutions were under immense pressure and on the verge of
collapse. Recently, the French President visited the US and called for US cooperation in dealing
with collective challenges. Albeit the Democratic Party performed well in mid-term elections and
Trump’s popularity seems to be declining; however, Ron Densities like bellwethers are emerging
who additionally do not have a wildly divergent view about transnational cooperation than Trump.
It can withal increase the possibility of the return of right-wing populism in Europe.
 TOPIC #05 RUSSO-UKRAINE CONFLICT INTENSIFIES ENERGY
CRISIS IN EUROPE

Facing the worst energy crisis since World War II as the cold-weather heating season starts, Europe
continues to dither. European Union (EU) member states are majorly reliant on Russian energy
supplies, and a hitback on gas is a critical factor in the crisis caused by Russia’s invasion of
Ukraine.
Europe depends on close to 40 percent of its annual gas consumption on Russian supplies, imported
via four routes – Ukraine, Belarus-Poland, as well as the Nord Stream 1 and Turk Stream corridors
linking Russia to Germany and Turkey via the Baltic and the Black Sea, respectively. Because of
the war and financial sanctions imposed on Russia, supplies have been severely curtailed. Overall
Russian pipeline supplies were reduced throughout 2021, and producer Gazprom, the Russian
energy behemoth, has interrupted its gas supplies to Italy in what looks to be the latest iteration of
the dispute between Moscow and Western Europe over natural gas supply since Russia’s invasion
of Ukraine in February. Overall, Russia has banned gas exports to several EU countries and has
reduced flows through the Nord Stream I pipeline.
Resultantly, inventories in Europe have been at historic lows since last autumn because the
Russians had already cut back their supply. Low inventories, a perception of scarcity, and
unchanged levels of demand created the conditions for a perfect storm – a fear factor and actual
shortage, which drove prices up. During the winters of 2020-2021 and 2021-2022, Europe
witnessed a substantial increase in electricity and natural gas prices, as well as a scarcity of gas,
which led to greater use of coal and fuel oil. As the winter season approaches, rising prices
intensify inflationary pressures, limit post-Covid recovery aims, and aggravate millions of
Europeans’ energy poverty. Natural gas and electricity prices in Europe have soared to record
highs, forcing the industry to curb output and fueling a cost-of-living crisis.
Recent years have seen a slate of LNG projects canceled as the pandemic weighed on energy
demand, and an oversupplied market made greenfield LNG investments uneconomic. The
resulting lack of investment, coupled with the post-Covid rebound in global energy demand and
the Ukraine war, has sent the price of natural gas soaring – with fuel prices in Europe up almost
five times from a year ago. The lack of such investment is putting a heavy burden on both
producers and consumers.

QATAR EMERGES AS EU’S POTENTIAL SAVIOR – BUT FAILS!

As European utilities seek alternatives to Russian gas, these pressures reportedly led the UK to
hold talks with Qatar in November 2021 (months before Russia’s aggression) about a long-term
gas arrangement that would make the Gulf state a “supplier of last resort” to the UK. The state of
Qatar has emerged as a key pillar of the EU’s strategy. Russia’s weaponization of gas in its
confrontation with the West had given Qatar new prominence as a depoliticized source of energy.
At that time, Qatar, ostensibly at the request of UK’s Prime Minister Boris Johnson, dispatched
four LNG shipments that were previously unallocated to the UK to alleviate a gas supply crunch.

However, Qatar is unable to meet the gas demands of several European countries, including
Germany, given the volume of supply that Russia has been providing to the old continent in recent
years, which has been compromised by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the resulting European
sanctions imposed on Vladimir Putin’s regime, and by the recent disruption of the Nord Stream
pipelines caused by leaks, which have yet to be investigated to determine their cause and
authorship. Rumors and conspiracy theories abound over who would have a motivation to ensure
the leak. Jeffery Sachs a prominent American economist at Columbia University caused huge
controversy recently when he suggested that the US had much to benefit from the action.

EUROPEAN ENERGY CHALLENGE MULTIPLIED BY POLICY PARALYSIS

As a bloc that has often led the shift to cleaner energy, the EU faces the conundrum of building an
extensive LNG import infrastructure while making good on net-zero commitments – or steering
an energy transition during an energy crisis. The EU’s goal is to save 170 billion cubic meters by
2030 through energy efficiency and renewable energy. Europe’s failure to undertake coherent
collective action to sort out its dependency on gas imported from beyond its borders has been
worsened by the decline of its domestic production, which covers 42 percent of its requirements
down from 53 percent a decade ago.

In 2020, the EU the dependency rate (measured by the share of net imports (imports – exports) in
gross inland energy consumption) was equal to 58 percent, which means that more than half of the
EU’s energy needs were met by net imports. This rate is lower as compared with 2019 (60 percent),
which is partly linked to the COVID-19 economic crisis; however, it is still slightly higher
compared with the year 2000 (56 percent). Across the member states, the import dependency rate
ranges from over 90 percent in Malta, Cyprus, and Luxembourg to 10 percent in Estonia. In 2020,
the EU mainly remained dependent on Russia for imports of crude oil, natural gas, and solid fossil
fuels, followed by Norway for crude oil and natural gas.
European policymakers imposed substantial changes in the energy supply to rapidly transition
from fossil fuels and nuclear energy to renewable sources. Simultaneously, they overlooked
estimates for sustained demand for oil and natural gas, as well as the necessity for a reliable
baseload fuel source to supplement intermittent solar and wind. With the notable exception of
Russian gas, several EU member states reduced the domestic output of fossil fuels and restricted
imports. Germany, which has large natural gas reserves, barred fracking, as did France and other
countries. Also, Europe has rejected long-term import contracts, resulting in Europe being gas-
starved while being surrounded by some of the world’s largest gas reserves—not just in Russia but
also in North Africa, Central Asia, and other countries.

Furthermore, political uncertainty in the UK has exacerbated headwinds for European investors
already dealing with the consequences of Russia’s war in Ukraine, as well as global fears about
inflation and increasing interest rates. Prime Minister Liz Truss put caps on energy bills, which
among other things ended up creating a financial market turmoil in the country. The markets saw
it as a fiscally irresponsible act that has ended up with her and her new chancellor being perceived
as incompetent and is threatening her government.
Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, has outlined a set of new European
Union energy policies, including price ceilings, higher taxes on energy producers, the development
of a new European hydrogen bank, and new support for electric vehicles. Meanwhile, member
states of the EU are nationalizing utilities, fixing power pricing, and subsidizing consumers.
Europe’s energy challenge is immense and put into stark relief by the response to Russia’s war in
Ukraine. Cutting the ties that bind EU and non-EU nations to Russian gas and oil will be extremely
painful this year and in years to come. Governments across Europe have plowed hundreds of
billions of Euros into tax cuts, handouts, and subsidies to tackle the continent’s worst energy crisis
in decades that is driving up inflation, forcing industries to shut production and hiking energy bills
ahead of winter. However, analysts estimate that Europe will need to import around 200 million
tonnes of LNG over the next decade to phase out Russian gas. Germany, Europe’s biggest importer
of Russian gas, would need around 40 million tonnes of LNG alone to replace the 50 billion cubic
meters of pipeline gas it used to get from Moscow.
TOPIC #06 BIDEN ADMINISTRATION AND MIDDLE EAST

The Biden administration excels in scoring its own goals, nowhere more so than in the Middle
East.
Missed in the hype of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s recent visit to Saudi Arabia is that no part of
the world lends itself more than the Middle East to put into practice the administration’s vision of
a world in which the United States and China simultaneously cooperate and compete.
Yet, comparing the pomp and circumstance accorded Mr. Xi to the low-key, humbling reception
of President Joe Biden when he went on a pilgrimage to Jeddah in July to repair legitimately
strained relations with the kingdom demonstrates that US policy is backfiring.
Rather than ensuring a level playing field, US policy creates an opportunity for China
“China is making a long-term play, both for its own sake, and to stymie and confuse American
goals in Eurasia. China’s Middle Eastern arms sales mooted military bases, and yuan-denominated
futures contracts and purchases bring military and financial dimensions to Sino-US competition in
the Gulf. The US is not prepared for this challenge,” said scholar Lucille Greer in a just-published
book.

TO BE SURE, BAD BLOOD PLAYS A ROLE IN US-SAUDI TROUBLES.

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman will not forgive Mr. Biden for publicly holding him
responsible for the 2018 killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, albeit in word rather than deed, and
for the optics of the administration’s harsh verbal response to the kingdom’s refusal to push
OPEC+, the cartel of oil-producing countries plus Russia, to increase production.
Even so, the Xi visit, despite long-term Chinese ambitions, was as much about strengthening the
Gulf’s hand in demanding clarity on the future US commitment to Gulf security and wanting to
formalise arrangements as it was about China capitalising politically and economically on strains
in US-Saudi relations.
Gulf security is a Chinese, not just a Gulf interest, with the region meeting more than half of
China’s oil and gas needs. In other words, China, unwilling and unable to replace the United States
anytime soon, is as interested as Gulf states in ending uncertainty about US reliability as a security
guarantor.
Given the personal animosity between Messrs. Bin Salman and Biden, Saudi Arabia has left it
primarily to the United Arab Emirates to spell out what the Gulf wants from the United States.
Speaking three weeks before the Chinese leader’s visit, Anwar Gargash, the diplomatic adviser of
United Arab Emirates President Mohammed bin Zayed, insisted that “our primary strategic
security relationship remains unequivocally with the United States… Yet, it is vital that we find a
way to ensure that we can rely on this relationship for decades to come through clear, codified,
and unambivalent commitments.”
In response, the United States will have to do more than lay down red lines regarding networks
and critical infrastructure like senior Pentagon official Colin Kahl did at a recent security
conference in Bahrain.
To bridge the growing trust gap, the United States will have to respond in positive and confidence-
inspiring terms to Mr. Gargash’s demand.
Mr. Xi demonstrated his understanding of the efficacy of being attentive to Gulf concerns when
he agreed during his visit to a joint statement that stressed the need to “strengthen joint cooperation
to ensure the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program” and for Iran to respect “principles of good
neighbourliness.”
The acknowledgement was in line with Chinese policy but served as a reassurance to Saudi Arabia
given China’s close relations with Iran.
Saudi Arabia worries about an Iran that potentially is a threshold nuclear power and supports non-
state militias in various Middle Eastern countries.

TO BE SURE, THE UNITED STATES HAS LONG CONFRONTED IRANIAN

AMBITIONS
Nevertheless, the United States has an interest in being explicit rather than implicit in its response
to the demand articulated by Mr. Gargash, even if that may be a political hot potato in Washington.
Since the days of President Barak Obama, the US has fuelled doubts by its talk of a ‘pivot to Asia’
and Mr. Biden’s focus on the Indo-Pacific.
It takes a cursory look at a map to recognise that there is no viable Indo-Pacific strategy that does
not include its western flank, the Arabian Sea.
With the Gulf, the United States, and China in fundamental agreement on maintaining the Middle
East’s current security architecture, Chinese military sales, nuclear cooperation, and technology,
particularly its nuclear, military, and dual-purpose applications, are likely to be major frontlines in
regional US-Chinese competition.
That didn’t prevent Huawei Technologies from signing an agreement during Mr. Xi’ visit related
to cloud computing, data centres and building high-tech complexes in Saudi cities, despite US
warnings that networks and equipment produced by Chinese companies like Huawei could contain
technologies to gather intelligence that are embedded in ways that make them undetectable.
While the US dominates militarily in the competition with China as the Gulf’s primary weapons
supplier, it has yet to find an effective way in leveraging its advantage.
To a degree, the US is hobbled by its justified conditions on sales that have stopped it from selling
to Saudi Arabia cutting-edge killer drones and ballistic missiles – areas where Chinese weaponry
has made inroads in the kingdom.
With good reason, the United States also puts stringent regulatory conditions on its nuclear sales.

EVEN SO, THE UNITED STATES HAS TRUMP CARDS IT CAN PLAY
Beyond the agreement that the United States has a primary role to play and arms sales, it’s the
United States rather than China that is helping Saudi Arabia complete an overhaul of its defense
and national security architecture, the most radical military reform since the creation of the
kingdom in 1932.
The reforms aim to enable the kingdom to defend itself, absorb and utilize US weapons systems,
and make meaningful military and defense contributions to regional security, according to
political-military analyst and former Pentagon official Bilal Y. Saab.
“Through the vehicle of defense reform, the Biden administration has an opportunity to engage
the Saudis on critical national security matters while safeguarding US strategic interests and
honouring American values,” Mr. Saab said.
“It’s a wise form of US assistance that isn’t politically controversial, doesn’t cost much US
taxpayer money, and doesn’t require a significant US presence on the ground. It is perhaps the
only way to reset the currently tense relationship by gradually rebuilding trust between the two
sides,” Mr. Saab concluded in a detailed study.
So far, the US assistance has continued uninterrupted despite the strains in the relationship.
However, to put the relationship back on an even keel and secure greater Saudi and Gulf sensitivity
to US concerns, the United States will have to find a way to offer Gulf states the clarity and
commitment they need in politically feasible ways at home.
That could be easier said than done with an administration that often portrays an increasingly
complex world in binary black-and-white terms.
TOPIC #07 CHANGING SECURITY DYNAMICS IN MIDDLE EAST

Fading hopes for a revival of the 2015 international agreement that curbed Iran’s nuclear program
potentially puts one more nail in the coffin of a regional security architecture that would include
rather than target the Islamic republic.

The potential demise of the nuclear agreement, coupled with America redefining its commitment
to Middle Eastern security as it concentrates on rivalry with Russia and China, spotlights the need
for a regional security forum that would facilitate confidence-building measures, including
common approaches to transnational threats such as climate change, food security, maritime
security, migration, and public health.

Mitigating in favor of a firmer grounding of the reduction of regional tension is the fact that it is
driven not only by economic factors such as the economic transition in the Gulf and the economic
crisis in Turkey, Iran, and Egypt but also by big-power geopolitics.

UNDERSTANDING THE MATTER BETTER

China and Russia have spelled out that they would entertain the possibility of greater engagement
in regional security if Middle Eastern players take greater responsibility for managing regional
conflicts, reducing tensions, and their own defense.

Rhetoric aside, that is not different from what the United States, the provider of the Middle East’s
security umbrella, is looking for in its attempts to rejigger its commitment to security in the Gulf.

In addition to the emerging, albeit tentative, unspoken, macro-level big power consensus on a more
inclusive, multilateral approach, efforts by the major regional powers – Saudi Arabia, the UAE,
Turkey, Israel, and Iran, except for as it regards ties between the Jewish state and the Islamic
republics — to reduce tensions and put relations on a more even keel, contribute to an environment
potentially conducive to discussion of a more broad-based security architecture.

The need to focus on conflict prevention and improved communication between regional rivals
alongside more robust defense cooperation is evident irrespective of whether the Iran nuclear
accord is brought back from the dead, given that the covert war between Israel and Iran will
continue no matter what happens.

Israeli officials this month warned that an Israel airstrike against Syria’s Aleppo airport was a
warning to President Bashar al-Assad that his country’s air transport infrastructure would be at
risk if he continues to allow “planes whose purpose is to encourage terrorism to land,” a reference
to flights operated on behalf of the Iranian military and Revolutionary Guards.
Even so, the Biden administration remains focused on broadening responsibility for a regional
security architecture that targets Iran rather than an inclusive structure that would give all parties
a stake, seek to address root problems, and stymie an evolving arms race.

The administration has encouraged security cooperation between Israel, the United Arab Emirates
and Bahrain, the two Arab states that two years ago established diplomatic relations with Israel,
and Saudi Arabia, which has changed its long-standing hostile attitudes towards the Jewish state
but refuses to formalize relations in the absence of a resolution of the Palestinian problem.

The year’s move of Israel from the US military’s European to its Central Command (CENTCOM)
that covers the Middle East facilitates coordination between regional militaries. In a first, Israel
this year participated in a US-led naval exercise alongside Saudi Arabia, Oman, Comoros,
Djibouti, Somalia, Yemen, and Pakistan, countries with which it has no diplomatic relations, as
well as the UAE and Bahrain.

In March, top military officers from Israel, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Jordan, and Egypt met in the
Egyptian resort town of Sharm el-Sheikh to discuss the contours of potential military cooperation.

Similarly, the US, the UAE, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia are attempting to create a regional air
defense alliance. In June, Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz claimed the partnership had
already thwarted Iranian attacks.

Similarly, the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Israel are working on a fleet of naval drones to
monitor Gulf waters and ward off Iranian threats.

Furthermore, CENTCOM plans to open a testing facility in Saudi Arabia to develop and assess
integrated air and missile defense capabilities.

Scholar Dalia Dassa Kaye argues that focusing on confidence-building aspects of cooperative
security involving a dialogue that aims to find common ground to prevent or mitigate conflict
rather than collective security that seeks to counter a specific threat is one way of breaking the
Middle East’s vicious circle.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) patchwork of security structures, alliances
between external powers and individual association members, and inclusive regional forums
demonstrate that the two security approaches are not mutually exclusive.

The ASEAN model also suggests that, at least initially, a less centralized and institutionalized
approach may be the best way to kickstart moves towards regional cooperative security in the
Middle East.

Negotiating an agreement on principles guiding regional conduct on the back of exchanges

between scholars, experts, and analysts, as well as informal, unofficial encounters of officials,
could be the first step.
THE WAY FORWARD
To be sure, Iran’s refusal to recognize Israel and its perceived goal of destroying the Jewish state
likely constitutes the foremost obstacle to initiating an inclusive, cooperative security process.

The carrot for Iran will have to be credible assurances that the United States, Saudi Arabia, and
Israel will not pursue regime change in Tehran and recognize that Iran’s security concerns are as
legitimate as those of others in the region. However, even that could prove to be a tall order,
particularly if the negotiations to revive the nuclear accord fail.

Nevertheless, that may be the only realistic way of putting Iran’s support for militants in various
Arab countries, including Lebanon’s Hezbollah Shiite militia, various pro-Iranian paramilitary
groups in Iraq, and Houthi rebels in Yemen, as well as the Islamic republic’s ballistic missiles
program – the two major concerns of Israel and the Gulf states — on an agenda to which Iran is a
participating party.

Ms. Kaye argues that “despite these serious obstacles, it is important to present a vision and
pathway for an inclusive, cooperative process when a political opening emerges, or when a crisis
erupts of such severe magnitude that even bitter adversaries may consider options that were
previously unthinkable.”
TOPIC # 08 GLOBAL ENERGY SECURITY

We are in the midst of the first global energy crisis, according to the International Energy
Agency.
It says that because of it, tens of millions of people across the world may lose access to electricity,
or fuel for their homes.
Why have energy prices risen so high?
The price of natural gas has increased almost five-fold since the summer of 2020.
It has been selling on international markets for the equivalent of $250 per barrel of oil.
The International Energy Authority (IEA) says Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February is the
main factor behind this.
Russia has cut natural gas supplies to countries in the European Union by over 80% because of
their opposition to the invasion, and this has led to a bidding war for supplies of gas across the
world.
• What pushed gas prices to extreme highs?
• How Russia is cutting off gas to Europe
• How can the world cope without Russian oil and gas?

The price of natural gas was rising even before the outbreak of the war. As countries emerged from
Covid lockdowns, industries started using much more of it.
Coal prices have also risen sharply - tripling over the past year. That's because with the shortage
of gas, many power stations around the world have switched to using coal. instead.
Oil, the third major fossil fuel energy sources, has also risen in price as EU members, along with
countries such as the UK and US, have banned purchases of Russian oil.
This has created further oil shortages, and at its peak, Brent crude reached $125 a barrel.
The price is now at levels of between $90 and $95 a barrel.
The IEA says this year's energy crisis is worse than the oil price shocks of the 1970s because it
involves not just oil but natural gas and coal, as well.
It is also affecting the lives of many more people around the world - and especially in developing
countries.
Who is most at risk because of high energy prices?
High fuel prices have increased the cost of producing electricity, and the prices that consumers
pay for it.
The IEA says that in recent years, hundreds of millions more people around the world have been
able to afford electricity supplies for their homes.
But because of rising prices, it says, 75 million people may not be able to afford their electricity
supplies any more.
Hundreds of millions of people in developing countries also use canisters of fuel such as liquefied
petroleum gas (LPG) for cooking at home.
In Nigeria, the price of LPG has almost doubled over the past year.
The IEA says 100m people may no longer be able to afford using LPG for their cooking and may
have to use firewood instead.
This creates a health problem because wood smoke damages the lungs.
• Global cost of living: 'We left New Zealand - it's costly'
• How are other countries tackling energy bills?

How much are Opec+ oil producers to blame?

Russia is widely blamed for causing the energy crisis by holding back gas exports to EU countries.
However, the 22 oil producing countries in the Opec+ group (which also includes Russia) have
also played a part.
In 2020, Opec+ countries cut oil production by more than nine million barrels per day because of
falling demand during the pandemic.
When the pandemic ended and the demand for oil rose, OPEC+ countries only increased their
output slightly.
This created international shortages, pushing up petrol prices around the world.
At the start of October, OPEC+ cut output again, by two million barrels a day.
The IEA says the current energy crisis is even worse than in the 1970s
• Why are the world's big oil producers cutting supplies?
How can the crisis be ended?
Some producer countries have responded to the world energy crisis by increasing their output of
fossil fuels.
In the US, companies are expected to increase natural gas production to new record levels in 2022,
and again in 2023. Much of this will be sold to EU countries as liquefied natural gas.
However, Europe may have to endure a tough upcoming winter, with continued high gas prices,
before these new LNG supplies arrive.
The IEA expects renewables to be key in solving the world's energy shortages over the next few
years.
It says that by 2030, companies around the world are expected to be investing $2 trillion dollars a
year in clean energy.
It says by this time, the US could be producing two-and-a-half-times the amount of solar energy
and wind energy that it produces now.
China and India are both expected to ramp up their clean energy production.
By 2030, the IEA expects India to near its goal of producing two-thirds of its electricity from
renewable sources.
TOPIC #09 US CONTAINMENT POLICY OF CHINA

Imagine that a superpower declared war on a great power and nobody noticed. Joe Biden
this month launched a full-blown economic war on China — all but committing the US to stopping
its rise — and for the most part, Americans did not react.

To be sure, there is Russia’s war on Ukraine and inflation at home to preoccupy attention. But
history is likely to record Biden’s move as the moment when US-China rivalry came out of the
closet. America is now pledged to do everything short of fighting an actual war to stop China’s
rise.

It is not clear that corporate America, or its foreign counterparts, have fully digested what is about
to hit them. For decades, serious businesses have based their growth models on having a China
strategy — whether it be by exporting to China, or producing there, or both. Unless a company’s
product is, say, luxury goods or agricultural commodities, Biden’s technological decoupling will
hit their bottom line. His escalation also marks a final break with decades of US foreign policy that
assumed China’s global integration would tame its rise as a great power.

America’s conversion to China containment is bipartisan. It was one thing for Donald Trump to
target Huawei and ZTE, the Chinese telecoms conglomerates, and aim for managed trade. It is
another for Trump’s Democratic successor to isolate China’s entire high-tech sector. It is notable
there are no prominent voices raised in either political party against US-China decoupling.
Washington’s China politics is now about which party can get more to the right of the other.

There are two big risks to Biden’s gamble. The first is that America is now close to making regime
change in China its implicit goal. The new restrictions are not confined to the export of high-end
US semiconductor chips. They extend to any advanced chips made with US equipment. This
incorporates almost every non-Chinese high-end exporter, whether based in Taiwan, South Korea
or the Netherlands. The ban also extends to “US persons”, which includes green card holders as
well as US citizens. That presents a binary choice between America or China. Most will choose
the US. But there are tens of thousands of Chinese green card holders who will now be inclined to
believe Beijing’s claim that there can be no such thing as divided loyalty.

The hit to China’s economy will be far bigger than the word “semiconductor” implies. Biden’s
move draws on the premise that any advanced chip can be used by China’s military, including for
nuclear weapon and hypersonic missile development. It is also meant to undercut China’s goal of
dominating global artificial intelligence by 2030. But all such chips are dual use, which means that
the US is now committed to blocking China in all kinds of civilian technologies that make up a
modern economy.

In most American and many western eyes, such steps look like a fair response to decades of
Chinese intellectual property theft that has fuelled its military growth. In Chinese eyes, it will look
like the US wants to keep communist China permanently down. It is no great leap from that to
regime change.

The more imminent risk is that Biden’s gamble could prompt Xi Jinping, China’s president, to
accelerate his timetable for Taiwan reunification. The island state is by far the world’s largest
maker of high-end chips. That Biden’s move took place shortly before China’s 20th party congress,
which ends on Saturday with a likely third five-year term for Xi, is notable. Many China watchers
think Xi wanted to put the party congress behind him before turning to his vow of fixing the Taiwan
problem. Biden could have made a violent resolution to China’s Taiwan policy more likely. He
could equally have given Xi pause for thought. We will find out.

What we do know is that national security is once again the lens through which Washington sees
the world. Rest in peace “the world is flat” and the “end of history”. The US has endorsed a zero-
sum metric in which China’s rise is seen as being at America’s expense. You could say that Biden
is belatedly reacting to what China has been talking about for years — with increasing unsubtlety
by Xi. But that is hardly reassuring. It means that the world’s hegemon and its only serious rival
now see each other through the same lens. As is usually the case in history, nobody else gets much
of a say.

Will Biden’s gamble work? I’m not relishing the prospect of finding out. For better or worse, the
world has just changed with a whimper not a bang. Let us hope it stays that way.
TOPIC #10 CHINA-KSA STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP

From December 7 to 9, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Saudi Arabia. The agenda of the visit
was the China-Saudi bilateral agreement, participation in the first Arab Summit, and participation
in the Gulf Summit.

Both summits were arranged by Saudi Arabia, especially for the visit of President Xi. The state-
run Saudi Press Agency reported that China and Saudi Arabia had signed 34 investment
agreements within the framework of President Xi’s visit. The agreements cover “several sectors
in the fields of green energy, green hydrogen, photovoltaic energy, information technology, cloud
services, transportation, logistics, medical industries, housing and construction factories”. I think
the most significant agreement for China was the Huawei Technologies agreement worth $30
billion.

Chinese state media covered this visit extensively and hundreds of Chinese media- persons were
present in Riyadh for covering back-to-back events. They called the first China-Arab States
Summit one of the most significant events having taken place in the recent past. The summit issued
the Riyadh Declaration signed by heads of the state of 21 countries, announcing that China and
the Arab states agreed to make all-out efforts to build a China-Arab community with a shared
future in the new era President Xi delivered a keynote speech entitled “Carrying Forward the Spirit
of China-Arab Friendship and Jointly Building a China-Arab Community with a Shared Future in
the New Era” at the summit. His speech is a real roadmap for China’s future involvement in the
Arab world. He also attended the China-Gulf Summit comprising six gulf nations: Bahrain,
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. Foreign ministers of the member countries
attended the summit.

West seemed skeptical, and rightfully so, was that the Chinese President’s purple carpet reception
by Saudi Arabia is not something considered a routine diplomatic event. Saudi Arabia, a seasoned
US ally, exhibits clear signs that it has more options today compared to yesteryears. The demand
of the US for increasing oil production is already rejected by OPEC that sent a loud and clear
message to US allies in Europe that Washington has again botched down in diplomacy as was in
Afghanistan and President Joe Biden has to swallow the bitter pill of yet another catastrophic
diplomatic failure.

America tried its level best to get out of the crude oil dependency, starting from Libya to Iraq, and
Syria, of course. The oil hunt was done in the backdrop of the war on terror that was actually
portrayed as a war for peace. So it eventually dragged
the US into Afghanistan that became another Vietnam for it, but more drastic than actual Vietnam.
This oil poaching did not turn out to be fruitful for Washington and drained all its energies; and
constant terror-hunting provided ample time for China to build solid foundations for its future
strategic structures.

After fleeing from Afghanistan, Biden realised and said, “We are putting everything else on the
back burner and Indo-Pacific is our priority.” Nonetheless, oil starvation compelled him to visit
Saudi Arabia and he said, “We will not walk away and leave a vacuum to be filled by China.” In
my opinion, it was too late for a realisation of that magnitude, and Saudi Arabia cannot forget
statements such as “West Asia is not a priority, and Asia-Pacific is a priority.”

The US was in the dark that a priority and a non-priority could align to set their mutual priorities.
Western media is beating about the bush with a given script and I will quote, “Two authoritarian
nations [China and Saudi Arabia] are seeking new partnerships in a multipolar world.” The
excessive use of the adjective ‘authoritarian’ is a slapstick move to make the over-exploited word
‘humanity’. One analyst on France 24 went to the length of saying that China and Saudi Arabia
can get along well, as there will be no human rights issues to be kept in mind. He claimed
America’s intact humanity and reprimanding capability made authoritarian nations uncomfortable,
now they can play by their rules, putting humanity on the back burner. Western experts have even
given a name to the Sino-Saudi relationship ‘a marriage of convenience’.

Western media is not discussing how tired the world has gotten of putting up with Western
hegemony and desperately looking for new strategic alignment based on mutual respect and equal
benefits. The credit for China’s successful diplomacy goes to the US, which has created a vacuum
by bullying and harassing the rest of the world which will be filled eventually.

(Al Jazeera)
TOPIC #11 CHINA AND RUSSIA RELATIONS

ARE CHINA AND RUSSIA ALLIES?

China and Russia are not formal treaty allies, meaning they aren’t bound to come to the other’s
defense, and they are otherwise unlikely to do so in the case of Ukraine or Taiwan. But they call
each other strategic partners and have grown closer in recent years. At a meeting in February 2022,
days before Russia invaded Ukraine, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir
Putin said their partnership has “no limits” and vowed to deepen cooperation on various fronts. Xi
and Putin are believed to have a close personal relationship, having met with each other more than
forty times since 2012.

But some experts say the partnership is one mostly of convenience, where the main force pushing
them together is their shared perception that the United States threatens their interests. For their
part, U.S. leaders have in recent years characterized China and Russia as the country’s great-power
rivals “I don’t think China-Russia is a natural alliance,” Yale Law School’s Susan A. Thornton
says. “The deterioration of relations with the United States facilitates the driving together of China
and Russia.”

HOW DO THEIR FOREIGN POLICIES AND INTERESTS COMPARE?

The Chinese and Russian political systems have some similarities: Both are considered
authoritarian regimes with power concentrated in the hands of a single, long-serving leader. China
is a one-party state led by the Chinese Communist Party, while Russia is a multiparty system
dominated by Putin’s United Russia party. Both governments have increasingly cracked down on
domestic dissent and undermined the rule of law to preserve their authority.

They have also used subversive nonmilitary tactics to project their influence abroad and undermine
democratic norms. For example, Russia has interfered in foreign elections, including the 2016 U.S.
presidential election, through online disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks. Meanwhile,
China’s state-owned media organizations have moved to fill information gaps in dozens of
countries, broadcasting and publishing news that is favorable to Beijing.

China and Russia tend to back (or at least not oppose) each other at the UN Security Council, of
which they are both veto-wielding permanent members. Although they have different interests in
Central Asia—Russia has focused on supporting the security and political stability of allied former
Soviet republics, while China has focused on bolstering trade and economic development—they
have avoided conflict with each other and have collaborated on maintaining regional security
through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

However, there are major differences that shape their foreign policy goals and the tools they use
to pursue them. China’s economy is the second largest in the world, behind the United States’, and
more than eight times the size of Russia’s. And it is still growing, despite a slowdown amid the
COVID-19 pandemic. On the other hand, Russia’s economy, the eleventh largest prior to the
Russian invasion of Ukraine, had stagnated in recent years. Following the 2022 invasion, Western
governments hit Russia with unprecedented sanctions, which are expected to further hamper its
growth for years to come. These diverging trajectories have led some within the Chinese
government to see Russia as a weak partner, experts say.
China has greatly benefited from the current international order and seeks to reform it, rather than
replace it, to better suit its interests. Since China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001,
Chinese officials have touted the country’s development as a “peaceful rise” that aims to avoid
military conflict with the United States and its allies. It has worked to compete with the United
States, build economic and diplomatic ties with countries worldwide through its Belt and Road
Initiative, and promote a vision of win-win cooperation. Moreover, it has played an increasingly
active role in international institutions, such as the United Nations.

Russia, on the other hand, has flouted many international laws and norms in its actions abroad—
such as its election meddling, political assassinations, and cyberattacks—and experts have
described it as a rogue state. “Russia is much more provocative, while China is taking a more
careful, long-term approach when it comes to global competition with the West,” Georgia State
University’s Maria Repnikova says. She adds that although both China and Russia are contributing
to authoritarian trends globally, there is limited evidence that they carry out coordinated activities
to undermine democracies together.

WHAT ARE MAJOR CHALLENGES FOR THE RELATIONSHIP?

Distrust. Many Chinese and Russian officials, business leaders, and citizens maintain a mutual
distrust of each other. Although Xi and Putin are friendly, historically, the countries’ leaders have
not been close. Also, people in both countries have been known to express nationalistic sentiment
that diminishes the other, and Chinese and Russian companies have expressed difficulties working
with the other side. Though the countries share a long border, tourism and academic exchanges
between them are limited. The COVID-19 pandemic also heightened distrust.

War in Ukraine. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has put China in an awkward position. China has
not publicly provided Russia with military assistance in Ukraine (even though Russia reportedly
asked for it), knowing that doing so would trigger backlash from the United States and the
European Union (EU). Aiding Russia’s offensive in Ukraine would also violate China’s long-
standing policy of noninterference. But Chinese officials have refused to condemn Putin for the
war, and have blamed the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for
provoking Russia.

India. Russia has maintained a friendly relationship with India since the Cold War, supplying most
of its arms. But China remains wary of its neighbor due to long-running disputes over their shared
border. These led to a brief war in 1962 and other standoffs, including one simmering since 2020.

WHAT HAVE BEEN TURNING POINTS IN THE RELATIONSHIP?

The China-Russia relationship has experienced many highs and lows over the decades, but some
stand out. China’s and Russia’s adherence to Marxist-Leninist communist ideology initially
brought them together, with Chinese leader Mao Zedong looking to the Soviet Union as a model
for building a socialist society. In 1950, they signed a thirty-year alliance treaty. The Soviet Union
supported China’s efforts to develop nuclear weapons, provided the country with conventional
arms, and sent Soviet academics and scientists to advise the Chinese government.
In the 1960s, the relationship soured in what became known as the Sino-Soviet split.
Disagreements over communist ideology were partly to blame, as were the debate over whether to
develop relations with the West and Russia’s support for India. Tensions culminated in a
monthslong border conflict in 1969, in which Chinese soldiers attacked Soviet security personnel
near contested river islands. Some analysts feared that the Soviet Union would use nuclear
weapons against China, but it never did. By 1980, the China-Soviet Union treaty had expired, and
the countries were essentially cut off from one another.

Tensions began to ease in the late 1980s. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev visited Beijing in 1989,
marking the first formal meeting between a Soviet and Chinese leader in thirty years. Gorbachev
and Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping declared that they would normalize the countries’ relations.
After the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, China and Russia continued to foster ties. In 2001, they
signed the Treaty of Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation, agreeing not to use nuclear
weapons against each other and pledging to strengthen cooperation.

During the 2008 global financial crisis, China and Russia saw the United States and the West as
in decline. Together, they worked to boost collaboration with each other as well as with emerging
economies, such as Brazil and India through the BRIC grouping. (South Africa joined the group
in 2010, and it was renamed the BRICS.)

Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 greatly accelerated China-Russia cooperation, even though
Beijing did not recognize the annexation. As the United States and many others imposed sanctions
and shunned business with Russia, “Russia decided that it needed to look more closely to China
and turn to Asia,” American University’s Joseph Torigian says. Xi’s visit to Moscow in 2015 was
a clear signal of deepening ties, with the leaders signing more than two dozen bilateral agreements,
including on new arms sales.