The NATO alliance is stronger than ever

Shaffer, Acting President, London Center for Policy Research,2/4/19

(https://londoncenter.org/nato-is-now-stronger-than-ever/)

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is now stronger than ever. What was a Cold War relic is
now returned to service with renewed vigor and teeth.
Take it from NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg himself, who said that President Trump’s pressure on European allies to meet their
military funding commitments has had “real results.” “President Donald Trump is having an impact,” Stoltenberg told Fox News in a Sunday
morning interview. In all, Stoltenberg continued, “by
the end of next year, NATO allies will add $100 billion extra
toward defense. So we see some real money and some real results . And we see that the clear message from President
Donald Trump is having an impact.” When asked if he was concerned that President Trump’s tough rhetoric might be “helping Putin splinter
NATO,” Stoltenbergsaid the exact opposite is happening. “What I see is that actually NATO is united because we are able to adapt to
deliver,” he explained. “North
America and Europe are doing more together now than before .” For context,
U.S. defense spending amounted to just under $686 billion in 2017, equating to 3.6 percent of GDP. By
comparison, Germany spent around $45 billion on its armed forces last year, or 1.2 percent of GDP. For years, our NATO allies in Europe
have shortchanged the system and relied on the United States to foot most of the bill for our mutual defense, but President Trump shocked the
elites of Washington and Brussels by demanding that those countries actually meet their pledges to spend at least 2 percent of GDP on defense.
President Trump declared during the 2018 NATO summit that the United States will no longer tolerate other member states spending only a
little more than 1 percent of their GDP on defense while the United States “in actual numbers is paying 4.2 percent of a much larger GDP,”
saying this is not fair to U.S. taxpayers and “we’re not going to put up with it.” While some European diplomats initially reacted to the
President’s pronouncement with outrage, it’s now clear that his strategy is bearing fruit. The biggest loser in all this is Russia—a country that
spent just $66.3 billion on defense in 2017, a 17 percent decline from the previous year and the first year-over-year drop since 1998. That
means the $100 billion in new defense spending promised by our NATO allies in Europe is nearly double that of Russia’s entire 2017 budget.
President Trump is an effective negotiator—proof’s in the pudding so to speak. Despite political criticism (most of it free of facts) both at home
and abroad, his
insistence that our allies meet their spending commitments has made NATO stronger than
it’s been for years. His policy is strength. His Reaganesque view of security is necessary. His goals of protecting the interests of the United
States and our allies are being realized. Lt. Col. Tony Shaffer is a retired senior intelligence operations officer and Acting President of the London
Center for Policy Research.

US arms sales force conflict with China over Taiwan – Raising the stakes and making
peaceful resolution impossible
Chung, 18 – Lawrence, 10/31/18 covers major news in Taiwan, ranging from presidential and parliament elections
to killer earthquakes and typhoons; “United States wont allow force against Taiwan, new US envoy as Beijing piles on pressure,”
South China Morning Post, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/2171037/united-states-wont-
allow-force-against-taiwan-new-us-envoy-says CC

The United States will not stand by to allow any non-peaceful attempt
to unilaterally alter the status quo of Taiwan, a senior US diplomat has said in an
apparent warning against Beijing’s threats to retake the self-ruled island, by force if necessary. Washington
would also do all it could to help Taiwan rejoin some international organizations such as Interpol, the official
said, despite strong protests from Beijing, which considers Taiwan a wayward province. In his debut press
conference on the island on Wednesday, Brent Christensen, the new director of the US de facto embassy, the
American Institute in Taiwan, signaled stronger US support for the island in the face of persistent pressure
from Beijing against Taipei. “I am here to tell you that US policy towards Taiwan
has not changed,” Christensen said. “Any effort to determine the future of
Taiwan by other than peaceful means represents a threat to the peace
and security of the Western Pacific area and is of grave concern to the
United States. “We are opposed to unilateral attempts to change the
status quo.” Since Tsai Ing-wen, of the independence-leaning Democratic Progressive Party, became
the island’s president in 2016 and refused to accept the one-China principle, Beijing has stepped

up pressure against Taiwan, including staging war games around the

island and poaching five of Taipei’s allies. It has also demanded that
international companies, including airlines, change the title of Taiwan to
either a Chinese province or “China, Taiwan” to indicate that the island
is a part of China. The principle is part of an understanding reached in 1992 between unofficial
representatives of Beijing and Taipei that there is only “one China”, but each side would
have its own interpretation of what constitutes “China”. Christensen said that
as the new US envoy to Taiwan he would do all he could to promote security cooperation between
Washington and Taipei, saying “promoting security cooperation and improving Taiwan’s self-defense
capability go hand in hand”. He also said it was the US’ “obligation to support Taiwan in
maintaining a sufficient self-defense capability against coercion” and this
policy was consistent for both the Democratic and Republican parties. He cited the Trump

administration’s approval of two arms sales, including the US$330

million deal for spare parts for the island’s F-16s and other warplanes,
as examples of that commitment. He said one of his four priorities as the institute’s director
was to promote Taiwan’s participation in the international community. “As we face a multitude of global
challenges – the impacts of global health pandemics; transnational terrorism and crime; and the insidious
spread of disinformation, to name a few – we cannot afford to exclude a society [Taiwan] with so much to
offer the world,” he said. He said the US had long been a vocal supporter of Taiwan’s meaningful
participation in international organizations. “We continue our informal consultations and engagement to
allow Taiwan to have a more substantive role in the international community,” he said, adding that the
broader engagement would benefit the global community. He said he expected high-level US officials would
visit Taiwan in line with the newly enacted Taiwan Travel Act, which allows exchanges of top-level officials
between Taiwan and the United States. Christensen said the institute would move to its US$255 million new
compound at the end of this year and he hoped it would be a good chance for a high-level US official to visit .

Christensen’s comments are expected to again infuriate Beijing, which

has loudly protested against the US for supplying arms to Taiwan and
allowing senior officials to visit the island – acts the mainland says violates the one-
China policy that Washington committed to observe after switching official recognition to Beijing.

US-China tensions high now – nuclear miscalc prompts immediate US action

Lowther 13 William Lowther, Taipei Times, citing a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 3/16/13, “Taiwan could
spark nuclear war: report,” http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/03/16/2003557211. BZ.

Taiwan is the most likely potential crisis that could trigger a nuclear war between China and the US , a
new academic report concludes. ¶ “Taiwan remains the single most plausible and dangerous source of tension and conflict between the US and
China,” says the 42-page report by the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). ¶ Prepared by the CSIS’ Project
on Nuclear Issues and resulting from a
year-long study, the report emphasizes that Beijing continues to be set on a
policy to prevent Taiwan’s independence, while at the same time the US maintains the capability to
come to Taiwan’s defense.¶ “Although tensions across the Taiwan Strait have subsided since both Taipei and Beijing embraced a
policy of engagement in 2008, the situation remains combustible, complicated by rapidly diverging cross-strait
military capabilities and persistent political disagreements,” the report says.¶ In a footnote, it quotes senior fellow at the
US Council on Foreign Relations Richard Betts describing Taiwan as “the main potential flashpoint for the US in East Asia.” ¶ The report also
neither Beijing nor Washington can fully control developments that might ignite a
quotes Betts as saying that
Taiwan crisis.¶ “This is a classic recipe for surprise, miscalculation and uncontrolled escalation,” Betts
wrote in a separate study of his own. ¶ The CSIS study says: “For the foreseeable future Taiwan is the contingency in which
nuclear weapons would most likely become a major factor , because the fate of the island is intertwined
both with the legitimacy of the C hinese Communist Party and the reliability of US defense commitments
in the Asia-Pacific region.Ӧ Titled Nuclear Weapons and US-China Relations, the study says disputes in the East and South China seas appear
unlikely to lead to major conflict between China and the US, but they do “provide kindling” for potential conflict between the two nations
because the disputes implicate a number of important regional interests, including the interests of treaty allies of the US. ¶ The danger posed by
flashpoints such as Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula and maritime demarcation disputes is magnified by the potential for mistakes, the study
says.¶ “Although Beijing and Washington have agreed to a range of crisis management mechanisms , such as
the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement and the establishment of a direct hotline between the Pentagon and the Ministry of Defense,
the bases for miscommunication and misunderstanding remain and draw on deep historical reservoirs
of suspicion,” the report says.¶ For example, it says, it is unclear whether either side understands what
kinds of actions would result in a military or even nuclear response by the other party.¶ To make things worse,
“neither side seems to believe the other’s declared policies and intentions, suggesting that escalation

management, already a very uncertain endeavor, could be especially difficult in any conflict,” it says.¶ Although conflict
“mercifully” seems unlikely at this point, the report concludes that “it cannot be ruled out and may become increasingly likely if we are unwise
or unlucky.”¶ The report says: “With
both sides possessing and looking set to retain formidable nuclear weapons
arsenals, such a conflict would be tremendously dangerous and quite possibly devastating.”

2nd scenario is climate; there’s plenty of opportunity for US-China climate change co-op and its k2 solve
warming
Harvard Project on Climate Agreements, 02-2018’, " Bilateral Cooperation between China and
the United States: Facilitating Progress on Climate-Change Policy," National Center for Climate Change
Strategy and International Cooperation and Harvard Project on Climate Agreements,
https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/harvard-nscs-paper-final-160224.pdf,
MMC
 - What evidence do you have that disagreeing over arm sales means the US and
China disagree over climate change?
Over the past two decades, disagreements between developing and developed countries have often
frustrated efforts to reach consensus on an effective international response to the problem of global
climate change. Key disputes have centered on the appropriate prioritization of economic development versus climate mitigation,
responsibility for historic emissions versus contribution to current and forecasted emissions, and total emissions versus emission per capita.
While differences between developing countries’ perspectives and developed-country perspectives on
these issues are unlikely to be resolved in the short term, the imperative to move beyond these disputes
toward a more cooperative and coordinated approach to global climate mitigation is becoming urgent.
At this critical juncture, the recent joint announcements between China and the United States
concerning climate change actions represented an important development in global climate
negotiations and were appropriately hailed as offering a new model for improved cooperation between
emerging and developed economies. Given the size of the two countries’ economies and their large
contributions to global GHG emissions, the actions outlined in the joint announcements per se will have
a significant impact on future mitigation efforts —and, indeed, did much to facilitate a successful
outcome in Paris. By demonstrating these actions, China and the United States may encourage other
countries to increase their climate mitigation ambitions. This paper has identified three specific areas of international
climate policy, namely marketbased mechanisms, comparison of efforts, and trade policy and climate policy interactions, where China and the
United States can deepen their cooperation. Cooperation on marketbased climate policies, particularly cap-and-trade, is important, not only
because marketbased approaches offer the most cost-effective approach to mitigating GHG emissions, but also because emissions trading
systems make it possible to address equity concerns by adjusting the level of the emissions cap and the allocation of emission allowances .
A
logical focus for China–U.S. cooperation with respect to market-based mechanisms is capacity building.
A functioning cap-and-trade system requires properly designed government and market institutions. At a
micro level, the United States and China can exchange experience and expertise on topics such as allowance allocation, price ceilings and floors,
allowance banking and borrowing, and other detailed emissions trading rules. At a macro level, both China and the United States confront
challenges to implementing cap-and-trade systems— in the United States because of political polarization and in China because of features of
the regulated electricity market and the power of state-owned enterprises. Cooperation
and communication can help both
countries overcome these barriers, while also advancing theoretical and empirical understanding of cap-
and-trade and other market-based approaches. Cooperation on standards and procedures for comparing mitigation efforts
can strengthen the technical basis for other aspects of China–U.S. cooperation, particularly in the area of cap-and-trade systems, and facilitate
the linkage of homogeneous or heterogeneous climate policies. Cooperation
in this area can also increase transparency
and consistency in climate negotiations, improve trust among parties, and advance efforts to track
collective progress toward achieving global mitigation targets. But China and the United States have different
preferences and interests in terms of the scope and timeframe of mitigation efforts and other issues. Thus it will be important to recognize
from the outset that no single perfect comparison metric is likely to satisfy both countries’ needs. Instead, a suite of metrics is likely to offer the
best option for comprehensively reflecting and comparing the mitigation efforts undertaken by each country. More broadly, it will be important
to develop a rigorous, systematic, and transparent system for tracking domestic policy developments in the context of an international climate
policy framework. Interactions between trade and climate policy constitute a third important area for future U.S.–China cooperation. Reforms
can be initiated within the WTO and UNFCCC, which currently provide the dominant frameworks for global coordination on trade and climate
change. But China and the United States should also explore opportunities to advance progress in this area through more flexible plurilateral
and bilateral relationships. Cooperation
between the two countries to develop GHG standards and methods for
comparing the impact of domestic climate policies would be particularly helpful in reducing the
potential for future trade conflicts and facilitating the coordination of climate and trade policies. Climate
change has added a new dimension to a bilateral relationship that is already one of the most important
of the twenty-first century. While China and the United States have different national interests in many
areas, climate change represents an important area where their interests , and those of every other
country interested in the wellbeing of its citizens and future generations, converge. But the success of
the China–U.S. relationship in this arena will be determined less by the ability to find common ground
than by the ability to find solutions that properly address the real socioeconomic and political
differences that exist between these two nations. If an effective response to climate change eventually
requires the participation of all countries, despite their different cultures, states of economic
development, and political systems, successful China–U.S. cooperation under the hybrid Paris climate
policy architecture may well prove crucial in paving the way for broader international cooperation to
reduce the risk of global climate change.