Taiwan Negative - SDI 2019

CASE
*** CCP
IL---1NC
CCP response will be constrained
Sputnik 19 ---- citing Paul Huang who is an East Asian columnist for The Epoch Times and master’s
candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (Tufts University) along with Benjamin
Cavender who is the Director of The China Market Research Group and MBA (Columbia University),
“How Can Prospect of Taiwanese F-16 Procurement Affect US Trade Talks With China?” 3/26,
https://sputniknews.com/analysis/201903261073564311-f-16-taiwan/
Paul Huang, an East Asia military analyst, believes that China's verbal response to the sale of the improved F-16s will be
strong, but noted that its practical steps will be milder and "far more constrained". Benjamin Cavender,
principal of the Shanghai-based China Market Research Group, agreed with him, noting that Beijing has taken a firmer stance on Taiwan in recent years,
trying to downplay all demonstrations of the island's "sovereignty".
IL---Ext---No Retaliation
Large scale Chinese retaliation is highly unlikely and small-scale backlash has no
impact
Huang listed a range of possible responses from China if Taiwan's procurement of F-16s is approved in
the US. According to him, Beijing could cut ties between the two states' militaries, try to deprive Taiwan of its diplomatic allies, retaliate against companies
involved in the production of F-16s, such as Lockheed Martin and Raytheon, or even intensify exports of sensitive military technologies to countries of concern to the
US, such as Iran.
The military analyst also drew up two extreme scenarios, although he marked them as "highly unlikely". One
such scenario would have China cutting all diplomatic ties with the US, whereas in the other, Beijing would use the F-16 procurement as a pretext for launching
military action against Taiwan.
"It is extremely unlikely that the arms sales alone would be a factor in Beijing's strategic calculus in making
such a decision, however", he said.
The analyst noted, though, that most of these responses would either have only a mild effect or cause more
trouble for Beijing than for Washington or Taiwan. He said that the Chinese Armed Forces are getting more out
of their cooperation with their American colleagues than vice versa, and that military supplies to American rivals
would only trigger counter-measures from the US against China. He also added that measures targeting US
military contractors would have little effect , as their presence in China is minimal .
It’s empirically denied from the threat of sanctions

Tiezzi 15 — Shannon Tiezzi, Associate Editor for the Diplomat, Former Research Associate at the US-
China Policy Foundation, M.A. in East Asian Regional Studies from Harvard University, B.A. in Chinese
Language and Literature from the University of William and Mary, 2015. (“On Taiwan Arms Sales,
China's Bark May Be Worse Than Its Bite”, The Diplomat, December 18th, 2015, Available Online at:
http://thediplomat.com/2015/12/on-taiwan-arms-sales-chinas-bark-may-be-worse-than-its-bite/Accessed
9-13-16)
Interestingly, the promised sanctions against U.S. firms (which, as is the case today, were always a vague
concept) never came . That may be in part because two of the firms involved in the 2010 sale – Boeing
and General Electric – have major commercial interests in China. Actually following through on
sanctioning these companies would have been a serious escalation in an already-tense relationship.
In September 2011, the United States announced a $5.9 billion upgrade package for Taiwan’s F-16A/B
fighter jets, to a fairly muted reaction from Beijing. Once again, a vice foreign minister (this time Zhang
Zhijun) summoned the U.S. ambassador (then Gary Locke) to lodge a protest. Zhang warned the sale
would “inevitably” take a toll on the overall relationship, especially military ties. Yet, even though one
Chinese military officer urged China to “take revenge” in an article for the People’s Daily, Beijing didn’t
take major steps to retaliate for the sale. A few U.S.-China military contacts were postponed, but nothing
on the scale of 2010’s break.
Part of that, however, may have been related to timing – Beijing was unwilling to create a huge issue in
U.S.-China relations only a few months before a heavily anticipated tour of the United States by then
president-in-waiting Xi Jinping. Xi’s February 2012 visit to the U.S. was seen as a display of his foreign
policy prowess ahead of his actually assuming China’s top leadership roles; Beijing needed the visit to go
off smoothly. Meanwhile, Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou, who had spearheaded a warming of cross-
strait relations during his first term, faced reelection in January 2012. China’s leadership may have
decided to cut Ma a break by not lashing out over the arms sale, in the hopes he would win reelection
(and he did).
So, with that background, what should we make of this week’s reaction from Beijing? First, it’s
interesting that China summoned the U.S. charge d’affaires, rather than Ambassador Max Baucus
himself, to lodge its protest – that suggests a more moderate response. Military relations will likely suffer
in the short term, but given the intense work both sides have put into institutionalizing those ties since
2011, a serious break a la 2010 would be a huge blow, and likely farther than Beijing wants to go for the
smallest Taiwan arms sale yet of the Obama administration.
The proposed sanctions on U.S. companies are interesting, as it provides a new lever for Beijing to pull
when responding to these arms sales. And despite what many observers dismiss as pro forma responses
from China, it should be noted that U.S. arms sales to Taiwan remain the top issue of concern listed by
Chinese military officials when discussing the relationship. But Beijing has made the sanctions threat
before and not followed through – much as the Obama administration has yet to follow through on its
threat to sanction Chinese companies profiting from cyber espionage. The threat alone remains a useful
policy tool, and Beijing may again decide that warnings – rather than action – are enough.
CCP---1NC
No CCP lash-out or diversionary war
Hewitt 15 [Duncan Hewitt is Shanghai correspondent for Newsweek/IBT Media. He was previously a
BBC correspondent in Beijng and Shanghai, and also worked for the BBC World Service in London,
focusing on East and Southeast Asia. He studied Chinese at Edinburgh University, and first lived in China
in the late 1980s. His book ‘Getting Rich First – Life in a Changing China’ (Vintage UK, 2008) looks at
the social changes unleashed by China’s economic reforms. http://www.ibtimes.com/enigma-xi-jinping-
ahead-us-visit-chinas-tough-leader-beset-economic-social-challenges-2107893]
Victor Shih, a specialist in China's political economy and international relations at the U niversity of C alifornia, San
Diego, agrees that, in challenging times, “'Stability trumps all', as the Chinese saying goes -- I think this is more true today than ever
before.” Some observers have argued that a weaker Chinese leader, faced with a slowing economy, might be more
prone to provoking confrontation, raising the potential for clashes between China’s fast-modernizing military, and regional rivals
with whom relations have been tense, including U.S. allies such as the Philippines, Taiwan or Japan. The latter has just angered Beijing by
passing laws allowing its military to engage in overseas actions as well as simply self-defense, for the first time since World War II. However,
Lam says that a more chastened Xi may need “a foreign policy success” with the U.S. more than before --
making the chances of an accord on cybersecurity, foreign investment in China, or even some form of
agreement over the future of the S outh C hina S ea, a little more likely on this trip. “Xi is still strong -- no other
faction in China can threaten him at the moment,” Lam says, “but we have seen some dents in his armor, and not everyone is happy.”
A serious military confrontation with the U.S. over the South China Sea is the last thing Xi needs at present, Lam adds.
“A skirmish would cause panic in China," he says. "It would hit the economy, the stock market might
collapse -- and they can’t afford that.” Over the past two years, Lam says, the world has seen a more assertive China
flexing its muscles -- without planning to go too far in provoking others.
CCP resilient – no alternative, reforms solve, public polls prove support, and empirical
trends
Heath 15 ---- Timothy, M.A. in Asian Studies (George Washington University), Senior International
Defense Research Analyst at RAND, former Senior Analyst for the USPACOM China Strategic Focus
Group, “No, China’s Not About to Collapse,” The Diplomat, 3/13, http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/no-
chinas-not-about-to-collapse/
The CCP’s liabilities are well known. These include an antiquated political identity, cumbersome ideology, and widespread
disenchantment with Marxism among the public (and among more than a few party members). CCP-led government has failed to provide
adequate services, ensure rule of law, and has long tolerated corruption, malfeasance, and widening inequality. Many of these vulnerabilities have
persisted for years, and some have worsened over time. The party’s advantages are less often discussed, but these bear
reviewing if one is to evaluate the viability of CCP rule . One of the most overlooked, but important, assets is a lack
of any credible alternative . The party’s repressive politics prevent the formation of potential candidates, so
the alternative to CCP rule for now is anarchy. For a country still traumatized by its historic experience with national
breakdown, this grants the party no small advantage. To truly imperil its authority, the CCP would need to behave
in so damaging a manner as to make the certainty of political chaos and economic collapse preferable to
the continuation of CCP rule. A party that attempted to return to extreme Mao-era policies such as the
catastrophic Great Leap Forward could perhaps meet that threshold. But despite the numerous superficial comparisons in
Western media, little about the current administration policy agenda resembles classic Maoism. The
second major political advantage lies in improvements to the party’s effectiveness in recent years. In a
major paradigm shift, the CCP redefined itself as a “governing party” whose primary responsibility rests
in addressing the myriad economic, political, cultural, ecological, and social welfare demands of the people. It
has carried out ideological and political reforms to improve its competence and effectiveness accordingly.
The Xi administration has refined, but upheld, the focus on increasing the nation’s standard of living and realizing national
revitalization, objectives embodied in the vision of the
“Chinese dream.” Although the party has rightly come in for
criticism for moving slowly and inadequately on these issues, the policy agenda nevertheless appears to resonate
with the majority of Chinese citizens. Independent polls consistently show that the party has in recent
years enjoyed surprisingly strong public support. When weighing the party’s political liabilities against its
assets, therefore, the evidence suggests that the CCP faces little danger of imminent collapse . Improvements
to its cohesion, competence, and responsiveness, combined with a policy agenda that resonates with most Chinese and
the lack of a compelling alternative outweigh the persistent political liabilities . The party’s overall political
stability throughout the 2000s, despite massive political unrest generated by breakneck economic
growth, underscores this point.
CCP---Ext---No War
No lash-out
Gilley 4 – Bruce Giley, former contributing editor at the Far Eastern Economic Review, M.A. Oxford,
2004, China’s Democratic Future, p. 114
the risks, even to a dying regime, may be too high . An unprovoked attack on Taiwan would almost certainly
Yet
bring the U.S. and its allies to the island's rescue. Those forces would not stop at Taiwan but might march on Beijing and oust the CCP, or attempt to do so
through stiff sanctions, calling it a threat to regional and world peace. Such an attack might also face the opposition of the peoples of Fujian, who would be expected to provide logis¬tical
support and possibly bear the worst burdens of war. They, like much of coastal China, look to Taiwan for investment and culture and have a close affinity with the island. As a result, there
A failed war would prompt a Taiwan declaration of independence
are doubts about whether such a plan could be put into action.
and a further backlash against the CCP at home, just as the May Fourth students of 1919 berated the Republican government for weakness in the
face of foreign powers. Failed wars brought down authoritarian regimes in Greece and Portugal in 1974 and in Argentina in
1983. Even if CCP leaders wanted war, it is unlikely that the PLA would oblige. Top officers would see
the disastrous implications of attacking Taiwan. Military caution would also guard against the even wilder scenario
of the use of nuclear weapons against Japan or the U.S.47 At the height of the Tiananmen protests it appears there was
consideration given to the use of nuclear weapons in case the battle to suppress the protestors drew in outside countries.48 But even
then, the threats did not appear to gain even minimal support . In an atmosphere in which the military
is thinking about its future , the resort to nuclear confrontation would not make sense .
Qualitative and quantitative studies disprove diversion – Falklands and invasion of

Cyprus
Fravel 10 ---- M. Taylor, Cecil and Ida Green Career Development Associate Professor of Political
Science and member of the Security Studies Program (MIT), “The Limits of Diversion: Rethinking
Internal and External Conflict,” Security Studies 19(2), 10/26, available via MIT Open Access
The stakes in the validity of the diversionary hypothesis are deceptively high . As a domestic-level explanation of
international conflict, it offers one of several important alternatives to rationalist explanations of war based on the state as a unitary actor.6 Strong empirical support
for diversion would confirm another pathway to international conflict, complementing those based on rationalist approaches. By contrast, limited
support for
diversion would
cast doubt on one class of second-image theories of international conflict. Despite two
decades of renewed research, cumulative knowledge on diversion remains elusive . Quantitative studies
contain mixed and often contradictory empirical results regarding the relationship between internal and external conflict. Some
studies find a positive relationship between indicators of domestic dissatisfaction and threats or uses of force in analysis of U.S. behavior7 and in cross-national
studies.8 By contrast, other research identifies a weak or nonexistent relationship between these same variables.9 Indeed,
the gap between the intuition underlying diversion as a motive for conflict and existing quantitative research that Jack Levy
noted in 1989 continues to characterize this research program today.10 Given the mixed empirical results in recent
quantitative research, this article offers a different type of test of the diversionary hypothesis. In particular, I extend efforts to
employ case study methods to test the hypothesis systematically and against alternative explanations in specific episodes of
historical interest.11 Adopting a modified “most likely” approach to theory testing pioneered by Harry Eckstein , I examine two cases that should
be easy for diversionary theory to explain: Argentina’s 1982 seizure of the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands and
Turkey’s 1974 invasion of Cyprus. In these episodes, high levels of domestic political unrest preceded the escalation of salient disputes that leaders
could manipulate to rally public support or demonstrate their competence as statesmen. These cases should be homeruns for the
diversionary hypothesis, but they are in fact quite difficult for it to explain . In these cases, the relationship
between domestic political conflict and dispute escalation is weak at best , as the onset and magnitude of
social unrest was only linked loosely with decisions to use force. Leaders’ statements and reasoning provide
little evidence for diversion as a central motivation for escalation. Instead, a standard realist model of international politics
and the dynamics of coercive diplomacy offer a more compelling explanation of Argentine and Turkish decision making.12
Leaders in these states chose force in response to external threats to national interests, not internal threats to their
political survival.
The psycho-social explanation for diversion is illogical – This evidence also proves
your studies suck – rally too short/can backfire, selection effect dissuades, alternate
measures for peace – tons of history goes neg
Fravel 10 ---- M. Taylor, Cecil and Ida Green Career Development Associate Professor of Political
Science and member of the Security Studies Program (MIT), “The Limits of Diversion: Rethinking
Internal and External Conflict,” Security Studies 19(2), 10/26, available via MIT Open Access
My findings have several implications for the literature on diversionary war theory. At the most general level of
analysis, the lack of support for the diversion hypothesis in Argentina and Turkey complements those
quantitative studies of diversion that do not identify a systematic and significant relationship between
domestic politics and aggressive foreign policies, including the use of force.127 In addition, the modified most likely research
design used in this article raises questions about those quantitative studies that do provide empirical support
for diversion because it demonstrates that despite the presence of domestic unrest, the underlying causal
mechanisms of diversion may not account for the decisions to use force. The lack of support for diversion raises a simple
but important question: why is diversion less frequent than commonly believed, despite its plausible intuition? Although
further research is required, several factors should be considered. First, the rally effect that leaders enjoy from an international crisis is
generally brief in duration and unlikely to change permanently a public’s overall satisfaction with
its leaders.128 George H. W. Bush, for example, lost his reelection bid after successful prosecution of the 1991 Gulf War.
Winston Churchill fared no better after the Allied victory in World War II.129 Leaders have little reason to
conclude that a short-term rally will address what are usually structural sources of domestic dissatisfaction.
Second, a selection effect may prevent embattled leaders from choosing diversion. Diversionary action should
produce the largest rally effect against the most powerful target because such action would reflect a leader’s skills through
coercing a superior opponent. At the same time, leaders should often be deterred from challenging stronger targets,
as the imbalance of military forces increases the risk of defeat and thus the probability of losing office at home. Although the odds of
victory increase when targeting weaker states, success should have a much more muted effect on
domestic support, if any, because victory would have been expected .130 Third, weak or embattled leaders can
choose from a wide range of policy options to strengthen their standing at home. Although scholars such as Oakes
and Gelpi have noted that embattled leaders can choose repression or economic development in addition to
diversionary action, the range of options is even greater and carries less risk than the failure of diversion.
Weak leaders can also seek to deepen cooperation with other states if they believe it will strengthen their position at home.
Other studies, for example, have demonstrated that political unrest facilitated détente among the superpowers in
the early 1970s, China’s concessions in its many territorial disputes, support for international financial
liberalization, and the formation of regional organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian States and the Gulf
Cooperation Council. 131 The findings from these two cases also carry implications for future empirical tests of the
diversionary hypothesis and the broader relationship between internal and external conflict. To start, given the
common view within the field of international relations that some past conflicts are best explained by diversionary motives, additional case
studies are needed to test diversionary claims against plausible alternative explanations . In other cases
that scholars have cast as diversionary, for example, evidence exists that casts doubt upon the hypothesis .
Historian Arno Mayer, among others, is often cited as providing support for diversion through his argument that domestic crises
accounted for key decisions leading to the outbreak of World War I (as well as other conflicts) in Europe.132 Yet in
his analysis of German decision making before 1914, Dale Copeland finds leadership statements that disconfirm the
diversionary hypothesis. As early as 1905-06, for instance, Admiral Tirpitz concluded that war in Europe would only
“cause chaos at home,” not increase societal cohesion.133 Similarly, the 1904-05 Russo-Japanese war is often
mentioned as another example of diversion. One of the key pieces of evidence to support his claim comes from a memoir of a Russian
official, Count Sergei Witte, who quotes V. K. Pleve, minister of the interior at the time, as stating that “we need a little victorious war to stem
the tide of revolution.”134 Geoffrey Blainey notes, however , numerous problems with this statement as evidence of
Russian decision making: the quote appeared in a memoir that was penned eight years later, Witte and Pleve were rivals, and Witte in
other parts of the memoir that analyzes the war includes no other statements that would support a diversionary explanation.135 These two
examples suggest that a thorough audit of other diversionary cases would be helpful . In addition, although
smoking-gun evidence in leadership statements may be impossible to find, scholars
can use case study methods to test
diversionary arguments against alternative explanations. In particular, scholars can trace changes in the domestic political
environment with foreign policy decision making to identify a clear relationship between domestic political strife and plans to threaten or use
force. Scholars can also examine leadership statements for evidence consistent with diversion, such as concern about their domestic political
standing or the anticipated effects of an external conflict on domestic politics.
CCP---Ext---Resilient
They’ll adapt
Thompson 15 – Neil, MA in International Relations of East Asia, December 1, "Is Fear of People
Power Turning the Chinese Communist Party from Red to Green?",
Nonetheless regular public scandals over pollution and the mass protests they spawn show that there is public demand at home
for China’s one-party system to take some responsibility in setting and enforcing standards to tackle the issue. The
protests unite China’s growing middle classes with its poor migrant laborers, and its more privileged city dwellers with the hard-scrabble rural
peasants out in the countryside. Despite China’s extensive censorship and pervasive security forces, protests about social conditions
break out across the country with monotonous regularity . The government’s response is often to clamp down on
the organizers but also to offer local concessions to appease the demonstrators. China’s huge internal security budget reveals
that the Party is uneasy about the ferment of social changes it has unleashed with its modernization of the country.
Protests in China are no longer illegal so long as they do not call for the downfall of the CCP but attending them can be risky. Despite this tens of
thousands of single issue protests break out across the country every year according to human rights groups, the vast majority concerned with
corruption, development concerns or environmental problems. For all China is a one-party state, the
regime of Xi Jinping is keen to
stay ahead of the issues that matter to the Chinese public, as shown by his draconian anticorruption
campaign since coming to power. The idea of a nation-wide green movement taking off in the country that could not be
assuaged by closing an unpopular chemical plant or sacking a hated local government official is anathema to Beijing.
President Xi Jinping has therefore shown himself to be more inclined to take green issues into account than his
predecessors, who focused more closely on economic development. He has committed to capping carbon emissions by 2030
and turning to renewable sources for 20 percent of the country’s energy. By 2013 China had even become the world’s largest
producer of wind and solar power. Increasingly the CCP must balancing its mission to lift the many more millions of Chinese who remain in
grinding poverty against the costs of climate change and pollution that creating this wealth often entails. With a growing middle class
increasingly outspoken about living in smog-ridden cities reminiscent of the early industrial revolution, Beijing is looking at radical changes in
how its economy operates. Some observers think that China has realized it must go green for its own survival, but just as likely is that the CCP
has calculated that, as with corruption , the limits of public tolerance for pollution, public health scandals and
massive industrial accidents has been tested to dangerous limits. Since 1989 Chinese politics has worked on the
operating principle that popular discontent must never be allowed to build up unchecked . The Arab Spring
protests of 2010-11 which swept away a clutch of fossilized and underperforming authoritarian regimes in the Middle East with a wave of street
protests were seen as a warning in Beijing. As a result it stepped up repression of civil society activists including
environmental activists, anticorruption campaigners or defense lawyers, but scrutinized many of their concerns more intently. Beijing’s
monopoly on political power still rests on showing that it can deliver economic growth and rising living standards. But the costs of a rapid
industrial development, and the attendant explosion of consumerism among 1.5 billion people have taken their toll. Under Xi Jinping it has
become a mature middle-sized economy that is now pondering what kind of society it would like to be by 2050. Affluence is creating more
interest in social issues. People power movements are already a well-established phenomenon in local politics in China going back many years,
but there has been no national movement since the suppression of pro-democracy protestors in 1989. The CCP fears that allowing any widespread
organization on social issues will quickly turn political and lead to the overthrow of the communist system. It cites examples such as the Polish
Solidarity trade union movement which led to the eventual democratization of Poland over of the course of the 1980s or the more recent Color
Revolutions. Unlike various secular Arab regimes however, the CCP has long proved adept at anticipating and diffusing
popular concerns before they become a mortal threat to the Party’s political survival . The
suppression of pro-democracy protests stalled but did not stop a pre-existing economic program to develop the
Chinese economy. Once rising living standards had been achieved and official corruption was becoming a pressing issue the
Party moved to clean up these Augean stables itself, without subjecting CCP cadres to an independent judiciary. It had
already begun to soften its rhetoric on global warming under the previous leadership team around Hu Jintao. There is no reason to
suppose that as green issues becomes more important globally and locally that the leadership of the CCP
will not move to co-opt and ingratiate itself with the movements that emerge to tackle it. Whether this will help or
harm the cause of green politics in China itself will be determined by the CCP’s ability to deliver on its promises. If Beijing cannot, it may find
itself facing the very public protests it is currently trying to head off.
Empirics
Pei, 09 – Minxin, Senior Associate in the China Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, 3/12. “Will the Chinese Communist Party Survive the Crisis?” Foreign Affairs.
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64862/minxin-pei/will-the-chinese-communist-party-survive-the-
crisis
It might seem reasonable to expect that challenges from the disaffected urban middle class, frustrated college graduates, and unemployed
migrants will constitute the principal threat to the party's rule. If those groups were in fact to band together in a powerful coalition, then the
world's longest-ruling party would indeed be in deep trouble. But that is not going to happen. Such a revolutionary scenario
overlooks two critical forces blocking political change in China and similar authoritarian political systems: the
regime's capacity for repression and the unity among the elite. Economic crisis and social unrest may
make it tougher for the CCP to govern, but they will not loosen the party's hold on power. A glance at
countries such as Zimbabwe, North Korea, Cuba, and Burma shows that a relatively unified elite in control of
the military and police can cling to power through brutal force, even in the face of abysmal economic
failure. Disunity within the ruling elite, on the other hand, weakens the regime's repressive capacity and usually spells the rulers' doom. The
CCP has already demonstrated its remarkable ability to contain and suppress chronic social protest and
small-scale dissident movements. The regime maintains the People's Armed Police , a well-trained and well-
equipped anti-riot force of 250,000. In addition, China's secret police are among the most capable in the world and are
augmented by a vast network of informers. And although the Internet may have made control of information more difficult, Chinese
censors can still react quickly and thoroughly to end the dissemination of dangerous news. Since the Tiananmen
crackdown, the Chinese government has greatly refined its repressive capabilities. Responding to tens of thousands of riots each
year has made Chinese law enforcement the most experienced in the world at crowd control and
dispersion. Chinese state security services have applied the tactic of "political decapitation" to great effect, quickly arresting protest leaders
and leaving their followers disorganized, demoralized, and impotent. If worsening economic conditions lead to a potentially explosive political
situation, the party will stick to these tried-and-true practices to ward off any organized movement against the regime.
Democracy---1NC
Election interference now
Rogin 18 ---- Josh, political analyst for The Washington Post and CNN, foreign policy and national
security for Bloomberg View, B.A. in international affairs (George Washington University's Elliott School
of International Affairs), former military reporting fellow with the Knight Center for Specialized
Journalism, “China’s Interference in the 2018 Elections Succeeded — in Taiwan,” The Washington Post,
12/18, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2018/12/18/chinas-interference-elections-succeeded-
taiwan/
While Washington is focused on Russian election interference, China

is rapidly advancing its own election-meddling capability
using social media, illicit funding and false news. The Chinese government’s massive and successful
interference in Taiwan’s elections last month shows Beijing is getting into the game in a major way .
Washington is slowly but surely waking up to China’s multifaceted foreign influence operations. But many here remain skeptical about the threat of Beijing’s direct
interference in American politics. The Trump administration said Beijing interfered in the 2018 U.S. midterm elections, but there wasn’t a ton of visible evidence.
After what just happened in Taiwan, however, few can now argue that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) doesn’t have
the means and the motive to perpetrate such acts.
“CCP attempts to erode democratic processes and norms around the world threaten U.S. partnerships
and prosperity,” six U.S. senators, led by Catherine Cortez Masto (D-Nev.) and Marco Rubio (R-Fla.), wrote last week in a letter to Secretary of State Mike
Pompeo, Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin, Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats and FBI Director Christopher Wray. “Allegations such as
those surrounding Taiwan’s recent elections must therefore be pursued with seriousness and urgency.”
The senators asked the Trump administration to work with Taiwanese authorities to investigate events leading up to the November
elections that saw sweeping losses for the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and its leader President Tsai Ing-wen. Beijing
carried out a massive propaganda and social media campaign that spread false news designed to undermine
Tsai’s government . The CCP refuses to deal with Tsai in objection to her cross-Strait policies.
Tsai futilely urged Taiwanese citizens to see Beijing’s effort for what it was — a Russian-style influence
campaign . The island’s 23 million citizens were bombarded with anti-Tsai and anti-DPP content through Facebook,
Twitter and online chat groups, promoted by China’s “50-cent army” of paid social media trolls. There are also dozens of investigations into
allegations that Chinese money went to fund Taiwanese candidates opposing Tsai and the DPP.
“If true, CCP interference in Taiwan’s elections would be deeply concerning not only for Taiwan’s future, but also for
fellow democracies around the world where the CCP may choose to interfere,” the senators wrote. “In an era of growing authoritarian
interference, we believe such allegations must be taken seriously if free societies are to continue to thrive.”
Alt causes – Beijing has other strategies for Taiwan that kill democracy
taiwan/
The Chinese government is bribing or coercing foreign governments to break diplomatic relations with
Taiwan, pressuring them to evict Taiwan from international organizations. Beijing is also threatening
foreign companies unless they literally erase Taiwan from their websites. Their ultimate goal is to dissolve the U.S.-
Taiwan partnership and subjugate the island to the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
“The PRC is engaged in an intensifying political warfare campaign that is aimed at isolating Taiwan by
suppressing the island’s international space so that all roads in and out must go through Beijing, while directly interfering with the island’s
political process by manipulating social and political tensions to subvert its democratic system,” said
Russell Hsiao, executive director of the Global Taiwan Institute.
That’s a foreign policy issue that Washington should address for its own sake. But the fact that Beijing is using Russian-style
political interference tools should prompt a full-scale national security alarm. The capabilities Beijing is honing in Taiwan could do huge damage if applied to the
United States. China is testing them on a country it knows well but preparing for their use around the world.
Democracy resilient – overwhelming public backing supports gains

Wollack 16 ---- Kenneth, president of the National Democratic Institute, former co-editor of the Middle
East Policy Survey, former senior fellow at UCLA’s School for Public Affairs, “How Resilient is
Democracy?” This text is the transcript from an interview with Alexander Heffner, PBS – The Open
Mind, 10/15, http://www.thirteen.org/openmind/government/how-resilient-is-democracy/5553/
Well I think we’re seeing a number of phenomena that take place. Um, first of all you have new democracies around the
world, that are struggling to deliver for its people. New institutions, political institutions that for the first time have legitimacy among the people, but in order to
succeed and sustain their democratic system, they have to deliver on quality of life issues for, for the entire population. And if those institutions don’t deliver in many
of these new democracies that have emerged over the last forty years, uh, then you’re gonna see backsliding and people will either go to the streets or vote for a
populist demagogue who promises to bring sort of instant solutions to their problems. And then in non-democratic countries, you have what is
called authoritarian learning, and that is autocrats today that are smarter than they were before, uh, that are fearful of diffusion of political power, uh,
fearful of losing power themselves. Um, and they are using uh, traditional means and new legal means in which to repress the population, prevent the emergence of
civil society, and not to speak of opposition political parties. And then you
have a situation that you see in a number of countries in the Middle East where you
have a sectarian strife and conflict. Uh, but in all of these situations, what you find is democratic resilience . That
people around the world basically want the same thing. They want to put food on their table, uh, they want to have
jobs and shelter and they want a political voice . And that, those aspirations and those hopes, uh, and those desires as I said are
universal, and if you look at public opinion polls around the world , uh, people do want to have
democratic systems that allow them to participate in the political life of their country. And that is, we are in
the optimism business , and we believe in people and I think that ultimately those efforts, um, will, will succeed . But they
need a lot of support, they need backing, um, uh, in order for uh, some very brave and courageous people to, to move the democratic for—uh, process forward in some
of the most unlikely places in the world.
Democracy doesn’t cause peace – statistical models are spurious and don’t assume
economic growth
Mousseau, 12 (Michael – Professor IR Koç University, “The Democratic Peace Unraveled: It’s the
Economy” International Studies Quarterly, p 1-12)
Model 2 presents new knowledge by adding the control for economic type. To capture the dyadic expectation of peace among contract-intensive nations, the variable Contract- intensive
EconomyL (CIEL) indicates the value of impersonal contracts in force per capita of the state with the lower level of CIE in the dyad; a high value of this measure indicates both states have
contract-intensive economies. As can be seen, the coefficient for CIEL ()0.80) is negative and highly significant. This corroborates that impersonal economy is a highly robust force for peace.
The coefficient for DemocracyL is now at zero. There are no other differences between Models 1 and 2, whose samples are identical, and no prior study corroborating the democratic peace has
considered contractintensive economy. Therefore, the standard econometric inference to be drawn from Model 2 is the nontrivial result that all prior reports of
democracy as a force for peace are probably spurious, since this result is predicted and fully
accounted for by economic norms theory. CIEL and DemocracyL correlate only in the moderate range
of 0.47 (Pearson’s r), so the insignificance of democracy is not likely to be a statistical artifact of
multicollinearity. This is corroborated by the variance inflation factor for DemocracyL in Model 2 of 1.85, which is well below the usual rule-of-thumb indicator of
multicollinearity of 10 or more. Nor should readers assume most democratic dyads have both states with impersonal economies: While almost all nations with contract-intensive economies (as
indicated with the binary measure for CIE) are democratic (Polity2 > 6) (Singapore is the only long-term exception), more than half—55%—of all democratic nation-years have contract-poor
economies. At the dyadic level in this sample, this translates to 80% of democratic dyads (all dyads where DemocracyBinary6 = 1) that have at least one state with a contract-poor economy. In
not only does Model 2 show no evidence of causation from democracy to peace (as reported in
other words,
Mousseau 2009), but it also illustrates that this absence of democratic peace includes the vast majority—80%—
of democratic dyad-years over the sample period. Nor is it likely that the causal arrow is reversed—with
democracy being the ultimate cause of contract-intensive economy and peace. This is because correlations
among independent variables are not calculated in the results of multivariate regressions: Coefficients
show only the effect of each variable after the potential effects of the others are kept constant at their mean
levels. If it was democracy that caused both impersonal economy and peace, then there would be some
variance in DemocracyL remaining, after its partial correlation with CIEL is excluded, that links it directly with peace. The
positive direction of the coefficient for DemocracyL informs us that no such direct effect exists (Blalock
1979:473–474). Model 3 tests for the effect of DemocracyL if a control is added for mixed-polity dyads, as suggested by Russett (2010:201). As discussed above, to avoid problems of
mathematical endogeneity, I adopt the solution used by Mousseau, Orsun and Ungerer (2013) and measure regime difference as proposed by Werner (2000), drawing on the subcomponents of
the Polity2 regime measure. As can be seen, the coefficient for Political Distance (1.00) is positive and significant, corroborating that regime mixed dyads do indeed have more militarized
conflict than others. Yet, the inclusion of this term has no effect on the results that concern us here: CIEL ()0.85) is now even more robust, and the coefficient for DemocracyL (0.03) is above
zero.7 Model 4 replaces the continuous democracy measure with the standard binary one (Polity2 > 6), as suggested by Russett (2010:201), citing Bayer and Bernhard (2010). As can be
observed, the coefficient for CIEL ()0.83) remains negative and highly significant, while DemocracyBinary6 (0.63) is in the positive (wrong) direction. As discussed above, analyses of fatal
dispute onsets with the far stricter binary measure for democracy (Polity = 10), put forward by Dafoe (2011) in response to Mousseau (2009), yields perfect prediction (as does the prior binary
measure Both States CIE), causing quasi-complete separation and inconclusive results. Therefore, Model 5 reports the results with DemocracyBinary10 in analyses of all militarized conflicts, not
just fatal ones. As can be seen, the coefficient for DemocracyBinary10 ()0.41), while negative, is not significant. Model 6 reports the results in analyses of fatal disputes with DemocracyL
the coefficient for
squared (after adding 10), which implies that the likelihood of conflict decreases more quickly toward the high values of DemocracyL. As can be seen ,
DemocracyL 2 is at zero, further corroborating that even very high levels of democracy do not appear to
cause peace in analyses of fatal disputes, once consideration is given to contractintensive economy. Models
3, 4, and 6, which include Political Distance, were repeated (but unreported to save space) with analyses of all militarized interstate disputes, with
the democracy coefficients close to zero in every case. Therefore, the conclusions reached by Mousseau (2009) are corroborated even with the
most stringent measures of democracy, consideration of institutional distance, and across all specifications: The democratic peace
appears spurious , with contract-intensive economy being the more likely explanation for both
democracy and the democratic peace.
Democracy---Ext---Interference Now
Interference now – China’s targeting other countries too – Cambodia and the US
taiwan/
That’s a foreign policy issue that Washington should address for its own sake. But the fact that
Beijing is using Russian-style political
interference tools should prompt a full-scale national security alarm. The capabilities Beijing is honing in Taiwan could do huge damage if
applied to the United States. China is testing them on a country it knows well but preparing for their use around the world.
There’s credible evidence that China is already using cyber campaigns to interfere in the politics of other
foreign countries , as was seen in Cambodia this year. There are more and more Chinese government-friendly
social media trolls and bots on Twitter, attacking American companies and journalists. Meanwhile, Chinese influence
operations on American soil are ramping up as the U.S.-China relationship continues to worsen.
Democracy---Ext---No Impact
Democracy doesn’t solve war
Taner, 2 (Binner, PhD Candidate – Syracuse U., Alternatives: Turkish Journal of Int’l Relations, 1(3),
p. 43-44, http://www.alternativesjournal.com/binnur.pdf)
The discussion above suggests that the

most important drawback of the “democratic peace” theory is the
essentialization of the political regime as the only factor contributing to international peace and war. The
‘democratic peace’ theory underemphasizes, and most often neglects, the importance of other domestic
factors such as political culture,35 degree of development, socio-economic and military considerations,36
the role of interest-groups and other domestic constituencies,37 strategic culture38 among others in
decision-making. In other words, it is easily the case that the “democratic peace theory” lacks sensitivity to context and decisionmaking
process. Although one should not dispute the fact that domestic political structure/regime type is an important component of any analysis of war
and peace, this should be seen as only one of domestic variables, not necessarily the variable. Devoid of an analysis that gives
respect to a number of other factors, superficial and sweeping generalizations will leave many details in
decision-making unaccounted for. Consequently, although “democratic peace” theory should not be discarded entirely, current
emphasis on the importance of “democracy” in eliminating bloody conflicts in the world should not blind scholars and policy circles alike to the
fact that “democratic peace” is theoretically and empirically overdetermined.
No stats for DPT

Gowa 95 (Joanne, “Democratic States and International Disputes”, 6-22,
http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-194275_ITM)
Students of this issue have been very careful to make clear that whether or not a state is democratic does not affect its overall propensity to wage
war. As they observe, democracies
are just as likely as are other states to engage in war.(9) In addition, no
strong evidence that democracies are any less likely than are other polities to initiate war exists. Thus, the
incidence of war between democracies is not an indicator of the war-proneness of democracies in general.
Instead, the distinctive effect of democracy on war is limited to cases in which both members of a pair
of states are democratic. Another finding that emerges from this literature relates to the outbreak of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs). Several
studies find that a statistically significant difference in the incidence of MIDs exists between members of pairs of democratic states and members of other dyads.
Charles Gochman and Zeev Maoz categorize a dispute as an MID if (1) it involves "threats to use military force, displays of military force, or actual uses of force";
and (2) the threat or deployment of military forces is "explicit, overt, nonaccidental, and government sanctioned."(10) Examples of MIDs include the 1898 Fashoda
crisis, the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, and the 1969 Sino-Soviet border crisis. The finding about MIDs echoes that about wars, namely, that militarized disputes are
much less likely to occur between democracies than between members of other pairs of states.
*** RELATIONS
IL---1NC
Alt causes – passage of US ships through the Strait
Maizland 19 ---- Lindsay, Asia writer for the Council on Foreign Relations, B.A. in international
relations (American University), “U.S. Military Support for Taiwan: What’s Changed Under Trump?”
4/3, https://www.cfr.org/article/us-military-support-taiwan-whats-changed-under-trump
For three months in a row this year, U.S. military ships have sailed through the Taiwan Strait, seen as a
show of support for Taipei and a challenge to Beijing . They are just one aspect of Trump administration’s
backing for Taiwan , and combined with China’s more aggressive approach to the democratic island, many analysts fear a cross-strait crisis.
Trump Is Raising the Stakes
In the past nine months, U.S. ships have sailed through the Taiwan Strait six times . During the Obama
administration, passages were far less frequent , at just one to three times per year. Even though the Taiwan Strait is an international waterway,
China is sensitive to the U.S. military’s presence and considers any transits of U.S. ships through the strait
“provocative actions.”
No threat from arms sales – require Congress and on hold until after trade negotiations
Meanwhile, the Trump administration is said to be encouraging Taipei to purchase dozens of F-16s, a sale that, like other
major arms deals, would require congressional approval. The last time the United States sold these fighter jets to Taiwan was 1992. If
the sale goes through, it would mark another departure from the Obama administration, which declined to sell the
jets to avoid escalating tensions with Beijing. But experts say a sale would be put on hold until after the U nited S tates
seals a trade deal with China.
Trump arms sales won’t crush ties – they’re flat and empirically denied
Yet U.S. Arms Sales Flat

While the Trump administration is taking more assertive steps than those of his predecessors , its arms sales to
Taiwan are thus far nothing remarkable.
The U nited S tates has sold military equipment to Taiwan since 19 79 . That year, as President Jimmy Carter severed formal diplomatic ties
with the island and formally recognized China, Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act, which is the basis for Washington’s relationship with Taipei and includes
the provision of arms for Taiwan’s self-defense. The law does not require the United States to defend Taiwan if China attacks, but it also doesn’t rule it out—a policy
known as strategic ambiguity.
Since then, the
U nited S tates has followed through on its commitment to support the island’s defenses, with Taiwan
ranking as one of the top importers of U.S. arms [PDF] in recent years. During his first term, President Barack Obama signed off on
two major packages , totaling about $12 billion [PDF]. President George W. Bush approved nine arms packages ,
worth approximately $5 billion , during his first term.
US/China relations strong and resilient
Chen 14 – Chen Weihua, Knight Fellow at Stanford University, World Press Institute Fellow based at
Macalester College, Deputy Editor of China Daily USA, “Year of Cooperation Marks US, China
Relations”, China Daily, 12/31, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/us/2014-12/31/content_19206219.htm
In particular, the two intertwined global powers of China and the US have continued to forge a new paradigm of "big country
relations" in the face of disagreement and competition.
Teng Jianqun, a senior research fellow from the China Institute of International Studies, said the China-US relationship is shifting into a
"new normal" , a term Xi has recently adopted to describe the current stage of China's economic development.
" Despite fierce competition and frequent setbacks in traditional areas such as trade and security, China and the
US have managed to avoid conflicts and seek in-depth understanding," Teng said.
Bilateral tensions stood high at the beginning of the year following futile efforts by Washington and its regional allies to thwart China's designation of its Air Defense
Identification Zone (ADIZ), in the East China Sea.
To prevent China from launching a parallel in the disputed South China Sea, the US had thrown intensive objections in the first half of the year, questioning China's
territorial legitimacy in relevant waters. On the other hand, Washington avidly endorsed hardline claims by Manila and Hanoi, further interfering in the disputes by
calling for international arbitration and a "voluntary freeze" of provocative actions.
"In terms of South China Sea, the US is no longer satisfied with simply ‘waving flags' at the backstage, instead it is intervening with a purpose of creating regulations
to its own advantage," said Wu Xinbo, executive dean of Institute of International Studies with Fudan University in Shanghai.
Hostility regarding maritime differences was evident during high-level visits to Beijing by US Secretary of State John
Kerry in February, followed by then Defense Chief Chuck Hagel two months later.
During his visit to Japan in April, President Barack Obama for the first time clearly stated that the US security treaty with Japan covers China's Diaoyu Islands,
manifesting Washington's increasing determination to back up Tokyo's contested stance.
A column published in the December 6th-12th edition of The Economist said China's territorial disputes are largely zero-sum, as the country's aspiration for regional
leadership challenges the US naval supremacy in the Western Pacific.
"Little so far suggests that any American leader would be willing to lose," it said.
However, Cheng Li, director of the John L. Thornton China Center of the Brookings Institution, said China's adjustment in foreign policy has demonstrated a growing
maturity, although the disputes will not go away.
"The wisdom of leaders, the growing interaction among nations will help make the views more mature, and leaders will get a better understanding of the framework of
China-US relations," Cheng said.
Another clashing area lay in cyber security . In May, the US announced an indictment against five Chinese military officers on allegations of
cyber theft. Beijing demanded the US to withdraw the "purely groundless" indictment and suspended work on a joint cyber security work group.
Cheng urged the two countries to find a way out of the cyber security issue and resume dialogue, "the early the better".
"This is a totally new area that is characterized by the fact that whoever launches preemptive strike gains huge advantage. It is hard to know where the threat comes
from, it could be just a lone wolf, and the consequences of cyber attack is unimaginable," he said.
Despite sharp public disagreements , the two sides have still managed to advance substantive
cooperation . The situation started to "take a clear turn for the better" in July after the sixth round of the
China-US Strategic and Economic Dialogue reaffirmed joint efforts in boosting exchanges and tackling
problems.
In November during the convention of the 2014 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Xi took the "home-court" opportunity in Beijing to renew their
California cordiality with visiting US counterpart Obama through the signing of landmark pacts on visa extension and climate change.
Observers said the leaders of the two states might better understand each other through personal communication so as to minimize suspicion and miscalculation, and
finalize cooperative deals.
"As the world's two largest greenhouse gas emitters, China and the US declaring their post-2020 reduction targets have injected
‘adrenalin' to next year's Paris Climate Convention Conference, where a binding global agreement will be adopted," said Wu, the Fudan University professor.
"We have also seen efforts from both sides to simplify visa application, fight against terrorism and
corruption and advance investment treaty negotiations," he added.
Breakthroughs also took place in the military sphere, which is often marred by strong mistrust. In July, China for
the first time participated in the US-led Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) naval exercise. Last year, the two defense authorities also established a mutual notification
mechanism for major military activities and a standard of behavior for air and sea safety.
IL---Ext---Alt Causes
Tons of other thorns in relations – call with Tsai and embassy upgrades
Aside from military contacts , President Donald J. Trump has bolstered Taiwan through other measures .
After the 2016 election, for example, he talked to Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen on the phone in what was believed to be the first
time a U.S. president or president-elect spoke directly with a Taiwanese leader since at least 1979 . In 2018, the
U nited S tates unveiled $250 million worth of upgrades to a de facto embassy in Taipei despite Chinese
objections .
Tensions high – reunification threats, trade, technology, and security

The cloudsover Taiwan have grown darker in recent months. In January, Chinese President Xi Jinping said Taiwan
must be unified with the mainland and urged Taipei to embrace the 1992 Consensus. It states that there is only
“one China” and Taiwan belongs to it but allows different interpretations of which is the governing entity. China “will not rule
out the use of force” against foreign intervention, Xi said. Tsai reiterated that her government will never accept the
“one country, two systems” model and defended the democratic island’s sovereignty.
The worrisome China-Taiwan tensions come as the U.S.-China relationship has deteriorated , with the
two rivals engaged in major disputes over trade and technology and jostling for power in the western
Pacific. During this week’s North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) meetings in Washington, threats from China reportedly
featured more prominently than ever before .
Experts say all of these factors are increasing the risk of a cross-strait crisis . “The status quo is admittedly
imperfect ,” wrote CFR President Richard N. Haass, “but it is far less imperfect than what would follow unilateral actions and attempts to resolve a
situation that doesn’t lend itself to a neat solution.”
Ending arms sales doesn’t solve relations - Chinese leadership and territorial
aspirations mean new issues will arise
Roy ’15 (Denny Roy, a Senior Fellow at the East - West Center, 6-23-15, “Trading away Taiwan is no
bargain for the USA,” http://csis.org/files/publication/Pac1537.pdf)
Glaser’s case has other weaknesses. He assumes that the US abandonment of Taiwan would “dramatically
improve” US - China relations, and that “China can be very secure with the United States maintaining its alliances and forward
deployment” as long as Taiwan is no longer in play. This is believable only if we posit that Beijing has no aspirations
for regional leadership or revisions of the current order beyond gaining control over Taiwan, both now
and in the future. The “grand bargain” idea probably resonates less with Beijing than Washington . From Beijing ’s point of view, this
would be asking it to trade something it believe s it already own s for something else it believe s it already own s . If they did agree, how the
“bargain” would be operationalized is unclear. What would it mean for China to “officially accept” US alliances and military bases in the Asia -
Pacific? This would seem to require Beijing to renounce its proudly “principled” opposition to any country having “Cold War era” alliances and
foreign bases. At the same time, it is easy to foresee China continuing its pre - bargain activities (military buildup,
maneuvers with Russia, naval patrols in the E ast and S outh C hina S ea, etc.) while claiming these were
not attempts to drive US influence out of the region. Glaser recognizes that Chinese leaders may intend to push
out their US rival. He argues his proposal would answer the question of whether this is Beijing’s plan. If Beijing accept s the proposal, it
would indicate th at China has limited aims and can tolerate continued US regional hegemony. If not, Ch ina intends to usurp that role from the
United States. If we now recognize that expelling US strategic leadership may be Beijing’s intention,
unilaterally assisting the Chinese by abandoning Taiwan is not the most sensible policy if the US hopes to
retain its accustomed role. The timing of Glaser’s proposal is particularly bad given that Xi Jinping’s government seems to
represent a shift toward a more assertive Chinese fo reign po licy that has grown impatient with waiting
for the U nited S tates to decline on its own.
IL---Ext---Alt Causes---A2: Arms Sales Key
No solvency – ending sales creates new issues and US backlash – both upset China –
also ignore broader debates on unification in Taiwan AND China
Rigger 11 (Shelley Rigger, the Brown Professor and chair of political science at Davidson College, 11-
11, “Why Giving Up Taiwan Will Not Help Us with China,” p. 4-5, https://www.aei.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/11/-why-giving-up-taiwan-will-not-help-us-with-china_163406442997.pdf)
Even if it were true that Sino-American tensions could be melted away with a single policy change in Washing- ton, the United States should still continue to support
Taiwan to maintain the credibility of its alliances and uphold its commitment to democracy as a desirable and feasible goal for developing nations. But, in reality,
ending US defense assistance to Taipei is unlikely to produce the salutary effects the critics of current US
policy anticipate. Such a change would indeed delight Beijing; however, it would create new problems just as intractable
as the old ones but less familiar and potentially even more challenging . The point of departure for critics of America’s
existing Taiwan policy is their shared belief that ending security assistance to Taiwan would improve US- China relations. As Freeman puts it, “The kind of long-term
relationship of friend- ship and cooperation China and America want with each other is incompatible with our emotionally fraught differences over the Taiwan issue.
These differences propel mutual hostility and the sort of ruinous military rivalry between the two countries that has already begun. We are coming to a point at which
we can no longer finesse our differences over Taiwan. We must either resolve them or live with the increasingly adverse consequences of our failure to do so.” 10 As
a syllogism, this argument makes sense: Beijing believes Taiwan should be unified with the mainland, and it views US security assistance to Taiwan as the primary
reason it is not. Because unification is a core issue for the PRC, leaders in Beijing cannot ignore or overlook US intervention; they must constantly challenge it. Thus,
if the United States ended its security assistance to Taiwan, the biggest irritant in US-China relations would disappear. In
practice, unfortunately, there is
no guarantee that a change in US policy toward Taiwan would instantly or automatically end, or even significantly reduce,
the tensions the Taiwan issue creates in Sino-American relations. Ending security assistance to Taiwan
would raise expectations in China without removing the existing obstacles to peaceful unification. It
likely would provoke panic in Taiwan, but it would not make the Taiwanese people any more enthusiastic
about unification. On the contrary, the more vulnerable and threatened the Taiwanese people felt, the harder it
would be for them to consider China’s overtures rationally. For decades, the U nited S tates has justified arms sales
to Taiwan on the grounds that Taipei can negotiate with Beijing more effectively from a position of
strength than of weakness. It is easy to dismiss this logic as a rational- ization, but as Randall Schriver said, “In what other instance involving a
negotiation is the weaker party better off? . . . Historically, what you find is where there is equal power—or, at least, credible deterrent power—you get better
outcomes.” Neither Beijing nor Taipei is well served by a negotiating process that leads to a bad deal, including one Taiwanese citizens cannot accept. Success- fully
pressuring Taiwan’s negotiators into accepting a deal might seem like a victory for Beijing, but if
Taiwan’s domestic politics make it
impossible to implement the deal, the long-term result might be worse than no deal at all. Ending US
defense assistance to Taiwan—whether by repealing the Tai- wan Relations Act or by simply declining to provide defensive equipment to Tai- wan’s
armed forces—would not “ripen” Taiwan for peaceful unification or obvi- ate the rationale the United States
has historically followed regarding Taiwan. It would, however, intensify the debate over Taiwan policy
within the U nited S tates. Taiwan still has many US friends and supporters, and many foreign policy experts would question a
decision to change course. The policy changes Gilley, Glaser, Freeman, and Owens recommend would stimulate a debate over China policy at a time when negative
The last thing Sino-American relations need is an acrimonious,
attitudes toward the PRC already are on the rise.
politically charged debate in Washington over policy toward China and Taiwan . In sum, changing America’s Taiwan
policy could easily induce a poisonous turn in the domestic politics of US China policy without making peaceful unification easier.
IL---Ext---Resiliency
High-level political commitments ensure strength
Hammand 15 (Andrew, Associate at the Centre for International Affairs, Diplomacy and Strategy at
the London School of Economics and a Former UK Government Special Adviser, "US-Beijing Links
Relatively Upbeat," 2/4, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2015/02/04/2003610759)
despite the irritation of some in Beijing toward these events, US-China relations remain on at least a
Yet,
modest upswing . This was symbolized during Obama’s visit to China in November last year, when he and Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) showed
international leadership by announcing a bilateral climate change agreement that could help catalyze a new global treaty later this year. Moreover, yesterday, on the
same day that Obama was to see the Dalai Lama, top US and Chinese military officials were to meet at the Pentagon for Defense Policy Coordination Talks,
While fragility and disagreements
addressing confidence-building measures including joint training exercises and exchange programs.
remain in bilateral relations , with potential setbacks on the horizon , the outlook for this year is
relatively positive . There are multiple reasons for this from the vantage points of Washington and
Beijing. While China continues to build its international influence, it has recently softened its stance on
some foreign policy issues. In part, this reflects the influence and changed calculations of Xi , now two
years into his presidency, who has gradually extended his writ, including over the military. In the US
context, he has called for a “new type of great power relationship” to avoid any sense of the inevitability
of conflict between Beijing and Washington. While this new idea is an audacious goal that is unlikely to
be fully realized, it reflects his desire to try to take unnecessary confrontation off the table . To this end, while
assertiveness will not disappear from Chinese policy, partly because of domestic public appetite for it, there has recently been reversion to greater diplomacy and
defusing of tension. One example was the decision of the Chinese Ministry of Defense in December last year to hold an unprecedented meeting between the two
nations’ defense policy planning staffs. Moreover, a party from Beijing visited Washington last fall to discuss cybersecurity issues — a regular bilateral irritant. While
Washington does not necessarily believe that this conciliatory behavior will last, it does appear to represent a break with the first 18 months of Xi’s presidency, when
Beijing’s foreign and military positions and rhetoric were more pugnacious. This was showcased by the near-collision between a Chinese warship and the USS
Cowpens in the South China Sea in December 2013, which then-US secretary of defense Chuck Hagel blamed on “incendiary” and “irresponsible” Chinese behavior,
and in August last year, when a Chinese fighter jet carried out what the Pentagon termed a “dangerous intercept” of a US surveillance aircraft, again over the South
China Sea. From Washington’s standpoint, this warming in relations is to be welcomed, especially when crises in the Middle East and Ukraine will continue to receive
the bulk of high-level US attention and considerable military resources this year. While the US’ long-term pivot towards Asia-Pacific will continue, Obama is
keen to avoid a major spike in bilateral tensions. Washington will thus seek to avoid too many clear “red
lines” in the region to provide greater latitude and to encourage Beijing to the view that the US is not trying to contain a rising China. Nevertheless, even in this
relatively cooperative context, there are still potential icebergs on the horizon that could see a freeze in relations . First, China’s animus toward US sea and air
maneuvers near its borders is growing. As with the naval and air incidents near the South China Sea, further (potentially more serious) spats cannot be ruled out this
year. However, perhaps the biggest source of risk lies in relation to Japan, where nationalist Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was re-elected in a landslide victory
in December last year. A key part of his conservative agenda of emphasizing Japanese pride in its past is overturning the remaining legal and political underpinning of
the nation’s post-war pacifist security identity, so that it can become more actively engaged internationally. This includes building up military capabilities. This is
perceived as a threat in Beijing, exacerbated by Washington’s close security ties with Tokyo. And while no country desires conflict, serious misjudgement by one or
Significant
more sides cannot be ruled out. Taken overall, the short-term outlook for China-US relations is relatively positive, despite regular bilateral irritants.
downside risks remain, but both Beijing and China appear to have resolved to manage tensions better, while
cooperating more in areas, such as climate change, where there are potentially significant
overlapping interests .
Ties are strong

Chen 15 – Chen Weihua, Knight Fellow at Stanford University, World Press Institute Fellow based at
Macalester College, Deputy Editor of China Daily USA, “2014 Ends On Positive Note For US, China”,
China Daily, 1-2, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/us/2015-01/02/content_19222744.htm
The year ends, experts see huge potential in China-US relations, but thorny issues ranging from cyber security and maritime disputes to
arms sales to Taiwan stand in the way of improving the complex relationship, CHEN WEIHUA reports from Washington.
For observers who have witnessed the often bumpy and sometimes roller coaster rides in the 35 years of
diplomatic ties between China and the U nited S tates, many applauded that the increasingly complex
relationship ended in 2014 on a positive note .
The mood looked somewhat somber in the first half of 2014. Headlines were dominated by heightened tensions over maritime territorial disputes in the South and East
China seas and disputes in the cyber domain.
2014 ends on positive note for US, China
That mood started to lighten up in the second half, especially after US President Barack Obama and Chinese President Xi
Jinping met in Beijing inNovember to announce a long list of cooperative agreements from carbon reduction to visa extension.
"President Obama's visit to China and attending the APEC leaders' summit in Beijing has pushed the bilateral relationship to a
climax ," said Cheng Li, director of the John L. Thornton China Center of the Washington-based Brookings Institution.
IL---Ext---Resiliency---A2: Taiwan Different
Relations resilient – empirics – our evidence is specific to Taiwan arms sales
Straits Times 11 (Taiwan's Fate: China, US Won't Rock the Boat, Lexis, 6/3)
For years, Washington sought to uphold two objectives: deter the Chinese use of force against Taiwan, while at the same time hold out for a peaceful resolution of the
Taiwan question. Now, however, the focus has tilted to the latter, given Washington's reluctance to face another Taiwan Strait crisis scenario. Mr Robert Sutter, a
George Washington University professor and career civil servant, argues that Mr Obama's support for Taiwan's China policy 'fails to hide the reduced overall US
The resilience of
backing for Taiwan, especially for actions that risk complicating US-China relations for the sake of shoring up support for Taiwan'.
Sino-American understanding over Taiwan is also evident if one examines their interactions following
previous US arms sales to Taiwan. In 1992, the President George H.W. Bush sold 150 F-16s to Taiwan. Beijing
protested vehemently, but eventually relations were restored to normal. Last year, the US sold a US $6.4 billion (S $7.9 billion)
arms package to Taiwan. Beijing protested and broke off military-to-military contacts. Relations were
restored earlier this year, when Mr Gates visited Beijing. This was followed by a visit to the US by General Chen Bingde, the People's Liberation Army's
chief of general staff.
Disease---1NC
Disease won’t cause extinction
Farquhar 17 – Sebastian Farquhar, Leader of the Global Priorities Project (GPP) at the Centre for
Effective Altruism, et al., “Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance”, https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-
content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf
1.1.3 Engineered pandemics
For most of human history, natural pandemics have posed the greatest risk of mass global fatalities.37 However, there
are some reasons to believe
that natural pandemics are very unlikely to cause human extinction. Analysis of the International Union for
Conservation of Nature (IUCN) red list database has shown that of the 833 recorded plant and animal species
extinctions known to have occurred since 1500, less than 4% (31 species) were ascribed to infectious
disease.38 None of the mammals and amphibians on this list were globally dispersed, and other factors
aside from infectious disease also contributed to their extinction. It therefore seems that our own species,
which is very numerous , globally dispersed , and capable of a rational response to problems, is very
unlikely to be killed off by a natural pandemic. One underlying explanation for this is that highly lethal pathogens can kill
their hosts before they have a chance to spread, so there is a selective pressure for pathogens not to be
highly lethal. Therefore, pathogens are likely to co-evolve with their hosts rather than kill all possible
hosts.39
No global pandemics – other international actors solve – US efforts solve

globalization and trade warrants
Wayne 14 ---- Alex, syndicated columnist on US health policy, “Global Effort Signed to Halt Spread of
Infectious Disease,” Bloomber, 2/13, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-02-13/global-effort-signed-
to-halt-spread-of-infectious-disease.html
The U.S. won commitments from 25 countries and the W orld H ealth O rganization to work together on systems to
better detect and combat outbreaks of infectious diseases such as H7N9 avian flu and Ebola virus. The Obama
administration plans to spend $40 million in 10 countries this year to upgrade laboratories and communications
networks so outbreaks can be controlled more quickly , Thomas Frieden, director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, said today in
an interview. President Barack Obama will seek another $45 million next year to expand the program. Infectious diseases account for about 1 in 4 deaths
worldwide, according to the U.S. National Institutes of Health. While diseases such as Ebola and Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome haven’t posed a threat to the U.S., lapses in other countries
We’re all only as safe as the weakest
may allow an outbreak to spread rapidly, Frieden said. “No country can protect itself solely within its borders,” Frieden said. “
link out there. This is an effort to essentially make the U.S. safer and make the world safer , to improve
countries’ capacity to better find, stop and prevent health threats .” Frieden and Kathleen Sebelius, the U.S. health secretary, held a
videoconference today with the partners in the effort. While no other country made a specific financial commitment today, Frieden said, all the nations at the conference
including China, Russia, France and the U.K. agreed to “ accelerate progress and address not just the
health sector but include security in health in new ways .” First Consensus “ For the first time , really, we have a
consensus on not only what are the threats, but what do we have to do to address them,” he said. As an
example, Frieden said Turkey’s government agreed to host a WHO office to respond to outbreaks in its region. The
agreement will also target emerging infections such as M iddle E ast R espiratory S yndrome. The 10 countries in line for the U.S. investment,
which will be funded by the CDC and the Department of Defense, weren’t identified. The CDC plans to build on test projects last year in Uganda and Vietnam,
where the agency helped the two nations’ health officials improve systems to detect and combat outbreaks of
dangerous pathogens that include drug-resistant tuberculosis, Ebola virus and exotic flu strains. In Uganda, CDC officials helped the country’s
Ministry of Health upgrade laboratories where tissue samples would be tested in the event of an outbreak, and developed a system for
local doctors to report cases of illness by text message, according to an article published in the CDC’s journal Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report.
Uganda now is able to quickly transport tissue samples from rural outbreaks to a high-security lab in the
Ultimately
capital, Kampala, by motorcycle courier and overnight mail, Frieden said. A mobile phone network-connected printer then texts lab results back to rural hospitals, he said. “
every country in the world should have this kind of system,” Frieden said. The $40 million, he said, “is
certainly enough to make a good start.”
Disease---Ext---No Impact
Burnout
York 14 ---- Ian, head of the Influenza Molecular Virology and Vaccines team in the Immunology and
Pathogenesis Branch, Influenza Division at the CDC, former assistant professor in
immunology/virology/molecular biology (MSU), former RA Professor in antiviral and antitumor
immunity (UMass Medical School), Research Fellow (Harvard), Ph.D., Virology (McMaster), M.Sc.,
Immunology (Guelph), “Why Don't Diseases Completely Wipe Out Species?” 6/4,
http://www.quora.com/Why-dont-diseases-completely-wipe-out-species
But mostly diseases don't drive species extinct . There are several reasons for that. For one, the most dangerous diseases
are those that spread from one individual to another. If the disease is highly lethal, then the population
drops, and it becomes less likely that individuals will contact each other during the infectious phase. Highly
contagious diseases tend to burn themselves out that way. Probably the main reason is variation. Within the
host and the pathogen population there will be a wide range of variants. Some hosts may be naturally resistant. Some
pathogens will be less virulent. And either alone or in combination, you end up with infected individuals
who survive . We see this in HIV, for example. There is a small fraction of humans who are naturally resistant or
altogether immune to HIV, either because of their CCR5 allele or their MHC Class I type. And there are a handful of people who
were infected with defective versions of HIV that didn't progress to disease. We can see indications of this sort of thing
happening in the past, because our genomes contain many instances of pathogen resistance genes that have
spread through the whole population. Those all started off as rare mutations that conferred a strong selection advantage to the carriers, meaning
that the specific infectious diseases were serious threats to the species.
Empirics and isolated populations

Beckstead 14 – Nick Beckstead, Research Fellow at the Future of Humanity Institute, citing Peter
Doherty, recipient of the 1996 Nobel Prize for Medicine, PhD in Immunology from the University of
Edinburgh, Michael F. Tamer Chair of Biomedical Research at St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital,
“How much could refuges help us recover from a global catastrophe?” in Futures, published online 18
Nov 2014, Science Direct
While there is little published work on human extinction risk

That leaves pandemics and cobalt bombs, which will get a longer discussion.
from pandemics, it seems that it would be extremely challenging for any pandemic —whether natural
or manmade—to leave the people in a specially constructed refuge as the sole survivors . In his introductory book on
pandemics (Doherty, 2013, p. 197) argues: “ No pandemic is likely to wipe out the human species. Even without the
protection provided by modern science, we survived smallpox, TB, and the plagues of recorded
history. Way back when human numbers were very small , infections may have been responsible for some
of the genetic bottlenecks inferred from evolutionary analysis, but there is no formal proof of this.” Though some authors have
vividly described worst-case scenarios for engineered pandemics (e.g. Rees, 2003 and Posner, 2004; and Myhrvold, 2013), it would take a
special effort to infect people in highly isolated locations , especially the 100+ “largely uncontacted”
peoples who prefer to be left alone. This is not to say it would be impossible. A madman intent on annihilating all human life could use cropduster-style delivery
systems, flying over isolated peoples and infecting them. Or perhaps a pandemic could be engineered to be delivered through animal or environmental vectors that would reach all of these people
Disease---Ext---SQ Solves
Global health uniformly up – all their evidence is speculative fear mongering
Cohen 12 ---- Michael A., fellow at The Century Foundation, former senior fellow at the New
America Foundation, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the American Security
Project, IR Demigod, bachelor’s degree in international relations (American), a master’s degree
(Columbia), adjunct lecturer in the School of International and Public Affair (Columbia), “Clear and
Present Safety”, March/April, Accessed on Hein, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137279/micah-
zenko-and-michael-a-cohen/clear-and-present-safety
A final trend contributing to the relative security of the United States is the improvement in global health and
well-being . People in virtually all countries , and certainly in the United States, are living longer and
healthier lives. In 2010, the number of people who died from aids-related causes declined for the third year in a
row. Tuberculosis rates continue to fall, as do the rates of polio and malaria. Child mortality has
plummeted worldwide , thanks in part to expanded access to health care, sanitation, and vaccines . In
1970, the global child mortality rate (deaths of children under five per 1,000) was 141; in 2010, it was 57. In 1970, global average life
expectancy was 59, and U.S. life expectancy was 70. Today, the global figure is just under 70, and the U.S. figure is 79. These
vast improvements in health and well-being contribute to the global trend toward security and safety
because countries with poor human development are more war-prone. PHANTOM MENACE None of this is meant to suggest that
the United States faces no major challenges today. Rather, the point is that the problems confronting the
country are manageable and pose minimal risks to the lives of the overwhelming majority of
Americans. None of them—separately or in combination—justifies the alarmist rhetoric of policymakers and
politicians or should lead to the conclusion that Americans live in a dangerous world.
SARS changed everything – created effective mechanisms and political will for
multilateral cooperation to survey, contain and treat disease
Roos 13 ---- Robert, medical editor, master's degree in science journalism (Minnesota), fellow at the
Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy, “Experts: SARS Sparked Global Cooperation to Fight
Disease,” Minnesota Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy, 4/15,
http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/news-perspective/2013/04/experts-sars-sparked-global-cooperation-fight-
disease
A new set of journal articles

related to the 10th anniversary of the SARS epidemic in 2003 says the episode did much to boost
recognition of the need for coordinated international and national responses to emerging infectious diseases. The articles and
commentaries in Emerging Infectious Diseases reflect on the effects of SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome), which arose in China in late 2002 and spread to
more than 30 countries in early 2003, sickening about 8,000 people and killing around 800. The outbreak was first publicized by the World Health Organization
(WHO) on Mar 12, 2003. Among the reports is one describing two new SARS-like coronaviruses—close relatives of the SARS coronavirus—found in bats in China.
The new viruses are more distant relatives of the novel human coronavirus that has caused illnesses in 17 people, with 11 deaths, in the past year. All of the cases had
connections to the Middle East. Publication of the articles comes as the world is contending with still another emerging
pathogen, the novel H7N9 influenza virus in China, which has infected at least 64 people and killed 14 in recent weeks. Surveillance and response In a
"synopsis" piece, a team led by Christopher R. Braden, MD, of the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) reports on progress in
global surveillance and response capacity in the 10 years since SARS emerged. They review the milestones of the
epidemic, from its silent emergence in southern China in November 2002 to its spread to Hong Kong and, boosted by a "superspreader," from there to many
other countries. They say the SARS epidemic powerfully stimulated international cooperation to fight
emerging diseases. "Perhaps the most important legacy of SARS is the recognition of the critical need for a
multilateral response, led by WHO, in the event of a rapidly moving but ultimately containable global epidemic," they write. "The central
role of WHO in coordinating the laboratory network that identified the etiologic agent and shared reagents, the epidemiology
network that characterized the spread and identified the most effective control measures, and the policy and communications network that incorporated
rapidly changing knowledge into measured travel advisories was critical for the control of the epidemic and a credit to
WHO. " The SARS epidemic dramatically reduced global travel and business, showing how disruptive a new pathogen could be, Braden and colleagues
observe. Those effects stimulated pandemic flu planning and surveillance, a greater focus on global health
security, and improved laboratory and surveillance networks. Further , the episode spurred efforts to
update the International Health Regulations, which had not been revised since 1969, the article says. The regulations
took effect in 2007. However, fewer than 20% of the 194 WHO countries that accepted the regulations had complied with their core requirements by the June 2012
deadline, according to Braden and colleagues. Another effect of SARS was to spur the establishment of new national public
health agencies in Canada (the Public Health Agency of Canada, or PHAC) and the United Kingdom (the Health Protection Agency), the
authors say. In a related perspective article, a team led by Jeffrey P. Koplan, MD, MPH, of Emory University, a former CDC director, says the value of
national public health institutes was one of the major lessons of SARS. Koplan is joined by authors from the PHAC and its
counterparts in Hong Kong and China. They note that more than 80 national public health institutes are now linked through the
International Association of National Public Health Institutes , which promotes the establishment of new institutes and helps
strengthen existing ones.
Prolif---1NC
No prolif impact
Pashakhanlou 15 [Arash Heydarian Pashakhanlou is currently a Teaching Fellow in International
Relations. He holds a BA and an MRes degree in International Relations and International Relations
theory respectively from Aberystwyth University 7-14-2015
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/122301/nuclear-proliferation-myth]
Proliferation, after all, means rapid spread. And whereas nuclear weapons have proliferated “vertically”, with existing nuclear states adding to their existing nuclear
there has not been a “horizontal” nuclear weapons proliferation – that is, a fast spread of these
arsenals,
weapons to new nations. On the contrary, nuclear weapons have spread slowly across the world, even though
academics, politicians and the media frequently discuss horizontal nuclear weapons proliferation as if it
was a matter of fact. Reality check Currently, there are only nine states in the world with nuclear weapons among the
UN’s 193 members: the US (since 1945), Russia (since 1949), the UK (since 1952), France (since 1960), China (since 1964), Israel (since 1966, unofficial), India
(since 1974), Pakistan (since 1998) and North Korea (since 2006). Other countries have dropped off the list. South Africa joined the nuclear
club in the 1980s, but dismantled its weapons in the early 1990s. Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine inherited nuclear weapons from the
Soviet Union when they became independent states after the Cold War, but they transferred their nuclear arsenal to Russia in the 1990s. In
other words, only a handful of countries in Europe, Asia and North America possess these weapons, while Africa, Australasia and Latin America are devoid of nuclear
weapons states. In fact, thenumber of nuclear weapons states has actually decreased ever since the 1990s. And
even though the Pakistani nuclear weapons scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan confirmed the existence of a global nuclear black market
which purportedly provided nuclear technology, expertise, and designs to various countries, including Libya, no horizontal nuclear weapons
proliferation has taken place. Libya eventually voluntarily renounced its secret nuclear weapons efforts in December
2003. Argentina, Brazil, South Korea, and Taiwan have also shelved their nuclear weapons programs . As of
now, there are 31 countries with nuclear power plant units in operation; countries such as Australia, Canada, and Japan are widely believed to have the technological
even
sophistication to become nuclear weapons states in relatively short amount of time should they want to – but they have not pursued that path. In other words,
though there have been opportunities for nuclear weapons proliferation across a range of new states, such a
development has not materialised . All of the available evidence thus unanimously suggests that no
horizontal nuclear weapons proliferation has taken place throughout the 70 years that these weapons have
existed. Claims to the contrary lack basis , whether they are made for political or economic reasons , sheer
ignorance , or for any other purposes. Horizontal nuclear weapons proliferation is a bogeyman that does not exist .
If we are to devise sound strategies and policies regarding nuclear weapons we have to ground them in existing reality. Recognising that there is no
horizontal nuclear weapons proliferation is a good place to start.
No prolif
Bergenas 10 (Johan, Associate at the Henry M. Stimson Center for International Research, "The
Nuclear Domino Myth,", Foreign Affairs, 7/26, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66738/johan-
bergenas/the-nuclear-domino-myth)
But there's one problem with this "nuclear domino" scenario: the historical record does not support it.
Since the dawn of the nuclear age, many have feared rapid and widespread nuclear proliferation; 65 years later,
only nine countries have developed nuclear weapons. Nearly 20 years elapsed between the emergence of the first nuclear
state, the United States, in 1945, and the fifth, China, in 1964.¶ The next 40 years gave birth to only five additional nuclear
countries: India, Israel, South Africa, Pakistan, and North Korea. South Africa voluntarily disarmed in the 1990s, as did Belarus, Kazakhstan,
and Ukraine following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. After Israel developed a nuclear weapons capability in the late 1960s,
no regional nuclear chain reaction followed , even though the country is surrounded by rivals. Nor was there even a
two-country nuclear arms race in the region.¶ Similarly, it has now been four years since North Korea
became a nuclear weapons state, yet South Korea and Japan have not followed suit , despite the fact that
they have a latent nuclear weapons capability -- access to the fissile material necessary for nuclear weapons. These countries'
decisions to not go nuclear are largely thanks to extensive U.S. efforts to dissuade them. Both South Korea and Japan enjoy firm and long-
standing security assurances from Washington, including protection under the U.S. strategic nuclear umbrella, obviating the need
for their own deterrents.
Prolif---Ext---No Impact
Prolif is slow, won’t happen, and has no impact – reject their evidence
Keck 13 (Zachary, Associate Editor of The Diplomat, 12/4/13, “Why Nuclear Weapons Don't Spread
(Quickly)”, The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/why-nuclear-weapons-dont-spread-quickly/)
Cartwright is hardly alone in holding these views. Indeed, the general consensus when it comes to nuclear weapons has long been “when there’s a
will there’s a way.” And yet, the spread of nuclear weapons has always been surprisingly slow . Moreover, despite
the diffusion of nuclear technology, nuclear weapons have actually been spreading much more slowly than they
did during the first few decades of the nuclear era.
Consider that, in the three decades following the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, no less than seven
countries developed at least a nascent nuclear weapon capability. In the nearly four decades since, only three
countries — Pakistan, South Africa, and North Korea — have developed a nuclear weapons capability, and one of these states —
South Africa — voluntarily dismantled its arsenal.
So what explains this great nuclear slowdown? Two converging trends seem to be at work. First, there has been an undeniable
decline in the number of states interested in acquiring nuclear weapons. Harald Muller and Andreas Schmidt have
documented this well. In their comprehensive study of states with nuclear weapons activities between 19 45
and 20 05 , they find that “states with nuclear weapons activities were always a minority , and today they
are the smallest minority since 1945.” Specifically, in 2005 they identified 10 states as having nuclear weapons
activities (including those with nuclear weapons), which constituted less than six percent of UN members. Today the
only non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS) that might be interested in an atomic weapon is Iran.
The fact that states have by and large been uninterested in nuclear weapons is somewhat perplexing from a historic
perspective. After all, what other revolutionary military technology hasn’t elicited strong interest from most states competing in the international
system?
At the same time, when one examines the properties of nuclear weapons more closely, the lack of interest is easier to understand. Nuclear
weapons have basically served one purpose for states possessing them; namely, they have deterred others from challenging that
state’s survival and other fundamental interests. But the nuclear era has also been characterized by a sharp decline in
warfare and today fewer states face fundamental external threats to their existence. Given the high costs of building and maintaining
a nuclear arsenal, it makes little sense to acquire nuclear weapons without such an existential threat.
While lack of interest explains why some states have renounced nuclear weapons despite possessing the capability to build them, the difficulty
in building them has prevented others states that seek nuclear weapons from acquiring them. Despite the view
that “where there is a will there’s a way,” and a strong sense that globalization has exacerbated this, the historical
record tells a very different story.
As Jacques Hymans has pointed out, before 1970 seven countries launched dedicated nuclear weapon programs and all seven succeeded in an
average of seven years. Since 1970, ten
states have launched dedicated nuclear weapons programs and only three
have succeeded (the jury’s still out on Iran). These three have taken an average
of 17 years to succeed and Iran under the
Islamic Republic has been working towards a nuclear weapon capability for some three decades.
Just as pundits have routinely underestimated the difficulty of building nuclear weapons, so too do they grossly
overstate the number of states who are technically capable of building them. Both journalists and scholars regularly cite 40 as the
number of non-nuclear weapon states who are technically capable of building them. This figure is often attributed to the former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),
Mohamed ElBaradei, who said in 2004:
“Some estimates indicate that 40 countries or more now have the know-how to produce nuclear weapons, which means if they have the required fissile material — high enriched uranium or
plutonium — we are relying primarily on the continued good intentions of these countries.”
As Scott Sagan has pointed out, most of those citing ElBaradei omit the latter part of his statement about having the required fissile material. But this statement is crucial as only a handful of
NNWS are capable of producing or otherwise procuring fissile material, which is necessary for a nuclear bomb.
global availability of fissile material has been declining as

Moreover, thanks in no small part to President Obama’s focus on nuclear security, the
the U.S. and its allies help remove fissile material from some states while downsizing the stockpiles in many others.
Furthermore, compared with the Cold War era and even the 1990s, nuclear weapon holding and nuclear
capable states are much less
willing to sell NNWS crucial dual use technology that can be used to indigenously produce fissile material.
Thus, contrary to common perception, there is no impeding nuclear domino about to fall.
No impact – prolif empirically doesn’t cause war and is slow

Walt, 12 (Stephen Walt – Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard
University, 11/30, Foreign Policy, “The mother of all worst-case assumptions about Iran”,
http://walt.foreignpolicy.com /posts/2012/11/30/the_mother_of_all_worst_case_assumptions_about_iran)
Yet this "mother of all assumptions" is simply asserted and rarely examined. The obvious question to ask is this: did
prior acts of nuclear
proliferation have the same fearsome consequences that Iran hawks now forecast? The answer is no. In fact,
the spread of nuclear weapons has had remarkably little impact on the basic nature of world politics and the ranking
of major powers. The main effect of the nuclear revolution has been to induce greater caution in the behavior
of both those who possessed the bomb and anyone who had to deal with a nuclear-armed adversary.
Proliferation has not transformed weak states into influential global actors, has not given nuclear-armed
states the ability to blackmail their neighbors or force them to kowtow, and it has not triggered far-
reaching regional arms races . In short, fears that an Iranian bomb would transform regional or global politics have been greatly exaggerated; one
might even say that they are just a lot of hooey.¶ Consider the historical record.¶ Did the world turn on its axis when the mighty Soviet Union tested
its first bomb in 1949? Although alarmist documents like NSC-68 warned of a vast increase in Soviet influence and aggressiveness, Soviet nuclear
development simply reinforced the caution that both superpowers were already displaying towards each other. The United States already saw the
USSR as an enemy, and the basic principles of containment were already in place. NATO was being formed before the Soviet test and Soviet dominance of Eastern
Europe was already a fait accompli. Having sole possession of the bomb hadn't enabled Truman to simply dictate to Stalin, and getting the bomb didn't enable Stalin
or his successors to blackmail any of their neighbors or key U.S. allies. It
certainly didn't lead any countries to "reorient their
political alignment toward Moscow." Nikita Khrushchev's subsequent missile rattling merely strengthened the cohesion of NATO and other U.S.-led
alliances, and we now know that much of his bluster was intended to conceal Soviet strategic inferiority. Having a large nuclear arsenal didn't
stop the anti-commnist uprisings in East Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, or Poland, and didn't allow
the Soviet Union to win in Afghanistan. Nor did it prevent the USSR from eventually collapsing entirely. ¶
Did British and French acquisition of nuclear weapons slow their decline as great powers? Not in the
slightest. Having the force de frappe may have made De Gaulle feel better about French prestige and having their own deterrent made both states less dependent
on America's security umbrella, but it didn't give either state a louder voice in world affairs or win them new influence anywhere. And you might recall that Britain
couldn't get Argentina to give back the Falklands by issuing nuclear threats -- even though Argentina had no bomb of its own and no nuclear guarantee -- they had to
go retake the islands with conventional forces. ¶ Did China's detonation of a bomb in 1964 suddenly make them a superpower?
Hardly. China remained a minor actor on the world stage until it adopted market principles, and its rising global influence is due to three decades of
economic growth, not a pile of nukes. And by the way, did getting a bomb enable Mao Zedong--a cruel megalomaniac who launched the
disastrous Great Leap Forward in 1957 and the destructive Cultural Revolution in the 1960s -- to start threatening and blackmailing his
neighbors? Nope. In fact, China's foreign policy behavior after 1964 was generally quite restrained.¶ What about Israel? Does Israel's nuclear
arsenal allow it to coerce its neighbors or impose its will on Hezbollah or the Palestinians? No. Israel uses its
conventional military superiority to try to do these things, not its nuclear arsenal. Indeed, Israel's bomb didn't even prevent Egypt and
Syria from attacking it in October 1973, although it did help convince them to limit their aims to regaining the territory they had lost in 1967. It is
also worth noting that Israel's nuclear program did not trigger a rapid arms race either. Although states like Iraq and Libya did
establish their own WMD programs after Israel got the bomb, none of their nuclear efforts moved very rapidly or made it across the finish line. ¶ But wait, there's
more. The white government in South Africa eventually produced a handful of bombs, but nobody noticed
and apartheid ended anyway. Then the new government gave up its nuclear arsenal to much acclaim. If anything, South Africa was more secure without an arsenal
than it was before.¶ What about India and Pakistan? India's "peaceful nuclear explosion" in 1974 didn't turn it into a global superpower, and its only
real effect was to spur Pakistan -- which was already an avowed rival -- to get one too. And it's worth noting that there
hasn't been a large-scale
war between the two countries since, despite considerable grievances on both sides and occasional skirmishes and other provocations.¶ Finally,
North Korea is as annoying and weird as it has always been, but getting nuclear weapons didn't transform it from an economic basket
case into a mighty regional power and didn't make it more inclined to misbehave . In fact, what is most remarkable about
North Korea's nuclear program is how little impact it has had on its neighbors. States like Japan and South
Korea could go nuclear very quickly if they wanted to, but neither has done so in the six years since North Korea's first nuclear
test. ¶ In short, both theory and history teach us that getting a nuclear weapon has less impact on a country's
power and influence than many believe, and the slow spread of nuclear weapons has only modest effects
on global and regional politics. Nuclear weapons are good for deterring direct attacks on one's homeland, and they induce greater
caution in the minds of national leaders of all kinds. What they don't do is turn weak states into great
powers, they are useless as tools of blackmail, and they cost a lot of money . They also lead other states to worry
more about one's intentions and to band together for self-protection. For these reasons, most potential nuclear states have concluded that getting the bomb
isn't worth it.¶ But a few states-and usually those who are worried about being attacked-decide to go ahead. The good news is that when they do, it has remarkably
little impact on world affairs.
Prolif---Ext---No Prolif
Slow proliferation doesn’t open the floodgates
Waltz 3 (Kenneth, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed, 2003, p. 42-43)
Countries have to take care of their own security, if countries feel insecure and believe that nuclear weapons would make
them more secure, America’s policy of opposing the spread of nuclear weapons will not prevail. Any slight
chance of bringing the spread of nuclear weapons to a halt exists only if the United States strenuously tries to achieve that end. To do so
carries costs measured in terms of other interests. The strongest way for the United States to persuade other countries to forego nuclear
weapons is to guarantee their security. How many states’ security do we want to guarantee? Wisely, we are reluctant to make promises, but
then we should not expect to decide how other countries provide for their security. Some
have feared that weakening
opposition to the spread of nuclear weapons will lead numerous states to obtain them because it may
seem that “everyone is doing it.” Why should we think that if we relax, numerous states will begin to
make nuclear weapons? Both the U nited S tates and the Soviet Union were relaxed in the past, and
those effects did not follow. The Soviet Union initially supported China’s nuclear program. The United States helped both Britain
and France to produce nuclear weapons. By 1968 the CIA had informed President Johnson of the existence of Israeli nuclear weapons, and in
July of 1970, Richard Helms, director of the CIA, gave this information to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. These and later
disclosures were not followed by censure of Israel or by reductions of economic assistance. And in September of 1980, the executive branch,
against the will of the House of Representatives but with the approval of the Senate, continued to do nuclear business with India despite its
explosion of a nuclear device and despite its unwillingness to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty . Many more countries can
make nuclear weapons than do. One can believe that American opposition to nuclear arming stays the deluge only by overlooking the complications of
international life. Any state has to examine many conditions before deciding whether or not to develop nuclear weapons. Our opposition is only one factor and is not likely to be the
decisive one. Many states feel fairly secure living with their neighbors. Why should they want nuclear weapons? Some countries, feeling threatened, have found security through their own
strenuous efforts and through arrangements made with others. South Korea is an outstanding example. Many officials believe that South Korea would lose more in terms of American
support if it acquired nuclear weapons than it would gain by having them. Further, on occasion we might slow the spread of nuclear weapons by not opposing the nuclear weapons
programs of some countries. When we opposed Pakistan’s nuclear program, we were saying that we disapprove of countries developing nuclear weapons no matter what their neighbors do.
The gradual spread of nuclear weapons has not opened the nuclear floodgates. Nations attend to their
security in the ways they think best. The fact that so many more countries can make nuclear weapons than do says more about
the hesitation of countries to enter the nuclear military business than about the effectiveness of American nonproliferation policy. We
should suit our policy to individual cases, sometimes bringing pressure against a country moving toward nuclear weapons
capability and sometimes quietly acquiescing: No one policy is right in all cases. We should ask what the interests of other countries require
before putting pressure on them. Some countries are likely to suffer more in cost and pain if they remain conventional states than if they
become nuclear ones. The
measured spread of nuclear weapons does not run against our interests and can
increase the security of some states at a price they can afford to pay.
Terror---1NC
No nuclear terrorism – reject their fear-mongering – no motive, lack of means, and
barriers to acquisition
Weiss 15 ---- Leonard, visiting scholar at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and
Cooperation, former staff director on the Governmental Affairs Committee for the US Senate, former
tenured professor of applied mathematics and engineering (Brown and Maryland), Ph.D. (Johns Hopkins
University), “On Fear and Nuclear Terrorism,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 71.2, 3/3,
http://thebulletin.org/2015/march/fear-and-nuclear-terrorism8072
Fear of nuclear weapons is rational, but its extension to terrorism has been a vehicle for fear-mongering
that is unjustified by available data . The debate on nuclear terrorism tends to distract from events that raise the
risk of nuclear war, the consequences of which would far exceed the results of terrorist attacks . And the
historical record shows that the war risk is real. The Cuban Missile Crisis and other confrontations have demonstrated that
miscalculation, misinterpretation, and misinformation could lead to a "close call" regarding nuclear war.
Although there has been much commentary on the interest that Osama bin Laden, when he was alive, reportedly expressed in
obtaining nuclear weapons, evidence of any terrorist group working seriously toward the theft of nuclear
weapons or the acquisition of such weapons by other means is virtually nonexistent . The acquisition of
nuclear weapons by terrorists requires significant time, planning, resources, and expertise, with no guarantees
that an acquired device would work. It requires putting aside at least some aspects of a group’s more
immediate activities and goals for an attempted operation that no terrorist group has accomplished .
While absence of evidence does not mean evidence of absence, it is reasonable to conclude that the fear of nuclear terrorism
has swamped realistic consideration of the threat.
No impact – data and experts - no linkages, your evidence is alarmism

Mueller 14, John political scientist at Ohio State and co-author of Terror, Security, and Money:
Balancing the Risks, Benefits, and Costs of Homeland Security “Has the threat from terrorism been
exaggerated?” The Commentator 1/8
http://www.thecommentator.com/article/4579/has_the_threat_from_terrorism_be en_exaggerated
Two years after the raid on Osama bin Laden’s hideaway, terrorism alarmists remain in peak form explaining that although
al-Qaeda has been weakened it still manages to present a grave threat. Various well-honed techniques are applied to support
this contention. One is to espy and assess various “linkages” or “connections” of “ties” or “threads” between and among a range of
disparate terrorists or terrorist groups, most of which appear rather gossamer and of only limited consequence on
closer examination. Another is to exaggerate the importance and effectiveness of the “affiliated groups”
linked to al-Qaeda central. In particular, alarmists point to the al-Qaeda affiliate in chaotic Yemen, ominously hailing it as the “deadliest” and the
“most aggressive” of these and a “major threat.” Yet its chief
efforts at international terrorism have failed abysmally : an
underwear bomb and laser printer bombs on cargo planes. With that track record, the group may pose a problem or
concern, but it scarcely presents a “major threat” outside of war zones. More generally, “ al-Qaeda is its own worst
enemy ,” as Robert Grenier, a former top CIA counterterrorism official , notes. “Where they have succeeded
initially, they very quickly discredit themselves.” Any terrorist threat within the developed world seems even
less impressive. The Boston terrorists of 2013 were the first in the United States since 9/11 in which Islamist terrorists actually were
able to assemble and detonate bombs -- albeit very primitive ones . But except for that, they do not seem to have
been more competent than most of their predecessors. Amazingly, they apparently thought they could somehow get
away with their deed even though they chose to set their bombs off at the most-photographed spot on the planet at the time. Moreover,
they had no coherent plan of escape and, as commonly found, no ability to explain how killing a few random
people would advance their cause. While the scope of the tragedy in Boston should not be minimized, it should also be noted that if
the terrorists’ aim was to kill a large number of people , their bombs failed miserably . As recent cases in
Colorado and Connecticut sadly demonstrate, far more fatalities have been inflicted by gunmen. Before Boston, some 16 people had
been killed by Islamist terrorists in the United States in the years since 2001, and all of these were murdered by people who
were essentially acting alone. By contrast, in the 19 70s , organized terrorists inflicted hundreds of attacks, mostly bombings, in the
United States, killing 72. As concern about organized attacks has diminished, fear of “lone wolf” attacks has grown in recent years, and one
official assessment contends that “lone offenders currently present the greatest threat.” This is a reasonable observation, but those concerned
should keep in mind that, as analyst Max Abrahms has noted, while lone wolves may be difficult to police, they have carried out
only two of the 1,900 most deadly terrorist attacks over the last four decades. The key question, at least outside of war
zones, is not, “are we safer?” but “how safe are we?” At current rates, an American’s chance of becoming a victim of
terrorism in the U.S., even with 9/11 in the calculation, is about 1 in 3.5 million per year . In comparison, that same
American stands a 1 in 22,000 yearly chance of becoming a homicide victim, a 1 in 8,000 chance of perishing in an auto accident, and a 1 in 500
chance of dying from cancer. These calculations are based, of course, on historical data . However, alarmists who
would reject such history need to explain why they think terrorists will suddenly become vastly more
competent in the future. But no one seems to be making that argument. Indeed, notes one reporter, U.S. officials now say that al-Qaeda
has become less capable of a large attack like 9/11. But she also says that they made this disclosure only on condition of
anonymity out of fear that “publicly identifying themselves could make them a target” of terrorists. In contrast, one terrorism specialist, Peter
Bergen, has observed in heroic full attribution mode that, “The last terror attack (in the West) was seven years ago in
London,” that there “ haven’t been any major attacks in the U.S. ,” and that “they are recruiting no-hopers
and dead-enders.”
Terror---Ext---No Impact
No impact to terrorism—they’re not rocket scientists
Mueller 13 (John Mueller – political scientist at Ohio State and senior fellow at the Cato Institute,
Mark G. Stewart – civil engineer at the University of Newcastle in Australia and a visiting fellow at Cato,
April 22, “Hapless, Disorganized, and Irrational”, CATO Institute, http://www.cato.org/publications/
commentary/hapless-disorganized-irrational)
By far the most striking difference between the Boston Marathon killings and these earlier cases is that, for the first time, terrorists actually were able to assemble and detonate bombs. Many
until
previous plotters harbored visions of carrying out bombings, and in 10 of the cases, they were supplied with fantasy-fulfilling, if bogus, bombs by obliging FBI informants. But
Boston, no would-be terrorists had been able to make and set one off on their own. And, except for four bombs
detonated on the London transport system in 2005, nor has any terrorist in the U nited K ingdom. This is surprising in part
because in the 1970s there were hundreds of terrorist incidents on U.S. soil, most of them bombings, killing 72 people.
In many other respects, however, the Boston Marathon bombing is quite similar to the other 52 cases. For example, the Boston perpetrators were clearly not suicidal, which is the standard in
American cases. In only six of the earlier plots were the perpetrators clearly willing to die in their terrorist effort.
And except for their ability to fabricate and detonate bombs, the Boston terrorists do not seem to have been any
more competent than most of their predecessors. The Department of Homeland Security, in assessing what it ominously calls
“the nature of the terrorist adversary,” is fond of stressing their determination, persistence, relentlessness, patience, and
flexibility. This may apply to some terrorists somewhere, including at least a few of those involved in the Sept. 11 attacks. But it scarcely
describes the vast majority of those individuals picked up on terrorism charges in the United States since those
attacks.
In describing the “adversary,” the case studies far more commonly use words like incompetent , ineffective ,
unintelligent , idiotic , ignorant , inadequate , unorganized , misguided , muddled , amateurish ,
dopey , unrealistic , moronic , irrational , foolish , and gullible . Many of the cases suggest that there is little
exaggeration in the 2010 film, Four Lions, the impressive dark comedy about a band of hapless home-grown British terrorists.
Amazingly, the Boston perpetrators apparently thought they could somehow get away with their deed even though they chose to set their
bombs off at the most-photographed spot on the planet at the time. Moreover, although they were not prepared to die with their bombs, they do
not seem to have had anything that could be considered a coherent plan of escape . This rather bizarre
inability to think about the aftermath of the planned deed is quite typical in the case studies. (Also commonly found: an
inability to explain how killing a few random people would advance their cause.)
The Boston perpetrators seem never to have ventured much more than a few miles from the bombing location, and they appear to have
had no reliable means of transport and no money. Then, when the police published their photographs, they mindlessly blew
whatever cover they had by killing a campus cop, hijacking a car, stealing money, trying to run a police blockade, and engaging in a brief
Hollywood-style car chase and shootout. Surveillance imagery played an important role in identifying the (as it did terrorists
in terrorist events in London in 2005), but the key breakthrough appears to have come when the culprits decided to leave their lair, after which the police applied standard killer-on-the-loose
methodology.
in Boston should not be minimized, it should also be noted that, if the terrorists’ aim was to kill a large
And while the scope of the tragedy
number of people, their bombs failed miserably . As recent cases in Colorado and Connecticut sadly demonstrate, far more
fatalities have been inflicted by gunmen.
Concern about “lone wolf” attacks has grown in recent years, and a 2011 DHS assessment concluded that “lone offenders currently present the
greatest threat.” This is a reasonable observation, but those concerned should keep in mind that, as Max Abrahms has noted, while lone
wolves may be difficult to police, they have carried out only two of the 1,900 most deadly terrorist attacks over the
last four decades. They may be harder to stop, but they are also less lethal . (It should also be kept in mind that an American’s
chance of being killed by any kind of terrorist, even with 9/11 included in the count, remains about one in 3 million or 4
million per year.)
It is still unclear what motivated the Boston bombers. We are hearing a lot about “radicalization,” a concept that is not only vague but also questionably suggests, as Arun Kundnani has pointed out, that violence is inherent or implied
in Muslims who become deeply religious.
Evidence from the 52 cases strongly indicates that assuming an ideological motivation for terrorism is not useful . In almost all the cases, the overwhelming
driving force was not something that could be called ideology, but rather a simmering, and more commonly boiling, outrage at U.S. foreign policy — the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, in particular, and the country’s support for Israel
in the Palestinian conflict. Religion was a part of the consideration for most, but not because they wished to spread Sharia law or to establish caliphates (few of the culprits would be able to spell either word). Rather they wanted to
protect their co-religionists against what was commonly seen to be a concentrated war upon them in the Middle East by the U.S. government.
Rather remarkably, none of the 52 cases after 9/11 has inspired much in the way of continued interest from the public and
the media. After some days of coverage — or weeks in a very few instances — they largely faded from attention. This is impressive
because some were actually rather threatening, and many were populated by colorful characters and involve interesting law-and-order issues.
Books have been written about only two of the cases, and neither appears to have sold very well. Whether the Boston
Marathon case will prove to be an exception — perhaps because of its venue and the manhunt — is yet to be seen, of course.
You’re more likely to die in your bathtub

Brookings 8 (Institution, Independent Research and Policy Institute, “Have We Exaggerated the Threat
of Terrorism?”, 7-18, http://www.brookings.edu/events/2008/0221_terrorism.aspx)
One participant argued that terrorism presents minimal cause for concern. Discounting war zones, studies show
that there have been very few people killed by “Muslim extremists” each year—in fact, more people
drown in bathtubs each year in the United States. The FBI reported in 2005 that it had not found an al-Qaeda presence in the United States.
Additionally, terrorism, by its very nature, can be self-defeating: many attacks by al-Qaeda have caused the group to lose
popularity. This participant questioned both the intentions and capability of al-Qaeda. Osama bin Laden has threatened many attacks
that he has not been able to execute. In specific, this participant thought it unlikely that that al-Qaeda would obtain nuclear weapons, despite fears
to the contrary. Another participant agreed that the fears about terrorism are exaggerated and differentiated between the actual campaign
against al-Qaeda and its supporters and the idea of a general “war on terrorism.” However, participants also detailed the larger problems that terrorism can create,
regardless of the numbers it kills directly: terrorism often leads to insurgencies or civil wars; it could destabilize U.S. allies in the Middle East and the whole Middle
Eastern architecture; terrorism keeps oil prices high; and it has psychological effects beyond the actual death tolls. Additionally, many planned attacks have been
stopped before they were carried out; one participant noted that there have been several near-misses recently. One participant argued that the war on terrorism is
actually about an ideological battle between the United States and its allies and radical forces. Another participant agreed with this assessment of the general struggle
between the United States and “radical Islamic extremism.” This participant noted that the larger struggle is much more complicated to understand than terrorism in
specific and that this leads to a disproportionate focus on terrorism and the accompanying misallocation of resources. Participants highlighted the difference between
the risks presented by terrorism in the United States and around the world. The impact of terrorism in Iraq and Lebanon, for instance, is completely different than the
impact in the United States, which one participant categorized as being essentially psychological. The relevance of the capability of governments at preventing
terrorism was also addressed. Terrorism is particularly dangerous in places where there is weak government capacity and rule of law. Participants discussed why has
there not been another terrorist attack in the United States since September 11, 2001. One participant presented several
reasons: the U nited S tates has a supportive domestic Muslim population; the would-be terrorists in the
United States are not skilled; and U.S. counterterrorism policy has made it more difficult for the al-Qaeda
core to plan complex attacks. This participant argued, however, that there are risks that this situation may change going forward. As the al-Qaeda core
reconstitutes itself in Pakistan, it may be able to plan more complex attacks again. Additionally, the U.S. Muslim population may become less supportive overtime as
a result of U.S. homeland security policy. However, another participant did not think the attitudes of the U.S. Muslim community were particularly relevant to this
debate.
It's not an existential risk

Mueller, 11 (John Mueller, Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, 8-2-11, “The Truth
About al Qaeda,” http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68012/john-mueller/the-truth-about-al-qaeda?)
Indeed, noMuslim extremist has succeeded in detonating even a simple bomb in the U nited S tates in the last ten
years, and except for the attacks on the London Underground in 2005, neither has any in the United Kingdom. It seems wildly unlikely
that al Qaeda is remotely ready to go nuclear. Outside of war zones, the amount of killing carried out by al
Qaeda and al Qaeda linkees, maybes, and wannabes throughout the entire world since 9/11 stands at perhaps a few
hundred per year. That's a few hundred too many, of course, but it scarcely presents an existential, or elephantine, threat.
And the likelihood that an American will be killed by a terrorist of any ilk stands at one in 3.5 million per
year, even with 9/11 included. That probability will remain unchanged unless terrorists are able to increase their capabilities massively -- and
obtaining nuclear weapons would allow them to do so. Although al Qaeda may have dreamed from time to time about getting such weapons, no
other terrorist group has even gone so far as to indulge in such dreams, with the exception of the Japanese cult Aum
Shinrikyo, which
leased the mineral rights to an Australian sheep ranch that sat on uranium deposits, purchased some semi-
relevant equipment, and tried to buy a finished bomb from the Russians. That experience, however, cannot be very
encouraging to the would-be atomic terrorist. Even though it was flush with funds and undistracted by drone attacks (or
even by much surveillance), Aum
Shinrikyo abandoned its atomic efforts in frustration very early on. It then
moved to biological weapons, another complete failure that inspired its leader to suggest that fears
expressed in the U nited S tates of a biological attack were actually a ruse to tempt terrorist groups to pursue
the weapons. The group did finally manage to release some sarin gas in a Tokyo subway that killed 13 and led to the group's terminal
shutdown, as well as to 16 years (and counting) of pronouncements that WMD terrorism is the wave of the future. No elephants there, either.
Terror---Ext---No Impact---A2: Retaliation
No retaliation
Davis and Jenkins 2 (Paul K., Professor – RAND Corporation and Research Leader – Naval Studies
Board, and Brian M., Special Advisor – RAND Corporation and International Chamber of Commerce,
RAND Research Paper,
http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1619/MR1619.pdf)
Deterring acquisition and use of WMD is profoundly important and difficult. Terrorists appear to have grandiose intentions, and some have
intense interest in such weapons. Moreover, they may believe that they have what a Cold War theorist would call “escalation dominance.” That is,
al Qaeda could use WMD against the United States, but retaliation—and certainly escalation— would be difficult because (1) the
U nited S tates will not use chemical, biological, or radiological weapons; (2) its nuclear weapons will seldom
be suitable for use; and (3) there are no good targets (the terrorists themselves fade into the woodwork). And, of course, the
U nited S tates has constraints. Although this gap in the deterrent framework is dismissed by some, we regard it as very dangerous.
Terror---Ext---No Terror
No large-scale terror – psychology means you should purposely deflate their impact
during the decision – empirics and new defenses disprove their impacts
Thompson 16 ---- Mark, Pulitzer Prize winning defense columnist, Bachelors from Boston University,
“Obama Puts Terrorism in Perspective in State of the Union,” Time – Politics,
http://time.com/4178403/state-of-the-union-terrorism/
President Obama basically told the nation to take a “chill pill” over the threat posed to Americans by ISIS and other terrorists in
his final State of the Union address Tuesday night.
“Over-the-top claims that this
is World War III just play into their hands ,” Obama said. “Masses of fighters on the back of
pickup trucks and twisted souls plotting in apartments or garages pose an enormous danger to civilians and must be stopped. But they
do not threaten our national existence.”
Echoing the views of most non-politicized U.S. terrorism experts , he urged the nation to keep terror attacks in
perspective. The priority, they say, is to keep nuclear weapons away from terrorists and deny them the ability to launch 9/11-like attacks. But smaller-scale
terror, like the killing of 14 Americans in San Bernardino, California, Dec. 2 by a husband-wife team of radicalized Muslims, may be impossible to prevent.
While Obama may have the facts on his side, people’s irrational fears often overwhelm facts. It’s the politician’s job to acknowledge that fear, while harnessing it to
keep the facts that fuel it from getting any worse. That’s where Obama has fallen short.
His message was muddled as Iran held 10 U.S. sailors as he spoke. Iran seized them several hours before the speech, after their two patrol craft apparently drifted into
Iranian territorial waters near Iran’s Farsi Island in the middle of the northern Persian Gulf. The Obama Administration said it had assurances from Tehran that the
sailors and their boats would soon be released. Obama didn’t mention them in his address.
Calming fears of terrorism remains a challenge. Obama erred, at least politically, when he called ISIS a “JV team” two years ago—before it started beheading
Americans—and said it was “contained” just before the terror attacks in Paris and California killed 144.
Americans’ preoccupation with terrorism, while understandable, stands in marked contrast to their toleration for other
kinds of violent death. In 2014, 32,675 U.S. residents died in highway accidents, 33,599 died by firearms— and 17 were
killed in terror attacks on U.S. soil. That preoccupation can warp public attention and investment—and makes an over-reaction (cf., the
2003 invasion of Iraq) more likely if another major terror attack were to occur.
“Public opinion poll data show that the U nited S tates suffers a long-term, routinized, mass anxiety —or at least a sense of concern—
about terrorism that has shown little sign of waning in the years since 2001,” terrorism analysts John Mueller and Mark Stewart wrote last month in
Foreign Affairs. “Although other issues—particularly economic ones—often crowded out terrorism as a topic of daily concern, terrorism has won an apparently
permanent space in the American mind.”
By most accounts the world, in fits and starts, is becoming more peaceful. Put bluntly: you have less chance of dying in war today than in the past. But such
reassurances can be fleeting. Sure, the Atlantic and Pacific oceans acted as walls against invaders for most of the nation’s history. And the advent of nuclear weapons
70 years ago stayed the hands of nation-states when it came to warring against one another.
But terrorism—designed to inflict fright—is a different beast. First, because of its relatively small scale, it can be unleashed nearly anywhere, against nearly anyone.
Terrorism doesn’t target soldiers on the battlefield—who, by and large, are young men who know their mission is dangerous. Instead, terrorism targets civilians,
including children, going about their daily lives. It’s that jarring
juxtaposition—the idea that one isn’t truly safe, anywhere—that lets terrorism
pack a punch far above its throw-weight class .
The turning point in the U.S. attitude toward terror, justifiably, was 9/11. For most Americans, the attacks that day came clear out of the blue, raining horror on a U.S.
public who believed that such violence, when it happened, took place in troubled lands far away, like the Middle East. The willingness of the perpetrators to die in
their lust to kill surprised, and scared, many Americans. While that fright has ebbed and flowed, it hasn’t gone away, and surges anew in the wake of terror attacks.
Following the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon—and a hijacked airliner brought down in rural Pennsylvania by
passengers whose delayed takeoff let them learn of their grim fate—Americans were filled with a sense of foreboding that more major
attacks were all but inevitable. But that hasn’t happened .
The 9/11 hijackers fired vulnerable U.S. airliners into defenseless U.S. buildings and killed nearly 3,000. In other words, the only way they could carry out their plot
was if they outfitted themselves with U.S. equipment. Following the attacks,
local , state and federal governments have built, or
bolstered, defenses against future terror strikes.
There hasn’t been a similar attack on U.S. soil—fingers crossed— in nearly 15 years . That’s the key fact to keep in mind,
amid the fusillade of fear-mongering the 2016 presidential campaign has already unleashed.
Theoretical possibilities are irrelevant – there are too many difficult steps which make
it functionally impossible
Chapman 12 (Stephen, editorial writer for Chicago Tribune, “Chapman: Nuclear terrorism unlikely,”
May 22, http://www.oaoa.com/articles/chapman-87719-nuclear-terrorism.html)
A layperson may figure it’s only a matter of time before the unimaginable comes to pass. Harvard’s Graham Allison, in his book “Nuclear
Terrorism,” concludes, “On the current course, nuclear terrorism is inevitable.” But remember: Afxter Sept. 11, 2001, we all thought
more attacks were a certainty. Yet al-Qaida and its ideological kin have proved unable to mount a second strike.
Given their inability to do something simple — say, shoot up a shopping mall or set off a truck bomb —
it’s reasonable to ask whether they have a chance at something much more ambitious. Far from being plausible,
argued Ohio State University professor John Mueller in a presentation at the University of Chicago, “the likelihood that a terrorist
group will come up with an atomic bomb seems to be vanishingly small .” The events required to make that
happen comprise a multitude of Herculean tasks. First, a terrorist group has to get a bomb or fissile material,
perhaps from Russia’s inventory of decommissioned warheads. If that were easy, one would have already gone missing .
Besides, those devices are probably no longer a danger, since weapons that are not maintained quickly become what one expert
calls “radioactive scrap metal.” If terrorists were able to steal a Pakistani bomb, they would still have to defeat the
arming codes and other safeguards designed to prevent unauthorized use. As for Iran, no nuclear state has ever given
a bomb to an ally — for reasons even the Iranians can grasp. Stealing some 100 pounds of bomb fuel would require help
from rogue individuals inside some government who are prepared to jeopardize their own lives. Then comes the task of building a
bomb. It’s not something you can gin up with spare parts and power tools in your garage. It requires
millions of dollars, a safe haven and advanced equipment — plus people with specialized skills, lots of
time and a willingness to die for the cause. Assuming the jihadists vault over those Himalayas, they would have to
deliver the weapon onto American soil. Sure, drug smugglers bring in contraband all the time — but seeking their help would
confront the plotters with possible exposure or extortion. This, like every other step in the entire process, means
expanding the circle of people who know what’s going on, multiplying the chance someone will blab,
back out or screw up. That has heartening implications. If al-Qaida embarks on the project, it has only a minuscule chance of seeing it
bear fruit. Given the formidable odds, it probably won’t bother. None of this means we should stop trying to minimize the risk
by securing nuclear stockpiles, monitoring terrorist communications and improving port screening. But it offers good reason to think that in this
war, it appears, the worst eventuality is one that will never happen
Trade---IL---1NC
Arms sales won’t derail trade talks – they’re being used as leverage and more tied to
geostrategic considerations
Impact on Trade Talks Between China and the US
The request for F-16 supplies to Taiwan also comes amid crucial trade talks between Beijing and Washington.
The two states were embroiled in a trade war in 2018, mutually imposing hefty tariffs on goods worth billions of dollars. The US and China have recently made
certain progress towards striking a new trade deal, according to Donald Trump, who recently refused to impose a new round of tariffs in order to avoid hampering the
trade talks.
Paul Huang was at a loss to predict if Beijing would retaliate against the F-16 supplies to Taiwan via its trade talks with the US, but at the same time
suggested that Washington could be using the matter to pressure China in the talks.
"If anything, having the option to sell arms to Taiwan actually gives US decision makers a
considerable leverage in its negotiating position with Beijing", Huang said.
Cavender also suggested that the possibility of selling F-16s to Taiwan could be used by Washington in trade talks
with Beijing, but noted that there could be other reasons to permit the sale of the jets.
"This potential deal does come at the same time as the US is completing arms sales to its other allies in the region who are
concerned about China's military build-up", he said.
No trade deal regardless and it wouldn’t solve their impacts

Palmer 5/10 ---- Doug, senior trade reporter for Politico, Bachelor’s degree in Business Administration
and Management (University of Missouri – Kansas City), “Trump's Trade Agenda on the Verge of
Imploding,” Politico, 2019, https://www.politico.com/story/2019/05/10/trump-china-trade-1422319
President Donald Trump

is heading toward his 2020 reelection campaign with virtually nothing to show for his big trade
promises — except for angry farmers and a jittery stock market.
A long-sought deal with China appears to be falling apart , exposing businesses on both sides of the Pacific to
more tariffs and steep losses for farmers. His new pact with Canada and Mexico is facing significant opposition in Congress even from
Republicans, who are demanding that he lift steel and aluminum tariffs before they’ll vote on it. Deals with the European Union, Japan and Great Britain are also
stalled by politics here and abroad.
Trump’s failure to reach agreements with America’s trading partners could have a brutal impact on the economy and his
reelection effort, even if his base likes his tough talk on China. By the time voters head to the polls in 2020, the prices of consumer goods could
be skyrocketing . Farmers may be swamped with products they can’t sell abroad . And a bear market
could be shrinking everyone’s retirement savings.
So far, Trump has only one trade agreement to his name after two years in office: A relatively minor agreement with South Korea that didn’t require approval from
Congress.
What he has achieved are mostly unilateral actions: imposing tariffs on more than $50 billion of steel and aluminum imports from both allies and adversaries and
tariffs on $250 billion of Chinese goods. He's also threatening to raise tariffs on a remaining $325 billion of China's exports.
“He’s a one-trick pony . He only knows how to do one thing: impose tariffs,” said Bill Reinsch, a trade expert at the
Center for Strategic and International Studies.
The White House did not respond to a request for comment, but did put out a press release Friday listing statements of support for Trump's handling of the trade talks.
Reinsch, a former Commerce Department official, said he sees only a slight chance of Trump eking out a political
victory in the China talks, which grew more tense Monday after Beijing pledged to retaliate against the
U.S. with fresh tariffs on $60 billion in American goods.
He's more likely to come back with a deal that Democrats will be able to successfully portray as too weak and a
cave to Beijing , Reinsch said.
Or he'll walk away from the talks, leaving tariffs in place on potentially $575 billion worth of Chinese goods — everything from clothing and toys
to Apple iPhones and computers.
In that scenario, China is expected to increase its already substantial retaliation on U.S. exports, such as farm goods,
seafood and chemicals. Boeing aircraft, which Beijing has spared so far, could also face increased duties.
That would allow Democrats to accuse Trump of being a terrible trade negotiator who has inflicted pain on U.S. farmers and businesses without achieving his goal of
forcing China to make trade reforms, Reinsch said.
Trump has repeatedly stressed his desire for an agreement that reins in China's trade and i ntellectual p roperty
abuses. But he also seems content with simply imposing higher duties on all Chinese goods.
Trade---IL---Ext---No Deal
No deal – China won’t backdown – latest White Paper
Stevenson 6/2 ---- Alexandra, business correspondent for the New York Times, B.A. in political
science (McGill University), “China Strikes Defiant Stance on Trade Against Trump,” New York Times,
2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/02/business/china-trump-trade-fedex.html
BEIJING — China struck a defiant stance on Sunday in response to President Trump’s growing pressure on trade,
blaming the U nited S tates for a breakdown in negotiations and saying it must withdraw its latest round
of tariffs before a deal can be reached.
In a white paper released Sunday morning, Chinese officials showed little indication that they would back down,
sending a signal that confrontation is the government’s formal approach to its trade dispute with Washington. The white
paper came less than two days after the Chinese government threatened to put American companies and
individuals on a blacklist if they stopped supplying their Chinese partners, without citing specifics.
“China will never give in on major issues of principle,” the white paper said. “China isn’t willing to fight a trade war,
but it isn’t afraid to fight and will fight if necessary. That attitude has not changed.”
The white paper was released at a hastily arranged news conference on Sunday morning featuring Wang Shouwen, the Chinese vice minister of commerce and deputy
China international trade representative.
“When you give them an inch, the U.S. wants a yard,” Mr. Wang said, adding that the U nited S tates insisted on “unreasonably high
demands” that crossed over into the area of “intervening with China’s sovereignty.”
The Trump administration’s latest efforts to ramp up pressure on China “show very clearly who should take
responsibility” for the current state of relations, he added.
While the white paper did not list any specific new threats, it showed an “alarming” amount of defiance, said Diana Choyleva,
chief economist at Enodo Economics.
“It’s not necessarily an escalation as such, but a confirmation that China is now digging its heels in and preparing for a
drawn-out conflict ,” Ms. Choyleva said. “ There won’t be any papering over the cracks as any potential trade deal
would have been.”
China uses white papers to detail and formalize its response to often contentious issues, indicating that the government holds a
singular and unified view on the matter.
Trump’s making everything worse – Huawei and new tariffs proves

Stevenson 6/2 ---- Alexandra, business correspondent for the New York Times, B.A. in political
science (McGill University), “China Strikes Defiant Stance on Trade Against Trump,” New York Times,
2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/02/business/china-trump-trade-fedex.html
The paper was released less than a month after Mr. Trump
raised tariffs on Chinese-made products and threatened to impose still
more after accusing China of backing away from its earlier commitments. It also follows the announcement
three weeks ago that the Trump administration would restrict Huawei, a Chinese telecommunications company that the United States considers a
security threat, from access to essential American-made technology like chips and software.
Mr. Wang called the Huawei move a “severe setback” for negotiations between the two countries, saying it had
“unduly escalated trade frictions.”

Trade---Econ---1NC
Economy resilient – their impacts are epistemologically faulty and exaggerated –
durability of macro-economic trends, empirical examples of the policy/economic
disconnect, offset uncertainty for households/businesses, and faith in intervening actors
SEB 17 ---- Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken Group, “ Global Economy Resilient to New Political
Challenges,” 2/22, https://sebgroup.com/press/news/global-economy-resilient-to-new-political-
challenges
The interplay between economics and politics was undoubtedly a dominant feature of analyses during 2016. As we know, it was
difficult to foresee both election results and their economic consequences. It was certainly not strange that economists were unable to predict the Brexit referendum
outcome or Donald Trump’s victory, when public opinion polling organisations and betting firms failed to do so, but lessons might be learned from the economic
assessment impacts they made. Economists probably tend to exaggerate the importance of more general political
phenomena. While in the midst of elections that appear historically important, it is tempting to present alarmist projections
about election outcomes that seem improbable and/or unpleasant. But once the initial shock effect has faded, more
ordinary economic data such as corporate reports and macroeconomic figures take the upper hand .
Psychological effects often exaggerated
One important observation is that it is difficult to find any historical correlation between heightened
security policy tensions and economic activity. Households and businesses do not seem to be especially
sensitive in their consumption or capital spending behaviour. This is perhaps because uncertainty is offset by
investments in a defence build-up, for example. Only when the conditions that directly determine profitability and investments are affected, for example via
rising oil prices or poorly functioning financial markets, will the effects become clear.
Markets also seem to have a general tendency to assume that the economic policy makers can actually behave
rationally in crisis situations, until this has been disproved. Both during the US sub-prime mortgage crisis of 2007-2008
and the euro zone's existential crisis a few years later, for a rather long time the market maintained its faith that
a response would come. Not until after a lengthy period of inept actions by decision makers did these crises
become genuinely acute, with large secondary effects as a consequence. This market "patience" is presumably based on a long-
time pattern of recurring bailout measures by governments and central banks, which usually benefit risk-taking at the
expense of caution or speculation that policy responses will not materialise.\
Econ decline doesn’t cause conflict

Clary 15 – Christopher Clary, Ph.D. in Political Science from MIT, Postdoctoral Fellow, Watson
Institute for International Studies, Brown University, “Economic Stress and International Cooperation:
Evidence from International Rivalries,” April 22, 2015, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2597712
Do economic downturns generate pressure for diversionary conflict? Or might downturns encourage austerity and economizing
behavior in foreign policy? This paper provides new evidence that economic stress is associated with conciliatory
policies between strategic rivals. For states that view each other as military threats, the biggest step possible toward bilateral cooperation is to
terminate the rivalry by taking political steps to manage the competition. Drawing on data from 109 distinct rival dyads since
1950, 67 of which terminated, the evidence suggests rivalries were approximately twice as likely to
terminate during economic downturns than they were during periods of economic normalcy. This is true controlling for
all of the main alternative explanations for peaceful relations between foes (democratic status, nuclear weapons
possession, capability imbalance, common enemies, and international systemic changes), as well as many other possible
confounding variables . This research questions existing theories claiming that economic downturns are
associated with diversionary war , and instead argues that in certain circumstances peace may result from
economic troubles .
Trade---Econ---Ext---No War
Their ev can’t explain 2007 – this also answers any possible aff warrants (gambling
for resurrection, diversion, prolif, lash out, nationalism, ethnic exclusion, and
protectionism all did not happen)
Drezner 14 (Daniel, Professor of International Relations (Tufts), Nonresident senior fellow at
Brookings, former international economist at the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of International
Banking and Securities Markets, “The System Worked: Global Economic Governance during the Great
Recession”, B.A. in political economy (Williams College), M.A. in economics and Ph.D. in political
science (Stanford), World Politics, 66.1, January)
The final significant outcome addresses a dog that hasn't barked : the effect of the Great Recession on cross-
border conflict and violence. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial crisis would lead states to
increase their use of force as a tool for staying in power.42 They voiced genuine concern that the global economic downturn would
lead to an increase in conflict—whether through greater internal repression, diversionary wars, arms races, or a
ratcheting up of great power conflict. Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the disruptions of the Occupy
movement fueled impressions of a surge in global public disorder. The aggregate data suggest otherwise , however. The Institute for
Economics and Peace has concluded that "the average level of peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it was in
2007."43 Interstate violence in particular has declined since the start of the financial crisis, as have military expenditures in most
sampled countries. Other studies confirm that the Great Recession has not triggered any increase in violent
conflict , as Lotta Themner and Peter Wallensteen conclude: "[T]he pattern is one of relative stability when we consider the trend for the past
five years."44 The secular decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed. Rogers Brubaker observes that "the
crisis has not to date generated the surge in protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion that might have been
expected."43
Empirically denied, instability burns out, and no backing for extremism – reject
their evidence, it’s internet fear-mongering
Barnett 9 (Thomas, Senior Strategic Researcher – Naval War College, “The New Rules: Security
Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis”, Asset Protection Network, 8-25, http://www.aprodex.com/the-
new-rules--security-remains-stable-amid-financial-crisis-398-bl.aspx)
When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze with all sorts of scary
predictions of, and commentary regarding, ensuing conflict and wars -- a rerun of the Great Depression leading to
world war, as it were. Now, as global economic news brightens and recovery -- surprisingly led by China and emerging markets -- is the talk
of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past year and realize how globalization's first truly worldwide recession has had
virtually no impact whatsoever on the international security landscape. None of the more than three-dozen
ongoing conflicts listed by GlobalSecurity.org can be clearly attributed to the global recession. Indeed, the last new
entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestine) predates the economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of
the chronic struggles began in the last century. Ditto for the 15 low-intensity conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican
"drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict last August was specifically timed, but by most accounts the opening
ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most important external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden spike in
an almost two-decade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions. Looking over the various databases, then, we see a most
familiar picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist movements. Besides the recent Russia-
Georgia dust-up, the only two potential state-on-state wars (North v. South Korea, Israel v. Iran) are both tied to one
side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process wholly unrelated to global economic trends. And with the U nited
S tates effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions (Iraq and Afghanistan-bleeding-into-Pakistan), our
involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest , both leading up to and following the onset of the economic
crisis: e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America, the usual military exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it up with pirates off
Somalia's coast). Everywhere else we find serious instability we pretty much let it burn , occasionally pressing the Chinese
-- unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our new Africa Command, for example, hasn't led us to anything beyond advising and training local forces.
So, to sum up: No significant uptick in mass violence or unrest (remember the smattering of urban riots last year in places like
Greece, Moldova and Latvia?); The usual frequency maintained in civil conflicts (in all the usual places); Not a single state-on-state
war directly caused (and no great-power-on-great-power crises even triggered); No great improvement or
disruption in great-power cooperation regarding the emergence of new nuclear powers (despite all that diplomacy); A modest
scaling back of international policing efforts by the system's acknowledged Leviathan power (inevitable given the strain); and No serious efforts
by any rising great power to challenge that Leviathan or supplant its role. (The worst things we can cite are Moscow's occasional deployments of
strategic assets to the Western hemisphere and its weak efforts to outbid the United States on basing rights in Kyrgyzstan; but the best include
China and India stepping up their aid and investments in Afghanistan and Iraq.) Sure, we've finally seen global defense spending surpass the
previous world record set in the late 1980s, but even that's likely to wane given the stress on public budgets created by all this unprecedented
"stimulus" spending. If anything, the friendly cooperation on such stimulus packaging was the most notable great-power dynamic caused by the
crisis. Can we say that the world has suffered a distinct shift to political radicalism as a result of the economic crisis? Indeed,
no. The world's major economies remain governed by center-left or center-right political factions that remain decidedly friendly
to both markets and trade. In the short run, there were attempts across the board to insulate economies from immediate damage (in
effect, as much protectionism as allowed under current trade rules), but there was no great slide into "trade wars." Instead, the
W orld T rade O rganization is functioning as it was designed to function, and regional efforts toward free-trade agreements have not
slowed. Can we say Islamic radicalism was inflamed by the economic crisis? If it was, that shift was clearly overwhelmed by
the Islamic world's growing disenchantment with the brutality displayed by violent extremist groups such as al-Qaida. And looking
forward, austere economic times are just as likely to breed connecting evangelicalism as disconnecting fundamentalism. At the end of the day, the
economic crisis did not prove to be sufficiently frightening to provoke major economies into establishing global regulatory schemes, even as it
has sparked a spirited -- and much needed, as I argued last week -- discussion of the continuing viability of the U.S. dollar as the world's primary
reserve currency. Naturally, plenty of experts and pundits have attached great significance to this debate, seeing in it the beginning of "economic
warfare" and the like between "fading" America and "rising" China. And yet, in a world of globally integrated production chains and
interconnected financial markets, such "diverging interests" hardly constitute signposts for wars up ahead. Frankly, I don't welcome a world in
which America's fiscal profligacy goes undisciplined, so bring it on -- please! Add it all up and it's fair to say that this global financial crisis has
proven the great resilience of America's post-World War II international liberal trade order. Do I expect to read any analyses along those lines in
the blogosphere any time soon? Absolutely not. I expect the fantastic fear-mongering to proceed apace. That's what the
Internet is for.
No resources mean no war

Bennett 2K ---- D. Scott and Timothy Nordstrom, Professors of Political Science (Penn State),
“Foreign Policy Substitutability and Internal Economic Problems in Enduring Rivalries,” February,
Journal of Conflict Resolution
In this analysis, we focus on using economic conditions to understand when rivalries are likely to escalate or
end. Rivalries are an appropriate set of cases to use when examining substitutability both because leaders in rival states have clearly substitutable choices and
because rivalries are a set of cases in which externalization is a particularly plausible policy option.7 In particular, when confronted with domestic
problems, leaders in a rivalry have the clear alternatives of escalating the conflict with the rival to divert attention or to
work to settle the rivalry as a means of freeing up a substantial amount of resources that can be directed toward
solving internal problems. In the case of the diversion option, rivals provide logical, believable actors for leaders to target; the presence of a clear rival
may offer unstable elites a particularly inviting target for hostile statements or actual conflict as necessary. The public and relevant elites already consider the rival a
threat or else the rivalry would not have continued for an extended period; the presence of disputed issues also provides a casus belli with the rival that is always
present. Rivals also may provide a target where the possible costs and risks of externalization are relatively controlled. If the goal is diversion, leaders willwant to
divert attention without provoking an actual (and expensive)war. Over the course of many confrontations, rival states may learn to anticipate response patterns,
leading to safer disputes or at least to leaders believing that they can control the risks of conflict when they initiate a new confrontation. In sum, rivals provide good
targets for domestically challenged political leaders. This leads to our first hypothesis, which is as follows: Hypothesis 1: Poor economic conditions lead to
diversionary actions against the rival. Conflict
settlement is also a distinct route to dealing with internal problems that
leaders in rivalries may pursue when faced with internal problems. Military competition between states requires
large amounts of resources, and rivals require even more attention. Leaders may choose to negotiate a settlement that
ends a rivalry to free up important resources that may be reallocated to the domestic economy. In a “guns versus butter”
world of economic trade-offs, when a state can no longer afford to pay the expenses associated with
competition in a rivalry, it is quite rational for leaders to reduce costs by ending a rivalry. This gain (a peace
dividend) could be achieved at any time by ending a rivalry. However, such a gain is likely to be most important and
attractive to leaders when internal conditions are bad and the leader is seeking ways to alleviate active
problems. Support for policy change away from continued rivalry is more likely to develop when the
economic situation sours and elites and masses are looking for ways to improve a worsening situation. It
is at these times that the pressure to cut military investment will be greatest and that state leaders will be
forced to recognize the difficulty of continuing to pay for a rivalry . Among other things, this argument also encompasses the
view that the cold war ended because the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics could no longer compete economically with the United States. Hypothesis 2: Poor
economic conditions increase the probability of rivalry termination . Hypotheses 1 and 2 posit opposite behaviors in response to
a single cause (internal economic problems). As such, they demand a research design that can account for substitutability between them.
Trade---Econ---Ext---Resiliency
Econ’s resilient – shocks don’t spill over
Posen, 16 – Adam S. Posen, president of the Peterson Institute for International Economics and external
voting member of the Bank of England’s rate-setting Monetary Policy Committee, “Chapter 1: Why We
Need a Reality Check”, REALITY CHECK FOR THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, Peterson Institute for
International Economics, PIIE Briefing 16-3, March 2016
A combination of public policies and decentralized private-sector responses to the crisis have increased our
economic resilience , diminished the systemic spillovers between economies , and even created some room
for additional stimulus if needed. Large parts of the global financial system are better capitalized,
monitored, and frankly more risk averse than they were a decade ago, with less leverage. The riskier parts of today’s
global economy are less directly linked to the center’s growth and financing than when the troubles were within the United
States and most of Europe in 2008. Trade imbalances of many key economies are smaller, though growing, and thus
accumulations of foreign debt vulnerabilities are also smaller than a decade ago. Most central banks are now so committed to
stabilization that they are attacked for being too loose or supportive of markets , making them at least unlikely to
repeat some policy errors from 2007–10 of delaying loosening or even excessive tightening. Finally, corporate and household
balance sheets are far more solid in the US and some other major economies than they were a decade ago
(though not universally), and even in China the perceptions of balance sheet weakness exceed the reality in scope and scale.
Governments buffer damages, safety nets work, and empirics prove

Zakaria 9 (Fareed, Ph.D. in Political Science – Harvard University and Editor – Newsweek
International, “The Secrets of Stability”, Newsweek, 12-21, Lexis)
One year ago, the world seemed as if it might be coming apart. The global financial system, which had fueled a great expansion of capitalism and trade across the world, was crumbling. All the certainties of the age of -globalization--
about the virtues of free markets, trade, and technology--were being called into question. Faith in the American model had collapsed. The financial industry had crumbled. Once-roaring emerging markets like China, India, and Brazil
were sinking. Worldwide trade was shrinking to a degree not seen since the 1930s. Pundits whose bearishness had been vindicated predicted we were doomed to a long, painful bust, with cascading failures in sector after sector,
country after country. In a widely cited essay that appeared in The Atlantic this May, Simon Johnson, former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, wrote: "The conventional wisdom among the elite is still that the
current slump 'cannot be as bad as the Great Depression.' This view is wrong. What we face now could, in fact, be worse than the Great Depression." Others predicted that these economic shocks would lead to political instability and
violence in the worst-hit countries. At his confirmation hearing in February, the new U.S. director of national intelligence, Adm. Dennis Blair, cautioned the Senate that "the financial crisis and global recession are likely to produce a
wave of economic crises in emerging-market nations over the next year." Hillary Clinton endorsed this grim view. And she was hardly alone. Foreign Policy ran a cover story predicting serious unrest in several emerging markets. Of
one thing everyone was sure: nothing would ever be the same again. Not the financial industry, not capitalism, not globalization. One year later, how much has the world really changed? Well, Wall Street is home to two fewer
investment banks (three, if you count Merrill Lynch). Some regional banks have gone bust. There was some turmoil in Moldova and (entirely unrelated to the financial crisis) in Iran. Severe problems remain, like high unemployment
But overall, things look nothing like they did in the

in the West, and we face new problems caused by responses to the crisis--soaring debt and fears of inflation.
19 30s . The predictions of economic and political collapse have not materialized at all. A key measure
of fear and fragility is the ability of poor and unstable countries to borrow money on the debt markets. So consider this:
the sovereign bonds of tottering Pakistan have returned 168 percent so far this year. All this doesn't add up to a recovery
yet, but it does reflect a return to some level of normalcy. And that rebound has been so rapid that even the shrewdest
observers remain puzzled. "The question I have at the back of my head is 'Is that it?' " says Charles Kaye, the co-head of Warburg Pincus. "We
had this huge crisis, and now we're back to business as usual?" This revival did not happen because markets managed to stabilize themselves on
their own. Rather, governments, having learned the lessons of the Great Depression, were determined not to
repeat the same mistakes once this crisis hit. By massively expanding state support for the economy--through central
banks and national treasuries--they buffered the worst of the damage. (Whether they made new mistakes in the
process remains to be seen.) The extensive social safety nets that have been established across the industrialized world also
cushioned the pain felt by many. Times are still tough, but things are nowhere near as bad as in the 19 30s , when
governments played a tiny role in national economies. It's true that the massive state interventions of the past year may be fueling some new
bubbles: the cheap cash and government guarantees provided to banks, companies, and consumers have fueled some irrational exuberance in
stock and bond markets. Yet these rallies also demonstrate the return of confidence, and confidence is a very
powerful economic force. When John Maynard Keynes described his own prescriptions for economic growth, he believed government
action could provide only a temporary fix until the real motor of the economy started cranking again--the animal spirits of investors, consumers,
and companies seeking risk and profit. Beyond all this, though, I believe there's a fundamental reason why we have not faced
global collapse in the last year. It is the same reason that we weathered the stock-market crash of 19 87 ,
the recession of 19 92 , the Asian crisis of 19 97 , the Russian default of 19 98 , and the tech-bubble collapse
of 20 00 . The current global economic system is inherently more resilient than we think. The world today
is characterized by three major forces for stability, each reinforcing the other and each historical in nature.
2008 crushes their impact

Drezner, 12 (Professor International Politics Tufts University, ’12 (Daniel, October, “The Irony of
Global Economic Governance: The System Worked” Council on Foreign Relations International
Institutions and Global Governance)
In looking at outcomes, the obvious question is how well the global economy has recovered from the 2008
crisis. The current literature on economic downturns suggests two factors that impose significant barriers to a strong recovery from the Great
Recession: it was triggered by a financial crisis and it was global in scope . Whether measuring output, per capita income,
or employment, financial crashes trigger downturns that last longer and have far weaker recoveries than standard business
cycle downturns.10 Furthermore, the global nature of the crisis makes it extremely difficult for countries to export
their way out of the problem. Countries that have experienced severe banking crises since World War II have usually done so when the
global economy was largely unaffected. That was not the case for the Great Recession. The global economy has rebounded much
better than during the Great Depression. Economists Barry Eichengreen and Kevin O’Rourke have compiled data to compare
global economic performance from the start of the crises (see Figures 1 and 2).11 Two facts stand out in their comparisons. First, the
percentage drop in global industrial output and world trade levels at the start of the 2008 financial crisis
was more precipitous than the falloffs following the October 1929 stock market crash . The drop in industrial
output was greater in 2008 nine months into the crisis than it was eighty years earlier after the same amount of time. The drop in trade flows was
more than twice as large. Second, the post-2008 rebound has been far more robust. Four years after the onset of the Great Recession, global
industrial output is 10 percent higher than when the recession began . In contrast, four years after the 1929
stock market crash, industrial output was at only two-thirds of precrisis levels. A similar story can be told with
aggregate economic growth. According to World Bank figures, global economic output rebounded in 2010 with 2.3 percent
growth, followed up in 2011 with 4.2 percent growth. The global growth rate in 2011 was 44 percent higher than the average of the previous
decade. Even more intriguing, the growth continued to be poverty reducing.12 The World Bank’s latest figures suggest that despite the 2008
financial crisis, extreme poverty continued to decline across all the major regions of the globe. And the developing world achieved its first
Millennium Development Goal of halving the 1990 levels of extreme poverty.13 An important reason for the quick return to positive economic
growth is that cross-border flows did not dry up after the 2008 crisis . Again, compared to the Great Depression, trade
flows have rebounded extremely well.14 Four years after the 1929 stock market crash, trade flows were off by 25 percent compared
to precrisis levels. Current trade flows, in contrast, are more than 5 percent higher than in 2008. Even compared to other postwar recessions, the
current period has seen robust crossborder exchange. Indeed, as a report from CFR’s Maurice R. Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies
concluded in May 2012, “The growth in world trade since the start of the [current] recovery exceeds even the
best of the prior postwar experiences.”15 Other cross-border flows have also rebounded from 2008–2009 lows. Global foreign
direct investment (FDI) has returned to robust levels. FDI inflows rose by 17 percent in 2011 alone. This put annual FDI levels at $1.5 trillion,
surpassing the three-year precrisis average, though still approximately 25 percent below the 2007 peak. More generally, global foreign investment
assets reached $96 trillion, a 5 percent increase from precrisis highs. Remittances from migrant workers have become an increasingly important
revenue stream to the developing world—and the 2008 financial crisis did not dampen that income stream. Cross-border remittances to
developing countries quickly rebounded to precrisis levels and then rose to an estimated all-time high of $372 billion in 2011, with growth rates
in 2011 that exceeded those in 2010. Total cross-border remittances were more than $501 billion last year, and are estimated to reach $615 billion
by 2014.16 Another salient outcome is mass public attitudes about the global economy. A general assumption in public opinion research
is that during a downturn, demand for greater economic closure should spike, as individuals scapegoat
foreigners for domestic woes. The global nature of the 2008 crisis, combined with anxiety about the
shifting distribution of power, should have triggered a fall in support for an open global economy . Somewhat
surprisingly, however, the reverse is true. Pew’s Global Attitudes Project has surveyed a wide spectrum of countries since 2002, asking
people about their opinions on both international trade and the free market more generally.17 The results show resilient support
for expanding trade and business ties with other countries. Twenty-four countries were surveyed both in 2007 and at least
one year after 2008, including a majority of the G20 economies. Overall, eighteen of those twenty-four countries showed equal or greater support
for trade in 2009 than two years earlier. By 2011, twenty of twenty-four countries showed greater or equal support for trade compared to 2007.
Indeed, between 2007 and 2012, the unweighted average support for more trade in these countries increased from 78.5 percent to 83.6 percent.
Contrary to expectation, there has been no mass public rejection of the open global economy. Indeed, public support for the open trading system
has strengthened, despite softening public support for free-market economics more generally.18 The final outcome addresses a dog
that hasn’t barked: the effect of the Great Recession on crossborder conflict and violence. During the initial stages of
the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial crisis would lead states to increase their use of force as a
tool for staying in power.19 Whether through greater internal repression, diversionary wars, arms races, or
a ratcheting up of great power conflict, there were genuine concerns that the global economic downturn
would lead to an increase in conflict. Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the disruptions
of the Occupy movement fuel impressions of surge in global public disorder. The aggregate data suggests otherwise , however.
A fundamental conclusion from a recent report by the Institute for Economics and Peace is that “the average level of peacefulness in
2012 is approximately the same as it was in 2007.”20 Interstate violence in particular has declined since
the start of the financial crisis—as have military expenditures in most sampled countries. Other studies confirm that the Great
Recession has not triggered any increase in violent conflict ; the secular decline in violence that started with the end of
the Cold War has not been reversed.21
Trade---Pharma---1NC
Pharma resilient
Fitch 14 [Fitch Ratings' Report at Reuters 12-11-2014 http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/11/fitch-
ma-drives-negative-global-pharma-r-idUSFit86078120141211]
(The following statement was released by the rating agency) Link to Fitch Ratings' Report: 2015 Outlook: Global Pharmaceuticals (Strategic Industry Evolution to Continue;
M&A Reduces Rating Headroom) here LONDON, December 11 (Fitch) Fitch Ratings believes 2015 will be a transitional year for global pharma
companies as they continue to evolve their business models and position themselves for structural changes in the industry. Accordingly, we have
revised the rating outlook to negative as we expected rating headroom for Fitch-rated pharmaceutical companies to remain under pressure in 2015. This is
reflected in the Negative Outlook on 28% of the Fitch-rated global pharma universe (Amgen, BMS, Merck, Bayer). There was one downgrade in the sector during 2014 (AstraZeneca). Financial
flexibility has been eroded during 2014 on the back of a sharp rise in debt-funded M&A activity as companies focus on boosting scale in therapeutic areas and consumer healthcare. They are also
Fitch's sector outlook remains stable, reflecting that

improving R&D productivity to manage increasing costs and risks of bringing new drugs to market.
underlying long-term growth drivers remain intact , characterised by an ageing and growing world population leading
towards an increase of chronic and lifestyle diseases, ongoing emerging-market investments in healthcare, and treatment and technology
advances. However, we also factor in the intensifying efforts of healthcare authorities to reduce costs, improve outcomes and focus on patient value. As a result, we expect
stable operating performance in 2015. Continued M&A, pressure towards increasing shareholder returns (particularly for US players), as well as the growing
exposure to potentially rising interest rates as a result of increased debt levels across the sector are key rating risks. In addition, the industry's focus on scale in selected therapeutic areas over
diversification, the execution and integration of recent corporate activity, as well as risks and costs bringing the competitive late state R&D pipeline to market may lead to pressures on the
supported by
business risk profile of individual players. In aggregate, we expect global pharma sector to continue to display a strong investment grade credit profile,
favourable underlying demographics, emerging market growth, and anticipated innovation in specialist
treatment areas, with rating underpinned by strong and above average profitability and cash generation. Fitch believes that stretched rating profiles could be repaired assuming a
careful focus on capital allocation in the sector. The full report, '2015 Outlook: Global Pharmaceuticals' is available at www.fitchratings.com or by clicking the link above.
No impact – media and pharma hype benefits

Huff 9 [E. Huff, staff writer, Natural News, 12-16-2009
http://www.naturalnews.com/027749_journalism_pharmas.html]
Doctors and researchers are beginning to question the outlandish claims being made by the media in response to
alleged breakthroughs in cancer research. In an editorial published in the Journal of the National Cancer Institute (JNCI), several doctors expressed concern that news pieces fail to
accurately reflect the truth concerning drugs and scientific studies. Drs. Lisa Schwartz and Steven Woloshin from the Center for Medicine
and the Media at the Dartmouth Institute for Health Policy and Clinical Practice in New Hampshire, along with Dr. Barnett Kramer from JNCI, examined media claims about a new anti-cancer
drug called olaparib that was reported on in the acclaimed New England Journal of Medicine (NEJM). Though the study was uncontrolled and preliminary, some sources were claiming it as the
most important cancer breakthrough in ten years. Another report exaggerated study findings concerning alcohol and cancer risk. In response to a study that showed a two-percent increase in
breast cancer risk from drinking one alcoholic beverage a day versus not drinking at all, one media source produced a headline that said, "A drink a day raises a women's risk of cancer", with no
the coverage failed to accurately assess the truth and may have needlessly
mention of the important details in the article. Perhaps a simple oversight,
scared readers concerning alcohol consumption. Coverage concerning pharmaceutical drugs is often the most inaccurate . Aside from the
fact that many drug studies are corrupted from the start because of who is bankrolling them, negative findings are
often omitted from the results while miniscule benefits are highlighted as breakthroughs. The intensity and rate of severe negative side effects from
pharmaceutical drugs is routinely left out of mainstream reports concerning drug study results.
Trade---Pharma---Ext---No Impact
Pharma develops the wrong medicine
Basulto 14 “Ebola might change the way we think about pharmaceutical innovation” Dominic Basulto,
Washington Post, August 14, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/innovations/wp/2014/08/14/ebola-might-
change-the-way-we-think-about-pharmaceutical-innovation/
However, the current drug development system also produces a lot of market abnormalities, in the sense that
pharmaceutical companies won’t produce certain drugs because it just doesn’t make financial sense .
Instead, the focus is on creating drugs where there is a large target audience. (You can think of these as the types of
drugs you see advertised on TV every night). Think about this from the perspective of a chief executive or shareholder – the
share price is only going to go up if the market is convinced that you’re on to something really big . The
easiest way to understand these market abnormalities is the current situation now, where we simply weren’t
prepared for a large-scale Ebola outbreak. Ebola, unfortunately, is seen by many as “a disease of poor people in
poor countries.” If you’re the chief executive of a Western pharmaceutical company, what’s the incentive for creating a cure
that only a few thousand people are ever going to use or pay for? Doing the mortality math is an icky and morally challenging process, but the
1,000 lives already lost to Ebola are surely worth more than the $2 billion that it would have cost to develop
the drug in the first place.
Pharma can’t solve disease – inventions fail, too slow, and don’t make it to market
Young 14 [Jeffrey Young is a health care reporter at The Huffington Post based in Washington. He has
covered health care, business, and politics for 15 years at organizations including Bloomberg News and
The Hill 10-2-2014 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/10/02/ebola-cure_n_5915892.html]
That doesn't mean it's easy, even with all possible support from governments, pharmaceutical companies or anyone else.
Inventing medicines and vaccines and diagnostic tests is difficult , takes time and is more likely to fail than
succeed , Ross said. "It really takes almost a decade from concept to finally put the drug into a vial that you're ready to hand to a physician or a
nurse," Ross said. " Very few drugs ever make it to market ." Scientists must follow a basic set of procedures throughout
that can take an unknown amount of time and pose challenges all along, any one of which could scuttle the entire
enterprise, Ross said. It starts out with the basic, fundamental research of understanding what the disease is, how it works and how it might be counteracted. If
those stages are successful and researchers have an idea of a way to attack the disease, they have to test it on animals to see whether it works at all, and whether it's
safe. Before a treatment or vaccine can be tested on living humans, scientists must conduct two rounds of research on human cells and tissue, first for safety and then
for effectiveness. If all of that is successful, a drug company then has to get approval from the Food and Drug Administration and regulators in other countries to sell
the product, which can take years. During those painstaking steps, researchers and drugmakers always have to think about money. "It costs millions of dollars to do
human trials," Ross said. "Even
if you have a drug that is effective, it really sometimes comes down to the economics of it. If it's going
to cost you way more than what a person can afford, they're not going to be able to manufacture it," Ross said. " There won't be a
market for it."
Note: Internally citing Ted Ross, program director for vaccines and viral immunity at the Vaccine and Gene Therapy Institute of Florida in Port
Saint Lucie.
Trade---Pharma---Ext---Resiliency
Adaption solves
Childers 14 -- Magid Abou-Gharbia * and Wayne E. Childers, Moulder Center for Drug Discovery Research, Temple
University School of Pharmacy, Magid Abou-Gharbia received his B.Sc. in Pharmacy and his M.Sc. in Medicinal Chemistry
from Cairo University in 1971 and 1974, respectively, and his Ph.D. in Organic Chemistry from the University of Pennsylvania
in 1979. Following an NIH postdoctoral fellowship at Temple University, Magid joined Wyeth Pharmaceuticals in 1982, where
he was ultimately promoted to Senior Vice President of Chemical and Screening Sciences. His team’s efforts led to the
identification of eight marketed drugs and several clinical candidates. In 2008, Magid joined Temple University School of
Pharmacy as Professor of Pharmaceutical Sciences, Associate Director of Research, and Director of the Molder Center for Drug
Discovery Research. Magid serves on the Scientific Advisory Board of several companies and professional societies and has
adjunct professor appointments at several universities, Wayne E. Childers received his B.A. in Chemistry from Vanderbilt
University in 1975 and his Ph.D. in Organic Chemistry from the University of Georgia in 1984. While pursuing his Ph.D. studies,
Wayne served as Assistant Adjunct Professor at Bucknell University from 1982–1984. Following a postdoctoral fellowship at
Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, Wayne joined Wyeth in 1987, where he led CNS-directed project teams that
advanced four new chemical entities to clinical trials. In 2010, Wayne joined Temple University School of Pharmacy to serve as
Associate Professor of Pharmaceutical Sciences and Associate Director of the Molder Center for Drug Discovery Research.
Wayne’s research interests involve applying state-of-the-art techniques to the identification and development of new chemical
entities for treating unmet medical needs, American Chemical Society, 1/15, http://cdn-pubs.acs.org/doi/full/10.1021/jm401564r
The pharmaceutical industry is facing enormous challenges, including reduced efficiency, stagnant success rate, patent
expirations for key drugs, fierce price competition from generics, high regulatory hurdles, and the industry’s perceived tarnished image.
Pharma has responded by embarking on a range of initiatives. Other sectors, including NIH, have also
responded. Academic drug discovery groups have appeared to support the transition of innovative
academic discoveries and ideas into attractive drug discovery opportunities . Part 1 of this two-part series
discussed the criticisms that have been leveled at the pharmaceutical industry over the past 3 decades and summarized the supporting data for and
against these criticisms. This second installment will focus on the current challenges facing the pharmaceutical industry and Pharma’s responses,
focusing on the industry’s changing perspective and new business models for coping with the loss of talent and declining clinical pipelines as
well as presenting some examples of recent drug discovery successes.
*** WAR
IL---1NC
Not zero sum – their authors assume no defense spending increases
Hunzeker and Lanoszka 18 ---- Michael A. Hunzeker is an assistant professor at the Schar School
of Policy and Government (George Mason University), former postdoctoral research associate and
lecturer in public affairs (Princeton University), Ph.D. in Public Affairs (Princeton University), Master’s
Degree in Public Affairs (Princeton University), B.A. in political science (University of California,
Berkely), Alexander Lanoszka is an assistant professor (University of Waterloo), former US Foreign
Policy and International Security Fellow (Dartmouth University), former Stanton Nuclear Security
Postdoctoral Fellow (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), M.A. and Ph.D. in Politics (Princeton
University), and B.A. in IR (University of Windsor), A Question of Time: Enhancing Taiwan’s
Conventional Deterrence Posture, Center for Security Policy Studies, Schar School of Policy and
Government (George Mason University), November, http://csps.gmu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/A-
Question-of-Time.pdf
Our team agreed on two assumptions at the project’s outset: first, that Taiwan’s conventional deterrence posture will be more credible if it can
function without U.S. intervention during a crisis; and second, that Taiwan’s defense budget will not significantly increase in the
near term. We must emphasize that these assumptions do not necessarily reflect our beliefs about whether the United States might intervene in a crisis. Some of us
firmly believe the United States will come to Taiwan’s diplomatic, economic, and even military aid. Similarly, we have no doubt that the Tsai
Administration and its successors can generate the political support necessary to increase Taiwan’s
defense spending . Instead, we adopted these assumptions to identify a strategy by which Taiwan might
enhance its conventional deterrence posture to the maximum extent possible under “worst case scenario” conditions. If
Taiwan’s political and military leaders are confident that the United States will intervene in a crisis, and/or if defense budgets increase
significantly, then some of our recommendations are “overkill.” However, we think that the logic of deterrence means it is better to plan
for the worst—and then adjust those plans when better conditions present themselves—than the other way around.
China’s deterred now – arms sales are key magnify their fear
Greer 18 ---- Tanner, writer and analyst for Foreign Policy, “Taiwan Can Win a War With China,”
9/25, Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/25/taiwan-can-win-a-war-with-china/
***Modified for language
This sketch makes sense of the anxiety the PLA officer manuals express. They know war would be a
terrific gamble , even if they only admit it to each other. Yet it this also makes sense of the party’s violent
reactions to even the smallest of arms sales to Taiwan. Their passion betrays their angst. They understand what Western
gloom-and-doomsters do not. American analysts use terms like “mature precision-strike regime” and “anti-access and area denial warfare” to describe technological
trends that make it extremely difficult to project naval and airpower near enemy shores. Costs favor the defense: It is much cheaper to
build a ship-killing missile than it is to build a ship.
But if this means that the Chinese army can counter U.S. force projection at a fraction of America’s costs, it also
means that the democracies straddling the East Asian rim can deter Chinese aggression at a fraction
of the PLA’s costs . In an era that favors defense, small nations like Taiwan do not need a PLA-sized
military budget to keep the Chinese at bay .
No one needs to hear this message more than the Taiwanese themselves. In my trips to Taiwan, I have made a point of tracking down and interviewing both conscripts
and career soldiers. Their pessimism is palpable. This morale crisis in the ranks partly reflects the severe mismanagement of the conscription system, which has left
even eager Taiwanese patriots disillusioned with their military experience.
But just as important is the lack of knowledge ordinary Taiwanese have about the strength of their islands’ defenses. A recent poll found that 65 percent of Taiwanese
“have no confidence” in their military’s ability to hold off the PLA. Absent a vigorous campaign designed to educate the public about the true odds of successful
military resistance, the Taiwanese people are likely to judge the security of their island on flawed metrics, like the diminishing number of countries that maintain
formal relations with Taipei instead of Beijing. The PLA’s projected campaign is specifically designed to overwhelm and overawe a demoralized Taiwanese military.
The most crucial battlefield may be the minds of the Taiwanese themselves. Defeatism is a more dangerous threat to Taiwanese democracy than any weapon in
China’s armory.
Both Westerners and Taiwanese should be more optimistic about the defense of Taiwan than is now
normal. Yes, the Taiwanese Army projects that it can only hold off its enemy for two weeks after the landing— but the
PLA also believes that if it cannot defeat the Taiwanese forces in under two weeks, it will lose the war!
Yes, the disparity between the military budgets on both sides of the strait is large, and growing— but the Taiwanese
do not need parity to deter Chinese aggression . All they need is the freedom to purchase the sort of
arms that make invasion unthinkable . If that political battle can be resolved in the halls of Washington, the
party will not have the power to threaten battle on the shores of Taiwan.
IL---Ext---Deterrence High
Taiwan can win the war now – China knows it – no surprises, infiltration of Chinese
intelligence means no surprise, geography, and established invasion plan – counter-
invasion is already the norm
Greer 18 ---- Tanner, writer and analyst for Foreign Policy, “Taiwan Can Win a War With China,”
9/25, Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/25/taiwan-can-win-a-war-with-china/
***Modified for language
Two recent studies, one by Michael Beckley, a political scientist at Tufts University, and the other by Ian Easton, a fellow at the Project 2049 Institute, in
his book The Chinese Invasion Threat: Taiwan’s Defense and American Strategy in Asia, provide us with a
clearer picture of what a war
between Taiwan and the mainland might look like. Grounded in statistics , training manuals , and planning
documents from the PLA itself, and informed by simulations and studies conducted by both the U.S. Defense
Department and the Taiwanese Ministry of National Defense, this research presents a very different picture of a cross-
strait conflict than that hawked by the party’s official announcements.

Chinese commanders fear they may be forced into armed contest with an enemy that is better trained ,
better motivated , and better prepared for the rigors of warfare than troops the PLA could throw against them. A
cross-strait war looks far less like an inevitable victory for China than it does a staggeringly risky gamble .
Chinese army documents imagine that this gamble will begin with missiles. For months, the PLA’s Rocket Force will have been preparing this opening salvo; from
the second war begins until the day the invasion commences, these missiles will scream toward the Taiwanese coast, with airfields, communication hubs, radar
equipment, transportation nodes, and government offices in their sights. Concurrently, party sleeper agents or special forces discreetly ferried across the strait will
begin an assassination campaign targeting the president and her Cabinet, other leaders of the Democratic Progressive Party, officials at key bureaucracies, prominent
media personalities, important scientists or engineers, and their families.
The goal of all this is twofold. In the narrower tactical sense, the PLA hopes to destroy as much of the Taiwanese Air Force on the ground as it can and from that point
forward keep things chaotic enough on the ground that the Taiwan’s Air Force cannot sortie fast enough to challenge China’s control of the air. The missile
campaign’s second aim is simpler: paralysis [delaying action]. With the president dead, leadership mute, communications down, and transportation impossible, the
Taiwanese forces will be left rudderless, demoralized, and disoriented. This “shock and awe” campaign will pave the way for the invasion proper.
This invasion will be the largest amphibious operation in human history. Tens of thousands of vessels will be assembled—mostly commandeered from the Chinese
merchant marine—to ferry 1 million Chinese troops across the strait, who will arrive in two waves. Their landing will be preceded by a fury of missiles and rockets,
launched from the Rocket Force units in Fujian, Chinese Air Force fighter bombers flying in the strait, and the escort fleet itself.
Confused, cut off, and overwhelmed, the Taiwanese forces who have survived thus far will soon run out of supplies and be forced to abandon the beaches. Once the
beachhead is secured, the process will begin again: With full air superiority, the PLA will have the pick of their targets, Taiwanese command and control will be
destroyed, and isolated Taiwanese units will be swept aside by the Chinese army’s advance. Within a week, they will have marched into Taipei; within two weeks
they will have implemented a draconian martial law intended to convert the island into the pliant forward operating base the PLA will need to defend against the
anticipated Japanese and American counter-campaigns.
This is the best-case scenario for the PLA. But an
island docile and defeated two weeks after D-Day is not a guaranteed
outcome . One of the central hurdles facing the offensive is surprise. The PLA simply will not have it .
The invasion will happen in April or October. Because of the challenges posed by the strait’s weather, a transport fleet can only
make it across the strait in one of these two four-week windows . The scale of the invasion will be so large that
strategic surprise will not be possible , especially given the extensive mutual penetration of each side by the other’s
intelligence agencies.
Easton estimates that Taiwanese, American, and Japanese leaders will know that the PLA is preparing for a cross-strait
war more than 60 days before hostilities begin. They will know for certain that an invasion will happen more
than 30 days before the first missiles are fired. This will give the Taiwanese ample time to move much of their
c ommand and c ontrol infrastructure into hardened mountain tunnels , move their fleet out of vulnerable ports,
detain suspected agents and intelligence operatives, litter the ocean with sea mines , disperse and camouflage army units
across the country, put the economy on war footing, and distribute weapons to Taiwan’s 2.5 million reservists .
There are only 13 beaches on Taiwan’s western coast that the PLA could possibly land at. Each of these has already
been prepared for a potential conflict. Long underground tunnels—complete with hardened, subterranean supply
depots —crisscross the landing sites. The berm of each beach has been covered with razor-leaf plants .
Chemical treatment plants are common in many beach towns—meaning that invaders must prepare for the clouds of
toxic gas any indiscriminate saturation bombing on their part will release. This is how things stand in times of peace.
As war approaches, each beach will be turned into a workshop of horrors . The path from these beaches to the capital has
been painstakingly mapped; once a state of emergency has been declared, each step of the journey will be complicated or booby-
trapped . PLA war manuals warn soldiers that skyscrapers and rock outcrops will have steel cords strung
between them to entangle helicopters ; tunnels, bridges, and overpasses will be rigged with munitions (to be
destroyed only at the last possible moment); and building after building in Taiwan’s dense urban core will be transformed
into small redoubts meant to drag Chinese units into drawn-out fights over each city street.
IL---Ext---No Tradeoff
Taiwan will increase defense spending
Asia Times 19 ---- “Taiwan: Incremental Rises in Defense Spending,” 4/16,
https://www.asiatimes.com/2019/04/article/taiwan-incremental-rises-in-defense-spending/
The Taiwanese military can expect more cash and resources as the self-governed island is planning, amid recent
menacing gestures from Beijing, to devote more than US$13 billion annually on defense within the next
decade.
This is the main thrust of Taiwan’s new military spending plan spanning the next 10 years. It represents the latest bid by President
Tsai Ing-wen to drum up resistance to Xi Jinping’s renewed threat to annex the island. Taiwan remains, in Beijing’s view, a breakaway province
that must be brought back under its suzerainty either through peaceful reunification or by force.
Taiwan’s Defense Ministry announced on Monday an incrementally rising 10-year budget aimed at
breaking the NT$400 billion (US$13 billion) mark by 2027 and further growing to NT$420 billion by 2029.
Part of the money will be spread over the years to fund Taiwan’s bid to procure 66 F-16V fighter jets from the US, in addition to
108 M1A2 assault tanks, should Washington approve the deals.
China/Taiwan---1NC
Status quo solves Taiwan war.
Cole 17 — J. Michael Cole, Associate Researcher at the French Centre for Research on Contemporary
China, Senior Non-Resident Fellow at the China Policy Institute at the University of Nottingham, China
Correspondent for Jane's Defence Weekly, Editor in Chief of The Taiwan Sentinel, former Deputy News
Chief and Reporter for the Taipei Times, former Analyst with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service,
holds a Master’s in War Studies from the Royal Military College of Canada, 2017 (“Trump Vows to
‘Honor’ ‘One China’ Policy,” The Taiwan Sentinel, February 10th, Available Online at
https://sentinel.tw/trump-xi-honor-one-china/, Accessed 02-10-2017)
U.S. President Donald Trump had a “lengthy” telephone conversation with Chinese President Xi Jinping
on Thursday night and agreed to honor the “one China” policy, according to a press statement by the
White House.
“President Donald J. Trump and President Xi Jinping of China had a lengthy telephone conversation on
Thursday evening,” the press release stated. “The two leaders discussed numerous topics and President
Trump agreed, at the request of President Xi, to honor our ‘one China’ policy.”
The statement went on to add that “Representatives of the United States and China will engage in
discussions and negotiations on various issues of mutual interest. The phone call between President
Trump and President Xi was extremely cordial, and both leaders extended best wishes to the people of
each other’s countries. They also extended invitations to meet in their respective countries.”
“President Trump and President Xi look forward to further talks with very successful outcomes,” it said.
Relations between China and the U.S. appeared to get off on the wrong foot after president-elect Trump
held a 10-minute telephone conversation with Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen on Dec. 2, the first such
conversation between a Taiwanese president and an elected American president since the U.S. severed
official diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan) in 1979. Weeks later, Trump again
“angered” Beijing by telling an interview that the U.S.’ “one China” policy was negotiable, comments
that suggested the possibility of both closer engagement with Taiwan and apprehensions that Taiwan’s
status, and U.S. assistance to the democratic island-nation, could also be used as a bargaining chip during
negotiations between Washington and Beijing.
President Trump’s assurances to President Xi follow a statement by U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson
earlier this month that that the Three U.S.-China Joint Communiqués, the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA)
and the Six Assurances constitute the foundations of U.S. policy toward China and Taiwan. Tillerson
added that the U.S. should continue to uphold its “one China policy,” in which the U.S. acknowledges
Beijing’s position that there is only one China and that Taiwan is part of China.
While vague, the White House statement’s reference to President Trump’s agreeing to honor our — that
is, the U.S.’ — “one China” policy should be sufficient to please Beijing while reassuring Taipei that
Washington has no intention to revise its official position, such as adopting the more definitive language
contained in Beijing’s “one China” principle . Although Mr. Trump’s apparent (and not entirely
unexpected) shift toward continuity may disappoint the more impatient segment of Taiwan’s green camp
who were hoping for a break with the longstanding status quo, his decision to do so should dispel fears
in Beijing and remove some of the incentives it had for punishing Taiwan. By doing so, President Trump
may therefore have removed some of the variables that could have contributed to instability in the
Taiwan Strait at a time when Washington is still fleshing out its policies for the wider Asia Pacific.
No Taiwan invasion
Babones 15 Salvatore Babones is an associate professor of sociology & social policy at the University
of Sydney, Foreign Policy in Focus, March 12, 2015, “Is China a threat? The Devil’s in the details”,
http://salvatorebabones.com/is-china-a-threat/
What about regional conflict? China’s growing military certainly sounds like a regional menace. But a menace to whom?
Here again the details get in the way of the China threat story.
To the east, Japan’s government is responding to Chinese expansion by boosting its own defense spending to record levels, proposing to change its pacifist
constitution to allow greater military flexibility, and making a renewed push to resolve the long-standing Kuril Islands dispute with Russia. If Prime Minister Shinzo
Abe finally succeeds in making peace with Russia, that would leave China and its ally North Korea as the sole focus for Japan’s entire military capacity. Japan is a
rich, technologically advanced country of 127 million people. It can look after itself.
For very different reasons, China poses little threat to South Korea. China increasingly views North Korea more as a burden than as an advance column for an attack
on the South. And China has recently been courting South Korean technology investment in order to reduce its dependence on Japan.
Every election in Taiwan sparks
Political relations across the Taiwan Strait are inevitably dominated by questions over the status of Taiwan.
talk about and fears of Chinese invasion. But no country in the world has staged a large-scale
amphibious assault since the U.S. landings at Incheon, South Korea in 1950 . For more than half a century, even
American adventures abroad have been small-scale (Grenada) or launched from land bases (Iraq).
The Chinese military will never have the capacity to invade Taiwan against armed resistance — not
now, not later, not ever. It just can’t be done in the contemporary military context in which a single
cruise missile can sink a transport ship carrying thousands of troops . It makes no sense to worry
about something that is not technically possible.
The Philippines? Why would China want to invade the Philippines? Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar? Ditto, ditto, ditto. China is involved in a plethora of
minor border disputes with its neighbors, but none of these involve core territorial interests or serious
legal claims that China (or most of its neighbors, for that matter) have historically been interested in pushing. They’re all frozen
conflicts that are unlikely ever to thaw.
China/Taiwan---Ext---No Invasion
No Taiwan invasion – too difficult and economic ties
Thim 15 Michal Thim is a Ph.D. candidate in the Taiwan Studies Program at the China Policy Institute
(CPI), University of Nottingham, a CPI blog Emerging Scholar, and a Research Fellow at the Prague-
based think-tank Association for International Affairs, Thinking Taiwan, January 21, 2015, “Can China
Take Over Taiwan by Force?”, http://thinking-taiwan.com/can-china-take-taiwan-by-force/
However, taking Taiwan by force presents a greater challenge for the modernizing PLA than most
observers assume.
To begin with, geographical conditions are favorable to the defense of Taiwan. This may appear incredible, since geographically
Taiwan lacks strategic depth since its entire territory is within range of PLA’s advanced combat jets and cruise and ballistic missiles. However, Taiwan’s
rugged coastline lacks suitable landing beaches and its mountainous landscape offers natural defensive
advantages, especially given the weather conditions in the Strait. If defended by a determined population ,
Taiwan can be quite inhospitable to any external power attempting to land its forces.
Three scenarios are most frequently considered for possible use of force by China against Taiwan.
Air/missile strikes
The first scenario involves missile and air strikes against key military and civilian infrastructure, including government buildings, communication nodes, ports, and airports. Those would aim to
cripple air defenses, the Navy and communication systems, while blinding defenders and subjecting the political leadership to “shock and awe.” Beijing would thus hope to force Taipei to accept
China’s terms without a costly invasion.
This is arguably a tempting option for Beijing. It has many benefits for the attacker: rapid, decisive action with minimal losses, resulting in the opponent’s surrender.
Hence, it is commonly held that should Beijing decide to use force, missile strikes would be the preferred option. Proponents of this scenario argue that in recent
conflicts, air strikes (including use of guided missiles) proved decisive, forcing opponents to surrender without the need to conduct ground operations. NATO’s
intervention against Serbia in 1999 is sometimes cited as an example. However, this assumes nearly perfect execution of the plan, and as Von
Moltke once observed “No campaign plan survives first contact with the enemy.” Moreover, NATO’s Kosovo campaign took nearly three months of sustained
bombardment before Belgrade capitulated and withdrew from Kosovo.
Air power’s importance rose prominently throughout the 20th and into 21st century, but careful examination of individual cases reveals that
air forces have never truly won conflicts on their own. Even in the face of considerable losses, there
would be no guarantee that the Taiwanese government would simply surrender without PLA boots on the
ground. Further, while the Second Artillery Corps may field over 1,600 ballistic missiles, it is limited by the number of launching platforms it possesses, allowing
it to fire “only” a few hundred missiles in each wave. Even that would be a feat that the PLA has never performed.
Taiwan is preparing extensively for this scenario, establishing rapid runway repair capability,
Moreover,
redundant communication infrastructure, and underground bases, all designed to survive a first strike. Some
of the expensive platforms that have been criticized as a waste of resources have potentially great value in preventing the effects of “shock and awe.” The long-range
early-warning radar at Leshan in Hsinchu County will buy additional time, while a missile defense centered on the U.S.-made Patriots and Taiwan’s Tien-Kung III,
although doomed to destruction in the process, will limit the impact of a first strike. The psychological effect of images of successful interceptions could provide
balance to the destruction caused by airborne and land-based missiles. Beijing’s hope that Taiwan would quickly surrender therefore does not rest on a strong
foundation.
Naval blockade/quarantine
A naval blockade is often regarded as a viable option for Beijing. The PLA Navy (PLAN) has benefitted greatly from ongoing modernization, with the recent
introduction of new submarines and guided missile destroyers. A naval blockade (likely called a quarantine by Beijing, implying action within its territory rather than
blocking a sovereign nation) is that it could be a relatively bloodless action, with the exception of likely exchanges between the Taiwanese Navy and the PLAN. The
disadvantage is that naval blockades lack efficiency and take time. Moreover, they are logistically complex if the
goal is total isolation. The PLAN, undergoing transformation from an offshore navy to ocean-going navy, is wanting in experience in exercising this type
of sea-control. Moreover, a blockade would be a prolonged effort that lacks the advantage of surprise. Should a blockade fail to persuade
Taiwanese leaders to give up, the PLA would have to strike against alerted defenders.
Amphibious assault
An amphibious invasion is the most radical option of all, and it is also in many ways a poor option for Beijing. However, given the
problems with the first two options, this measure appears ultimately necessary if Taiwan is to be incorporated into the People’s Republic of China. Currently, the
PLA is still far from having sufficient capacity to land forces and reinforce them with sufficient
manpower to secure a beachhead. The element of surprise would be a challenge because of the
necessary preparations resulting in concentration of transport ships and the PLA troops in civilian ports in proximity to Taiwan.
The first phase would be similar to the missile and air attack scenario, except that this time there would be a continuous action aimed at achieving complete control of
the sea and air and destruction of Taiwan’s key assets on the ground. This is a necessary condition before attempting to traverse the unkind waters of the Taiwan Strait
in slow, vulnerable, troop-carrying landing ships. Moreover, even with the sea and air secured, the danger of lurking mobile
land-based anti-ship missiles would remain. Finally, the conditions of Taiwan’s coastline would make it easy for
Taiwan’s defense planners to determine where the landings could take place. If Beijing’s preferred option is a quick victory, an amphibious attack
does not offer it.
Ultimately, Beijing would prevail, perhaps even if the U.S. intervenes. However ,
the cost of victory would inevitably be high. China
is no longer the China of the 1950s, when it could send hundreds of thousands of volunteers to die, as it did in
the Korean War. This time its soldiers would be the only sons or daughters of parents who are reluctant to see them
die. The CCP’s attempt to consolidate its power by “returning” Taiwan to China’s bosom could very well
backfire and mark the end of its rule.
Chinese generals also face an additional dilemma: Whether to strike against U.S. bases in Japan to take them out pre-emptively, gaining additional time before Washington can dispatch new
forces to the area, or refrain from striking in the hope that the U.S. will not intervene. The former option makes the U.S. (and Japanese) intervention a certainty, while the latter gives the U.S. the
initiative with its bases intact.
Possible assistance to Taiwan in the case of a cross-Strait conflict is understandably a thorny issue, and Washington keeps its intentions deliberately ambiguous. However, while preventing the
forceful seizure of Taiwan by China is too important for the U.S. (and even more so for Japan), assistance to Taiwan does not have to take the form of a full-scale intervention. The U.S. could
limit itself to providing real-time intelligence or supplying war materials to Taipei. Though U.S. intervention should not be taken for granted, by the same token, it would be unwise to
underestimate the value of Taiwan for Washington and Tokyo.
Though the most feasible, the three scenarios outlined above do not cover all the cards that Beijing has at its disposal. Two other options have been discussed lately: “Salami-slicing” and
“Crimea-style” scenarios.
Salami-slicing
Some observers argue that Beijing is already using the salami-slicing method in the South China Sea, taking assertive steps that are not provocative enough to prompt a forceful reaction. In a
Taiwan scenario, the PLA could opt for a phased invasion divided into three stages, using the time between respective stages to break Taiwan’s will to resist. The first stage would begin with the
occupation of Kinmen and Matsu, two island groups near the Chinese coast. The second stage would be aimed at seizing the Penghu islands in the middle of the Strait, while the third stage would
constitute the final attempt to take Taiwan proper if negotiations failed to convince Taipei of the futility of resistance. It is a possible though not optimal option, one that entails the loss of the
element of surprise and prolonged operations, which Beijing does not appear to find palatable. However, seizing part of the territory governed by Taipei may be enough to satisfy Beijing’s short-
term intentions. In fact, the time span between the respective stages could involve years. The ultimate downside of such action is that after the first move, Taiwan’s population would never again
trust any “goodwill” moves by Beijing.
Crimea-style/hybrid warfare
The Crimea-style/hybrid warfare scenario, with “little green men” operating behind enemy lines, gives the intruder plausible deniability and is a tempting option.
However, there is crucial element missing in the case of Taiwan: widespread local support. Support for unification is extremely low in
Taiwan. Even if we take into consideration that a United Front could mobilize manpower within Taiwan and manufacture perceptions of higher support, the
emergence of an armed militia to protect “Chinese citizens” from the “separatist” central government in Taipei is hardly conceivable. This option is likely feasible
only for Kinmen and Matsu, where both local support and ease of resupply is possible. The relevance for a Taiwan scenario lies not in the tactics used by Moscow in
Crimea, but in the blatant disregard for Taiwan’s sovereignty.
China does not have many options for a rapid victory. Its best bet is to strike hard and hope that united front efforts and asymmetrical
economic interdependence will do the rest. However, a United Front, relying on pro-Beijing sympathizers, will likely fade in strength once missiles start to fly.
Economic leverage and exploiting cross-strait integration are arguably also part of the United Front’s arsenal. However, if economic factors alone could compel
Taiwanese to accept Beijing’s rule, no use of force would be needed. In other words, use of force would ultimately mean that Beijing failed to absorb Taiwan by other
means.
If a quick victory is out of reach, Beijing may still consider a prolonged costly campaign with amphibious invasion as the ultimate option. However, the longer the campaign, the more
problematic it will become. Naturally, these are not all the options. Beijing may also choose to use a combination of individual elements for each scenario (e.g., a naval blockade and seizure of
offshore islands).
Special Forces deployed in Taiwan prior to the outbreak of hostilities to strike at key targets, kidnap or kill political leaders, and secure airstrips for the PLA’s airborne soldiers is another option.
This is a more traditional version of “little green men” deployment and presumably part of larger military operations. However useful Special Forces may be, their greatest utility lies in their
ability to conduct hit-and-run operations, not holding ground awaiting relief. Arguably, Beijing could simultaneously land its airborne forces in some of the regular cross-strait flights and perhaps
sneak-in military transport planes carrying armored personnel vehicles or light tanks for greater mobility and firepower, but further resupply would become difficult once Taiwan’s armed forces
are alerted. Nevertheless, Beijing may opt for Special Forces reinforced by airborne troops to maximize the element of surprise, destroy key infrastructure, seize key government buildings, and
quickly install a puppet government. If successful, it would undoubtedly become the greatest operation of its kind in history.
Cyber warfare
One last option that has not been mentioned so far is cyber warfare. For example, large-scale cyber-attacks could damage the electric power grid, resulting in considerable economic losses for
Taiwan. However, as an asymmetrical method, cyber war does not give Beijing the qualitative and quantitative advantages found in the previous options. Taiwan could retaliate with its own
offensive cyber campaign, since the advantage that China enjoys in traditional military power would be irrelevant. In any case, cyber attacks would be part of each of the above outlined options,
differing only in scale, adding a new element to the traditional three domains (land, air, sea) of war.
***
What else is missing in the equation? Discussing strategic, tactical, and operational aspects, comparing capabilities and outlining scenarios of their use notwithstanding, the will to resist is a
crucial aspect of armed conflict, essential part for weaker actors to prevail over stronger. It is also one that is inherently difficult to assess prior to the outbreak of hostilities. Taiwan’s conscript-
based armed forces have not received much credit in that respect. Young Taiwanese are often criticized for being too soft and comfortable, and unwilling to face hardship. As if this were not
enough, the loyalty of their commanders has been called into question by the seemingly endless string of arrests for espionage for the China. However, everything would change after the first
shot is fired. Recall that the famous “this house will not fight for King and Country” resolution at the Oxford Union in 1933. Six years later, when war broke out, undergrads at Oxford flocked to
volunteer.
Thus, along with military options, non-military scenarios should be considered. Numerous
observers often echo a sentiment that is
recurrently shared by general public: Beijing would not need to fire a single shot to take over Taiwan.
Economic interdependence would tie hands of even the most determined government in Taiwan.
Furthermore, the prospect of economic breakdown should Taiwan refuse to follow Beijing’s dictates would be
enough for a majority of Taiwanese to do Beijing’s bidding. That could happen despite the fact that nations have historically
resisted rather than surrender.
China won’t invade

Keck 13 (Zachary Associate Editor at The Diplomat “Why China Won't Attack Taiwan” 12/24 The
Diplomat http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/why-china-wont-attack-taiwan/)
Although relatively muted in recent years, Taiwan is seen as the greatest potential flashpoint in U.S.-China relations. Indeed,
U.S. defense analysts perceive China’s expanding Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities primarily through the lens of preventing the
U.S. from intervening should Beijing invade Taiwan. Consequently, the
main concepts the U.S. military has developed for
countering A2/AD — namely, Air-Sea Battle and a blockade approach — appear to be based on the assumption that a
shooting war with China would break out over Taiwan.
In many ways, the concern over Taiwan is well-placed. China covets the island far more than any other piece of real estate, including the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. For CCP leaders and many
ordinary Chinese, Taiwan is one of the vast remaining vestiges of the country’s century of humiliation. Acquiring Taiwan would also significantly enhance the PLA’s ability to project power
outwardly. Despite improvements in cross-Strait relations in recent years, China has refused to rule out the possibility of invasion.
Besides having the motivation to acquire Taiwan, China seemingly is rapidly acquiring the capability to take the island by force. In recent years, the cross-Strait military balance has rapidly
shifted in Beijing’s favor, and this trend is almost certain to continue so long as China’s economy continues to grow. Today, China has at least 1,600 ballistic missiles pointed at Taiwan, and
Taiwan’s own Ministry of Defense admits that China will have sufficient military capabilities to mount a full cross-Strait attack by 2020.
This has led some U.S. analysts, particularly academics of the Realist persuasion, to argue that the U.S. should gradually cede Taiwan to the People’s Republic of China. For example, Charles
Glaser argued in a controversial Foreign Affairs article in 2011 that, given the risks of nuclear war between China and the United States, “the United States should consider backing away from its
commitment to Taiwan. This would remove the most obvious and contentious flash point between the United States and China and smooth the way for better relations between them in the
decades to come.”
Similarly, in a recent talk in Taiwan, John Mearsheimer argued that short of acquiring an independent nuclear deterrent, Taiwan’s best option is to pursue the “Hong Kong strategy” toward
Beijing. Under the Hong Kong strategy, “Taiwan accepts the fact it is doomed to lose its independence and become part of China. It then works hard to make sure that the transition is peaceful
and that it gains as much autonomy as possible from Beijing.”
it is ultimately extremely unlikely that China will try to seize Taiwan

Although the trend lines are undoubtedly working in China’s favor,
by force. Furthermore, should it try to do this, it is unlikely to succeed.

Even assuming China’s military capabilities are great enough to prevent the U.S. from intervening , there
are two forces that would likely be sufficient to deter China from invading Taiwan . The first and least important is the
dramatic impact this would have on how countries in the region and around the world would view such a move. Globally, China seizing
Taiwan would result in it being permanently viewed as a malicious nation. Regionally, China’s invasion of Taiwan
would diminish any lingering debate over how Beijing will use its growing power. Every regional power would
see its own fate in Taiwan. Although Beijing would try to reassure countries by claiming that Taiwan was part of China
already, and thus the operation was a domestic stability one, this narrative would be convincing to none of China’s neighbors.
Consequently, Beijing would face an environment in which each state was dedicated to cooperating with others to
balance against Chinese power.
But the more important deterrent for China would be the uncertainty of success. To be sure, China’s military capabilities
are growing to the point where it will soon be assured of its ability to quickly defeat Taiwan’s military forces. A little longer down the road it will
also likely be confident that it can prevent the U.S. from intervening in the conflict.
However, as recent U.S. military conflicts have adequately demonstrated, being able to defeat another nation’s armed
forces and being able to pacify the country are two different things altogether. It is in this latter aim that China’s
strategy is likely to falter. Taiwanese are adamantly opposed to being incorporated into a non-Democratic
China. These feelings would only harden in the aftermath of the invasion.
Thus, even if it quickly defeated Taiwan’s formal military forces, the PLA would continue to have to contend with the
remnants of resistance for years to come. Such a scenario would be deeply unsettling for leaders in Beijing as this defiance would
likely inspire similar resistance among various groups on the mainland, starting first and foremost with ethnic minorities in the
western China. Should the PLA resort to harsh oppression to squash resistance in Taiwan, this would deeply unsettle even Han Chinese on the
mainland. In fact, the clear parallels with how Imperial Japan sought to pacify Taiwan and China would be lost on no one in China and elsewhere.
The entire situation would be a nightmare for Chinese leaders. Consequently, they are nearly certain to avoid
provoking it by invading Taiwan. The only real scenario in which they would invade Taiwan is if the island nation
formally declared independence. But if Taiwanese leaders have avoided doing so to date, they are unlikely to think the
idea is very wise as China goes stronger.
Thus, the status-quo in the Taiwanese strait is unlikely to be changed by military force. Instead, Beijing is likely to continue drawing Taiwan closer
economically, and seeking to disrupt the U.S.-Taiwanese bilateral relationship. The hope would be that leaders in Taipei will ultimately conclude that they cannot resist being absorbed into
China, something China itself can facilitate this by offering favorable terms.
China/US---1NC
No US/China war – relatively high relations/low hostility, trade networks, cooperation
on mutual issues, peaceful military postures, lack of public support for conflict and
empirics – answers miscalc and accidental war
Heath 17 ---- Timothy, senior international defense researcher (RAND Corporation), former senior
analyst for the USPACOM China Strategic Focus Group, M.A. in Asian studies (George Washington
University), B.A. in philosophy (College of William and Mary), Ph.D. candidate in Political Science
(George Mason University), written with William R. Thompson who is a Professor of Political Science
(Indiana University), “U.S.-China Tensions Are Unlikely to Lead to War,” National Interest, 4/30,
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/us-china-tensions-are-unlikely-lead-war-20411?page=2
Graham Allison's April 12 article, “How America and China Could Stumble to War,” explores
how misperceptions and bureaucratic
dysfunction could accelerate a militarized crisis involving the United States and China into an unwanted war. However, the article fails to
persuade because it neglects the key political and geostrategic conditions that make war plausible in the first place. Without those
conditions in place, the risk that a crisis could accidentally escalate into war becomes far lower . The U.S.-China
relationship today may be trending towards greater tension, but the relative stability and overall low level of
hostility make the prospect of an accidental escalation to war extremely unlikely .
In a series of scenarios centered around the South China Sea, Taiwan and the East China Sea, Allison explored how well-established flashpoints involving China and
the United States and its allies could spiral into unwanted war. Allison’s article argues that given the context of strategic rivalry between a rising power and a status-
quo power, organizational and bureaucratic misjudgments increase the likelihood of unintended escalation. According to Allison, “the underlying stress created by
China’s disruptive rise creates conditions in which accidental, otherwise inconsequential events could trigger a large-scale conflict.” This argument appears persuasive
on its surface, in no small part because it evokes insights from some of Allison’s groundbreaking work on the organizational pathologies that made the Cuban Missile
Crisis so dangerous.
However, Allison ultimately fails to persuade because he fails to specify the political and strategic conditions that
make war plausible in the first place. Allison’s analysis implies that the U nited S tates and China are in a situation
analogous to that of the Soviet Union and the United States in the early 1960s. In the Cold War example, the two countries faced each other on a near-
war footing and engaged in a bitter geostrategic and ideological struggle for supremacy. The two countries experienced a series of militarized crises and fought each
other repeatedly through proxy wars. It was this broader context that made issues of misjudgment so dangerous in a crisis.
By contrast , the U.S.-China relationship today operates at a much lower level of hostility and threat . China
and the U nited S tates may be experiencing an increase in tensions, but the two countries remain far from the bitter,
acrimonious rivalry that defined the U.S.-Soviet relationship in the early 1960s. Neither Washington nor Beijing
regards the other as its principal enemy. Today’s rivals may view each other warily as competitors and threats on some issues, but they
also view each other as important trade partners and partners on some shared concerns , such as North Korea,
as the recent summit between President Donald Trump and Chinese president Xi Jinping illustrated. The behavior of their
respective militaries underscores the relatively restrained rivalry. The military competition between China and the United
States may be growing, but it operates at a far lower level of intensity than the relentless arms racing that typified the U.S.-
Soviet standoff. And unlike their Cold War counterparts, U.S. and Chinese militaries are not postured to fight each other in
major wars. Moreover, polls show that the people of the two countries regard each other with mixed views —a
considerable contrast from the hostile sentiment expressed by the U.S. and Soviet publics for each other.
Lacking both preparations for major war and a constituency for conflict, leaders and bureaucracies in both countries
have less incentive to misjudge crisis situations in favor of unwarranted escalation.
To the contrary , political leaders and bureaucracies currently face a strong incentive to find ways of defusing
crises in a manner that avoids unwanted escalation . This inclination manifested itself in the EP-3 airplane
collision off Hainan Island in 2001, and in subsequent incidents involving U.S. and Chinese ships and aircraft, such as the harassment
of the USNS Impeccable in 200 9 . This does not mean that there is no risk, however. Indeed, the potential for a dangerous militarized crisis may be growing.
Moreover, key political and geostrategic developments could shift the incentives for leaders in favor of more escalatory options in a crisis and thereby make Allison’s
scenarios more plausible. Past precedents offer some insight into the types of developments that would most likely propel the U.S.-China relationship into a hostile,
competitive one
featuring an elevated risk of conflict.
Tensions won’t escalate to conflict – geography, lack of motive, and resilient relations--
answers China rise, their historical appeals, new weapons, and either US or Chinese-
initiated war
Moeller 15 ---- Joergen Oerstroem, Visiting Senior Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies
(Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore), Adjunct Professor (Singapore Management University & Copenhagen
Business School), 10/29, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/joergen-oerstroem-moeller/war-in-asia-
unthinkable_b_8415838.html
What does vital interest plus capability and willingness to challenge or defend supremacy tell us looking at the U.S.
and China through today’s periscope?
do not threaten each other’s vital interest. They are safe. Geography makes an armed conflict
First of all they
impossible .
Militarily the U.S. enjoys a colossal geographic benefit ensconced in the Western Hemisphere with no enemies.
Recalling the time it took and the drain on logistics to move half a million men into the Middle East to wage war in 1991 and 2003 a
U.S. military attack on China falls in the category of not thinkable . China is surrounded by India, Russia, and Japan
with a land border traditionally difficult to defend and the sea offering trade routes as well as invasion routes.
China’s military capability may be growing but recalling necessity to defend China’s borders, the advantages
geography offer to the U.S., and the starting positions for measuring relative military power any rational analysis concludes
that no military threat to U.S. vital interests is thinkable . Comparing China today to Germany and the U.S. to Britain 100 years ago
is fascinating, but not relevant . So far, if a comparison is sought, China is much more akin to Bismarck’s Germany moving slowly and weighing
every step fully aware of the balance of power not wishing to upset it even if striving to enhance its own role.
The Napoleonic wars, the run up to World War I, and the run up to World War II reveal that the established power and the rising power do not bump into each other
with a bang in the revolving door. In all three cases a string of negotiations and attempts to find a modus vivendi dominated the picture.
The Napoleonic Wars included the Revolutionary Wars stretched from the beginning of the 1790s to 1815, but it was not one long war — far from it. There were
seven coalitions whereof five from 1803 when Britain entered the arena in earnest; periods of peace, admittedly unstable, interrupted war. The question was whether
France and Britain could find out how to live with each other; only when that proved impossible was the war taken to a battle for supremacy with Britain as the
winner.
Prior to 1914 the same pattern is visible. Numerous publications including Norman Angell’s ‘The Great illusion’ from 1909 classified war as futile explaining that no
advantages or benefits flowed from waging major wars in an era of strong trade and investment links. The book influenced British political thinking prior to 1914 and
despite rising tensions with Germany successive governments tried to shape a mutually acceptable power balance. An example of this maneuvering was the British
proposal in 1912 (the Haldane mission) for a moratorium on battleship building. It failed for various reasons, but underline that great powers actually diagnose
confrontations and implement policies to prevent them from escalating.
The appeasement policy pursued by Prime Minister Chamberlain in the late 1930s illustrates the same behavior. He went a long way to see whether Britain could
accommodate Nazi-Germany.
The by far most likely scenario for U.S.-China relationship over the next decades is continued negotiations to adjust
and adapt to a new power balance. There may be skirmishes also of military character but with lightning speed
diplomacy will be mobilized to contain such events. There may be armed conflicts using proxies to test each other but
kept under control. In new areas such as cyber warfare and space ‘rules of engagement’ or ‘conduct’ - written or
unwritten - will be formulated as nuclear weapons not only introduced MAD (Mutual Assured Destruction), but also
common understanding between the U.S. and the Soviet Union about how to manage the power game under such conditions. Cyber warfare and
space may technologically be new, they do not , however, change the parameters of the power game: Measure capability and
willingness of your ‘enemy’ to threaten vital interests.
It seems a fair bet to rule out major armed conflicts in Asia while a merciless rivalry about trade, investment, money and probably also
societal model will rule the agenda.
China/US---Ext---No War
Chinese military inferiority, economic interdependence, and US alliances
Artyom Lukin 14, Professor @ Far Eastern Federal University (Russia), “Imagining World War III --
In 2034,” 8/4/2014, The World Post (partnership of the Huffington Post and Berggruen Institute,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/artyom-lukin/world-war-iii_b_5646641.html
three reasons war is unlikely anytime soon . First, despite the double-digit annual growth in its
There are
defense budgets, China's military still significantly lags behind the U.S.' It will take China 15 to 20 years to attain parity or near-parity with the U.S.-Japan allied forces
Second
in the East Asian littoral. China depends on America much more than the other way round.
, for all the talk of mutual interdependence,
China is still critically reliant on the U.S and its allies, the EU and Japan, as its principal export markets
and sources of advanced technologies and know-how. Overall, China's dependence on international
markets is very high , with the trade to GDP ratio standing at 53 percent. China imports many vital raw
materials, such as oil and iron ore. China would be extremely vulnerable to a
As most of its commodity imports are shipped by the sea,
naval blockade , which is likely to be mounted by the U.S. in case of a major conflict. Both for economic and strategic reasons, the Chinese
government pursues policies to reduce the country's reliance on foreign markets, trying to shift from an export-oriented model to domestic sources of growth. It is also making efforts to secure raw materials in the countries and regions contiguous to China, like Central Asia, Russia or
Third, China would have to

Burma, so as to reduce dependence on sea-born shipments. However, at least for the next 15 to 20 years China's dependency on the West-dominated global economic system is going to stay very significant.
confront not the U.S. alone but also America's Asian allies, including Japan, Australia and perhaps India.
Thus China needs at least one major power ally and some lesser allies. Whether China dares to pose a serious challenge to the U.S. will, to a large extent, hinge upon Beijing and Moscow forming a Eurasian geopolitical bloc. This is already happening now, but it is going to take some more
The bottom line: over the next 15 to 20 years a major war in Asia is highly unlikely because Beijing
time.
will be playing a cautious game . Even if a military clash does occur, it will be short , with China being
quickly routed by the preponderant American force . However, around 2030 the balance is bound to undergo considerable changes, if China is successful in: 1) closing military gap with the
U.S.; 2) making its economy less reliant on the Western markets and overseas raw resources; and 3) forming its own alliance structure.
Geography and MAD

Keck, 13 (Zachary – Assistant Editor of The Diplomat, 7/12, “Why China and the US (Probably) Won’t
Go to War”, The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2013/07/12/why-china-and-the-us-
probably-wont-go-to-war/)
But while trade cannot be relied upon to keep the peace, a U.S.-China war is virtually unthinkable because of two other
factors: nuclear weapons and geography.
The fact that both the U.S.and China have nuclear weapons is the most obvious reasons why they won’t clash,
even if they remain fiercely competitive. This is because war is the continuation of politics by other means, and nuclear weapons
make war extremely bad politics. Put differently, war is fought in pursuit of policy ends, which cannot be achieved
through a total war between nuclear-armed states.
This is not only because of nuclear weapons destructive power. As Thomas Schelling outlined brilliantly, nuclear weapons have not actually increased humans destructive capabilities. In fact,
there is evidence to suggest that wars between nomads usually ended with the victors slaughtering all of the individuals on the losing side, because of the economics of holding slaves in nomadic
“societies.”
What makes nuclear weapons different , then, is not just their destructive power but also the certainty and
immediacy of it. While extremely ambitious or desperate leaders can delude themselves into believing they can prevail in a conventional
conflict with a stronger adversary because of any number of factors—superior will, superior doctrine, the weather etc.— none of this matters in
nuclear war. With nuclear weapons, countries don’t have to prevail on the battlefield or defeat an opposing army to destroy an entire country, and
since there are no adequate defenses for a large-scale nuclear attack, every leader can be absolute certain
that most of their country can be destroyed in short-order in the event of a total conflict.
Since no policy goal is worth this level of sacrifice, the only possible way for an all-out conflict to ensue is for a
miscalculation of some sort to occur. Most of these can and should be dealt by Chinese and the U.S. leaders holding
regularly senior level dialogues like the ones of the past month, in which frank and direct talk about redlines are discussed.
These can and should be supplemented with clear and open communication channels, which can be especially useful when unexpected crises
arise, like an exchange of fire between low-level naval officers in the increasingly crowded waters in the region. While this possibility is real and
frightening, it’s hard to imagine a plausible scenario where it leads to a nuclear exchange between China
and the U nited S tates. After all, at each stage of the crisis leaders know that if it is not properly contained, a
nuclear war could ensue, and the complete destruction of a leader’s country is a more frightening possibility
than losing credibility among hawkish elements of society. In any case, measured means of retaliation would be available to
the party wronged, and behind-the-scenes diplomacy could help facilitate the process of finding mutually acceptable retaliatory
measures.
Geography is the less appreciated factor that will mitigate the chances of a U.S.-China war, but it could be nearly as important
as nuclear weapons. Indeed, geography has a history of allowing countries to avoid the Thucydides Trap, and
works against a U.S.-China war in a couple of ways.
First, both the United States and China are immensely large countries—according to the Central Intelligence Agency, the U.S. and China
are the third and fourth largest countries in the world by area, at 9,826,675 and 9,596,961 square km respectively. They also
have difficult topographical features and complex populations. As such, they are virtually unconquerable by another power.
This is an important point and differentiates the current strategic environment from historical cases where power transitions led to war. For
example, in Europe where many of the historical cases derive from, each state genuinely had to worry that the other side
could increase their power capabilities to such a degree that they could credibly threaten the other side’s national survival.
Neither China nor the U.S. has to realistically entertain such fears, and this will lessen their insecurity and therefore
the security dilemma they operate within.
Besides being immensely large countries, China and the U.S. are also separated by the Pacific Ocean, which will also
weaken their sense of insecurity and threat perception towards one another. In many of the violent power transitions of
the past, starting with Sparta and Athens but also including the European ones, the rival states were located in close proximity
to one another. By contrast, when great power conflict has been avoided , the states have often had considerable
distance between them, as was the case for the U.S. and British power transition and the peaceful end to the Cold War. The reason is
simple and similar to the one above: the difficulty of projecting power across large distances —particularly bodies of
waters— reduces each side’s concern that the other will threaten its national survival and most important strategic interests.
True, the U.S. operates extensively in China’s backyard, and maintains numerous alliances and partnerships with Beijing’s neighbors. This undeniably heightens the risk of conflict. At the same
time, the British were active throughout the Western Hemisphere, most notably in Canada, and the Americans maintained a robust alliance system in Western Europe throughout the Cold War.
Even with the U.S. presence in Asia, then, the fact that the Chinese and American homelands are separated by the
largest body of water in the world is enormously important in reducing their conflict potential, if history
is any guide at least.
Thus, while every effort should be made to avoid a U.S.-China war, it is nearly unthinkable one will occur.
CP---ADVANTAGE CP
*** SHELL
1NC
First/next off is the soft balancing CP
The United States federal government should
-deepen its engagement with Taiwan by promoting participation in international organizations,
-conduct high-level exchanges with Taiwan officials,
-propose a free trade agreement with Taiwan,
-routinize arms sales to Taiwan, and
-create people-to-people exchanges with Taiwan.
Creates uniqueness, solves the deterrence advantage, and solves the impact to the
CCP advantage
Hsiao 19 ---- Russell, Executive Director of the Global Taiwan Institute, Editor-in-Chief of the Global
Taiwan Brief, Penn Kemble Fellow at the National Endowment for Democracy and an Adjunct Fellow at
Pacific Forum, J.D. (Catholic University), B.A. in International Studies (American University), “The
Taiwan Relations Act at 40: Reaching a New Optimal Equilibrium in US-Taiwan Policy,” Foreign Policy
Research Institute, 4/8, https://www.fpri.org/article/2019/04/the-taiwan-relations-act-at-40-reaching-a-
new-optimal-equilibrium-in-u-s-taiwan-policy/
Policy Recommendations
Despite Beijing’s efforts to undermine the status quo and achieve the political subordination of Taiwan under its “One China Principle,”
Washington has managed to foster robust U.S.-Taiwan relations . Notwithstanding its past successes, the
current policy framework has not kept pace with fundamental changes that have taken place in Taiwan, and
Beijing’s increasing belligerence towards Taiwan and may not be sustainable. A representation that is more in tune with the
reality on the ground in Taiwan—which takes into account its transition from authoritarian regime to democracy—and in China—which
takes into account its authoritarianism that has become more aggressive domestically and abroad —
would allow for a recalibration of the U.S.-Taiwan relationship that would be more conducive to long-
term U.S. interests in the region , and more accurately reflect American principles and values. Towards that end, the
governments in Washington and Taipei should consider promoting the following[5]:
(1) Normal, Stable, and Constructive Relations: The U nited S tates should deepen and broaden its
engagement with Taiwan and consider ways to move toward a more normal relationship over the longer term. Taiwan is a great
democratic success story, a thriving economy, and a global leader in health and science. It stands to contribute greatly as a good citizen of the world. The U.S.
should seek to promote opportunities for Taiwan to participate meaningfully in international organizations, and resist pressure
to isolate Taiwan from participating in the cooperative work among nations in international organizations.
(2) High-level Exchanges: U.S. officials at the highest levels should engage counterparts in Taiwan on a
regular basis in accordance with the Taiwan Travel Act . President Donald Trump and President Tsai Ing-wen should seek
the opportunity to meet each other in person. This will invariably cause friction between Washington and Beijing, but
treating democratic leaders with dignity and respect is key to a broader strategy. Cabinet-level officials
should regularly visit their counterparts in Taiwan to discuss national, departmental, and technical issues of shared interest. Hindering high-
level contacts encourages misunderstandings and policy mistakes , especially in times of crisis. The current
level and pace of interactions is inadequate for managing the complexities of a relationship that encompasses issues ranging from trade to science
and technology, and from environmental protection to defense and security affairs.
(3) Bilateral Trade Agreement: The U nited S tates government should negotiate a free trade agreement with
Taiwan, with similar or even better terms than the ones it already has with South Korea, Singapore, and Australia. Taiwan is an island nation, heavily
dependent upon trade to sustain itself as an economic powerhouse, and it is vulnerable to increasing Chinese economic coercion ,
especially since just in 2018, 41% of Taiwan’s merchandise exports were to mainland China and Hong Kong,
according to data released by the Congressional Research Service.[6] This
effort will likely occur over the long term, but it could have important
payoffs for American statecraft by integrating trade into the calculation of a comprehensive strategy for
great power competition. The U.S. would benefit both economically and strategically from a closer trade relationship
with Taiwan.
(4) Routinize Arms Sales: The United States, as stipulated under the TRA and reinforced by the recently proposed Taiwan Assurance Act of 2019,
“conducts regular transfers of defense articles to Taiwan in order to enhance its self-defense capabilities.”[7] Just in September 2018, the U.S. State Department
approved a $330 million military sale to Taiwan.[8] However, regardless
of past and recent practices of arm sales to Taiwan, the U nited S tates
should routinize the arms sale process for addressing Taiwan’s requests for defense articles and services; provide a timely response to requests as
well as commercial export licenses; and base arms sales decisions on Taiwan’s strategic and operational requirements, which are inherently defensive in nature and
serve U.S. interests. In keeping with the terms of the Reagan’s Six Assurances, Beijing should not be consulted in advance of arms sales to Taiwan.
(5) People-to-People Exchange: The U.S. State Department should launch a new initiative to enhance people-to-people
exchanges with Taiwan, especially in the areas of education and culture. The U nited S tates government should support the development of more
nonprofit educational organizations that encourage mutual understanding among citizens of the two nations.
Adjusting the U.S. approach toward its Taiwan policy and cross-Strait relations to ensure that the TRA-created framework is able
to manage the current and future challenges ahead demands a new approach that fundamentally extends
greater legitimacy to democratic Taiwan politically, economically, and militarily. Sustained and high-level
discussion is needed now more than ever before between the United States and Taiwan to determine a new optimal
equilibrium that best reflects the objective reality in the Strait .
*** SOLVENCY
Solves---Assurance
High-level contacts reassure Taiwan
Tucker and Glaser ’11 (Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Professor of History at Georgetown University
and at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and a Senior Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars, Bonnie Glaser, a Senior Fellow with the Freeman Chair in China
Studies at CSIS and also a Senior Associate with the CSIS Pacific Forum, Fall 2011, “Should the United
States Abandon Taiwan?,” The Washington Quarterly 34.4, p.35,
http://csis.org/files/publication/twq11autumntuckerglaser.pdf)
Higher - level contact between U.S. and Taiwan officials ought to occur routinely. Even if presidential meetings
are not possible, dialogue between leaders should be facilitated by video conferences and regular
correspondence. Cabinet - level visits to Taiwan, five of which occurred during the Clinton administration alone, could
quickly be resumed. The prolonged and ill - considered hiatus in those visits during the George W. Bush and
early Obama years is self - defeating. Such trips are important symbolically, but they also improve
communication and raise awareness of common interests. Taiwan’s representatives also should be granted better access to
U.S. officials in Washington and not be barred from buildings such as the Department of State. There is no formal agreement that requires such
restrictions; they are entirely self - imposed.
Solves---Deterrence
CP is key to China deterrence and US resolve – reactive approaches fail –
affirmative policy is key
new-optimal-equilibrium-in-u-s-taiwan-policy/
The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA)—passed by the U.S. Congress in 1979—has provided an enduring framework for U.S.-
Taiwan relations . This remarkable legislation mandated special American obligations and commitments to Taiwan that have
helped to preserve peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait for the past 40 years. It is also the only legal underpinning of U.S.
policy toward Taiwan. Yet, much as strategic changes necessitated adjustments in U.S. policy during the Cold War, fundamental changes in the
circumstances of the 21st century, as former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage said at a Global Taiwan Institute and Project 2049 Institute
forum, require, at the very least, a “rethink”[ 1] of the U.S. approach to Taiwan policy and cross-Strait relations.
To be sure, the U.S.-Taiwan relationship is stronger now than it has ever been since 1979, so “if it ain’t broke, don’t
fix it,” right? Wrong. Even though it is not broken , Taiwan policy needs to be recalibrated . While the U.S.-Taiwan
relationship is heading in the right direction , the U.S. should start thinking about a destination. Perhaps most
importantly, the U.S. needs to shift from a reactive to an affirmative policy to Taiwan.
Recalibrating the Trilateral Relationship
U.S. policy towards Taiwan does not exist in a vacuum. Relations between Washington and Beijing over the last 40 years have had a disproportionate influence in
how the United States conducted (and conducts) its informal relations with Taiwan. The current framework for the trilateral relationship between Washington, Taipei,
and Beijing, which includes the TRA, Six Assurances, Three Communiqués, and the U.S. “One China” policy, requires recalibration.[2]
While a U.S. and Taiwan policy of maintaining the status quo has helped to maintain peace in the Taiwan Strait
and remains the best near-term option, it is unsustainable in the long term because China is unceasingly
and aggressively seeking to change the status quo through military and non-military means. The massive
military buildup across the Taiwan Strait by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the Chinese leadership’s continued refusal to renounce the
use of force against Taiwan, and the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) non-military coercive pressure are
destabilizing the Strait and are threatening the peace and security of the Indo-Pacific area.
While the U nited S tates has managed to deter Beijing militarily from taking destructive military action against Taiwan
over the last four decades, because Beijing has been relatively weak, the risks of the U.S. approach inch dangerously
close to outweighing its benefits as the PLA rapidly modernizes. Meanwhile, the CCP is intensifying its
political infiltration and subversion activities through United Front and other active measures-like campaigns to affect the social and
economic systems of Taiwan. As the PLA grows stronger, a perceived lack of commitment that the U.S. will
intervene in defense of Taiwan, which is shared in Taiwan and other countries in the region , could weaken
morale in Taiwan and further embolden Beijing to use force to resolve the Taiwan issue . Public
perceptions and misperceptions toward arms sales and economic ties, as well as the continuation of the U.S. policy of
strategic ambiguity have fueled such attitudes. However , this perceived lack of commitment is unfounded
as the U.S. has repeatedly shown, through legislation, arms sales, Global Cooperation and Training Framework (GCTF) initiatives, the free and
open Indo-Pacific strategy, and many other projects and activities, that it values Taiwan’s freedom and democracy.
If Washington and Taipei continue their reactive approach toward Beijing’s unilateral challenges to the status quo, it can lead
to greater instability in the Taiwan Strait. Greater clarity of U.S. commitments to defend Taiwan,
coupled with demonstrative commitments by Taiwan to its own self-defense, is critical for purposes of
deterrence and stability .
Solves---War
Committing to Taiwan alleviates fears about decreasing arms sales and stops risky
behavior
Kok and Firestein ’13 (Piin-Fen Kok, director of the China, East Asia and United States program at
the EastWest Institute, and David J. Firestein, the Perot Fellow and EastWest Institute's Vice President for
the Strategic Trust-Building Initiative and Track 2 Diplomacy, 3-13, “Threading The Needle: Proposals
for U.S. and Chinese Actions on Arms Sales to Taiwan,” p. 50,
http://www.eastwest.ngo/sites/default/files/TAS%20Final%20%2528ISSUU%20VERSION
%209_17_2013%2529.pdf)
5. The U nited S tates should signal its continued unwavering commitment to preserving and promoting
extensive, close and friendly commercial, cultural and other relations with Taiwan, including by
enhancing senior-level exchanges with Taiwan within the constraints of the United States’ one-China policy. These actions
would reassure Taiwan that any incremental modifications of U.S. policy on arms sales, such as that proposed in Rec -
ommendation 4, do not constitute a weakening of U.S. commitment to its relationship with Taiwan. Such
reassurances would also have a stabilizing factor, as they would dissuade Taiwan’s leaders from
undertaking potentially drastic measures to ensure Taiwan’s own security, which may then be construed,
right or wrongly, by the mainland as attempts to contravene the one-China policy.
Solves---War---A2: Hurts Relations
CP’s soft balancing is the ideal approach – ignore US/China relations if the CP
prevents war – they’re unlikely to exist regardless
new-optimal-equilibrium-in-u-s-taiwan-policy/ ***Modified for language
U.S. policy towards Taiwan over the past 40 years has operated on the premise that America’s primary interest is in the
process—as opposed to the outcome—of resolving differences between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.
There is wide latitude for policymakers within the United States and Taiwan to work within the existing legal and policy framework, but a necessary
foundation to ensure the sustainability of peace over time is an affirmative policy of soft balancing by the U nited
S tates.
By design, U.S. policy was inherently reactive and intentionally ceded the initiative of shaping the ultimate
outcome to the two other parties. It was an approach that some senior U.S. policymakers, at the time that the policy was conceived in the 1970s,
expected would create a fait accompli, and one that would provide Washington with the flexibility to respond to broader geopolitical challenges of the Cold War with
the Soviet Union while maintaining stability in the Strait.
Despite some expectations to the contrary, Taiwan thrived in the ensuing four decades. The government liberalized from the top down while
an active civil society fervently pushed for political reforms from the bottom up. Taiwan evolved from an authoritarian regime to a vibrant democracy. As a
consequence, support for Taiwan and its democracy grew within the United States as well.
Yet , the growing power disparity between Taipei and Beijing and a protracted practice of undue deference
by Washington to Beijing’s sensitivities has gradually eroded some of the original commitments
made under the TRA and President Ronald Reagan’s Six Assurances.[3] These Assurances include, perhaps most importantly,
maintaining the U.S. position of not taking a position on the issue of sovereignty over Taiwan, no prior consultation with Beijing on arms sales to Taiwan, and no
attempt to pressure Taiwan to enter into negotiations with the PRC, among other measures.
As the power disparity between Taiwan and China widens , a U.S. policy based purely on ensuring a
peaceful process is and will increasingly be under strain , leaving Taiwan more susceptible to
coercion and Beijing more emboldened to pressure Taiwan, and increasing the risk of military
conflict .
The PRC’s coercive pressure campaign is aimed at gradually and unceasingly pushing for its own desired outcome: ending the sovereignty of a democratically elected
government and the freedom of its 23 million people by unifying Taiwan into the PRC. All the while, the
current approach may be
inadvertently drawing the U nited S tates towards China’s preferred objectives, at the expense of its own values
and strategic interests.
Indeed, some American scholars and former policymakers have floated the alarming idea that the U.S. needs to
accommodate China by reaching a new modus vivendi with Beijing—which would have the U.S. effectively abandon
Taiwan.[4] This flawed view is based on a tendency to construct events in the Taiwan Strait in binary
terms—either independence or unification—and for Beijing, the only option is unification, even if it means going to war. But U.S. policy
should not accept the assertion that cross-Strait relations pose such a Hobson’s choice.
An Affirmative Vision
Despite Washington’s and Taipei’s pragmatic approach, Beijing’s approach is becoming more coercive, unilateral, and
increasingly detrimental to U.S. interests.
The U.S.needs to adopt a more affirmative Taiwan policy that not only insists on a peaceful process , but
also provides an alternative substantive vision that, at the very least, reflects the objective reality that two
legitimate, mutually non-subordinate political entities coexist across the Taiwan Strait.
This would entail a significant, but marginal , change in U.S. policy, and a great deal of uncertainty comes with any change. But the
alternatives to such change present equally destabilizing propositions , and fear of even thinking about change
could lead to a state of paralysis [inaction], which would be seriously disruptive in the Taiwan Strait.
DA---ASSURANCE
*** SHELL
1NC
First/next off is the prolif DA
Taiwan/US ties and assurances high – ending arms sales crushes global assurances
Wang 18 ---- Yuan-Kang, Professor of Political Science (Western Michigan University), Ph.D. in
Political Science (University of Chicago), M.A. in International Relations (Johns Hopkins University),
former International Security Fellow at Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International
Affairs, former visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution's Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies,
“The 'Realist' Case for the US to Keep Supporting Taiwan,” The News Lens, 9/28,
https://international.thenewslens.com/article/104917
Thus, the
changing international structure foretells a competitive dynamic between the U nited S tates and
China. China’s suspicions of U.S. motives and intentions are structurally-driven, just as U.S. suspicions of China are driven by the same structural conditions.
Uncertainty about intentions is a built-in characteristic of an anarchic system, generating the security dilemma and mutual distrust.
How, then, does Taiwan fit into this? In the context of U.S.-China security competition, Washington will
have strong incentives to ramp up security cooperation with Taiwan in order to contain the growth of Chinese
power.
First, Taiwan’s geostrategic location is of particular value to U.S. national security interests. The island controls the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) extending
from Japan to Southeast Asia and serves as a check on China’s maritime expansions into the East and the South China Seas.
If Washington wishes to maintain its preeminent position in Asia, it is in the U.S. interest to include
Taiwan (along with Japan, South Korea, and other allies) in its overall Asia strategy. It makes good strategic sense for the
U nited S tates to help strengthen Taiwan’s defense capabilities in order to deter Beijing from attacking the island. Strong U.S.-
Taiwan security ties ameliorate the power asymmetry across the Taiwan Strait and thereby increase the costs of China’s military coercion.
Second, defending
Taiwan is linked to the credibility of the United States for protecting allies and
partners in Asia . If Washington abandons Taiwan, Beijing would likely view the concession as a weakening of U.S. resolve for protecting other interests
in Asia. Seeing the United States as a “paper tiger,” China might become more aggressive in pursuing territorial interests in maritime Asia.
Moreover, abandoning Taiwan would reduce allies’ confidence in the credibility of U.S. security
commitment to them. At a time when Asian states need the United States to counterbalance Chinese
power , a U.S. decision to abandon Taiwan would be particularly alarming , sending shock waves
across the region .
Based on shared strategic interests, realism anticipates that the U nited S tates will cooperate with Taiwan to
thwart China from dominating Asia. Washington is currently taking measures to upgrade U.S.-Taiwan relations . In
early 2018, Congress passed the Taiwan Travel Act, which encourages high-level visits between the two countries. The
N ational D efense A uthorization A ct calls for “strengthening the defense partnership between the U nited S tates and
Taiwan.”
In August 2018, the White House took the unusual step of issuing a stern warning and recalling U.S.
ambassadors to three Latin American countries (El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, and Panama) for switching diplomatic
recognition from Taiwan to China. Going forward, U.S. support of Taiwan is expected to grow.
Credibility of security commitments key to prevent allied prolif – academic literature

review, policy-maker intuition, qualitative analysis, paired-case analysis, and previous
quantitative work
Bleek 13 ---- Philipp C., Assistant Professor in the Nonproliferation and Terrorism Studies Program
(Monterey Institute of International Studies – Middlebury College), Fellow at the James Martin Center for
Nonproliferation Studies, “Friends Don’t Let Friends Proliferate: Credibility, Security Assurances, and
Allied Nuclear Proliferation,” 2/28,
http://posse.gatech.edu/sites/posse.gatech.edu/files/BleekLorberISAISA'13.pdf
Recent academic research suggests that policymakers’ intuition about the efficacy of security assurances
is correct ; on average, nuclear security assurances decrease an ally’s likelihood of exploring, pursuing, and
acquiring nuclear weapons.5 But, while policymakers and analysts appear to be correct that security
assurances can prevent allied proliferation , much less is known about why some security assurances succeed and others fail. Many have
put forth prescriptions meant to increase the effectiveness of U.S. security assurances, but little scholarship has rigorously theorized and tested these. 6 Without this
knowledge, U.S. attempts to stem allied proliferation through security assurances may be suboptimal or, in the worst case, might even backfire. In addition to being
policy relevant, the question of what makes security assurances effective in preventing allied proliferation also presents an interesting academic puzzle. In cases such
as the United Kingdom immediately following World War II, South Korea, Sweden, and Japan, the United States provided security assurances to varying degrees of
effect. In some cases, the assurances were very effective in preventing proliferation (i.e. Japan), whereas in others, they appear to have had less of an impact (i.e.
South Korea in the 1970s).7 This puzzle – why assurances were more effective at preventing allied proliferation in some circumstances than others – has yet to be
fully analyzed in the academic literature. To address this gap in our understanding, this
article uses qualitative methods to help
policymakers and academics better understand why assurances succeed – or fail – in preventing allied nuclear
proliferation. Building on previous quantitative work showing that assurances can prevent such
proliferation ,8 this article takes this research a step further by asking why security assurances were
more effective at preventing allied proliferation in some cases than others . To answer this question, we analyze two
cases of allied proliferation: South Korea in the 1960s, 70s, and 80s and the United Kingdom immediately following World War
II. By using a paired comparison of these cases, we explore when security assurances succeeded in preventing
allied proliferation activity (in the 1980s in South Korea) and when they failed (in South Korea in the
1970s and in the United Kingdom after World War II). Our research suggests that certain factors do increase the likelihood
that security assurances will prevent allied nuclear proliferation .9 The ally’s perception of the
credibility of the patron’s assurance is extremely important; in both cases, South Korean and British
perceptions of the credibility of the assurance – and the robustness of the overall relationship – played a
major role in their proliferation decisions. The logic is straightforward : if the ally believes that the
assurance is credible and that the patron is committed to the ally’s security, it will be less likely to
engage in proliferation activity. As both South Korea and the U nited K ingdom feared that the United States
was becoming less invested in their security, they increased their proliferation activity. Only when the
ally began to perceive that the United States was firmly invested in its security did it curb its
proliferation activity.
Prolif causes nuclear war via micalc

Kleiner 16 ---- Sam, postdoctoral fellow at Yale Law School, former Senior Policy Advisor for the US
Trade Representative, former Adjunct Researcher at the RAND Corporation, J.D. (Yale Law School), D.
Phil and M. Phil in International Relations (University of Oxford), B.A. in Political Science & American
Studies (Northwestern University), “With His Finger on the Trigger,” 6/3,
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/06/donald-trump-nuclear-weapons/485504/
A nuclear-armed Trump is indeed a scary thought. But his apparent comfort

with encouraging other countries to develop their
own nuclear stockpiles is just as scary , if not more so. For 70 years, American presidents of both parties have
understood the simple arithmetic involved—that the more countries have nuclear weapons, the more
opportunities there are for nuclear war to break out, whether by design or by accident .
*** UNIQUENESS
A2: Taiwan/US Relations Low
Taiwan/US ties high – Tsai’s unprecedented visit, broader strengthening, and realism
https://international.thenewslens.com/article/104917
President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文)'s recent stopover visit to the U nited S tates on her way to Paraguay and Belize, two of Taiwan’s remaining
diplomatic allies, is seen as a breakthrough in U.S.-Taiwan relations . For the first time since 1979 , a sitting
Taiwanese president visited a U.S. federal government building : NASA’s Johnson Space Center in Houston. This, along
with other breakthroughs , should be seen in the broader context of the strengthening of U.S.-Taiwan
relations driven by the changing structure of the international system , a development that is anticipated
by realism.
Unfortunately, realism is often associated with the “abandon Taiwan” arguments. Yet realism, properly understood , actually does not
call for the U nited S tates to weaken its security commitment to Taiwan. Instead, as China rises in power ,
realism predicts a strengthening of U.S.-Taiwan relations , a trend that is becoming increasingly
apparent today . The changing international structure is pushing Washington and Taipei into closer
security cooperation.
A2: Taiwan/US Relations Low---Process
Consultations now --- we’re meeting demand for extended deterrence now
Roberts 16 (Brad, William J. Perry Fellow in International Security, Freeman Spogli Institute for
International Studies, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense
Policy, The Case for U.S. Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century, 2016, pp. 201-204)
It is important to acknowledge that the new initiatives to cooperate in this area in 2009 built on solid foundations . In the prior
decade, Japan and the United States had broken significant new ground in developing cooperative approaches to missile defense, while also taking some initial steps
to discuss nuclear deterrence in the new strategic environment. Similarly, the
Republic of Korea and the United States had renewed the
two-plus-two framework (a process of alliance coordination involving ministries of defense and foreign affairs and their U.S. counterparts) with an eye
to strengthening deterrence of North Korea.¶ The consultations in 2009 focused heavily on U.S. declaratory policy and on U.S.
capabilities for extended nuclear deterrence. On declaratory policy, the Obama administration carefully considered the views of its allies
in Northeast Asia (and elsewhere) before rejecting the “sole purpose formulation” and modifying the negative security assurance.
The “sole purpose formulation” would have reduced the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. deterrence strategy to the sole purpose of deterring nuclear attack on the
United States or its allies, thereby eliminating their role in deterring attacks on vital interests by other means, including chemical and biological weapons and large-
scale conventional wars. The result is a U.S. policy that specifies a continued role for U.S. nuclear weapons in deterring attacks on allies by nonnuclear means that
threaten their vital interests. The modified negative security assurance also clarifies that states such as North Korea that
cheat and leave the NPT and threaten the United States and its allies are objects of U.S. deterrence planning .¶ The bilateral dialogue with Japan
about whether to maintain or modify U.S. declaratory policy was complicated in part by a language translation issue. As Yukio Satoh has noted, ¶ Discussions about
the term “first use” in Japan are somewhat distorted because of the Japanese translation of the term. The widely used Japanese term for “first use”—“sensei-shiyo”—
literally means “preemptive use” in Japanese, while “first use” does not always imply “preemptive use,” particularly in contrast to preemptive “first strike.” It is
understandable that a notion of “preemptive use” is repugnant to many, and the Japanese are no exception . . . However it would be counterproductive for the sake of
the country’s security if the Japanese people would become critical of the U.S. policy of calculated ambiguity about “first use,” believing that “first use” is always
preemptive.11¶ On
capabilities, the Obama administration carefully considered the views of its allies in
Northeast Asia and elsewhere before retiring the nuclear-armed Tomahawk cruise missile and committing to modernize dual-capable aircraft (DCA) that are
globally deployable in support of a commitment to an ally anywhere, not just in Europe. The two capabilities to forward-deploy nuclear weapons with a nonstrategic
delivery system were essentially redundant from a U.S. perspective. From an alliance perspective, the DCA had benefits for deterrence that the Tomahawk did not.
Deployment of DCA is a way to signal the shared and collective resolve of the United States and its allies to stand together in the face of nuclear coercion and
aggression and efforts to split them from one another with nuclear threats. These decisions reflected a view shared by allies in Northeast Asia and Europe: that the
strategic systems of the United States alone are not sufficient for purposes of deterrence and assurance.12 ¶ One
of the most important results of
the NPR-era consultations was the personal engagement of the U.S. president and his clear commitment to
preserve the nuclear umbrella even while reducing the role and number of U.S. nuclear weapons. As President Obama declared in Tokyo in
November 2009: “So long as these [nuclear] weapons remain, the United States will maintain a strong and effective nuclear
deterrent that guarantees the defense of our allies —including South Korea and Japan.”13 He followed this with written guidance to the
U.S. military “reaffirming the role of nuclear weapons in extending deterrence to U.S. Allies and partners and the U.S. commitment to strengthen regional deterrence
architectures” and directing the military to ensure “a wide range of effective response options” drawing on both a strong strategic deterrent and the capability to
deploy nuclear weapons in the region.14¶ On conclusion of the NPR in 2010, the
United States, Japan, and South Korea were all
interested in sustaining the high-level substantive dialogue that had been built during the NPR. Accordingly, the United States
and Japan founded the Extended Deterrence Dialogue (EDD), and the United States and the Republic of Korea founded the
Extended Deterrence Policy Committee (EDPC).¶ The mechanisms serve multiple purposes: to institutionalize sustained leadership focus on these issues, to enable
active policy discussion and development where needed, and to ensure sustained progress on practical agendas of cooperation in support of the comprehensive
strategy for strengthening regional deterrence architectures. The
EDD and EDPC have helped to ensure coordinated policy
development in the subsequent strategic documents and leadership statements of all three countries, as for example in the development of South Korea’s
“proactive deterrence strategy” and Japan’s “dynamic deterrence.” The EDD process had an impact on Japan’s 2010 National Defense Program Guidelines, where
The EDPC has
Japan clarified its intention to play a role in countering nuclear threats rather than simply “relying on” U.S. extended deterrence.15
produced a tailored deterrence strategy that helps the two countries to “work together more seamlessly
to maximize the effects of our deterrence.”16 These processes have also provided both allies the
opportunities that European allies have had for decades to have firsthand experience of the capabilities the United States
provides in support of its extended deterrence commitments through visits to U.S. nuclear bases and facilities.17 Cumulatively, these various new forms
of interaction have helped to build common understanding of emerging deterrence challenges , the nature of
potential conflicts, and the means to address the risks of escalation. ¶ These processes have also helped to meet rising demand in
Japan and South Korea for a deeper understanding of extended deterrence and of what they can do to
increase its credibility. As one observer has argued, officials in Northeast Asia “want more than verbal reassurances; they want to know
how deterrence works.”18 Yukio Satoh summarized the issue cogently in 2009:¶ If the credibility of the U.S. commitment is the question at issue, it is
Japanese perceptions that matter. The U.S. commitment to provide extended deterrence to Japan has been repeatedly
affirmed by presidents, including President Obama, and other senior officials in agreed documents. Nevertheless, Japanese misgivings and
doubts about American commitment persist . . . it is important for Tokyo to be officially engaged in consultations with
Washington on deterrence strategy, including nuclear deterrence. Without such consultations, the Japanese government, let alone the public, will have to
be speculative about the credibility of U.S. commitment. That U.S. strategic thinking is undergoing epoch-making changes makes such consultations more
important.19¶ All three capitals have wanted to ensure that efforts to adapt and strengthen extended deterrence do not come at the expense of efforts to use political
tools to reduce and ultimately eliminate nuclear dangers. Without strong agendas to try to denuclearize North Korea, to try to engage China on strategic stability, to
combat proliferation networks in the region, and to strengthen nuclear materials security, it is not clear that the political commitment would have been found or
the three capitals have largely converged on a common view
sustained for these new deterrence-focused processes.¶ In fact,
of a balanced approach to reducing nuclear dangers with a mix of military and political tools and of the fundamentally
complementary roles of these tools. With an effective extended deterrent in place, the nonproliferation and disarmament effort may yet be advanced with
denuclearization of the Korean peninsula—if and as leaders in Pyongyang come to understand that new nuclear and missile capabilities bring no enduring advantages
for the North and indeed bring significant new risks. And with a stable strategic balance, that effort may also yet be advanced by China’s participation in the nuclear
transparency and reductions process—if and as leaders in Beijing come to believe that China’s interest in a stable security environment is best served by the practice
of strategic restraint in a manner that meets the transparency and other requirements of other stakeholders in stability.
A2: Taiwan/US Relations Low---US Weak
US military and economy strong
Miller 16 ---- Nick, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and Watson Institute for
International and Public Affairs (Brown University), Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow (Harvard Kennedy
School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs), PhD in Political Science (MIT), “Donald
Trump Thinks More Countries Should Have Nuclear Weapons. Here’s What the Research Says,”
Washington Post – Monkey Cage, 4/6, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-
cage/wp/2016/04/06/should-more-countries-have-nuclear-weapons-donald-trump-thinks-so/ **Modified
for ableist language
What about Trump’s belief that U.S. allies will inevitably seek nuclear weapons because the U nited S tates is
economically and militarily weak [declining]? That doesn’t match the facts , either. The U nited S tates remains the
world’s dominant military power — it spends three to four times as much on its military than China does, and it has the
world’s most advanced nuclear arsenal. The U nited S tates also has a dynamic and growing economy, while its
rivals’ economies are slowing or even declining . But even when the U.S. economy was flagging, the government
successfully prevented other countries from acquiring nuclear arms. The 1970s were a period of high inflation and low economic growth in the
United States. Yet that’s when Washington launched some of its most determined and successful nonproliferation
efforts, including founding the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group, a global body that restricts the spread of sensitive nuclear technology, and passing laws that imposed
mandatory nonproliferation sanctions, which have successfully deterred other countries from embarking on nuclear
weapons programs.
*** LINK
Link---Arms Sales
Ending arms sales to Taiwan crushes faith in the US order – the DA starts with the
end of US/Japan ties
Twining ’13 (Daniel Twining, senior fellow for Asia at the German Marshall Fund of the United
States, 2-1-13, “The Taiwan Linchpin,” http://www.hoover.org/research/taiwan-linchpin)
Canary in the coal mine Proponents of “letting Taiwan go” seem to assume that everything else would remain unchanged in U.S. Asia strategy.
America’s alliance system would remain robust, its military would continue to expand its access to regional ports and basing facilities, and non-
Chinese Asia would continue to underwrite American leadership. In fact, abandoning Taiwan — say, by ending military sales (it
is the top recipient of American arms worldwide) — would create a cascade of strategic consequences that would upend
the U.S.-led regional order. The first thing to erode would be the U.S.-Japan alliance, without which American
leadership in East Asia in its present form would be impossible. Japan, Washington’s most important ally in Asia, may have few viable
strategic options to maintain an independent foreign policy without a free Taiwan . As China’s military power casts
a growing shadow over its neighbors, Japan’s capacity to retain strategic choice may hinge on Taiwan ’s ability to
maintain autonomy from the mainland — in ways that preclude a hostile China from projecting military
power from Taiwan into the sea lanes that are the Japanese economy’s lifeline . Too often, analysis of Taiwan’s
strategic evolution focuses on its implications for China, on the one hand, and the United States, on the other. In fact, the foundations of
Japanese grand strategy since 1951 — starting with its intimate alliance with the U nited S tates — may well be
unsustainable should Taiwan fall under the control of a hostile, assertive China that defines Japan as an
adversary. As Japan’s primary security partner, the U nited States therefore has a compelling interest in
protecting Taiwan’s autonomy, not only for reasons related to Taiwan and U.S.-China relations but because it is
foundational to Japan’s strategic future as America’s bedrock ally in East Asia . Taiwan and the U.S.-Japan alliance
America’s role as what former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates called a “resident power” in Asia is made possible by the U.S. alliance with
Japan. Nearly 50,000 American troops are forward-deployed there, and it is headquarters of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, whose ships and submarines
patrol the Pacific and Indian Ocean sea lanes that carry most world trade in goods and energy resources. The problem of 20th-century Asia, of
how to constrain Japanese power, was solved by a post–World War II alliance that contained Japanese militarism, reassuring its neighbors and
enabling Asia’s economic miracle by allowing regional states to focus on modernizing their economies rather than competing militarily. China’s
own extraordinary growth since it launched economic reforms in 1978 was made possible by the security umbrella America provided to Japan.
This neutered armed conflict in East Asia and allowed American forces to operate freely in the region in ways that reassured rather than
threatened key Asian powers. Japan’s strategic posture and identity as a peaceful trading state are intimately tied
to Taiwan’s orientation. Japan and Taiwan are natural allies — a term not usually associated with Japan’s relations with
neighbors due to friction over “history issues” related to wartime Japan’s rapacity. Japan and Taiwan share a strategic geography
as offshore trading powers dependent on free access to the maritime commons. Japan is Taiwan’s second-
largest trading partner, and their economies are closely bound together by two-way flows of technology and capital as well as goods and
services. They share a common military ally in the United States, the lodestar of their security in a rapidly changing region. They
both define a national interest in an Asian balance of power that is not dominated by mainland China but preserves pluralism among Asia-Pacific
states, allowing each to choose its alignments freely. Cultural and political values pull Taiwan and Japan together rather than pushing them apart,
laying a more enduring foundation for their shared strategic interests. Both are democracies in which political power has alternated between
parties and governments are held accountable through strong institutions, free media, and the rule of law. Culturally, Japan’s occupation of
Taiwan from 1895 to 1945 did not leave the imperial scars so evident elsewhere in Asia; to the contrary, Japanese administration helped
modernize Taiwan and is remembered as a time of progress. Today, people-to-people ties between the two nations remain strong: Polling
consistently shows that majorities in both societies hold the other in high regard. Taiwanese popular esteem for Japan is exceptional when
compared with most of its neighbors. Many scholars and analysts predict a near-term future in which Taiwan is increasingly drawn into mainland
China’s embrace — willingly or otherwise. Yet as long as Japan and the prc remain security competitors, Taiwan’s
reintegration with the mainland would put it on the wrong side of the divide, allied with the country that
most threatens it against its most natural East Asian partner . In the absence of political liberalization in China, Taiwan’s
interests and political values clash with the prc’s as strongly as they coincide with Japan’s — suggesting that we might expect to see a
closer convergence in Japanese-Taiwanese relations over the coming decade, rather than the divergence
that would occur from Taiwan’s reunification with a still-authoritarian regime in Beijing . For this reason, the
future of Taiwan’s relations with Japan approach in importance the future of relations across the Taiwan
Strait.
Stopping arms sales wrecks assurance
Sutter 16 (Robert, Professor of Practice of International Affairs at George Washington University,
DAVID GITTER is a Research Consultant with Defense Group Inc. (DGI), where he provides research
and analysis for DGI initiatives pertaining to China, Taiwan’s Strong but Stifled Foundations of National
Power, the national bureau of asian research, nbr special report #54,
http://www.nbr.org/publications/specialreport/pdf/free/03072016/SR54_Taiwan_Jan2016.pdf)
To augment its strategic resources, Taiwan continues to pursue a wide range of weapons, but it runs into various obstacles and issues. Weapons
procurement from the United States and elsewhere is subject to political concerns, as countries are worried about provoking Beijing. The recent
flux in Taiwan’s overall strategy toward the China threat means that the porcupine strategy recently favored by some U.S. strategists is only one
element considered in the ROC’s multifaceted defense program. Thus, a wide range of weapons systems are under consideration for purchase or
development by the current government and military leaders. These include stealth aircraft such as the F-35B as well as submarines through a
long-stalled U.S. submarine program and an indigenous defensive submarine program. Veteran journalists often report the view
in Taiwan that many U.S. weapons systems are acquired less for defending against China and more for their
symbolic importance of showing continued U.S. support for Taiwan’s security .86 For both Taiwan and
the United States, the arms sales represent a recurring show of commitment to the island’s defense. It remains the case,
however, that weapons from the United States must be justified by the U.S. government as defensive in character. The U.S. president and
Congress determine Taiwan’s needs as stated in the Taiwan Relations Act.
Ending arms sales would devastate U.S. alliances even though Taiwan is a “different
kind of ally.”
Rigger 11 — Shelley Rigger, Brown Professor of East Asian Politics and Chair of Political Science at
Davidson College, former Visiting Researcher at National Chengchi University (Taiwan) and Visiting
Professor at Fudan University (China), holds a Ph.D. in Government from Harvard University, 2011
(“Why giving up Taiwan will not help us with China,” American Enterprise Institute, November 29 th,
Available Online at https://www.aei.org/publication/why-giving-up-taiwan-will-not-help-us-with-china/,
Accessed 10-27-2016)
Glaser dismisses the idea that security assistance to Taiwan helps sustain the postwar security architecture
in East Asia. He writes, “the risks of reduced U.S. credibility for protecting allies . . . should be small,
especially if any change in policy on Taiwan is accompanied by countervailing measures.”[8] Certainly,
other nations differentiate between Taiwan—which not only is not a formal US ally, but which the US
government does not even recognize as a state—and other US defense partners. Nonetheless , no
competent security planner would dismiss a US retreat from a long-standing security commitment as
irrelevant, especially if it appears driven by American weakness .
If Washington appears to be backing away from its commitment to the alliances and institutions in which
it has invested so much, other governments will take that as a sign that they may not be able to rely on
US-backed security arrangements to ensure their future security, forcing them to become more
competitive and individualistic. According to retired Army colonel and military analyst Albert Willner,
America’s friends already are on the alert for signs of a decline in US commitments. He said in an
interview, “There is a growing sense in the world that the US is a fair-weather friend, it won’t be there for
the long run. This causes people in many countries to maneuver ahead of time , to get into position in
anticipation of the day the US pulls back. If the US makes decisions regarding Taiwan that reinforce this
perception, it will have profound implications for our other relationships .”
Another strategic interest the United States has in maintaining close ties to Taiwan rests with Taiwan’s
position on the front line of China’s rise. China’s behavior toward Taiwan indicates how it will perform
its role as a lead actor on the world stage. As Randall Schriver, a former deputy assistant secretary of state
for East Asian and Pacific affairs, put it, “Beijing’s ambitions go beyond Taiwan, but right now, it’s the
Taiwan issue that drives their military modernization, so it’s very important to us. Taiwan is a prism
through which we can understand China’s evolution, and gain insights into it.” Richard Bush, a leading
analyst of the US-PRC-Taiwan relationship, summarized these concerns when he said, “How the Taiwan
Strait issue is resolved is an important test—perhaps the most important test—of what kind of great
power China will be and of how the US will play its role as the guardian of the international system.” By
extension, how the United States and its allies treat Taiwan is an important indicator of what other
countries in the region can expect from Washington as the PRC’s influence expands. They may ask, if the
United States acquiesces to a rising China on the Taiwan issue, will it also acquiesce on issues
important to them?
Link---Consultation
Close consultation and cooperation matters for perception of extended deterrence –
fiat necessarily trashes that – it’s not about the capabilities the aff changes but the
process
Roberts 13 ---- Brad, former visiting fellow at the National Institute for Defense Studies of the
Ministry of Defense of Japan, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile
Defense Policy in the Obama Administration, Ph.D. in Political Science (Erasmus University Rotterdam),
M.Sc. in International Relations (London School of Economics and Political Science), B.A. in
International Relations (Stanford University), Director designate at the Center for Global Security
Research (Livermore National Laboratory), “Extended Deterrence and Strategic Stability in Northeast
Asia,” NIDS Visiting Scholar Paper Series, No.1, 8/9,
http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/visiting/pdf/01.pdf
In the assessment of the Obama administration, efforts to strengthen extended deterrence and preserve strategic
stability require close cooperation with allies . After all, these efforts involve not just shared benefits but
also shared risks and shared responsibilities. In Europe, the U nited S tates has helped lead NATO through a
significant re-crafting of its overall approach on these matters. Over the last 3 years NATO has reworked and updated
its Strategic Concept, refreshed its agenda in the NATO-Russia Council, and conducted a comprehensive, year-
long review of the alliance’s deterrence and defense posture, which was released in unclassified form at the Chicago summit in
spring 2012.18 In the Middle East, the United States continues to work with multiple allies to strengthen the
deterrence posture in the Persian Gulf and to otherwise mitigate the destabilizing effects of Iran’s continued
development of nuclear and missile capabilities. In Northeast Asia, bilateral processes have been built
to help advance cooperation . The U nited S tates and Japan founded the Extended Deterrence Dialogue in
2010. Also in 2010, the U nited S tates and the Republic of Korea founded the Extended Deterrence Policy Committee.
The U nited S tates also regularly consults with other allies in the regions on these matters. The purposes of these
processes are to institutionalize sustained leadership focus on these issues, to enable active policy discussion and
development where needed, and to ensure sustained progress on practical agendas of cooperation.
Link---Declaratory Policy
Aff is a unilateral declaratory policy of abandonment – that’s an independent link –
consultation guides Japanese trust in the credibility of extended deterrence – plan’s
actual size/significance for geopolitics is irrelevant
Rowberry 15 ---- Ariana Navarro, Special Assistant at The White House’s National Security Council,
Herbert Scoville Jr. Peace Fellow at the Brookings Institution, B.A. in Peace, War, and Defense; Political
Science (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill). This article was reviewed by Steven Pifer who is
the Director of the Arms Control Initiative (Brookings) and a former Senior Adviser with the Center for
Strategic & International Studies, “Advanced Conventional Weapons, Deterrence and the U.S.-Japan
Alliance,” Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative, the article was published on 1/6/15, it was
written in December 2014, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2015/01/06-
advanced-conventional-weapons-deterrence-us-japan-alliance-rowberry/advanced-conventional-weapons-
deterrence-and-the-usjapan-alliance--rowberry
The U.S. Extended Political Deterrent to Japan While

nuclear and conventional capabilities provide the “hard” aspects
of extended deterrence, “soft” components, including U.S. declaratory policy, clear statements of U.S. support after
provocative actions by adversaries, and formalized bilateral dialogue, are indispensable components of the
extended deterrent relationship. Given the increasing uncertainty of Japan’s security environment,
continued U.S. political support for Japan is crucial as a means of assuring Tokyo. Washington
sends strong signals to Japan and potential adversaries through its declaratory policy, which outlines how and
when the United States might use military force. As discussed above, the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United
States and Japan is the linchpin of the alliance. Article 5 states, “Each party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories
under the Administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in
accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes.”29 Despite the “mutual” defense commitments of both the United States and Japan,
historically the United States has borne the majority of the burden for providing protection to the alliance. Declaratory policy under the
mutual defense treaty has become particularly important in light of escalating tensions with neighbors.
Some Japanese scholars have expressed concern that the U nited S tates could be reluctant to come to Japan’s
aid in the event of a low-level conflict, such as a dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.30 In providing assurance to
Japan, it is necessary to make clear that U.S. declaratory policy applies to these types of contingencies.
Another example of declaratory policy is the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, which serves as a guiding
document for the Obama Administration’s nuclear policy. More than previous NPRs, the 2010 document stresses
the importance of reducing the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security policy. However , the document
also identifies strengthening regional deterrence and reassuring U.S. allies and partners as a key
objective .31 As part of the effort to assure Japan that changes in U.S. policy would not be to Japan’s
detriment, U.S. and Japanese officials conducted extensive consultations during the formulation
of the 2010 NPR. Many Japanese officials felt that those close talks resolved their anxieties regarding
Crucially , these consultations gave Japan an opportunity to provide input
future U.S. policy on nuclear weapons.32
in the formulation of U.S. declaratory policy, and provided a channel for Japan to express its thinking
about the U.S. extended deterrent .
Aff sidesteps institutionalized channels of bilateral dialogue and past efforts at

transparency – creams security assurance credibility
Rowberry 15 ---- Ariana Navarro, Special Assistant at The White House’s National Security Council,
Herbert Scoville Jr. Peace Fellow at the Brookings Institution, B.A. in Peace, War, and Defense; Political
Science (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill). This article was reviewed by Steven Pifer who is
the Director of the Arms Control Initiative (Brookings) and a former Senior Adviser with the Center for
Strategic & International Studies, “Advanced Conventional Weapons, Deterrence and the U.S.-Japan
Alliance,” Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative, the article was published on 1/6/15, it was
written in December 2014, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2015/01/06-
advanced-conventional-weapons-deterrence-us-japan-alliance-rowberry/advanced-conventional-weapons-
deterrence-and-the-usjapan-alliance--rowberry
A third part of the political component of extended deterrence is formalized bilateral dialogue
between the U nited S tates and Japan. Unlike NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group, which provides member-states with a venue to discuss and influence
nuclear policy, the U.S.-Japan alliance does not include an institutionalized dialogue. However, the U nited S tates and Japan have collaborated
to create other fora to discuss nuclear policy issues. In 2000 Japan and the United States created the Security Consultative
Committee (SCC), which is used as a forum for officials at the ministerial level to discuss pertinent policy issues to the
U.S.-Japan alliance.36 In 2007, following North Korea’s first nuclear test, the SCC meeting (known as the two-plustwo)
reaffirmed that “the full range of U.S. military capabilities , both nuclear and non-nuclear strike forces and defensive capabilities,
form the core of the extended deterrence.”37 The Obama administration, through the 2010 NPR, has taken large steps to
further institutionalize bilateral dialogue .38 In 2011, the U nited S tates and Japan established the Extended
Deterrence Dialogue (EDD), a biannual dialogue in which American officials discuss U.S. nuclear capabilities
with Japan, with the goal of increasing transparency and enhancing Japan’s assurance . For
example, in April 2012, under the auspices of the EDD, Japanese officials spent three days at U.S. Naval Base Kitsap-Bangor in Washington.
During the site visit, Japanese officials were shown a U.S. nuclear attack submarine and Trident missiles .39 According to the
Pentagon, the dialogue “ reinforces the critical role of the U.S.-Japanese alliance in deterring and
responding to strategic threats in the East Asia region. Through frank discussion, transparent information
exchange and interaction with U.S. Navy personnel, the EDD communicates to America’s allies that the U.S.
extended deterrent continues to be credible , capable, and enduring.”40 As the U.S.-Japan alliance evolves, the
political component of extended deterrence, including bilateral dialogue and U.S. declaratory policy, will
remain central to Japan’s faith in the credibility of the extended deterrent . U.S. policy makers and
military leaders should endeavor to broaden existing dialogues to include discussion of the potential contribution of advanced conventional weapons systems to
Japanese and regional security.
Link---Relations Advantage
Relations link – Plan’s US/China coop creates Japanese fears of abandonment –
crushes credibility of the security assurance and broad relations – aff is a new
“Nixon Shock”
-Process and credibility outweigh substance: perceptions and consultation matter
-Broader military dynamics mean diplomatic and economic issues spillover
-Perception of China as a frenemy is enough
Kato 13 ---- Akira, Visiting Scholar at the East-West Center, Director of the Institute for International
Studies (Obirin University), “The Japan-US Alliance Is in Danger of Drifting Apart,” Asia Pacific
Bulletin Number 230, 9/11, http://www.eastwestcenter.org/sites/default/files/private/apb230.pdf
difficultly in the Japan-US relationship concerns their alternative views of

Different Views of the World The second
the world. The current prevailing view of an emerging world order dominated by US China cooperation
continues to gather momentum , at a time when Japan is perceived to be in decline. This view of a new
world order as “a quasi US-China alliance” is outlined in Henry Kissinger’s recent book, On China. For the U nited
S tates, such a quasi alliance means that it will still be able to maintain influence in Asia even if the Japan-US
alliance dissolves . For Japan, it implies that it would be controlled jointly by the U nited S tates and
China, or worse still, that it would be subject to Chinese dictatorship . For Japan, neither scenario is acceptable. This
quasi alliance scenario reminds Japan of the “Nixon Shock” nightmare of July 1971 when the Nixon administration
suddenly announced US-China diplomatic normalization without any advance notice or consultation with
Japan. To say that Japan was astounded is an understatement. The U nited S tates not only neglected to consult with its ally, but
more importantly, Washington dumped the above-mentioned foundations of the Japan-US Security Treaty
to shake hands with communist China— an enemy of Japan— and only for US interests . The current security
environment in Asia is very similar to the one in the 1970s, when China was beginning to emerge as a potential
geopolitical power and the U nited S tates was bogged down in Vietnam amidst talk of a decline in US military and economic power.
Today, the U nited S tates is extracting itself from two prolonged wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and a grim domestic
economic slowdown, at a time when China’s rising military and economic power is perceived to be a challenge to US
superiority in Asia. While China might not be an enemy, or a friend, of the United States, at best it is a “frenemy. ” This fact
worries Japan, with some believing that it is only a matter of time before there is another “Nixon Shock” and
again at Japan’s expense.
*** INTERNAL LINK
A2: Assurances Not Key
Credible security guarantees and allied assurance prevents allied prolif – we have
the best set of methodologies: conventional wisdom, quantitative analysis, and case
studies
Nonproliferation Studies, “Security Guarantees and Allied Nuclear Proliferation,” Journal of Conflict
Resolution, 58.3, 4/14, DOI: 10.1177/0022002713509050
Conclusion and Policy Implications This study, the first to subject the proliferation-tamping effects of security guarantees to
in-depth quantitative analysis bolstered by a focused case study, robustly supports the conventional
wisdom among policy makers in Washington and elsewhere that security guarantees can reduce the risk of nuclear
proliferation . Recent quantitative and qualitative studies suggesting the absence of such a relationship, or reaching
indeterminate conclusions, find little support here. We especially want to highlight our findings with regard to pursuit, or
the launching of nuclear weapons programs, which we regard as the clearest demand signal for nuclear
weapons. Given the very small number of states that have acquired nuclear weapons, those findings deserve to be taken with a grain of salt, especially since
robustness checks limiting the acquisition risk pool to only those states that have previously explored or pursued yielded more mixed results. In other words, our
statistical analysis suggests we can be extremely confident that security guarantees will make states that have
not yet launched their own nuclear weapons programs less likely to do so. But given data constraints, we can be only moderately
confident that once states have launched indigenous nuclear weapons programs, the extension of security guarantees will make them less likely to see these through to
acquisition. With some nuances, the latter is the story we have told about South Korea, and at least in that case security
guarantees do appear to
have played a crucial role in convincing a state not to see a nuclear weapons program , albeit a modest one,
through to acquisition . Further, our analysis of the So uth Ko rean case suggests that a country weighs fears of
abandonment with the costs of pursuing a nuclear program in its decision whether to proliferate. This decision calculus suggests
that US policy makers can take actions that bolster or undercut the credibility of a security guarantee and thus the country’s
fear of abandonment. As the South Korean case illustrates, patron state troop deployments, joint operational planning, and joint training seem to reduce abandonment
concerns. These preliminary findings also highlight the need for more in-depth analysis of the proliferation-tamping effects of security guarantees, especially to try to
shed light on the conditions under which they may be more or less effective. Policy makers seeking to prevent proliferation in the
Middle East, Asia, and elsewhere are well advised to consider security guarantees as a key
arrow in their quiver. At the same time, this study suggests guarantees are not a nonproliferation panacea. The relationship between guarantees and
nonproliferationis probabilistic, and our work suggests that a number of other factors play crucial roles in determining proliferation outcomes. Further, the nuances of
particular states’ domestic and external political relationships can be expected to also play important roles. Caveats and nuances notwithstanding, security guarantees
appear to have played a crucial role in stemming the spread of nuclear weapons in the past and have the potential to do likewise in future.
Best research proves security assurances work – general policy wisdom,

Resolution, 58.3, 4/14, DOI: 10.1177/0022002713509050, SAGE
But while policy analysts almost universally regard security guarantees as crucial to preventing
proliferation, empirical research has reached more mixed conclusions. This article uses quantitative and
qualitative methods to address this apparent gap.3 We argue that security guarantees make their recipients
substantially less likely to engage in all levels of proliferation activity , a hypothesis that
receives robust support from our quantitative analysis and additional confirmation from qualitative
examination of an important historical case, which also sheds light on underlying causal mechanisms.
Assurances work if credibility is high – all logic goes negative – alliance avoids
security costs of proliferation,
By allying with a patron that has nuclear weapons, a state can enjoy many of the deterrent benefits of the patron’s
nuclear weapons while not paying the costs associated with developing its own. A security guarantee serves
as a substitute for a state obtaining nuclear weapons; a potential challenger to the protégé´ state will observe
that a nuclear-armed patron protects the protégé´ and will therefore be less likely to threaten or attack the
protégé´ (Huth 1988). Yet from the perspective of the protégé´ state, this strategy entails risks, most importantly the potential for abandonment
(Snyder 1984). Because allies can abandon protégé’s in the face of threats, protégé´ states can never feel completely secure (Goldstein 2000).
For states where the risk of abandonment is perceived to be high, or the technological, economic, and political constraints on
proliferation are low, security guarantees are less likely to be viewed as viable substitutes for proliferation.
Conversely, for states that perceive the likelihood of abandonment as low, or the technological, economic, and political
constraints on proliferation as high, security guarantees are more likely to be perceived as viable
alternatives to proliferation.
A2: Assurances Not Key---Asia
Assurances solve
Weitz 13 (Richard, director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis and a Senior Fellow at the
Hudson Institute, North Korean Threats Deepen Southern Nuclear Insecurities,
http://thediplomat.com/2013/07/north-korean-threats-deepen-southern-nuclear-insecurities/?allpages=yes)
U.S. experts have considered exploiting Chinese fears that

North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities will lead
Japan and perhaps even Taiwan to acquire missile defenses and nuclear weapons in response. Still, the expectation, in Beijing
and elsewhere, is that none of these countries would make the controversial decision to pursue their own nuclear
deterrents as long as they feel reassured that the United States will protect them. In the past, U.S.
officials managed to end the clandestine nuclear weapons programs of Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea by warning
them that the United States could respond by annulling its pledges to defend them. Although ROK-U.S. relations
have never been better, the Obama administration needs to subtly remind South Koreans of this possibility if the movement for ROK nukes
genuinely takes off.
A2: Assurances Not Key---Japan
Loss of alliance cred causes Japan prolif – ensures arms racing and crushes the NPT –
nuke war – weapons get used to coerce US into conflicts, accidents, and miscalc – even
ineffective development causes preemptive conflicts and kills heg
-Arms racing includes South Korean horizontal proliferation and NoKo/Chinese vertical
proliferation/modernization
-NPT collapse causes Iranian, German and Saudi Arabian prolif
-Yes domino: empirical stability is because of US assurances
-Stability turns are academically flawed even if empirically based
Nuclear allies can also become security risks . Vipin Narang demonstrates that when weaker [junior] states gain
nuclear weapons, they often seek to coerce their senior partners into intervening on their behalf by threatening to
use nuclear weapons. That’s what Israel did at the height of the 19 73 Arab-Israeli War. That’s what South Africa did during
its 19 88 confrontation with Cuban forces in Angola. And that’s what Pakistan did in the midst of its 1990 military crisis with India.
Instead of relieving the U nited S tates of a military burden, as Donald Trump suggests, having more nuclear allies could
increase the risk that the U nited S tates would get involved in conflicts that might turn nuclear . Furthermore,
were South Korea or Japan to begin developing nuclear weapons, their rivals might be tempted to launch preventive
military strikes , which research suggests has been frequently considered in the past. The road to nuclear
acquisition is often rocky and increases the likelihood of militarized conflict . For example, Soviet worries that
West Germany would acquire nuclear weapons helped trigger the Berlin Crisis. And if Japan or South Korea actually
acquired nuclear weapons, we could possibly see a nuclear arms race in Asia . Japan’s neighbors, including
So uth Ko rea, would fear resurgent Japanese militarism. No rth Ko rea would expand its nuclear capabilities. China
would continue to expand its own nuclear arsenal. Why haven’t we seen nuclear arms races before? Nuclear “domino effects”
have not been common historically. But that’s largely because of determined U.S. efforts to stop them.
Since the dawn of the nuclear age, the United States has pursued nonproliferation as a top policy priority. That includes sponsoring and enforcing
the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Research suggests the NPT has been instrumental in limiting the spread of
nuclear weapons, in part by coordinating states’ beliefs about one another’s nonproliferation commitments. To develop
nuclear weapons, Japan and South Korea would need to violate or withdraw from the NPT. That could prompt U.S.
allies and adversaries in other regions — including Saudi Arabia, Germany and Iran — to question the treaty’s
viability and consider seeking their own nuclear arsenals . Would this be so bad? After all, no two nuclear armed
states have fought a major war with each other, and nuclear weapons have not been used in conflict since the United States bombed
Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. But the conclusion that nuclear weapons produce peace is subject to debate . It’s
true that there has been no war between major powers since 1945. But that may be due to other factors. The quantitative
evidence linking nuclear weapons to a reduced risk of conflict is limited at best. Further, theoretical and historical
evidence suggests that nuclear accidents and miscalculations are likely. More countries with nuclear weapons
would mean more opportunities for catastrophic nuclear mistakes . So what’s the takeaway? A look at history shows us
that nuclear proliferation is anything but inevitable . U.S. nonproliferation efforts have been surprisingly successful ,
even when the United States was weaker [less influential] than it is today. Without firm U.S.
opposition to the spread of nuclear
weapons — a policy implemented through “carrots” like alliances and “sticks” like sanctions — the world would
probably have far more than nine countries with nuclear weapons. What’s more, research suggests that nuclear
proliferation would reduce U.S. world influence , undermine global stability and increase the risk of
nuclear war.
Loss of security credibility causes Japan prolif
Yoshihara 9 (Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes, visiting professor at the U.S. Air War College, in
Montgomery, Alabama; and senior research associate at the University of Georgia Center for
International Trade and Security, Naval War College Review. Washington: Summer 2009. Vol. 62, Iss. 3;
pg. 59, Thinking about the Unthinkable: Tokyo's Nuclear Option, proquest)
Japanese concerns over the Obama administration's recent moves to advance nonproliferation and disarmament objectives attest to such
sensitivities. Specifically, Japanese policy makers fret that "extended deterrence could weaken if Washington appears too eager to placate China
and Russia on these [global disarmament] issues in pursuit of the nonproliferation objective or if it permits a latent North Korean nuclear
capability in exchange for safeguards against proliferation." 33 In 2006, North Korea's nuclear test compelled the Japanese government to seek
public reassurances from the United States that extended deterrence remained intact.34 Not surprisingly, even skeptics on the matter
of Japanese nuclearization concede that an erosion of American credibility could fundamentally reshape
the Japanese strategic calculus. The Congressional Research Service forcefully contends that "perhaps the single most
important factor to date in dissuading Tokyo from developing a nuclear arsenal is the U.S. guarantee to
protect Japan's security."35 The causes and processes by which U.S. extended deterrence could be undermined in Tokyo's eyes are
beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, we contend that a gradual or sudden collapse of the nuclear umbrella
would be among the most decisive stimuli for a Japanese nuclear breakout. Indeed, historical precedents in Cold War
Asia provide ample evidence of the proliferation-related consequences of real or perceived American indifference to the region. In the past,
perceptions of declining American credibility and of weaknesses in the nuclear umbrella have spurred
concerted efforts by allies to break out . In 1971, under the Nixon Doctrine, which called on allies to bear heavier burdens,
Washington withdrew a combat division from the Korean Peninsula . As a consequence, according to Seung-
Young Kim, "Korean leaders were not sure about U.S. willingness to use nuclear weapons," despite the
presence of tactical nuclear weapons on Korean soil.36 Such fears compelled President Park ChungHee to
initiate a crash nuclear-weapons program . To compound matters, President Jimmy Carter's abortive attempt to withdraw all U.S.
forces and nuclear weapons from the Korean Peninsula accelerated Park's pursuit of an independent deterrent. Similarly, China's nuclear test in
1964 kindled "fear that Taiwan might be wiped out in a single attack, with U.S. retaliation coming too late to prevent destruction." 37 This lack
of confidence in American security guarantees impelled Chiang Kai-shek to launch a nuclear-weapons
program. The Sino-U.S. rapprochement of the early 1970s further stimulated anxieties among Nationalist leaders about a potential
abandonment of Taiwan. In fulfilling its pledges under the Shanghai Communiqué, which began the normalization process, the United States
substantially reduced its troop presence on the island. As Nancy Bernkopf Tucker argues, "The withdrawal of American forces from Taiwan
compelled the Nationalists to think more seriously about alternative ways of protecting themselves," including nuclear weapons.38 Recently
declassified materials document growing American alarm at the prospect of a nuclear breakout on the island throughout the decade.39 In both
cases, sustained American pressure, combined with reassurances, persuaded the two East Asian powers to forgo
the nuclear option. The Taiwanese and South Korean experiences nonetheless show that states succumb to
proliferation temptations as a result of a deteriorating security environment , heightened threat
perceptions, and a lessening of confidence in the United States . While Japan certainly faces far different and less
worrisome circumstances, these two case studies serve as a reminder to analysts not to casually wave away the possibility of a Japanese nuclear
option.
A2: Assurances Not Key---Methodology
Prefer our studies – best modeling approach, avoids path dependency, checks
robustness, and controls for all possible third/confounding variables (blue if they read
Jo/Gartzke)
Following Singh and Way, we analyze our data using hazard models. The key characteristic of this approach is that
the dependent variable is time until proliferation. This allows us to focus on why states initiate behaviors and
avoids the pathdependency problem faced by Jo and Gartzke.18 [CONTUINUE TO FOOTNOTE #18]
Because Jo and Gartzke’s approach does not drop states once they engage in the behavior in question—for example, after the United States
acquired nuclear weapons in 1945, it is coded as though it reacquired them in every subsequent year—it gives less traction on why
states initiate proliferation behavior [END FOOTNOTE] We employ the Akaike information criterion to
adjudicate between the Weibull distribution and Cox semiparametric approach taken by some other recent proliferation studies (Akaike 1974).
We find the Weibull approach superior , and further note that it yields more precise estimates , especially in a modest
sized data set of the sort employed here (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997).19 As a robustness check , we reran all our reported
models using the Cox approach. Multivariate Analysis We present both ‘‘core’’ and ‘‘fully specified’’ models to shed
light on the relationship between security guarantees and proliferation behavior while controlling for a range of
variables . Table 2 presents our core models. Security guarantees are statistically significant and negative for all three
stages of proliferation; we can be highly confident that states receiving security guarantees are less
likely to explore, pursue, and acquire nuclear weapons. The other results are unsurprising. Economic and nuclear capacity are significantly and
positively associated with all the three stages of proliferation. Conventional threat is significantly and positively linked to both exploration and pursuit, though not acquisition. The latter is
puzzling, but the more fully specified model reported later, as well as almost all the additional models we ran as robustness checks, found conventional threat to be robustly and positively linked
to acquisition. Nuclear threat is significantly and positively linked to exploration, but has no relationship to pursuit and acquisition, consistent with Bleek’s (2010) previously reported findings
employing a different model but contra conventional wisdom about ‘‘reactive proliferation’’ dynamics. Prior studies have incorporated other potentially
relevant variables, and the fully specified model in Table 3 includes an array of these . Despite the large number of
variables, the core result on security guarantees remains robust , although as expected the large number of variables reduces statistical significance across the
board. With regard to the core control variables , economic capacity is no longer statistically significant for
explore or pursue, though still significantly and positively correlated with exploration and acquisition. And dropping a few of the variables that are never
significant for any stage of proliferation behavior restores the highly significant and positive relationship at the pursue stage
without meaningfully affecting the results for other variables . Nuclear capacity remains significant at explore and pursue, albeit no longer at
acquire. Like economic capacity, dropping a few variables that are never significant for any stage of proliferation behavior restores the statistically significant and positive correlation at the
acquire stage. Conventional threat is no longer statistically significant for explore, but is highly significant for both pursue and acquire. Nuclear threat yields the same results as the core models at
reduced statistical significance.
A2: Assurances Not Key---Taiwan
Credible US assurances are the single strongest factor stopping proliferation
Fitzpatrick 16 (After ten years heading the International Institute for Strategic Studies Non-
Proliferation and Nuclear Policy Programme, Mark Fitzpatrick moved to Washington in December 2015
to also take on the role of Executive Director of the office here. Mr. Fitzpatrick's research focus is on
preventing nuclear dangers through non-proliferation, nuclear security and arms control. He has lectured
throughout Europe, North America and Asia and is a frequent commentator on proliferation and
disarmament on BBC, NPR and other news outlets. He is a founding member of the EU Non-Proliferation
Consortium and a member of the World Economic Forum Global Agenda Council on Nuclear Security,
Conclusions, Adelphi Series, Volume 55, Issue 455, Special Issue: Asia’s Latent Nuclear Powers: Japan,
South Korea and Taiwan, by Mark Fitzpatrick, date published online,
DOI:10.1080/19445571.2015.1146024, Taylor and Francis, 2/5)
Non-proliferation in Northeast Asia depends foremost on the credibility of US deterrence . There is

no reason for any of the three actors to entertain the risks associated with indigenous nuclear weapons as
long as they can rely on the US for ultimate security. Even Taiwan, which does not enjoy an explicit US
alliance relationship, can count on de facto US protection . To state the converse, a failure of the US to ensure
effective deterrence would be the strongest stimulant to a proliferation cascade in Northeast Asia. Japan, for
example, worries about China's recent nuclear force modernisation. There is equal if not greater concern about China's growing conventional anti-
access/area-denial capabilities and whether they might someday preclude America's ability to come to Japan's defence. Combined with China–US
mutual vulnerability at the strategic level, a perceived superiority of China's conventional capabilities conceivably could cause Japan to consider
a nuclear dimension of its own. In Taiwan, notwithstanding the trend against all forms of nuclear technology, resumed tensions with the
mainland that appear on the horizon mean that nuclear-hedging options cannot
be ruled out, especially if the US were to
become isolationist or its perceived commitment to defend Taiwan were to weaken . In the Korean Peninsula,
a loss of credibility of the US extended deterrence could make the nuclear imbalance between North and South intolerable to Seoul.
Credible assurances ensure Taiwan’s commitment to nonprolif – erosion leads to

immediate build-up
Conclusions, Adelphi Series, Volume 55, Issue 455, Special Issue: Asia’s Latent Nuclear Powers: Japan,
South Korea and Taiwan, by Mark Fitzpatrick, date published online,
DOI:10.1080/19445571.2015.1146024, Taylor and Francis, 2/5)
Like Japan and South Korea, Taiwan is often considered to be a latent nuclear power, possessing the technological basis
for developing nuclear weapons. Like South Korea, Taiwan twice went down the weapons path in a post-war period
of authoritarian rule and deep security anxieties. Today, the authoritarianism is gone but the reasons for anxiety remain. Taiwan
faces a potential existential threat unparalleled anywhere else in the world , and its weakness relative to the
Chinese mainland increases by the day. Yet non-proliferation norms are strong . A resumed nuclear weapons
pursuit cannot be ruled out if the implicit US defence commitment were to wane and the positive shift
in cross-Strait relations were to change dramatically. Neither condition is likely for the foreseeable future .
Although a negative political shift in cross-Strait relations may be in the offing, it is not likely to change things so dramatically that it will reverse
Taiwan's non-proliferation status.
A2: Assurances Resilient---Nuke Umbrella
Nuclear umbrella alone is insufficient – three warrants – stability/instability paradox
renders massive retaliation not credible, conventional means resolve de-coupling risks,
and US opposition to mutual vulnerability
The comprehensive approach to strengthening extended deterrence clearly embeds the nuclear
component of the strategy in a larger policy construct . As one analyst has described it, “the nuclear umbrella has become the
pinnacle of a security dome.”13 The U nited S tates has set out this comprehensive approach as opposed to relying on
nuclear means alone for three basic reasons. First, the threat of U.S. nuclear use may not always be
credible in the eyes of the individual(s) the United States might seek to deter. Some enemy may convince
itself that there are forms of nuclear attack (or other forms of attack) that fall beneath the U.S. response threshold.
For example, an enemy might believe that nuclear attack primarily to generate e lectro m agnetic p ulse effects on nearby
conventional forces might escape a U.S. nuclear response . This could be a serious miscalculation but, from a
deterrence perspective, this scenario highlights the value of supplemental non-nuclear elements in the deterrence
architecture. Second, whether or not nuclear threats are credible , the non-nuclear components of this strategy
offer valuable deterrence benefits . For example, b allistic m issile d efense of the U.S. homeland mitigates de-coupling risks
by greatly reducing if not eliminating risks run by the United States in defending its allies. And b allistic m issile d efense within the
region protects key assets from an enemy’s preemptive strikes, enables offensive operations to begin at a time of
our choosing rather than the enemy’s, and raises the scale of attack that an attacker must attempt if it wants to overwhelm the
defense (severely limiting the credibility of threats to launch a small number of weapons while holding more in reserve). These
strategic benefits help to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in regional deterrence architectures
even while a core element remains, given the fundamental role of nuclear weapons in deterring nuclear attack. Third, the United
States flatly rejects mutual vulnerability as the basis of the strategic relationship with states like North Korea and Iran that violate
international obligations, destabilize their regions and threaten their neighbors, and threaten the United States with nuclear attack. The global security
environment would become deeply unstable if such states were to conclude that they are free under their
own nuclear umbrellas to coerce their neighbors and commit aggression.14
A2: Assurances Resilient---Post-Plan Assurances
Even if the plan is offset with security assurances, they fail – South Korea proves
While the South Koreans secretly acquired components for an indigenous nuclear weapon capability, US actions
continued to undercut the credibility of the US commitment. Following Gerald Ford’s assumption of
the Presidency, the U nited S tates announced the Pacific Doctrine, which advocated a burden-sharing approach similar to the
Guam Doctrine. While President Ford provided assurances that the U nited S tates would not continue scaling
down its troop levels in the ROK, South Korean policy makers were uncertain whether US domestic politics
might lead to changes in that position (Siler 1998). As a result of this uncertainty surrounding the
credibility of the US commitment , South Korean decision makers continued to develop nuclear
weapons as a way to ensure the country’s security (MacDonald 1988). Indeed, South Korean president Park told the
Washington Post that his country would actively pursue the nuclear option if the U nited S tates withdrew its
nuclear umbrella (Ha 1978).
A2: Credibility Theory False
Abandoning Taiwan kills US credibility with all Asian allies – causes prolif
Rehman ’14 (Iskander Rehman, a fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2-28-
14, “Why Taiwan Matters,” http://nationalinterest.org/print/commentary/why-taiwan-matters-9971?
page=2)
Abandoning Taiwan would erode American credibility in the Indo-Pacific and add fuel to an ongoing
regional arms race . Taiwan policy cannot be compartmentalized, and viewed in isolation from the pivot and U.S. policy
towards Asia. Decision-makers in Seoul, Tokyo, and Manila would naturally question U.S. resolve and
Washington’s commitment to their security in the event of an abandonment of Taiwan. [22]Japan, in particular,
would feel threatened [22] by the stationing of Chinese forces on Taiwan—in essence losing a valuable geopolitical
buffer—in such close proximity to its southwestern approaches . Heightened threat perceptions in Tokyo, if
combined with a lack of faith in the credibility of U.S. conventional and nuclear deterrence, could lead Japan to acquire a nuclear-
weapons capability. The corrosive effect of forfeiting Taiwan would also extend to other key allies such as So uth
Ko rea, which might question Washington’s determination to defend it from No rth Ko rean aggression.
Indeed, recent public-opinion polls have indicated that a growing proportion of the So uth Ko rea public now favors the
development of a So uth Ko rea nuclear arsenal. Revealingly, the reasons invoked [23] for such a shift were
growing concerns over North Korea’s increasingly unpredictable and belligerent behavior, as well as over
the continued viability of the U nited S tates’ security guarantee.
Policymakers believe it
Tang 5 – Shiping Tang, associate research fellow and deputy director of the Center for Regional
Security Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing, January-March, “Reputation, Cult
of Reputation, and International Conflict,” Security Studies, Vol. 14, No. 1, p. 34-62
The problem, of course, is that politicians usually

do not have such nuanced understandings of credibility, reputation,
resolve, and capability.24 Too often, they fight for behavioral reputation for resolve and hope to improve their
bargaining reputation (thus credibility) in the future. By doing so, they confuse themselves, mislead their domestic audiences,
and squander their countries’ blood and treasure for the wrong commodity. In fact, most strategists and politicians have either lumped the two
kinds of reputation together or believed that behavioral reputation can easily be converted into bargaining reputation (that is, they have
believed that commitments are interdependent or that reputation is fungible ). Because developing and maintaining a
behavioral reputation for being resolute is desirable, many politicians and strategists undertake certain tasks ex ante to develop such a reputation,
without ever questioning whether having a behavioral reputation is possible at all. This practice, as discussed below, informs one central
belief behind the
cult of reputation . Perhaps because behavioral reputation is something that may count in the
future, moreover, it is the type of reputation about which decisionmakers are most concerned.25 In fact, decisionmakers
actually may bargain hard largely because they care more about their future behavioral reputation. This article thus focuses on behavioral
reputation for resolve (which hereafter will be referred to as “reputation” unless specified otherwise).
Theory’s true – strong empirical basis

Gibler 8 (Douglas M., Professor of Political Science – University of Alabama, “The Costs of Reneging:
Reputation and Alliance Formation”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 52(3), June, p. 4)
More sophisticated treatments of the reputation logic have been produced by formal theorists , both in
economics and in political science . In economics, the ability of firm reputation to deter competition has been well analyzed (see
Kreps and Wilson, 1982; Wilson, 1989; and Weigelt and Camerer, 1988), and political scientists have adopted these theories as tools in
understanding the types of signals leaders can send (see for example, Alt, Calvert, and Humes, 1988; Ordeshook, 1986; and Wagner, 1992).
Sartori (2002) and Guisinger and Smith (2002) probably go furthest in arguing that leaders and their envoys have incentives to
develop certain types of reputations in order to overcome the uncertainty endemic to crisis diplomacy. In these models, a
reputation for honesty allows the sender to credibly give information that would otherwise be “cheap
talk”, and thus, leaders may concede less important issues, without bluffing , in order to maintain a reputation for
honesty when more important issues arise (Sartori, 2002: 122). The sum argument of these statements and theoretical treatments is
clear. Decision-makers argue and act , at least in part, based on reputations . Traditional deterrence theory suggests
reputations should be pursued by leaders as important and manipulable tools, which are useful in future crises. Formal theorists agree;
reputations provide valuable information when the costs of signaling are low.
A2: No Spillover
Nations pay attention to other regions – plan’s action gets perceived by key allies
Further from a U.S. perspective, partnership with allies in three different regions provides many opportunities for
cross-fertilization . To varying degrees, analysts and policy makers pay attention to developments in
other regions with an eye to their local implications. Analysts in Japan have examined multiple
developments in Europe for their impact on the East Asian security environment. NATO’s nuclear
debate has been of interest in Japan. Michito Tsuruoka, for example, sees an opportunity for a nuclear policy
dialogue between experts in Japan and Europe: “ despite considerable differences in their respective security
situations, the two communities [transatlantic and Asian] face similar challenges concerning extended
deterrence ” and interaction between the two communities “might create fresh perspectives and new policy dynamics.”20
NATO’s proposal that Russia re-locate tactical nuclear weapons away from the Euro-Atlantic security environment has sparked concern in Japan, as it appears that
NATO is seeking to export its problems to East Asia, much as it seemed ready to do in the early 1980s when many in NATO advocated for re-location of Soviet
nuclear-tipped intermediate-range nuclear forces to somewhere East of the Ural mountains (where they might have targeted Japan).21 Yukio Satoh has argued that:
“the Strategic Concept adopted at NATO’s Lisbon Summit in 2010…fell short of what Japan had expected of NATO: a global perspective from which to address the
issue of nuclear weapons.”22
It's especially true for leaving Taiwan

Bosco ’15 (Joseph A. Bosco, national security consultant, retired in 2010 from the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD), Sumitro Chair for Southeast Asia Studies,May 15, 2015, “Taiwan and
Strategic Security”, The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/taiwan-and-strategic-security/)
For the same reason, Taiwan now became even more of a bone in Beijing’s throat as a model of democratic governance in a Chinese society,
undermining the myth that democracy and Confucianism are incompatible. The potential internal pressure for political reform in China increased
during the 1980s, culminating in the 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre. Given those geopolitical stakes regarding the future of Taiwan, the U.S.
commitment enshrined in the Taiwan Relations Act took on even greater strategic significance for the United States. When President
Barack Obama announced what he called the U.S. “pivot to Asia” before the Australian parliament in
2011, he linked America’s strategic interests to the success of democracy in the region and pledged
“every element of American power” to achieving “security, prosperity, and dignity for all.” That places
Taiwan and its democratic future at the strategic epicenter of America’s moral and political commitment
to the region. U.S. credibility is now tied inextricably to Taiwan’s fate , with or without an explicit
defense commitment in the TRA. Any weakening of American resolve to ensure Taiwan’s continued
security would significantly undermine that credibility throughout the region among friends, allies, and
most critically, our adversaries. Those who argue that the Taiwan game is not worth the candle fail to
grasp how much weight other countries in the region place on America’s commitment to Taiwan as a
bell-weather of U.S. reliability should any of them come under increased coercive pressure or outright
hostility from China. They see the U.S. as the necessary balancer to China’ s military buildup and
expansionist policies and Taiwan is the number one test case of U.S. will. That is why the U.S. declarative policy of
“strategic ambiguity” needs to change sooner rather than later. Washington’s refusal to make an explicit public commitment to not only provide
Taiwan with defensive weapons but to come actively to its defense sows doubts in the region. Worse, it encourages China to continue pursuing its
anti-access, area denial strategy of deploying attack submarines and ballistic missiles to deter, delay, or defeat any U.S. intervention in a cross-
Strait conflict. After all, Washington has said ever since 1995 that it might or might not defend Taiwan depending on the circumstances. So
Beijing has been creating the circumstances to affect that calculus. Would it have invested so much of its national wealth and effort to an anti-
Taiwan strategy if the U.S. had made it clear back in 1995 that an attack on Taiwan would certainly mean military conflict, possibly all-out war
with the United States? Whatever their faults, Chinese leaders are not suicidal. Yet, some experts argue that a clear declarative policy statement is
unnecessary and “passé.” According to that thesis, China has been told in no uncertain terms in various private meetings of the U.S. commitment
to defend Taiwan so, they argue, it is already being deterred from taking action against Taiwan.
*** IMPACT
Turns Case---War
Taiwan prolif causes war with China – no deterrence gains
Hunzeker and Lanoszka 18 ---- Michael A. Hunzeker is an assistant professor at the Schar School
of Policy and Government (George Mason University), former postdoctoral research associate and
lecturer in public affairs (Princeton University), Ph.D. in Public Affairs (Princeton University), Master’s
Degree in Public Affairs (Princeton University), B.A. in political science (University of California,
Berkeley), Alexander Lanoszka is an assistant professor (University of Waterloo), former US Foreign
Policy and International Security Fellow (Dartmouth University), former Stanton Nuclear Security
Postdoctoral Fellow (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), M.A. and Ph.D. in Politics (Princeton
University), and B.A. in IR (University of Windsor), A Question of Time: Enhancing Taiwan’s
Conventional Deterrence Posture, Center for Security Policy Studies, Schar School of Policy and
Government (George Mason University), November, http://csps.gmu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/A-
Question-of-Time.pdf
The second thought concerns the very desirability of pursuing a conventional military strategy. Some readers might conclude from this monograph that the
balance of power is so hopeless for Taiwan that Chinese victory is inevitable. As such, the nuclear weapons option ought to receive
consideration. Such assessments would be terribly wrong , however. The worst thing that Taiwan could do is to
reopen the nuclear question. To begin with, Taiwan would be unable to reconstitute a nuclear weapons program in
secret. Throughout the 1960s and the 1970s, Washington was aware of Taiwanese efforts to procure sensitive nuclear
technologies. In 1987, a double agent informed the intelligence community in the United States of Taiwanese activities.253 The likelihood that this sort of
intelligence experience would repeat itself, whether with a Chinese or U.S. double agent, is high . Disclosure of this program would
almost certainly provoke the very thing that the nuclear weapons would purportedly seek to deter : a
Chinese military attack . Even if Taiwan were somehow to succeed in secretly developing nuclear
weapons, it would have to disclose those capabilities eventually in order to realize their deterrent benefits.
Yet such a gesture would still be profoundly destabilizing because Chinese decision-makers would
probably feel intense domestic pressure to use military force before Taiwan acquires reliable delivery
vehicles or a survivable second-strike capability. Worsening this situation is that Taiwan would remain highly
vulnerable precisely because it chose to neglect its own defenses. A robust conventional military posture is
thus the safer and more prudent posture for Taiwan because it will not encourage such dynamics.
Asian Prolif---A2: Inev
Not inevitable and not an answer – speed and severity clearly matter, and security
assurances allow more stable proliferation
Beyond identifying which factors seem to make assurances more or less effective in proliferation, these cases
provide a number of additional insights. The first is that, even in circumstances where proliferation is highly
likely (such as in the British case), policymakers’ actions can still have an effect in either slowing or
catalyzing proliferation . In the British case, given the likelihood that the UK would develop an independent nuclear capability,
it is perhaps surprising that the U.S. could have a substantial influence on the program. Yet U.S. actions,
especially with the Quebec Agreement and the McMahon Act, clearly did. This suggests that U.S.
policymakers should not automatically assume that credible security assurances will be unable to work
in hard cases. Second, in circumstances where proliferation is possible, though not as likely as in the U.K. case, U.S. security
assurances can be even more influential . As the South Korean episode illustrates, the credibility of the
U.S. commitment directly influenced South Korea’s decision to pursue – and then forgo – nuclear
weapons.
Asian Prolif---A2: No Domino
Domino theory empirically verifiable and logical because of the three-fold motives for
proliferation – ‘64 Chinese testing
School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs), PhD in Political Science (MIT), “Nuclear
Dominoes: A Self-Defeating Prophecy?” Security Studies, Volume 23, Issue 1, Accessed via Taylor &
Francis Online **Modified for ableist language
Is the nuclear domino theory historically valid? Despite its longstanding centrality to thinking on nuclear proliferation amongst scholars and
policymakers, in recent years a revisionist consensus has emerged in opposition to this traditional view. Based on an analysis of historical
evidence from the aftermath of the 1964 Chinese nuclear test, this article argues that scholars have gone too far in
rejecting the nuclear domino theory. Reactive proliferation has been more prevalent than commonly believed,
and while it is true that only India acquired a nuclear arsenal in response to the Chinese test, to a significant extent this is
precisely because the U nited S tates was aware of the danger of reactive proliferation and worked to stop it. Finally, the
historical evidence suggests that the nuclear domino theory is compatible with both domestic and prestige
motivations for proliferation in addition to the security motives normally associated with the theory. When one state acquires nuclear weapons, do
other states inevitably follow? The belief in the affirmative (hereafter termed the nuclear domino theory) was once an article of
faith among world leaders and analysts of nuclear proliferation. In the last decade, however, a growing chorus of scholars has attacked the validity
of the nuclear domino theory from a diverse array of methodological and theoretical perspectives. 1 The goal of this article is to contest this emerging revisionist
consensus. More specifically, the article advances three primary claims: (1) that reactive
proliferation behavior in the form of nuclear exploration and pursuit
has been more common than recent scholarship has acknowledged; (2) that, contrary to common belief, the nuclear
domino theory is compatible with a multicausal approach to proliferation, embracing security, domestic, and normative motivations;
and (3) most importantly, that US nonproliferation policy has played a central role in rendering nuclear domino predictions self-defeating.
Asian Prolif---A2: No Extinction
It only takes 50 nukes to cause extinction- and all of them would hit cities
multiplying smoke yields
Baum 15 (10/14, Seth Baum leads the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute’s planning and management
and contributes to GCRI’s research. He is also a Research Scientist at the Blue Marble Space Institute of
Science and an Affiliate Researcher at the Columbia University Center for Research on Environmental
Decisions. He holds a Ph.D. in Geography from Pennsylvania State University (2012), an M.S. in
Electrical Engineering from Northeastern University (2006), and B.S. degrees in Optics and Applied
Mathematics from the University of Rochester (2003)., Futures 72: 69-79,
http://www.sethbaum.com/ac/2015_Winter.pdf)
2. Reducing the Probability of Nuclear War Nuclear winter cannot happen without a sizable nuclear war. A single nuclear weapon
would not produce enough smoke to cause significant nuclear winter effects—hence there was no nuclear winter following the Hiroshima and
Nagasaki bombings. A lower bound for the number of nuclear weapons needed to cause nuclear winter has not
been established, and at any rate would depend on the weapons’ yield and how much flammable material is in the vicinity of
their detonation, among other factors. Recent research finds significant nuclear winter effects from an India-Pakistan
nuclear war involving 100 weapons (50 per side) of 15 kiloton yield dropped on major cities (Mills et al. 2014). Until
further research has been conducted, a lower bound of 50 total weapons may be appropriate for ensuring a
sufficiently small probability of permanent civilization collapse .2
Asian Prolif---A2: No War
Asian prolif causes nuclear war
Stephen J. Cimbala 15, Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University
Brandywine, The New Nuclear Disorder: Challenges to Deterrence and Strategy, 2015, pp. 59-63
the possibility of inadvertent

Although the construct or policy option of a preventive nuclear war became institutionally unthinkable in Washington and in Moscow,
nuclear war or escalation to nuclear from conventional war was very real during the Cold War . This legacy
has carried forward into the post-Cold War and twenty-first century world. The term “inadvertent” means something other than
“accidental” war, such as the possibility of a test misfire or other technology failure that leads to a war. Inadvertent nuclear war is the result of an
unforeseen combination of human and technical factors , pulling both sides in a nuclear crisis over the brink despite their shared interest in avoiding
war.¶ The likelihood of inadvertent nuclear war between two states is based on their political intentions, military capabilities, approaches to crisis management, the personalities of leaders,
standard operating procedures for the management of nuclear forces during peacetime and in crisis, and other variables.16 A decision for nuclear preemption is so irrevocable that leaders will
inside dope on the opponent’s political thinking
want as much intelligence as possible relative to the plans and actions of their opponent. Unfortunately,
and military planning may be hard to come by, under the exigent pressures of crisis. Therefore, states may infer
the other side’s intentions from the disposition of its forces, from the behavior of its command, control,
communications and intelligence systems, or from guesswork based on past experience.¶ For example: during Able
Archer 83, a NATO command and communications exercise testing procedures for the release of alliance nuclear weapons in November 1983, there was an apparent mind set among some Soviet
intelligence officials that led them to conclude (temporarily) that the exercise might be the “real thing”: an actual set of preparatory moves for NATO nuclear release and a possible first strike
against Soviet forces and installations in Europe.17 The pessimistic Soviet interpretations of Able Archer were not universally shared among their intelligence officers, but some of the alarmism
arose from Soviet military doctrine that foresaw the conversion of an exercise simulating an attack into a real attack as one possible path to war.18¶ Another example of the difficulty of reading
the other side’s intentions during a crisis occurred during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. A second letter from Khrushchev to Kennedy on October 27, more demanding in its terms for
settlement compared to an earlier letter the previous day, caused some ExComm deliberators to wonder whether Khrushchev had been overruled by a hostile faction of the Soviet Presidium.
Robert Kennedy noted that “The change in the language and tenor of the letters from Khrushchev indicated confusion within the Soviet Union, but there was confusion among us as well.”19
Fortunately, in both the NATO “Able Archer” exercise and in the Cuban crisis, the most pessimistic assumptions were proved incorrect before leaders could act on them.¶ A post-Cold War
example of a scenario for inadvertent nuclear war occurred in January 1995 during the launch of a Norwegian scientific rocket for the purpose of studying the Aurora borealis. The initial phase of
the rocket’s trajectory resembled that of a ballistic missile launched from a nuclear submarine and possibly headed for Russian territory. Russian early warning systems detected the launch and
passed the information to military headquarters. Russian President Boris Yeltsin, the defense minister and the chief of the Russian general staff were connected via their emergency
communication network, and the Russian President for the first time opened his secure briefcase or “football” with nuclear codes for launch authorization. The crisis passed when the rocket
trajectory eventually veered away from any possible threat to Russia. The operational misinterpretation of the Norwegian rocket launch was made possible by an earlier bureaucratic mistake.
Norwegian officials had notified the Russian foreign ministry well in advance of the launch date that the rocket test was scheduled and of its mission. For unknown reasons, the Russian foreign
ministry failed to pass that information to the defense ministry or other military headquarters in time to avoid confusion.¶ The Future: Issues of Concern¶If the possibility
existed of a mistaken preemption during and immediately after the Cold War, between the experienced
nuclear forces and command systems of America and Russia, then it may be a matter of even more
concern with regard to states with newer and more opaque forces and command systems . In addition, the
Americans and Soviets (and then Russians) had a great deal of experience getting to know one another’s military
operational proclivities and doctrinal idiosyncrasies: including those that might influence the decision for or against war.¶ Another consideration, relative to nuclear
stability in the present century, is that the Americans and their NATO allies shared with the Soviets and Russians a commonality of culture and historical experience. Future threats to
American or Russian security from weapons of mass destruction may be presented by states or non-state actors motivated by cultural
and social predispositions not easily understood by those in the West nor subject to favorable
manipulation during a crisis.¶ The spread of nuclear weapons in Asia (including those parts of the Middle East with geostrategic
proximity or reach into Asia) presents a complicated mosaic of possibilities in this regard . States with nuclear forces of variable
force structure, operational experience, and command-control systems will be thrown into a matrix of
complex political, social and cultural cross-currents contributory to the possibility of war. In addition to the
existing nuclear powers in Asia, others may seek nuclear weapons if they feel threatened by regional rivals or hostile alliances.
Containment of nuclear proliferation in Asia is a desirable political objective for all of the obvious reasons. Nevertheless, the present century is unlikely to see
the nuclear hesitancy or risk aversion that marked the Cold War : in part, because the military and political discipline imposed by the Cold
War superpowers no longer exists, but also because states in Asia have new aspirations for regional or global respect. 20¶ The spread of
ballistic missiles and other nuclear capable delivery systems in Asia, or in the Middle East with reach into Asia, is especially dangerous because plausible adversaries
live close together and are already engaged in ongoing disputes about territory or other issues. The Cold War
Americans and Soviets required missiles and airborne delivery systems of intercontinental range to strike at one another’s vitals. But short range ballistic missiles or fighter-bombers suffice for
India and Pakistan to launch attacks at one another with potentially “strategic” effects. China shares borders with Russia, North Korea, India and Pakistan; Russia, with China and North Korea;
The short flight times of ballistic missiles between the cities or military forces of
India, with Pakistan and China; Pakistan, with India and China; and so on.¶
means that very little time will be available for warning and attack assessment by the
contiguous states
defender. Conventionally armed missiles could easily be mistaken for a tactical nuclear first use. Fighter-bombers appearing
over the horizon could just as easily be carrying nuclear weapons as conventional ordnance. In addition to the challenges posed by shorter flight times and uncertain weapons loads,
potential victims of nuclear attack in Asia may also have first strike vulnerable forces and command-
control systems that increase decision pressures for rapid, and possibly mistaken, retaliation .¶ This
potpourri of possibilities challenges conventional wisdom about nuclear deterrence and proliferation on
the part of policy makers and academic theorists. For policy makers in the United States and NATO, spreading nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in Asia
could profoundly shift the geopolitics of mass destruction from a European center of gravity (in the twentieth century) to an Asian and/or Middle
Eastern center of gravity (in the present century).21 This would profoundly shake up prognostications to the effect that wars of mass
destruction are now passé, on account of the emergence of the “Revolution in Military Affairs” and its encouragement of information-based warfare.22 Together with this,
there has emerged the argument that large scale war between states or coalitions of states, as opposed to varieties of unconventional warfare and failed states, are exceptional and potentially
obsolete.23 The spread of WMD and ballistic missiles in Asia could overturn these expectations for the obsolescence or marginalization of major interstate warfare.
Asian Prolif---A2: No War---Structural Checks
Structural checks on conflict don’t apply to Northeast Asia
Andrew O’Neil 13, Sep 2 2013, Asia, the US and Extended Nuclear Deterrence: Atomic Umbrellas in
the Twenty-First Century, p 31-32, google books
Northeast Asia is the least developed of all Asia's sub-regions in terms of identity and institutions. 12 This is despite
the deepening economic interdependence among sub-regional states (with the notable exception of North Korea). Trade between northeast
Asian states has been growing steadily since the 1997 regional economic crisis. Countries have increasingly critical direct investments, exemplified
by the large-scale Japanese and South Korean investment in the information technology production networks in the Pearl River Delta, the Yangtze River Delta,
and the Bohai—Yellow Sea region. 3 While economic relations are very warm among northeast Asia's states, political relations are
distant and cold , which has major implications for security dynamics in this sub-region. Territorial disputes
run deep in this part of Asia and multilateral institutions have played almost no role in mitigating
security dilemmas between states. Talk of a Northeast Asian Security Dialogue gained little traction in the 1990s and the Six Party Talks have failed to deliver any real
outcomes in achieving effective confidence-building measures, let alone placing any meaningful constraints on North Korea's nuclear program. Any sustained dialogue between sub-regional
states on the security challenges engendering mistrust has proven elusive. Ironically, the most substantive dialogue between China, Japan, and South Korea has taken place under the rubric of a
Inter-Korean and inter-Chinese tensions, which were deliberately fanned by the superpowers during the Cold War,
southeast Asia-based institution, ASEAN-+3.
have inhibited any meaningful resolution of outstanding territorial issues in northeast Asia.
Japan Prolif---A2: Inev
Prolif limited now because of credible US security guarantees – aff alters that
stability
Is nuclear proliferation inevitable? Trump’s logic for this idea is based on his belief that the U nited S tates is weak
[constrained] and that past proliferation ensures future proliferation. Here’s what Trump told the Times about Japan: “If the United States
keeps on … its current path of weakness, [Japan is] going to want to have [nuclear weapons] anyway with or without me discussing it.” Trump also implied
that So uth Ko rea and Japan would inexorably seek nuclear weapons — regardless of what the U nited S tates does — because so
many countries have already gone nuclear. As he said to Anderson Cooper: “It’s only a question of time. … You have so many [nuclear] countries
already.” But as we show in a number of research articles , those assumptions don’t match the historical record.
For the past 70 years , through mutually reinforcing policies — including security guarantees , troop
deployments, arms sales, nuclear umbrellas and sanctions threats — U.S. administrations from both parties have inhibited nuclear
prolif eration. When another country built nuclear weapons, the U nited S tates limited the repercussions by
discouraging that country from conducting nuclear tests.
Japan Prolif---A2: No Prolif---Constitution
Political support exists for constitutional revision – new voters, youth support and
political allies
Harney 15 ---- Stephen, syndicated columnist focused on Japan writing from Forbes, M.A. in
International Economics (Johns Hopkins SAIS), B.A. in Political Science and Government (San Diego
State University-California State University), “How to 'Meet China Halfway' In Managing Japan-China
and U.S.-Japan Security Relations,” 6/29, http://www.forbes.com/sites/stephenharner/2015/06/29/how-to-
meet-china-halfway-in-managing-japan-china-and-u-s-japan-security-relations/#f446cc64e44d
Last week, the Diet’s Upper House passed legislation lower the minimum voting age for Japanese from 20 to 18. By this act,
Japanese politics will gain some 2.4 million new potential voters, all eligible to vote in next summer’s important upper
House of Councillors elections. Abe’s conservative/nationalistic Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), now seeking to ally with
the similarly nationalistic Osaka-based Japan Restoration Party led by Osaka mayor Hashimoto Toru, hope to enlist these new
voters to elect to the Upper House delegates who will support Abe’s proposal to revise the constitution to, most
importantly, remove Article 9 ‘s prohibitions on maintaining armies and making war. It is undoubtedly true that Abe’s LDP
and other parties aiming to revise the constitution have conducted polls and otherwise discerned that younger voters will
be more inclined to support revision than has been true among voters to date.
Japan Prolif---A2: No Prolif---Cost
Japan has the money and tech to nuclearize
McMaken 15 [Ryan, Ryan W. McMaken is the editor of Mises Wire and The Austrian. He has degrees
in economics and political science from the University of Colorado, “Japan Gets Ready for More Military
Spending”, 8/7, https://mises.org/library/japan-gets-ready-more-military-spending, MSCOTT]
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has been pressing for more military spending in Japan, in what critics claim is a violation of
Japan’s so-called pacifist constitution. Foreign Policy reports: In January, the government of conservative Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe endorsed a defense
budget of nearly 5 trillion yen , or $42 billion , continuing a three-year growth trend after nearly a decade of decline.
The sum still represents a small portion of Japan’s GDP — it accounts for just one percent of it, according to the World Bank — but because offensive military action is prohibited by Japan’s
Japan Has a Big Military Already We often speak of the Japanese military as if it were some sort of skeleton
constitution, even a modest increase is controversial.
crew of caretakers. This is not the case at all. Japan spends more on its military than India, for instance, which is in an arms
race with Pakistan and has many border issues with which to deal. Indeed, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Japan is the number-seven
country in terms of military spending, placing it ahead of hot-spot countries like Israel and South Korea.
The IISS estimates that Japan’s military spending is $47 billion, compared to Russia’s $70 billion and China's $129 billion. (The US, of course, spends far more than everyone else with $581
billion.) So, we find that Japan’s military is hardly insignificant. Yes, Russia has a larger military, but Russian military might is primarily directed toward Eastern Europe, thousands of miles
away, and China has many neighbors other than Japan to deal with, and it has a much larger territory that does not enjoy the natural defensive advantage of being an island nation. Moreover,
everyone knows that Japan could build deliverable nuclear weapons very quickly if necessary, and it
has access to some of the best military technology in the world.
Japan Prolif---A2: No Prolif---Public
Their evidence assumes the status quo – Pacifism only exists because of credible
assurances
Beauchamp 16 ---- Zack, former commentator at the Center for American Progress Action Fund,
syndicated World Correspondent based at Vox, former Research Associate at the Uehiro Centre for
Practical Ethics (University of Oxford), MSc in International Relations (The London School of
Economics and Political Science), B.A. in Political Science and Philosophy (Brown University),
“Trump’s Comments on Japanese Nukes are Worrisome — Even by Trump Standards,” 3/31,
http://www.vox.com/2016/3/31/11339040/trump-nukes-japan-south-korea
East Asian security is a very delicate balance between several competing military powers, but it's stable due in large part
to political choices made by the regional powers and the U nited S tates for the past 70 years. After Japan's defeat in World
War II, the country's new constitution declared that the country would be officially pacifist, meaning its military would be limited to
self-defense only. While the constitution was imposed by the US occupation forces, this was also an earnest expression of Japan's postwar regret.
This also played out in Japan's rejection of nuclear weapons, which was rooted as well in its experience of having
suffered two nuclear bombings during the war. "Japan, as a country, has deep-seated anti-nuclear sentiment, based on the variety of
experiences they've had with this technology," Lind explains. Over time, Japan's nuclear taboo might have waned , scholars
say, if not for its mutual defense treaty with the U nited S tates. As part of that treaty, the US pledged its own nuclear
weapons to Japan's defense, meaning Japan had little reason to consider developing its own weapons — even as
the nearby Soviet Union and China and, much later, No rth Ko rea joined the nuclear club. "At various times,
Japanese leaders have seriously considered developing a nuclear arsenal," Nick Miller, a professor at Brown University
who studies nuclear proliferation, explains. "Every time, they concluded it's not in their interests. ... The US security
guarantee/US nuclear umbrella provides for their security without them having nuclear weapons." This goes to show
the importance of America's role in protecting Japan from having to defend itself, which might lead it to desire
nuclear weapons . Though the vast majority of Japanese oppose developing nuclear weapons — 80 percent, according to a
2006 poll — it's at least possible these numbers could shift absent US military support.
Japan Prolif---A2: No Prolif---Tech
Japan could build a bomb in months
Rayne 16 (Sierra, national security writer and analyst, “Japan's security concerns and the need for a
revitalized U.S. nuclear deterrent,” 3/20/16,
http://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2016/03/japans_security_concerns_and_the_need_for_a_revitalize
d_us_nuclear_deterrent.html)
any significant change in the

Exchanging basing rights for security and protection under the U.S. deterrence umbrella after WWII,
United States' commitment to maintaining its nuclear deterrence structure would have profound implications
for Japan's defense policy. A strengthened U.S.-China relationship and the ongoing buildup of nuclear weapons capacity by North
Korea may call into question whether the U.S. will continue to exert dominance in East Asia to the extent needed to adequately defend Japanese
interests. Japan began researching nuclear weapons development during WWII. Today, with one of the world's
most advanced civilian nuclear power programs and a highly technologically sophisticated society ,
many believe that Japan could develop nuclear weapons in a matter of months should it choose to do so. Despite being a
non-nuclear state, Japan has long been committed to developing and maintaining a full-spectrum fuel cycle capability.
The Rokkasho reprocessing facility is due to come online in 2016 and will be capable of producing eight tons of
weapons-grade plutonium annually. Japan already has 48 tons of plutonium stockpiled and a defense and space industry capable of
producing advanced delivery systems. As China gets ever more expansive in its territorial ambitions, and North Korea continues to flex its
military muscle, other Asian countries are put on the defensive over issues that may be unlikely to trigger the extended deterrence promised by
If the U.S.-Japan alliance weakens , for example as a result of closer U.S.-China ties or a softening of the negotiating
the U.S.
position on North Korea's denuclearization, it
may strengthen the argument of advocates pushing for Japan to develop its
own independent deterrence.
Japan Prolif---A2: No War
Japan prolif causes war – defense falsely relies on empirics from a different bipolar
world
-MAD doesn’t make sense with emerging nuclear states (no full destruction)
-Increased avenues to conflict in increasingly multipolar world
-East Asia most likely because of territorial disputes and unpredictable actors
A new nuclear-arms race, moreover, could be even riskier than the one Reagan and others worked so hard to end. In retrospect,
the Cold War standoff between two massive, nuclear-armed superpowers offered some stability; among other things,
the fact that the U nited S tates and the Soviet Union could destroy each other, or any other challenger, in a nuclear
confrontation ended up preventing either side from using nuclear weapons. Global alliances were structured in a bipolar
system, with smaller powers picking one side or the other, which meant fewer possible avenues for conflict. But that world
came to an end when the Cold War finished. We now live in a multipolar world that is, in many ways, a more dangerous
one. Former Secretaries of State Kissinger and George Shultz, former Secretary of Defense William Perry, and Senator Sam Nunn
warned in 2011 that “the growing number of nations with nuclear arms and differing motives, aims and
ambitions poses very high and unpredictable risks and increased instability.” One particularly risky and
region right now is East Asia, where competing territorial claims and an unpredictable No rth Ko rea threaten to
flare into conflict . If Japan, which is revising its pacifist post-World War II foreign policy toward a more assertive one, or
South Korea, where there is broad popular support for weaponization , go nuclear, the chances grow for a regional arms race
—and for nuclear war .
South Korea Prolif---A2: No Prolif---Cost
No economic constraints
Ferguson 15 (Charles, President of the Federation of American Scientists, 5/5/15, “How South Korea
Could Acquire and Deploy Nuclear Weapons,” http://npolicy.org/books/East_Asia/Ch4_Ferguson.pdf)
First, South Korea has become one of the most globalized nations in the world with one of the largest
economies, supplying coveted goods (such as electronic products made by Samsung and LG Corporation) to markets around the
world, especially to the United States. This argues against South Korea acquiring nuclear weapons because it
would jeopardize its economy due to the resulting international sanctions. On the other hand, South Korea would
most likely weather the storm of sanctions considering the precedent of India. In May 1998, India
conducted nuclear explosive tests and was then sanctioned. But the sanctions did not last much longer than a year.
While India was not producing many coveted goods at that time, its huge population offered an enticing market and, as a democracy,
was seen by the United States as an important counter to communist China’s rising military strength . In the case
of South Korea, it has a tiny population compared to India, but most of its people are relatively wealthy and take part in a
vibrant democracy, and as mentioned, many South Korean companies create goods that Americans want to
consume. Thus, the sanctions would likely be pro forma and be removed after a period of a few to several
months .
South Korea Prolif---A2: No Prolif---Means
SoKo has the means – civilian energy and scientific desire
Ahn 14 ---- Mun Suk, lecturer in international politics and North Korean studies (Hanseo University in
South Korea), former leader of the Korean Broadcasting System's diplomacy and security affairs
coverage, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and Diplomacy (Chonbuk National
University, South Korea), “A Nuclear South Korea?” International Journal, 69.1, DOI:
10.1177/0020702013518495, SAGE
The Seoul government fully understands the reasons against a nuclear South Korea and often reaffirms its desire for direct denuclearization talks
with the North. This has been consistent government policy. So uth Ko rea is equipped with the technical and industrial
capacity to produce nuclear warheads within a few years of any decision to go nuclear.12 The South is the
world‘s fifth-largest producer of atomic energy, and it has not suffered a nuclear accident since the
beginning of nuclear energy production in 1978. The literature on nuclearization does not derive consistent predictions from these
circumstances. On the one hand, the theory that states equipped with cutting-edge nuclear technology tend to be nuclear-armed would point to the
likelihood that Seoul will go nuclear. However, motivational theory, which emphasizes incentives and intentions, rather than technology, in
relation to nuclear armament, leads to the opposite conclusion. In fact, the South has the capability , but not the intention to go
nuclear. Two further issues related to the South’s going nuclear remain unresolved: the transfer of wartime operational control and the prestige of
the scientific community. The US is scheduled to transfer wartime operational control to South Korea in December 2015, according to the South
Korea–US agreement. South Korean conservatives have been worrying that the subsequent dissolution of the South Korea-US Combined Forces
Command will undermine the South’s national defence. The concern is likely to grow as the date of the transfer approaches and may buttress the
argument for Seoul’s nuclear armament. At the same time, scientists may argue that further developments in technology
and scientific knowledge will enhance the prestige of the South Korean scientific community. In the case of
India’s nuclear development, the scientific community was motivated to produce nuclear weapons in order to
demonstrate its capabilities .13 In So uth Ko rea, the uranium enrichment experiment in 2000 was attributed to
several scientists’ desire to confirm their capabilities . Nuclear technology in South Korea is constantly
developing and scientists’ desire to increase their prestige may become a factor in the debate.
South Korea Prolif---A2: No Prolif---Motive
South Korea would proliferate – fear of NoKo and China
South Korea plays a central role in current debates about allied nuclear
An added benefit of our case selection is that
proliferation. Along with Japan, U.S. policymakers focused on security dynamics in East Asia are concerned with
South Korea’s potential proliferation activity in response to aggressive postures taken by North Korea and
China. Providing policymakers with an understanding of the role that previous security assurances played
in preventing South Korea from developing nuclear weapons may aid them in making contemporary
assurances more effective.
South Korea Prolif---A2: No Prolif---Politics
Public supports prolif given lacking assurances – polls and empirics
-Fear of nuke encirclement and US protection only works if its credible, which plan trashes
Beauchamp 16 ---- Zack, former commentator at the Center for American Progress Action Fund,
syndicated World Correspondent based at Vox, former Research Associate at the Uehiro Centre for
Practical Ethics (University of Oxford), MSc in International Relations (The London School of
Economics and Political Science), B.A. in Political Science and Philosophy (Brown University),
“Trump’s Comments on Japanese Nukes are Worrisome — Even by Trump Standards,” 3/31,
http://www.vox.com/2016/3/31/11339040/trump-nukes-japan-south-korea
So uth Ko rea, like Japan, is surrounded by nuclear powers, and like Japan it has not developed its own nukes, in part
because it is under US protection. But the nuclear taboo is not quite as strong there — one poll found 68
percent support developing nuclear weapons, though another found only 53 percent support — and in the 1970s the country had a
short-lived covert nuclear program.
South Korea Prolif---A2: No Prolif---Taboo
This time is different
-2/3 people supported it in a recent survey
-Answers no public government statement and nuclear taboo
Kwon 13 ---- K.J., Producer for CNN’s Seoul bureau, former Open Source Intelligence Analyst at
Korea Defense Intelligence Command, B.S. (Peking University), “Under threat, South Koreans Mull
Nuclear Weapons,” CNN – World, 3/18, http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/18/world/asia/south-korea-
nuclear/
The barrage of threats from North Korea has sparked talk from within South Korea of the need to
develop its own nuclear weapons . A recent poll shows that two-thirds of South Korean citizens
surveyed support the idea, especially in the wake of North Korea's third nuclear test in February. "We, the Korean people, have
been duped by North Korea for the last 20 to 30 years and it is now time for South Koreans to face the reality
and do something that we need to do," said Chung Mong-joon, a lawmaker in the governing Saenuri (New Frontier) Party
and a former presidential conservative candiate. "The nuclear deterrence can be the only answer . We have to have
nuclear capability ." The talk of South Korea arming with its own nuclear weapon used to be taboo in the country-- and
there's no apparent official government move to do so. But the tensions between the two Korean nations
have amplified over the weeks, becoming reminiscent of the Cold War . Earlier this month, South Korean
Defense Ministry spokesman Kim Min-seok responded to North Korea's threat to attack the South with a pre-emptive
nuclear strike saying: "If North Korea is to attack the South with its nuclear weapons... Kim Jong Un's regime
will cease to exist on the face of Earth." After North Korea conducted its third nuclear test last month,
the South unveiled a cruise missile, which it claims to be so precise that it can target "a specific window of a North Korean military
commander's office." Some commentators in South Korean media have been calling for a nuclear weapons
option, claiming that the country has the technology and economy to develop them in a short period of
time. And public opinion is following in line . According to a February poll conducted by South Korea's private
think tank, Asan Institute, 66% of South Koreans said they support developing a nuclear weapons program . The
poll suggests that just under half of South Koreans in 2012 believed that the United States would provide South Korea with what's known as the
"nuclear umbrella" in the case of a North Korean nuclear attack, indicating a 7% decrease from 2011. Under the nuclear umbrella,
the U.S. is to provide South Korea with defensive means to ensure deterrence
against a nuclear threat.
South Korea Prolif---A2: No Prolif---Tech
They have all the technical foundations
Ferguson 15 (Charles, President of the Federation of American Scientists, 5/5/15, “How South Korea
Could Acquire and Deploy Nuclear Weapons,” http://npolicy.org/books/East_Asia/Ch4_Ferguson.pdf)
Essential components for any successful nuclear warhead design include highspeed electronic triggers to
signal the detonations of high-energy conventional explosives, the ability to shape the high-energy explosives, and of course,
the capacity to manufacture reliable high-energy explosives. Advanced computers would also be helpful but
not necessary given the fact that the earliest nuclear warheads did not require such computers; nonetheless, South Korea has very
advanced computers . The other components are truly necessary, and South Korea has them available
and could most likely readily adapt their non-nuclear applications to nuclear weapons use.
South Korea Prolif---A2: No War
SoKo prolif causes nuke war – even hedging causes NoKo preemptive strikes
But that world came to an end when the Cold War finished. We now live in a multipolar world that is, in many ways, a more dangerous one. Former Secretaries of
State Kissinger and George Shultz, former Secretary of Defense William Perry, and Senator Sam Nunn warned in 2011 that “the growing number of nations with
nuclear arms and differing motives, aims and ambitions poses very high and unpredictable risks and increased instability.” One particularly risky and region right now
If Japan, which is revising its pacifist post-World
is East Asia, where competing territorial claims and an unpredictable North Korea threaten to flare into conflict.
War II foreign policy toward a more assertive one, or So uth Ko rea, where there is broad popular support for weaponization,
go nuclear, the chances grow for a regional arms race— and for nuclear war . One possibility, as Mark Fitzpatrick of
the International Institute for Strategic Studies noted: “ No rth Ko rea might be tempted to launch a preemptive attack at a time when
the U.S. defense commitment [to South Korea] might no longer apply.” But even “short of this worst-case
scenario, rather than negotiate disarmament, No rth Ko rea more likely would claim the South’s actions as a justification for
stepping up its own nuclear program.”
Taiwan Prolif---A2: No Prolif---Means
They’d have an arsenal in less than two years
Asia’s Nuclear Arena: Hedging And Deterring, Interview with the Diplomat, 3/9,
http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/asias-nuclear-arena-hedging-and-deterring/)
Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are latent

nuclear powers in that their advanced nuclear energy programs and
rocket technologies provide capabilities that could be applied to weapons development. If judged
necessary for national survival, they could build nuclear weapons in perhaps two years – or less in Japan’s case
because it already possesses uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technologies. Beyond latency, Japan employs a quasi-hedging
strategy, which is defined as latency with intent. In Japan’s case, the hedging is “quasi” because the nuclear capabilities were developed primarily
for economic reasons. Nuclear hedging was a secondary purpose. Over the years, Japanese officials have often noted that the facilities provide a
future weapons option, although saying so publicly was also a means of creating diplomatic leverage with the U.S. to encourage Washington to
strengthen its security guarantees. Many South Koreans want the same reprocessing and enrichment capabilities for a sense of equality with Japan
and to provide a nuclear hedge vis-à-vis North Korea. Taiwan is abandoning nuclear power altogether and no longer talks about a nuclear
hedge. But it probably keeps blueprints for the old weapons facilities in a cupboard somewhere.
Taiwan can prolif quickly and easily

Keck 14 (Zachary, formerly Managing Editor of The Diplomat where he authored The Pacific Realist
blog, Previously, he worked as Deputy Editor of e-International Relations and has interned at the Center
for a New American Security and in the U.S. Congress, where he worked on defense issues., Are
Taiwan’s Days Numbered?, http://thediplomat.com/2014/02/are-taiwans-days-numbered/)
Finally, I would not rule out the possibility that if China becomes too powerful, Taiwan might seek an independent nuclear
deterrent before it chooses the “Hong Kong strategy.” It would hardly be the first nation that acquired nuclear weapons to negate a rival’s
vastly superior military power because it couldn’t do so through conventional means alone. Furthermore, Taiwan has a fairly robust
civilian nuclear program that would make it easy—at least relative to some of the recent proliferators—to
acquire a nuclear arsenal. The real challenge would be trying to do so covertly since Beijing might attack Taiwan if it discovered the
island’s dash for the bomb.
Taiwan Prolif---A2: No Prolif---Motive
History proves motive
Reiter 14 (Dan, Samuel Candler Dobbs Professor of Political Science at Emory, Security Commitments
and Nuclear Proliferation*, Foreign Policy Analysis (2014) 10, 71-72)
South Korea and Taiwan may be the exceptions that prove the rule. They appear to have pursued nuclear weapons even in the
context of a third party security commitment because they perceived the credibility of that commitment
to be declining (for more on South Korea, see next section). Beyond this specific point, the results perhaps highlight the diplomatic and
geopolitical costs of nuclear acquisition, relative to nuclear pursuit. The results are consistent with the proposition that states pay higher costs
when they acquire nuclear weapons in comparison with pursuing nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons pursuit can occur in secret ,
virtually always in the realm of plausible deniability. Nuclear weapons acquisition, however, is usually a public
event, often a nuclear test. Common knowledge that a state has gone nuclear can mean higher costs , in terms of
diplomatic isolation, being targeted for economic sanctions and international opprobrium, and stimulating the nuclear programs
of rivals and neighbors. States may be less willing to pay those costs if foreign nuclear weapons deployments offer
the security benefits that an indigenous nuclear arsenal would provide . However, because the diplomatic and
geopolitical costs of nuclear weapons pursuit are lower, states may be more open to nuclear pursuit short of acquisition, even if American nuclear
forces have been deployed. This may have been the case for South Korea and Taiwan, two states that sought to pursue nuclear
arsenals secretly as hedges in the face of the decline in the credibility of the American security
guarantee .
Confidence in the US is the key variable

Copley 7 (Gregory, President of the International Strategic Studies Association, based in Washington,
DC, and Editor-in-Chief of the "Defense & Foreign Affairs" group of publications, including the
government-only intelligence service, the Global Information System, The New Asian Strategic Balance,
lexis)
* Consideration of strategic counter-strike capabilities. The

US has historically used all its efforts to ensure that the ROC
did not obtain either nuclear weapons or longer-range ballistic missile delivery systems as part of its deterrence of PRC strategic
power. The weakening US leverage over the ROC -- as Washington is seen more as a friend of Beijing
than of Taipei -- means that Taipei, over the longer term, must consider whether it should develop the ability to
ensure a sound deterrence of any PRC military adventurism. It is likely that the cost-effectiveness of an offensive strategic
weapons program, however, may be less than the development of sound defenses which could ensure that a PLA offensive is blunted.
New Mod---CBWs
Even if nuclear acquisition is tough, states will proliferate with chemical and
biological weapons
In the nuclear age, states facing acute external threats can adopt a range of policies to increase their
security, including developing nuclear weapons or allying with a state that possesses them .5
[CONTINUE TO FOOTNOTE #5] 5. States can also adopt a range of nonnuclear options; for a
discussion of biological and chemical weapons proliferation as a substitute for—or complement to—nuclear
proliferation, see Horowitz and Narang (2014).[END FOOTNOTE] Possessing nuclear weapons allows states to deter
adversaries with the threat of significant reprisal (Brodie 1974). But nuclear proliferation is a costly strategy. Nuclear weapons are technically
difficult to produce, require the establishment of expensive programs, can cause significant political rifts with allies, and may motivate rivals to
proliferate (Schwartz 1998; Oberdorfer 2001).
Bioweapons cause extinction

Matheny 7 (Jason, Department of Health Policy and Management, Bloomberg School of Public Health,
Johns Hopkins University, Reducing the Risk of Human Extinction, Risk Analysis, Volume 27, Issue 5)
Of current extinction risks , the most severe may be bioterrorism. The knowledge needed to engineer a virus
is modest compared to that needed to build a nuclear weapon; the necessary equipment and materials are
increasingly accessible and because biological agents are self-replicating , a weapon can have an
exponential effect on a population (Warrick, 2006; Williams, 2006). 5 Current U.S. biodefense efforts are funded at $5 billion per
year to develop and stockpile new drugs and vaccines, monitor biological agents and emerging diseases, and strengthen the capacities of local
health systems to respond to pandemics (Lam, Franco, & Shuler, 2006).
New Mod---Heg
Allied prolif kills heg – undermines US leverage, lets allies run wild, and questions
American influence
cage/wp/2016/04/06/should-more-countries-have-nuclear-weapons-donald-trump-thinks-so/ ***Modified
Reducing military commitments and letting allies build their own nuclear weapons might save money for the United States. But
i nternational r elations scholarship suggests that allied proliferation would have broader negative repercussions .
Among these would be declining U.S. influence . When nations gain their own military capabilities, they rely
less on their allies and become less subject to their sway. And that can undermine a senior partner’s ability to hold its
junior allies back from risky military actions. In other words, allowing or encouraging proliferation would worsen the
“American weakness” [decline] that Trump decries. Recent nonproliferation research underscores this proposition . Mark Bell
shows that nuclear allies are likely to become more independent of their patrons and in some cases can develop more
assertive foreign policies . And Francis Gavin and Matthew Kroenig show that the fear of declining influence was
one reason why most American administrations vigorously opposed the spread of nuclear weapons.
Every global hotpot goes nuclear and it triggers their impact by collapsing the
economy
Brands 15 – Hal Brands, PhD in International Relations, Faculty at the Sanford School of Public
Policy at Duke University and the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington
University, “Fools Rush Out? The Flawed Logic of Offshore Balancing”, Washington Quarterly, p. 7-28
The fundamental reason is that both U.S. influence and international stability are thoroughly interwoven with a
robust U.S. forward presence. Regarding influence, the protection that Washington has afforded its allies has
equally afforded the United States great sway over those allies’ policies .43 During the Cold War and after,
for instance, the United States has used the influence provided by its security posture to veto allies’ pursuit of
nuclear weapons, to obtain more advantageous terms in financial and trade agreements , and even to affect the
composition of allied nations’ governments.44 More broadly, it has used its alliances as vehicles for shaping political, security, and economic
agendas in key regions and bilateral relationships, thus giving the United States an outsized voice on a range of important issues. To be clear, this
influence has never been as pervasive as U.S. officials might like, or as some observers might imagine. But by any reasonable standard of
comparison, it has nonetheless been remarkable. One can tell a similar story about the relative stability of the post-war
order. As even some leading offshore balancers have acknowledged, the lack of conflict in regions like Europe in recent
decades is not something that has occurred naturally . It has occurred because the “American pacifier” has
suppressed precisely the dynamics that previously fostered geopolitical turmoil. That pacifier has limited
arms races and security competitions by providing the protection that allows other countries to under-
build their militaries. It has soothed historical rivalries by affording a climate of security in which
powerful countries like Germany and Japan could be revived economically and reintegrated into thriving
and fairly cooperative regional orders. It has induced caution in the behavior of allies and adversaries
alike, deterring aggression and dissuading other destabilizing behavior. As John Mearsheimer has noted, the United
States “effectively acts as a night watchman,” lending order to an otherwise disorderly and anarchical environment.45 What would
happen if Washington backed away from this role? The most logical answer is that both U.S. influence and global
stability would suffer. With respect to influence, the United States would effectively be surrendering the most
powerful bargaining chip it has traditionally wielded in dealing with friends and allies, and jeopardizing
the position of leadership it has used to shape bilateral and regional agendas for decades. The
consequences would seem no less damaging where stability is concerned . As offshore balancers have argued, it may
be that U.S. retrenchment would force local powers to spend more on defense, while perhaps assuaging certain points of friction with countries
that feel threatened or encircled by U.S. presence. But it equally stands to reason that removing the American pacifier would
liberate the more destabilizing influences that U.S. policy had previously stifled. Long-dormant security
competitions might reawaken as countries armed themselves more vigorously; historical antagonisms
between old rivals might reemerge in the absence of a robust U.S. presence and the reassurance it
provides. Moreover, countries that seek to revise existing regional orders in their favor —think Russia in
Europe , or China in Asia—might indeed applaud U.S. retrenchment, but they might just as plausibly feel empowered to
more assertively press their interests. If the United States has been a kind of Leviathan in key regions, Mearsheimer acknowledges,
then “take away that Leviathan and there is likely to be big trouble .”46 Scanning the global horizon today, one can
easily see where such trouble might arise. In Europe, a revisionist Russia is already destabilizing its
neighbors and contesting the post-Cold War settlement in the region. In the Gulf and broader Middle East,
the threat of Iranian ascendancy has stoked region-wide tensions manifesting in proxy wars and hints of
an incipient arms race, even as that region also contends with a severe threat to its stability in the form of
the Islamic State. In East Asia, a rising China is challenging the regional status quo in numerous ways,
sounding alarms among its neighbors—many of whom also have historical grievances against each other.
In these circumstances, removing the American pacifier would likely yield not low-cost stability, but increased
conflict and upheaval. That conflict and upheaval, in turn, would be quite damaging to U.S. interests even if it
did not result in the nightmare scenario of a hostile power dominating a key region. It is hard to imagine, for instance, that increased
instability and acrimony would produce the robust multilateral cooperation necessary to deal with
transnational threats from pandemics to piracy. More problematic still might be the economic
consequences . As scholars like Michael Mandelbaum have argued, the enormous progress toward global prosperity and
integration that has occurred since World War II (and now the Cold War) has come in the climate of relative
stability and security provided largely by the United States.47 One simply cannot confidently predict that this
progress would endure amid escalating geopolitical competition in regions of enormous importance to the
world economy. Perhaps the greatest risk that a strategy of offshore balancing would run , of course, is that a
key region might not be able to maintain its own balance following U.S. retrenchment . That prospect might have
seemed far-fetched in the early post-Cold War era, and it remains unlikely in the immediate future. But in East Asia particularly, the
rise and growing assertiveness of China has highlighted the medium- to long-term danger that a hostile
power could in fact gain regional primacy. If China’s economy continues to grow rapidly , and if Beijing
continues to increase military spending by 10 percent or more each year, then its neighbors will ultimately face grave
challenges in containing Chinese power even if they join forces in that endeavor . This possibility, ironically, is one
to which leading advocates of retrenchment have been attuned. “The United States will have to play a key role in countering China,” Mearshimer
writes, “because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves.”48 If this is true, however, then offshore balancing
becomes a dangerous and potentially self-defeating strategy . As mentioned above, it could lead countries like
Japan and South Korea to seek nuclear weapons , thereby stoking arms races and elevating regional
tensions. Alternatively, and perhaps more worryingly, it might encourage the scenario that offshore balancers seek to
avoid, by easing China’s ascent to regional hegemony. As Robert Gilpin has written, “Retrenchment by its very
nature is an indication of relative weakness and declining power, and thus retrenchment can have a
deteriorating effect on relations with allies and rivals .”49 In East Asia today, U.S. allies rely on U.S.
reassurance to navigate increasingly fraught relationships with a more assertive China precisely because
they understand that they will have great trouble balancing Beijing on their own . A significant U.S. retrenchment
might therefore tempt these countries to acquiesce to, or bandwagon with, a rising China if they felt that prospects for successful resistance were
diminishing as the United States retreated.50 In the same vein, retrenchment would compromise alliance relationships, basing agreements, and
other assets that might help Washington check Chinese power in the first place—and that would allow the United States to surge additional forces
into theater in a crisis. In sum, if one expects that Asian countries will be unable to counter China themselves, then reducing U.S. influence and
leverage in the region is a curious policy. Offshore balancing might promise to preserve a stable and advantageous environment while reducing
U.S. burdens. But upon closer analysis, the probable outcomes of the strategy seem more perilous and destabilizing than its proponents
acknowledge.
New Mod---Heg---A2: Heg Unsustainable
Heg is sustainable and solves great power war---no fill-in
Kagan 16 Robert, Senior Fellow, Project on International Order and Strategy at the Brookings
Institution, Why America Must Lead, Winter 2016, http://www.bushcenter.org/catalyst/leadership/why-
america-must-lead.html
The liberalworld order that was created in the aftermath of the Second World War is today being challenged by a variety of forces —
by powerful authoritarian
governments and anti-liberal fundamentalist movements , as well as by long-term shifts in the global
economy. Great power competition has returned . In Europe , Russia has launched the first cross-border
invasion of a neighboring country since World War II. In East Asia , China is expanding its reach as a military
power , seeking both economic and strategic hegemony at the risk of destabilizing that critical region. In the Middle
East, Iran is expanding its influence and Islamic jihadists have gained control of more territory . In the
face of this turmoil, many Americans have come to doubt whether there is anything the United States can do or should do in response. Many assume either that it
doesn’t matter very much what happens beyond America’s shores or that the United States no longer has the wisdom or capacity to shape events and prevent others
from doing what they please. Only seven years ago, pundits were talking of a “post-American world,” with a declining
United States and a remarkable “rise of the rest.” These days, however, that prognosis appears to have been at best
premature . Only seven years ago, pundits were talking of a “post-American world,” with a declining United States and a remarkable “rise of the rest.” These
days, however, that prognosis appears to have been at best premature. America has substantially recovered from the Great
Recession , while the once-heralded “rise of the rest” has stalled . Many around the world who once
decried American overseas involvement as “hegemonic” now seek greater American engagement in
international affairs. Widespread Support for US Actions Against ISIS Pew Research Center: Support for U.S. Actions against ISIS Among the
American public, too, there are signs of greater receptivity to a more active American global role . What is
missing for most Americans, however, is a sense of strategy and purpose in American foreign policy. During the Cold War, fear of the Soviet Union and international
communism did not always produce agreement on policy but did provide an answer, for most, as to why the United States needed to play an international role and
what that role should be. Today, our political leaders need to remind Americans that our fundamental interests are still
best served by upholding the world order — economic, political, and strategic — that was established at the end of the
Second World War and that was further strengthened and entrenched by the revolutions of 1989. Americans need to recognize their nation’s
central role in maintaining the present international order and muster the will to use their still formidable
power and influence to support that order against its inevitable challengers . Supporting Democracy is a Matter of National
Security What will this require? Above all, it means working to shore up all three pillars – politics, economics, security — of what has made
the American-led world order so remarkable. There is a tendency to separate politics, economics, and security — “ideals” from “interests,”
support for democracy from defense of security — but in the present world order they have all been related. Start with the reality that a world order that supports
freedom will only be supported by free nations. Supporting
democracy is not just a matter of keeping faith with our own values. It is a matter of
national security. Americans and other free peoples who benefit from and support the present world order therefore have an interest in supporting democracy
where it exists and in pressing for greater democratic reforms in the world’s authoritarian nations, including the two great power autocracies. Supporting democracy is
not just a matter of keeping faith with our own values. It is a matter of national security. In their economic policies, Americans need to continue
promoting and strengthening the international free trade and free market regime . This, of course, means setting
their own economy back on a course of sustainable growth. It means doing a better job of educating and training Americans to compete with others in an increasingly
competitive international economy. It means providing a healthy environment for technological innovation. But it also means
resisting protectionist
temptations and using American influence , along with other free-trading nations, to push back against some of the
tendencies of state capitalism in China and elsewhere . Gaining congressional approval of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, or TPP, and
then moving to agreement on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership with Europe, are critical, and not only for their economic benefits. They also are a
critical step in knitting the democratic world more closely together. But it also means resisting protectionist temptations and using American influence, along with
other free-trading nations, to push back against some of the tendencies of state capitalism in China and elsewhere. In Asia, especially, this is more much than a trade
issue. Although the United States stands to benefit from the agreement, it is, above all, a strategic issue. The
United States and China are locked
in a competition across the spectrum of power and influence. Militarily, the Chinese seek to deny
American access to the region and hope thereby to divide the United States from its allies . Economically,
China would like to turn Asia into a region of Chinese hegemony, where every key trade relationship is with Beijing. In such a world, the United States is a net loser
— providing costly security to allies but not much else, while China reaps the economic rewards and grabs the hearts and minds, and pocketbooks, of regional players.
Finally, there is the matter of American hard power . What has been true since the time of Rome remains true today: there can be
no world order without power to preserve it, to shape its norms, uphold its institutions, defend the
sinews of its economic system, and keep the peace . Military power can be abused, wielded unwisely and
ineffectively. It can be deployed to answer problems that it cannot answer or that have no answer. But it is also essential . No nation or group
of nations that renounced power could expect to maintain any kind of world order. If the United States begins
to look like a less reliable defender of the present order, that order will begin to unravel . It remains true today as
it has since the Second World War that only the United States has the capacity and the unique geographical
advantages to provide global security. There can be no stable balance of power in Europe or Asia
without the United States . And while we can talk about soft power and smart power, they have been and always will
be of limited value when confronting raw military power. Despite all of the loose talk of American decline, it is in the
military realm where U.S. advantages remain clearest . Even in other great power’s backyards, the United States retains
the capacity, along with its powerful allies, to deter challenges to the security order. But without a U.S. willingness to
play the role of providing balance in far-flung regions of the world, the system will buckle under the
unrestrained military competition of regional powers . Without a U.S. willingness to play the role of providing balance in far-
flung regions of the world, the system will buckle under the unrestrained military competition of regional powers. Today, as a result of the Budget Control Act and a
general unwillingness to spend adequately on defense, America’s ability to play this vital role is coming increasingly under question. Current defense spending has
created a readiness crisis within the armed forces. Only a handful of Army brigades are available for use in a crisis. The army is about to be forced to cut 40,000
soldiers from its active force. There are too few ships to provide a U.S. presence in the multiple hotspots that have sprouted up around the world. As the bipartisan,
congressionally-mandated National Defense Panel has argued, the
U.S. military must be able to deter or stop aggression in
multiple theaters, not just one, even when engaged in a large-scale war. It needs to be able to fight ISIS and deter Iran in
the Middle East, deter Russia in Europe and Syria, and in Asia deter North Korea and maintain
stability in the face of a rising China . Consider the threat now posed by Iran. Whatever one thinks about the recently-
concluded nuclear deal, any serious strategy aimed at resisting Iranian domination also requires confronting Iran
on the several fronts of the Middle East battlefield. In Syria, it requires a determined policy to remove
Iran’s close ally, Basher al-Assad, using U.S. air power to provide cover for civilians and creating a safe zone
for Syrians willing to fight. In Iraq, it requires using American forces to push back and destroy the forces
of the Islamic State so that we do not have to rely, de facto, on Iranian power to do the job. Overall, it requires a
greater U.S. military commitment to the region, a reversal of both the perceived and the real withdrawal of American power. And therefore it
requires a reversal of the downward trend in U.S. defense spending, which has made it harder for the military even to think about addressing these challenges, should
it be called upon to do so. The challenge we face today is to decide whether this liberal world order is worth defending and whether the United States is still willing to
it will require a renewal of American
play the role of its principal champion. The answer to both questions ought to be “yes,” but
leadership in the international system , economically, politically, and strategically. It will also require a
renewed understanding of how important and unique the present liberal world order is , both for
Americans and for peoples all across the globe . The simple fact is that for all the difficulties and suffering of the past 70 years, the period
since the end of World War II has been unique in the history of the human race. The period since the end of World War II has been unique in the history of the human
There has
race. Democratic government, once rare, has spread to over 100 nations around the world, on every continent, for peoples of all races and religions.
been an unprecedented growth in prosperity. Billions have been lifted out of poverty. Democratic government, once
rare, has spread to over 100 nations around the world, on every continent, for peoples of all races and religions. Although the period has been marked by war, peace
among the great powers has been preserved. There has been no recurrence of the two devastating world wars of the first half of the 20th century. This world order has
been a boon for billions around the world, but it has also served American interests. Any
other world order, one in which the United
States had to cede power and influence to China and Russia , or what is more likely, a descent into
disorder , is unlikely to serve Americans’ interests as well.
Heg is sustainable
Rubinovitz 12 (Ziv, Post-doctoral Fellow – Davis Institute for International Relations, The Hebrew
University of Jerusalem, “The US vs. the East Asian Rising Powers: Can The US Stay On Top?”,
Presented at the 22nd IPSA World Congress, Madrid, July 8-12, 2012,
http://rc41.ipsa.org/public/Madrid_2012/rubinovitz.pdf)
The Argument
This paper views the international system with geographical and geopolitical eyes. For this reason, it uses geographical facts as factors in analyzing the current global
system and its future prospects. The argument this paper will promote is that the U.S.
physical location and geopolitical position are the
cornerstones of its foreign policy and serve as a "safety net" from foreign powers' assaults (not perfect, obviously, as became painfully clear
on September 11, 2001). The U.S., unlike any other great or superpower – now or anytime – can decide whether or not and to what
extent will it be involved in international affairs . Isolationism was a practical policy (regardless of its success) for approximately twenty years
since the end of World War I until Pearl Harbor (1941). Even though since the end of World War II the United States is conducting an opposite strategy, theoretically
and hypothetically it can be resumed, perhaps not to the extent it was in the 1920s-1930s, but a sort of isolationism is possible. No other country can afford such a
policy because all other powers are on the same continent and cannot disregard one another.
Moreover, the U.S. is still – and will
remain in the foreseeable future – the naval superpower with the most powerful navy that
has the best power-projection capabilities . It can afford to leave the continent and become an offshore balancer. True, it will lose some
of its influence, but it can preserve its power on the sea and project it restrictedly whenever needed. So, very briefly, the
U.S. has a much wider room for maneuver than is presumed, and with the most powerful military with no
parallel in the foreseeable future, the U.S. still has a wide spectrum of policies it can use, hence it is in the best position for the
coming hegemonic competition.
Literature Review
It is important to note that most of the literature is American, which is expected and logical, but also somewhat problematic due to obvious biases. One of these is the
obsession with China, as it is the focus of most studies but seems more frightening than in reality. The obsession with China leaves out analyses of the rise of other
great powers, therefore the literature cannot really establish that the alternative to unipolarity is multipolarity. The studies that focus on China seem to implement that
the next system will be bipolar. To its credit, though, it seems that there is no power that is emerging as much as China does, hence it is
correct to focus on it. But then, will other powers be entitled to be regarded as poles? This is an extra-regional question with significant implications to East Asia in a
global context. The literature regarding the structure of the international system can be divided into two major types:
A. By the source of threat to the U.S. primacy (future structure): 1. The China alarmists (bipolarity); 2. The BRICS are emerging (multipolarity); 3. Who cares? The
American advance is too large to catch up (unipolarity).
B. By the effect on U.S. behavior: 1. Fight to preserve primacy – preemption or prevention; 2. Get used to it – selective engagement or offshore balancing.
Within the Realist paradigm there are two competing theories that prescribe conflicting advice that is based on contradictory readings of reality.12 Whereas offensive
realism suggests securing material power that will guarantee a given country's security, and securing regional and global primacy even by force,13 defensive realism
suggests possessing sufficient material power and prefers some sort of power sharing to enhance mutual trust among the great powers, which enhances – they believe
– the security of each power.14 In the American case, defensive realism suggests offshore balancing or selective engagement, while offensive realism would prefer
domination and engagement with potential rivals. This does not mean that there cannot be agreement among all realists concerning American actions, such as the
consensus among many realists that the war against Iraq in 2003 was unnecessary and even damaging.15 The disagreements grow and are much more acute regarding
other great powers. How should the U.S. treat China and other emerging or reemerging powers? Should they be engaged? Should the U.S. prevent the foreseen
competition by striking first, or should the U.S. allow them to emerge as regional hegemons and then divide the world into spheres of influence with them?
The question everyone asks is whether or not American hegemony is over or when will it happen. Ian Clark suggests that the term hegemony is misused, and prefers
questioning the future of American primacy.16 This paper will follow Clark in terminology and substance.
Schweller and Pu say that "If a great transformation is coming, it is not one that heralds a radically altered world politics based on legalism, constitutionalism, or
global civic activism. Rather, it is a structural transformation from unipolarity to multipolarity that most realists believe promises a return to the familiar history of
great powers struggling for power and prestige."17 There definitely seems to be a transition, but is it to multipolarity or
bipolarity, and in any case – will it resemble past experiences? This is highly uncertain. The power that the U.S. had obtained
in the last several decades places it in a different category than any other great power in the foreseeable future,
therefore even if the U.S. is less dominant compared to other great powers, it is far fetching to argue
for similar status as in any previous system. This is not to say that later in the future such a system might emerge, but in the near
future it is unlikely .18
Robert Art argued in 2010 that the U.S. is the most powerful state in the world in economic and military assets and
will remain the most powerful military power "for some time to come," but inevitably its edge relative to other great powers
will diminish in the coming decades. China is the greatest potential rival, provided that its economy will continue to grow in the coming two decades as it did in the
last two decades (then it will surpass the U.S. in its GDP, but not in its GDP per capita). For now, China had already changed the balance of
power in East Asia. It is already the region's dominant military land power. Art assesses that if China invests in its military forces for several decades, and is
determined to project naval and air power, it will be able to deploy a naval force that "could contest the American supremacy at sea in East Asia."19 Some
conflict seems inevitable, including arms race, but there can be more cooperation than is assumed by most
scholars.
Art correctly argues that as long as China's emerging hegemony in East Asia does not include Japan and the U.S. maintains
strongholds in the region (Singapore, the Philippines and Indonesia), the geopolitical threat from China will not be
of similar extent as that of the Soviet Union. China cannot jeopardize the global balance of power as long as
Europe, the Persian Gulf, India, Japan and Russia are independent or under U.S. influence.20 China cannot threaten the U.S. as the Soviet Union did due to its relative
size. His conclusion: be smart; let China grow but draw a line in the sand, accept that it is growing but make sure China knows the U.S. is stronger.
This seems as good advice, but one need only to see China's increasing defense budget to understand why apparently following it is a difficult job. China had
increased the defense budget by 11.2% in 2012, following two decades of annual two-figure percents increases (since 1989, except for 2009 – only 7.5%).21 There are
always questions on the purpose of this steady increase: in preparation for a global conflict with the U.S. over resources and political interests (i.e., preparing China to
become a rival pole); a regional conflict with any of its neighbors – and China indeed has issues with all of them, be it territorial, historical, economic, etc.; or
domestic, preparing to crush separatists or rebels.
In 2001, Mearsheimer wrote that "American policy [on China] has sought to integrate China into the world economy and facilitate its rapid economic development, so
that it becomes wealthy and, one would hope, content with its present position in the international system. This U.S. policy is misguided. A wealthy China would not
be a status quo power but an aggressive state determined to achieve regional hegemony…. Although it is certainly in China's interest to be the hegemon in Northeast
Asia, it is clearly not in America's interest to have that happen…. It is not too late for the United States to reverse course and do what it can to slow the rise of
China."22
A decade after Mearsheimer's warning, it seems that he was partly correct and partly wrong. A steadily increasing share of China's wealth is turned into military
power, and recently, it is reported, Chinese strategists apparently began calling their government to fit China's foreign policy to its capabilities, which means replacing
the "peaceful rise" and the "low profile policy" with a much more ambitious policy.23 But China's economic rise will first need to finance its aging population.
Nevertheless, China's goals are unclear to American and western analysts and policymakers, although there are official Chinese documents that allow assessing their
true aims.24
It is interesting to follow China's rise to hegemony in East Asia and the reaction of its neighbors. They were expected to act to balance China, but according to Chan's
study, they don't. The defense burden is not rising and trade with China is increasing – contrary to the theoretical expectations.25 This can indicate either that China
succeeded in splitting among its regional rivals, or that the U.S. is no longer functioning as a regional hegemon, therefore they have no one to turn to against China.
Michael Beckley provides a detailed analysis of the rise of China and of the U.S. decline or non-decline.26 Most declinists, as Beckley labels them, argue that the U.S.
is in economic decline, not in military decline.27 This is an important point – in military terms the U.S. is still the sole superpower, and it is hard to see circumstances
under which the U.S. would lose this status. The American spending on defense is still higher than that of all its potential rivals
combined, and even if the tipping point is coming closer and China will surpass the U.S. in defense expenditure, it will take many years for
China to close the gap – qualitative and quantitative. Unlike money, military assets do not vanish (it is hard to imagine
an aircraft carrier simply disappear or being given or sold to China). Therefore, even if the U.S. expenditure on defense decreases, it does not
affect American military primacy, at least in the short run. Nevertheless, the bond between economy and military affairs is very strong. For instance,
in April 2012 senior U.S. officials admitted that there is no budget to strike Syria, therefore the solution of the turmoil would have to be diplomatic.28
Mario Carranza mentions that those who argue that the U.S. hegemony is not in decline claim that neither China nor Europe can
shape events on the basis of their material power, but he also argues that they underestimate China's (and to lesser extent, Europe's) ability to take control over
markets in the Global South (South America and South Asia), and mentions that China increased dramatically its economic relations with key South American
countries such as Venezuela, Argentina and Brazil.29
Daniel Drezner presents the economic aspect of China's rise, and focuses on its new status as the U.S.'s greatest debt holder.30 This issue is political no less and
probably more than economic. But part of being proof that in the age of globalization that the U.S. promoted so powerfully it lost the economic primacy (and there are
counterarguments on this), does it make a real difference? After all, had the U.S. lost any military asset due to its economic decline? Had any such asset been sold to
China? Of course not. Hence, the balance in hard power is quite clear: China possesses the major part of American dollars in the world and is America's largest
creditor and debt holder, but the U.S. had not lost any of its military power, and it is still superior to any other power, especially China.
Hart and Jones assert that the U.S. economy is still three times larger than the Chinese one.31 But still, there is change in the degree
of influence each power has in the system. "China, for instance, has long been a ‘sovereignty hawk’, generally opposing the notion that interventions for humanitarian
purposes are legitimate. Its model of authoritarian capitalism has also increasingly become an ideological export, challenging the United States’ liberal model."32
Russia is perhaps misplaced in the list of emerging powers. Its economic data are not really improving and its population is declining annually by 4%, and with this
rate it might drop to less than 120 million by 2050 compared to 140 million today.33
This sample of scholarly literature of the last decade demonstrates the confusion regarding the current situation, although in
recent years it is clearer that there is a significant decline in American economic primacy. However, it seems clear to all that the U.S. still
holds military primacy and in this aspect primacy does not seem to be jeopardized for many years to come .34
New Mod---Heg---A2: Heg Unsustainable---Trump
Trump doesn’t thump---focus on action, not rhetoric
Carafano et al 17
“Trump Has a Foreign Policy Strategy” Apr 21st, 2017 Vice President, Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis
Institute James Jay Carafano is a leading expert in national security and foreign policy challenges.
http://www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/trump-has-foreign-policy-strategy
Though on the job for only about dozen weeks, the new administration handled a lot of action on multiple fronts quite deftly. At the core of Trump’s
view of the world are his views on the global liberal order. Trump is no isolationist. Trump will focus on
American interests and American values, and that poses no threat to friends and allies. Copied For two weeks, the
White House has unleashed a foreign-policy blitzkrieg, and Washington’s chattering classes are shocked and, if not awed, at least perplexed. CNN calls Trump’s
actions a “u-turn.” Bloomberg opts for the more mathematical “180 degree turn,” while the Washington Post goes with “flipflop.” Meanwhile, pundits switched from
decrying the president as an isolationist to lambasting him as a tool of the neocons. Amid all the relabeling, explanations of an “emerging Trump Doctrine” have
proliferated faster than North Korea’s nuclear arsenal. Here’s my take on what’s going on: • Yes, there
is a method to Trump’s “madness.” •
No, there has been no big change in Trump’s strategy. The
actions that flustered those who thought they had pigeon-holed Donald Trump
simply reflect the impulses that have driven the direction of this presidency since before the
convention in Cleveland. At the Center of the Storm Where is the head and heart of the president’s national-
security team? Ask that question a year ago, and the answer would have been simple: General Mike Flynn, Mayor Rudy Giuliani and Senator Jeff Sessions.
Today, Flynn is gone. Giuliani never went in. Sessions is still a crucial voice in the administration, but his duties as Attorney General deal only partially with foreign
policy and national-security matters. The new team centers round Jim Mattisat the Defense Department, Rex Tillerson at the State
Department, John Kelly at the Department of Homeland Security and H. R. McMaster in the West Wing—ably assisted by Nikki
Haley at the United Nations. Trump barely knew these people before the election. There is little question that the new
team’s character and competence affected the White House response to the recent string of high profile
events and activities—from presidential meetings with Egypt and China and Tillerson’s tête-à-tête with Putin, to the ominous developments in Syria and North
Korea. Though on the job for only about dozen weeks, the new administration handled a lot of action on multiple fronts quite
deftly. Much of that can be credited to the maturity and experience of Trump’s senior national-
security team. But how the administration responded was purely Trumpian—reflecting an impulse that transcends the makeup of his foreign team or other
White House advisors. Decoding Trumpian Strategy Since the early days of the campaign, one thing has been clear: trying stitch together an understanding of
Trump’s foreign and defense policy based on Trump’s tweets and other off-hand comments is a fool’s errand. That has not changed since the Donald took over the
Oval Office. That is not to say that none of Trump’s rhetoric matters. He has given some serious speeches and commentary. But pundits err when they give every
presidential utterance equal merit. A joint address to Congress ought to carry a lot more weight than a 3 a.m. tweet about the Terminator. But especially with this
presidency, one needs to focus on White House actions rather than words to gain a clearer understanding of
where security and foreign policy is headed. Do that, and one sees emerging a foreign and defense policy
more conventional and more consistent than what we got from Bush or Obama. Still, a deeper dive is necessary to get at the root of Trump’s
take on the world and how it fits with recent actions like the tomahawk strikes in Syria and the armada steaming toward North Korea. I briefed Candidate
Trump and his policy advisors during the campaign. I organized workshops for the ambassadorial corps during the Cleveland Convention and
worked with the presidential team through the inauguration. Those experiences let me observe how the policies from the future fledgling administration were
unfolding. Here are some observations that might be helpful in understanding the Trumpian way. At
the core of Trump’s view of the world
are his views on the global liberal order. Trump is no isolationist. He recognizes that America is a global
power with global interests and that it can’t promote and protect those interests by sitting at home
on its hands. Freedom of the commons, engaging and cooperating with like-minded nations, working to blunt problems “over there”
before they get over here—these are things every modern president has pursued. Trump is no different.
What distinguishes Trump—and what marks a particularly sharp departure from Obama—is his perception of what enabled post–World War America and the rest of
the free world to rise above the chaos of a half century of global depression and open war. Obama and his ilk chalked it all up to international infrastructure—the UN,
IMF, World Bank, EU, et al. For Trump, it was the sovereign states rather than the global bureaucracies that made things better. The international superstructure has to
stand on a firm foundation—and the foundation is the sovereign state. Without strong, vibrant, free and wealthy states, the whole thing collapses like a Ponzi scheme.
Trump is an arch nationalist in the positive sense of the term. America will never be safe in the world if the world doesn’t have an America that is free, safe and
prosperous. That belief is at the heart of Trump’s policies designed to spark an economic revival, rollback the administrative state and rebuild the military. It lies at the
core of his mantra: make America great again. Even the strongest America, however, can’t be a global power without the willingness
to act globally. And that's where Trump's declaration of “America First” comes in. What it means for
foreign policy is that the president will put the vital interests of the United States above the maintenance
of global institutions. That is not an abandonment of universal values. Every American president deals with the challenge of
protecting interests and promoting values. Trump will focus on American interests and American values, and that poses no threat to friends and
allies. In many cases, we share the same values. In many cases, what's in America's vital interest is also in their interest
—and best achieved through joint partnership. Here is how those animating ideas are currently manifesting themselves in Trump's strategy:
A strategy includes ends (what you are trying to accomplish), means (the capabilities you will use to do that) and ways (how you are going to do it). The
ends
of Trump’s strategy are pretty clear. In both talk and action in the Trump world, it boils down to three parts of the world: Europe, Asia and the
Middle East. That makes sense. Peace and stability in these regions are vital to U.S. interest s and are under assault. The United
States wants all three parts of the world to settle. It is unrealistic to think all the problems can be made to disappear, but it is not unrealistic to significantly reduce the
potential for region-wide conflict.
New Mod---Heg---A2: No Impact
Decline emboldens China, Russia, and Iran---causes counter-balancing and
transition wars
Twining, 17 - director of the Asia Program at The German Marshall Fund of the United States, based
in Washington, DC, MPhil & PhD degrees from Oxford University (Daniel, "Abandoning the Liberal
International Order for a Spheres-of-Influence World is a Trap for America…," Medium, 3-21-2017,
https://medium.com/out-of-order/abandoning-the-liberal-international-order-for-a-spheres-of-influence-
world-is-a-trap-for-america-7bfcdbb83df4)
The liberal world order is under assault . Polls suggest an American ambivalence about upholding the rules-based global system.
Populists are besieging governing elites in the West while Russia works strategically to destabilize European and American governments through
propaganda and proxies. A rising China wants to create a global system that is not U.S.-centric , one in which
smaller powers defer to bigger ones and norms of democracy and rule of law do not prevail. Meanwhile, the U.S. alliance system
looks adrift while competitors in China and Russia appear to be on the march. If it holds, this trend could produce a spheres-of-
influence world — which many, including the current presidents of the United States, China, and Russia, find intuitively
attractive . But were such an order to replace one based on global integration and American leadership in the geopolitical cockpits of Europe
and Asia, it would only engender insecurity and conflict . In a spheres-of-influence world, great powers
order their regions. The United States would go back to a “Monroe Doctrine” version of grand strategy; Russia would dominate
the former Soviet space; China would govern East Asia, and India South Asia. The problem with this kind of order,
however, is several-fold. Too many spheres overlap in ways that would generate conflict rather than clean lines
of responsibility. Japan would oppose Chinese suzerainty in East Asia, including by developing nuclear
weapons ; India and China would compete vigorously in Southeast Asia; Russia and China would
contest the resources and loyalties of Central Asia; Europe and Russia would clash over primacy of
Central and Eastern Europe. The Middle East would be an even more likely arena for hot war between
Saudi Arabia and Iran, and Turkey would contest regions also claimed by Russia, Europe, and possibly China.
Russia, like the Soviet Empire before it, would keep pushing west until it met enough hard power to stop it. A
spheres of influence world would also sharpen great power competition outside of each region. Regional
hegemony is a springboard for global contestation. China would be more likely to challenge the United
States out-of-area if it had subdued strategic competition in its own region. Russia, like the Soviet Empire before it,
would keep pushing west until it met enough hard power to stop it. (The fact that Russian troops marched through Paris
during the Napoleonic Wars demonstrates that the limits of Russian power need not be confined to the former Warsaw Pact). American leaders
have long understood that a “Fortress America” approach is a source of national insecurity. Franklin Roosevelt made this case in a series of
“fireside chats” in the run-up to America’s participation in World War II — even before the advent of the far more sophisticated power-projection
technologies that exist today. Roosevelt and his generals well understood that the United States could not be safe if hostile powers controlled
Europe and Asia, despite the wide oceans separating North America from both theaters. A spheres-of-influence world would also
crack up the integrated global economy that underlies the miracle in human welfare that has lifted billions out of poverty in past
decades. It would replicate the exclusive economic blocs of the 1930s, including an East Asia “co-prosperity
sphere,” seeding conflict and undercutting prosperity. A real-world and real-time example of what happens when American
power retreats in an effort to encourage regional powers to solve their own problems is the mess in Syria. It has produced the greatest refugee
crisis since 1945 — a stain on the consciousness of human civilization — and has led many to conclude that the Middle Eastern order of states
dating to the end of World War 1 is collapsing. President Obama pursued an express policy of retracting American military power from the
Middle East, including withdrawing all troops from Iraq and refusing to intervene militarily when President Assad used chemical weapons
against his own people, despite a red-line injunction from the United States not to do so. Obama and his White House political advisors believed
that American withdrawal from the Arab Middle East (if not from the ironclad U.S. commitment to Israel) would lead a new balance of power to
form, one policed by regional powers rather than by America. This flawed, amoral, and un-strategic approach has led to a
series of hot wars — in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen — the collapse of Arab allies’ confidence in the United States
as an ally, as well as an intensified cold war with Iran. Despite the international agreement freezing Iran’s
nuclear program, Iran’s support for terrorism and hostile insurgencies targeting American allies across its
region actually intensified during this period. A spheres-of-influence world leaves weaker states to become
the victims of stronger or more aggressive ones, and it seeds insecurity by removing the reassuring variable
of American military guarantees and presence This experience underlines a core problem with a spheres-of-influence
world. It leaves weaker states to become the victims of stronger or more aggressive ones, and it seeds insecurity by removing the reassuring
variable of American military guarantees and presence. It emboldens American adversaries and leads American allies
to take self-help measures that themselves may undercut American security interests. A spheres-of-
influence world would also produce contestation of the open global commons that are the basis for the
unprecedented prosperity produced by the liberal international economic order. Should the Indian and Pacific Oceans,
or the Arctic and Mediterranean Seas, become arenas of great-power conflict (like the South China Sea already has
thanks to China’s militarization and unilateral assertion of sovereignty over it) as leading states seek to incorporate them into
their privileged zones of control, economic globalization would collapse , harming the economies of every
major power. The United States, because of its sheer power and resource base as well as its relative geographical isolation, might
do OK in a spheres-of-influence world. Most of America’s friends and allies would not. Their weakening and
insecurity would in turn render the United States weaker and more insecure — since U.S. allies are force-
multipliers for American hard and soft power, and since norms like freedom of the global commons are in fact
underwritten by that power. More broadly, such a transition would also likely lead to the kind of hot wars that
reorder the international balance of power , including by incentivizing aggressive states to push out
and assert regional dominion , knowing that America does not have the will or interest to oppose them .
The fact that U.S. competitors such as Russia, China, and Iran — all of whom want to weaken the American-led world order —
would welcome a spheres-of-influence world is another reason for Americans to oppose it . It would also be
ironic if the United States were to back away from its historic commitment to shaping a world that is an idealized vision of America itself — one
ruled by laws, norms, institutions, markets, and peaceful settlement of disputes.
Global nuclear war

Khalilzad 16 – Zalmay Khalilzad, former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, counselor at the
CSIS, 3/23/16, “4 Lessons about America's Role in the World,” http://nationalinterest.org/feature/4-
lessons-about-americas-role-the-world-15574?page=show
Ultimately, however, we concluded that the United States has a strong interest in precluding the emergence of
another bipolar world —as in the Cold War—or a world of many great powers , as existed before the two world wars.
Multipolarity led to two world wars and bipolarity resulted in a protracted worldwide struggle with the risk
of nuclear annihilation . To avoid a return such circumstances, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney ultimately agreed that
our objective must be to prevent a hostile power to dominate a “critical region ,” which would give it the
resources, industrial capabilities and population to pose a global challenge . This insight has guided U.S. defense policy throughout the
post–Cold War era.
Giving major powers the green light to establish spheres of influence would produce a multipolar world
and risk the return of war between the major powers . Without a stabilizing U.S. presence in the Persian Gulf and U.S.
relationships with Jordan and the Gulf States, Iran could shut down oil shipments in its supposed sphere of influence. A similar scenario in fact
played out during the 1987 “tanker war” of the Iran-Iraq war, which eventually escalated into a direct military conflict between the United States
and Iran. Iran’s nuclear program makes these scenarios even more dangerous.
The United States can manage the rise and resurgence of great powers like China, Russia and Iran at an
acceptable cost without ceding entire spheres of influence. The key is to focus on normalizing the geopolitics of the Middle
East, Europe and the Asia-Pacific, which the United States can do by strengthening its transatlantic and transpacific alliances and adapting them
to the new, dangerous circumstances on the horizon. The United States should promote a balance of power in key regions
while seeking opportunities to reconcile differences among major actors.
New Mod---Heg---A2: No Impact---Fettweis
Fettweis is wrong
Fempa 11 – Francis P. Sempa, Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Middle District of Pennsylvania,
Adjunct Professor of Political Science at Wilkes University, and Contributing Editor to American
Diplomacy, October, Review of Dangerous Times? The International Politics of Great Power Peace By
Christopher J. Fettweis, Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 63, p. 150
Forget Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, and Machiavelli. Put aside Mackinder, Mahan, and Spykman. Close the military academies and war colleges. Shut
our overseas bases. Bring our troops home. Make dramatic cuts in the defense budget. The end of major war ,
and perhaps the end of war itself, is near, according to Tulane assistant professor Christopher Fettweis in his recent book, Dangerous
Times? The International Politics of Great Power Peace.
Fettweis is not the first intellectual, nor will he be the last, to proclaim the onset of perpetual peace. He is squarely in the tradition of Immanuel
Kant, Herbert Spencer, and Norman Angell, to name just three. Indeed, in the book’s introduction, Fettweis attempts to rehabilitate Angell’s
reputation for prophecy, which suffered a devastating blow when the Great War falsified his claim in The Great Illusion that economic
interdependence had rendered great power war obsolete. Angell, Fettweis writes, was the first “prominent constructivist thinker of the twentieth
century,” and was not wrong—just ahead of his time (p. 5).
Fettweis bases his theory or vision of the obsolescence of major war on the supposed linear progress of human nature, a major tenet of 20th-
century liberalism that is rooted in the rationalist theories of the Enlightenment. “History,” according to Fettweis, “seems to be unfolding as a line
extending into the future—a halting, incomplete, inconsistent line perhaps, one with frequent temporary reversals, but a line nonetheless.” The
world is growing “more liberal and more reliant upon reason, logic, and science” (p. 217).
We have heard this all before. Human nature can be perfected. Statesmen and leaders will be guided by reason and
science. Such thinking influenced the visionaries of the French Revolution and produced 25 years of war among the great powers of Europe.
Similar ideas influenced President Woodrow Wilson and his intellectual supporters who endeavored at Versailles to transform the horrors of
World War I into a peace that would make that conflict “the war to end all wars.” What followed were disarmament conferences, an international
agreement to outlaw war, the rise of expansionist powers, appeasement by the democracies, and the most destructive war in human history.
Ideas, which Fettweis claims will bring about the proliferation of peace , transformed Russia, Germany,
and Japan into expansionist, totalitarian powers. Those same ideas led to the Gulag, the Holocaust, and the Rape of Nanking. So
much for human progress.
Fettweis knows all of this, but claims
that since the end of the Cold War, the leaders and peoples of the major powers,
except the United States, have accepted the idea that major war is unthinkable. His proof is that there has
been no major war among the great powers for 20 years— a historical period that coincides with the
American “unipolar” moment . This is very thin empirical evidence upon which to base a predictive theory
of international relations.
Fettweis criticizes the realist and neorealist schools of thought, claiming that their adherents focus too narrowly on the past behavior of states in
the international system. In his view, realists place too great an emphasis on power. Ideas and norms instead of power, he claims, provide
structure to the international system. Classical geopolitical theorists such as Halford Mackinder, Alfred Thayer Mahan, Nicholas Spykman, and
Colin Gray are dismissed by Fettweis in less than two pages, despite the fact that their analyses of great power politics and conflict have long
been considered sound and frequently prescient.
Realists and classical geopoliticians have more than 2,000 years of empirical evidence to support their
theories of how states and empires behave and how the international system works . Ideas are important,
but power is the governing force in international politics , and geography is the most permanent factor in the analysis of
power.
Fettweis makes much of the fact that the countries of Western and Central Europe, which waged war against each other
repeatedly for nearly 400 years, are at peace, and claims that there is little likelihood that they will ever again wage war against each other.
Even if the latter assertion turns out to be true, that does not mean that the end of major war is in sight . Throughout history,
some peoples and empires that previously waged war for one reason or another became pacific without producing worldwide perpetual peace: the
Mongols, Saracens, Ottomans, Dutch, Venetians, and the Spanish Empire come immediately to mind. A Europe at peace does not translate to an
Asia, Africa, and Middle East at peace.
In a world in which major wars are obsolete, Fettweis
believes the United States needs to adjust its grand strategy from
vigorous internationalism to strategic restraint. His specific recommendations include the removal of all U.S. military forces
from Europe; an end to our bilateral security guarantees to Japan and South Korea; an end to our alliance with Israel; an indifference to the
balance of power on the Eurasian landmass; a law enforcement approach to terrorism; a drastic cut in military spending; a much smaller Navy;
and the abolition of regional combatant commands.
What Fettweis is proposing is effectively an end to what Walter Russell Mead calls “the maritime world order” that was
established by Great Britain and maintained first by the British Empire and then by the United States. It is a world order that has
defeated repeated challenges by potential hegemonic powers and resulted in an unprecedented spread of
prosperity and freedom. But all of that, we are assured, is in the past. China poses no threat . The United
States can safely withdraw from Eurasia. The power vacuum will remain unfilled.
Fettweis needs a dose of humility . Sir Halford Mackinder, the greatest of all geopoliticians, was referring to visionaries and liberal
idealists like Fettweis when he cautioned, “He would be a sanguine man . . . who would trust the future peace of the world to a change in the
mentality of any nation.” Most profoundly, General Douglas MacArthur, who knew a little bit more about war and international conflict than
Fettweis, reminded the cadets at West Point in 1962 that “only the dead have seen the end of war.”
It has no empirical backing

Hayes 15 (Jarrod; 3/9/15; Ph.D. in Politics and IR from the University of Southern California, B.A. in Political Science from the
University of Boulder, Assistant Professor of IR at the Georgia Institute of Technology, member of the International Studies Association and the
American Political Science Association; ISSF Roundtable, “ISSF Roundtable on The Pathologies of Power: Fear, Honor, Glory, and Hubris in
U.S. Foreign Policy,” https://networks.h-net.org/node/28443/discussions/63534/issf-roundtable-pathologies-power-fear-honor-glory-and-hubris-
us)
Fettweis is clear that he is writing to change (or begin to change) the national conversation in the United States regarding foreign policy. Thus, Fettweis's
target audience is policymakers and the general public. This fact can make the book frustrating reading for scholars. For
example, Fettweis does not always back his claims with evidence or citations. More problematic , however, is
Fettweis's call for a rational basis for policymaking based on the American national interest. What does that mean? Scott
Burchill goes so far as to call the concept of the national interest devoid of substantive content.[5] Thus, the
concept of the national interest, to say the least, is rarely clear—and that means that the rational pursuit of the national interest is at
best a very difficult endeavor. Moreover, there are multiple modes of rationality. A policymaker who , like most modern
presidents, obsessively monitors polling as a basis of policymaking is being rational -- even if it is a different rationality than that
which Fettweis calls for. Fettweis, however, largely leaves aside these issues. He never explicitly explores the sources or
foundations of rationality other than to invoke classical realism. He does not address the substantial scholarly
literature wrestling with the concept of a national interest. Going further, the growing literature on securitization theory problematizes the
idea that threats are objective conditions that can be clearly identified by savvy or wise policymakers.[6] This in turn undermines the objectivist ontology that
underlies Fettweis's thesis. If it is the case that threats are intersubjective constructions rather than objective conditions, Fettweis' argument is robbed of its
prescriptive force. To be sure, Fettweis's critique of the flaws in U.S. foreign policy remains trenchant. But the call to rational assessment of
objective foreign threats becomes a hollow one. In part these issues arise because of the ‘bridging the gap’ agenda
within which Fettweis situates the book. As the existence of programs like American University's International Policy Summer Institute and the resurgent
debate over the policy-academia gulf attest,[7] efforts like Fettweis's are both badly needed and very welcome. But if bridging the gap were easy, there would be little
need to encourage scholars and policymakers to do it. Fettweis's effort demonstrates just how difficult it can be to satisfy both sides. Academics
will be
frustrated by Fettweis's refusal to engage in explicit theory building or empirical verification. Policymakers will no
doubt be frustrated by Fettweis's amorphous policy guidance to be rational and focus on the national interest.
Fettweis makes terrible assumptions

Beede 11 – Benjamin R. Beede, Rutgers, The State University of New JerseyFettweis, Christopher J.
2008. Losing Hurts Twice as Bad: The Four States to Moving Beyond Iraq. New York, NY
Fettweis’ book might easily be dismissed as an intriguing analysis, but one that has been superseded by the advent of the Obama Administration, and the changes in
direction that the Obama team has advocated and that it may implement. Fettweis
made a number of assumptions that have now
been invalidated , moreover, including a continuation of prosperity. Despite its flaws, however, the book is a provocative contribution to the literature that
criticizes the forcefulness of the U.S. foreign and military policy. Fettweis states that his objective is to analyze the “likely consequences of disaster in Iraq” (16), but
he really has two purposes. One is to explain to people in the United States how they can adjust to the loss of the Iraq war. The second is to persuade readers that the
United States can safely reduce its activity in international affairs. Although the author’s discussion of Iraq must be addressed, this review emphasizes Fettweis’
contention that the United States can safely be less assertive in world affairs because the world is not as dangerous a place as often claimed, and his closely related
point that the public needs to develop a more discriminating approach to assessing threats from abroad, thereby enabling it to hold its government to higher levels of
competency and accountability. Fettweis’ book title comes from a remark by sports figure Sparky Anderson that “losing hurts twice as bad as winning feels good”
(13). He believes that this observation is valid, and he comes back to those words repeatedly. To support his contention concerning the significance of Anderson’s
statement, Fettweis borrows from the literature of psychology to explain how people experience losses, ranging from having relatives or friends taken from them by
death to having their favorite sports teams lose games. In competitive situations, the harmful psychological effects of losing are said to be intensified significantly
when one adversary or opponent was “supposed” to win because of its strength. The number of instances where large countries have lost to guerrilla movements
demonstrates that perceptions of the military advantages that the seemingly stronger side enjoys may well be outweighed by other factors, however (see Arreguin-Toft
2005; Record 2007). Fettweis recommends a rapid withdrawal of the U.S. forces from Iraq. He believes that the Iraq war has “been the
worst kind of defeat for the United States: an unnecessary one, in a war that should never have been fought” (16, emphasis in the original). Not only was the war a
huge error, Iraq is in such bad OCTOBER BOOK REVIEWS | 865 shape that the United States cannot do much to assist its reconstruction. A long-term occupation
might eliminate many problems in Iraq, but he doubts the United States will stay long enough to affect major changes in that country. Little harm will come from the
withdrawal, despite predictions by many that there would be civil war in Iraq and a security breakdown in the entire region. Fettweis is not a specialist in Middle
Eastern affairs, and his interest is in the effects the Iraq war is having and will have on the United States, not so much in the Iraq situation. Thus, his book is not
comparable to studies like that by O’Leary (2009). There are at least two schools of thought about the Iraq war, but Fettweis
ignores this division of opinion. One school, which includes Fettweis, criticizes the Bush Administration for having rashly invaded Iraq and for
having failed to plan and execute the operation properly. Fettweis writes that “[w]e were led into the Iraq morass not by evil people lying on behalf of oil companies
but by poor strategists with a shallow, naive understanding of international politics” (29). Another school of interpretation views the Iraq (and Afghanistan)
commitments simply as steps in a campaign undertaken to give the United States a lasting hegemony in the world. From the Bush Administration’s perspective, Iraq
might even be considered a success. The executive branch demonstrated once again that it can wage war with few checks on its actions, and gave the United States a
greater presence in the Middle East. The Obama Administration has altered Bush’s course to some extent, but so far, there has not been a
radical shift. Indeed, there has been and remains the possibility of a greater commitment in the region, especially into Pakistan. Iraq and the United States have agreed
to the removal of coalition forces by 2011, but the continued violence in Iraq and the construction of substantial military bases suggest that a U.S. military presence
might continue past 2011. In February 2009, Secretary of Defense Gates reiterated the Obama Administration’s commitment to 2011, but in late May 2009, the army
chief of staff, George Casey, declared that his service branch, at least, is planning for U.S. forces to remain in Iraq for another decade. In any event, there is little
prospect for a full disengagement from southwest Asia any time soon. Given one of the purposes of his book, it is hardly surprising that Fettweis focuses almost
entirely on Iraq. He ignores Afghanistan, except for repeatedly citing the Soviet persistence in trying to hold that country as an example of a great power making the
error of invading a small country in the face of deep nationalism in the latter. He might have been well advised to view the entire area of southwestern Asia. Ahmed
Rashid (2008) has described the U.S. involvement in the region that has extended well beyond Iraq and Afghanistan, and that suffers from the same kinds of
misjudgments made in Iraq and Afghanistan, especially an overreliance on military measures and a reluctance to commit substantial resources to economic
development. Fettweis uses Iraq to argue for a strategy of restraint based on his sanguine view that “we [the United States and, indeed, the
entire world] are living in a golden age” (31, emphasis in the original), and that “[g]reat power conflict today is all but unthinkable; therefore, calculations surrounding
the dangers posed by a united Eurasia should change, since the threats it once posed no longer exist” (208). With the end of the Cold War, the ability of the enemies of
the United States to harm this country is quite limited. Hostile acts can be perpetrated, but such attacks cannot overthrow the United States (31). This strategy is hardly
new. Years ago, it was summarized in these words, “Instead of preserving obsolete Cold War alliances and embarking on an expensive and dangerous campaign for
Despite
global stability, the United States should view the collapse of Soviet power as an opportunity to adopt a less interventionist policy” (Carpenter 1992, 167).
the optimistic picture painted by some national security theorists, the world does contain some
dangerous elements . David E. Sanger (2009), for example, presents a chilling picture of nuclear weapons in very
possibly unsteady hands. Much is said in the book concerning national “credibility,” that is, the ability of a country to maintain its prestige and its
reputation for decisive action based on its past performance. Fettweis argues that many governmental leaders, academic commentators, and journalists have been
obsessed with this element of national power and have wanted the United States to deal with virtually any political crisis that occurs (161-75). Fettweis
states
that “[f]or some reason, U.S. policymakers seem to be especially prone to overestimate the threats they
face” (116). There is no explanation of why this should be the case , nor is there any comparison with the
propensity of leaders in other countries to make similar inaccurate projections. Numerous instances can be cited where
governmental leaders and commentators have argued heatedly for “action” on the ground that “inaction” will damage the reputation of the United States. Early in the
Carter Administration, for example, National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski dedicated himself for some time to instigating the dispatch of navy task force to
the Horn of Africa during a period of tension between Ethiopia and Somalia. After failing to persuade the secretaries of state and defense that such action was
necessary, Brzezinski waged a covert effort through the media to bring a decision in favor of his policy (Gardner 2008, 40-2). Two case histories cited in the book as
examples of a disastrous insistence on maintaining credibility are the Spanish and British efforts to hold the Netherlands and the British colonies that became the
United States, respectively. More recent instances that could have been cited are the controversies in the United States concerning the “loss” of China in the late 1940s
and the establishment of a communist regime in Cuba in the late 1950s. Sensitivity concerning Cuba led in part to the intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965,
and other episodes where the United States committed itself to fighting insurgencies in Latin America. OCTOBER BOOK REVIEWS | 867 Concerns about the
political impact of the “loss” of Vietnam played a significant role in decisions to support the Republic of Vietnam. These episodes are largely omitted, though. Fear is
a potent political weapon, and foreign threats, whether real or imaginary, are highly useful within the domestic political arena. Claims of a “missile gap” helped John
F. Kennedy win the presidency, for example. The armed services and the various intelligence agencies are rewarded because of fears of foreign threats. Although the
armed forces may be cautious about entering a given conflict or making other violent moves, they are unlikely to stress the peaceful nature of the world if they want to
retain their budgets and their prestige. Another element in strategy formulation in the United States has been its experience with long-term threats. White (1997)
asserts that the long conflict with the Soviet Union fundamentally structured the discussion and resolution of public policy issues in the United States, and greatly
strengthened the presidency at the expense of Congress and the political parties. Although his book was written before 9/11, his observation that political activists and
the public have become accustomed to protracted battles with foreign enemies makes it easy to understand why they could readily accept a “long war” against
terrorism. Somewhat along the same line, Sherry (1995) maintains that this country has been under emergency conditions from the Great Depression onward, perhaps
even before, permeating the United States with “militarism” in its broadest sense. Going back even further, some writers have argued that United States’ assertiveness
may be traced to the late nineteenth and especially the early twentieth century. Lears (2009) points critically to Theodore Roosevelt as a key player in this
development, and Ninkovich (1999) offers a more favorable view of the “crisis internationalism” of Woodrow Wilson. Fettweis touches on this history, but he
underestimates the extent to which the United States has been conditioned to react vigorously to a range
of foreign policy issues, and overestimates the differences in foreign and military policy brought about by
changes from one administration to another. Given this conditioning, changing the mind-sets of both elites and the public may be an
extremely difficult task. To a degree, Fettweis’ arguments resemble those of the “American empire” theorists , such as
Bacevich (2008), Johnson (2006), and Gardner and Young (2005). Critics of the “American empire” believe that the United States
produces much of the unrest and the tension in the world through its unilateral actions and its emphasis on military power. Fettweis does not go that
far, but his advocacy of “strategic restraint” is certainly compatible with such views. He agrees that the United States’
involvements—especially military commitments—abroad may unsettle conditions in countries as much as they may stabilize them, but his purpose is primarily to
reassure the people of the United States that less assertive activity by their country will not result in world chaos. Thus he does not have much to say about the
motivations of elite figures 868 | POLITICS & POLICY / October 2011 who advocate an active foreign policy. His argument seems to be that the United States is
vastly overextended in its commitments as a result of a number of individual mistakes stemming from an overconcern with credibility rather than a flawed strategy.
Despite his disclaimers, Fettweis’ words sometimes resemble the arguments of pre-World War II isolationists . Indeed,
throughout the book, the word “internationalists,” which properly describes those concerned with international cooperation, is used to refer to those who should be
termed “interventionists,” whether their motivations are power political, economic, or humanitarian, or a mixture of the three. Fettweis
believes that
there was little that the United States could have done to prevent the outbreak of World War II in Europe,
moreover. On the contrary, firmer U.S. support of France and Great Britain might have encouraged those
countries to force Germany to evacuate the newly reoccupied Rhineland and to render it much more
cautious in its later actions. After he successfully implemented his plan to put troops into the Rhineland in 1936, Hitler told his confidants that a
French demand for a withdrawal would have been successful owing to Germany’s military weakness. Fettweis even praises the United States
because it “had the wisdom to remain neutral for more than two years ” and thus “escaped the worst of the suffering” (206).
This is surely wrong. An earlier involvement in the war would doubtless have reduced U.S. casualties and
other costs because invasions of Europe would have been unnecessary if the French and British had held at least part of the continent, and because Germany might not
have developed a cushion of occupied territories to protect it from land attacks and from air assaults for a time. Whether a public educated by books like this one
would be able to make suitable threat assessments, and thereby be better able to exercise control over governmental actions abroad is another question. Fettweis’
work may be quite persuasive because he expresses his views clearly and avoids highly charged language.
However, if elites agree about dangers from abroad, then popular opinion may have little effect on policy making and policy implementation. Fettweis’
thinking is significantly flawed by his assumption that “politics is, and always will be, the enemy of
strategy,” and reiterates his point (26, 157). Fettweis adds that “it would be naive to suggest that it is possible to keep politics completely separate from strategy,
nor would it be fully desirable to do so in a democracy” (26-7), but “for the sake of this book, we will attempt to clarify the national interest by keeping the two realms
separate, to the extent possible” (27). Determining national strategy is necessarily a highly political act, and it cannot be established without considering the demands
of major internal stakeholders. What he terms “politics” may often be differing opinions based on different data or interpretations of the same data. Political survival is
critical for a political leader, and such leaders can understandably be hesitant in exercising restraint if they believe their opponents will attack them, perhaps
decisively, for being “soft” on the enemies of the day. Fettweis is fond of the term “realist” to OCTOBER BOOK REVIEWS | 869 refer to some defense and foreign
policy analysts, but describing someone as a “realist” may simply mean that the person agrees with the views of the individual applying that description. In certain
instances, “realism” can mean being restrained, and, in other instances, being highly assertive. Appropriate
policy decisions are likely to be
made on the basis of accurate intelligence and careful assessments rather than adherence to a general
outlook.
New Mod---Terror
Prolif causes terror and lone wolf use – causes nuke strike
There is, for example, the risk of an accidental firing or a rogue officer deciding that he or she
These are by no means the only risks.
wants to launch a nuclear weapon. There is the risk of “loose nukes” falling into the wrong hands, and the risk that
individual scientists will be willing to transfer nuclear technology to the highest bidder, as Pakistan’s A.Q. Khan did in selling
nuclear technology to Iran, Libya, and No rth Ko rea. When the nuclear bomb was first being developed, Secretary of War Henry Stimson offered a poignant
warning about how devastating the weapon would be. He told President Henry Truman that “such a weapon may be constructed in
secret and used suddenly and effectively with devastating power by a willful nation or group against an unsuspecting nation or
group of much greater size and material power.” Today, America’s “greater size and material power” can’t necessarily stop a nuclear
strike , particularly if the materials fall into the hands of terrorists.
Terrorism causes extinction

Nickolas Roth 17 & Matthew Bunn, research associate at the Belfer Center’s Project on Managing the
Atom at Harvard University, professor of practice at the Harvard Kennedy School, 9/28/17, “The effects
of a single terrorist nuclear bomb”, https://thebulletin.org/2017/09/the-effects-of-a-single-terrorist-
nuclear-bomb/
And what standards of international order and law would still hold sway? The country attacked might well
lash out militarily at whatever countries it thought might bear a portion of responsibility. (A terrifying description of the kinds of
discussions that might occur appeared in Brian Jenkins’ book, Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?) With the nuclear threshold already
crossed in this scenario—at least by terrorists—it is conceivable that some of the resulting conflicts might escalate
to nuclear use. International politics could become more brutish and violent, with powerful states taking
unilateral action, by force if necessary, in an effort to ensure their security. After 9/11, the U nited S tates led the invasions
of two sovereign nations, in wars that have since cost hundreds of thousands of lives and trillions of dollars, while plunging a region into
chaos. Would the reaction after a far more devastating nuclear attack be any less?
In particular, the idea that each state can decide for itself how much security to provide for nuclear weapons and their essential ingredients would
likely be seen as totally unacceptable following such an attack. Powerful states would likely demand that others surrender
their nuclear material or accept foreign troops (or other imposed security measures) to guard it.
That could well be the first step toward a more profound transformation of the international system .
After such a catastrophe, major powers may feel compelled to more freely engage in preventive war , seizing
territories they worry might otherwise be terrorist safe havens, and taking other steps they see as brutal but necessary to preserve their security.
For this reason, foreign policy analyst Stephen Krasner has argued that “conventional rules of sovereignty
would be abandoned overnight .” Confidence in both the national security institutions of the country attacked and
international institutions such as the International Atomic Energy Agency and the U nited N ations, which had so
manifestly failed to prevent the devastation, might erode. The effect on nuclear weapons policies is hard to predict: One can imagine new
nuclear terror driving a new push for nuclear disarmament, but one could also imagine states feeling more certain than ever before that they
needed nuclear weapons.
New Mod---Terror---A2: No Impact
Nuclear terror causes accidental US/Russia nuclear war---extinction
Barrett 13 – PhD, Engineering and Public Policy from Carnegie Mellon University, Director of
Research, Global Catastrophic Risk Institute, Fellow in the RAND Stanton Nuclear Security Fellows
Program, Seth Baum, PhD, Geography, Pennsylvania State University, Executive Director, GCRI,
Research Scientist at the Blue Marble Space Institute of Science, former Visiting Scholar position at the
Center for Research on Environmental Decisions at Columbia University, and Kelly Hostetler, Research
Assistant, GCRI (6/28, Anthony, “Analyzing and Reducing the Risks of Inadvertent Nuclear War
Between the United States and Russia,” Science and Global Security 21(2): 106-133)
War involving significant fractions of the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, which are by far the largest of any
nations, could have globally catastrophic effects such as severely reducing food production for years,1 potentially leading to
collapse of modern civilization worldwide and even the extinction of humanity .2 Nuclear war between the United
States and Russia could occur by various routes, including accidental or unauthorized launch; deliberate first attack by one nation; and inadvertent attack. In an
accidental or unauthorized launch or detonation, system safeguards or procedures to maintain control over nuclear weapons fail in such a way that a nuclear weapon or
missile launches or explodes without direction from leaders. In a deliberate first attack, the attacking nation decides to attack based on accurate information about the
state of affairs. In an inadvertent attack, the attacking nation mistakenly concludes that it is under attack and launches nuclear weapons in what it believes is a
counterattack.3 (Brinkmanship strategies incorporate elements of all of the above, in that they involve intentional manipulation of risks from otherwise accidental or
inadvertent launches.4 ) ¶ Over the years, nuclear strategy was aimed primarily at minimizing risks of intentional attack through development of deterrence
capabilities, though numerous measures were also taken to reduce probabilities of accidents, unauthorized attack, and inadvertent war. For purposes of deterrence,
both U.S. and Soviet/Russian forces have maintained significant capabilities to have some forces survive a first attack by the other side and to launch a subsequent
counterattack. However, concerns about the extreme disruptions that a first attack would cause in the other side’s forces and command-and-control capabilities led to
both sides’ development of capabilities to detect a first attack and launch a counter-attack before suffering damage from the first attack.5¶ Many people believe that
with the end of the Cold War and with improved relations between the United States and Russia, the risk of East-West nuclear war was significantly reduced.6
However, it has also been argued that inadvertent nuclear war between the United States and Russia has continued to
present a substantial risk .7 While the United States and Russia are not actively threatening each other with war, they have remained ready to launch
nuclear missiles in response to indications of attack.8¶ False indicators of nuclear attack could be caused in several ways . First, a
wide range of events have already been mistakenly interpreted as indicators of attack, including weather phenomena, a faulty computer chip, wild animal activity, and
control-room training tapes loaded at the wrong time.9 Second, terrorist
groups or other actors might cause attacks on either the
U nited S tates or Russia that resemble some kind of nuclear attack by the other nation by actions such as
exploding a stolen or improvised nuclear bomb,10 especially if such an event occurs during a crisis between the United States and
Russia.11 A variety of nuclear terrorism scenarios are possible.12 Al Qaeda has sought to obtain or construct
nuclear weapons and to use them against the United States.13 Other methods could involve attempts to
circumvent nuclear weapon launch control safeguards or exploit holes in their security. 14 It has long been
argued that the probability of inadvertent nuclear war is significantly higher during U.S.-Russian crisis
conditions,15 with the Cuban Missile Crisis being a prime historical example. It is possible that U.S.-Russian relations will
significantly deteriorate in the future, increasing nuclear tensions . There are a variety of ways for a
third party to raise tensions between the United States and Russia, making one or both nations more likely
to misinterpret events as attacks.16
Detonation causes extinction---even without retaliation

Toon 7 – Chair of the Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences at CU-Boulder, et al. Owen B.,
April 19, 2007, “Atmospheric Effects and Societal Consequences of Regional Scale Nuclear Conflicts
and Acts of Individual Nuclear Terrorism,” online: http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/acp-7-1973-
2007.pdf
To an increasing extent, peopleare congregating in the world’s great urban centers, creating megacities with
populations exceeding 10 million individuals. At the same time, advanced technology has designed nuclear
explosives of such small size they can be easily transported in a car, small plane or boat to the heart of a city. We
demonstrate here that a single detonation in the 15 kiloton range can produce urban fatalities approaching one
million in some cases, and casualties exceeding one million. Thousands of small weapons still exist in the arsenals of the U.S. and Russia,
and there are at least six other countries with substantial nuclear weapons inventories. In all, thirty-three countries control sufficient amounts of highly enriched
uranium or plutonium to assemble nuclear explosives. A conflict between any of these countries involving 50-100 weapons with yields of 15 kt has the potential to
create fatalities rivaling those of the Second World War. Moreover, even a single surface nuclear explosion, or an air burst in rainy conditions,
in a city center is likely to cause the entire metropolitan area to be abandoned at least for decades owing to
infrastructure damage and radioactive contamination. As the aftermath of hurricane Katrina in Louisiana suggests, the economic consequences of
even a localized nuclear catastrophe would most likely have severe national and international economic
consequences. Striking effects result even from relatively small nuclear attacks because low yield detonations are most effective against city centers where
business and social activity as well as population are concentrated. Rogue nations and terrorists would be most likely to strike there.
Accordingly, an organized attack on the U.S. by a small nuclear state, or terrorists supported by such a state, could generate
casualties comparable to those once predicted for a full-scale nuclear “counterforce” exchange in a
superpower conflict . Remarkably, the estimated quantities of smoke generated by attacks totaling about one
megaton of nuclear explosives could lead to significant global climate perturbations (Robock et al., 2007). While we
did not extend our casualty and damage predictions to include potential medical, social or economic impacts following the initial explosions, such analyses have been
performed in the past for large-scale nuclear war scenarios (Harwell and Hutchinson, 1985). Such a study should be carried out as well for the present scenarios and
physical outcomes.
Global nuclear war

Ayson 10 (Robert, professor of strategic studies and director of the Centre for Strategic Studies, “After
a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” June 21,
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/1057610X.2010.483756)
A Catalytic Response : Dragging in the Major Nuclear Powers A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear
weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable.
Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly
existential threats . A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between
two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century
might bring would fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period.
And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal,
there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two
nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible
that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear
terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to
a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this
context, today's and tomorrow's terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small
nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were
considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a
considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a
massive inter-state nuclear war . For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be
wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be
fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting
that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest
themselves. For example, how might the U nited S tates react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used
in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks, 40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear
laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science
fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area
in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis:
the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.” 41
Alternatively , if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a
terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out
Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a
very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China
be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of
existing tension in Washington's relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major
powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to
increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting
each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too:
should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States,
could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager
of the attack? Washington's early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an
unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China . For example, in the noise and
confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country's
armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up
against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S.
intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such
actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating
response.
New Mod---Terror---A2: No Terror---Means
The risk has never been higher – a single-attack kills millions and escalates global
conflict – goes nuclear
Arguello 18 (Irma, founder and chair of the NPSGlobal Foundation, and head of the secretariat of the
Latin American and Caribbean Leadership Network, degree in physics, a Master’s in business
administration, and completed graduate studies in defense and security, “The global impacts of a terrorist
nuclear attack: What would happen? What should we do?,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 2-21,
https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2018.1436812)
Though hard to accept, the detonation of a nuclear device – by states or non-state actors – is today a plausible
scenario. And while much of the world’s focus has been on the current nuclear weapons arsenals possessed by states – about 14,550
warheads, all of which carry the risk of intentional or unintentional use – the threat of nuclear terrorism is here and
increasing . For more than a decade, Al Qaeda, Aum Shinrikyo, and other terrorist groups have expressed
their desire to acquire fissile material to build and detonate an improvised nuclear bomb. None of them could
fulfill that goal – so far. But that does not mean that they will not succeed in the future. Making matters worse, there is evidence of an
illicit market for nuclear weapons-usable materials. There are sellers in search of potential buyers, as
shown by the dismantlement of a nuclear smuggling network in Moldova in 2015. There certainly are plenty
of sites from which to obtain nuclear material . According to the 2016 Nuclear Security Index by the Nuclear Threat Initiative,
24 countries still host inventories of nuclear weapons-usable materials, stored in facilities with different degrees of
security. And in terms of risk, it is not necessary for a given country to possess nuclear weapons, weapons-usable materials, or nuclear facilities
for it to be useful to nuclear terrorists: Structural and institutional weaknesses in a country may make it favorable for
the illicit trade of materials. Permeable boundaries, high levels of corruption, weaknesses in judicial systems, and consequent impunity
may give rise to a series of transactions and other events, which could end in a nuclear attack. The truth is that, at this stage, no country
in possession of nuclear weapons or weapons-usable materials can guarantee their full protection against
nuclear terrorism or nuclear smuggling. Because we live in a world of growing insecurity, where explicit and tacit agreements
between the relevant powers – which upheld global stability during the post- Cold War – are giving way to increasing mistrust and hostility, a
question arises: How would our lives be affected if a current terrorist group such as the Islamic State (ISIS), or new terrorist groups in the future,
succeed in evolving from today’s Manchester style “low-tech” attacks to a “high-tech” one, involving a nuclear bomb, detonated in a capital city,
anywhere in the world? We attempted to answer this question in a report developed by a high-level multidisciplinary expert group convened by
the NPSGlobal Foundation for the Latin American and Caribbean Leadership Network. We found that there would be multiple harmful effects
that would spread promptly around the globe (Arguello and Buis 2016); a more detailed analysis is below, which highlights the need for the
creation of a comprehensive nuclear security system. The consequences of a terrorist nuclear attack A
small and primitive 1-kiloton
fission bomb (with a yield of about one-fifteenth of the one dropped on Hiroshima, and certainly much less sophisticated; cf. Figure 1),
detonated in any large capital city of the developed world, would cause an unprecedented catastrophic
scenario . An estimate of direct effects in the attack’s location includes a death toll of 7,300-to-23,000 people and
12,600-to-57,000 people injured, depending on the target’s geography and population density. Total physical destruction of the city’s
infrastructure, due to the blast (shock wave) and thermal radiation, would cover a radius of about 500 meters from the point of detonation (also
known as ground zero), while ionizing radiation greater than 5 Sieverts – compatible with the deadly acute radiation syndrome – would expand
within an 850-meter radius. From the environmental point of view, such an area would be unusable for years. In addition, radioactive fallout
would expand in an area of about 300 square kilometers, depending on meteorological conditions (cf. Figure 2). But the consequences would go
far beyond the effects in the target country, however, and promptly propagate worldwide. Global and national security, economy and
finance, international governance and its framework, national political systems, and the behavior of
governments and individuals would all be put under severe trial. The severity of the effects at a national level, however,
would depend on the countries’ level of development, geopolitical location, and resilience. Global security and regional/national
defense schemes would be strongly affected. An increase in global distrust would spark rising tensions
among countries and blocs, that could even lead to the brink of nuclear weapons use by states (if, for instance, a
sponsor country is identified). The consequences of such a shocking scenario would include a decrease in states’
self-control, an escalation of present conflicts and the emergence of new ones , accompanied by an
increase in military unilateralism and military expenditures. Regarding the economic and financial impacts, a severe
global economic depression would rise from the attack, likely lasting for years. Its duration would be strongly
dependent on the course of the crisis. Themain results of such a crisis would include a 2 percent fall of growth in
global G ross D omestic P roduct, and a 4 percent decline of international trade in the two years following the attack (cf. Figure 3). In the
case of developing and less-developed countries, the economic impacts would also include a shortage of high-technology
products such as medicines, as well as a fall in foreign direct investment and a severe decline of international
humanitarian aid toward low-income countries. We expect an increase of unemployment and poverty in all countries.
Global poverty would raise about 4 percent after the attack, which implies that at least 30 million more people
would be living in extreme poverty , in addition to the current estimated 767 million. In the area of international relations, we
would expect a breakdown of key doctrines involving politics, security, and relations among states . These
international tensions could lead to a collapse of the nuclear order as we know it today, with a consequent
setback of nuclear disarmament and nonprolif eration commitments. In other words, the whole system based on the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty would be put under severe trial. After the attack, there would be a reassessment of existing security doctrines, and a deep
review of concepts such as nuclear deterrence, no-first use, proportionality, and negative security assurances. Finally, the behavior of
governments and individuals would also change radically. Internal chaos fueled by the media and social networks would threaten
governance at all levels, with greater impact on those countries with weak institutional frameworks. Social turbulence would
emerge in most countries, with consequent attempts by governments to impose restrictions on personal
freedoms to preserve order – possibly by declaring a state of siege or state of emergency – and legislation would surely
become tougher on human rights. There would also be a significant increase in social fragmentation – with a deepening of
antagonistic views, mistrust, and intolerance, both within countries and towards others – and a resurgence of large-scale social movements
fostered by ideological interests and easily mobilized through social media.
Threat is high. Nuclear terrorists have multiple means of acquisition and will
detonate in the U.S.
Wilson 10 (Valeria Plame, Fellow – Santa Fe Institute and Former Covert CIA Operative Specializing
in Nuclear Terrorism, “Nuclear Terrorism Is Most Urgent Threat”, CNN, 4-8,
http://www.cnn.com/2010/OPINION/04/08/plame.wilson.nuclear.danger/index.html)
But I did not lose my belief that the danger of nuclear terrorism was the most urgent threat we face. Nor did I lose my
passion for working, albeit in a new way, to address that threat. I am working on this issue now as part of the international Global Zero
movement, in which political, military and faith leaders, experts and activists strive for the worldwide elimination of all nuclear weapons.
We know that terrorist groups have been trying to buy, build or steal a bomb.
In the past two decades, there have been at least 25 instances of nuclear explosive materials being lost or
stolen. There is enough highly enriched uranium, or HEU, in the world today to build more than 100,000 bombs.
Terrorists looking to buy or steal HEU could look to the approximately 40 countries with nuclear weapons materials. And
then there are rogue individuals out there who are running black markets selling nuclear materials and technology.
Pakistan's Dr. A. Q. Khan did it for years before my group at the CIA brought him down in December 2003 after catching him red-
handed selling a full-scale nuclear bomb to Moammar Gadhafi's regime in Libya.
If terrorists manage to get their hands on enough HEU, they could smuggle it into a target city, build a bomb and explode
it. A hundred pounds of highly enriched uranium could fit in a shoebox, and 100,000 shipping containers come into the U nited
S tates every day.
Multiple means of acquisition exist

Montgomery 10 (Evan Braden, Ph.D. in Politics – University of Virginia and Research Fellow –
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, “Understanding the Threat of Nuclear Terrorism”,
CBSA Backgrounder, April,
http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/B.20100402.Understanding_the_/B.20100402.Unde
rst anding_the_.pdf)
There are two major dimensions of the nuclear terrorist threat: the “supply” side of nuclear proliferation and the “demand” side of violent Islamist
extremism. Over the past decade, longstanding concerns over proliferation have become increasingly acute in light of a
number of worrisome developments, including the status of India and Pakistan as overt nuclear weapon states, North Korea ’s two
nuclear weapons tests, the international community’s failure to restrain Iran’s nuclear ambitions, and the fear that an Iran ian nuclear weapons
program could spark further proliferation throughout the Middle East. Ultimately, while existing nuclear arsenals and stockpiles of fissile material
represent the most immediate concern, the spread of nuclear weapons and material has increased the probability that
terrorists might be able to acquire or construct a nuclear device. At the same time that nuclear proliferation has become a
growing concern, terrorism has also been elevated from a secondary to a primary threat to US security because of the
emergence of groups that have few inhibitions on inflicting mass casualties by means of chemical, biological,
and even nuclear weapons. Today, for example, the threat of nuclear
New Mod---Terror---A2: No Terror---Motive
Threat’s high
Defence Journal 12 (Ashfaq Ahmed and Saima Kausar, Defence Journal, 9/30, lexis )
International community is aware of the terrorists' intentions to acquire nuclear material. We are thus living with the modern day
nightmare of the possibility of nuclear terrorism. Among non- state actors Al Qaeda is considered to be the most aspirant organization which
has used resources and made foiled attempts to acquire nuclear weapon/material and use it. Analysts fears that hostile states namely Iran and
North Korea would provide nuclear material to terrorists to use it against their enemies. Despite the fact international community realized the threat of
nuclear terrorism in 1990s, IAEA has registered 800 cases , since end of the Cold War to 2010, wherein radioactive material was either
missing or it was taken into possession by smugglers. As all roads of terrorist activities are linked with Pakistan, this country can face serious problems if
terrorists succeeds in their attempts. Several terrorist organizations and non- state actors across the globe have expressed their resolve to acquire
Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) material. Among these terrorists organizations Al Qaeda has made multiple attempts and expressed its determination to
obtain nuclear material. Prosecution witness Jamal Ahmad Al Fadl quit Al Qaeda in 1996 and assisted Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Fadl while
recording his statement in court claimed that in late 1993 or early 1994 Al Qaeda made an attempt to acquire uranium worth $ 1.5 million. Amount was paid to former Sudanese president Saleh
Mobruk. In post 9/11 era many feared that terrorists would acquire WMD and use it against their enemies and enemy allies. In 1998 Al Qaeda Chief Osama bin Laden declared, "it is his duty to
Non-state actors particularly Bin Laden and his followers
obtain WMD."Al Qaeda senior leadership in pre 9/11 era pursued strategy to acquire nuclear and biological weapons.
pursued first use policy and to use these weapons after getting their hold on these weapons against their enemies or their allies anywhere in the world. Bin Laden initiated his
fight against US believing it a holy war between Muslims and Christen-Jews Crusaders, to change the status quo in international system. He thought once the status quo is changed overall
conditions would be conducive for the organizations to overthrow the apostate regimes/governments in Islamic states and Islamic Caliphate would be restored. In order to inflict massive harm to
its enemies Al Qaeda's strategy is focused on acquiring "strategic weapons." "Documents seized in Afghan training camps in late 2001 also indicate a rudimentary understanding of nuclear
fission devices." Khalid Sheikh Muhammad, mastermind of 9/11 attacks, was interviewed by Al Jazeera in, 2002. Al Qaeda leader stated that "Al Qaeda initially planned to include a nuclear
plant in its 2001 attack sites, intensified concern about aircraft crashes." Acquisition of poisonous material had remained of little interest for Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda operatives were experimenting
on "crude chemical agents" before 9/11 in its training camps in Afghanistan. However, their use was left on the individuals outside Al Qaeda core leadership command. Abu Khabab planned
small scale chemical and biological activity, in 2002 and 2003 Abu Masab al Zarqawi planned attacks using ricin and cyanide in Europe and Bahrain based terror group also devised a plan to
carryout attack using crude cyanide gas device in New York City subway. Al Qaeda top leadership was kept uniformed of these attacks. Later, Al Zawahiri comes to know about New York
subway planned attack he cancelled it "for something better." After reading the preceding paragraphs it is understood that unlike state actors, who are determined to acquire nuclear weapons to
terrorists also have three routes to get hold on these weapons. First acquire WMD.
boost their security and deter enemies,
Second, develop nuclear device or dirty bomb. Thirdly, terrorist can carry-out attack on nuclear programme sites/complexes. Cont….
According to IAEA, 433 power plants and 240 operational nuclear research reactors are operating internationally. Despite the fact that measures are taken to deny the right of terrorists/non state
fissile material is produced in great quantity - around the globe both for military purposes and civilian
actors to acquire nuclear material,
needs. Such material is dispersed at various sites It is more difficult to maintain strict control
worldwide. over fissile material than over
nuclear weapons. States posed with security threats are attempting to develop clandestine nuclear weapons programme in violation of the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Iran is suspected by the
US that it is violating the clauses of the NPT and developing nuclear programme for military purposes. Proliferators want to get nuclear weapons in order to employ them to deter their enemies
presence of huge stockpile of nuclear fissile material, spread of nuclear weapons and existing
both potential and declared rather than use it. However,
nuclear arsenals have created fear that terrorists may either acquire or construct a nuclear device . Legacy of the risk of nuclear
attack will persist as long as fissile material exists.
DA---DETERRENCE
*** SHELL
1NC
First/next off is the deterrence DA
US strength and coop with Taiwan high – ending arms sales collapses deterrence of
China – causes invasion of Taiwan, broader aggressionism because of collapsed
resolve, and collapse of heg – offensive realism best
https://international.thenewslens.com/article/104917 ***Modified for language
Unfortunately, realism is often associated with the “abandon Taiwan” arguments. Yet realism,
properly understood , actually does not
call for the U nited S tates to weaken [decrease] its security commitment to Taiwan. Instead , as China rises in
power , realism predicts a strengthening of U.S.-Taiwan relations , a trend that is becoming increasingly
apparent today . The changing international structure is pushing Washington and Taipei into closer
security cooperation.
One vocal “abandon Taiwan” argument employs a version of realism known as “defensive realism.” This version holds that the
structure of the international system does not necessarily favor competitive policies; that the system is generally benign because it is often easier to defend than to
attack; that security is plentiful, competition unnecessary; and rational states can credibly convey information about their non-aggressive motives and intentions
through costly signals and policy choices. To avoid conflict, the United States can signal its benign intentions by scaling back its security commitment to Taiwan. If
China reciprocates, such as on the South China Sea or other issues, it would convey information about the limited extent of China’s foreign policy aims. China’s rise,
therefore, need not be competitive and dangerous.
But the problem is that the historical record often contradicts the dictates of defensive realism : states
often behave in ways contrary to the theory’s prescriptions . Defensive realism is a normative theory that
prescribes what states should do to achieve their goals, not how they actually behave. It is, in essence, idealism with a realist facade . As such, it
is not a useful guide to state behavior.

As John Mearsheimer points out, defensive realist theories “do a poor job of accounting for the past and
present actions of the major powers in the international system.”
A more useful strand of realism is offensive realism, which posits that international structure often favors competitive policies. To be
secure in an anarchic world, states need to maximize relative power and compete for dominance . Given the
limits of geography and technology, the practical outcome for a state is to become the hegemon in its own region . In the
19th century, the United States accomplished this feat in the western hemisphere through a series of determined pursuits of power. As the regional hegemon,
Washington enforced the Monroe Doctrine to exclude outside powers from meddling in its backyard, while making sure no other great power dominates another
region.
China is now trying to do the same in East Asia. Generations of Chinese leaders recognize that a strong, powerful
China is the best guarantee of national survival. The “century of humiliation,” when a weak [constrained] China was invaded
repeatedly, validates the imperatives of power . Beijing goes to great lengths to dismiss any hint of a future Chinese
hegemony. But if Chinese power grows to surpass that of the rest of East Asia combined, it will, by definition,
become a regional hegemon .
This outcome would go against U.S. national interest . As the regional hegemon, the U nited S tates does not want peer
competitors. There is consensus among U.S. policymakers and commentators that it is in the national interest to
prevent any power from dominating Asia (and Europe). Even Henry Kissinger, whom China considers an “old
friend,” stresses that “it is in the American national interest to resist the effort of any power to dominate
Asia” (emphasis original).
Thus, the changing international structure foretells a competitive dynamic between the U nited S tates and
China. China’s suspicions of U.S. motives and intentions are structurally-driven, just as U.S. suspicions of China are driven by the same
structural conditions. Uncertainty about intentions is a built-in characteristic of an anarchic system, generating the security
dilemma and mutual distrust .
How, then, does Taiwan fit into this? In the context of U.S.-China security competition, Washington will
have strong incentives to ramp up security cooperation with Taiwan in order to contain the growth
of Chinese power .
First, Taiwan’s geostrategic location is of particular value to U.S. national security interests. The island
controls the sea lines of communication ( SLOCs ) extending from Japan to Southeast Asia and serves as a check on China’s
maritime expansions into the E ast and the S outh C hina S eas.
If Washington wishes to maintain its preeminent position in Asia, it is in the U.S. interest to include
Taiwan (along with Japan, South Korea, and other allies) in its overall Asia strategy. It makes good strategic sense for
the United States to help strengthen Taiwan’s defense capabilities in order to deter Beijing from
attacking the island. Strong U.S.-Taiwan security ties ameliorate the power asymmetry across the
Taiwan Strait and thereby increase the costs of China’s military coercion.
Second, defending Taiwan is linked to the credibility of the United States for protecting allies and
partners in Asia . If Washington abandons Taiwan, Beijing would likely view the concession as a weakening
[softening] of U.S. resolve for protecting other interests in Asia. Seeing the U nited S tates as a “paper
tiger,” China might become more aggressive in pursuing territorial interests in maritime Asia.
Taiwan goes nuclear

Lowther 13 – William Lowther, Taipei Times, citing a report by the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, 3/16/13, “Taiwan Could Spark Nuclear War: Report,”
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/03/16/2003557211
Taiwan is the most likely potential crisis that could trigger a nuclear war between China and the US, a new
academic report concludes.¶ “Taiwan remains the single most plausible and dangerous source of tension and conflict between the US and China,”
says the 42-page report by the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). ¶ Prepared by the CSIS’ Project on
Nuclear Issues and resulting from a year-long study, the report emphasizes that Beijing continues to be set on a policy
to prevent Taiwan’s independence, while at the same time the US maintains the capability to come to Taiwan’s
defense.¶ “Although tensions across the Taiwan Strait have subsided since both Taipei and Beijing embraced a policy of engagement in 2008,
the situation remains combustible , complicated by rapidly diverging cross-strait military capabilities and
persistent political disagreements,” the report says.¶ In a footnote, it quotes senior fellow at the US Council on Foreign Relations
Richard Betts describing Taiwan as “the main potential flashpoint for the US in East Asia.” ¶ The report also quotes Betts as saying that neither
Beijing nor Washington can fully control developments that might ignite a Taiwan crisis .¶ “This is a classic
recipe for surprise, miscalculation and uncontrolled escalation ,” Betts wrote in a separate study of his own.¶ The CSIS study
says: “For the foreseeable future Taiwan is the contingency in which nuclear weapons would most likely become a
major factor, because the fate of the island is intertwined both with the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party
and the reliability of US defense commitments in the Asia-Pacific region.”¶ Titled Nuclear Weapons and US-China Relations,
the study says disputes in the East and South China seas appear unlikely to lead to major conflict between China and the US, but they do “provide
kindling” for potential conflict between the two nations because the disputes implicate a number of important regional interests, including the
interests of treaty allies of the US.¶ The danger posed by flashpoints such as Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula and maritime demarcation disputes is
magnified by the potential for mistakes, the study says.¶ “Although Beijing and Washington have agreed to a range of crisis
management mechanisms, such as the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement and the establishment of a direct hotline between the
Pentagon and the Ministry of Defense, the bases for miscommunication and misunderstanding remain and draw on
deep historical reservoirs of suspicion ,” the report says.¶ For example, it says, it is unclear whether either side
understands what kinds of actions would result in a military or even nuclear response by the other party.¶ To
make things worse, “neither side seems to believe the other’s declared policies and intentions, suggesting that
escalation management , already a very uncertain endeavor, could be especially difficult in any conflict,” it says.¶ Although
conflict “mercifully” seems unlikely at this point, the report concludes that “it cannot be ruled out and may become increasingly likely if we are
unwise or unlucky.”¶ The report says: “With
both sides possessing and looking set to retain formidable nuclear weapons
arsenals , such a conflict would be tremendously dangerous and quite possibly devastating.”
Every global hotpot goes nuclear and it triggers their impact by collapsing the
economy
Brands 15 – Hal Brands, PhD in International Relations, Faculty at the Sanford School of Public
Policy at Duke University and the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington
University, “Fools Rush Out? The Flawed Logic of Offshore Balancing”, Washington Quarterly, p. 7-28
The fundamental reason is that both U.S. influence and international stability are thoroughly interwoven with a
robust U.S. forward presence. Regarding influence, the protection that Washington has afforded its allies has
equally afforded the United States great sway over those allies’ policies .43 During the Cold War and after,
for instance, the United States has used the influence provided by its security posture to veto allies’ pursuit of
nuclear weapons, to obtain more advantageous terms in financial and trade agreements , and even to affect the
composition of allied nations’ governments.44 More broadly, it has used its alliances as vehicles for shaping political, security, and economic
agendas in key regions and bilateral relationships, thus giving the United States an outsized voice on a range of important issues. To be clear, this
influence has never been as pervasive as U.S. officials might like, or as some observers might imagine. But by any reasonable standard of
comparison, it has nonetheless been remarkable. One can tell a similar story about the relative stability of the post-war
order. As even some leading offshore balancers have acknowledged, the lack of conflict in regions like Europe in recent
decades is not something that has occurred naturally . It has occurred because the “American pacifier” has
suppressed precisely the dynamics that previously fostered geopolitical turmoil. That pacifier has limited
arms races and security competitions by providing the protection that allows other countries to under-
build their militaries. It has soothed historical rivalries by affording a climate of security in which
powerful countries like Germany and Japan could be revived economically and reintegrated into thriving
and fairly cooperative regional orders. It has induced caution in the behavior of allies and adversaries
alike, deterring aggression and dissuading other destabilizing behavior. As John Mearsheimer has noted, the United
States “effectively acts as a night watchman,” lending order to an otherwise disorderly and anarchical environment.45 What would
happen if Washington backed away from this role? The most logical answer is that both U.S. influence and global
stability would suffer. With respect to influence, the United States would effectively be surrendering the most
powerful bargaining chip it has traditionally wielded in dealing with friends and allies, and jeopardizing
the position of leadership it has used to shape bilateral and regional agendas for decades. The
consequences would seem no less damaging where stability is concerned . As offshore balancers have argued, it may
be that U.S. retrenchment would force local powers to spend more on defense, while perhaps assuaging certain points of friction with countries
that feel threatened or encircled by U.S. presence. But it equally stands to reason that removing the American pacifier would
liberate the more destabilizing influences that U.S. policy had previously stifled. Long-dormant security
competitions might reawaken as countries armed themselves more vigorously; historical antagonisms
between old rivals might reemerge in the absence of a robust U.S. presence and the reassurance it
provides. Moreover, countries that seek to revise existing regional orders in their favor —think Russia in
Europe , or China in Asia—might indeed applaud U.S. retrenchment, but they might just as plausibly feel empowered to
more assertively press their interests. If the United States has been a kind of Leviathan in key regions, Mearsheimer acknowledges,
then “take away that Leviathan and there is likely to be big trouble .”46 Scanning the global horizon today, one can
easily see where such trouble might arise. In Europe, a revisionist Russia is already destabilizing its
neighbors and contesting the post-Cold War settlement in the region. In the Gulf and broader Middle East,
the threat of Iranian ascendancy has stoked region-wide tensions manifesting in proxy wars and hints of
an incipient arms race, even as that region also contends with a severe threat to its stability in the form of
the Islamic State. In East Asia, a rising China is challenging the regional status quo in numerous ways,
sounding alarms among its neighbors—many of whom also have historical grievances against each other.
In these circumstances, removing the American pacifier would likely yield not low-cost stability, but increased
conflict and upheaval. That conflict and upheaval, in turn, would be quite damaging to U.S. interests even if it
did not result in the nightmare scenario of a hostile power dominating a key region. It is hard to imagine, for instance, that increased
instability and acrimony would produce the robust multilateral cooperation necessary to deal with
transnational threats from pandemics to piracy. More problematic still might be the economic
consequences . As scholars like Michael Mandelbaum have argued, the enormous progress toward global prosperity and
integration that has occurred since World War II (and now the Cold War) has come in the climate of relative
stability and security provided largely by the United States.47 One simply cannot confidently predict that this
progress would endure amid escalating geopolitical competition in regions of enormous importance to the
world economy. Perhaps the greatest risk that a strategy of offshore balancing would run , of course, is that a
key region might not be able to maintain its own balance following U.S. retrenchment . That prospect might have
seemed far-fetched in the early post-Cold War era, and it remains unlikely in the immediate future. But in East Asia particularly, the
rise and growing assertiveness of China has highlighted the medium- to long-term danger that a hostile
power could in fact gain regional primacy. If China’s economy continues to grow rapidly , and if Beijing
continues to increase military spending by 10 percent or more each year, then its neighbors will ultimately face grave
challenges in containing Chinese power even if they join forces in that endeavor . This possibility, ironically, is one
to which leading advocates of retrenchment have been attuned. “The United States will have to play a key role in countering China,” Mearshimer
writes, “because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves.”48 If this is true, however, then offshore balancing
becomes a dangerous and potentially self-defeating strategy . As mentioned above, it could lead countries like
Japan and South Korea to seek nuclear weapons , thereby stoking arms races and elevating regional
tensions. Alternatively, and perhaps more worryingly, it might encourage the scenario that offshore balancers seek to
avoid, by easing China’s ascent to regional hegemony. As Robert Gilpin has written, “Retrenchment by its very
nature is an indication of relative weakness and declining power, and thus retrenchment can have a
deteriorating effect on relations with allies and rivals .”49 In East Asia today, U.S. allies rely on U.S.
reassurance to navigate increasingly fraught relationships with a more assertive China precisely because
they understand that they will have great trouble balancing Beijing on their own . A significant U.S. retrenchment
might therefore tempt these countries to acquiesce to, or bandwagon with, a rising China if they felt that prospects for successful resistance were
diminishing as the United States retreated.50 In the same vein, retrenchment would compromise alliance relationships, basing agreements, and
other assets that might help Washington check Chinese power in the first place—and that would allow the United States to surge additional forces
into theater in a crisis. In sum, if one expects that Asian countries will be unable to counter China themselves, then reducing U.S. influence and
leverage in the region is a curious policy. Offshore balancing might promise to preserve a stable and advantageous environment while reducing
U.S. burdens. But upon closer analysis, the probable outcomes of the strategy seem more perilous and destabilizing than its proponents
acknowledge.
*** UQ
UQ---US Committed
US deterrence efforts high now – new, take-no-business approach
Carpenter 19 ---- Ted Galen, senior fellow in defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute,
Ph.D. in U.S. diplomatic history (University of Texas), “Forget the U.S.-China Trade War: Is a Conflict
Over Taiwan the Real Threat?” 6/8, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/forget-us-china-trade-war-conflict-
over-taiwan-real-threat-61627
There are multiple signs from various sources of growing U.S. backing for Taiwan’s de facto
independence . Congress certainly is stepping up its support. By a unanimous voice vote in early May, the
House of Representatives passed the T aiwan A ssurance A ct, which expresses firm support for Taiwan while urging
Taipei to increase its own defense spending. The legislation also recommends that Washington continue
“regular sales of defense articles” to Taiwan and back Taipei’s participation in international organizations—
something Beijing emphatically resists.
The Trump administration doesn’t seem to need much prodding . U.S. warships have transited the Taiwan Strait on
several occasions over the past year to demonstrate military support for Taipei . At the Shangri-La Dialogue session, Acting
Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan stated that the U nited S tates would no longer “tiptoe around” destabilizing Chinese
behavior regarding Taiwan or the South China Sea.
*** LINK
Link---Appeasement
Lack of US arms sales allows Chinese military aggression and hurts Asian alliances
USTBC ’12 (The US - Taiwan Business Council, a non - profit, member - based organization
dedicated to developing the trade and business relationship between the United States and Taiwan, and
Project 2049 Institute, seeks to guide decision makers toward a more secure Asia by the century’s mid –
point, 3-12, “Chinese Reactions to Taiwanese Arm Sales,” p. 6, http://www.us-
taiwan.org/reports/2012_chinese_reactions_to_taiwan_arms_sales.pdf)
For the U.S. , allowing China to influence its decisions on Taiwan arms sales is a mistake. Beijing has been given
ample opportunity to demonstrate its commitment to a peaceful approach by reducing its military posture opposite Taiwan, and has not taken that
opportunity. The U.S. reluctance to approve new arms sales to Taiwan is only legitimizing China ’ s reliance
on military coercion to resolve political differences. In addition, withholding tangible U.S. support for the
democratically elected government in Taiwan sends a signal to other allies in the region of a diminished
U.S. commitment in Asia
Link---Arms Sales
Arms sales are vital to deter a Chinese attack.
Bandow 15 — Doug Bandow, Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute, former Special Assistant to President
Ronald Reagan, holds a J.D. from Stanford University, 2015 (“Arm Taiwan, America. But Don’t Defend
It.,” The National Interest, December 21st, Available Online at http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-
skeptics/arm-taiwan-america-dont-defend-it-14695?page=show, Accessed 10-27-2016)
Enabling Taiwan to defend itself is the best way out of this conundrum. So long as the residents of
Zhongnanhai value prosperity and stability, they have reason to avoid costly conflict. No arms sales
would enable Taipei to defeat a determined PRC in war. The former’s objective, however, should be
deterrence, not victory. “The idea is to complicate China’s scenarios, to make them pause, to get them to
think twice before they attack,” explained Rupert Hammond-Chambers, president of the U.S.-Taiwan
Business Council. The higher the price any PRC government would pay for attempting to coerce Taipei,
the less likely it would try to do so. Continued patience would remain good sense.
Ending arm sales legitimizes Chinese military aggression – DA’s link alone turns
US/China relations
USTBC ’12 (The US - Taiwan Business Council, a non - profit, member - based organization
dedicated to developing the trade and business relationship between the United States and Taiwan, and
Project 2049 Institute, seeks to guide decision makers toward a more secure Asia by the century’s mid –
point, 3-12, “Chinese Reactions to Taiwanese Arm Sales,” p. 2, http://www.us-
taiwan.org/reports/2012_chinese_reactions_to_taiwan_arms_sales.pdf)
Over the past five years, senior members of both the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations have exercised extreme caution when
evaluating Taiwan ’ s requests for defense articles and services. These policymakers may believe that China ’ s cooperation on a range of global
issues – and/or the ongoing progress in cross - Strait relations, such as the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (EFCA) – warrants
withholding release of any new or significant military equipment to Taiwan. These U.S. policymakers may also be hoping for a substantive draw
- down of China ’ s military posture opposite Taiwan, and may believe that they are providing sufficient time for such a move to take place.
Beijing should be rewarded for cooperation with the U.S. on non - proliferation issues, global economic security, climate
change, and other issues. However, such
rewards should not include U.S. abandonment of our security
commitments to Taiwan. Potential PRC reactions to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan may warrant some caution, and Washington has to
expect some manner of chastisement by Beijing when the U.S. provides Taiwan with significant security
assistance. Nevertheless, China should also expect that its continued reliance on military instruments of
coercion to resolve political differences will come at a cost. Sound U.S. - China relations rest upon the
assumption that Beijing will adopt peaceful means to resolve differences with Taiwan. A de facto freeze on
U.S. arms sales to Taiwan , imposed while the PRC continues to expand its military capabilities opposite
Taiwan, legitimizes military coercion as a valid tactic for China.
Link---Capabilities---Jets
Jets key to deterrence – aff’s porcupine strategy fails and is more escalatory
Mazza 19 ---- Michael, visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, M.A. in international
relations (Johns Hopkins School of Advanced and International Studies), B.A. in history (Cornell
University), studied Chinese language (Tsinghua University in Beijing), “Assessing the Utility of New
Fighter Aircraft for Taiwan’s Defense Needs,” AEI, 3/13, http://www.aei.org/publication/assessing-the-
utility-of-new-fighter-aircraft-for-taiwans-defense-needs/
Apple Daily broke the news last week that Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) has submitted a formal letter of request
(LOR) to the U nited S tates for new fighter jets. Although Apple Daily reported that the request was specifically for 66 new F-16Vs, MND
denied that. According to the head of Air Force Command’s Planning Division, “The F-15, F-18, F-16, and even the F-35, are all among
our options, as long as the jets help to strengthen our air defense capabilities. […] We are still awaiting a US
response on what kind of aircraft it is willing to sell us before we evaluate if that model fits our needs and if we can afford it before making a final decision.”
MND has long had a stated requirement for new, modern fighter aircraft and has been seeking to
purchase them from the U nited S tates since President George W. Bush’s second term. The requirement has been a controversial one, less so in
Taiwan than in the United States, where some see new fighters as a waste of money and apparently question MND’s ability to conduct honest,
thorough assessments of Taiwan’s defense needs.
Christopher Twomey, a well-respected professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, was quick to disparage Taiwan’s Air Force following
news of the LOR, tweeting: “Note to ROCAF: the 1990s called and they want their net assessment of the [military balance] across the Taiwan Strait back.
Taiwan needs a thicket of mobile SAMs to defend air sovereignty. Don’t play the PLA’s game. Go porcupine or go home!”
The so-called “porcupine strategy” was first popularized by US Naval War College professor William S. Murray in a 2008 article in the Naval War College Review.
Professor Murray described the strategy in this way:
More affordable, more effective, and less destabilizing means of defense against precision bombardment, invasion, and blockade are nonetheless available, but to take
advantage of them, Taiwan must rethink its defense strategies. Rather than trying to destroy incoming ballistic missiles with costly PAC-3 SAMs [surface-to-air
missiles], Taiwan should harden key facilities and build redundancies into critical infrastructure and processes so that it could absorb and survive a long-range
precision bombardment. Rather than relying on its navy and air force (neither of which is likely to survive such an attack) to destroy an invasion force, Taiwan should
concentrate on development of a professional standing army armed with mobile, short-range, defensive weapons. To withstand a prolonged blockade, Taiwan should
stockpile critical supplies and build infrastructure that would allow it to attend to the needs of its citizens unassisted for an extended period. Finally, Taiwan should
eschew destabilizing offensive capabilities, which could include, in their extreme form, tactical nuclear weapons employed in a countervalue manner, or less
alarmingly, long-range conventional weapons aimed against such iconic targets as the Three Gorges Dam.
By adopting such a strategy, Taiwan “would be able to thwart a decapitation attempt,” and thus deter Beijing from making the attempt in the first place. Put another
way, Taiwan would make itself impossible to swallow, thus making invasion and occupation an unappealing option for the People’s Republic of China.
Unfortunately for proponents of the “porcupine strategy,” invasion and occupation are not the only, or
perhaps even the most likely , option for a Beijing that determines that a resort to force across the Taiwan
Strait is necessary. Nor do their assumptions about how a war would go necessarily hold up to close scrutiny.
Consider, for example, an increase in Chinese military pressure that falls short of violence, such as repeated transgressions
of the median line in the Taiwan Strait and incursions of Taiwan airspace by the People’s Liberation Army Air Force fighter aircraft. If
Taiwan were to depend on surface-to-air missiles to defend its air sovereignty, its only option in such a scenario would be
for SAM batteries to light up the offending aircraft with targeting radar. Such is a highly escalatory step , which would
risk inviting Chinese strikes on those batteries. It would be far better for Taipei to instead dispatch fighter
jets to intercept, warn, shadow, and, if ultimately necessary, lock on to Chinese fighters. In this case, Taiwan’s Air Force (Republic of China Air Force, or
ROCAF) fighters provide Taiwan with the ability to respond proportionately to the PLA offense and to more
gradually escalate the engagement.
Importantly, Taiwan’s fighters must be able to match their Chinese counterparts in speed and combat
power. If they do not, Chinese pilots will not take Taiwan’s warnings seriously . Indeed, a mismatch in
capability would invite Chinese hot-dogging , in which PLA pilots have previously indulged, particularly over the
South China Sea. Hence, the need for a modern fighter jet .
Fighter jets would likewise be useful in more stressful scenarios, like during an air or maritime blockade. A Taiwan
military that relied predominantly on land-based missiles to defend itself during such operations would, again, have limited
options to respond and to escalate and it would, in fact, invite more widespread Chinese strikes on the island in a
scenario in which Beijing apparently prefers to minimize escalation.
Link---Capabilities---Jets---A2: China Targets
Jets are valuable even if China targets them – successful attack is easier said than
done, Chinese leaders don’t think they can take them all out, jets can be hidden, and other
systems support them
Even in the invasion scenario, fighter jets have a role to play . “Porcupine strategy” adherents generally argue that the
PLA will target bunkers, aircraft shelters, and runways in the early stages of a conflict—many jets would be destroyed on the ground
and those that survived would be unable to take off. Certainly, this would be a PLA priority.
The Project 2049 Institute’s Ian Easton, however, persuasively argues in his book, The Chinese Invasion Threat, that this is not
such a simple task for the PLA and that even PLA commanders believe they will ultimately have to
contend with ROCAF fighter jets taking to the sky. On the one hand, Easton admits, “No one in Taiwan’s defense planning circles
harbors any illusion that the air force could emerge from ballistic missile and cruise missile attacks in the same fashion it went into them. […] Early losses are
expected to be heavy.” But not so heavy as to effectively eliminate the air force as a factor in the fight:
Steps taken during the mobilization and force preservation stage of the anti-invasion plan are intended to ensure that
China would stand little chance of seizing air superiority in the first days of conflict. In the minds of even
optimistic PLA planners, the ROC A ir F orce represents a fleet-in-being, a vague menace whose full strength and
wartime role cannot be calculated out of the equation . Only the most foolish of generals disregards a mighty
air force hiding dispersed and deep in the mountains, waiting to strike out at a time and place of its choosing.
And strike out they would . In addition to striving to deny PLA air superiority, Taiwan’s fighters would
be tasked with striking airfields, docked ships, ground transportation infrastructure, logistics, and radars in China as well
as amphibious assault ships, escort vessels, minesweepers, and helicopters approaching Taiwanese shores. Fighters
would not be alone in those tasks, with surface-launched cruise and ballistic missiles, capital ships, small missile boats, submarines,
attack helicopters, multiple launch rocket systems, and drones all contributing to the fight. This diversity of strike options
vastly complicates PLA planning in a way that a predominant or sole reliance on land-based missiles would not.
Link---Capabilities---Jets---A2: Other Planes
Other jets don’t fill-in
Unfortunately, Taiwan
cannot simply get by with the aircraft already in its inventory . Taiwan’s F-5s serve
only in a training role, spare parts for its Mirage-2000s are difficult to come by , and its Indigenous
Defense Fighters are soon to be outdated. Retirement of the F-5s and Mirage-2000s is imminent.
Taiwan is upgrading its F-16A/Bs, purchased from the United States in 1992, but that represents a stopgap measure. If
Taiwan is to have an air force to speak of, new aircraft is a necessity.
Link---Capabilities---Subs
Arms sales to help Taiwan acquire subs are key to deterrence – prevent a blockade
Cheng 15 ---- Dean, former senior analyst, first with Science Applications International Corporation,
former senior analyst for the China Studies division of the Center for Naval Analyses, bachelor's degree
in politics (Princeton University), “Why Taiwan Needs Submarines,” 1/12, Heritage,
https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/why-taiwan-needs-submarines
Thirteen years later, Taiwan’s submarine arm still consists of two ex-Dutch submarines and two boats most of whose peers
are now museum exhibits . Years of on-again, off-again discussions have not resulted in an actual sale from the United States or any other nation. More
seriously, there has also been no movement in facilitating American shipwrights’ and experts’ engagement with their Taiwanese counterparts to allow Taiwan to build
its own boats.
Taiwan’s Maritime Security Situation
An island nation, Taiwan is one of the most densely populated territories on earth , with over 630 persons
per square kilometer. The 23 million people on the island are almost wholly dependent on imports for both food
and energy.
Equally important, Taiwan’s security depends on the ability to challenge the ability of the Chinese People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) to cross the islands and mount an invasion, or impose a blockade that would leave the residents
starving and in the dark. The PLA’s main planning guidelines appear to focus, still, on taking Taiwan . The PLA’s best
forces, and much of its strategic and operational thinking, appear to be oriented toward either taking
Taiwan or countering any American attempt to prevent such Chinese actions .
Because of the disparity in physical size, economy, and geography, Taiwan’s maritime security in the face of
the Chinese threat is a challenging problem. China has the wherewithal to simultaneously bombard Taiwan
(especially with its large arsenal of short-range and medium-range ballistic missiles), while also being able to deploy forces farther afield of
Taiwan’s immediate environment. For Taipei, the key to a successful defense of the island is to hold out long enough
for the United States to intervene decisively . Taiwan’s military must therefore be able to
simultaneously defend the island, while also nonetheless being able to deny the Chinese regime the ability
to easily or rapidly isolate the island.
Submarines have long played a role in Taiwan’s defense calculations . Given the relative weakness of
China’s anti-submarine warfare capabilities, submarines would pose a significant threat to any amphibious force. Indeed, the
record of the British Royal Navy during the Falklands would suggest a disproportionate effect from even a
handful of modern submarines . On the one hand, the sinking of the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano led the
Argentines to withdraw all naval forces from the British-declared exclusion zone.
At the same time, however , even though the Royal Navy was considered the premier anti-sub marine force in NATO, it
failed to find the Argentine sub ARA San Luis.[1] That boat managed to remain at sea for over a month, and despite the best efforts of NATO’s
premier anti-submarine force, was apparently able to operate relatively unhindered. The Royal Navy expended substantial amounts of ordnance against a variety of
false contacts, depleting its stocks for no real effect.[2] Indeed, but for problems with its fire control system, that Argentine sub might well have
changed the course of the battle , as it repeatedly achieved firing solutions on elements of the British task force.[3]
In light of the importance of submarines , and given Taiwan’s aging fleet , the U.S. in April 2001 committed
to helping Taiwan acquire up to eight diesel-electric submarines. This commitment was complicated by the reality that the
United States has not built diesel-electric submarines since the 1950s, as the U.S. Navy transitioned to an all-nuclear power submarine force. As the U.S. has no
intention of transferring nuclear-powered subs to Taiwan, the United States was, in effect, promising to help Taiwan acquire such systems from third parties.
Modern subs are key to Taiwan’s defense – arms sales shape deterrence when China
is becoming extremely aggressive
in politics (Princeton University), “Why Taiwan Needs Submarines,” 1/12, Heritage,
https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/why-taiwan-needs-submarines
It is in U.S. security interests to ensure that Taiwan maintains a sufficiently robust defense that it can
deter Chinese aggression , especially as China has become increasingly assertive throughout the East
Asian littoral in recent years. The relatively quiet state of the Taiwan Straits may well change after the 2016 Taiwan presidential elections, particularly
given likely Chinese reaction to a Democratic Progressive Party victory. Recent Chinese actions toward Hong Kong have probably torpedoed any prospect of the “one
country, two systems” approach that Beijing has long proffered to Taiwan. The U nited S tates should:
Allow the “Conception Definition and Design Source Selection” phase to proceed promptly. Congress should direct the Department of State to either allow this to
move forward, or provide a formal explanation on why it is failing to do so.
Allow American shipbuilders and weapons manufacturers to cooperate with Taiwanese corporations in assessing Taiwan’s
capabilities and forward bids on relevant sensors and weapons systems. At the same time, the U.S. should also allow the sale of additional
submarine weapons (e.g., submarine-launched Harpoon missiles) that are already in the Taiwanese inventory.
Continue to encourage other manufacturers of conventional (diesel-electric) submarines to cooperate with Taiwan. The prospect of Japan engaging in arms sales, and
specifically the export of submarines to Australia, raises the possibility of additional, non-traditional suppliers who might be additional sources of either submarine
technology, or even completed boats.
Taiwan’s defense would be strengthened with more modern submarines . The U.S., as Taiwan’s best, and
often only, friend , should help Taipei acquire an underwater force, which would benefit not only Taiwan,
but America’s defense posture in the western Pacific. To this end, the United States should provide options that enable Taiwan to meet its
requirements in the most cost-effective way possible. Because leaving Taiwan with a single—extremely costly—option for fulfilling its defense needs puts Taiwan’s
democracy and defense in a very precarious position.
Link---Relations
US/China ties and lessened assurances of Taiwan risk cross-straight war
Bush 15 (December, Richard C. Bush is a senior fellow at The Brookings Institution in the Foreign
Policy Program. He is also the director of Brookings’s Center for East Asia Policy Studies and holder of
the Chen-fu and Cecilia Yen Koo Chair in Taiwan Studies. He served for 19 years in the U.S. government
—in the House of Representatives, the Intelligence Community, and as chairman and managing director
of the American Institute in Taiwan, Taiwan’s January 2016 Elections and Their Implications for
Relations with China and the United States,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2015/12/taiwan-elections-china-us-implications-
bush/taiwan-elections-china-us-implications-bush-final-2.pdf)
Logically, the outcome that would be best for the United States is a victory by Eric Chu, because his cross-Strait policies would be consistent
with Ma Ying-jeou’s, which have reduced the salience of the Taiwan issue in a U.S.-China relationship littered with other problems. But even as
Washington officials might hope for the best, they watch the Taiwan polls as closely as anyone. They know that if Tsai is elected, the United
States will have to work with her in order to protect its interests. Hence, they extended Tsai a proper welcome when she visited the
United States in June 2015, and took note of the reassurance she offered about her future policies . At the same time,
they know that Beijing has a very different view of the reliability of Tsai’s promises and that it may not respond with
the flexibility and restraint that they have encouraged. If Xi Jinping and his colleagues are bluffing (scenario three) and are willing to
accommodate to Tsai because of her victory, then cross-Strait relations will continue much as it has in the last few years. That would be
acceptable for the United States, as would my variant of scenario one (freezing cross-Strait interaction, limited punishment, plus a wait-and-see
attitude). But any version of scenario one comes with the risk that accident or misperception might eventually lead to deterioration in Taiwan-
Mainland ties. Worst for the United States is full scenario two: a freezing of cross-Strait relations accompanied by comprehensive punishment. If
scenario two occurs, the United States will probably have to return to dual deterrence. It cannot withdraw from the cross-Strait contest altogether
because U.S. allies and partners would likely read withdrawal as a sign that the U.S. security commitments to them are no longer dependable. It
cannot bless Tsai Ing-wen’s policies without qualification because that would create the possibility of “blank check” dynamics that complicated
U.S.-Taiwan relations during the last six years of the Chen Shui-bian administration. Urging each side to exercise restraint and
flexibility and warning against a unilateral change in the status quo by either side will continue to make
sense. Under scenario two, Washington will have to repeatedly judge which side is more responsible for damaging the positive state of cross-
Strait relations that it has valued since 2008. Both Beijing and Taipei will try to blame the other for any increased tensions and each would appeal
to different principles to make its case. Beijing will cite the U.S.’s declared non-support for Taiwan independence and Taiwan will assert that
Tsai’s policies reflect the will of the people as expressed through democratic elections. Each will have its own narrative about how the other is at
fault and will seek to find points of leverage with Washington. Part of dual deterrence is being willing to provide each side
with appropriate reassurances. Washington must make it clear to Taipei through word and deed that
it will not abandon it because it places a higher priority on its relations with China or is unwilling
to face Beijing if it unilaterally attempts to change the status quo. And, Washington should continue to remind Beijing that it does not
support Taiwan independence. At the same time, the United States must warn Taipei that it should exercise restraint in
taking initiatives that objectively bear on China’s interests . Simultaneously, it should continue to warn Beijing of its
“abiding interest” in peace and stability, and that China has an obligation along with Taiwan to help preserve it. The degree of mutual
dependence among all three parties is too great to risk an unnecessary conflict. Dual deterrence, which may
well be Washington’s best option for protecting its interest in peace and stability going forward, is never easy. It was hard to implement
during the 1995-2008 period. Since then, U.S.-China relations have become more competitive and less cooperative. China’s national power has
grown relative to that of both the United States and Taiwan. Some of the latter’s weaknesses are self-induced, the result of a dysfunctional system
that only its leaders can address. The credibility of Washington’s warnings and reassurances in this new context will be
as significant as the words that officials utter to their counterparts on each side of the Taiwan Strait. Despite the objective and subjective
changes in the balance of power, it will be Taiwan’s voters who will pick their leaders, as they should. Beijing will make its own judgment about
the implications of the results for all of its interests, and one can only hope that its assessment and the actions that follow will not stem from
unfounded analysis and an exaggerated feeling of vulnerability. Within the complex interplay of Taiwan’s democracy and
China’s fears and ambitions, the United States will have to make its way.
Link---Resolve/Signal---Taiwan
Sale of jets is vital for Taiwanese resolve – alternative strategies don’t bolster
morale
American commitment is useful for shoring up morale among Taiwan’s armed forces and in its broader
society. The aircraft themselves serve a similar purpose . The general population is unlikely to grasp the complex
intricacies of the island’s defense needs. Investments in SAM batteries and decoys, reinforced concrete, and other passive
defenses, as crucial as they are, are unlikely to instill Taiwan’s population with confidence in the island’s
ability to defend itself. On the other hand, everybody knows what a fighter jet is. Everybody knows what
a fearsome air force can do. Big-ticket items serve to boost morale and societal self-confidence and
that, in turn, enhances deterrence . A people that believes it can win a war is a people that will fight to
win a war.
Link---Resolve/Signal---US
Arms sales are key to signal of US resolve and willingness to support Taiwan
utility-of-new-fighter-aircraft-for-taiwans-defense-needs/ ***Modified for language
Despite the real military requirement for fighters, a common refrain of the “porcupine strategy” crowd is that Taiwan seeks the aircraft purely for their symbolic value.
While this is patently not the case, it is important to consider that symbolic
value is, in fact, value. Indeed, Taiwan’s purchase of new
fighter aircraft from the U nited S tates would serve a couple of important symbolic purposes . Most obviously, an
American decision to make the sale would be a clear statement of American commitment to Taiwan’s defense .
Indeed, it is worth considering that the sale would include not only the aircraft themselves, but logistical
support and pilot training—which means that ROCAF pilots would be flying ROCAF fighters on American air bases
alongside US airmen [pilots]. This would make for undoubtedly useful signaling at a time when Beijing seems
increasingly eager to snuff out Taiwan’s de facto independence .
Cutting arms sales crushes credibility – risks appeasing China – no one can fill-in
and deterrence high
in politics (Princeton University), “Don't Listen To China: U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan Are Right Thing to
Do,” The National Interest, 10/2, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/dont-listen-china-us-arms-sales-
taiwan-are-right-thing-do-32397
The U nited S tates on Sept. 24 announced a new set of arms sales to Taiwan. Valued at $330 million, this sale comprises mainly spare parts and
equipment to support Taiwan’s air force, including its F-16s and C-130s.
This marks the second major arms sale to Taiwan by the Trump administration, following a $1.4 billion sale in June 2017 that
included long-range missiles and heavy torpedoes.
Not surprisingly, Beijing promptly denounced the sale. The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman declared that “the U.S. arms sales to Taiwan severely violates the
international law [and] the basic norms governing international relations.”
The Chinese Defense Ministry spokesman warned that the U.S. move severely violated U.S.-China relations, “interfered with China’s domestic affairs and harmed
China’s sovereignty and security interests, and seriously damaged China-U.S. ties, relations between the two militaries, as well as peace and stability across the
Taiwan Strait.”
The arms sales announcement came not only amid another round of tariffs in the slowly escalating trade clashes between the United States and China, but also right
after the U.S. imposed sanctions against the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA).
Because the Chinese purchased Su-35 fighter jets and S-400 surface-to-air missiles from Russia, the U.S. announced sanctions required by the Countering America’s
Adversaries Through Sanctions Act of 2017 against the PLA’s Equipment Development Department and its director, Lt. Gen. Li Shangfu.
The Chinese, meanwhile, canceled a meeting between Vice Adm. Shen Jinlong (head of the Chinese navy) and U.S. Chief of Naval Operations John Richardson with
only 48 hours’ notice.
They also denied the USS Wasp access to Hong Kong for a port call. It is unclear whether these Chinese actions are more in response to the sanctions or the arms
sales, or perhaps the broader deterioration of U.S.-China ties.
The new arms sales will help Taiwan maintain some semblance of credibility in its own defense,
especially in the air. As China has increased its pressure on Taiwan (e.g., employing financial
diplomacy to erode Taiwan’s diplomatic standing), preserving Taiwan’s ability to maintain control of its own airspace
will be vital.
They are part of a larger mosaic of U.S. efforts to express support for Taiwan , including the 2018
Taiwan Travel Act, the decision of then-President-elect Donald Trump to take a call from Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen, and the recent
opening of a new U.S. diplomatic facility in Taipei.
This is an important policy . As Taiwan’s most vital partner, the U.S. must push back against Chinese
encroachment on it. If it does not, no one else will. It also upholds long-standing bipartisan precedent ,
set by every American president since Richard Nixon and Jimmy Carter.
*** INTERNAL LINK
A2: Credibility Theory False
Policymakers believe it
Tang 5 – Shiping Tang, associate research fellow and deputy director of the Center for Regional
Security Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing, January-March, “Reputation, Cult
of Reputation, and International Conflict,” Security Studies, Vol. 14, No. 1, p. 34-62
The problem, of course, is that politicians usually

do not have such nuanced understandings of credibility, reputation,
resolve, and capability.24 Too often, they fight for behavioral reputation for resolve and hope to improve their
bargaining reputation (thus credibility) in the future. By doing so, they confuse themselves, mislead their domestic audiences,
and squander their countries’ blood and treasure for the wrong commodity. In fact, most strategists and politicians have either lumped the two
kinds of reputation together or believed that behavioral reputation can easily be converted into bargaining reputation (that is, they have
believed that commitments are interdependent or that reputation is fungible ). Because developing and maintaining a
behavioral reputation for being resolute is desirable, many politicians and strategists undertake certain tasks ex ante to develop such a reputation,
without ever questioning whether having a behavioral reputation is possible at all. This practice, as discussed below, informs one central
belief behind the
cult of reputation . Perhaps because behavioral reputation is something that may count in the
future, moreover, it is the type of reputation about which decisionmakers are most concerned.25 In fact, decisionmakers
actually may bargain hard largely because they care more about their future behavioral reputation. This article thus focuses on behavioral
reputation for resolve (which hereafter will be referred to as “reputation” unless specified otherwise).
Theory’s true – strong empirical basis

Gibler 8 (Douglas M., Professor of Political Science – University of Alabama, “The Costs of Reneging:
Reputation and Alliance Formation”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 52(3), June, p. 4)
More sophisticated treatments of the reputation logic have been produced by formal theorists , both in
economics and in political science . In economics, the ability of firm reputation to deter competition has been well analyzed (see
Kreps and Wilson, 1982; Wilson, 1989; and Weigelt and Camerer, 1988), and political scientists have adopted these theories as tools in
understanding the types of signals leaders can send (see for example, Alt, Calvert, and Humes, 1988; Ordeshook, 1986; and Wagner, 1992).
Sartori (2002) and Guisinger and Smith (2002) probably go furthest in arguing that leaders and their envoys have incentives to
develop certain types of reputations in order to overcome the uncertainty endemic to crisis diplomacy. In these models, a
reputation for honesty allows the sender to credibly give information that would otherwise be “cheap
talk”, and thus, leaders may concede less important issues, without bluffing , in order to maintain a reputation for
honesty when more important issues arise (Sartori, 2002: 122). The sum argument of these statements and theoretical treatments is
clear. Decision-makers argue and act , at least in part, based on reputations . Traditional deterrence theory suggests
reputations should be pursued by leaders as important and manipulable tools, which are useful in future crises. Formal theorists agree;
reputations provide valuable information when the costs of signaling are low.
A2: Deterrence Resilient---Nuke Umbrella
Nuclear umbrella alone is insufficient – three warrants – stability/instability paradox
renders massive retaliation not credible, conventional means resolve de-coupling risks,
and US opposition to mutual vulnerability
The comprehensive approach to strengthening extended deterrence clearly embeds the nuclear
component of the strategy in a larger policy construct . As one analyst has described it, “the nuclear umbrella has become the
pinnacle of a security dome.”13 The U nited S tates has set out this comprehensive approach as opposed to relying on
nuclear means alone for three basic reasons. First, the threat of U.S. nuclear use may not always be
credible in the eyes of the individual(s) the United States might seek to deter. Some enemy may convince
itself that there are forms of nuclear attack (or other forms of attack) that fall beneath the U.S. response threshold.
For example, an enemy might believe that nuclear attack primarily to generate e lectro m agnetic p ulse effects on nearby
conventional forces might escape a U.S. nuclear response . This could be a serious miscalculation but, from a
deterrence perspective, this scenario highlights the value of supplemental non-nuclear elements in the deterrence
architecture. Second, whether or not nuclear threats are credible , the non-nuclear components of this strategy
offer valuable deterrence benefits . For example, b allistic m issile d efense of the U.S. homeland mitigates de-coupling risks
by greatly reducing if not eliminating risks run by the United States in defending its allies. And b allistic m issile d efense within the
region protects key assets from an enemy’s preemptive strikes, enables offensive operations to begin at a time of
our choosing rather than the enemy’s, and raises the scale of attack that an attacker must attempt if it wants to overwhelm the
defense (severely limiting the credibility of threats to launch a small number of weapons while holding more in reserve). These
strategic benefits help to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in regional deterrence architectures
even while a core element remains, given the fundamental role of nuclear weapons in deterring nuclear attack. Third, the United
States flatly rejects mutual vulnerability as the basis of the strategic relationship with states like North Korea and Iran that violate
international obligations, destabilize their regions and threaten their neighbors, and threaten the United States with nuclear attack. The global security
environment would become deeply unstable if such states were to conclude that they are free under their
own nuclear umbrellas to coerce their neighbors and commit aggression.14
A2: No Spillover
Nations pay attention to other regions – plan’s action gets perceived by key allies
Further from a U.S. perspective, partnership with allies in three different regions provides many opportunities for
cross-fertilization . To varying degrees, analysts and policy makers pay attention to developments in
other regions with an eye to their local implications. Analysts in Japan have examined multiple
developments in Europe for their impact on the East Asian security environment. NATO’s nuclear
debate has been of interest in Japan. Michito Tsuruoka, for example, sees an opportunity for a nuclear policy
dialogue between experts in Japan and Europe: “ despite considerable differences in their respective security
situations, the two communities [transatlantic and Asian] face similar challenges concerning extended
deterrence ” and interaction between the two communities “might create fresh perspectives and new policy dynamics.”20
NATO’s proposal that Russia re-locate tactical nuclear weapons away from the Euro-Atlantic security environment has sparked concern in Japan, as it appears that
NATO is seeking to export its problems to East Asia, much as it seemed ready to do in the early 1980s when many in NATO advocated for re-location of Soviet
nuclear-tipped intermediate-range nuclear forces to somewhere East of the Ural mountains (where they might have targeted Japan).21 Yukio Satoh has argued that:
“the Strategic Concept adopted at NATO’s Lisbon Summit in 2010…fell short of what Japan had expected of NATO: a global perspective from which to address the
issue of nuclear weapons.”22
*** IMPACT
Allied Confidence---A2: No Impact
Lack of Asian ally confidence in US triggers multiple wars throughout the region
and wrecks global leadership
Goh, 8 – Lecturer in International Relations in the Department of Politics and International Relations at
the University of Oxford (Evelyn, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, “Hierarchy and the role of
the United States in the East Asian security order,” 2008 8(3):353-377, Oxford Journals Database)
The centrality of these mutual processes of assurance and deference means that the stability of a hierarchical order is fundamentally related to a collective sense of certainty about the leadership and order of the hierarchy. This certainty is rooted in a combination of material calculations –
smaller states' assurance that the expected costs of the dominant state conquering them would be higher than the benefits – and ideational convictions – the sense of legitimacy, derived from shared values and norms that accompanies the super-ordinate state's authority in the social order. The
regional stability in East Asia

empirical analysis in the next section shows that can be correlated to the degree of collective in the post-Second World War years
certainty about the US-led regional hierarchy. East Asian stability and instability has been determined by
U.S. assurances, self-confidence, and commitment to maintaining its primary position in the regional
hierarchy; the perceptions and confidence of regional states about US commitment ; and the reactions of subordinate states in the region to the
the regional hierarchy in East Asia is still dominated by the U

varied challengers to the regional hierarchical order. 4. Hierarchy and the East Asian security order Currently, nited
S tates. Since the 1970s, China has increasingly claimed the position of second-ranked great power, a claim that is today legitimized by the hierarchical deference shown by smaller subordinate powers such as South Korea and Southeast Asia. Japan and South Korea can, by virtue of their
alliance with the United States, be seen to occupy positions in a third layer of regional major powers, while India is ranked next on the strength of its new strategic relationship with Washington. North Korea sits outside the hierarchic order but affects it due to its military prowess and nuclear
weapons capability. Apart from making greater sense of recent history, conceiving of the US' role in East Asia as the dominant state in the regional hierarchy helps to clarify three critical puzzles in the contemporary international and East Asian security landscape. First, it contributes to
Three of the key potential global challengers to US unipolarity

explaining the lack of sustained challenges to American global preponderance after the end of the Cold War.
originate in Asia (China, India, and Japan), and their support for or acquiescence to, US dominance have
helped to stabilize its global leadership. Through its dominance of the Asian regional hierarchy, the U nited
S has been able to neutralize the potential threats to its position from Japan via an alliance
tates , from India by gradually identifying
and from China by encircling and deterring it with allied and friendly states that
and pursuing mutual commercial and strategic interests,
support American preponderance. recognizing US hierarchical preponderance further explains

Secondly,
contemporary under-balancing in Asia, both against a rising China, and against incumbent American
power. I have argued that one defining characteristic of a hierarchical system is voluntary subordination of lesser states to the dominant state, and that this goes beyond rationalistic bandwagoning because it is manifested in a social contract that comprises the related processes of
successful and sustainable hierarchical assurance and deference helps to explain

hierarchical assurance and hierarchical deference. Critically,
why Japan is not yet a ‘normal’ country. Japan has experienced significant impetus to revise and expand the remit of its security forces in the last 15 years. Yet, these pressures continue to be insufficient to prompt a
the U S extends its security umbrella over Japan

wholesale revision of its constitution and its remilitarization. The reason is that which has led
nited tates through their alliance,
Tokyo not only to perceive no threat from US dominance, but has in fact helped to forge a security
community between them Adjustments in burden sharing in this alliance
(Nau, 2003).have arisen since the 1990s not from greater independent
from periods of strategic uncertainty and crises for Japan when it appeared that American
Japanese strategic activism, but rather
hierarchical assurance, along with US' position at the top of the regional hierarchy, was in question. the Thus,
Japanese priority in taking on more responsibility for regional security has been to improve its ability to
facilitate the US' central position, rather than to challenge it. 13 In the face of the security threats from North Korea and China, Tokyo's continued reliance on the security pact with the
United States is rational. While there remains debate about Japan's re-militarization and the growing clout of nationalist ‘hawks’ in Tokyo, for regional and domestic political reasons, a sustained ‘normalization’ process cannot take place outside of the restraining framework of the United
Abandoning the alliance will entail Japan making a conscience choice not only to
States–Japan alliance (Samuels, 2007; Pyle, 2007).
remove itself from the US-led hierarchy, but also to challenge the U S dominance directly. nited tates The United States–ROK alliance
may be understood in a similar way, although South Korea faces different sets of constraints because of its strategic priorities related to North Korea. As J.J. Suh argues, in spite of diminishing North Korean capabilities, which render the US security umbrella less critical, the alliance endures
because of mutual identification – in South Korea, the image of the US as ‘the only conceivable protector against aggression from the North,’ and in the United States, an image of itself as protector of an allied nation now vulnerable to an ‘evil’ state suspected of transferring weapons of mass
destruction to terrorist networks (Suh, 2004). Kang, in contrast, emphasizes how South Korea has become less enthusiastic about its ties with the United States – as indicated by domestic protests and the rejection of TMD – and points out that Seoul is not arming against a potential land
invasion from China but rather maritime threats (Kang, 2003, pp.79–80). These observations are valid, but they can be explained by hierarchical deference toward the United States, rather than China. The ROK's military orientation reflects its identification with and dependence on the United
States and its adoption of US' strategic aims. In spite of its primary concern with the North Korean threat, Seoul's formal strategic orientation is toward maritime threats, in line with Washington's regional strategy. Furthermore, recent South Korean Defense White Papers habitually cited a
remilitarized Japan as a key threat. The best means of coping with such a threat would be continued reliance on the US security umbrella and on Washington's ability to restrain Japanese remilitarization (Eberstadt et al., 2007). Thus, while the United States–ROK bilateral relationship is not
always easy, its durability is based on South Korea's fundamental acceptance of the United States as the region's primary state and reliance on it to defend and keep regional order. It also does not rule out Seoul and other US allies conducting business and engaging diplomatically with China.
India has increasingly adopted a similar strategy vis-à-vis China in recent years. Given its history of territorial and political disputes with China and its contemporary economic resurgence, India is seen as the key potential power balancer to a growing China. Yet, India has sought to negotiate
settlements about border disputes with China, and has moved significantly toward developing closer strategic relations with the United States. Apart from invigorated defense cooperation in the form of military exchange programs and joint exercises, the key breakthrough was the agreement
signed in July 2005 which facilitates renewed bilateral civilian nuclear cooperation (Mohan, 2007). Once again, this is a key regional power that could have balanced more directly and independently against China, but has rather chosen to align itself or bandwagon with the primary power, the
United States, partly because of significant bilateral gains, but fundamentally in order to support the latter's regional order-managing function. Recognizing a regional hierarchy and seeing that the lower layers of this hierarchy have become more active since the mid-1970s also allows us to
understand why there has been no outright balancing of China by regional states since the 1990s. On the one hand, the US position at the top of the hierarchy has been revived since the mid-1990s, meaning that deterrence against potential Chinese aggression is reliable and in place.14 On the
other hand, the aim of regional states is to try to consolidate China's inclusion in the regional hierarchy at the level below that of the United States, not to keep it down or to exclude it. East Asian states recognize that they cannot, without great cost to themselves, contain Chinese growth. But
they hope to socialize China by enmeshing it in peaceful regional norms and economic and security institutions. They also know that they can also help to ensure that the capabilities gap between China and the United States remains wide enough to deter a power transition. Because this
strategy requires persuading China about the appropriateness of its position in the hierarchy and of the legitimacy of the US position, all East Asian states engage significantly with China, with the small Southeast Asian states refusing openly to ‘choose sides’ between the United States and
China. Yet, hierarchical deference continues to explain why regional institutions such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN + 3, and East Asian Summit have made limited progress. While the United State has made room for regional multilateral institutions after the end of the Cold War,
its hierarchical preponderance also constitutes the regional order to the extent that it cannot comfortably be excluded from any substantive strategic developments. On the part of some lesser states (particularly Japan and Singapore), hierarchical deference is manifested in inclusionary
impulses (or at least impulses not to exclude the United States or US proxies) in regional institutions, such as the East Asia Summit in December 2005. Disagreement on this issue with others, including China and Malaysia, has stymied potential progress in these regional institutions (Malik,
2006). Finally, conceiving of a US-led East Asian hierarchy amplifies our understanding of how and why the United States–China relationship is now the key to regional order. The vital nature of the Sino-American relationship stems from these two states' structural positions. As discussed
earlier, China is the primary second-tier power in the regional hierarchy. However, as Chinese power grows and Chinese activism spreads beyond Asia, the United States is less and less able to see China as merely a regional power – witness the growing concerns about Chinese investment
and aid in certain African countries. This causes a disjuncture between US global interests and US regional interests. Regional attempts to engage and socialize China are aimed at mediating its intentions. This process, however, cannot stem Chinese growth, which forms the material basis of
US threat perceptions. Apprehensions about the growth of China's power culminates in US fears about the region being ‘lost’ to China, echoing Cold War concerns that transcribed regional defeats into systemic setbacks.15 On the other hand, the US security strategy post-Cold War and post-
9/11 have regional manifestations that disadvantage China. The strengthening of US alliances with Japan and Australia; and the deployment of US troops to Central, South, and Southeast Asia all cause China to fear a consolidation of US global hegemony that will first threaten Chinese
national security in the regional context and then stymie China's global reach. Thus, the key determinants of the East Asian security order relate to two core questions: (i) Can the US be persuaded that China can act as a reliable ‘regional stakeholder’ that will help to buttress regional stability
and US global security aims;16 and (ii) can China be convinced that the United States has neither territorial ambitions in Asia nor the desire to encircle China, but will help to promote Chinese development and stability as part of its global security strategy? (Wang, 2005). But, these questions
cannot be asked in the abstract, outside the context of negotiation about their relative positions in the regional and global hierarchies. One urgent question for further investigation is how the process of assurance and deference operate at the topmost levels of a hierarchy? When we have two
great powers of unequal strength but contesting claims and a closing capabilities gap in the same regional hierarchy, how much scope for negotiation is there, before a reversion to balancing dynamics? This is the main structural dilemma: as long as the United States does not give up its
the East Asian regional order is constituted

primary position in the Asian regional hierarchy, China is very unlikely to act in a way that will provide comforting answers to the two questions. Yet, has been and still
by US hegemony, and to change that could be extremely disruptive and may lead to regional actors acting
in highly destabilizing ways. Rapid Japanese remilitarization, armed conflict across the Taiwan
Straits, Indian nuclear brinksmanship directed toward Pakistan, or a highly destabilized Korean
peninsula are all illustrative of potential regional disruptions. 5. Conclusion To construct a coherent account of East Asia's evolving security order, I have suggested that
the U S is the central force in constituting regional stability and order.

nited tates The major patterns of equilibrium and turbulence in the region since 1945 can be explained
periods of greatest insecurity being correlated with greatest uncertainty

by the relative stability of the US position at the top of the regional hierarchy, with
over the American commitment to managing regional order. Furthermore, relationships of hierarchical assurance and hierarchical deference explain the unusual character of regional
order in the post-Cold War era. However, the greatest contemporary challenge to East Asian order is the potential conflict between China and the United States over rank ordering in the regional hierarchy, a contest made more potent because of the inter-twining of regional and global security
concerns. Ultimately, though, investigating such questions of positionality requires conceptual lenses that go beyond basic material factors because it entails social and normative questions. How can China be brought more into a leadership position, while being persuaded to buy into shared
strategic interests and constrain its own in ways that its vision of regional and global security may eventually be reconciled with that of the United States and other regional players? How can Washington be persuaded that its central position in the hierarchy must be ultimately shared in ways
The future of the East Asian security order is tightly bound up with the durability of the U S
yet to be determined? nited tates'
global leadership and regional domination. At the regional level, the main scenarios of disruption are an
outright Chinese challenge to US leadership, or the defection of key US allies, particularly Japan. Recent history
defections from US leadership will come at junctures where it appears that the
suggests, and the preceding analysis has shown, that challenges to or
US commitment to the region is in doubt, which in turn destabilizes the hierarchical order. At the global level, American geopolitical
over-extension will be the key cause of change. This is the one factor that could lead to both greater regional and global turbulence, if only by the attendant strategic uncertainly triggering off regional challenges or defections. However, it is notoriously difficult to gauge thresholds of over-
extension. More positively, East Asia is a region that has adjusted to previous periods of uncertainty about US primacy. Arguably, the regional consensus over the United States as primary state in a system of benign hierarchy could accommodate a shifting of the strategic burden to US allies
like Japan and Australia as a means of systemic preservation. The alternatives that could surface as a result of not doing so would appear to be much worse.
Heg---A2: Heg Unsustainable
Heg is sustainable and solves great power war---no fill-in
Kagan 16 Robert, Senior Fellow, Project on International Order and Strategy at the Brookings
Institution, Why America Must Lead, Winter 2016, http://www.bushcenter.org/catalyst/leadership/why-
america-must-lead.html
The liberalworld order that was created in the aftermath of the Second World War is today being challenged by a variety of forces —
by powerful authoritarian
governments and anti-liberal fundamentalist movements , as well as by long-term shifts in the global
economy. Great power competition has returned . In Europe , Russia has launched the first cross-border
invasion of a neighboring country since World War II. In East Asia , China is expanding its reach as a military
power , seeking both economic and strategic hegemony at the risk of destabilizing that critical region. In the Middle
East, Iran is expanding its influence and Islamic jihadists have gained control of more territory . In the
face of this turmoil, many Americans have come to doubt whether there is anything the United States can do or should do in response. Many assume either that it
doesn’t matter very much what happens beyond America’s shores or that the United States no longer has the wisdom or capacity to shape events and prevent others
from doing what they please. Only seven years ago, pundits were talking of a “post-American world,” with a declining
United States and a remarkable “rise of the rest.” These days, however, that prognosis appears to have been at best
premature . Only seven years ago, pundits were talking of a “post-American world,” with a declining United States and a remarkable “rise of the rest.” These
days, however, that prognosis appears to have been at best premature. America has substantially recovered from the Great
Recession , while the once-heralded “rise of the rest” has stalled . Many around the world who once
decried American overseas involvement as “hegemonic” now seek greater American engagement in
international affairs. Widespread Support for US Actions Against ISIS Pew Research Center: Support for U.S. Actions against ISIS Among the
American public, too, there are signs of greater receptivity to a more active American global role . What is
missing for most Americans, however, is a sense of strategy and purpose in American foreign policy. During the Cold War, fear of the Soviet Union and international
communism did not always produce agreement on policy but did provide an answer, for most, as to why the United States needed to play an international role and
what that role should be. Today, our political leaders need to remind Americans that our fundamental interests are still
best served by upholding the world order — economic, political, and strategic — that was established at the end of the
Second World War and that was further strengthened and entrenched by the revolutions of 1989. Americans need to recognize their nation’s
central role in maintaining the present international order and muster the will to use their still formidable
power and influence to support that order against its inevitable challengers . Supporting Democracy is a Matter of National
Security What will this require? Above all, it means working to shore up all three pillars – politics, economics, security — of what has made
the American-led world order so remarkable. There is a tendency to separate politics, economics, and security — “ideals” from “interests,”
support for democracy from defense of security — but in the present world order they have all been related. Start with the reality that a world order that supports
freedom will only be supported by free nations. Supporting
democracy is not just a matter of keeping faith with our own values. It is a matter of
national security. Americans and other free peoples who benefit from and support the present world order therefore have an interest in supporting democracy
where it exists and in pressing for greater democratic reforms in the world’s authoritarian nations, including the two great power autocracies. Supporting democracy is
not just a matter of keeping faith with our own values. It is a matter of national security. In their economic policies, Americans need to continue
promoting and strengthening the international free trade and free market regime . This, of course, means setting
their own economy back on a course of sustainable growth. It means doing a better job of educating and training Americans to compete with others in an increasingly
competitive international economy. It means providing a healthy environment for technological innovation. But it also means
resisting protectionist
temptations and using American influence , along with other free-trading nations, to push back against some of the
tendencies of state capitalism in China and elsewhere . Gaining congressional approval of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, or TPP, and
then moving to agreement on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership with Europe, are critical, and not only for their economic benefits. They also are a
critical step in knitting the democratic world more closely together. But it also means resisting protectionist temptations and using American influence, along with
other free-trading nations, to push back against some of the tendencies of state capitalism in China and elsewhere. In Asia, especially, this is more much than a trade
issue. Although the United States stands to benefit from the agreement, it is, above all, a strategic issue. The
United States and China are locked
in a competition across the spectrum of power and influence. Militarily, the Chinese seek to deny
American access to the region and hope thereby to divide the United States from its allies . Economically,
China would like to turn Asia into a region of Chinese hegemony, where every key trade relationship is with Beijing. In such a world, the United States is a net loser
— providing costly security to allies but not much else, while China reaps the economic rewards and grabs the hearts and minds, and pocketbooks, of regional players.
Finally, there is the matter of American hard power . What has been true since the time of Rome remains true today: there can be
no world order without power to preserve it, to shape its norms, uphold its institutions, defend the
sinews of its economic system, and keep the peace . Military power can be abused, wielded unwisely and
ineffectively. It can be deployed to answer problems that it cannot answer or that have no answer. But it is also essential . No nation or group
of nations that renounced power could expect to maintain any kind of world order. If the United States begins
to look like a less reliable defender of the present order, that order will begin to unravel . It remains true today as
it has since the Second World War that only the United States has the capacity and the unique geographical
advantages to provide global security. There can be no stable balance of power in Europe or Asia
without the United States . And while we can talk about soft power and smart power, they have been and always will
be of limited value when confronting raw military power. Despite all of the loose talk of American decline, it is in the
military realm where U.S. advantages remain clearest . Even in other great power’s backyards, the United States retains
the capacity, along with its powerful allies, to deter challenges to the security order. But without a U.S. willingness to
play the role of providing balance in far-flung regions of the world, the system will buckle under the
unrestrained military competition of regional powers . Without a U.S. willingness to play the role of providing balance in far-
flung regions of the world, the system will buckle under the unrestrained military competition of regional powers. Today, as a result of the Budget Control Act and a
general unwillingness to spend adequately on defense, America’s ability to play this vital role is coming increasingly under question. Current defense spending has
created a readiness crisis within the armed forces. Only a handful of Army brigades are available for use in a crisis. The army is about to be forced to cut 40,000
soldiers from its active force. There are too few ships to provide a U.S. presence in the multiple hotspots that have sprouted up around the world. As the bipartisan,
congressionally-mandated National Defense Panel has argued, the
U.S. military must be able to deter or stop aggression in
multiple theaters, not just one, even when engaged in a large-scale war. It needs to be able to fight ISIS and deter Iran in
the Middle East, deter Russia in Europe and Syria, and in Asia deter North Korea and maintain
stability in the face of a rising China . Consider the threat now posed by Iran. Whatever one thinks about the recently-
concluded nuclear deal, any serious strategy aimed at resisting Iranian domination also requires confronting Iran
on the several fronts of the Middle East battlefield. In Syria, it requires a determined policy to remove
Iran’s close ally, Basher al-Assad, using U.S. air power to provide cover for civilians and creating a safe zone
for Syrians willing to fight. In Iraq, it requires using American forces to push back and destroy the forces
of the Islamic State so that we do not have to rely, de facto, on Iranian power to do the job. Overall, it requires a
greater U.S. military commitment to the region, a reversal of both the perceived and the real withdrawal of American power. And therefore it
requires a reversal of the downward trend in U.S. defense spending, which has made it harder for the military even to think about addressing these challenges, should
it be called upon to do so. The challenge we face today is to decide whether this liberal world order is worth defending and whether the United States is still willing to
it will require a renewal of American
play the role of its principal champion. The answer to both questions ought to be “yes,” but
leadership in the international system , economically, politically, and strategically. It will also require a
renewed understanding of how important and unique the present liberal world order is , both for
Americans and for peoples all across the globe . The simple fact is that for all the difficulties and suffering of the past 70 years, the period
since the end of World War II has been unique in the history of the human race. The period since the end of World War II has been unique in the history of the human
There has
race. Democratic government, once rare, has spread to over 100 nations around the world, on every continent, for peoples of all races and religions.
been an unprecedented growth in prosperity. Billions have been lifted out of poverty. Democratic government, once
rare, has spread to over 100 nations around the world, on every continent, for peoples of all races and religions. Although the period has been marked by war, peace
among the great powers has been preserved. There has been no recurrence of the two devastating world wars of the first half of the 20th century. This world order has
been a boon for billions around the world, but it has also served American interests. Any
other world order, one in which the United
States had to cede power and influence to China and Russia , or what is more likely, a descent into
disorder , is unlikely to serve Americans’ interests as well.
Heg is sustainable
Rubinovitz 12 (Ziv, Post-doctoral Fellow – Davis Institute for International Relations, The Hebrew
University of Jerusalem, “The US vs. the East Asian Rising Powers: Can The US Stay On Top?”,
Presented at the 22nd IPSA World Congress, Madrid, July 8-12, 2012,
http://rc41.ipsa.org/public/Madrid_2012/rubinovitz.pdf)
The Argument
This paper views the international system with geographical and geopolitical eyes. For this reason, it uses geographical facts as factors in analyzing the current global
system and its future prospects. The argument this paper will promote is that the U.S.
physical location and geopolitical position are the
cornerstones of its foreign policy and serve as a "safety net" from foreign powers' assaults (not perfect, obviously, as became painfully clear
on September 11, 2001). The U.S., unlike any other great or superpower – now or anytime – can decide whether or not and to what
extent will it be involved in international affairs . Isolationism was a practical policy (regardless of its success) for approximately twenty years
since the end of World War I until Pearl Harbor (1941). Even though since the end of World War II the United States is conducting an opposite strategy, theoretically
and hypothetically it can be resumed, perhaps not to the extent it was in the 1920s-1930s, but a sort of isolationism is possible. No other country can afford such a
policy because all other powers are on the same continent and cannot disregard one another.
Moreover, the U.S. is still – and will
remain in the foreseeable future – the naval superpower with the most powerful navy that
has the best power-projection capabilities . It can afford to leave the continent and become an offshore balancer. True, it will lose some
of its influence, but it can preserve its power on the sea and project it restrictedly whenever needed. So, very briefly, the
U.S. has a much wider room for maneuver than is presumed, and with the most powerful military with no
parallel in the foreseeable future, the U.S. still has a wide spectrum of policies it can use, hence it is in the best position for the
coming hegemonic competition.
Literature Review
It is important to note that most of the literature is American, which is expected and logical, but also somewhat problematic due to obvious biases. One of these is the
obsession with China, as it is the focus of most studies but seems more frightening than in reality. The obsession with China leaves out analyses of the rise of other
great powers, therefore the literature cannot really establish that the alternative to unipolarity is multipolarity. The studies that focus on China seem to implement that
the next system will be bipolar. To its credit, though, it seems that there is no power that is emerging as much as China does, hence it is
correct to focus on it. But then, will other powers be entitled to be regarded as poles? This is an extra-regional question with significant implications to East Asia in a
global context. The literature regarding the structure of the international system can be divided into two major types:
A. By the source of threat to the U.S. primacy (future structure): 1. The China alarmists (bipolarity); 2. The BRICS are emerging (multipolarity); 3. Who cares? The
American advance is too large to catch up (unipolarity).
B. By the effect on U.S. behavior: 1. Fight to preserve primacy – preemption or prevention; 2. Get used to it – selective engagement or offshore balancing.
Within the Realist paradigm there are two competing theories that prescribe conflicting advice that is based on contradictory readings of reality.12 Whereas offensive
realism suggests securing material power that will guarantee a given country's security, and securing regional and global primacy even by force,13 defensive realism
suggests possessing sufficient material power and prefers some sort of power sharing to enhance mutual trust among the great powers, which enhances – they believe
– the security of each power.14 In the American case, defensive realism suggests offshore balancing or selective engagement, while offensive realism would prefer
domination and engagement with potential rivals. This does not mean that there cannot be agreement among all realists concerning American actions, such as the
consensus among many realists that the war against Iraq in 2003 was unnecessary and even damaging.15 The disagreements grow and are much more acute regarding
other great powers. How should the U.S. treat China and other emerging or reemerging powers? Should they be engaged? Should the U.S. prevent the foreseen
competition by striking first, or should the U.S. allow them to emerge as regional hegemons and then divide the world into spheres of influence with them?
The question everyone asks is whether or not American hegemony is over or when will it happen. Ian Clark suggests that the term hegemony is misused, and prefers
questioning the future of American primacy.16 This paper will follow Clark in terminology and substance.
Schweller and Pu say that "If a great transformation is coming, it is not one that heralds a radically altered world politics based on legalism, constitutionalism, or
global civic activism. Rather, it is a structural transformation from unipolarity to multipolarity that most realists believe promises a return to the familiar history of
great powers struggling for power and prestige."17 There definitely seems to be a transition, but is it to multipolarity or
bipolarity, and in any case – will it resemble past experiences? This is highly uncertain. The power that the U.S. had obtained
in the last several decades places it in a different category than any other great power in the foreseeable future,
therefore even if the U.S. is less dominant compared to other great powers, it is far fetching to argue
for similar status as in any previous system. This is not to say that later in the future such a system might emerge, but in the near
future it is unlikely .18
Robert Art argued in 2010 that the U.S. is the most powerful state in the world in economic and military assets and
will remain the most powerful military power "for some time to come," but inevitably its edge relative to other great powers
will diminish in the coming decades. China is the greatest potential rival, provided that its economy will continue to grow in the coming two decades as it did in the
last two decades (then it will surpass the U.S. in its GDP, but not in its GDP per capita). For now, China had already changed the balance of
power in East Asia. It is already the region's dominant military land power. Art assesses that if China invests in its military forces for several decades, and is
determined to project naval and air power, it will be able to deploy a naval force that "could contest the American supremacy at sea in East Asia."19 Some
conflict seems inevitable, including arms race, but there can be more cooperation than is assumed by most
scholars.
Art correctly argues that as long as China's emerging hegemony in East Asia does not include Japan and the U.S. maintains
strongholds in the region (Singapore, the Philippines and Indonesia), the geopolitical threat from China will not be
of similar extent as that of the Soviet Union. China cannot jeopardize the global balance of power as long as
Europe, the Persian Gulf, India, Japan and Russia are independent or under U.S. influence.20 China cannot threaten the U.S. as the Soviet Union did due to its relative
size. His conclusion: be smart; let China grow but draw a line in the sand, accept that it is growing but make sure China knows the U.S. is stronger.
This seems as good advice, but one need only to see China's increasing defense budget to understand why apparently following it is a difficult job. China had
increased the defense budget by 11.2% in 2012, following two decades of annual two-figure percents increases (since 1989, except for 2009 – only 7.5%).21 There are
always questions on the purpose of this steady increase: in preparation for a global conflict with the U.S. over resources and political interests (i.e., preparing China to
become a rival pole); a regional conflict with any of its neighbors – and China indeed has issues with all of them, be it territorial, historical, economic, etc.; or
domestic, preparing to crush separatists or rebels.
In 2001, Mearsheimer wrote that "American policy [on China] has sought to integrate China into the world economy and facilitate its rapid economic development, so
that it becomes wealthy and, one would hope, content with its present position in the international system. This U.S. policy is misguided. A wealthy China would not
be a status quo power but an aggressive state determined to achieve regional hegemony…. Although it is certainly in China's interest to be the hegemon in Northeast
Asia, it is clearly not in America's interest to have that happen…. It is not too late for the United States to reverse course and do what it can to slow the rise of
China."22
A decade after Mearsheimer's warning, it seems that he was partly correct and partly wrong. A steadily increasing share of China's wealth is turned into military
power, and recently, it is reported, Chinese strategists apparently began calling their government to fit China's foreign policy to its capabilities, which means replacing
the "peaceful rise" and the "low profile policy" with a much more ambitious policy.23 But China's economic rise will first need to finance its aging population.
Nevertheless, China's goals are unclear to American and western analysts and policymakers, although there are official Chinese documents that allow assessing their
true aims.24
It is interesting to follow China's rise to hegemony in East Asia and the reaction of its neighbors. They were expected to act to balance China, but according to Chan's
study, they don't. The defense burden is not rising and trade with China is increasing – contrary to the theoretical expectations.25 This can indicate either that China
succeeded in splitting among its regional rivals, or that the U.S. is no longer functioning as a regional hegemon, therefore they have no one to turn to against China.
Michael Beckley provides a detailed analysis of the rise of China and of the U.S. decline or non-decline.26 Most declinists, as Beckley labels them, argue that the U.S.
is in economic decline, not in military decline.27 This is an important point – in military terms the U.S. is still the sole superpower, and it is hard to see circumstances
under which the U.S. would lose this status. The American spending on defense is still higher than that of all its potential rivals
combined, and even if the tipping point is coming closer and China will surpass the U.S. in defense expenditure, it will take many years for
China to close the gap – qualitative and quantitative. Unlike money, military assets do not vanish (it is hard to imagine
an aircraft carrier simply disappear or being given or sold to China). Therefore, even if the U.S. expenditure on defense decreases, it does not
affect American military primacy, at least in the short run. Nevertheless, the bond between economy and military affairs is very strong. For instance,
in April 2012 senior U.S. officials admitted that there is no budget to strike Syria, therefore the solution of the turmoil would have to be diplomatic.28
Mario Carranza mentions that those who argue that the U.S. hegemony is not in decline claim that neither China nor Europe can
shape events on the basis of their material power, but he also argues that they underestimate China's (and to lesser extent, Europe's) ability to take control over
markets in the Global South (South America and South Asia), and mentions that China increased dramatically its economic relations with key South American
countries such as Venezuela, Argentina and Brazil.29
Daniel Drezner presents the economic aspect of China's rise, and focuses on its new status as the U.S.'s greatest debt holder.30 This issue is political no less and
probably more than economic. But part of being proof that in the age of globalization that the U.S. promoted so powerfully it lost the economic primacy (and there are
counterarguments on this), does it make a real difference? After all, had the U.S. lost any military asset due to its economic decline? Had any such asset been sold to
China? Of course not. Hence, the balance in hard power is quite clear: China possesses the major part of American dollars in the world and is America's largest
creditor and debt holder, but the U.S. had not lost any of its military power, and it is still superior to any other power, especially China.
Hart and Jones assert that the U.S. economy is still three times larger than the Chinese one.31 But still, there is change in the degree
of influence each power has in the system. "China, for instance, has long been a ‘sovereignty hawk’, generally opposing the notion that interventions for humanitarian
purposes are legitimate. Its model of authoritarian capitalism has also increasingly become an ideological export, challenging the United States’ liberal model."32
Russia is perhaps misplaced in the list of emerging powers. Its economic data are not really improving and its population is declining annually by 4%, and with this
rate it might drop to less than 120 million by 2050 compared to 140 million today.33
This sample of scholarly literature of the last decade demonstrates the confusion regarding the current situation, although in
recent years it is clearer that there is a significant decline in American economic primacy. However, it seems clear to all that the U.S. still
holds military primacy and in this aspect primacy does not seem to be jeopardized for many years to come .34
Heg---A2: Heg Unsustainable---Trump
Trump doesn’t thump---focus on action, not rhetoric
Carafano et al 17
“Trump Has a Foreign Policy Strategy” Apr 21st, 2017 Vice President, Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis
Institute James Jay Carafano is a leading expert in national security and foreign policy challenges.
http://www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/trump-has-foreign-policy-strategy
Though on the job for only about dozen weeks, the new administration handled a lot of action on multiple fronts quite deftly. At the core of Trump’s
view of the world are his views on the global liberal order. Trump is no isolationist. Trump will focus on
American interests and American values, and that poses no threat to friends and allies. Copied For two weeks, the
White House has unleashed a foreign-policy blitzkrieg, and Washington’s chattering classes are shocked and, if not awed, at least perplexed. CNN calls Trump’s
actions a “u-turn.” Bloomberg opts for the more mathematical “180 degree turn,” while the Washington Post goes with “flipflop.” Meanwhile, pundits switched from
decrying the president as an isolationist to lambasting him as a tool of the neocons. Amid all the relabeling, explanations of an “emerging Trump Doctrine” have
proliferated faster than North Korea’s nuclear arsenal. Here’s my take on what’s going on: • Yes, there
is a method to Trump’s “madness.” •
No, there has been no big change in Trump’s strategy. The
actions that flustered those who thought they had pigeon-holed Donald Trump
simply reflect the impulses that have driven the direction of this presidency since before the
convention in Cleveland. At the Center of the Storm Where is the head and heart of the president’s national-
security team? Ask that question a year ago, and the answer would have been simple: General Mike Flynn, Mayor Rudy Giuliani and Senator Jeff Sessions.
Today, Flynn is gone. Giuliani never went in. Sessions is still a crucial voice in the administration, but his duties as Attorney General deal only partially with foreign
policy and national-security matters. The new team centers round Jim Mattisat the Defense Department, Rex Tillerson at the State
Department, John Kelly at the Department of Homeland Security and H. R. McMaster in the West Wing—ably assisted by Nikki
Haley at the United Nations. Trump barely knew these people before the election. There is little question that the new
team’s character and competence affected the White House response to the recent string of high profile
events and activities—from presidential meetings with Egypt and China and Tillerson’s tête-à-tête with Putin, to the ominous developments in Syria and North
Korea. Though on the job for only about dozen weeks, the new administration handled a lot of action on multiple fronts quite
deftly. Much of that can be credited to the maturity and experience of Trump’s senior national-
security team. But how the administration responded was purely Trumpian—reflecting an impulse that transcends the makeup of his foreign team or other
White House advisors. Decoding Trumpian Strategy Since the early days of the campaign, one thing has been clear: trying stitch together an understanding of
Trump’s foreign and defense policy based on Trump’s tweets and other off-hand comments is a fool’s errand. That has not changed since the Donald took over the
Oval Office. That is not to say that none of Trump’s rhetoric matters. He has given some serious speeches and commentary. But pundits err when they give every
presidential utterance equal merit. A joint address to Congress ought to carry a lot more weight than a 3 a.m. tweet about the Terminator. But especially with this
presidency, one needs to focus on White House actions rather than words to gain a clearer understanding of
where security and foreign policy is headed. Do that, and one sees emerging a foreign and defense policy
more conventional and more consistent than what we got from Bush or Obama. Still, a deeper dive is necessary to get at the root of Trump’s
take on the world and how it fits with recent actions like the tomahawk strikes in Syria and the armada steaming toward North Korea. I briefed Candidate
Trump and his policy advisors during the campaign. I organized workshops for the ambassadorial corps during the Cleveland Convention and
worked with the presidential team through the inauguration. Those experiences let me observe how the policies from the future fledgling administration were
unfolding. Here are some observations that might be helpful in understanding the Trumpian way. At
the core of Trump’s view of the world
are his views on the global liberal order. Trump is no isolationist. He recognizes that America is a global
power with global interests and that it can’t promote and protect those interests by sitting at home
on its hands. Freedom of the commons, engaging and cooperating with like-minded nations, working to blunt problems “over there”
before they get over here—these are things every modern president has pursued. Trump is no different.
What distinguishes Trump—and what marks a particularly sharp departure from Obama—is his perception of what enabled post–World War America and the rest of
the free world to rise above the chaos of a half century of global depression and open war. Obama and his ilk chalked it all up to international infrastructure—the UN,
IMF, World Bank, EU, et al. For Trump, it was the sovereign states rather than the global bureaucracies that made things better. The international superstructure has to
stand on a firm foundation—and the foundation is the sovereign state. Without strong, vibrant, free and wealthy states, the whole thing collapses like a Ponzi scheme.
Trump is an arch nationalist in the positive sense of the term. America will never be safe in the world if the world doesn’t have an America that is free, safe and
prosperous. That belief is at the heart of Trump’s policies designed to spark an economic revival, rollback the administrative state and rebuild the military. It lies at the
core of his mantra: make America great again. Even the strongest America, however, can’t be a global power without the willingness
to act globally. And that's where Trump's declaration of “America First” comes in. What it means for
foreign policy is that the president will put the vital interests of the United States above the maintenance
of global institutions. That is not an abandonment of universal values. Every American president deals with the challenge of
protecting interests and promoting values. Trump will focus on American interests and American values, and that poses no threat to friends and
allies. In many cases, we share the same values. In many cases, what's in America's vital interest is also in their interest
—and best achieved through joint partnership. Here is how those animating ideas are currently manifesting themselves in Trump's strategy:
A strategy includes ends (what you are trying to accomplish), means (the capabilities you will use to do that) and ways (how you are going to do it). The
ends
of Trump’s strategy are pretty clear. In both talk and action in the Trump world, it boils down to three parts of the world: Europe, Asia and the
Middle East. That makes sense. Peace and stability in these regions are vital to U.S. interest s and are under assault. The United
States wants all three parts of the world to settle. It is unrealistic to think all the problems can be made to disappear, but it is not unrealistic to significantly reduce the
potential for region-wide conflict.
Heg---A2: No Impact
Decline emboldens China, Russia, and Iran---causes counter-balancing and
transition wars
Twining, 17 - director of the Asia Program at The German Marshall Fund of the United States, based
in Washington, DC, MPhil & PhD degrees from Oxford University (Daniel, "Abandoning the Liberal
International Order for a Spheres-of-Influence World is a Trap for America…," Medium, 3-21-2017,
https://medium.com/out-of-order/abandoning-the-liberal-international-order-for-a-spheres-of-influence-
world-is-a-trap-for-america-7bfcdbb83df4)
The liberal world order is under assault . Polls suggest an American ambivalence about upholding the rules-based global system.
Populists are besieging governing elites in the West while Russia works strategically to destabilize European and American governments through
propaganda and proxies. A rising China wants to create a global system that is not U.S.-centric , one in which
smaller powers defer to bigger ones and norms of democracy and rule of law do not prevail. Meanwhile, the U.S. alliance system
looks adrift while competitors in China and Russia appear to be on the march. If it holds, this trend could produce a spheres-of-
influence world — which many, including the current presidents of the United States, China, and Russia, find intuitively
attractive . But were such an order to replace one based on global integration and American leadership in the geopolitical cockpits of Europe
and Asia, it would only engender insecurity and conflict . In a spheres-of-influence world, great powers
order their regions. The United States would go back to a “Monroe Doctrine” version of grand strategy; Russia would dominate
the former Soviet space; China would govern East Asia, and India South Asia. The problem with this kind of order,
however, is several-fold. Too many spheres overlap in ways that would generate conflict rather than clean lines
of responsibility. Japan would oppose Chinese suzerainty in East Asia, including by developing nuclear
weapons ; India and China would compete vigorously in Southeast Asia; Russia and China would
contest the resources and loyalties of Central Asia; Europe and Russia would clash over primacy of
Central and Eastern Europe. The Middle East would be an even more likely arena for hot war between
Saudi Arabia and Iran, and Turkey would contest regions also claimed by Russia, Europe, and possibly China.
Russia, like the Soviet Empire before it, would keep pushing west until it met enough hard power to stop it. A
spheres of influence world would also sharpen great power competition outside of each region. Regional
hegemony is a springboard for global contestation. China would be more likely to challenge the United
States out-of-area if it had subdued strategic competition in its own region. Russia, like the Soviet Empire before it,
would keep pushing west until it met enough hard power to stop it. (The fact that Russian troops marched through Paris
during the Napoleonic Wars demonstrates that the limits of Russian power need not be confined to the former Warsaw Pact). American leaders
have long understood that a “Fortress America” approach is a source of national insecurity. Franklin Roosevelt made this case in a series of
“fireside chats” in the run-up to America’s participation in World War II — even before the advent of the far more sophisticated power-projection
technologies that exist today. Roosevelt and his generals well understood that the United States could not be safe if hostile powers controlled
Europe and Asia, despite the wide oceans separating North America from both theaters. A spheres-of-influence world would also
crack up the integrated global economy that underlies the miracle in human welfare that has lifted billions out of poverty in past
decades. It would replicate the exclusive economic blocs of the 1930s, including an East Asia “co-prosperity
sphere,” seeding conflict and undercutting prosperity. A real-world and real-time example of what happens when American
power retreats in an effort to encourage regional powers to solve their own problems is the mess in Syria. It has produced the greatest refugee
crisis since 1945 — a stain on the consciousness of human civilization — and has led many to conclude that the Middle Eastern order of states
dating to the end of World War 1 is collapsing. President Obama pursued an express policy of retracting American military power from the
Middle East, including withdrawing all troops from Iraq and refusing to intervene militarily when President Assad used chemical weapons
against his own people, despite a red-line injunction from the United States not to do so. Obama and his White House political advisors believed
that American withdrawal from the Arab Middle East (if not from the ironclad U.S. commitment to Israel) would lead a new balance of power to
form, one policed by regional powers rather than by America. This flawed, amoral, and un-strategic approach has led to a
series of hot wars — in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen — the collapse of Arab allies’ confidence in the United States
as an ally, as well as an intensified cold war with Iran. Despite the international agreement freezing Iran’s
nuclear program, Iran’s support for terrorism and hostile insurgencies targeting American allies across its
region actually intensified during this period. A spheres-of-influence world leaves weaker states to become
the victims of stronger or more aggressive ones, and it seeds insecurity by removing the reassuring variable
of American military guarantees and presence This experience underlines a core problem with a spheres-of-influence
world. It leaves weaker states to become the victims of stronger or more aggressive ones, and it seeds insecurity by removing the reassuring
variable of American military guarantees and presence. It emboldens American adversaries and leads American allies
to take self-help measures that themselves may undercut American security interests. A spheres-of-
influence world would also produce contestation of the open global commons that are the basis for the
unprecedented prosperity produced by the liberal international economic order. Should the Indian and Pacific Oceans,
or the Arctic and Mediterranean Seas, become arenas of great-power conflict (like the South China Sea already has
thanks to China’s militarization and unilateral assertion of sovereignty over it) as leading states seek to incorporate them into
their privileged zones of control, economic globalization would collapse , harming the economies of every
major power. The United States, because of its sheer power and resource base as well as its relative geographical isolation, might
do OK in a spheres-of-influence world. Most of America’s friends and allies would not. Their weakening and
insecurity would in turn render the United States weaker and more insecure — since U.S. allies are force-
multipliers for American hard and soft power, and since norms like freedom of the global commons are in fact
underwritten by that power. More broadly, such a transition would also likely lead to the kind of hot wars that
reorder the international balance of power , including by incentivizing aggressive states to push out
and assert regional dominion , knowing that America does not have the will or interest to oppose them .
The fact that U.S. competitors such as Russia, China, and Iran — all of whom want to weaken the American-led world order —
would welcome a spheres-of-influence world is another reason for Americans to oppose it . It would also be
ironic if the United States were to back away from its historic commitment to shaping a world that is an idealized vision of America itself — one
ruled by laws, norms, institutions, markets, and peaceful settlement of disputes.
Global nuclear war

Khalilzad 16 – Zalmay Khalilzad, former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, counselor at the
CSIS, 3/23/16, “4 Lessons about America's Role in the World,” http://nationalinterest.org/feature/4-
lessons-about-americas-role-the-world-15574?page=show
Ultimately, however, we concluded that the United States has a strong interest in precluding the emergence of
another bipolar world —as in the Cold War—or a world of many great powers , as existed before the two world wars.
Multipolarity led to two world wars and bipolarity resulted in a protracted worldwide struggle with the risk
of nuclear annihilation . To avoid a return such circumstances, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney ultimately agreed that
our objective must be to prevent a hostile power to dominate a “critical region ,” which would give it the
resources, industrial capabilities and population to pose a global challenge . This insight has guided U.S. defense policy throughout the
post–Cold War era.
Giving major powers the green light to establish spheres of influence would produce a multipolar world
and risk the return of war between the major powers . Without a stabilizing U.S. presence in the Persian Gulf and U.S.
relationships with Jordan and the Gulf States, Iran could shut down oil shipments in its supposed sphere of influence. A similar scenario in fact
played out during the 1987 “tanker war” of the Iran-Iraq war, which eventually escalated into a direct military conflict between the United States
and Iran. Iran’s nuclear program makes these scenarios even more dangerous.
The United States can manage the rise and resurgence of great powers like China, Russia and Iran at an
acceptable cost without ceding entire spheres of influence. The key is to focus on normalizing the geopolitics of the Middle
East, Europe and the Asia-Pacific, which the United States can do by strengthening its transatlantic and transpacific alliances and adapting them
to the new, dangerous circumstances on the horizon. The United States should promote a balance of power in key regions
while seeking opportunities to reconcile differences among major actors.
Heg---A2: No Impact---Fettweis
Fettweis is wrong
Fempa 11 – Francis P. Sempa, Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Middle District of Pennsylvania,
Adjunct Professor of Political Science at Wilkes University, and Contributing Editor to American
Diplomacy, October, Review of Dangerous Times? The International Politics of Great Power Peace By
Christopher J. Fettweis, Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 63, p. 150
Forget Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, and Machiavelli. Put aside Mackinder, Mahan, and Spykman. Close the military academies and war colleges. Shut
our overseas bases. Bring our troops home. Make dramatic cuts in the defense budget. The end of major war ,
and perhaps the end of war itself, is near, according to Tulane assistant professor Christopher Fettweis in his recent book, Dangerous
Times? The International Politics of Great Power Peace.
Fettweis is not the first intellectual, nor will he be the last, to proclaim the onset of perpetual peace. He is squarely in the tradition of Immanuel
Kant, Herbert Spencer, and Norman Angell, to name just three. Indeed, in the book’s introduction, Fettweis attempts to rehabilitate Angell’s
reputation for prophecy, which suffered a devastating blow when the Great War falsified his claim in The Great Illusion that economic
interdependence had rendered great power war obsolete. Angell, Fettweis writes, was the first “prominent constructivist thinker of the twentieth
century,” and was not wrong—just ahead of his time (p. 5).
Fettweis bases his theory or vision of the obsolescence of major war on the supposed linear progress of human nature, a major tenet of 20th-
century liberalism that is rooted in the rationalist theories of the Enlightenment. “History,” according to Fettweis, “seems to be unfolding as a line
extending into the future—a halting, incomplete, inconsistent line perhaps, one with frequent temporary reversals, but a line nonetheless.” The
world is growing “more liberal and more reliant upon reason, logic, and science” (p. 217).
We have heard this all before. Human nature can be perfected. Statesmen and leaders will be guided by reason and
science. Such thinking influenced the visionaries of the French Revolution and produced 25 years of war among the great powers of Europe.
Similar ideas influenced President Woodrow Wilson and his intellectual supporters who endeavored at Versailles to transform the horrors of
World War I into a peace that would make that conflict “the war to end all wars.” What followed were disarmament conferences, an international
agreement to outlaw war, the rise of expansionist powers, appeasement by the democracies, and the most destructive war in human history.
Ideas, which Fettweis claims will bring about the proliferation of peace , transformed Russia, Germany,
and Japan into expansionist, totalitarian powers. Those same ideas led to the Gulag, the Holocaust, and the Rape of Nanking. So
much for human progress.
Fettweis knows all of this, but claims
that since the end of the Cold War, the leaders and peoples of the major powers,
except the United States, have accepted the idea that major war is unthinkable. His proof is that there has
been no major war among the great powers for 20 years— a historical period that coincides with the
American “unipolar” moment . This is very thin empirical evidence upon which to base a predictive theory
of international relations.
Fettweis criticizes the realist and neorealist schools of thought, claiming that their adherents focus too narrowly on the past behavior of states in
the international system. In his view, realists place too great an emphasis on power. Ideas and norms instead of power, he claims, provide
structure to the international system. Classical geopolitical theorists such as Halford Mackinder, Alfred Thayer Mahan, Nicholas Spykman, and
Colin Gray are dismissed by Fettweis in less than two pages, despite the fact that their analyses of great power politics and conflict have long
been considered sound and frequently prescient.
Realists and classical geopoliticians have more than 2,000 years of empirical evidence to support their
theories of how states and empires behave and how the international system works . Ideas are important,
but power is the governing force in international politics , and geography is the most permanent factor in the analysis of
power.
Fettweis makes much of the fact that the countries of Western and Central Europe, which waged war against each other
repeatedly for nearly 400 years, are at peace, and claims that there is little likelihood that they will ever again wage war against each other.
Even if the latter assertion turns out to be true, that does not mean that the end of major war is in sight . Throughout history,
some peoples and empires that previously waged war for one reason or another became pacific without producing worldwide perpetual peace: the
Mongols, Saracens, Ottomans, Dutch, Venetians, and the Spanish Empire come immediately to mind. A Europe at peace does not translate to an
Asia, Africa, and Middle East at peace.
In a world in which major wars are obsolete, Fettweis
believes the United States needs to adjust its grand strategy from
vigorous internationalism to strategic restraint. His specific recommendations include the removal of all U.S. military forces
from Europe; an end to our bilateral security guarantees to Japan and South Korea; an end to our alliance with Israel; an indifference to the
balance of power on the Eurasian landmass; a law enforcement approach to terrorism; a drastic cut in military spending; a much smaller Navy;
and the abolition of regional combatant commands.
What Fettweis is proposing is effectively an end to what Walter Russell Mead calls “the maritime world order” that was
established by Great Britain and maintained first by the British Empire and then by the United States. It is a world order that has
defeated repeated challenges by potential hegemonic powers and resulted in an unprecedented spread of
prosperity and freedom. But all of that, we are assured, is in the past. China poses no threat . The United
States can safely withdraw from Eurasia. The power vacuum will remain unfilled.
Fettweis needs a dose of humility . Sir Halford Mackinder, the greatest of all geopoliticians, was referring to visionaries and liberal
idealists like Fettweis when he cautioned, “He would be a sanguine man . . . who would trust the future peace of the world to a change in the
mentality of any nation.” Most profoundly, General Douglas MacArthur, who knew a little bit more about war and international conflict than
Fettweis, reminded the cadets at West Point in 1962 that “only the dead have seen the end of war.”
It has no empirical backing

Hayes 15 (Jarrod; 3/9/15; Ph.D. in Politics and IR from the University of Southern California, B.A. in Political Science from the
University of Boulder, Assistant Professor of IR at the Georgia Institute of Technology, member of the International Studies Association and the
American Political Science Association; ISSF Roundtable, “ISSF Roundtable on The Pathologies of Power: Fear, Honor, Glory, and Hubris in
U.S. Foreign Policy,” https://networks.h-net.org/node/28443/discussions/63534/issf-roundtable-pathologies-power-fear-honor-glory-and-hubris-
us)
Fettweis is clear that he is writing to change (or begin to change) the national conversation in the United States regarding foreign policy. Thus, Fettweis's
target audience is policymakers and the general public. This fact can make the book frustrating reading for scholars. For
example, Fettweis does not always back his claims with evidence or citations. More problematic , however, is
Fettweis's call for a rational basis for policymaking based on the American national interest. What does that mean? Scott
Burchill goes so far as to call the concept of the national interest devoid of substantive content.[5] Thus, the
concept of the national interest, to say the least, is rarely clear—and that means that the rational pursuit of the national interest is at
best a very difficult endeavor. Moreover, there are multiple modes of rationality. A policymaker who , like most modern
presidents, obsessively monitors polling as a basis of policymaking is being rational -- even if it is a different rationality than that
which Fettweis calls for. Fettweis, however, largely leaves aside these issues. He never explicitly explores the sources or
foundations of rationality other than to invoke classical realism. He does not address the substantial scholarly
literature wrestling with the concept of a national interest. Going further, the growing literature on securitization theory problematizes the
idea that threats are objective conditions that can be clearly identified by savvy or wise policymakers.[6] This in turn undermines the objectivist ontology that
underlies Fettweis's thesis. If it is the case that threats are intersubjective constructions rather than objective conditions, Fettweis' argument is robbed of its
prescriptive force. To be sure, Fettweis's critique of the flaws in U.S. foreign policy remains trenchant. But the call to rational assessment of
objective foreign threats becomes a hollow one. In part these issues arise because of the ‘bridging the gap’ agenda
within which Fettweis situates the book. As the existence of programs like American University's International Policy Summer Institute and the resurgent
debate over the policy-academia gulf attest,[7] efforts like Fettweis's are both badly needed and very welcome. But if bridging the gap were easy, there would be little
need to encourage scholars and policymakers to do it. Fettweis's effort demonstrates just how difficult it can be to satisfy both sides. Academics
will be
frustrated by Fettweis's refusal to engage in explicit theory building or empirical verification. Policymakers will no
doubt be frustrated by Fettweis's amorphous policy guidance to be rational and focus on the national interest.
Fettweis makes terrible assumptions

Beede 11 – Benjamin R. Beede, Rutgers, The State University of New JerseyFettweis, Christopher J.
2008. Losing Hurts Twice as Bad: The Four States to Moving Beyond Iraq. New York, NY
Fettweis’ book might easily be dismissed as an intriguing analysis, but one that has been superseded by the advent of the Obama Administration, and the changes in
direction that the Obama team has advocated and that it may implement. Fettweis
made a number of assumptions that have now
been invalidated , moreover, including a continuation of prosperity. Despite its flaws, however, the book is a provocative contribution to the literature that
criticizes the forcefulness of the U.S. foreign and military policy. Fettweis states that his objective is to analyze the “likely consequences of disaster in Iraq” (16), but
he really has two purposes. One is to explain to people in the United States how they can adjust to the loss of the Iraq war. The second is to persuade readers that the
United States can safely reduce its activity in international affairs. Although the author’s discussion of Iraq must be addressed, this review emphasizes Fettweis’
contention that the United States can safely be less assertive in world affairs because the world is not as dangerous a place as often claimed, and his closely related
point that the public needs to develop a more discriminating approach to assessing threats from abroad, thereby enabling it to hold its government to higher levels of
competency and accountability. Fettweis’ book title comes from a remark by sports figure Sparky Anderson that “losing hurts twice as bad as winning feels good”
(13). He believes that this observation is valid, and he comes back to those words repeatedly. To support his contention concerning the significance of Anderson’s
statement, Fettweis borrows from the literature of psychology to explain how people experience losses, ranging from having relatives or friends taken from them by
death to having their favorite sports teams lose games. In competitive situations, the harmful psychological effects of losing are said to be intensified significantly
when one adversary or opponent was “supposed” to win because of its strength. The number of instances where large countries have lost to guerrilla movements
demonstrates that perceptions of the military advantages that the seemingly stronger side enjoys may well be outweighed by other factors, however (see Arreguin-Toft
2005; Record 2007). Fettweis recommends a rapid withdrawal of the U.S. forces from Iraq. He believes that the Iraq war has “been the
worst kind of defeat for the United States: an unnecessary one, in a war that should never have been fought” (16, emphasis in the original). Not only was the war a
huge error, Iraq is in such bad OCTOBER BOOK REVIEWS | 865 shape that the United States cannot do much to assist its reconstruction. A long-term occupation
might eliminate many problems in Iraq, but he doubts the United States will stay long enough to affect major changes in that country. Little harm will come from the
withdrawal, despite predictions by many that there would be civil war in Iraq and a security breakdown in the entire region. Fettweis is not a specialist in Middle
Eastern affairs, and his interest is in the effects the Iraq war is having and will have on the United States, not so much in the Iraq situation. Thus, his book is not
comparable to studies like that by O’Leary (2009). There are at least two schools of thought about the Iraq war, but Fettweis
ignores this division of opinion. One school, which includes Fettweis, criticizes the Bush Administration for having rashly invaded Iraq and for
having failed to plan and execute the operation properly. Fettweis writes that “[w]e were led into the Iraq morass not by evil people lying on behalf of oil companies
but by poor strategists with a shallow, naive understanding of international politics” (29). Another school of interpretation views the Iraq (and Afghanistan)
commitments simply as steps in a campaign undertaken to give the United States a lasting hegemony in the world. From the Bush Administration’s perspective, Iraq
might even be considered a success. The executive branch demonstrated once again that it can wage war with few checks on its actions, and gave the United States a
greater presence in the Middle East. The Obama Administration has altered Bush’s course to some extent, but so far, there has not been a
radical shift. Indeed, there has been and remains the possibility of a greater commitment in the region, especially into Pakistan. Iraq and the United States have agreed
to the removal of coalition forces by 2011, but the continued violence in Iraq and the construction of substantial military bases suggest that a U.S. military presence
might continue past 2011. In February 2009, Secretary of Defense Gates reiterated the Obama Administration’s commitment to 2011, but in late May 2009, the army
chief of staff, George Casey, declared that his service branch, at least, is planning for U.S. forces to remain in Iraq for another decade. In any event, there is little
prospect for a full disengagement from southwest Asia any time soon. Given one of the purposes of his book, it is hardly surprising that Fettweis focuses almost
entirely on Iraq. He ignores Afghanistan, except for repeatedly citing the Soviet persistence in trying to hold that country as an example of a great power making the
error of invading a small country in the face of deep nationalism in the latter. He might have been well advised to view the entire area of southwestern Asia. Ahmed
Rashid (2008) has described the U.S. involvement in the region that has extended well beyond Iraq and Afghanistan, and that suffers from the same kinds of
misjudgments made in Iraq and Afghanistan, especially an overreliance on military measures and a reluctance to commit substantial resources to economic
development. Fettweis uses Iraq to argue for a strategy of restraint based on his sanguine view that “we [the United States and, indeed, the
entire world] are living in a golden age” (31, emphasis in the original), and that “[g]reat power conflict today is all but unthinkable; therefore, calculations surrounding
the dangers posed by a united Eurasia should change, since the threats it once posed no longer exist” (208). With the end of the Cold War, the ability of the enemies of
the United States to harm this country is quite limited. Hostile acts can be perpetrated, but such attacks cannot overthrow the United States (31). This strategy is hardly
new. Years ago, it was summarized in these words, “Instead of preserving obsolete Cold War alliances and embarking on an expensive and dangerous campaign for
Despite
global stability, the United States should view the collapse of Soviet power as an opportunity to adopt a less interventionist policy” (Carpenter 1992, 167).
the optimistic picture painted by some national security theorists, the world does contain some
dangerous elements . David E. Sanger (2009), for example, presents a chilling picture of nuclear weapons in very
possibly unsteady hands. Much is said in the book concerning national “credibility,” that is, the ability of a country to maintain its prestige and its
reputation for decisive action based on its past performance. Fettweis argues that many governmental leaders, academic commentators, and journalists have been
obsessed with this element of national power and have wanted the United States to deal with virtually any political crisis that occurs (161-75). Fettweis
states
that “[f]or some reason, U.S. policymakers seem to be especially prone to overestimate the threats they
face” (116). There is no explanation of why this should be the case , nor is there any comparison with the
propensity of leaders in other countries to make similar inaccurate projections. Numerous instances can be cited where
governmental leaders and commentators have argued heatedly for “action” on the ground that “inaction” will damage the reputation of the United States. Early in the
Carter Administration, for example, National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski dedicated himself for some time to instigating the dispatch of navy task force to
the Horn of Africa during a period of tension between Ethiopia and Somalia. After failing to persuade the secretaries of state and defense that such action was
necessary, Brzezinski waged a covert effort through the media to bring a decision in favor of his policy (Gardner 2008, 40-2). Two case histories cited in the book as
examples of a disastrous insistence on maintaining credibility are the Spanish and British efforts to hold the Netherlands and the British colonies that became the
United States, respectively. More recent instances that could have been cited are the controversies in the United States concerning the “loss” of China in the late 1940s
and the establishment of a communist regime in Cuba in the late 1950s. Sensitivity concerning Cuba led in part to the intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965,
and other episodes where the United States committed itself to fighting insurgencies in Latin America. OCTOBER BOOK REVIEWS | 867 Concerns about the
political impact of the “loss” of Vietnam played a significant role in decisions to support the Republic of Vietnam. These episodes are largely omitted, though. Fear is
a potent political weapon, and foreign threats, whether real or imaginary, are highly useful within the domestic political arena. Claims of a “missile gap” helped John
F. Kennedy win the presidency, for example. The armed services and the various intelligence agencies are rewarded because of fears of foreign threats. Although the
armed forces may be cautious about entering a given conflict or making other violent moves, they are unlikely to stress the peaceful nature of the world if they want to
retain their budgets and their prestige. Another element in strategy formulation in the United States has been its experience with long-term threats. White (1997)
asserts that the long conflict with the Soviet Union fundamentally structured the discussion and resolution of public policy issues in the United States, and greatly
strengthened the presidency at the expense of Congress and the political parties. Although his book was written before 9/11, his observation that political activists and
the public have become accustomed to protracted battles with foreign enemies makes it easy to understand why they could readily accept a “long war” against
terrorism. Somewhat along the same line, Sherry (1995) maintains that this country has been under emergency conditions from the Great Depression onward, perhaps
even before, permeating the United States with “militarism” in its broadest sense. Going back even further, some writers have argued that United States’ assertiveness
may be traced to the late nineteenth and especially the early twentieth century. Lears (2009) points critically to Theodore Roosevelt as a key player in this
development, and Ninkovich (1999) offers a more favorable view of the “crisis internationalism” of Woodrow Wilson. Fettweis touches on this history, but he
underestimates the extent to which the United States has been conditioned to react vigorously to a range
of foreign policy issues, and overestimates the differences in foreign and military policy brought about by
changes from one administration to another. Given this conditioning, changing the mind-sets of both elites and the public may be an
extremely difficult task. To a degree, Fettweis’ arguments resemble those of the “American empire” theorists , such as
Bacevich (2008), Johnson (2006), and Gardner and Young (2005). Critics of the “American empire” believe that the United States
produces much of the unrest and the tension in the world through its unilateral actions and its emphasis on military power. Fettweis does not go that
far, but his advocacy of “strategic restraint” is certainly compatible with such views. He agrees that the United States’
involvements—especially military commitments—abroad may unsettle conditions in countries as much as they may stabilize them, but his purpose is primarily to
reassure the people of the United States that less assertive activity by their country will not result in world chaos. Thus he does not have much to say about the
motivations of elite figures 868 | POLITICS & POLICY / October 2011 who advocate an active foreign policy. His argument seems to be that the United States is
vastly overextended in its commitments as a result of a number of individual mistakes stemming from an overconcern with credibility rather than a flawed strategy.
Despite his disclaimers, Fettweis’ words sometimes resemble the arguments of pre-World War II isolationists . Indeed,
throughout the book, the word “internationalists,” which properly describes those concerned with international cooperation, is used to refer to those who should be
termed “interventionists,” whether their motivations are power political, economic, or humanitarian, or a mixture of the three. Fettweis
believes that
there was little that the United States could have done to prevent the outbreak of World War II in Europe,
moreover. On the contrary, firmer U.S. support of France and Great Britain might have encouraged those
countries to force Germany to evacuate the newly reoccupied Rhineland and to render it much more
cautious in its later actions. After he successfully implemented his plan to put troops into the Rhineland in 1936, Hitler told his confidants that a
French demand for a withdrawal would have been successful owing to Germany’s military weakness. Fettweis even praises the United States
because it “had the wisdom to remain neutral for more than two years ” and thus “escaped the worst of the suffering” (206).
This is surely wrong. An earlier involvement in the war would doubtless have reduced U.S. casualties and
other costs because invasions of Europe would have been unnecessary if the French and British had held at least part of the continent, and because Germany might not
have developed a cushion of occupied territories to protect it from land attacks and from air assaults for a time. Whether a public educated by books like this one
would be able to make suitable threat assessments, and thereby be better able to exercise control over governmental actions abroad is another question. Fettweis’
work may be quite persuasive because he expresses his views clearly and avoids highly charged language.
However, if elites agree about dangers from abroad, then popular opinion may have little effect on policy making and policy implementation. Fettweis’
thinking is significantly flawed by his assumption that “politics is, and always will be, the enemy of
strategy,” and reiterates his point (26, 157). Fettweis adds that “it would be naive to suggest that it is possible to keep politics completely separate from strategy,
nor would it be fully desirable to do so in a democracy” (26-7), but “for the sake of this book, we will attempt to clarify the national interest by keeping the two realms
separate, to the extent possible” (27). Determining national strategy is necessarily a highly political act, and it cannot be established without considering the demands
of major internal stakeholders. What he terms “politics” may often be differing opinions based on different data or interpretations of the same data. Political survival is
critical for a political leader, and such leaders can understandably be hesitant in exercising restraint if they believe their opponents will attack them, perhaps
decisively, for being “soft” on the enemies of the day. Fettweis is fond of the term “realist” to OCTOBER BOOK REVIEWS | 869 refer to some defense and foreign
policy analysts, but describing someone as a “realist” may simply mean that the person agrees with the views of the individual applying that description. In certain
instances, “realism” can mean being restrained, and, in other instances, being highly assertive. Appropriate
policy decisions are likely to be
made on the basis of accurate intelligence and careful assessments rather than adherence to a general
outlook.
War---A2: No Escalation
Taiwan war causes extinction- no checks on escalation
Littlefield 15 (8/11, Alex Littlefield is a professor at Feng Chia University, Dr. Adam Lowther is
Director, School of Advanced Nuclear Deterrence Studies, Air Force Global Strike Command, Taiwan
and the Prospects for War Between China and America, http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/taiwan-and-the-
prospects-for-war-between-china-and-america/)
For the United States and its allies and partners in Asia, China’s aggressive efforts to assert questionable claims in the South and East China Sea,
enforce a disputed Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), build the rocket/missile and naval capabilities needed to invade Taiwan, and build a
substantial ballistic missile capability all work to create a situation where conflict between the U.S. and the PRC could occur
and rapidly escalate. Given that American political and military leaders have a poor understanding of Chinese
ambitions and particularly their opaque nuclear thinking, there is ample reason to be concerned that a future conflict could
escalate to a limited nuclear conflict. Thus, it is worth taking a look at the PRC with an eye toward offering insight into Chinese
motivation and thinking when it comes to how a possible crisis over Taiwan could escalate to the use of nuclear
weapons. Chinese Capabilities In their latest estimate, Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris assess that the Second Artillery Corps
possesses forty long-range nuclear missiles that can strike the United States if fired from China’s eastern seaboard and an additional twenty that
could hit Hawaii and Alaska. The challenge for China, is reaching the East Coast – home to the nation’s capital and largest economic centers. To
overcome this challenge China is also developing its JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) which is a sea-based variant of the DF-31
land-mobile long-range missile that will go to sea on Jin-class submarines. China may also be developing a new mobile missile, the DF-41, which
will carry multiple warheads, giving the Chinese a way to potentially defeat an American ballistic missile defense system. It is worth noting that
the quantity, though not the quality, of China’s nuclear arsenal is only limited by its dwindling stock of weapons grade plutonium. This raises the
question; to what end is China developing and deploying its nuclear arsenal? Chinese Motivation The textbook answer is straightforward. China
seeks a secure second (retaliatory) strike capability that will serve to deter an American first strike. As China argues, it has a “no-nuclear-first
policy” which makes its arsenal purely defensive – while its other capabilities such as cyber are offensive. Potential nuclear adversaries including
Russia, India, and the United States are fully aware that China’s investment in advanced warheads and ballistic missile delivery systems bring
Delhi, Moscow, and, soon, Washington within reach of the “East Wind.” While not a nuclear peer competitor to either Russia or the U.S., China
is rapidly catching up as it builds an estimated 30-50 new nuclear warheads each year. While American leaders may find such a sentiment
unfounded, the PRC has a strong fear that the United States will use its nuclear arsenal as a tool to blackmail (coerce) China into taking or not
taking a number of actions that are against its interests. China’s fears are not unfounded. Unlike China, the United States maintains an ambiguous
use-policy in order to provide maximum flexibility. As declassified government documents from the 1970s clearly show, the United States
certainly planned to use overwhelming nuclear force early in a European conflict with the Soviet Union. Given American nuclear superiority and
its positioning of ballistic missile defenses in Asia, ostensibly to defend against a North Korean attack, China sees its position and ability to deter
the United States as vulnerable. Possible Scenario While there are several scenarios where conflict between the United States and China is
possible, some analysts believe that a conflict over Taiwan
remains the most likely place where the PRC and the U.S.
would come to blows. Beijing is aware that any coercive action on its part to force Taiwan to accept its political domination
could incur the wrath of the United States. [US]To prevent the U.S. from intervening in the region, China will certainly turn to
its anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy, beginning with non-lethal means and non-lethal threats to discourage the American public from
supporting the use of force in support of Taiwan. If thwarted in its initial efforts to stop Chinese aggression against Taiwan, the United States may
be tempted to resort to stronger measures and attack mainland China. A kinetic response to a cyber-attack, for example, although an
option, would very likely lead to escalation on the part of the Chinese. Given the regime’s relative weakness and the
probability that American attacks (cyber and conventional) on China will include strikes against PLA command and control (C2) nodes,
which mingle conventional and nuclear C2, the Chinese may escalate to the use of a nuclear weapon (against a
U.S. carrier in China’s self-declared waters for example) as a means of forcing de-escalation . In the view of China, such a strike
would not be a violation of its no-first-use policy because the strike would occur in sovereign Chinese
waters, thus making the use of nuclear weapons a defensive act. Since Taiwan is a domestic matter, any U.S.
intervention would be viewed as an act of aggression. This, in the minds of the Chinese, makes the United States an outside
aggressor, not China. It is also important to remember that nuclear weapons are an asymmetric response to American
conventional superiority. Given that China is incapable of executing and sustaining a conventional military campaign against the
continental United States, China would clearly have an asymmetry of interest and capability with the United
States – far more is at stake for China than it is for the United States. In essence, the only effective option in retaliation for a
successful U.S. conventional campaign on Chinese soil is the nuclear one. Without making too crude a point, the nuclear option provides more
bang for the buck, or yuan. Given that mutually assured destruction (MAD) is not part of China’s strategic thinking – in fact it is explicitly
rejected – the PRC will see the situation very differently than the United States. China likely has no desire to become a nuclear peer of the United
States. It does not need to be in order to achieve its geopolitical objectives. However, China does have specific goals that are a part of its
stated core security interests, including reunification with Taiwan. Reunification is necessary for China to reach its
unstated goal of becoming a regional hegemon. As long as Taiwan maintains its de facto independence of China it acts as a literal and symbolic
barrier to China’s power projection beyond the East China Sea. Without Taiwan, China cannot gain military hegemony in its own neighborhood.
China’s maritime land reclamation strategy for Southeast Asia pales in scope and significance with the historical and political value of Taiwan.
With Taiwan returned to its rightful place, the relevance to China of the U.S. military presence in Japan and South Korea is greatly diminished.
China’s relationship with the Philippines, which lies just to the south of Taiwan, would also change dramatically. Although China criticizes the
United States for playing the role of global hegemon, it is actively seeking to supplant the United States in Asia so that it can play a similar role in
the region. While Beijing may take a longer view toward geopolitical issues than Washington does, Chinese political leaders must still be
responsive to a domestic audience that demands ever higher levels of prosperity. Central to China’s ability to guarantee that prosperity is the
return of Taiwan, and control of the sea lines of commerce and communication upon which it relies. Unfortunately, too many Americans
underestimate the importance of these core interests to China and the lengths to which China will ultimately go in order to guarantee them – even
the use of nuclear weapons. Should China succeed it pushing the United States back, the PRC can deal with regional territorial disputes bilaterally
and without U.S. involvement. After all, Washington invariably takes the non-Chinese side. China sees the U.S. as a direct competitor and
obstacle to its geopolitical ambitions. As such it is preparing for the next step in a crisis that it will likely instigate, control, and conclude in the
Taiwan Straits. China will likely use the election or statement of a pro-independence high-ranking official as the
impetus for action. This is the same method it used when it fired missiles in the Straits in response to remarks by
then-President Lee Teng-hui, ushering in the 1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis. The U.S. brought an end to the mainland’s antics when the
U.S.S Nimitz and six additional ships sailed into the Straits. Despite the pro-China presidency of Ma Ying-jeou, China continues to expand its
missile force targeting Taiwan and undertakes annual war games that simulate an attack on Taiwan. China has not forgotten the humiliation it
The Second Artillery Corps’
faced in 1996 and will be certain no U.S. carrier groups have access to the Strait during the next crisis.
nuclear capabilities exist to help secure the results China seeks when the U.S. is caught off-guard,
overwhelmed, and forced to either escalate a crisis or capitulate . While the scenario described is certainly not
inevitable, the fact than many American readers will see it as implausible if not impossible is an example of the mirror-imaging that often
occurs when attempting to understand an adversary. China is not the United States nor do Chinese leaders think like their counterparts in the
United States. Unless we give serious thought to possible scenarios where nuclear conflict could occur, the
United States may be unprepared for a situation that escalates beyond its ability to prevent a catastrophe .
Taiwan war goes global

Hunkovic 9 (Lee J, American Military University, “The Chinese-Taiwanese Conflict: Possible Futures
of a Confrontation between China, Taiwan and the United States of America”, http://www.lamp-
method.org/eCommons/ Hunkovic.pdf)
A war between China, Taiwan and the U nited S tates has the potential to escalate into a nuclear conflict and
a third world war , therefore, many countries other than the primary actors could be affected by such a conflict,
including Japan, both Koreas, Russia, Australia, India and Great Britain, if they were drawn into the war,
as well as all other countries in the world that participate in the global economy, in which the U nited S tates
and China are the two most dominant members. If China were able to successfully annex Taiwan, the possibility
exists that they could then plan to attack Japan and begin a policy of aggressive expansionism in East and
Southeast Asia, as well as the Pacific and even into India, which could in turn create an international standoff and
deployment of military forces to contain the threat . In any case, if China and the United States engage in a full-
scale conflict, there are few countries in the world that will not be economically and/or militarily affected by it.
However, China, Taiwan and United States are the primary actors in this scenario, whose actions will determine its eventual outcome, therefore,
other countries will not be considered in this study.
China/Taiwan war goes nuclear

Glaser 11 (Charles, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at the Elliott School of
International Affairs at George Washington University, Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict
Studies, “Will China’s Rise lead to War? ,” Foreign Affairs March/April 2011,
http://web.clas.ufl.edu/users/zselden/coursereading2011/Glaser.pdf)
THE PROSPECTS for avoiding intense military competition and war may be good, but growth in China's power may nevertheless require some
changes in U.S. foreign policy that Washington will find disagreeable--particularly regarding Taiwan. Although it lost control of Taiwan during
the Chinese Civil War more than six decades ago, China still considers Taiwan to be part of its homeland, and unification
remains a key political goal for Beijing. China
has made clear that it will use force if Taiwan declares independence,
and much of China's conventional military buildup has been dedicated to increasing its ability to coerce Taiwan
and reducing the United States' ability to intervene. Because China places such high value on Taiwan and
because the United States and China--whatever they might formally agree to--have such different attitudes regarding the
legitimacy of the status quo, the issue poses special dangers and challenges for the U.S.-Chinese relationship, placing it in a different
category than Japan or South Korea. A crisis over Taiwan could fairly easily escalate to nuclear war , because
each step along the way might well seem rational to the actors involved. Current U.S. policy is designed to reduce the
probability that Taiwan will declare independence and to make clear that the United States will not come to Taiwan's aid if it does. Nevertheless,
the United States would find itself under pressure to protect Taiwan against any sort of attack, no matter how
it originated. Given the different interests and perceptions of the various parties and the limited control Washington has over Taipei's
behavior, a crisis could unfold in which the United States found itself following events rather than leading them. Such dangers have been around
for decades, but ongoing improvements in China's military capabilities may make Beijing more willing to
escalate a Taiwan crisis. In addition to its improved conventional capabilities, China is modernizing its nuclear forces
to increase their ability to survive and retaliate following a large-scale U.S. attack. Standard deterrence theory holds
that Washington's current ability to destroy most or all of China's nuclear force enhances its bargaining position. China's nuclear
modernization might remove that check on Chinese action , leading Beijing to behave more boldly in
future crises than it has in past ones. A U.S. attempt to preserve its ability to defend Taiwan, meanwhile, could fuel
a conventional and nuclear arms race . Enhancements to U.S. offensive targeting capabilities and strategic ballistic missile
defenses might be interpreted by China as a signal of malign U.S. motives, leading to further Chinese military efforts and a general poisoning of
U.S.-Chinese relations.
War---A2: No Impact
China war causes extinction
Lee 17 (Ann, Adjunct Professor of Economics and Finance at New York University. “Talking Policy:
Ann Lee on US-China Relations.” World Policy Journal. February 10.
http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2017/02/10/talking-policy-ann-lee-us-china-relations)
World Policy Journal: When President Trump was first elected, you expressed worry about the future of U.S.-
China relations. Now that he's been in office for a few weeks, how do you think this tension will play out?
Ann Lee: Well, I don't think I've changed my mind about this after seeing what has transpired with other nations. I
don't think that it's necessarily going to go much more smoothly with China .
WPJ: What do you think the worst-case scenario would be?
AL: I think the worst-case scenario is that the U.S. and China fight a real war where you have a series of
provocations that somehow end up becoming World War III .
WPJ: How likely do you think that is?
AL: That's hard to say. I think that based on some of his closest advisors like Peter Navarro and Steve Bannon, it's more likely
than not if he chooses to listen to whatever advice they give him. Let's hope that's not the case, but it
almost feels like there are certain people in his administration that want a war —are planning for one—and there are
obviously media reports that they seem to want one based on past interviews or statements.
WPJ: We do not hear a lot of Chinese perspectives in the Western media. What has been the Chinese government’s general
reaction to the proposals of the Trump administration?
AL: I think the Chinese are just as concerned as anybody else in the world . A lot of folks there have been disturbed by
Trump's actions in his first days in office—clearly the phone call he took from Taiwan sort of set the precedent. And I think the Chinese are
under no illusions that it's going to be an easy road dealing with the Trump administration. I am sure they are
ready and bracing for a very tumultuous, rocky road in this relationship. Hopefully they can avoid a
situation where the two nations do go to battle because certainly if that happens it would be the end of
civilization as we know it .
U.S.-China war causes nuclear extinction

Wittner 11 — Lawrence S. Wittner, Emeritus Professor of History at the State University of New York
at Albany, holds a Ph.D. in History from Columbia University, 2011 (“Is a Nuclear War with China
Possible?,” Huntington News, November 28th, Available Online at http://www.huntingtonnews.net/14446)
While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that they will be used . After all, for centuries national
conflicts have led to wars, with nations employing their deadliest weapons . The current deterioration of
U.S. relations with China might end up providing us with yet another example of this phenomenon.
The gathering tension between the United States and China is clear enough. Disturbed by China’s growing economic and military
strength, the U.S. government recently challenged China’s claims in the South China Sea, increased the U.S. military presence in Australia, and deepened U.S.
military ties with other nations in the Pacific region. According to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the United States was “asserting our own position as a Pacific
power.” But need
this lead to nuclear war? Not necessarily. And yet, there are signs that it could . After all, both the United
States and China possess large numbers of nuclear weapons. The U.S. government threatened to attack China with nuclear weapons
during the Korean War and, later, during the conflict over the future of China’s offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu. In the midst of the latter confrontation, President
Dwight Eisenhower declared publicly, and chillingly, that U.S. nuclear weapons would “be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else.” Of course,
China didn’t have nuclear weapons then. Now that it does, perhaps the behavior of national leaders will be more temperate. But the loose nuclear threats of U.S. and
Soviet government officials during the Cold War, when both nations had vast nuclear arsenals, should convince us that, even as the military ante is raised, nuclear
saber-rattling persists. Some
pundits argue that nuclear weapons prevent wars between nuclear-armed nations; and,
admittedly, there haven’t been very many—at least not yet. But
the Kargil War of 1999, between nuclear-armed India and
nuclear-armed Pakistan, should convince us that such wars can occur. Indeed, in that case, the conflict almost slipped into a
nuclear war. Pakistan’s foreign secretary threatened that, if the war escalated, his country felt free to use “any weapon” in its arsenal. During the conflict, Pakistan did
move nuclear weapons toward its border, while India, it is claimed, readied its own nuclear missiles for an attack on Pakistan. At the least, though, don’t nuclear
weapons deter a nuclear attack? Do they? Obviously, NATO leaders didn’t feel deterred, for, throughout the Cold War, NATO’s strategy was to respond to a Soviet
conventional military attack on Western Europe by launching a Western nuclear attack on the nuclear-armed Soviet Union. Furthermore, if U.S. government officials
really believed that nuclear deterrence worked, they would not have resorted to championing “Star Wars” and its modern variant, national missile defense. Why are
these vastly expensive—and probably unworkable—military defense systems needed if other nuclear powers are deterred from attacking by U.S. nuclear might? Of
course, the bottom line for those Americans convinced that nuclear weapons safeguard them from a Chinese nuclear attack might be that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is far
greater than its Chinese counterpart. Today, it is estimated that the U.S. government possesses over five thousand nuclear warheads, while the Chinese government
has a total inventory of roughly three hundred. Moreover, only about forty of these Chinese nuclear weapons can reach the United States. Surely the United States
would “win” any nuclear war with China. But what would that “victory” entail? A
nuclear attack by China would immediately
slaughter at least 10 million Americans in a great storm of blast and fire, while leaving many more dying
horribly of sickness and radiation poisoning. The Chinese death toll in a nuclear war would be far
higher . Both nations would be reduced to smoldering, radioactive wastelands . Also, radioactive debris
sent aloft by the nuclear explosions would blot out the sun and bring on a “ nuclear winter ” around the
globe— destroying agriculture , creating worldwide famine , and generating chaos and destruction .
Moreover, in another decade the extent of this catastrophe would be far worse. The Chinese government is currently expanding its nuclear arsenal, and by the year
2020 it is expected to more than double its number of nuclear weapons that can hit the United States. The U.S. government, in turn, has plans to spend hundreds of
billions of dollars “modernizing” its nuclear weapons and nuclear production facilities over the next decade. To
avert the enormous disaster of a
U.S.-China nuclear war, there are two obvious actions that can be taken. The first is to get rid of nuclear
weapons, as the nuclear powers have agreed to do but thus far have resisted doing. The second, conducted while the nuclear disarmament process is
occurring, is to improve U.S.-China relations . If the American and Chinese people are interested in
ensuring their survival and that of the world , they should be working to encourage these policies .
New Mod---Chinese Aggression
Ending arms sales to Taiwan makes US look weaker than China, incentivizing
further Chinese aggressiveness internationally
Rigger 11 (Shelley Rigger, the Brown Professor and chair of political science at Davidson College, 11-
11, “Why Giving Up Taiwan Will Not Help Us with China,” p. 3-4, https://www.aei.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/11/-why-giving-up-taiwan-will-not-help-us-with-china_163406442997.pdf)
Another strategic interest the United States has in maintaining close ties to Taiwan rests with Taiwan’s position on the front line of China’s rise.
China’s behavior toward Taiwan indicates how it will perform its role as a lead actor on the world stage.
As Randall Schriver, a former deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, put it,
“Beijing’s ambitions go beyond Taiwan, but right now, it’s the Taiwan issue that drives their military
modernization, so it’s very important to us. Taiwan is a prism through which we can understand China’s
evolution, and gain insights into it.” Richard Bush, a leading analyst of the US-PRC-Taiwan relationship, summarized
these concerns when he said, “How the Taiwan Strait issue is resolved is an important test— perhaps the most important
test—of what kind of great power China will be and of how the US will play its role as the guardian of
the international system. ” By extension, how the U nited S tates and its allies treat Taiwan is an important
indicator of what other countries in the region can expect from Washington as the PRC’s influence
expands. They may ask, if the U nited S tates acquiesces to a rising China on the Taiwan issue, will it
also acquiesce on issues important to them?

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CASE

It’s empirically denied from the threat of sanctions

Qualitative and quantitative studies disprove diversion – Falklands and invasion of

While Washington is focused on Russian election interference, China

Democracy resilient – overwhelming public backing supports gains

The discussion above suggests that the

No stats for DPT

Yet U.S. Arms Sales Flat

Tensions high – reunification threats, trade, technology, and security

Ties are strong

No global pandemics – other international actors solve – US efforts solve

Empirics and isolated populations

While there is little published work on human extinction risk

A new set of journal articles

global availability of fissile material has been declining as

No impact – prolif empirically doesn’t cause war and is slow

No impact – data and experts - no linkages, your evidence is alarmism

You’re more likely to die in your bathtub

It's not an existential risk

No trade deal regardless and it wouldn’t solve their impacts

President Donald Trump

Trump’s making everything worse – Huawei and new tariffs proves

“unduly escalated trade frictions.”

Econ decline doesn’t cause conflict

No resources mean no war

Governments buffer damages, safety nets work, and empirics prove

But overall, things look nothing like they did in the

2008 crushes their impact

Fitch's sector outlook remains stable, reflecting that

No impact – media and pharma hype benefits

strait conflict than that hawked by the party’s official announcements.

China won’t invade

it is ultimately extremely unlikely that China will try to seize Taiwan

by force. Furthermore, should it try to do this, it is unlikely to succeed.

Third, China would have to

Geography and MAD

Credibility of security commitments key to prevent allied prolif – academic literature

Prolif causes nuclear war via micalc

A nuclear-armed Trump is indeed a scary thought. But his apparent comfort

The U.S. Extended Political Deterrent to Japan While

Aff sidesteps institutionalized channels of bilateral dialogue and past efforts at

difficultly in the Japan-US relationship concerns their alternative views of

Best research proves security assurances work – general policy wisdom,

U.S. experts have considered exploiting Chinese fears that

Non-proliferation in Northeast Asia depends foremost on the credibility of US deterrence . There is

Credible assurances ensure Taiwan’s commitment to nonprolif – erosion leads to

The problem, of course, is that politicians usually

Theory’s true – strong empirical basis

It's especially true for leaving Taiwan

the possibility of inadvertent

any significant change in the

Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are latent

Taiwan can prolif quickly and easily

Confidence in the US is the key variable

* Consideration of strategic counter-strike capabilities. The

Bioweapons cause extinction

Global nuclear war

It has no empirical backing

Fettweis makes terrible assumptions

strike , particularly if the materials fall into the hands of terrorists.

Terrorism causes extinction

Detonation causes extinction---even without retaliation

Global nuclear war