2 Taiwan Affirmative

Text: The United States federal government should eventually eliminate all arm sales to
Taiwan
China Relations Adv
 1AC
Taiwan arms sales prevent US-China cooperation
Mike Stone, 6-6 3-2019, "Exclusive: U.S. pursues sale of over $2 billion in weapons to...," U.S.,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-taiwan-exclusive/exclusive-u-s-pursues-sale-of-over-2-billion-in-
weapons-to-taiwan-sources-say-angering-china-idUSKCN1T62CA, MMC

- China urges the United States to stop arms sales to Taiwan and prudently deal with issues relating
to Taiwan to prevent harm to bilateral relations and peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait

- They’ll argue in the Taiwan Straight – not other bipartisan things like climate change

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The

United States is pursuing the sale of more than $2 billion worth of tanks and weapons
to Taiwan, four people familiar with the negotiations said, sparking anger from Beijing which is already
involved in an escalating trade war with Washington . An informal notification of the proposed sale has been sent to the U.S. Congress, the
four sources said on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to speak about the possible deal. The potential sale included 108 General Dynamics Corp
M1A2 Abrams tanks worth around $2 billion as well as anti-tank and anti-aircraft munitions, three of the sources said. Taiwan has been interested in refreshing its
existing U.S.-made battle tank inventory, which includes M60 Patton tanks. The United States is the main arms supplier to Taiwan,
which China deems its own and has never renounced the use of force to bring the self-ruled island under its
control. Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen said in March Washington was responding positively to Taipei’s
requests for new arms sales to bolster its defenses in the face of pressure from China. The United States has no formal
ties with Taiwan but is bound by law to help provide it with the means to defend itself. China and the United States are engaged in a fierce

trade war, with clashes over Taiwan and the South China Sea exacerbating tensions. A spokesman for the State
Department, which oversees foreign military sales, said the U.S. government does not comment on or confirm potential or pending arms sales or transfers before they
have been formally notified to Congress. The congressional notifications included a variety of anti-tank munitions, including 409 Raytheon Co and Lockheed Martin Corp-
made Javelin missiles worth as much as $129 million, two of the sources said. The notifications also included 1,240 TOW anti-tank missiles worth as much as $299
million, one of the sources said. There were also 250 stinger missiles worth as much as $223 million in the notification, the source said. Stingers are often used in
portable anti-aircraft weapons systems. Taiwan’s Defense Ministry confirmed it had requested those weapons and that
the request was proceeding normally. The U.S. commitment to providing Taiwan with the weapons to
defend itself helps Taiwan’s military to raise its combat abilities, consolidates the Taiwan-U.S. security
partnership and ensures Taiwan’s security, the ministry said in a statement. The Chinese government
condemned the planned sale. “We are severely concerned about the U.S. move and are firmly against U.S.
arms sales to Taiwan,” Foreign Ministry spokesman Geng Shuang told a daily news briefing in Beijing. China urges the United States to
stop arms sales to Taiwan and prudently deal with issues relating to Taiwan to prevent harm to bilateral
relations and peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, he added. CHINA HAWK U.S. President Donald Trump’s
administration rolled out a long-awaited overhaul of U.S. arms export policy in 2018 aimed at expanding
sales to allies, saying it would bolster the American defense industry and create jobs at home. Trump’s trade adviser Peter Navarro was
one of the administration’s architects of that policy. Navarro, a China hawk, wrote about the possible sale
of tanks to Taiwan in a March opinion column in the New York Times ahead of a presidential trip to the
Lima, Ohio, plant where they are made . At a low point, the U.S. Army had only one tank coming from the plant a month, General Dynamics CEO
Phebe Novakovic said during an April conference call with investors, but said “we’ll be rolling out 30 tanks a month by the end of this year,” partly because of
international orders. The
Pentagon announced last week it would sell 34 ScanEagle drones, made by Boeing Co, to
the governments of Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam for $47 million. The drones would
afford greater intelligence-gathering capabilities, potentially curbing Chinese activity in the region. China
claims almost all of the strategic South China Sea and frequently lambastes the United States and its allies
over naval operations near Chinese-occupied islands. Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam all have competing
claims. China’s Defense Minister Wei Fenghe warned the United States at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore last weekend not to meddle in security disputes over
Taiwan and the South China Sea. Acting U.S. Defense Secretary Patrick Shanahan told the meeting that the United States would no longer “tiptoe” around China’s
behavior in Asia. Taiwan’s Foreign Ministry, responding to the Reuters report of planned the new arms sale, said Wei’s “threatening” comments and recent Chinese
military drills near Taiwan showed the importance of its need to strengthen its defensive abilities. “Going forward our government will continue to deepen the close
security partnership between Taiwan and the United States,” it said.
1st scenario is trade war; sales fuel US-China disagreement, a reason why the trade war
exists
Nyshka Chandran, 12-05-18, “There may be more at stake than just trade concessions in the US-China
tariff battle,” CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/12/06/us-china-trade-war-south-china-sea-and-taiwan-
may-be-factors.html, MMC

Trade frictions between the world’s two largest economies go well beyond the parameters of imports and
exports. Washington has been attempting to negotiate with Beijing about issues like forced tech transfers
and intellectual property theft, but there’s a growing sense among international analysts that talks may also
be touching on other deep-rooted issues in their relationship, particularly on the national security and
military front. The ongoing spat is a reflection of great power rivalries, political scientist Joseph Nye wrote in a Project Syndicate editorial last
month: “It is much more than a typical trade dispute like, say, America’s recent clash with Canada over access to that country’s dairy market.” Many
economists have pointed out that the current dispute is more of a tech war than a tariff war as U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration
targets China’s technology sector practices. Beijing’s
militarization of the South China Sea and the sovereignty of
Taiwan could also be influencing negotiations. More than just trade “Clearly, there’s some recognition that there’s more at stake
than trade,” said Jeffrey Kucik, assistant professor of political science at the University of Arizona. “There are now so many issues at play, it’s not
clear how to alleviate tensions.” One
of the issues, he argued, is U.S. interference in the South China Sea and Taiwan
— which Beijing considers internal matters . Washington’s arm sales to Taipei this year have angered
Chinese officials who oppose countries pursuing relations with the East Asian island. According to the One
China Policy, Taiwan and mainland China are considered part of the same territory. Xi’s administration has also been
angered by U.S. naval patrols in the South China Sea. The country claims nearly all of the international waterway despite competing claims from
neighboring Asian countries. The
fact that China’s statement on this past weekend’s temporary tariff ceasefire
highlighted Trump’s promise to respect the One China Policy — something not mentioned in the White
House’s version — reveals the importance Beijing attaches to its national interests, Kucik said. A lasting
resolution to the trade war will require multiple compromises on such matters, the professor continued.
For Xi’s administration, “trade takes a back seat to territory ,” according to Kucik. It is certainly clear that the White
House views Beijing as a strategic competitor beyond the realms of trade, said Patrick Lozada, director of Albright Stonebridge Group’s China
practices.

Trade war correlates with protectionism, further escalation threatens interdependence

Chloe Taylor, 02-05-2019, “UN warns of currency wars and widespread protectionism if trade conflict
escalates,” CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/05/un-warns-of-currency-wars-and-protectionism-if-
trade-war-escalates.html

Currency wars, widespread protectionism and billion-dollar losses could arise if the U.S. and China fail to
settle their trade differences before March 1, the UN warned in a new study. Published by the UN
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) on Monday, the report said that while some countries
would see a surge in exports, negative global effects were likely to dominate. China and the U.S. have been
embroiled in a trade dispute since early 2018. In September, the U.S. added 10 percent tariffs on around
$200 billion of Chinese imports, and it planned to increase those rates to 25 percent in January. However,
both parties agreed to freeze these increases until March 1 while they engaged in talks. According to the
UN report, continuing or hiking tariffs between the two superpowers would have an unavoidable impact on
the “still fragile” global economy, including disturbances in commodities, financial markets and currencies.
“One major concern is the risk that trade tensions could spiral into currency wars, making dollar-
denominated debt more difficult to service,” UNCTAD’s report said. “Another worry is that more countries
may join the fray and that protectionist policies could escalate to a global level.” A currency war occurs
when nations deliberately depreciate the value of their domestic currencies in order to stimulate their
economies. The report’s authors noted that protectionist policies generally hurt weaker economies the
most, while tit-for-tat moves of the trade giants would have a domino effect beyond their domestic
markets. “Tariff increases penalize not only the assembler of a product, but also suppliers along the chain,”
the report noted. Chinese exports affected by U.S. tariffs would likely hit east Asian value chains the
hardest, UNCTAD said, with an estimated contraction of around $160 billion. Of the total $250 billion in
Chinese products currently subject to U.S. tariffs, around 82 percent will instead be exported by firms in
other countries, the study estimated. While 12 percent was estimated to be retained by Chinese
companies, only 6 percent would be captured by domestic U.S. firms. Meanwhile, of the U.S. exports
subject to Chinese tariffs, about 85 percent would be captured by outside markets, UNCTAD estimated. The
report said U.S. firms would likely retain less than 10 percent of those exports, while Chinese businesses
would capture around 5 percent. The countries expected to benefit the most were those that had the
economic capacity to replace U.S. and Chinese firms. EU exports would capture $70 billion of U.S.-China
bilateral trade, the report estimated, while Japan, Mexico and Canada would each gain around $20 billion.
The countries expected to see the highest percentage increase to their current total exports were Australia,
Brazil and India. “Because of the size of their economies, the tariffs imposed by Unites States and China will
inevitably have significant repercussions on international trade,” Pamela Coke-Hamilton, head of UNCTAD’s
international trade division, said at a press conference on Monday. “While bilateral tariffs are not very
effective in protecting domestic firms, they are valid instruments to limit trade from the targeted country.
The effect of U.S.-China tariffs would be mainly distortionary. U.S.-China bilateral trade will decline and be
replaced by trade originating in other countries.”

Perception of declining trade ties wrecks interdependence and increases protectionism

Stein Tønnesson, 2015’, PhD from the University of Oslo, is research professor at the Peace Research
Institute Oslo(PRIO), adjunct professor at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research,Uppsala
University where he leads a six-year research programme on the East AsianPeace, associate editor for Asia
in the Journal of Peace Research, International Area Studies Review, 2015, Vol. 18(3), “Deterrence,
interdependence and Sino–US peace”, 297–311, MMC

- We are in a trade war, why is this impact not nonunique?

- How much worse on “trade expectations” can you get than being in a trade war?
In bipolar systems a state believing itself to be in decline is much more likely than a rising power to initiate conflict: ‘rising states should want to
avoid war while they are still rising, since by waiting they can fight later with more power’ (Copeland, 2000: 2–3, 14, 20). Hence China
and the
US have a mutual interest in preventing each other from fearing decline . Strong military powers who believe
themselves to be in decline (have negative trade expectations) are particularly dangerous (Copeland, 2000: 5, 13, 22, 237,
241, 244; Copeland, 2015: 429). Thus Beijing must be weary of tying itself up too closely with a declining Russia and even more weary of American
fears of decline. Dynamic
relational factors such as ‘potential power’ or ‘trade expectations’ are more important in
determining choice between war and peace than static factors, such as the actual level of trade, or a
state’s form of governance on the ‘unit level’ (Copeland, 2000: 235–236, 238, 245; Copeland, 2015: 12, 14, 27–50, 435–436). To the
extent that unit level differences count, the character of the target state is more important than that of the aggressor; while the liberal assumption
that some kinds of regimes are more likely to initiate war than others is wrong, it is true that some kinds of regimes are more likely to be targetted
than others.2 To avoid becoming a target it may help to be seen as predictable, transparent, respectful of
international law, and open to trade and investments. In the conclusion to his exhaustive examination of
how trade expectations have influenced various decisions for war in the period 1790–1991 , Copeland is
optimistic about today’s prospects: ‘there are strong reasons to believe that China will stay peacefully
engaged in the system over the long term, at least as long as the United States proves willing to maintain an open
and free-flowing global economic system’; ‘the reasons for optimistic economic expectations in both China
and the U nited S tates should outweigh the reasons for pessimism for at least a couple more decades’ (Copeland,
2015: 432, 444). Chan’s and Copeland’s optimism depends on the continued success of globalization . If trade
expectations falter on any or both sides of the Pacific the unit-level economy-first policies may lose their
pacifying effect. Chan confirms that the dampening effect of economic inter-dependence on conflict
behaviour depends on policies of economic openness and integration. Hence there is need to understand
global financial politics, global trends and economic expectations in Beijing, Washington, Tokyo and other East Asian
capitals before assessing the likelihood that economic interdependence will continue to ensure peace
among major nuclear powers.

Protectionism collapses econ

Jonathan D. Ostry, 3-13-2019, "Why protectionism spells trouble for global economic growth," World
Economic Forum, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/03/why-tariffs-spell-trouble-for-economic-
growth/, MMC
It is sometimes alleged that for all the microeconomic distortions that protectionist policies inflict, there can be a silver lining in terms of
macroeconomic gains: more jobs, more output and a stronger trade balance. Indeed, some economies today are seemingly using commercial policy
to pursue macroeconomic objectives. Tariffs can dampen imports, boost net exports (the difference between exports and imports, or the trade
balance), and so boost GDP, other things being equal. Economists, however, have generally been skeptical. Since the time
of Adam Smith (or maybe even before), open and competitive markets have been seen as most likely to
maximize output by directing resources more productively. Tariffs, on the other hand, encourage both the
deflection of trade to inefficient producers and smuggling in order to evade them; such distortions reduce
any beneficial effects. Further, consumers lose more from tariffs than producers gain, so there is deadweight loss. And the redistributions
associated with tariffs tend to create vested interests, so harm tends to persist . Broad-based protectionism can also provoke
retaliation, which adds further costs in other markets. Moreover, economists believe macroeconomic
policies (fiscal and monetary policies such as interest rates or the budget deficit) to be the natural
instruments for achieving macroeconomic goals, such as raising growth and jobs. Tariffs are more likely to
lead to offsetting changes in exchange rates that frustrate the achievement of macroeconomic objectives;
less imports and a stronger trade balance increase demand for the domestic currency, and so its value . There
is in addition a powerful lesson from history. Protectionist policies helped precipitate the collapse of international trade
in the 1930s, and this trade shrinkage was a plausible seed of World War II. So while protectionism has not
been much used in practice as a macroeconomic policy, most economists emphatically consider that this is
as it should be. But times change. Some economies today are using commercial policy seemingly for macroeconomic objectives. Can we say
something about what the likely practical consequences of such actions are likely to be? In a recent study covering the vast majority of developed
and developing countries in the world, and half a century’s-worth of macroeconomic data, we examined the responses of six key macroeconomic
variables to changes in the tariff rate: real GDP, productivity, the unemployment rate, the real exchange rate, the trade balance and inequality. We
found that tariff increases have adverse domestic macroeconomic and distributional consequences: these
effects are robustly and statistically significant, and are large enough in an economic sense to merit the
attention of policymakers. We also found that output (GDP) falls after tariffs rise because of a significant
decrease in labour productivity. When firms in the import-competing sectors receive protection, resources
are reallocated within the economy to relatively unproductive uses, and this is harmful to the added value
generated by the economy. That is, the wasteful effects of protectionism lead to a meaningful reduction in
the efficiency with which labour is used, and thus to a fall in output. Nor did we find an improvement in the
trade balance after a rise in tariffs, plausibly reflecting our finding that the real exchange rate tends to
appreciate as a result of higher tariffs (a prediction that is in line with theory and much earlier empirical evidence). We also
found that protectionism leads to a small increase in unemployment, further bolstering the case against
protectionism, and that tariff increases lead to greater inequality after a few years. We found that the hit to
economic growth from a tariff increase is more pronounced if the tariff increase is undertaken during an
economic expansion. It is also larger for advanced countries than it is for developing countries. This is worrisome, since tariffs are currently
being used as a macroeconomic instrument in buoyant economic conditions and in advanced economies. To summarize: the aversion of
the economics profession to the deadweight losses caused by protectionism seems warranted. While the case
against protectionism has typically been bolstered by theoretical or microeconomic evidence, the macroeconomic case for liberal trade is also
strong. Higher tariffs seem to lower output and productivity, while raising unemployment and inequality, and leaving the trade balance unaffected.
These results are wholly consistent with conventional wisdom from standard economics, and bolster the case for free trade . Protectionism
just weakens the macroeconomy.
2nd scenario is climate; there’s plenty of opportunity for US-China climate change co-op
and its k2 solve warming
Harvard Project on Climate Agreements, 02-2018’, " Bilateral Cooperation between China and the
United States: Facilitating Progress on Climate-Change Policy," National Center for Climate Change Strategy
and International Cooperation and Harvard Project on Climate Agreements,
https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/harvard-nscs-paper-final-160224.pdf,
MMC
- What evidence do you have that disagreeing over arm sales means the US and
China disagree over climate change?
Over the past two decades, disagreements between developing and developed countries have often
frustrated efforts to reach consensus on an effective international response to the problem of global
climate change. Key disputes have centered on the appropriate prioritization of economic development versus climate mitigation,
responsibility for historic emissions versus contribution to current and forecasted emissions, and total emissions versus emission per capita. While
differences between developing countries’ perspectives and developed-country perspectives on these
issues are unlikely to be resolved in the short term, the imperative to move beyond these disputes toward a
more cooperative and coordinated approach to global climate mitigation is becoming urgent. At this critical
juncture, the recent joint announcements between China and the United States concerning climate change
actions represented an important development in global climate negotiations and were appropriately
hailed as offering a new model for improved cooperation between emerging and developed economies.
Given the size of the two countries’ economies and their large contributions to global GHG emissions, the
actions outlined in the joint announcements per se will have a significant impact on future mitigation
efforts—and, indeed, did much to facilitate a successful outcome in Paris. By demonstrating these actions,
China and the United States may encourage other countries to increase their climate mitigation ambitions.
This paper has identified three specific areas of international climate policy, namely marketbased mechanisms, comparison of efforts, and trade
policy and climate policy interactions, where China and the United States can deepen their cooperation. Cooperation on marketbased climate
policies, particularly cap-and-trade, is important, not only because marketbased approaches offer the most cost-effective approach to mitigating
GHG emissions, but also because emissions trading systems make it possible to address equity concerns by adjusting the level of the emissions cap
and the allocation of emission allowances.
A logical focus for China–U.S. cooperation with respect to market-based
mechanisms is capacity building. A functioning cap-and-trade system requires properly designed
government and market institutions. At a micro level, the United States and China can exchange experience and expertise on topics
such as allowance allocation, price ceilings and floors, allowance banking and borrowing, and other detailed emissions trading rules. At a macro
level, both China and the United States confront challenges to implementing cap-and-trade systems— in the United States because of political
polarization and in China because of features of the regulated electricity market and the power of state-owned enterprises. Cooperation and
communication can help both countries overcome these barriers, while also advancing theoretical and
empirical understanding of cap-and-trade and other market-based approaches. Cooperation on standards and
procedures for comparing mitigation efforts can strengthen the technical basis for other aspects of China–U.S. cooperation, particularly in the area
of cap-and-trade systems, and facilitate the linkage of homogeneous or heterogeneous climate policies. Cooperation
in this area can
also increase transparency and consistency in climate negotiations, improve trust among parties, and
advance efforts to track collective progress toward achieving global mitigation targets. But China and the United
States have different preferences and interests in terms of the scope and timeframe of mitigation efforts and other issues. Thus it will be important
to recognize from the outset that no single perfect comparison metric is likely to satisfy both countries’ needs. Instead, a suite of metrics is likely to
offer the best option for comprehensively reflecting and comparing the mitigation efforts undertaken by each country. More broadly, it will be
important to develop a rigorous, systematic, and transparent system for tracking domestic policy developments in the context of an international
climate policy framework. Interactions between trade and climate policy constitute a third important area for future U.S.–China cooperation.
Reforms can be initiated within the WTO and UNFCCC, which currently provide the dominant frameworks for global coordination on trade and
climate change. But China and the United States should also explore opportunities to advance progress in this area through more flexible
plurilateral and bilateral relationships. Cooperation
between the two countries to develop GHG standards and
methods for comparing the impact of domestic climate policies would be particularly helpful in reducing
the potential for future trade conflicts and facilitating the coordination of climate and trade policies.
Climate change has added a new dimension to a bilateral relationship that is already one of the most
important of the twenty-first century. While China and the United States have different national interests in
many areas, climate change represents an important area where their interests , and those of every other
country interested in the wellbeing of its citizens and future generations, converge. But the success of the
China–U.S. relationship in this arena will be determined less by the ability to find common ground than by
the ability to find solutions that properly address the real socioeconomic and political differences that exist
between these two nations. If an effective response to climate change eventually requires the participation
of all countries, despite their different cultures, states of economic development, and political systems,
successful China–U.S. cooperation under the hybrid Paris climate policy architecture may well prove crucial
in paving the way for broader international cooperation to reduce the risk of global climate change.

Extinction
Griffin David, 2015’, Claremont Philosophy Professor “The climate is ruined. So can civilization
even survive?”, 4-14, http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/14/opinion/co2-crisis-griffin/, MMC
Although most of us worry about other things, climate scientists have become increasingly worried about the survival of
civilization. For example, Lonnie Thompson, who received the U.S. National Medal of Science in 2010, said that virtually all climatologists "are now
convinced that global warming poses a clear and present danger to civilization." Informed journalists share this concern.
The climate crisis "threatens the survival of our civilization," said Pulitzer Prize-winner Ross Gelbspan. Mark
Hertsgaard agrees, saying that the continuation of global warming "would create planetary conditions all
but certain to end civilization as we know it." These scientists and journalists, moreover, are worried not only about the distant future but about the
condition of the planet for their own children and grandchildren. James Hansen, often considered the world's leading climate scientist, entitled his book "Storms of My Grandchildren." The

threat to civilization comes primarily from the increase of the level of carbon dioxide (CO2) in the
atmosphere, due largely to the burning of fossil fuels. Before the rise of the industrial age, CO2 constituted only 275 ppm (parts per million) of the atmosphere. But it is now above 400 and
rising about 2.5 ppm per year. Because of the CO2 increase, the planet's average temperature has increased 0.85 degrees

Celsius (1.5 degrees Fahrenheit). Although this increase may not seem much, it has already brought about
serious changes. The idea that we will be safe from "dangerous climate change" if we do not exceed a temperature rise of 2C (3.6F) has been widely accepted. But many informed
people have rejected this assumption. In the opinion of journalist-turned-activist Bill McKibben, "the one degree we've raised the temperature already has melted the Arctic, so we're fools to find

The burning of
out what two will do." His warning is supported by James Hansen, who declared that "a target of two degrees (Celsius) is actually a prescription for long-term disaster."

coal, oil, and natural gas has made the planet warmer than it had been since the rise of civilization 10,000
years ago. Civilization was made possible by the emergence about 12,000 years ago of the "Holocene"
epoch, which turned out to be the Goldilocks zone - not too hot, not too cold. But now, says physicist Stefan Rahmstorf, "We are
catapulting ourselves way out of the Holocene." This catapult is dangerous , because we have no evidence civilization can long

survive with significantly higher temperatures. And yet, the world is on a trajectory that would lead to an increase of 4C (7F) in this century. In the opinion of
many scientists and the World Bank, this could happen as early as the 2060s. What would "a 4C world" be like? According to Kevin Anderson of

the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research (at the University of East Anglia), "during New York's
summer heat waves the warmest days would be around 10-12C (18-21.6F) hotter [than today's]."
Moreover, he has said, above an increase of 4C only about 10% of the human population will survive. Believe
it or not, some scientists consider Anderson overly optimistic . The main reason for pessimism is the fear that the

planet's temperature may be close to a tipping point that would initiate a "low-end runaway greenhouse,"
involving "out-of-control amplifying feedbacks." This condition would result, says Hansen, if all fossil fuels are burned (which is the intention of all fossil-
fuel corporations and many governments). This result "would make most of the planet uninhabitable by humans." Moreover,

many scientists believe that runaway global warming could occur much more quickly, because the rising
temperature caused by CO2 could release massive amounts of methane (CH4), which is, during its first 20
years, 86 times more powerful than CO2. Warmer weather induces this release from carbon that has been stored in methane hydrates, in which enormous
amounts of carbon -- four times as much as that emitted from fossil fuels since 1850 -- has been frozen in the Arctic's permafrost. And yet now the Arctic's temperature is warmer than it had been
for 120,000 years -- in other words, more than 10 times longer than civilization has existed. According to Joe Romm, a physicist who created the Climate Progress website, methane release from
thawing permafrost in the Arctic "is the most dangerous amplifying feedback in the entire carbon cycle." The amplifying feedback works like this: The warmer temperature releases millions of tons

The resulting threat of runaway global warming may not

of methane, which then further raise the temperature, which in turn releases more methane.

be merely theoretical. Scientists have long been convinced that methane was central to the fastest period
of global warming in geological history, which occurred 55 million years ago. Now a group of scientists have
accumulated evidence that methane was also central to the greatest extinction of life thus far: the end-
Permian extinction about 252 million years ago. Worse yet, whereas it was previously thought that significant amounts of permafrost would not melt,
releasing its methane, until the planet's temperature has risen several degrees Celsius, recent studies indicate that a rise of 1.5 degrees would be enough to start the melting. What can be

done then? Given the failure of political leaders to deal with the CO2 problem, it is now too late to prevent
terrible developments. But it may -- just may -- be possible to keep global warming from bringing about
the destruction of civilization. To have a chance, we must, as Hansen says, do everything possible to
"keep climate close to the Holocene range" -- which means, mobilize the whole world to replace dirty
energy with clean as soon as possible.

China views foreign policy through offensive realism, they have zero desire to become a
hegemon and are willing to cooperate with the US once sales to Taiwan cease.
Ghazala Yasmin Jalil, 2019, "," No Publication, http://www.issi.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/3-
SS_Ghazala_Yasmin_Jalil_No-1_2019.pdf, MMC

China’s current policy seems to be firmly rooted in defensive realism. Its policy seems to be aimed at
maintaining the balance of power rather than upsetting it . As the earlier section has argued, China is not a
revisionist power but a status quo one. The analysts like Shiping Tang are convinced that China’s security strategy flows out of its
realisation of the security dilemma whereby the Chinese leaders have understood that an aggressive expansionist strategy would just lead to
counterbalancing alliances. “This
recognition has led China to adopt a defensive realism-rooted security strategy
emphasising moderation, self-restraint and security cooperation.” Moreover, China’s military
modernisation, its Taiwan policy and its increased policies in the South China Sea also make more sense if
seen through the lens of defensive realism. China’s Taiwan policy may be more geared towards preventing
redistribution of power in the region. Since the US is providing arms assistance to Taiwan, China may be
averse to the US aiding Taiwan’s independence ─ the latter issue is one where China has made clear that
independence is not acceptable to China. Similarly, there is good evidence that China’s military modernisation programmes and
training exercises since the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1996 are aimed partially at dealing with the issue of the Taiwanese separation.58 On the question
of whether China is balancing against the US, Johnston says, “There seems to be little doubt that China’s military modernisation programme since
the mid-1990s has been aimed in large measure at developing capabilities to deter or slow the application of the US military power in the
region.”59It would then seem that China is not concerned with gaining power or projecting its powers but
with balancing against a predominance of the US power in the region. China has not shown any signs of
hegemonic behaviour as a lot of Western analysts feared. Instead of guided by offensive realism, China’s
policies seem to be guided by defensive realism where it is concerned with survival and with maintaining its
position in the system. Just as the US fears China’s hegemonic rise, China also fears the increase of the US
influence in the region and its talk of containing China . China’s policy may change in the future to display
hegemonic tendencies. However, at present, there is not much evidence to support the theory of offensive
realism.
 UQ – Relations Low Now
UQ – China threatens to “severely damage” relationships with the U.S. because of arms
sales to Taiwan
Christopher Bodeen, Beijing Correspondent at the Associated Press, September 25, 20 18. “China demands US cancel arms sale to Taiwan,” The
Associated Press, https://www.apnews.com/b8b0fa7421504374a43eea1e325a2729, TL

BEIJING (AP) — China on Tuesday demanded the U.S. cancel a $330 million sale of military equipment to Taiwan,
warning of “severe damage” to bilateral relations and mutual cooperation if Washington fails to comply.
Foreign ministry spokesman Geng Shuang told reporters at a regular briefing that the sale violated international law and the “basic
norms governing international relations.” It was unclear what aspect of international law Geng was referring to. “We urge the U.S. side to ...

immediately cancel this arms sale plan, and stop military contact with Taiwan so as to avoid severe
damage to China-U.S. ties, peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and bilateral cooperation in major
fields,” Geng said. China’s defense ministry issued a similar statement, saying the sale had “interfered in China’s
internal affairs and harmed China’s sovereignty and security interests.” Washington has no official relations with Taiwan’s
democratically elected government but is obliged by U.S. law to see that it has the means to defend itself. The Trump administration said Monday

that it had approved the sale of spare parts and related support for Taiwan’s U.S.-made F-16 fighters and
other military aircraft. The U.S. said the sale will improve Taiwan’s ability to defend itself without altering the basic military balance in Asia, where
Washington and Beijing are increasingly competing for dominance. China as a principle opposes all U.S. military sales to Taiwan ,

which split with the mainland in 1949 but which Beijing continues to claim as part of its territory and
threatens to invade to bring under its control. The arms sale coincides with a U.S. decision to issue a visa
ban and assets freeze on China’s Equipment Development Department and its director, Li Shangfu, over the
purchase from Russia of Su-35 combat aircraft in 2017 and S-400 surface-to-air missile system-related
equipment this year. China’s purchase of the weapons from Rosoboronexport, Russia’s main arms exporter, violated a 2017 law intended to punish the
government of Russian President Vladimir Putin for interfering in U.S. elections and other activities. In response, China summoned the

American ambassador and defense attache to deliver a protest and recalled its navy commander from a
U.S. trip. China’s Defense Ministry said the U.S. had no right to interfere in Chinese military cooperation
with Russia and demanded the sanctions be revoked. The Kremlin dismissed the sanctions as an “unfair” move to undercut Russia as a
major arms exporter. In a further sign of retaliation, China turned down a request for an October port call in Hong Kong by the U.S. Navy’s amphibious assault ship USS
Wasp, according to the U.S. Consulate in the semi-autonomous Chinese territory. China last denied such a visit in 2016 amid a spike in tensions between the sides over
the disputed South China Sea. Geng, the foreign ministry spokesman, declined to give details, saying only that such requests were handled “case-by-case in accordance
with the doctrine of sovereignty and specific situation.”
 Link – Arms Sales Hurt Relations
Ending Taiwan arms sales improves US-China relations
Glaser 15
(Charles, professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs and the Department of Political Science at
George Washington University, Spring 2015 “A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between
Military Competition and Accommodation”)
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/isec_a_00199.pdf

China considers U.S. support of Taiwan a key source of “strategic distrust.” A recent study by two leading authorities on
U.S.-China relations concludes that Beijing views U.S. arms sales to Taiwan “as conªrming American arrogance and determination to interfere in
China’s domestic affairs and to prevent peaceful uniªcation from occurring, thereby harming a clearly-articulated Chinese core interest.” In a similar
vein, their report argues that “continuing to provide Taiwan with advanced weapons . . . is viewed as pernicious in Chinese eyes
and has added to suspicion that Washington will disregard Chinese interests and sentiments as long as China’s power
position is secondary to America’s.”68 Nathan and Scobell conclude that “most Chinese see strategic motives at the root of American
behavior. They believe that keeping the Taiwan problem going helps the U.S. tie China down. ”69 Similarly, a
prominent Chinese analyst argues: “The position the U.S. takes on the Taiwan issue determines the essence of American
strategy toward China, and thus determines the quality and status of U.S.-China relations.”70 Xu Hui, a professor at China’s National
Defense University, holds that “U.S. policies toward Taiwan have been and are the fundamental cause of some anti-American sentiment among the
Chinese public....I assure you that a
posture change of the U.S. policy on Taiwan will remove the major obstacle for our military-
to-military relations and also strengthen Sino-American cooperation by winning the hearts and minds of 1.3 billion
Chinese people.”71 In short, ending the U.S. commitment to Taiwan has the potential to dramatically improve U.S.-China relations, which in
turn could increase the possibility of cooperation on other issues and reduce the probability of competition and conºict.
 UX – No Climate Cooperation Now
US-China friction inhibits work on climate change
Somini Sengupta, international climate reporter for the New York Times and a George Polk Award winner, December 7, 20 18. “U.S.-China
Friction Threatens to Undercut the Fight Against Climate Change,” The New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/07/climate/us-china-
climate-change.html, TL

They have the largest carbon footprints. Also the largest economies. Now, as diplomats meet in Poland for high-stakes climate negotiations, a
pitched standoff between the United States and China threatens to slow global action on climate change
precisely at a time when the risks of catastrophe are accelerating. The tensions between Washington and Beijing range
from trade to cybersecurity to military rivalry in the Pacific. And while some of those issues have simmered for years, cooperation in the fight
against climate change had once been a bright spot, so much so that it propelled the creation of the landmark global agreement in Paris in 2015 to
curb greenhouse gas emissions. But then the Trump administration announced its intention to pull out of the Paris pact altogether, rejecting the
scientific consensus that greenhouse gas emissions are warming the planet. That represented perhaps the most consequential diplomatic reversal
of the Trump era. “The biggest threats to the planet are the lack of U.S. climate leadership at home and the
unwillingness of the U.S. to engage with China,” said Joanna Lewis, a China specialist at Georgetown University. “The rest of the
world looks to the U.S. and China for leadership, and it has become clear that, as the alliance has waned, global momentum to address
climate change has slowed.” Taken together, the emissions produced by the United States and China account
for more than 40 percent of the global total. In both countries, emissions went up this year, according to an
analysis issued this week by the Global Carbon Project in which one scientist likened the acceleration of global emissions to “a
speeding freight train.” That fact hovers over Katowice, the Polish city where the United Nations is leading two weeks of talks to figure out how to
implement the Paris Agreement. Adding to the urgency of that meeting, the promises made so far under the Paris pact are nowhere enough to
avert the worst effects of climate change. A
United Nations scientific report issued this fall warned that, if emissions
continued to rise at the current rate, the planet would warm so fast that it could lead to widespread food
shortages, wildfires, and floods. It’s hard to imagine a worse time for the world’s two behemoths — the United States, traditionally
representing the rich world in climate negotiations, and China, representing the developing countries — to be locked in a cycle of intense distrust at
the highest levels
 Link – Arm Sales Hurt Climate Coop
U.S. China relations are key to solving climate change and need to stabilize – Taiwan is
the key
Gewirtz, Paul D., June 26, 2019. “Can the US-China crisis be stabilized?,” Brookings,
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/06/26/can-the-u-s-china-crisis-be-stabilized/, TL
This week President Trump will meet with China’s leader Xi Jinping at the G-20 summit meeting in Japan. The media is focusing on whether the two leaders can restart
trade talks or at least call a “trade war” truce. But far more is at stake. The entire U.S.-China relationship is now in a dangerous
downward spiral. Can the Trump-Xi meeting stabilize things? Unfortunately that’s unlikely because the crisis in U.S.-China relations now exists in virtually
every part of the relationship. Even more troubling and dangerous, there is a growing sense in each country’s government that the other is a pervasive adversary. Here
are just a few areas of conflict: Trade war: The
current trade war is having large negative consequences in both countries—
with huge tariffs in place, more tariffs promised, and collapsed negotiations that have become so publicly politicized in both
countries that a deal will be very difficult to achieve. Tech rivalry: The U.S. and China have escalated their tech rivalry, each believing that hi-tech will determine who
dominates the future global economy and military power. The Chinese leadership believes that U.S. actions like placing Huawei on the “Entity List” (banning it from
buying components from U.S. companies without U.S. government approval) reveals a U.S. goal to gravely wound China’s economy. Many in the U.S. government favor
“decoupling” our two economies to protect us, in spite of radical effects this would have. Taiwan escalations: Taiwan, the single most sensitive and
militarily dangerous issue in the U.S.-China relationship for more than 50 years, is newly fraught on both sides. In a striking
departure from the “One China” principle, a Department of Defense report recently referred to Taiwan in a category of “countries.” Senior Chinese

officials, meanwhile, have spoken in seemingly stronger tones about “reuniting” the mainland and Taiwan,
“reserving the option of taking all necessary measures.” Asia-Pacific militarization: China’s growing military power—and its occupation,
reclamation and militarization of various South China Sea land features (in violation of international law as determined by a UN arbitration tribunal)—have produced
intensified U.S. patrols and freedom of navigation operations, creating real risks of military conflict, with weakened crisis management procedures making escalations
from accidents and individual incidents much more likely. Ideological clashes: Open ideological shouting matches have increased. On the U.S. side, Acting Secretary of
Defense Shanahan recently described the U.S.-China relationship as a “geopolitical rivalry between free and repressive world order visions,” and a senior State
Department official recently called it a “clash of civilizations.” China’s authoritarian leaders have not only more bluntly criticized the inequalities and disarray of U.S.
democracy and U.S. “bullying,” but domestically have more firmly imposed CCP political control, slowed down liberalizing economic reforms, and more branzenly
committed human rights abuses, most disturbingly with the massive detentions in Xinjiang to “re-educate” the Uighur population. Visa wars: Each country is
undermining the stabilizing power of people-to-people exchanges by denying visas to people from the other country. One rationale on the U.S. side was stated by FBI
Director Christopher Wray, who calls China’s espionage and influence activity a “whole of society” effort, making every potential Chinese visitor a person of suspicion.
China’s intimidation of foreigners, including its shocking ongoing detention of several Canadian travelers, is on the increase. International system conflict: In different
ways, both China under Xi and the U.S. under Trump are challenging the international system that has generally provided remarkable global stability over the last 70
years, and challenging each other’s role in the system. The system is rapidly weakening, with no significant efforts underway to adjust and strengthen it. These are just
some specific examples. The deeper problem is a more fundamental change in each government’s perception of the other. U.S. government officials are now openly
calling China an adversary, seeking to undermine and displace U.S. power and global leadership. China’s leaders have publicly used more moderate language but clearly
have concluded that, at least under the Trump administration, the U.S. is China’s enemy and is seeking to weaken China and to bring about regime change of Chinese
Communist Party rule. Perceptions are becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy, as each country is taking actions that reflect its perceptions of the other’s hostile intentions,
and these reactions themselves reinforce the other country’s sense of enmity. Fundamental attitudinal shifts will get even worse if the relationship is not stabilized.
Global dynamics will change. China will continue moving closer to Russia —an inherently unstable but dangerous coalition, especially as our ties with our own allies are
weakening. Other countries caught up in this escalating rivalry but not wanting to take sides can easily stumble. This terrible downward spiral must be stopped. But can
it be? Of course it can. Government policies and actions are made by human beings. Structural forces affect history, but human agency—not “destiny”—determines
history’s outcomes. Whether human beings with power will in fact make appropriate choices or blunder disastrously is a separate question. Despite the rhetoric of
systemic forces and historical trends common on both sides, we must focus on the fact that human beings in the United States and China will shape the future of the
U.S.-China relationship, and neither country is synonymous with its leader or even with its government. There is debate and fluidity in both countries about the
relationship. Very significantly, the genuine enmity that is developing is very much in the government-to-government relationship, with much more nuanced and even
constructive thinking about the relationship widely held among people of all walks of life within each country. But the latter voices in the United States, numerous and
respected voices, are often marginalized—and very regrettably the media in the United States largely focus on the harshest, loudest voices and often wrongly suggest
that they reflect a new U.S. consensus. These more nuanced voices in the U.S. are part of the real new U.S. consensus—that things have changed with China and we
need to push back much more than in the past to advance our interests, but not that China is our enemy. They see an historic turning point because the balance of
power between the United States and China has changed. China, a country of 1.4 billion people, has become powerful. It has an authoritarian political system and state-
led economy very different from ours, and has been using China’s new power in various disturbing ways. Our interests often diverge, and the United States needs to push
back frequently, deter forcefully, and stand up consistently for our interests and values. For example there is a wide and bipartisan U.S. consensus that China’s economic
behaviors over decades have been unfair. Even though many disagree with President Trump’s “tariffs strategy,” including the U.S. business community, almost all agree
that we need to push back strongly on China’s very unfair and non-reciprocal economic practices, including the U.S. business community. (Although the business
community wants strong push back and is no longer cheering China engagers, it wants a vibrant economic relationship of fair competition with China and certainly not
national enmity.) There is a wide consensus that, with China’s growing military power, we need to develop new and better approaches to deterring and blocking
potential military threats. There is a wide consensus that the U.S. needs to stand up for our democratic values. But that does not mean that China is our enemy or
adversary. It does not mean we are or should be entering a “new Cold War” with China—analogizing the U.S.-China relationship to the relationship between the U.S. and
the Soviet Union in the second half of the 20th century. The “Cold War” comparison is a poor one. The U.S. and China have interdependent and mutually beneficial
economies, whereas the Soviet Union’s economy was not significant in our relationship. The U.S. and China have a huge number of people-to-people exchanges in every
walk of life; the U.S. and Soviet Union did not. The Soviet Union’s leaders told the United States “we will bury you” and the Soviet Union invaded and occupied numerous
foreign countries; China may be a tough competitor, but it is not seeking to destroy us, is not an existential threat to us, and is not invading other countries. Its leaders
are proud of what China’s system has achieved, but do not seem to be aggressively trying to export it to other countries, at least not yet. Our Cold War strategy with the
Soviet Union was “containment,” resting on the ultimately correct assumption that the Soviet Union would collapse from within; but it’s very unlikely that an awakened
and powerful China of 1.4 billion people will self-destruct if we try to “contain” it. As important as any of the above, U.S. and China cooperation is urgently necessary to
We need to cooperate with China if we are to
address problems that do pose existential threats to both countries and the entire planet.

have any chance of effectively addressing climate change, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and
pandemic diseases, to give three particularly salient examples. (The Trump administration has rejected
both the Paris climate accords and the Iran nuclear deal, each partly a product of U.S.-China cooperation,
so it does not treat these achievements of cooperation as actual benefits to U.S. interests and a strong
reason we should manage our differences with China in a way that preserves such cooperation.) China and the
U.S. will have many differences and will compete in many dimensions. But along with tension and competition and even rivalry, we need to cooperate. And to have that
necessary cooperation we must effectively manage our competition. The challenge facing the United States is whether we can live with a powerful China. An important
part of this must be U.S. domestic policy, addressing our own economic and political problems so that we can compete with China in the strongest way, remain a shining
example to the world, and offer other countries assistance and support that are alternatives to what China is offering. We should also be working collaboratively with our
allies and other partners to better deter, balance, and incentivize China. But
we must also address the China challenge with China
directly, working with China to try to figure out ways for us to live together and get along, each as powerful
countries. What are the terms of co-existence that protect U.S. interests and values, that acknowledge and manage the tension and competition that will surely
exist with a powerful China, and that also foster positive-sum cooperation with China? The greatest diplomatic challenge of our time is to try to work out the principles,
policies, and rules by which we can live together—in the economic realm, in the security realm, in reshaping the international system—rather than prejudging that the
outcome of that effort will be unsuccessful. The
U.S. today is not even attempting diplomacy. We do not have a coherent
policy towards China, we are not working with our allies to develop and implement a collaborative policy
towards China, and even routine U.S. diplomacy with Beijing is limited these days. Moreover, the brinksmanship,
evasiveness, and stonewalling of much Chinese diplomacy has never made this kind of candid and ambitious interaction easy. At the moment, the best that may be
possible is for experts outside of the two governments to attempt these in-depth discussions through Track II dialogues among nongovernmental actors. Such discussions
can lay the groundwork for future government-to-government action, even if sustained and fundamental government diplomacy is not likely during the Trump
administration. But what about the meeting this week between President Trump and President Xi? Given the current situation in U.S.-China relations described above,
we should not have high expectations for the meeting, particularly since diplomatic preparation has been minimal. Even on the “trade war” front, the situation has
become so complicated substantively and politically on both sides that concrete progress will be very difficult. The best we can hope may be only that the two leaders,
sustaining the shared imagery that they are “friends,” will create a better atmosphere in which serious trade negotiations can resume. A trade deal will not be possible if
either side insists on messaging that it has beaten the other. If each leader respectfully indicates not only that they are “friends” but gives each other credit for being a
strong leader trying to get a “good deal” for his country, the diplomats may be able to restart negotiations that could yield a politically acceptable deal that actually is a
good deal for each country. But this may not happen. Indeed, it is no longer clear that either Trump or Xi wants a trade deal at this point. And even if a trade deal does
evolve, that would only stabilize things on one front in the U.S.-China relationship, and only temporarily. Implementating any deal will be complicated, certainly creating
some new tensions, and, even more importantly, there are all the other contested fronts in the U.S.-China relationship. The challenge of the U.S. and China living
together as powerful countries will be with us for a very long time. We will need to live with that reality, as well as with each other.
 I/L – Relations Solve Warming
US-China relations k2 solving warming
Somini Sengupta, 12-7-2018, "U.S.-China Friction Threatens to Undercut the Fight Against Climate
Change," No Publication, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/07/climate/us-china-climate-change.html,
MMC
They have the largest carbon footprints. Also the largest economies. Now, as diplomats meet in Poland for high-stakes climate
negotiations, a pitched standoff between the United States and China threatens to slow global action on
climate change precisely at a time when the risks of catastrophe are accelerating. The tensions between Washington
and Beijing range from trade to cybersecurity to military rivalry in the Pacific. And while some of those issues have simmered for
years, cooperation in the fight against climate change had once been a bright spot, so much so that it
propelled the creation of the landmark global agreement in Paris in 2015 to curb greenhouse gas emissions.
But then the Trump administration announced its intention to pull out of the Paris pact altogether,
rejecting the scientific consensus that greenhouse gas emissions are warming the planet. That represented
perhaps the most consequential diplomatic reversal of the Trump era. “The biggest threats to the planet are the lack of U.S. climate leadership at
home and the unwillingness of the U.S. to engage with China,” said Joanna Lewis, a China specialist at Georgetown University. “The rest of the
world looks to the U.S. and China for leadership, and it has become clear that, as the alliance has waned, global momentum to address climate
change has slowed.” Taken
together, the emissions produced by the United States and China account for more
than 40 percent of the global total. In both countries, emissions went up this year , according to an analysis
issued this week by the Global Carbon Project in which one scientist likened the acceleration of global
emissions to “a speeding freight train.” That fact hovers over Katowice, the Polish city where the United Nations is leading two weeks
of talks to figure out how to implement the Paris Agreement. Adding to the urgency of that meeting, the promises made so far under the Paris pact
are nowhere enough to avert the worst effects of climate change. A United Nations scientific report issued this fall warned that, if emissions
continued to rise at the current rate, the planet would warm so fast that it could lead to widespread food shortages, wildfires, and floods. It’s hard
to imagine a worse time for the world’s two behemoths — the United States, traditionally representing the rich world in climate negotiations, and
China, representing the developing countries — to be locked in a cycle of intense distrust at the highest levels. “The U.S.-China climate honeymoon
is definitely over. That much is very clear,” said Li Shuo, a senior policy adviser for Greenpeace Asia, based in Beijing. “The U.S. is asking a lot but
there’s nothing that the U.S. can give. That’s the fundamental challenge.” For
China’s part — even though its emissions have
grown in the last two years, mainly because of continued coal use — the country is on track to meet its
modest, self-imposed Paris target, which is to reach peak emissions by 2030. In fact, it appears on track to
do so ahead of schedule, according to independent analysts. It is also ramping up renewable energy sources
faster than any country in the world. The emissions intensity of its economy, geared to manufacture goods
for the rest of the world, is declining. At the same time though, coal plants have not closed down as fast as
some had expected. Much more worrying, China is exporting coal technology abroad, with its powerful
state-owned companies proposing to build coal-fired power plants from Kenya to Pakistan, effectively
exporting its carbon footprint.
 Impact - Warming– Climate Migrants
Massive climate migration is certain and shreds interdependence
Wennerstein and Robbins, 2018’, [John and Denise. John R. Wennersten is a senior fellow at the
National Museum of American History at the Smithsonian Institution, and a member of the board of
directors for the Anacostia Watershed Society. He is a professor emeritus of environmental history at the
University of Maryland. Denise Robbins is a writer and communications expert on climate change issues in
Washington, DC. A graduate of Cornell University, she regularly publishes articles dealing with all aspects of
global and national environmental change, with a focus on regional politics. Rising Tides: Climate Refugees
in the Twenty-First Century. Indiana University Press. Available via GoogleBooks. //jv], MMC
Lester Brown. in his book World on the Edge, writes that “over the longer term. rising-sea refugees will likely dominate the
flow of environmental refugees.”8 How far might sea levels rise? The most conservative projections estimate between one and three
feet. The ever-practical and forward-looking Dutch, for planning purposes. are assuming a two-and-a-half-foot rise by 2050. Maybe the Dutch can
withstand two and a half feet, but this is enough to obliterate large portions of island nations like the Maldives. Yet scientists
now think we
are locked in to a sea level rise of at least three feet, and that is only with aggressive worldwide reduction
of fossil fuels. Without climate action, sea levels could rise six feet by the end of 2100 and as much as ten
feet within two centuries. creating —places as diverse as neighborhoods in Norfolk, Virginia; major parts of southern Louisiana; and island
republics like Tuvalu and the Maldives in the Indian and Pacific oceans. In the Western Hemisphere. Americans may find themselves
struggling to resettle tens of millions forced to migrate because of rising tides along the Gulf of Mexico,
South Florida, and the East Coast, reaching nearly to New England. While scientists cannot predict the details of
short-term human history, there is little doubt that changes will be momentous . Renowned climatologist James
Hansen argues that China will have great difficulties despite its growing economic power as “hundreds of millions
of Chinese are displaced by rising seas. With the submersion of Florida and coastal cities, the United States may be equally stressed.”
With global interdependence, he notes. “there may be a threat of collapse of economic and social
systems.”11
 AT: Trade War Good – IP
TPP death thumps IP, and lower IP rights is good for global health it lowers drug prices
Robert Farley, 11-30-16, Robert Farley is a senior lecturer at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and
International Commerce and a visiting professor at the U.S. Army War College, “With TPP's Demise, What
Happens to US Intellectual Property Rights Abroad?”, thediplomat.com, 6-28-19,
https://thediplomat.com/2016/11/with-tpps-demise-what-happens-to-us-intellectual-property-rights-
abroad/, AR

What does the death of the Trans-Pacific Partnership mean for U.S. intellectual property (IP) rights abroad? The United States pushed
heavily, and controversially, for the inclusion of significant IP protections in the TPP . This push is consistent with a broader effort on the
part of the U.S. government to include robust IP protection in just about every bilateral or multilateral trade agreement since the turn of the century. For some
corporations, the
death of TPP represents a major strategic setback . The international intellectual property
regime (centered around the TRIPS agreement, which is part of the WTO) was spearheaded primarily by a number of large firms with
interests in pharmaceuticals and in entertainment . The latter worry a great deal about piracy, and wanted to use TPP to lock in strong
enforcement mechanisms for copyright violations. The former are primarily concerned with state-level decisions to procure and produce generic drugs that might
compete with the more expensive, patented versions available in the United States. In addition, some electronics and technology firms sought greater IP enforcement
mechanisms out of concern over technology theft in vertically integrated production streams .Governments went along with the (often stringent) IP
requirements for two reasons: to gain greater access to the U.S. market in other products, and to cement a strategic

relationship with Washington. But now, with TPP all but dead and the broader strategic orientation of the United States in some
considerable doubt, it’s not clear that the companies which had sought these levels of protection will ever find

them. Generally speaking, developing economies do not benefit from high levels of IP protection . Even the United
States, Prussia, and France, in the years of British economic hegemony, sought to acquire as much British IP as
possible through means honest and (more often) dishonest. Some argue that a defeat for IP means a victory for global health.
Without stringent IP enforcement, governments in the Asia-Pacific can continue to invest in the production
and distribution of generic drugs, usually at a small fraction of the costs of the originals. Similarly, the ability of western
corporations to assert ownership of certain indigenous medicines and treatments will continue to face limits. No replacement for the TPP , whether

spearheaded by China or by a consortium of regional states, will include IP protections as restrictive as the ones in the current

agreement. No other nation (or at least, the major corporations of no other nation) benefits as much from robust IP protection as the United States. Developing
countries in other parts of the world have already begun to play hardball over U.S. IP concerns. Without the TPP, US negotiators will have to try to pursue IP protection
through bilateral agreements, a second-best strategy.
 Link - Arm Sales Cause Trade War
Leaving arm sales unresolved fuels trade war
Linette Lopez, 6-11-2019, "Forget the trade war — a bigger conflict between the US and China is playing
out right under our noses," Business Insider, https://www.businessinsider.com/us-arms-sales-to-taiwan-
bigger-threat-to-us-china-relations, MMC

The world has its eye on the trade war between the US and China, but a more dangerous confrontation
between the two nations is playing out in the background: the worsening disagreement over the "One
China" policy. Last week, Reuters reported that Washington was on its way to approving $2 billion worth of
arms sales to Taiwan. The move indicates the Trump administration isn't trying to create an atmosphere
conducive to trade negotiations and suggests that disputes between the US and China are more likely
headed toward escalation than resolution. "Taiwan is the thing the Chinese care most about hands down," said Susan Thornton, a
former assistant US secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs. "Anything where the US is interfering with Taiwan hits a national third rail."
The One China policy — under which the US acknowledges China's claim that Taiwan is not an independent nation but rather a part of China,
without taking a side — was developed during the Nixon administration to improve US-China relations. The idea is central to China's identity as a
modern world power, and since President Donald Trump took office the US has challenged that notion repeatedly. Despite protests from Beijing,
Trump signed the Taiwan Travel Act, legislation permitting high-level talks between US and Taiwanese officials, last year. In May, the US national
security adviser, John Bolton, met with David Lee, one of Taiwan's top security officials. This meeting came just after Taiwan renamed its unofficial
embassy in Washington the Taiwan Council for US Affairs. The old name, the Coordination Council for North American Affairs, neglected to mention
Taiwan or the US. The
Trump administration has also sold arms to Taiwan before, as have previous
administrations, but this $2 billion arms sale digs at a delicate wound during a delicate time . It's a big sale,
even in a world where weapons are becoming more and more expensive. And though it does not include
the US's top fighter jets, it is sure to antagonize Beijing before the G20 meeting at the end of the month in
Osaka, Japan, where US and Chinese heads of state are expected to meet. On Thursday, a Chinese Foreign
Ministry representative, Geng Shuang, responded to the news of the arms sale with a warning, according to
the Chinese state media outlet Xinhua. " We urge the US side to stop arms sales to Taiwan and sever their
military ties, prudently and properly handle Taiwan-related issues, to avoid serious damage to China-US
relations as well as to the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait," Geng said. In January 2017, China — most likely
aware that the incoming US president was unfamiliar with the complexities of US-China relations — clarified its position on Taiwan in a rare US
media interview by the Chinese Foreign Ministry official Lu Kang. "Because this issue touches upon China's core interest, by no means is this
something that could be negotiated or used as a bargaining chip," he told NBC. " One China policy, 100%." The fight over Taiwan's status started in
1949 after the Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek left the mainland for the island when he was defeated by Mao Zedong's Communist forces. To the
Chinese, the island's independence is both a product and a reminder of China's century of humiliation, when China was carved up by foreign powers
and then thrown into decades of chaos and civil war after the end of the Qing dynasty. "It's the mythology they've told themselves for years,"
Thornton said. In that way the One China policy and China's economic nationalism are tied together in the Chinese political imagination. That may
seem foreign to the US, where one set of technocrats handles economics and another handles national security, but the merging of the two
interests are a response to the China's lost century. And both are being tested by the Trump administration. While
the US-China trade
war producing a " tech Cold War" has grabbed headlines, less attention has been paid to escalation in
hostilities surrounding the One China policy. This despite the fact that the conflict has all the trappings of
the Cold War era. China sees US interference in Taiwan as an encroachment on its sphere of influence . And
the US sees Chinese involvement in the Caribbean similarly. Back in February 2018 after a speech in Texas, then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson
warned Latin American nations of China's "imperial" ambitions, invoking the Monroe Doctrine. "Latin America does not need new imperial powers
that seek only to benefit their own people," he said. "China's state-led model of development is reminiscent of the past. It doesn't have to be this
hemisphere's future." All of this matters for Taiwan because the more involved a country is with China, the more pressure China puts on it to wipe
Taiwan off the map. Earlier this year the Dominican Republic dropped its recognition of Taiwan at China's behest. El Salvador did it in 2018, and
Panama in 2017. There may be a Cold War-reminiscent motivation behind this arms sale as well. Taiwan's anti-China president, Tsai Ing-wen, faces
an uphill battle for reelection next year. In Washington the sale may be seen as a way to bolster her chances of winning. "One thing US
administrations tend to think, which may or may not be true," Thornton said, "is that selling weapons to Taiwan helps political candidates show that
they have US support and can stand up to China." We — the US and China — may be slipping into a world where that theory has to be tested.

Arms sales to Taiwan will escalate trade war tensions

Michael Selby-Green, an investigative journalist and digital fellow at Business Insider, September 25, 2018. “US-Taiwan $330 million arms deal
set to escalate trade war spat amid claims of 'a knife' to China’s neck,” Business Insider, https://www.businessinsider.com/us-taiwan-330-million-
arms-deal-escalates-trade-war-spat-amid-claims-of-a-knife-to-chinas-neck-2018-9, TL
The United States has approved a $330 million arms deal with China's neighbor Taiwan, in a move set to further increase tensions between Beijing and Washington
amidst the escalating trade war, The South China Morning Post reported. The news comes as China said on Tuesday that it was impossible
to hold trade
talks with the US while Washington's tariffs are like "a knife" to China's neck, following a fresh $200
billion of tariffs on China, and US President Donald Trump's threat of $267 billion more. The proposed
arms deal which was announced on Tuesday by the Pentagon and will be put before the US Congress
would include parts for F16 and F5 fighter jets, C130 cargo planes, Taiwan's Indigenous Defence Fighter,
and other aircraft systems. The sale will contribute to the "foreign policy and national security of the United States," the Pentagon's Defense Security
Cooperation Agency said, adding that Taiwan "continues to be an important force for political stability, military balance and economic progress in the region." Taiwan has
welcomed the move, and said that the deal helps the independent nation off the coast of China strengthen its defenses and deal with the challenges from Beijing. A
spokesperson for the presidential office of Taiwan said, it would boost confidence in the face of "severe" security challenges, adding "We greatly appreciate that the US
government takes note of the national security of Taiwan." China
sees Taiwan as its sovereign territory, and as a breakaway
province that must be united with the mainland by force if necessary. China has previously warned the US not to sell weapons
to the country or establish close military ties there, the South China Morning Post reported. The sale which is not yet finalized is the second under Trump following a $1.4
billion sale in June 2017 that also prompted anger from Beijing. Critics of the deal in Washington said it bows to the wishes of Chinese opposition including US defence
secretary, Mike Pompeo who criticised the Obama administration for delaying weapons sales to the area. Officials in Taipei and Washington say it is now likely that the
Trump administration will resume regular weapons sales to Taiwan, the Financial Times reported. The
escalating tensions come in the context
of China rejecting an invitation for official talks in Washington, with its vice commerce minister, Wang
Shouwen saying, "Now that the US has adopted this type of large-scale trade restrictions, they're holding
a knife to someone's throat. Under these circumstances, how can negotiations proceed?" US military officials said
On Monday that the Chinese government denied permission for a US Navy ship to do a port visit in Hong Kong next month, the Wall Street Journal reported. The denial
comes amid escalating tensions between the countries over both economic and military issues.
 I/L – Trade War Causes Protectionism
Trade war tensions will eventually escalate to global protectionism as the world
becomes adamant against neoliberal globalization
Grace Blakeley, economics commentator for New Statesman and research fellow at IPPR, May 13, 2019. “The US-China trade war is another
sign that protectionism is here to stay, “New Statesman America, https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/economy/2019/05/us-china-trade-war-
another-sign-protectionism-here-stay, TL

In its most recent economic and fiscal outlook, the International Monetary Fund (IMF)warned that the two greatest potential dangers
to global growth in 2019 were a no-deal Brexit and an escalation of the US’s trade war with China. The
first issue looks about as unlikely as it always has, but the second has heated up again. Up until today, many thought
the worst of the trade war was over. In 2018, Trump imposed tariffs on $250bn worth of Chinese imports. China retaliated with tariffs on $110bn of US products. As
tensions heated up, Trump threatened to increase the tariff rate from 10 per cent to 25 per cent, and to impose tariffs on a much wider selection of Chinese goods. But
the conflict appeared to de-escalate as the two sides came to the negotiating table. Trump’s rhetoric became markedly
tempered, and the threat of further sanctions seemed to recede. Many thought the two sides would come to a swift agreement. But Trump defied those

expectations on Friday by announcing that talks with Beijing weren’t progressing as quickly as he would
like. He has now followed through on his threat to raise the tariff rate to 25 per cent, as well as stating
that he plans to expand the now 25 per cent tariff to a further $325bn worth of Chinese goods. China is
expected to retaliate soon. Looking at trade statistics alone, it would appear that China has more to lose
from the altercation. The US imports $539bn worth of goods from China, while China only imports $120bn
back. US tariffs will reduce American demand for Chinese exports, hurting demand in an already slowing
economy. But, as highlighted in a recent report from IPPR that I co-authored, the US economy is reaching the
peak of the business cycle and looks likely to fall into recession at some point over the next two years. An
escalated trade war, which would both increase uncertainty and reduce US exports, could tip the economy into an early
downturn. The impact on the global economy could also be severe. The IMF estimates that a renewed trade war could reduce global GDP by up to 0.8 per cent in
2019. If it tips the US or China into an early recession, the effects will be much starker. Absent demand from the two main engines of growth since the recession, the
global economy’s mounting problems will start to look much more severe. Global debt is now more than three times the size of world GDP. Globalisation –

whether measured by trade or financial flows – appears to have stalled. And monetary policy has remained extremely loose for a very long time, meaning
that when the next recession does come, there won’t be much more room to cut interest rates. Both sides stand to lose a great deal from another altercation – which is
why many still anticipate that the US and China will reach an agreement before the end of the year. But democracy
may yet prevent tensions
from thawing. Workers across the global north have had just about enough of neoliberal globalisation. In
the US, most voters are now highly sceptical about the benefits of free trade. This scepticism helped to quash the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP) in 2016 when the US Congress refused to ratify the deal. In Europe, anti-EU sentiment is on the rise. The far-

right is the main beneficiary. Nationalist parties are likely to put in a strong showing in the upcoming EU elections. TPP’s European counterpart – the
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) – was also quashed several years ago after a popular backlash. It isn’t hard to see why these concerns have
emerged. Free trade today is not free, and is not strictly about trade. TTIP, which I campaigned against in 2015, included measures to “open up” public services like the
NHS to competition from private US corporations, drive down regulatory standards in Europe, and create international courts to allow investors to sue democratically-
The most recent wave of globalisation – marked by a liberalisation
elected governments if they imposed regulations that harm investors profits.

of financial flows – delivered few tangible benefits to workers in the global north, whilst actively harming the

global south. It has instead driven the kind of financial integration that helped cause the financial crisis, as well as boosting Wall Street and the City at the
expense of manufacturers and exporters. The dispute between the US and China is just the latest manifestation of a widespread backlash against the unfair, unstable and
unsustainable model of economic integration that has emerged since the financial crisis. Even if the two sides do reach a deal, protectionism is here to stay.
 Impact – Econ
Economic crisis causes war---strong statistical support
Royal 10 – Jedediah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense,
2010, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises,” in Economics of
War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-214

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political
science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and
the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at
systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level,
Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson’s (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that
rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of pre-eminent power and the often
bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic
crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin, 10981) that leads to uncertainty
about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Fearon, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively
certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may
seek to challenge a declining power (Werner, 1999). Seperately, Polllins (1996) also shows that global
economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major,
medium, and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global
economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland’s
(1996,2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that ‘future expectation of trade’ is a significant variable
in understanding economic conditions and security behavior of states. He argues that interdependent
states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade
relations. However, if the expectation of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such
as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases , as states will be inclined to use force to gain
access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on
its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states. Third, others have considered
the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess
(2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods
of economic downturn. They write, The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are
strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns
the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and
external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002, p.89). Economic decline has also been
linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the
capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the
popularity of a sitting government. ‘Diversionary theory’ suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising
from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to create a ‘rally round the flag’
effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995), and Blomberg, Hess and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence
showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997) Miller (1999)
and Kisanganie and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for
democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more
susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided
evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak
presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force.
 Impact – Protectionism Bad
Signal of protectionism causes nuclear war
Lieberthal and O’Hanlon 12’ [Ken – Dir of the China Center and Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy at
Brookings. And Michael – Dir of Research and Senior Fellow of Foreign Policy at Brookings. “The Real
National Security Threat: America’s Debt” The LA Times, 7/10/12 //GBS-JV], MMC

Second, such a chronic economic decline would undercut what has been 70 years of strong national political
consensus in favor of an activist and engaged American foreign policy . One reason the United States was so
engaged through the Cold War and the first 20 years of the post-Cold War world was fear of threats. But the other reason was that
the strategy was associated with improvements in our quality of life as well . America became even more
prosperous, and all major segments of society benefited .¶ Alas, globalization and automation trends of the
last generation have increasingly called the American dream into question for the working classes. Another
decade of underinvestment in what is required to remedy this situation will make an isolationist or populist president far
more likely because much of the country will question whether an internationalist role makes sense for
America — especially if it costs us well over half a trillion dollars in defense spending annually yet seems correlated with more job losses. ¶ Lastly,
American economic weakness undercuts U.S. leadership abroad. Other countries sense our weakness and
wonder about our purported decline. If this perception becomes more widespread, and the case that we are in
decline becomes more persuasive, countries will begin to take actions that reflect their skepticism about America's
future. Allies and friends will doubt our commitment and may pursue nuclear weapons for their own security, for
example; adversaries will sense opportunity and be less restrained in throwing around their weight in their
own neighborhoods. The crucial Persian Gulf and Western Pacific regions will likely become less stable. Major war
will become more likely.¶ When running for president last time, Obama eloquently articulated big foreign policy visions: healing America's
breach with the Muslim world, controlling global climate change, dramatically curbing global poverty through development aid, moving toward a
world free of nuclear weapons. These were, and remain, worthy if elusive goals. However, for Obama or his successor, there
is now a much
more urgent big-picture issue: restoring U.S. economic strength. Nothing else is really possible if that
fundamental prerequisite to effective foreign policy is not reestablished .

Global trade deescalates every conflict

Sapiro 2014 Miriam, Visiting Fellow in the Global Economy and Development program, former Deputy US
Trade Representative, Why Trade Matters, September 2014,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2014/09/why%20trade%20matters/trade
%20global%20views_final.pdf, MMC

This policy brief explores the economic rationale and strategic imperative of an ambitious domestic and
global trade agenda from the perspective of the United States. International trade is often viewed through the relatively narrow prism of
trade-offs that might be made among domestic sectors or between trading partners, but it is im- portant to consider also the
impact that increased trade has on global growth, development and security. With that context in mind, this paper
assesses the implications of the Asia-Pacific and European trade negotiations underway, including for
countries that are not participating but aspire to join . It outlines some of the challenges that stand in the way of completion and
ways in which they can be addressed. It examines whether the focus on "mega-regional" trade agreements comes at the expense of broader
liberalization or acts as a catalyst to develop higher standards than might otherwise be possible. It concludes with policy recommendations for
action by governments, legislators and stakeholders to address concerns that have been raised and create greater domestic support. It is fair to ask
whether we should be concerned about the future of international trade policy when dire develop- ments are threatening the security interests of
the United States and its partners in the Middle East, Asia, Africa and Europe. In
the Middle East, significant areas of Iraq have
been overrun by a toxic offshoot of Al-Qaeda, civil war in Syria rages with no end in sight, and the Israeli-
Palestinian peace process is in tatters. Nuclear negotiations with Iran have run into trouble, while Libya and Egypt
face continuing instability and domestic challenges. In Asia, historic rivalries and disputes over territory have heightened
tensions across the region, most acutely by China's aggressive moves in the South China Sea towards Vietnam,
Japan and the Philippines. Nuclear-armed North Korea remains isolated, reckless and unpredictable. In Africa, countries
are struggling with rising terrorism, violence and corruption. In Europe, Russia
continues to foment instability and destruction
in eastern Ukraine. And within the European Union, lagging economic recovery and the surge in support for extremist parties have left
people fearful of increasing violence against immigrants and minority groups and skeptical of further integration. It is tempting to focus solely on
these pressing problems and defer less urgent issues—such as forging new dis- ciplines for international trade to another day, especially when such
issues pose challenges of their own. But that would be a mistake. A
key motivation in building greater domestic and
international consensus for advanc- ing trade liberalization now is precisely the role that greater economic
integration can play in opening up new avenues of opportunity for promoting development and increasing
economic prosperity. Such initiatives can help stabilize key regions and strengthen the security of the United
States and its partners. The last century provides a powerful example of how expanding trade relations can
help reduce global tensions and raise living standards. Following World War II, building stronger economic
cooperation was a centerpiece of allied efforts to erase battle scars and embrace former enemies. In defeat,
the economies of Germany, Italy and Japan faced ruin and people were on the verge of starvation. The United States led efforts to rebuild Europe
and to repair Japan's economy. A key element of the Marshall Plan, which established the foundation for unprecedented growth and the level of
European integration that exists today, was to revive trade by reducing tariffs.1 Russia, and the eastern part of Europe that it controlled, refused to
participate or receive such assistance. De- cades later, as the Cold War ended, the United States and Western Europe sought to make up for lost
time by providing significant technical and financial assistance to help integrate central and eastern European countries with the rest of Europe and
the global economy. "There have been subsequent calls for a "Marshall Plan" for other parts of the world,' although the confluence of dedicated
resources, coordinated support and existing capacity has been difficult to replicate. Nonetheless, impor-tant lessons have been
learned about the valuable role economic development can play in defusing tensions , and how opening markets can
hasten growth. There is again a growing recognition that economic security and national security are two sides of the same
coin. General Carter Ham, who stepped down is head of U.S. Africa Command last year, observed the close connection between increasing
prosperity and bolstering stability. During his time in Africa he had seen that "security and stability in many ways depends a lot
more on economic growth and oppor- tunity than it does on military strength ."1 Where people have opportunities for
themselves and their children, he found, the result was better governance, increased respect for human rights and lower levels of conflict. During
his confirmation hearing last year, Secretary John Kerry stressed the link between economic and national security in the context of the
competitiveness of the United States but the point also has broader application. Our nation cannot be strong abroad, he argued, if it is not strong at
home, including by putting its own fiscal house in order. He asserted—rightly so—that "more
than ever foreign policy is economic
policy," particularly in light of increasing competition for global resources and markets. Every day, he said,
"that goes by where America is uncertain about engaging in that arena , or unwilling to put our best foot forward and win,
unwilling to dem- onstrate our resolve to lead, is a day in which we weaken our nation itself."4 Strengthening America's
economic security by cementing its economic alliances is not simply an option, but an imperative. A strong nation needs a
strong economy that can generate growth, spur innovation and create jobs. This is true, of course, not only for the United States
but also for its key partners and the rest of the global trading system. Much as the United States led the
way in forging strong military alliances after World War II to discourage a resurgence of militant nationalism
in Europe or Asia, now is the time to place equal emphasis on shoring up our collective economic security . A
failure to act now could undermine international security and place stability in key regions in further
jeopardy.
 Impact – Warming
Warming outweighs – famine, sea level rise, natural disasters – extinction first –
regardless of probability
Bostrom, 13’, Prof, Faculty of Philosophy @ Oxford, Director of the Future of Humanity Institute in the
Oxford Martin School, “Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority”, February, Volume 4, Issue 1, pages
15–31, February 2013, CMR, MMC

I believe thatif we destroy mankind, as we now can, this outcome will be much worse than most people think. Compare three outcomes: 1  Peace. 2  A
99 per cent of the world’s existing population. 3  A nuclear war that kills 100 per cent. 2 would be worse than 1, and 3 would be worse than 2. Which is the
nuclear war that kills

greater of these two differences? Most people believe that the greater difference is between 1 and 2. I believe that the difference between 2 and 3 is very much greater. The

Earth will remain habitable for at least another billion years. Civilisation began only a few thousand years ago. If we do not destroy mankind,
these few thousand years may be only a tiny fraction of the whole of civilised human history . The difference
between 2 and 3 may thus be the difference between this tiny fraction and all of the rest of this history. If we compare this possible history to

a day, what has occurred so far is only a fraction of a second (Parfit, 1984, pp. 453–454). To calculate the loss associated with an existential catastrophe, we must consider how

much value would come to exist in its absence. It turns out that the ultimate potential for Earth-originating intelligent life
is literally astronomical. One gets a large number even if one confines one’s consideration to the potential for biological human beings living on Earth. If we suppose with Parfit
that our planet will remain habitable for at least another billion years, and we assume that at least one billion people could live on it sustainably, then the potential exist for at least 10^16 human
lives of normal duration. These lives could also be considerably better than the average contemporary human life, which is so often marred by disease, poverty, injustice, and various biological

limitations that could be partly overcome through continuing technological and moral progress. However, the relevant figure is not how many people could live on Earth but
how many descendants we could have in total. One lower bound of the number of biological human life-years in the future accessible universe (based on current
cosmological estimates) is 10^34 years.7 Another estimate, which assumes that future minds will be mainly implemented in computational hardware instead of biological neuronal wetware,
produces a lower bound of 1054 human-brain-emulation subjective life-years (or 10^71 basic computational operations) (Bostrom, 2003).8 If we make the less conservative assumption that future
civilisations could eventually press close to the absolute bounds of known physics (using some as yet unimagined technology), we get radically higher estimates of the amount of computation and
memory storage that is achievable and thus of the number of years of subjective experience that could be realised.9 Even if we use the most conservative of these estimates, which entirely ignores

the expected loss of an existential catastrophe is greater than the

the possibility of space colonisation and software minds, we find that

value of 10^16 human lives. This implies that the expected value of reducing existential risk by a mere one millionth of one
percentage point is at least a hundred times the value of a million human lives . The more technologically comprehensive estimate of 1054 human-
brain-emulation subjective life-years (or 1052 lives of ordinary length) makes the same point even more starkly. Even if we give this allegedly lower bound on the cumulative output potential of a

the expected value of reducing existential risk by a mere

technologically mature civilisation a mere 1 per cent chance of being correct, we find that

one billionth of one billionth of one percent age point is worth a hundred billion times as much as a billion human lives.
One might consequently argue that even the tiniest reduction of existential risk has an expected value greater than that of

the definite provision of any ‘ordinary’ good, such as the direct benefit of saving 1 billion lives. And, further, that the absolute value of
the indirect effect of saving 1 billion lives on the total cumulative amount of existential risk—positive or negative—is almost certainly larger than the positive value of the direct benefit of such an

the loss in expected value resulting from an existential catastrophe is so enormous that
action.10 Maxipok These considerations suggest that

the objective of reducing existential risks should be a dominant consideration whenever we act out of an impersonal concern for
humankind as a whole. It may be useful to adopt the following rule of thumb for such impersonal moral action:
China War Adv
 1AC
US arms sales force conflict with China over Taiwan – Raising the stakes and making
peaceful resolution impossible
Chung, 18 – Lawrence, 10/31/18 covers major news in Taiwan, ranging from presidential and parliament elections to
killer earthquakes and typhoons; “United States wont allow force against Taiwan, new US envoy as Beijing piles on pressure,” South
China Morning Post, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/2171037/united-states-wont-allow-force-
against-taiwan-new-us-envoy-says CC

The United States will not stand by to allow any non-peaceful attempt to
unilaterally alter the status quo of Taiwan, a senior US diplomat has said in an apparent
warning against Beijing’s threats to retake the self-ruled island, by force if necessary. Washington would also do
all it could to help Taiwan rejoin some international organizations such as Interpol, the official said, despite
strong protests from Beijing, which considers Taiwan a wayward province. In his debut press conference on the
island on Wednesday, Brent Christensen, the new director of the US de facto embassy, the American Institute in
Taiwan, signaled stronger US support for the island in the face of persistent pressure from Beijing against Taipei .

“I am here to tell you that US policy towards Taiwan has not changed,”
Christensen said. “Any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than

peaceful means represents a threat to the peace and security of the

Western Pacific area and is of grave concern to the United States. “We
are opposed to unilateral attempts to change the status quo.” Since Tsai Ing-
wen, of the independence-leaning Democratic Progressive Party, became the island’s president in 2016 and
refused to accept the one-China principle,
Beijing has stepped up pressure against
Taiwan, including staging war games around the island and poaching five
of Taipei’s allies. It has also demanded that international companies, including
airlines, change the title of Taiwan to either a Chinese province or “China,

Taiwan” to indicate that the island is a part of China. The principle is part of an
understanding reached in 1992 between unofficial representatives of Beijing and Taipei that there is only
“one China”, but
each side would have its own interpretation of what
constitutes “China”. Christensen said that as the new US envoy to Taiwan he would do all he could
to promote security cooperation between Washington and Taipei, saying “promoting security cooperation
US’
and improving Taiwan’s self-defense capability go hand in hand”. He also said it was the
“obligation to support Taiwan in maintaining a sufficient self-defense
capability against coercion” and this policy was consistent for both the Democratic and
Republican parties. He cited the Trump administration’s approval of two arms

sales, including the US$330 million deal for spare parts for the island’s F-
16s and other warplanes, as examples of that commitment. He said one of his
four priorities as the institute’s director was to promote Taiwan’s participation in the international community.
“As we face a multitude of global challenges – the impacts of global health pandemics; transnational terrorism
and crime; and the insidious spread of disinformation, to name a few – we cannot afford to exclude a society
[Taiwan] with so much to offer the world,” he said. He said the US had long been a vocal supporter of Taiwan’s
meaningful participation in international organizations. “We continue our informal consultations and
engagement to allow Taiwan to have a more substantive role in the international community,” he said, adding
that the broader engagement would benefit the global community. He said he expected high-level US officials
would visit Taiwan in line with the newly enacted Taiwan Travel Act, which allows exchanges of top-level officials
between Taiwan and the United States. Christensen said the institute would move to its US$255 million new
compound at the end of this year and he hoped it would be a good chance for a high-level US official to visit .

Christensen’s comments are expected to again infuriate Beijing, which

has loudly protested against the US for supplying arms to Taiwan and
allowing senior officials to visit the island – acts the mainland says violates the one-China
policy that Washington committed to observe after switching official recognition to Beijing.

China is ramping up and preparing for a military war in the Cross Strait
Huang, 18 – Kristin, 10/31/18, a senior China reporter, who focuses on diplomacy and defense; ‘Prepare for war’, Xi Jingping tells
military region that monitors South China Sea, Taiwan,” South China Morning Post,
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/2170452/prepare-war-xi-jinping-tells-military-region-monitors-south CC

- why would china attack the Cross Straight?

China’sPresident Xi Jinping has ordered the military region responsible for monitoring
the South China Sea and Taiwan to assess the situation it is facing and boost its capabilities
so it can handle any emergency. The Southern Theatre Command has had to bear a “heavy military
responsibility” in recent years, state broadcaster CCTV quoted him as saying during an inspection tour made on
Thursday as part of his visit to Guangdong province. “It’s necessary to strengthen the mission … and concentrate
preparations for fighting a war,” Xi said. “We need to take all complex situations into consideration and make
emergency plans accordingly. “Wehave to step up combat readiness exercises, joint
exercises and confrontational exercises to enhance servicemen’s capabilities and
preparation for war.” Xi’s visit to the military command was one of several he made during a four-day trip
to the south China province aimed at bolstering confidence amid an economic slowdown, and growing trade and
strategic disputes with the United States. Details of his speech came a day after China’s State Councillor General
and Defence Minister Wei Fenghe said the country would never give up “one single piece” of its territory and
warned that “repeated challenges” to its sovereignty over Taiwan were extremely dangerous and would result in
military action. One of
the primary missions of the Southern Theatre Command is
overseeing the South China Sea, an area where tensions and military activity involving
China, the US and other powers have been growing steadily . Earlier this month, a Chinese
destroyer almost collided with a US warship in the disputed waters after making what the Americans described
as an “unsafe and unprofessional” manoeuvre in an attempt to warn it to leave the area. Military observers said
Xi’s comments were most likely intended to boost morale and reiterate Beijing’s territorial claims in the South
China Sea. “It’s likely intended as a signal to the US in particular and any parties that Beijing perceives to be
causing provocation [in the disputed waters],” said Collin Koh, a research fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of
International Studies at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. Beijing-based analyst Zhou Chenming
took a similar view. “The United States is expected to conduct more freedom of
navigation exercises in the South China Sea region, and because it does not
recognise [Beijing’s] rights to artificial islands, like Mischief Reef, there will probably
be more military friction between the two countries there.” Koh said Xi’s address to the
Southern Theatre Command was also a clear warning to pro-independence forces in Taiwan, as the military
region shared responsibility with the Eastern Theatre Command for monitoring the self-ruled island.

Arms sales make conflict with Taiwan inevitable.

Thrall & Dorminey 18. Trevor Thrall is a senior fellow for the Cato’s Institute’s Defense and Foreign Policy Department, with expertise
in international security and the politics of American national security. Thrall is also an associate professor at George Mason University’s Schar
School of Policy and Government where he teaches courses in international security. Caroline Dorminey was a policy analyst in defense and foreign
policy studies at the Cato Institute. “Risky Business: The Role of Arms Sales in U.S. Foreign Policy.” CATO Institute,
https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/risky-business-role-arms-sales-us-foreign-policy. Date Accessed: 6/25/2019. BZ.

Second,arms sales can also prolong and intensify ongoing conflicts and erode rather than promote regional
stability. Few governments, and fewer insurgencies, have large enough weapons stocks to fight for long without resupply. 82 The tendency
of external powers to arm the side they support , however understandable strategically, has the inevitable
result of allowing the conflict to continue at a higher level of intensity than would otherwise be the case. As
one study of arms sales to Africa notes, “Weapons imports are essential additives in this recipe for armed conflict and carnage.” 83 Third, this
recipients of
dynamic appears to be particularly troublesome with respect to internal conflicts. Jennifer Erickson, for example, found that
major conventional weapons are 70 percent more likely to engage in internal conflicts than other states.
Though halting arms sales alone is not a panacea for peace and stability, arms embargoes can help lessen the destructiveness
of combat in both civil and interstate wars simply by restricting access to the means of violence. 84 Finally,
because of their effects on both interstate and internal conflict, arms sales can also erode rather than promote regional stability. As noted in the
arms sales often create tension, whether
previous section, where the United States seeks to manage regional balances of power,
because the American role in the region threatens others or because American clients feel emboldened . The
Middle East, for example, has seesawed between violence and tense standoffs for the past many decades, at first because of Cold War competition
and more recently because of the American war on terror. The notion that increased U.S. arms sales since 9/11 made the Middle East more stable is
Similarly, though many argue that American security commitments to countries like
far-fetched to say the least.
Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea have produced greater stability, there is a strong case to be made that the
opposite is now true. American support of South Korea has driven North Korea to develop nuclear weapons; the presence of U.S. missile
defense systems in South Korea has aggravated China, and American support of Taiwan produces continual tension
between the two powers.85

US-China tensions high now – nuclear miscalc prompts immediate US action

Lowther 13 William Lowther, Taipei Times, citing a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 3/16/13, “Taiwan could
spark nuclear war: report,” http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/03/16/2003557211. BZ.

Taiwan is the most likely potential crisis that could trigger a nuclear war between China and the US, a new
academic report concludes.¶ “Taiwan remains the single most plausible and dangerous source of tension and conflict between the US and China,”
says the 42-page report by the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). ¶ Prepared by the CSIS’ Project on Nuclear
Issues and resulting from a year-long study, the report emphasizes that Beijing continues to be set on a policy to
prevent Taiwan’s independence, while at the same time the US maintains the capability to come to
Taiwan’s defense.¶ “Although tensions across the Taiwan Strait have subsided since both Taipei and Beijing embraced a policy of engagement
in 2008, the situation remains combustible, complicated by rapidly diverging cross-strait military capabilities
and persistent political disagreements,” the report says.¶ In a footnote, it quotes senior fellow at the US Council on Foreign Relations
Richard Betts describing Taiwan as “the main potential flashpoint for the US in East Asia.” ¶ The report also quotes Betts as saying that neither
Beijing nor Washington can fully control developments that might ignite a Taiwan crisis .¶ “This is a classic
recipe for surprise, miscalculation and uncontrolled escalation,” Betts wrote in a separate study of his own. ¶ The CSIS
study says: “For the foreseeable future Taiwan is the contingency in which nuclear weapons would most likely become
a major factor, because the fate of the island is intertwined both with the legitimacy of the Chinese
Communist Party and the reliability of US defense commitments in the Asia-Pacific region.Ӧ Titled Nuclear Weapons and
US-China Relations, the study says disputes in the East and South China seas appear unlikely to lead to major conflict between China and the US, but
they do “provide kindling” for potential conflict between the two nations because the disputes implicate a number of important regional interests,
including the interests of treaty allies of the US. ¶ The danger posed by flashpoints such as Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula and maritime demarcation
disputes is magnified by the potential for mistakes, the study says. ¶ “Although Beijing and Washington have agreed to a range
of crisis management mechanisms, such as the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement and the establishment of a direct hotline
the bases for miscommunication and misunderstanding remain and
between the Pentagon and the Ministry of Defense,
draw on deep historical reservoirs of suspicion,” the report says.¶ For example, it says, it is unclear
whether either side understands what kinds of actions would result in a military or even nuclear response
by the other party.¶ To make things worse, “ neither side seems to believe the other’s declared policies and
intentions, suggesting that escalation management, already a very uncertain endeavor, could be especially difficult in
any conflict,” it says.¶ Although conflict “mercifully” seems unlikely at this point, the report concludes that “it cannot be ruled out and may become
increasingly likely if we are unwise or unlucky.” ¶ The report says: “With
both sides possessing and looking set to retain formidable
nuclear weapons arsenals, such a conflict would be tremendously dangerous and quite possibly devastating.”

Cross-Strait conflict is the most likely scenario

Campbell & Mitchell 01 Kurt M. Campbell is Senior Vice President and Director of the International Security Program at the
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and Deputy Director of the Aspen Strategy Group. Derek J. Mitchell is Senior Fellow for
Asia at CSIS. “Crisis in the Taiwan Strait?.” Foreign Affairs Newsletter. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2001-07-01/crisis-taiwan-
strait. Date Accessed: 6/25/2019. BZ.

Washington's official relationship with Beijing on the one hand and its unofficial relationship with Taipei on the
other represent perhaps the most complex foreign-policy balancing act in the world today. At stake are a
number of core U.S. foreign policy goals: the promotion of democracy, the preservation of U.S. credibility,
loyalty to traditional allies and friends, the engagement and integration of an emerging power into the
international system, and the maintenance of peace and stability in Asia as a whole. The interplay and clash
among these various goals make the Taiwan Strait an unpredictable and therefore dangerous place. Moreover,
Taiwan's recent democratization has undermined the "one-China" policy and made the prospect of conflict increasingly likely. Compounding the
Perhaps nowhere
problem is the deep division within the U.S. foreign policy elite over how to maintain the increasingly fragile peace there.
else on the globe is the situation so seemingly intractable and the prospect of a major war involving the
United States so real.

US-China conflict over Taiwan goes nuclear

Talmadge 18 Caitlin Talmadge is Associate Professor of Security Studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown
University. “Beijing’s Nuclear Option - Why a U.S.-Chinese War Could Spiral Out of Control.” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-
10-15/beijings-nuclear-option. Date Accessed: 12/16/2018. BZ.

the prospect of a military confrontation— resulting, for example,

A war between the two countries remains unlikely, but
from a Chinese campaign against Taiwan —no longer seems as implausible as it once did. And the odds of
such a confrontation going nuclear are higher than most policymakers and analysts think. Bottom of Form
Members of China’s strategic community tend to dismiss such concerns. Likewise, U.S. studies of a potential war with China often exclude nuclear
weapons from the analysis entirely, treating them as basically irrelevant to the course of a conflict. Asked about the issue in 2015, Dennis Blair, the
former commander of U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific, estimated the likelihood of a U.S.-Chinese nuclear crisis as “ somewhere between nil and zero.”
This assurance is misguided. If deployed against China, the Pentagon’s preferred style of conventional warfare
would be a potential recipe for nuclear escalation . Since the end of the Cold War, the United States’ signature approach to war
has been simple: punch deep into enemy territory in order to rapidly knock out the opponent’s key military assets at minimal cost. But the
If deployed
Pentagon developed this formula in wars against Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Serbia, none of which was a nuclear power.
against China, the Pentagon’s preferred style of conventional warfare would be a potential recipe for
nuclear escalation. China, by contrast, not only has nuclear weapons; it has also intermingled them with its
conventional military forces, making it difficult to attack one without attacking the other. This means that a
major U.S. military campaign targeting China’s conventional forces would likely also threaten its nuclear
arsenal. Faced with such a threat, Chinese leaders could decide to use their nuclear weapons while they were still able to. As U.S. and Chinese
leaders navigate a relationship fraught with mutual suspicion, they must come to grips with the fact that a conventional war could skid
into a nuclear confrontation. Although this risk is not high in absolute terms, its consequences for the region and the world would be
devastating. As long as the United States and China continue to pursue their current grand strategies, the risk

is likely to endure. This means that leaders on both sides should dispense with the illusion that they can easily fight a limited war. They
should focus instead on managing or resolving the political, economic, and military tensions that might lead to a conflict in the first place.

The United States failed to honor its commitments to China without

much consequence
McClaran, 2000– John, July-Aug, 2000 served in the United States Army from 1974 to 2011. He retired at the
rank of Major General[1] in the United States Army; “U.S. ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN Implications for the Future of the Sino-U.S.
Relationship, “University of California press https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/3021185.pdf?refrecid=excelsior
%3Abdd6a0551af9eb1e292ae0809b57c69e CC

The net effect is that these arms sales have become the single biggest obstacle to establishing fully normal
relations between the U.S. and China and narrow the options for both sides to either conflict or cooperate .

The U.S. in essence has painted itself into a corner because it has failed to
honor the commitments it has made to China in the past. The truth is not a
currency easily converted by changed circumstances . The fundamental truth is that the U.S.

promised China that it would show great restraint in providing limited

and defensive arms to Taiwan during an ill-defined transition era that was
to follow the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1979. The U.S. promised
that during this transition it would shift its emphasis away from supplying arms to Taiwan and toward promoting
the necessary dialogue and negotiation that would help reconcile China and
Taiwan. Doing such would allow these two entities to find a formula to
live together in peace and create a transitional era in which the U.S. and
China could then solve the problems left over from history while allowing
their own relationship to move forward. Both Washington and Beijing had a great deal to
gain from one another in 1979 and this remains the case today. Arms sales, however, are the

major problem left over from history that prevents the relationship from
developing as both governments would wish. Taiwan does not need more
arms from the U.S. What it does need is help in both assimilating the diverse and sophisti- cated array
of equipment it now has and reducing the influence of non-war fighting factors that seriously impinge the
development of a modern force capable of executing its national military strategy. To
help Taiwan
achieve these objectives, the U.S. must shift from supplying arms overtly
to a discreet strategy of advice and assistance designed to improve and
rationalize Tai- wan's force structure with its military objectives.
 UX – Conflict Now
China wont back down to US deterrence efforts in cross strait, trade war
proves china wont listen to US
Liang, 19 – Lim Yan, 6/13/19 China Correspondent In Beijing. “China repeats warning to US against arms sale to Taiwan,” The
Straits Times; Singapore. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1yZ4uB2FOq6AgzeVkI1orf7OVws5oYt-NZwsy6wI1Qko/edit (date accessed
6/27/19) CC

Strongly opposing official exchanges and military ties between the US and Taiwan,
the spokesman for China's policymaking Taiwan Affairs Office An Fengshan also said
yesterday that any attempts at Taiwan independence will meet a dead end. Mr An's
comments came after recent escalations in US-China tensions that threaten to spill
over beyond the ongoing trade war and into other domains. Reports last week said
the US is pursuing a US$2 billion (S$2.72 billion) arms sale to Taiwan consisting of
108 Abrams tanks and a range of portable anti-tank missiles, angering Beijing.
China's Foreign Ministry had slammed the proposed arms sale, which would be the
fourth such deal for Taiwan under President Donald Trump if it is approved by
Congress. The proposed deal comes on the back of a US$330 million sale of F-16 and
other military aircraft parts last year, and an F-16 pilot training, maintenance and
logistics support programme worth some US$500 million that was approved in April.
Yesterday, Mr An reiterated the Foreign Ministry's call for the US to sever military
ties with Taiwan and to avoid upsetting stability in the Taiwan Strait. "The situation
in the Taiwan Strait is, at present, complicated and serious, and the US should
handle Taiwan- related issues with caution and not send the wrong signals to
'Taiwan independence' separatist forces," he said.

US is taking steps increasingly in support of the Taiwenesee people that

China wont tolerate
Liang, 19 – Lim Yan, China Correspondent In Beijing. “China repeats warning to US against arms sale to Taiwan,” The Straits
Times; Singapore . https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/china-repeats-warning-to-us-against-arms-sale-to-
taiwan
(date accessed 6/27/19) CC

The Pentagon has in recent months increased the frequency of naval patrols
through the Taiwan Strait, in what officials call freedom of navigation exercises.
Earlier this month, the US released its first Indo-Pacific Strategy Report that included
Taiwan on a list of those it called "reliable, capable and natural partners of the
United States". Washington timed the release of the report with Acting US Defence
Secretary Patrick Shanahan's speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, where
he said the US would no longer "tiptoe" around China's behaviour in Asia. The US
Pacific Marine Corps has since released photos of a Taiwanese general at an
annual gathering of military leaders in Hawaii last week. The White House this
month also posted on Instagram a photo of Mr Trump with US Air Force Academy
graduates, with the Taiwan flag visible on the side. China considers self-governed
Taiwan a renegade province with no right to state-to-state ties, and territory to be
"reunified" by force if necessary. Mr An did not directly answer whether China
viewed these latest developments as having breached its bottom line regarding the
mainland's "one China" principle, but said Taiwan is an inalienable part of China.
China takes the position that there is one China, with each side having different
interpretations of what "one China" means. Mr An said China will not tolerate any
attempt to divide the country, and that Beijing "reserves the option to take all
necessary measures targeting interference by external forces and the separatist
activities of a very small number of 'Taiwan independence' separatist forces". "There
is only one China in the world; Taiwan is an inalienable part of China, and Taiwan
has never been a country," he said. "This fact has never changed and cannot be
changed."
 UX – Taiwan War Likely
Confrontation in the cross strait is increasingly becoming a legitimate
threat
Auslin, 2019- Michael is the Payson J. Treat Fellow in Contemporary Asia at the Hoover Institution, 4/3/19
Stanford University. “Sparks in the Taiwan Strait Tinderbox,” National review.
https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/sparks-in-the-taiwan-strait-tinderbox/ (accessed 6/27/19) CC

The real sparks in the Taiwan Strait tinderbox came from Tsai’s
public announcement that she will order a “forceful expulsion” of any Chinese
military jets that cross the de facto border of the Median Line. Tsai also ordered the
military to “complete all tasks on war preparation.” There is undoubtedly a range of options
Tsai has that would fulfill her promise of forcibly expelling Chinese intruders, but she has also raised the stakes
appreciably. Any inability to immediately counter PLA Air Force incursions and prevent Chinese jets from
lingering in what Taiwan considers to be its airspace will undermine her credibility .
If the Taiwanese Air
Force simply shadows Chinese fighters or bombers, waiting for them to leave of
their own accord, then Beijing will undoubtedly be emboldened to further poke at
Taiwan’s defenses. That could then cause an accident or miscalculation happening at hundreds of miles an
hour thousands of feet above the ground. Taiwan’s frustration could boil over into an actual
use of force, or Chinese pilots could also miscalculate in such an encounter, as
happened in April 2001, when a hotshot Chinese fighter pilot collided with a U.S. Navy surveillance plane over
the South China Sea.

The end result of a similar accident over the Taiwan Strait could be an armed clash, giving
Beijing the excuse it needs to deal a blow to Taiwan’s military, and try to intimidate
the country into some sort of agreement that curtailed its sovereignty. It would also
present Washington with a grave choice, of whether to risk an intervention against the world’s second-most
powerful military or to have its credibility shredded by failing to support Taiwan after so many decades (for
those who really want to get into the policymaking weeds, consider what would happen if Taiwan fired the first
shot or caused an accident that claimed Chinese life, and Beijing retaliated. Would a U.S. president get involved
short of a clear offensive action against Taiwan by China?). One way for the U.S. to avoid getting drawn in
directly, is to fast-track the approval to sell Taiwan the F-16V fighters it wants. That will send a message that
Washington won’t shrink from supporting Taiwan, and it will give Taipei greater ability to defend itself, which
may give China some pause.

The US Will eventually lose control over arm sales situation, escalates to war
Glaser, 04 Charles L. (http://politics.virginia.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Glaser-VISC.pdf) Charles L.Glaser is a Professor of Political
Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George
Washington University

As China grows more powerful, it may increasingly resent U.S. influence in Northeast Asia. But unless U.S.-Chinese relations become severely
strained, China is likely to accept a continuing U.S. presence in the region, given the alternatives. ACCOMMODATION ON TAIWAN? THE PROSPECTS
for avoiding intense military competition and war may be good, but growth in China's power may nevertheless require some changes in U.S. foreign
policy that Washington will find disagreeable--particularly regarding Taiwan. Although it lost control of Taiwan during the Chinese Civil War more
than six decades ago,
China still considers Taiwan to be part of its homeland, and unification remains a key
political goal for Beijing. China has made clear that it will use force if Taiwan declares independence, and
much of China's conventional military buildup has been dedicated to increasing its ability to coerce
Taiwan and reducing the United States' ability to intervene . Because China places such high value on Taiwan and because
the United States and China--whatever they might formally agree to--have such different attitudes regarding the legitimacy of the status quo, the
issue poses EBSCOhost http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/delivery?sid=79ce0d35-f789- 4c... 5 of 10 4/6/11 4:30 PM special dangers and challenges
for the U.S.-Chinese relationship, placing it in a different category than Japan or South Korea. A
crisis over Taiwan could fairly easily
escalate to nuclear war, because each step along the way might well seem rational to the actors
involved. Current U.S. policy is designed to reduce the probability that Taiwan will declare independence and to make clear that the United
States will not come to Taiwan's aid if it does. Nevertheless, the United States would find itself under pressure to protect
Taiwan against any sort of attack, no matter how it originated. Given the different interests and perceptions of the various
parties and the limited control Washington has over Taipei's behavior, a crisis could unfold in which the United States found
itself following events rather than leading them. Such dangers have been around for decades, but ongoing
improvements in China's military capabilities may make Beijing more willing to escalate a Taiwan crisis. In
addition to its improved conventional capabilities, China is modernizing its nuclear forces to increase their ability to
survive and retaliate following a large-scale U.S. attack. Standard deterrence theory holds that Washington's current ability
to destroy most or all of China's nuclear force enhances its bargaining position. China's nuclear modernization might remove that check on Chinese
action, leading Beijing to behave more boldly in future crises than it has in past ones. A U.S. attempt to preserve its ability to defend Taiwan,
meanwhile, could fuel a conventional and nuclear arms race. Enhancements to U.S. offensive targeting capabilities and strategic ballistic missile
defenses might be interprete7c69e)

Answering the question of what policy solutions can mitigate the problems caused by U.S. arms sales to Taiwan is complex. The issue is not just one
of differing political interpretations between the 1982 U.S.-PRC Joint Communique and the TRA. These two documents are at loggerheads where
fundamental foreign policy differences between the U.S. and China collide. U.S. efforts to exert its global and regional influence exacerbate long-
held Chinese suspicions of U.S. aspirations to hegemony. In turn, China's drive to modernize its military along with Beijing's domestic and
international behavior exacerbate equally long-held suspicions of China in the U.S. This has left Taiwan as the destination of U.S. d by China as a
signal of malign U.S. motives, leading to further Chinese military efforts and a general poisoning of U.S.-Chinese relations .

Given such risks, the United States should consider backing away from its commitment to Taiwan. This
would remove the most obvious and contentious flash point between the United States and China and
smooth the way for better relations between them in the decades to come. Critics of such a move argue that it would
result in not only direct costs for the United States and Taiwan but indirect costs as well: Beijing would not be satisfied by such appeasement;
instead, it would find its appetite whetted and make even greater demands afterward--spurred by Washington's lost credibility as a defender of its
allies. The critics are wrong, however, because territorial concessions are not always bound to fail. Not all adversaries are Hitler, and when they are
not, accommodation can be an effective policy tool.
 Link – Arms Sales Cause War
Chinas increasing military capabilities and threats against the US
for backing Taiwan cause war
Sullivan, 19- Harvey. 1/2/19 “ON A KNIFE EDGE China’s Xi Jinping vows to take back
Taiwan ‘by force’ just hours after threatening to blow up US warships,”
https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/8102338/china-take-back-taiwan-xi-jinping-us-warships/ (date
accessed 6-27-19) CC

CHINESE President Xi Jinping has vowed to forcibly take back

Taiwan - just hours after one of China's chief naval officers
threatened to sink US warships. Xi made the comments in a
Beijing speech just a day after the Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-
wen insisted people on the island wish to stay independent. The
Chinese president said: "We are firmly against those who conspire
behind the ideo of 'Two China', or 'One China-One Taiwan', or
Taiwan Independence. "We have achieved great victory on defeating any pro-
independence or separatist activities. "Nobody, and no party, can change the historical and legal that
Taiwan is part of China and that both sides of the strait belong to China," He
added that
China "reserves the option of taking all necessary measures".
Yesterday, China's Rear Admiral Lou Yuan made a chilling threat
to sink two US aircraft carriers to solve disputes over the South
China Sea, risking 10,000 lives. Speaking at a top level military summit, the
notoriously outspoken military expert declared: "What the United States fears the most is taking
casualties." He said the loss of one super carrier would cost the US the lives of 5,000 service men and
women. Sinking two would double that toll. “We’ll see how frightened America is,” he then said,
reports He bragged China’s new anti-ship ballistic and cruise missiles
are more than capable of taking out US carriers, despite them
being at the centre of a "bubble" of defensive escorts. The Nimitz-class
aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson surrounded by a fleet of warships in the Philippine Sea. His

threats came just ten days after experts warned that war between
US and Chinese forces in the South China Sea could break out in
2019. Concerns are mounting the two superpowers could become embroiled in a terrifying
conflict in the directly contested region which could kill thousands of people. Malcolm Davis, a
senior analyst in defence strategy and capability at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute in
Canberra, told Sun Online: "Expect greater tension in the South China Sea. China won’t back
down – nor will the US. "The
South China Sea will remain a key flashpoint
between China and the US, who are now engaged in an extended
period of strategic competition." Rear Admiral Lou Yuan made his chilling threat at
a top level military summit. He said China’s anti-ship ballistic and cruise missiles were more than
capable of taking out US carriers. The contested South China Sea may be at the centre of a future
war, experts warn In his speech, Admiral lou said there were ‘five cornerstones of the United States’
open to exploitation: their military, their money, their talent, their voting system - and their fear of
adversaries. He said China should “use its strength to attack the enemy’s shortcomings. Attack
wherever the enemy is afraid of being hit. Wherever the enemy is weak …” It’s not the controversial
commentator’s first aggressive outburst. In December he said:
“If the US naval fleet
dares to stop in Taiwan, it is time for the People’s Liberation Army
to deploy troops to promote national unity on (invade) the island.
The contested South China Sea may be at the centre of a future war, experts warn. “Achieving
China’s complete unity is a necessary requirement. The achievement of the past 40 years of reform
and opening-up has given us the capability and confidence to safeguard our sovereignty. "Those

who are trying to stir up trouble in the South China Sea and
Taiwan should be careful about their future.”
Arms sales exacerbate tensions in the Taiwan Strait and violate international
law.
Xia 19 Li Xia is an American editor and columnist for the Xinhuanet. “Commentary: U.S. arms sales to Taiwan a dangerous move
to aggravate cross-Strait situation.” Xinhuanet. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-04/17/c_137985601.htm. Date Accessed:
5/17/19. BZ.

BEIJING, April 17 (Xinhua) --The U.S. arms sale plan unveiled Monday is a dangerous move that will only
aggravate the already complex and grim situation across the Taiwan Strait. The U.S. government
has approved a possible 500-million-U.S. dollar military sale to Taiwan, claiming that the move
will help to improve the security and defensive capability of the recipient. Subsequently, Taiwan leader Tsai Ing-wen
expressed "gratitude," saying that the arms sale was "timely." The situation across the Taiwan Strait , which is already

complicated and grim, is worsening as the United States has been using Taiwan to contain China
while the Taiwan administration kept seeking foreign intervention. The Taiwan question concerns China's
sovereignty and territorial integrity and is the most important and sensitive issue in China-U.S. relations. The U.S. arms sales to Taiwan

constitutes a serious violation of international law, the basic norms governing international
relations, the one-China principle and the three Sino-U.S. joint communiques and undermine China's
sovereignty and security interests. China's firm opposition to such arms sales is consistent and
firm. Since the current U.S. administration took office, it has constantly played the "Taiwan card"
to contain China, especially in arms sales to Taiwan and military exchanges between the United
States and Taiwan. This has seriously damaged China-U.S. relations and jeopardized peace and
stability across the Taiwan Strait. The Taiwan question, which concerns China's core interests and the national bond of the Chinese
people, brooks no external interference. The U.S. administration has once again stirred up sensitive nerves in

the Taiwan Strait. Its gross interference in China's internal affairs has aroused the strong
indignation of the Chinese people on both sides of the Strait . Some Taiwan organizations and people protested
outside the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) in Taipei, condemning U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and demanding "no war, only peace," and "Taiwan is not
a pawn for the United States."

Arms sales to Taiwan leads to conflict

Panda 19 Ankit Panda is an editor at The Diplomat. He writes on security, politics, economics, and culture. “Are the US
and China About to Face off Over American Fighter Sales to Taiwan?.” The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2019/03/are-the-
us-and-china-about-to-face-off-over-american-fighter-sales-to-taiwan/. Date Accessed: 6/25/2019. BZ.

The United States and China appear to be heading toward a major confrontation over the
possible sale of American fighters to Taiwan . Last week, Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen
confirmed that the country’s Ministry of Defense had submitted a formal request to
Washington, D.C., to purchase F-16V Viper fighters. Tsai said the decision to make the request was supported by
a review of Taiwan’s defense needs. Days later, Bloomberg News reported that the White House was poised to
approve the Taiwanese request. If that report is true, the United States would be turning course on
what has been a longstanding reluctance to sell fighters to Taiwan, even as it has authorized other arms
sales in line with the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, which requires the U.S. government to support Taiwan “with arms of a defensive
character.” Even as the Obama administration and the Trump administration have approved weapons and spare parts for sale to
Taiwan, fighters have long been seen as a bridge too far given Beijing serious reservations. The United States authorized
the sale of 150 F-16 fighters to Taiwan in 1992. The Obama administration, after receiving a request from Taipei,
turned it down, initiating a set of upgrades instead to Taipei’s existing fleet. The issue hasn’t gone unnoticed in China, where Taiwan
is seen as an inherent part of the country. Relations across the Taiwan Strait have been particularly strained
since Tsai’s inauguration in 2016. The Taiwanese president hails from the independence-leaning Democratic Progressive
Party (DPP), though she herself has not explicitly supported independence — long a red-line for Beijing — Tsai, however, has refused
to endorse the so-called “1992 consensus,” which her predecessor had supported and which forms what Beijing sees as the baseline
for cordial cross-strait relations. “China’s
position to firmly oppose arms sales to Taiwan is consistent and
clear,” Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Geng Shuang said during a press briefing on Friday . “We have made stern
representations to the U.S. We have urged the U.S. to fully recognize the sensitivity of this issue
and the harm it will cause.” The prospect of a fighter sale to Taiwan this time comes at a time of
particularly heightened U.S.-China tensions . The Trump administration has been known to seek leverage with Beijing
across issues and it is possible that this may turn into the latest case of Taiwan being used a possible bargaining chip as Trump seeks
to clinch a favorable trade deal with Chinese President Xi Jinping. Trump, however, has been unconventional on Taiwan policy in the
past. As president-elect, he broke expectations by receiving a telephone call from Tsai. That call occurred at a time when Trump had
Either
yet to endorse the United States’ one-China policy as president — something that he did for the first time in February 2017.
way, Tsai’s fighter request and the Trump administration’s reported acceptance could set up
another major area of turbulence between the U nited States and China. Taiwan’s fleet of multi-role
fighter aircraft consists of three squadrons of Mirage 2000-5/E/D fighters, three squadrons of the F-5E/F Tiger Ii, six squadrons of the
F-16A/B Fighting Falcon, and five squadrons of the indigenously developed F-CK-1 Ching Kuo series of fighters. In an interview with
Tsai assessed Taiwan’s defense readiness against a possible invasion by China,
CNN last month,
noting that the island was “well prepared for an attack at any time — for any situation where we
would need to fend China off for 24 hours.” She added that she “ would hope that after
withstanding any first wave of attacks ourselves, other countries throughout the world would
stand up in unison and put strong pressure upon China in response.”
US Arms Sales to Taiwan increase the likelihood of a cross-strait conflict
Bush 14 Richard C. Bush III is an American expert on China affairs. He is the director of Center for Northeast Asian Policy
Studies of the Brookings Institution and a Senior Fellow of Foreign Policy. "Thoughts on U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan," Brookings,
https://www.brookings.edu/on-the-record/thoughts-on-u-s-arms-sales-to-taiwan/. Date Accessed: 6/25/2019. BZ.

It is my great pleasure to provide a few comments on a policy report by Piin‐Fen Kok and David Firestein. This is a really valuable
resource that pulls together a lot of useful information. For example, when I worked on Capitol Hill, I kept track of way in which
notification of defense articles to Taiwan differed sometimes sharply from deliveries, as this report does. That material is probably
somewhere in my basement, but if I had to find it I’m not sure I could. Now I don’t khave to worry because it’s all in “Threading the
Needle.” So it will be on my shelf of studies that need to be accessible on a moment’s notice. More importantly, I agree with the
sound conclusions that are drawn from the report’s analysis. Each of us comes at the general subject of Taiwan and at specific
subsidiary issues in different ways. The authors of “Threading the Needle” have their way. This morning, I would like to provide my
own analytical perspective. As an aside, I have long felt that the August 1982 communique, which figures a lot in “Threading the
Needle,” was not one of the shining hours of American diplomacy. Far from it. In terms of substance and process, it was not a good
outcome for the United States. But I’ve discussed that elsewhere and won’t dwell on it here. From my own perspective, I would
any analysis of China’s approach to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan
make five basic points. The first point is that
must start with Beijing’s own logic on the issue. The starting point here is Deng Xiaoping’s conversation with
Leonard Woodcock on December 15, 1978 on the arms sales issue. This was a difficult meeting that revealed that the two
governments had a fairly significant disagreement. Among other things, Deng told Woodcock that “continued arms sales would
such sales would block efforts to find a rational means of
amount to retaining the essence of the MDT, that
settling the Taiwan issue peacefully , and that force would be left as the last resort.” Specifically, Deng warned that if
Chiang Ching‐kuo “should lean on certain powerful support, say the provision of arms, and refuses to talk to us about the problem of
reunification,” that was a circumstance in which China would use force against Taiwan. When Deng visited the United States in
January 1979, he repeated this condition. He claimed that Beijing had a “fair and reasonable policy” towards Taiwan and would “try
This link
our very best to use peaceful means” to solve the issue. China had patience, he said, but the patience was not unlimited.
between Taiwan’s willingness to negotiate and China’s non‐use of force continues, I would argue
until today. It occurs in an important speech that Qian Qichen gave in 2001 on the “two hands” of Beijing’s Taiwan policy. It occurs in
the 2000 White Paper. And it was enshrined most authoritatively in the Anti‐Secession Law of 2005. Note how this relationship
sheds new light on the key linkage in the August 1982 Communique: between China’s statement of a “fundamental policy to strive
For Washington, China’s
for a peaceful solution to the Taiwan question” and the U.S. agreement to reduce arms sales.
stated policy provided, it claimed, a context that made weapons sales to Taiwan less necessary . For
Beijing, on the other hand, a U.S. reduction in arms sales, “leading to a final resolution” is the
precondition for avoiding the use of force. My second point has to do with odd, asymmetric character of the
bargain undertaken in the August 1982 Communique. Simply put, Beijing makes a commitment about its intentions (that is, it
commits to strive for a peaceful solution) in return for a U.S. commitment to restrict Taiwan’s
military capabilities. The problem, of course, is that intentions are eminently and quickly
reversible while creating or restoring capabilities can take a long time. Moreover, Beijing’s statement of
its intentions has always been stated in an ambiguous way, and it has always reserved the right to determine whether circumstances
have changed to the point that a change in intentions is necessary. This asymmetry between PRC intentions and ROC capabilities
may not have been such a big issue at the time that the Communique was signed, but that has changed. As “Threading the Needle”
clearly explains, China’s acquisition and use of its capabilities since the early 1990s calls into question its peaceful intent. Based on its
own logic, however, China would say that its acquisition and use was made necessary by actions by Taiwan leaders that frustrated
China’s desire for a peaceful solution. My third point is to question the very premise of the PRC logic that created the linkage
between U.S. arms sales, Taiwan’s willingness to negotiate, and whether China need to use force to fulfill its goals. Obviously,
whether Taipei is willing to negotiate with Beijing is a function of its confidence that those negotiations won’t hurt Taiwan’s
fundamental interests. Precisely because Beijing reserves the right to use force, the greater Taiwan’s ability to deter, the more
there is plenty of evidence that there is a weak correlation at
confidence it will have 57 to negotiate. And
best between U.S. arms sales and Taipei’s willingness to negotiate with Beijing. Just look at the last five
years. But, there is another, basic reason why Taiwan is reluctant to negotiate with China. That is, Beijing’s formula for resolving the
fundamental dispute between it and Taiwan. That formula, one country, two systems, has been around for over thirty years, and its
acceptability on Taiwan is about as low in the early 2010s as it was in the 1980s. There is a broad consensus on the island – Blue and
Green – that one country, two systems is fundamentally flawed and incompatible with Taiwan’s interests. That would seem to be a
good reason not to negotiate on the fundamental dispute, even though there might be other, lesser issues on which talks are useful.
But there is no reason for the United States or anyone else to accept the PRC logic on arm sales and the prospects of negotiations.
The better way for Beijing to achieve its political goals concerning Taiwan would be to make a more acceptable offer. My fourth
point is related, and has to do with how this report addresses what has happened in Taiwan over the last three decades. In brief,
democratization has transformed the how cross‐Strait relations are conducted. The premise of the Deng Xiaoping logic, I would
guess, was that reunification simply required a negotiation between senior leaders of the CCP and the KMT. The only question was
whether the offer would be attractive enough and leveraged enough to get Chiang‐Ching‐kuo’s agreement. Since the early 1990s, of
course, Taiwan’s political parties and 18 million registered voters have gained a seat at the negotiating table, along with the island’s
political leaders. For example, one might speculate that a majority of voters in 2008 and 2012 voted for Ma Ying‐jeou because they
believed that he would bring greater stability in cross‐Strait relations and strengthen ties with the United States, including arms
sales. In my view, more coverage of the implications of Taiwan’s democratization would have made “Threading the Needle” a
stronger report. My fifth and final point has to do with the political character of arms sales versus their military value. Of course, the
U.S. transfer of advance weapons systems to Taiwan has a political character for both Beijing and Taipei. That is particularly true of
civilian leaders in both places, who happen to be the folks that most of us talk to. But U.S. weaponry is not trivial in a military sense.
From the U.S. perspective, its arms sales, whatever their political value for Taiwan, should also contribute to Taiwan’s ability to deter
a Mainland attack or threat of attack. If we were to decide to come to Taiwan’s defense in the event of such an attack, we would
need Taiwan to hold on for several weeks while we do all that would be needed to mount that defense. So Taiwan needs the
capability to hold on. Optimally, if it possesses that capability then Beijing is less likely to consider an attack in the first place. In this
there is growing concern that Taiwan’s past defense strategy , on which its arms requests
regard,
to the United States are based , is no longer appropriate to its threat environment, thus reducing
the deterrent effect of the capabilities it has or might have.
 I/L – Taiwan War Escalates
Chinese cross-strait aggression draws in US
Roy 17 Danny Roy is a senior research fellow at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies. “Prospects for Taiwan Maintaining
Its Autonomy under Chinese Pressure.” https://as.ucpress.edu/content/ucpas/57/6/1135.full.pdf. Date Accessed: 6/26/2019. BZ.

Finally, declining to defend Taiwan against involuntary unification would call into question
American credibility in capitals throughout Asia, if not the world. Both allies and potential
adversaries know that Americans consider Taiwan a longtime friend and a country that largely
shares American values, and that as recently as 2001 an American president promised to do
‘‘whatever it takes’’ to defend Taiwan.33 Regional observers would likely interpret American inaction as evidence that
the US would no longer stand up to a China that now has the capability to inflict serious retaliatory damage. American strategic
leadership in the Asia-Pacific would be greatly diminished, perhaps irretrievably. American interests in defending Taiwan will always
Nevertheless, the rationale for American intervention is still strong in an
be subject to reconsideration.
Asia-Pacific region where the US promotes democratization and intends to maintain a strategic
leadership role, and where some Chinese actions fundamentally challenge the US agenda. A Chinese campaign of
military or some other form of coercion to force Taiwan into unification , especially if perceived as not
being provoked by some drastic action on the part of Taipei, would still probably draw a determined attempt by
American forces to assist Taiwan.

Four ways china escalates tensions that lead to miscalculation

CPA 19 – 2/26/19 aims to help policymakers devise timely and practical strategies to prevent and
mitigate armed conflict around the world, especially in places that pose the greatest risk to U.S. interests. “Averting a
Cross-Strait Crisis,” Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/report/averting-cross-strait-crisis CC

Specific events related to one or more of those developments could prompt China to

intensify its pressure campaign against Taiwan. This could include, for
example, a decision by Xi to press for cross-strait negotiations on an
accelerated timetable, Tsai’s replacement ahead of Taiwan’s 2020 election
by a candidate more interested in independence, or an attempt by the
United States to demonstrate its support for Taiwan that inadvertently
prompts Chinese escalation. Whatever the triggering event or sequence of events, China
could choose a variety of responses, either separately or in combination. 1)
Diplomatic Isolation. China could try to further decrease Taiwan’s
diplomatic space by targeting several of Taiwan’s seventeen remaining
diplomatic allies simultaneously. For example, China could try to further
decrease Taiwan’s diplomatic space by pressuring those countries that still
officially recognize Taipei to switch their ties to Beijing. This includes the Vatican
and Eswatini, Taiwan’s only remaining diplomatic partners in Europe and Africa respectively, as
well as nine states in Latin America and the Caribbean and six in the Pacific. Beijing could also try
strong-arming some of Taipei’s unofficial partners into curtailing their level of interaction with
Taiwan. 2) Economic Coercion. China could sharply increase economic pressure on Taiwan.
For instance, Beijing could stop most or all mainland tourists from visiting the
island, reduce the number of mainland students in Taiwan, or harass
Taiwanese businesses in China as it did South Korean businesses over the
deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile
system in 2017. 3) Military Intimidation. China has numerous options to display military
power in an attempt to intimidate Taiwan. The PLA could hold major military exercises
opposite Taiwan. Such exercises could include a demonstration of amphibious
landing capabilities. China could also dramatically increase the level of air
force and naval activity around Taiwan, for instance by dispatching its aircraft carrier
and conducting flight operations close to Taiwan. China could send fighter aircraft or
reconnaissance aircraft across the Taiwan Strait centerline to send a message to Taiwan. In
addition, China could increase the number of H-6K bomber flights around Taiwan, which the
former sometimes refers to as “encirclement” patrols. At a higher level of intensity, China could
conduct missile flight tests close to Taiwan as it did in the 1995–96 crisis, or even launch a
missile over the island. 4) Influence Operations. China could increase its use of official media
channels or social media platforms to amplify the message sent by other types of coercive activity.
Additionally, China could launch a major information operations campaign
against Taiwan, one that could exceed the scale and scope of what it has
done in recent years. A stepped-up campaign could include activities such as funding or
providing other forms of clandestine support to actors that back Beijing’s agenda , hacking
and releasing emails of political actors, and increasing social media
manipulation to undermine confidence in the integrity of elections or sow
division in Taiwan more generally.
 AT: Weapons Good
Ending arm sales does not make negotiation impossible, it makes it more likely
Chen Kastner and Reed 17. (Ping-Kuei Chen is an assistant professor at the Department of Diplomacy- National
Chengchi University, Scott L. Kastner is a Professor in the Department of Government and Politics at University of Maryland-College
Park, William L. Reed joined the Government and Politics Department in 2009, 2017 “A Farewell to Arms? US Security Relations with
Taiwan and the Prospects for Stability in the Taiwan Strait”) TM FROM THE BOOK- Taiwan and China: Fitful Embrace DOI:
10.1525/j.ctt1w76wpm.15

While we find these counterarguments plausible, we believe the logic underpinning them needs
to be teased out at greater length. This is especially so for claims about the prospects for
stability in the Taiwan Strait. For instance, we believe it is likely that an end to arms sales would
indeed lead Taiwanese officials to feel less confident about their bargaining power vis-à-vis the
PRC. But it is not obvious why this should in itself make them less likely to negotiate with Beijing:
it is also plausible that, in such a scenario, Taiwan’s leaders would feel they had no other choice
but to negotiate with an increasingly powerful PRC. Similarly, while a shift in the cross-Strait
balance of power would indeed imply that Beijing could more easily utilize a military option, it
isn’t obvious that this would in turn make the relationship less stable: it is conceivable, for
instance, that Taiwan would respond with more accommodating policies that would remove
Beijing’s incentives to consider military force. In short, how a shifting cross-Strait military
balance of power would affect stability in the Taiwan Strait is not straightforward; in the
following section, we consider the topic more systematically
 Solvency – Ending Causes Peaceful Resolution
Ending arms sales key to a peaceful resolution
Thrall & Dorminey 18. Trevor Thrall is a senior fellow for the Cato’s Institute’s Defense and Foreign Policy Department,
with expertise in international security and the politics of American national security. Thrall is also an associate professor at George
Mason University’s Schar School of Policy and Government where he teaches courses in international security. Caroline Dorminey
was a policy analyst in defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. “Risky Business: The Role of Arms Sales in U.S. Foreign
Policy.” CATO Institute, https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/risky-business-role-arms-sales-us-foreign-policy. Date
Accessed: 6/25/2019. BZ.

Forgoing arms sales is likely to be a superior strategy even in cases where the United States has
an entrenched interest. In the case of Taiwan, for example, though it is clear that Taiwan needs
to purchase weapons from other countries to provide for its defense, those weapons do not
have to be made in the United States. Having Taiwan buy from other suppliers would help
defuse U.S.-China tensions. Even if Taiwan’s defenses remained robust, China would clearly
prefer a situation in which American arms no longer signal a n implicit promise to fight on
Taiwan’s behalf. This could also promote more productive U.S.-China diplomacy in general, as
well as greater stability in the Pacific region. Most important, breaking off arms sales would also
reduce the likelihood of the United States becoming entangled in a future conflict between
Taiwan and China.

Ending arms sales with Taiwan solves

Lu 18 Zhenhua Lu is a Washington-based correspondent for the South China Morning Post who covers US-China bilateral
diplomacy and defense. “US$330 million arms sale to Taiwan will go ahead, says US Congress.”
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/2170262/us330-million-arms-sale-taiwan-clears-congressional-review-may.
Date Accessed 12/16/2018. BZ.

China strongly opposes any US arms sales and official contact with Taiwan, which Beijing regards
as a wayward province to be unified with the mainland by force if necessary. The US has no formal
diplomatic relations with the self-ruled island but maintains informal ties and is its sole arms supplier. At the Xiangshan security
forum in Beijing on Thursday, Wei Fenghe, the Chinese defence minister, vowed not to cede “a single inch” of territory. “China is the
only big nation in the world that is not unified … And the Chinese military has a heavy responsibility to not let a single inch of its
territory be lost,” Wei said . “If there is anyone attempting to separate Taiwan from China, the Chinese
military will take action.” Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Lu Kang last week also urged the
US “to correct its mistakes [and] stop any official contact and military ties with, and arms sales
to, the Taiwan region”.

Ending arms sales ends our commitment to Taiwan

Chen Kastner and Reed 17. (Ping-Kuei Chen is an assistant professor at the Department of Diplomacy- National
Chengchi University, Scott L. Kastner is a Professor in the Department of Government and Politics at University of Maryland-College
Park, William L. Reed joined the Government and Politics Department in 2009, 2017 “A Farewell to Arms? US Security Relations with
Taiwan and the Prospects for Stability in the Taiwan Strait”) TM FROM THE BOOK- Taiwan and China: Fitful Embrace DOI:
10.1525/j.ctt1w76wpm.15

Some worry that walking away from a commitment to Taiwan would send a troubling signal to
other US allies in East Asia. Beijing might likewise view US concessions on Taiwan as a sign of
weakness and conclude that Washington was unlikely to challenge the PRC on other issues in
the region. Third, ending arms sales—because it would add to Taiwan’s sense of insecurity—
could actually make Taipei more hesitant about entering into sensitive political talks with the
PRC; thus it isn’t clear that a reduced US commitment to Taiwan would facilitate a peaceful
resolution to the dispute. Finally, and relatedly, ending arms sales would likely undercut
Taiwan’s deterrent capabilities, which in turn could encourage a more coercive PRC approach to
the island.10

US wouldn’t defend Taiwan post plan

Ted Galen Carpenter, 4-4-2019, "It's Time to Rethink America’s Foreign Alliance Commitments,"
National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/its-time-rethink-america%E2%80%99s-
foreign-alliance-commitments-50717

At the time, the TRA seemed to be a morally justified, low-risk concession to a long-time U.S.
ally. The U.S. military advantage over China in the late 1970s was overwhelming, and Chinese
leaders, including Deng Xiaoping, made statements that the official goal of Taiwan’s
reunification with the mainland was not urgent. When Taiwan transitioned to being a
democracy in the 1990s, the moral case for Washington’s informal defense commitment to the
island became stronger, even though the mainland government began to show signs of greater
impatience and belligerence. The United States deployed two aircraft carriers and support
vessels to waters near the Taiwan Strait in 1996 in response to Chinese shelling and other
measures Beijing had taken to intimidate Taiwan’s voters on the eve of the island’s first fully
free election. And Washington could make its show of force with little fear of reprisal. However,
East Asia’s security environment has changed at least as much as Europe’s over the past few
decades. China was weak militarily and a minor player in the world’s economy at the time of the
TRA’s adoption. Today, China is the world’s number two economic power, and its military
capabilities are significant and growing rapidly. China’s leaders also exhibit mounting impatience
about Taiwan’s efforts to maintain its de facto independence. Beijing’s actions since Taiwan’s
January 2016 election empowered the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party are
especially ominous. China is putting growing pressure on Taiwan, poaching the island’s shrinking
number of diplomatic allies and conducting menacing military exercises in the Taiwan Strait. The
potential costs to the United States of continuing to protect Taiwan have soared. China is now
one of America’s largest trading partners and sources of funds for Washington’s seemingly
endless addiction to deficit spending. A breakdown of the U.S. relationship with Beijing would
have enormous adverse economic consequences. The military risks also are alarming. China’s
ambitious military modernization program has focused on anti-ship missiles and other “access
denial” weaponry. It would be massively more difficult and costly in treasure and blood for the
United States to intervene militarily to defend Taiwan today than it was when the TRA became
law. Indeed, it would be far more costly and uncertain to do so now than when the aircraft
carrier battle groups made their show of force in the mid-1990s. In another decade or so, it may
be entirely unfeasible to enforce an effective shield to defend Taiwan.
2AC CPs
AT: Regularize Arm Sales CP
 Solvency
No Solvency: Taiwan is try or die for China- Chinese rhetoric has become more
tense with increased US-Taiwan relations on arms
Zhenhua Lu, 6-4-2018, "US$330 million arms sale to Taiwan clears US Congressional review,"
South China Morning Post,
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/2170262/us330-million-arms-sale-taiwan-
clears-congressional-review-may
The annual event is “in a series of ongoing conferences addressing the future of US defence cooperation with Taiwan, the defence
procurement process and Taiwan’s defence and national security needs”, the organising US-Taiwan Business Council said in an
introduction. China strongly opposes any US arms sales and official contact with Taiwan, which Beijing
regards as a wayward province to be unified with the mainland by force if necessary. The US has no formal diplomatic relations with
the self-ruled island but maintains informal ties and is its sole arms supplier. At the Xiangshan security forum in Beijing on Thursday,
Wei Fenghe, the Chinese defence minister, vowed not to cede “a single inch” of territory. “China is the only big nation in the world
that is not unified … And theChinese military has a heavy responsibility to not let a single inch of its
territory be lost,” Wei said. “If there is anyone attempting to separate Taiwan from China, the Chinese military will
take action.” Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Lu Kang last week also urged the US “to correct its
mistakes [and] stop any official contact and military ties with, and arms sales to, the Taiwan region”.

No Solvency- Arms sales = Stronger sense of Taiwan identity = increased

destabilization of the region
January 2019 Richard Bush, Brookings Institution

Shelley Rigger, Davidson CollegeThe Taiwan Issue and the Normalization of US-China Relations
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/The-Taiwan-Issue-and-the-
Normalization-of-US-China-Relations-Bush-Rigger1.pdf

Beijing soon experienced a series of rude awakenings . Washington enhanced its political, economic, and even
military support for Taiwan, and affirmed that all its steps were within its definition of its one-China policy. It refused
to sacrifice Taiwan for the sake of better U.S.-China relations. Taiwan’s democratization both
empowered the electorate to set limits on cross-Strait policy and denied any leader the power to impose on
the public a solution to the dispute with China, whether independence or unification. A stronger Taiwanese identity, a
preference for the status quo, and widespread opposition to “one country, two systems” all put a mutually
acceptable compromise apparently out of reach. Even growing economic interdependence became a political liability:
Tsai Ing-wen’s electoral prospects were boosted by the Sunflower Movement, which rejected a draft agreement on trade in services
that the Ma administration had struck with Beijing, and by growing sentiment that economic dependence on China was increasing
the risk of political incorporation on the PRC’s terms.
 Turn
Increased arms sales lead to independence movements

Joshua Keating, JUNE 17, 2019

"The Hong Kong Protests Could Be a Prelude to a Big Showdown Over Taiwan," Slate Magazine,
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/06/taiwan-hong-kong-protests-china-extradition-
independence.html

This support has increased under the Trump administration, amid the overall deterioration in U.S.-China
relations. Trump broke protocol by accepting a phone call from Tsai during his transition period. He recently signed legislation, which
passed with significant congressional support, encouraging U.S. officials to make high-level visits to Taiwan. The Navy has stepped up
frequency of the passage of ships through the Taiwan Strait. And the
administration is proposing a new $2 billion
arms sale to the country. These visible displays of support, over Beijing’s furious objections, have
emboldened Taiwan’s nationalists. (In a sign of just how confusing U.S. foreign policy can be in the Trump era, the
president recently held an unusual White House meeting with Terry Gou, the billionaire Foxconn chairman who is running for
president of Taiwan on a pro-China platform.) All of this bears watching,
if only because an invasion of Taiwan may
be the scenario most likely to lead to direct military conflict between the U.S. and China . Despite
Xi’s warnings, that still seems unlikely for the moment. But what the past week’s events in Hong Kong and Taiwan’s show of
solidarity have demonstrated is that the People’s Republic has a major soft-power problem. Given China’s stunning economic
it shouldn’t be this hard for its leaders to make the case for
success and rapid rise to global power,
unification to places like Hong Kong and Taiwan, given their shared history and culture. One
wonders when China’s leaders will run out of patience and resort to more extreme measures

The US is pushing for established relations with Taiwan- furthers independence

push
Yimou Lee, 8-24-2018, "Taiwan says China 'out of control' as it loses El Salvador to Beijing," U.S.,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-diplomacy/taiwan-says-china-out-of-control-as-it-
loses-el-salvador-to-beijing-idUSKCN1L6058
The news comes as Tsai wrapped up a high-profile trip to Latin America, including stops in the United States, that drew anger from
China. “China will not get unification with Taiwan by luring away our allies . What China did was to humiliate
Taiwan repeatedly without getting any respect from Taiwan’s people,” Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party wrote in a
statement. El Salvador is the fifth country Taiwan will lose as a diplomatic ally since Tsai came to office in
2016, following Burkina Faso, the Dominican Republic, Sao Tome and Principe and Panama. Amanda Mansour, spokeswoman of
the de facto U.S. embassy in Taiwan, told Reuters in a written statement late on Tuesday that China’s efforts
were “harmful” and had undermined “the framework that has enabled peace, stability, and
development for decades”. “The United States urges China to abstain from coercion that would
jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan,” she wrote. The U.S.
ambassador in El Salvador, Jean Manes, wrote in a Twitter post on Tuesday the United States was analyzing El Salvador’s
“worrisome” decision to break ties with Taiwan. “Without a doubt, this will impact our relationship with the
(Salvadoran) government. We continue supporting the Salvadoran people,” she wrote without elaborating.
Taiwan pushes for independence after CP leads to war
Ted Galen Carpenter, 2-26-2019, "Taiwan Could Overreach and Cause Disaster for Itself and
America," Cato Institute, https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/taiwan-could-
overreach-cause-disaster-itself-america
But the United States does have an implied commitment to defend Taiwan. Even the language of the Taiwan Relations Act, which
Congress passed when Jimmy Carter’s administration decided to switch diplomatic relations from Taipei to Beijing in 1979, suggests
that theUnited States would not stand by idly if the PRC sought to coerce the island . And U.S. officials
since the passage of the TRA have repeatedly implied—or even stated outright—that there
is a security commitment to
Taiwan. If the Taiwanese hold a referendum on independence, it would place America in a very
awkward and dangerous position. Such an ostentatious defiance of Beijing’s position, that Taiwan is an integral part of
China, would be an extreme provocation. It is possible that the PRC might simply dismiss the gesture with contempt—
as long as all significant countries refused to recognize such a proclamation of Taiwanese independence. But it is more likely that
Beijing would mount a display of force to threaten and intimidate the island. Worse, Chinese
leaders might decide that Taiwan was irrevocably slipping away from any prospect of eventual PRC control and there was no
choice but to take decisive military action to prevent that outcome , despite the danger of a clash with the United
States.
 Extra Cards
Turn- The United States would reverse the regularization of arms sales- does
not fit with the mission of the executive
Gary J. Schmitt, Jamie M. Fly 4-8-2019, "The Taiwan Relations Act at 40: It’s time to deepen ties,"
AEI, http://www.aei.org/publication/the-taiwan-relations-act-at-40-its-time-to-deepen-ties/

The Act, as signed by President Carter, stated that “any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful
means . . . would be of grave concern to the United States.” And, to support that policy, the United States was “to
provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character” and “maintain the capacity . . . to resist any resort to force or other
forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people of Taiwan.” Yet as significant
as the passage of the Act was at the time, its
policy goals have been undercut in practice over the years by the fact
that it left decisions about what was required to maintain peace in the Strait and about what weapons to sell Taiwan
entirely in the hands of the Executive Branch. The result has been an erosion in the military balance in the mainland’s
favor, as successive Administrations have put a priority on engagement with China and often have seen
arms sales to Taiwan as complicating that effort. Members of Congress at times have protested Administration
decisions about weapon sales, but never forcefully enough to change the underlying dynamic. The Taiwan Relations Act
was also intended to allow the people of Taiwan and the United States to remain in close
partnership. Over time, however, successive U.S. Administrations have elaborated increasingly narrow
perspectives regarding those contacts.
AT: Grand Bargain Conditions CP
 Perm
Perm do both- The USFG should pursue a decrease in Taiwan arms sales and
condition the ending of it’s defensive commitment’s to taiwan if China ends its
use of maritime force
Perm solves – us making a unilateral concession first leads to a piecemeal
agreement that’s more likely to suceed
Glaser 15
(Charles, professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs and the Department of Political
Science at George Washington University, Spring 2015 “A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard
Choice between Military Competition and Accommodation”)
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/isec_a_00199.pdf

U.S. unilateral adoption of less dramatic changes in the government’s Taiwan policy—most importantly ,
slowing or ending
U.S. arms sales to Taiwan110—is an option that might provide a better balance of risks and beneªt. Even
this much smaller change in U.S. policy, however, risks sending China the wrong signal. Another
way to balance feasibility and beneªts, therefore, could be to look for a path that divides the grand
bargain into smaller, more attainable increments. One can imagine a series of steps, including
the United States ending its arms sales to Taiwan and China ending its use of force to advance
its maritime claims, that could be implemented sequentially to create a phased grand bargain.
This approach would enable the United States to revert to its current Taiwan policy if China
failed to uphold its side of the phased agreement. Another possibility might include partial resolution of the maritime
disputes. An agreement that delayed resolution of the sovereignty disputes far into the future, or indeªnitely, while settling the
resource disputes would be more feasible to achieve than a full resolution. This type of agreement could be possible because, for the
most part, the sovereignty disputes can be separated from the resource disputes. In fact, China and Japan reached this type of
arrangement in 2008, although it has yet to be implemented.111 The United States could pursue a variant of this staged approach
that would enable it to try to push the diplomatic process forward. In this more proactive model, the United States would make its
initial concession unilaterally, while explaining that further concessions would hinge on China’s reciprocation of its initial move.
 Japan DA
US and Japan are increasing relations now but they still need work
Matthew P. Goodman Ann Listerud 12-3-2018, "The Article II Mandate: Forging a Stronger
Economic Alliance between the United States and Japan," senior vice president, senior adviser
for Asian Economics, and holds the William E. Simon Chair in political economy at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. a research associate for the CSIS
Simon Chair. Daniel Remler is a former research associate with the CSIS Simon Chair. No
Publication, https://www.csis.org/analysis/article-ii-mandate-forging-stronger-economic-
alliance-between-united-states-and-japan-0
Utilize U.S. and Japanese strength in technical assistance and human capacity building to nurture small and medium-sized enterprises. Know-how,
human capacity development, and a healthy climate for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are key forces for market-based growth and
development. The United States and Japan should step up their efforts to develop capacity and skills in
third countries and enhance SME access to global financing and trade. Collaborate on anti-corruption efforts. Countries with high levels of corruption
are unlikely to generate stable or equitable economic growth and are at risk of becoming reliant upon non-democratic countries for trade and
investment. Washington and Tokyo should enhance intelligence sharing on corruption and deepen joint work on anti-corruption in international
forums. The United States and Japan should offer more support to countries that are part of the Belt and Road Initiative. The
United States
and Japan are the world’s two largest market economies, bound together by a decades-old
alliance that has become the lynchpin of stability and security in the Asia-Pacific region. But differences over
economic and commercial issues have been a recurring source of strain in the relationship for over half a
century and still cast a shadow over bilateral ties today. Despite this, U.S. and Japanese strategic
interests in the Indo-Pacific region are substantially—and increasingly—aligned, and economic
cooperation between the two countries has the potential to advance those shared interests in
the region and beyond. This enhanced cooperation will require hard work on both sides. For
Washington, it will mean recognizing that, while the United States and Japan may compete in commercial affairs, the two are not economic rivals.
Rather, they
are vital partners with shared interests and values , capable of playing a joint
leadership role in Asia that advances high-standard economic rules, norms, and standard

US-Japan relations are still tense but increasing now

Kelly Olsen, June 24, 2019, “Japan and China look to strengthen ties at G-20 summit, even as
Trump looms large,” CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/06/25/japan-abe-and-china-xi-look-to-
strengthen-ties-at-g-20-as-trump-looms.html

“The greatest impetus for warming Sino-Japanese relations is their realization that China and
Japan need to cooperate with each other more closely in the face of their changing relations with the United
States, ” Victor Teo, an assistant professor in the Department of Japanese Studies at the University of Hong Kong, told CNBC in an
email. Japan
is a loyal U.S. ally and the countries are tightly bound economically . But Abe is wary of
Trump’s protectionist “America First” tendencies and has — so far, at least — deftly avoided becoming a major
tariff target. Not so Xi, who has been forced to fight back in a damaging trade war launched by the Trump administration. Almost
smiling While Trump has provided Abe and Xi with reasons to move closer, the effort long predates his arrival.
Already high bilateral tensions between China and Japan were spiraling higher just before the two Asian leaders took power, around
the same time more than six years ago.

Counterplan turns Japans reliance on the United States- loses alliance

Glaser 15
(Charles, professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs and the Department of Political
Science at George Washington University, Spring 2015 “A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard
Choice between Military Competition and Accommodation”)
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/isec_a_00199.pdf

Thus, the question arises whether accommodation on Taiwan and possibly these still less important issues
would help keep China’s rise peaceful, while the United States continued to effectively protect its vital interests in the
region. Accommodation could bring risks of its own. For example, it would jeopardize U.S. security if it
were to convince China that the United States lacked the resolve to protect its vital national interests, leading China to adopt a more
assertive foreign policy. This
danger would be especially large if, instead of limited aims, China desired regional
hegemony and was determined to force the United States out of East Asia. Accommodation might also raise serious
concerns among U.S. allies—most importantly, Japan—about the reliability of U.S . security
guarantees, thereby undermining alliances that are widely judged to be essential to the security of
the United States. Finally, ending the United States’ commitment to Taiwan could sacriªce important U.S. nonsecurity
interests, including support for democracy and individual liberties, with no guarantee of beneªts in return.

Relations between Japan and the US are on the brink right now- They are key to
stability in the Indo-pacific
*FOIP= Free and Open Indo-Pacific

The Indo-Pacific in Japan’s Foreign Policy March 17 2019 Ryo Sahashi Center for Strategic and
International Studies Ph.D., Associate Professor of International Politics, Institute for Advanced
Studies on Asia, the

University of Tokyo. https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/FINAL_Working

%20Paper_Ryo%20Sahashi.pdf

Japan and the United States have different approaches to China that shape their respective
understandings of FOIP. The Trump administration, as shown in the National Security Strategy and Vice President Mike
Pence’s speech at the Hudson Institute on October 4, 2018, regards China as a strategic competitor. The U.S. approach to
FOIP therefore emphasizes the competitive aspects against China in the political, economic and value realms and calls for a whole-
of-government pushback against China’s malicious activities. The
aim of Japanese diplomacy over the last 10
years has been to maintain the U.S.- led, postwar international order in the Asia Pacific as the
balance of power shifts. In addition to reinforcing the alliance with the United States, “Japan’s Asia diplomacy
has been securitized through sustained efforts to build and enhance both bilateral and
multilateral security partnerships in the region. 15 ” Abe’s ability to remain in power for more than six years
assures the longevity of Japan’s robust Asian diplomacy, and FOIP is one of the toolkits to shape dynamics in the region. The fact that
the United States has started to focus on and commit diplomatic resources to the Indo-Pacific, as shown in Pence’s speech in Papua
New Guinea on November 16, 2018, is welcome. Japan has
called for more political resources to be dedicated
to the Indo-Pacific and the United States has been asked to enhance its presence in the region.
This apparent alignment of priorities suggests commonalities between the U.S. and Japanese FOIP visions and the policies that
support them. However, Japan has multifaceted concerns about the U.S. approach towards China . Firstly,
Japan still fears that the transactional nature of Trump foreign policy could be applied to China.16 Secondly, Trump’s economic
external policy is driven by economic nationalists who claim an “America First” approach. While Japan shares interests in rule-
making against China’s unfair trade practices, such as subsidies, support for State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), and forced technology
transfer from foreign companies that want to do business in China, bilateral negotiations between Washington and Beijing might
prioritize the reduction of the bilateral trade deficit, not satisfying Japan and other advanced economies. Thirdly, Japan’s biggest fear
is perhaps the U.S. government’s desire to tighten controls on foreign direct investment (FDI), emerging and foundational
technologies and the flow of people. Washington’s security concerns about China prompted calls for tighter controls over
international students, investment, joint research, and technologies through legislation to strengthen the Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States (CFIUS), the Export Control Reform Act (ECRA), and reforms in visa policy. Also, such regulations are
based on the domestic legal system and it is still uncertain whether international regimes can be utilized for this purpose. There
are fears that regulations shall be applied unilaterally by U.S. authorities against foreign
companies that engage in transnational commercial activities in globalized supply and capital chains. Japan, like other counties,
will not enjoy the luxury of merely engaging China economically and socially as it has done for the last forty years. Ultimately ,
Japan will emphasize its security interests and reject a Sino-centric order . However, Japan might
simultaneously continue to seek a more open and inclusive region under FOIP for its own
economic survival and try to promote multilateral rule-making to counter American unilateral
policy against China. From this perspective, one can understand what a Japanese leading scholar on international affairs has
said regarding Japan’s position on U.S.-China power politics. Akihiko Tanaka, President of the National Graduate Institute for Policy
Studies, points out Japan’s goals in the era of U.S.-China competition. “[New
Cold War] should not be
metamorphosed into a hot war and Japan should make efforts not only for strengthening the
U.S.-Japan alliance for deterrence but also for enlarging a sphere for ‘peaceful co-existence’ with
China… Japan should not give up shaping Chinese models of development and political reforms
in the future.” 17 It is most desirable for Japan and other like-minded countries to play a different role
than the United States in implementing FOIP, while adhering to a similar vision. For example, Japan could make use of its
diplomatic relations and mutual trust with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), as well as countries in the Pacific and
South Asia, to promote a rules-based economic and security order. Japan’s reputation for economic assistance,
encapsulated in a commitment to human security under the SDGs, can help it shape the regional order under a shared vision. It is
especially significant that Japan has engaged ASEAN over many decades. Japan could persuade ASEAN nations, as a geographical
nodal point of the Indo-Pacific, to assume important roles in maintaining a rules-based order.

Regional instability leads to war

Goodson 19 (Jeff, retired U.S. Foreign Service officer who worked for the U.S. Agency for
International Development, 4-22-2019, "The Line Between Conflict and Stability in Great Power
Competition," Stratfor,) TM https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/line-between-conflict-and-
stability-great-power-competition

Often an end in itself, stability is characterized by constancy, persistence, absence of turbulence and
resistance to change. Political systems vary in how stable they are. Totalitarian governments are arguably the most stable,
followed by established democracies, dictatorships, new regimes and failed states. In economics, stability makes social and
economic development possible by attracting the critical mass of foreign direct investment required to pay for national
development. In terms of war, stability is important because stable
countries are more resistant to the kinds of
influence that lead to war, and stability makes military progress more sustainable. Until countries
stabilize, they typically require help from a wide range of military, civilian, government, bilateral,
multilateral, nongovernmental and private sector actors . In practice, this assistance focuses on three basic
elements: security, governance and economics. All three are deeply co-dependent. Security is the sine qua non.
Without strong national and internal security, neither good governance nor economic fundamentals can
evolve sustainably. Stable governance — not to be conflated with democracy — requires countries to manage their political,
military, policing, economic, social, legal, regulatory and judicial affairs. Economic elements of stability include economic
infrastructure, and the legal, regulatory and policy environments required for economic growth. In the era of great power
competition, the number of countries in the gray zone between war and peace will grow as new countries
become theaters of competition. This will require stronger engagement in gray-zone stability operations, both before and after
conflicts. Fewer U.S. resources will likely be allocated to long-term stabilization, however, because of
U.S. budget limitations, domestic funding needs, donor fatigue and widespread public aversion to anything that
walks, talks or looks like nation-building. Even as stability operations are increasingly funded by other donors,
the most likely scenario is less stability in countries where stability needs are unmet. Where the United States does engage,
like in Syria and Iraq, it will play a declining hands-on role as the scope and extent of direct intervention narrows.
This assistance will mostly be executed through grants to the host country, and to international organizations like the World Bank,
the regional development banks and the United Nations.

US-Japan relations k2 stability in the Indo-Pacific- FOIP

Kuni Miyake, 3-11-2019, "What does the 'Indo-Pacific strategy' mean?," Japan Times,
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2019/03/11/commentary/japan-commentary/indo-
pacific-strategy-mean/#.XRZjwNNKjq0
Nine months ago, in this column, I wrote about the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy. Some argue that it was initiated by
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe as early as in 2012. Other claim that the originally biogeographic concept was first used, as a strategic
term, by an Indian Naval officer back in 2007. No matter who initiated the FOIP strategy, however, it is now
the official policy of Japan and the United States. The Foreign Ministry states that the “key for
stability and prosperity” is the “dynamism that is created by combining ‘Two Continents’: Asia and
Africa, and ‘Two Oceans’: Free and open Pacific and Indian Oceans.” The U.S. government seemed to have signed
onto the FOIP strategy in November 2017 , when the Trump administration started referring to the “Indo-Pacific
region” during President Donald Trump’s first tour to Asia. Washington now uses this concept as its regional
strategy with close cooperation among the “Quad”: Japan, India, Australia and the United States.

Japan and US alliance in the Indo-Pacific is key to check China

Dingding Chen, Professor at Jinan University- Guangzhou 6-4-2018, "The Indo-Pacific Strategy: A
Background Analysis," ISPI, https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/indo-pacific-strategy-
background-analysis-20714

"Indo-Pacific", originally a geographic concept that spans two regions of the Indian Ocean and
the Pacific Ocean, is not a new concept in itself. 10 years ago, Gurpreet s. Khurana, who used the word" Indo-Pacific Strategy"
for the first time, was a marine strategist and executive director of the New Delhi National Marine Foundation. Recently, he wrote in
the Washington Post that the new term has changed the new strategic mind map since China’s “reform and opening up” in the
1980s. “Asia Pacific” has shaped the image of a community of interests linking the United States and East Asia. The " Indo-Pacific "
used by Trump means that India, the United States, and other major Asian democracies, especially Japan and Australia, will join in
curbing China in the new framework of growing "Cold War" influence. In
recent years, the Indo-Pacific strategy and
the Quad concept have been introduced and advocated by various countries at various points in time. Shinzo
Abe held talks with Indian Prime Minister Modi and promoted the "Indo-Pacific Strategy" several times. On the one hand, he praised
India's "Eastward Action" policy. On the other hand, he expressed the need to strengthen cooperation with India. The
Trump’s
visit to Japan formally called the “Indo-Pacific Strategy,” reflecting the US-Japan interest in this
strategy. Chinese scholars believe that the geopolitical changes brought about by China's rise are the main reason
Washington is devoting efforts to boost Indo-Pacific alliances, and the Indo-Pacific strategy is intended to hedge
against China’s foreign and security policy behaviour. On the other hand, many scholars also argue that
Trump's Indo-Pacific strategy is an update of Obama's “rebalance.” Xue Li, a researcher at the Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences, believes that the new strategy is needed because of the strategic culture and the need for balance of
power in the United States. As such, changes
in the geopolitical environment in the Asia-Pacific region are
the fundamental causes motivating the creation of the Indo-Pacific strategy . Against the backdrop of the
relative weakening of the United States’ dominant position and the increasing shift of geopolitical and economic gravity to the Indo-
Pacific, theaim is to reshape alliances and partnerships to respond to China’s rise. THE UNITED STATES
The United States is the leader of the " Indo-Pacific Strategy“. At present, the United States has put forward the
"Indo-Pacific Strategy" which reflects the attention of the United States to the Indian Ocean region. Through its economic
rise in recent years India has has become a leader among emerging economies. On the other hand, after the retreat of Obama's
"Asia-Pacific rebalancing" strategy, the Asia-Pacific power structure involved corresponding adjustments. Allies in the Asia-Pacific
region have been skeptical of Trump's foreign policies. This time, The objective why Trump returned to the "Indo-Pacific Strategy" is
very clear——The "Indo-Pacific Strategy" is the expansion and revision of the "Asia-Pacific rebalancing strategy." The purpose is to
contain China's rise and safeguard U.S.l eadership in the region. JAPAN Japan, as an important ally of the United
States in the Asia-Pacific region, plays an important role in the conception and promotion of the
India Pacific. Apart from its own insecurities as an island nation, the reason that Japan is so clearly united with India and the
United States is Japan’s vigilance against and concers about China’s rising economic and military capabilities

More US and Japan k2 check China

Scot 18 (David, NATO Defense College, Rome; Baltic Defence College, Tartu The Indo-Pacific in
US Strategy: Responding to Power Shifts Rising Powers Quartley V.3 Issue 2) TM
http://risingpowersproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/vol3.2-scott.pdf
At the start of 2018, the State Department Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs stressed the
importance of “strengthening U.S. partnerships in the Indo-Pacific” (Thornton 2018). US
diplomacy has long operated a
network of bilateral alliances across the Pacific, most importantly with Japan and Australia. These
bilateral alliances reflected Cold War concerns about the Soviet Union but have been strengthened still further with the rise of
China. Such traditional Pacific alliances have been complemented by more recent security partnerships established further
eastwards with Vietnam, Singapore, Indonesia, and most significantly India. The China-related need for
constrainment was evident in the US Defense Department, with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian
and Pacific Security Affairs’ admission that “for this administration’s vision for a free and Indo- Pacific to be
realised we also have to deal with the rising challenges presented by China”, where “the Chinese
Communist Party’s vision for a new security architecture in Asia with China at the center is in many ways at odds with our own
aspirations for the region” (Schriver 2017). With regard to Japan, strong bilateral military cooperation continues to be strengthened
in the Ryukyu chain and around Guam in the West Pacific. It is significant that Trump’s
specific adoption of the Free
and Open Indo-Pacific framework in autumn 2017 followed on from Japan’s initiation of the
concept in 2016. Their common focus remains on China’s growing presence across the
IndoPacific. Hence, Mattis’ welcome to the Japanese Foreign Minister at the Pentagon in April 2018 was aimed at China;
“together, we stand for a free and open IndoPacific region, reinforced by the international rule of law. And we oppose the use of
predatory economics by those seeking to impose their will on others in the region” (Mattis 2018b
 Solvency
Chinese aggression with Taiwan is inevitable- Taiwan can’t exist peacefully and
no peace talks
Grossman, Derek, March 21 2019, "A Taiwan Diplomatic Victory Over China Could Be
Inevitable," No Publication, https://www.rand.org/blog/2019/03/a-taiwan-diplomatic-victory-
over-china-could-be-inevitable.html

Beijing's tightening diplomatic squeeze of Taiwan is part of a larger strategy, including the exploitation
of economic, military, and politically subversive pressure points, to bring the island's president, Tsai Ing-wen, to heel . Tsai has
refused to agree to the so-called “1992 Consensus” that would require explicit acknowledgement of the
“one China principle.” Her refusal has frustrated Chinese president Xi Jinping who has indicated that
cross-Strait reunification is the only acceptable outcome. Without at least the initiation of political talks on
Beijing's terms, China's pressure campaign is certain to continue, meaning, in the diplomatic domain, Beijing
will relentlessly pursue additional Taiwan allies to cross over to its side. Although it is difficult to identify
the country most likely to flip next, there are troubling indications in numerous places. Last month, for example, Taiwan
offered to send its ally Nicaragua a $100 million bailout loan as the government deficit in that country has
ballooned to $320 million and President Daniel Ortega tries to quell protests against his regime. One cannot help but
wonder whether Ortega is simply looking for funds to ensure his own survival, and whether Beijing
might offer a better deal to a fellow authoritarian (it would not be the first time Ortega broke ties with Taiwan—
he did so in 1985)

No Solvency- Forced Unification/Independence of Taiwan will not happen- Both

China and Taiwan are unwilling to talk/compromise
Zhiqun Zhu, 2-1-2019, "China's reunification with Taiwan won't happen anytime soon. Here's
why," Newsweek, https://www.newsweek.com/china-taiwan-two-systems-hong-kong-usa-
democracy-1315516

First, few Taiwanese identify themselves as Chinese . With Taiwan's "de-Sinonization （去中国化）" education, the
Taiwanese increasingly see China as a foreign country and hostile neighbor . It's not just that the majority
of Taiwanese do not like the communist government in Beijing or they do not favor "One Country, Two Systems"; they also feel
that Taiwan is already an independent state, with its own government, military, territory, and population. Various
polls in Taiwan suggest that the majority, often over 80 percent of Taiwanese, prefer the status quo to
either independence or unification. For most Taiwanese, the "status quo" means Taiwan is already a separate country
from China despite historical and cultural links. Since Taiwan is a democracy, the Taiwanese naturally believe they
can and should determine Taiwan's future by themselves. Indeed, some in Taiwan would rather turn Taiwan
into the 51st state of the United States than a part of China. President Xi has said unification should be more than integration of
Taiwan and the mainland; it should mean "agreement of the minds （心灵契合）"across the Taiwan Strait. He is spot on, but with
Taiwanese identity clashing with Chinese nationalism, how can such a harmony exist? Second ,
China lacks soft power and
popular appeal, and is not ready for unification. Beijing is already preoccupied with handling numerous pressing
issues at home. With daunting challenges including a slowing economy and growing ethnic tensions in Xinjiang and Tibet already on
its plate,Beijing cannot afford to rush for a premature unification. Unification may also prompt people inside
China to ask: why can't Taiwan and the mainland live under "One Country, One System" or "One
Country, Good System (一国良制)," and demand a better system across the strait . Since Beijing says anything can
be discussed under "One China," what if Taiwan says it would join China when it becomes a democracy?
Is Beijing willing to lift media censorship and guarantee freedom of speech? Or allow the existence of
opposition parties? Taiwan's dynamic, sometimes boisterous democracy is the most powerful weapon it possesses. Taiwan can also
refer to Dr. Sun Yat-sen's "Three Principles of the People"（三民主义）as preconditions for reunification: nationalism, democracy, and
people's livelihood. Sun is revered on both sides, and it will be difficult for Beijing to say no.
 Turn
Turn- China talks fail- China attacks the independence of Taiwan meaning they
have to buy arms- Talks mean arms sales are inevitable
Tyrone Siu, 6-15-2018, "China-Taiwan Relations," Council on Foreign Relations,
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-relations

Although Beijing
continues to seek progress with Taipei through the discussion of economic issues
and high-level people-to-people exchanges, it has refused to renounce the use of force to
resolve the dispute over the island’s status. The PRC’s introduction of the 2005 Anti-Secession Law,
intended to strengthen Beijing’s approach to “peaceful national reunification,” included language stating that in
the event secessionist forces seek independence, Beijing would “employ non-peaceful means” to protect its national sovereignty.
[China] has refused to renounce the use of force to resolve the dispute over the island’s status.
In response, Taiwan continues to purchase weapons, primarily from the United States. In June 2017,
the United States announced a $1.4 billion arms sale to Taiwan. Between 1979 and 2017, Taiwan ranked as the ninth largest
recipient of arms globally. During the same period, the United States supplied more than three-quarters of Taiwan’s imported
weapons, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s arms transfers database.

China won’t bargain on Taiwan- no end to arms sales

James Stavridis, 8-31-2018, "Taiwan Is Not a Bargaining Chip With China," Bloomberg,
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-08-31/trump-can-t-make-taiwan-a-
bargaining-chip-with-china

First, the Washington must recognize that support for Taiwan is not a bargaining chip to be put on the table to
obtain better outcomes with mainland China. The U.S. has significant disputes with the People’s Republic over
trade imbalances, cyber-intrusions, intellectual property theft, North Korean bad behavior, and Beijing’s territorial claims over the
South China Sea. It is certainly tempting for the U.S. to use Taiwan as leverage in dealing with those issues, e.g.
telling China to modulate its positions favorably for the U.S. in return for lessened U.S. support to the island. When he was
president-elect, Donald Trump mused about doing exactly that, and as the trade dispute heats up, that temptation will grow. That
would be a significant mistake. Taiwan has been a steadfast supporter of the U.S. for decades, and continues to perform as a staunch
ally in a very turbulent and vital geopolitical arena. A betrayal of trust would have a ripple effect globally , further
degrading U.S. credibility as an ally. It also misreads Beijing’s intent and attitude — China has no interest
in a deal involving Taiwan. The claim to the island is the ultimate red line in its foreign policy, and it is especially true that a
nationalist government like Xi’s will not be part of a negotiation involving Taiwan’s status. The Trump administration
must come to understand the overarching importance China places on eventually incorporating
Taiwan into its governance structure ,

Talks with China are a slippery slope that will lead to unification for Taiwan-
China/Normalization of Peace Talks Bad
J Michael Cole Taiwan Sentinel, 2-21-19, The KMT’s Dangerous Flirting with a China Peace
Agreement https://sentinel.tw/the-kmts-dangerous-flirting-with-a-china-peace-agreement/
Wu’s position is therefore similar to President Ma’s back in 2011, while others like Lu are already seeking to transcend it. The
interplay between those two positions (election as referendum versus elections + referendum), and the
Tsai
administration’s decision to seek a legal amendment which would necessitate a referendum, is
nevertheless moving the goal posts: what was deemed a non-starter in the 2012 elections — talk of a peace
agreement with China — will now be made more acceptable, and deemed less alarming, by the
fact that a subsequent referendum would have to be held. While Lu’s maximalist position is unlikely to gain
currency, those who support holding a referendum on the subject are now seen as the “responsible”
politicians (propose a very bad option alongside a bad one, and suddenly the latter doesn’t look too terrible anymore). A
referendum would act as a buffer; the threat would appear less immediate, and a KMT victory less threatening. What this
process risks accomplishing is the normalization of the idea of a peace agreement . Inadvertently, by
insisting on laws requiring a referendum, the DPP may have reduced fears over the implications of a KMT victory in the 2020
elections. Wu has been quick to defend his proposed peace agreement against accusations that it would constitute capitulation to
China. “It’s definitely not a pact of surrender to China,” he said earlier this week, adding he hoped the DPP would not engage in a
“smear campaign” against it. The problem with that proposition is that even if Wu, and others in the KMT camp, have the best
intentions in the world when proposing a peace treaty with Beijing — lasting peace and a modus vivendi with China that protects
Taiwan’s sovereignty — they would never be treated as equals at the negotiating table with their
counterparts from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The Taiwan side will always be the weaker party in any
negotiations on the subject, as Hong Kong’s fate has made perfectly clear. Consequently, Taiwan would be forced into
concessions that inevitably would erode the nation’s sovereignty and its ability to defend itself
against Chinese encroachment. Successful negotiations would be contingent on both sides
agreeing to different interpretations of the text and to a certain amount of flexibility in implementation. That, as Xi
made clear in his Jan. 2 address to Taiwanese compatriots, is no longer viable. At the top of the list of Beijing’s
requests would be for Taiwan to end arms procurement from the U.S. and for Washington to cease
extending security guarantees to its longstanding democratic ally. Only after this would Beijing presumably
“renounce” to use force against Taiwan. It would be pure folly, with Xi Jinping in charge, to take
such promises at face value.

China can’t talk to the US on arms sales- Six assurances (Taiwan relations act)
and empirics
Piin-Fen Kok David J. Firestein 2013 EastWest Institute Threading The Needle Proposals for U.S.
and Chinese Actions on Arms Sales to Taiwan The EastWest Institute is an international, non-
partisan, not-for-profit policy organization focused on confronting critical challenges that
endanger peace. https://www.eastwest.ngo/sites/default/files/TAS%20Final%20%2528ISSUU
%20VERSION%209_17_2013%2529.pdf
Recognizing that a reduction in China’s military force posture opposite Taiwan would decrease Taiwan’s requirements for defensive
weaponry, President
Jiang Zemin was the first to articulate a linkage between China’s ballistic missile
deployments and U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, proposing a “missiles for arms” reduction to President Bush
when they met at Bush’s Crawford, Texas ranch in October 2002. While details of Jiang’s proposal have not been made public or
presented in written form, media reports indicate that Jiang had suggested that Chinawas willing to reduce its
missile deployments across from Taiwan if the United States agreed to reduce , and eventually end, its
arms sales to Taiwan. A month after the Bush-Jiang summit, Jiang and other senior Chinese civilian and military leaders
suggested a similar idea to former Defense Secretary William Perry when he visited Beijing. U.S. officials purportedly asked China to
raise this proposal directly with Taiwan’s leadership.52 According to the Congressional Research Service , the Bush
administration did not respond directly to Jiang’s verbal proposal but noted that China’s missile buildup
represented a continuing military threat to Taiwan, that China needed to talk directly to Taiwan about this
issue, and that the United States was constrained by its Six Assurances to Taiwan, which
prohibits it from negotiating specific arms sales decisions with China. However, China’s broader military
posture continued to be an indicator by which the United States would assess Taiwan’s defense need.53 Successive administrations
in Taiwan—under Chen Shui-bian and Ma Ying-jeou—have also called for China to withdraw its missiles directed at Taiwan as a
precondition for any political negotiations that could lead to a cross-Strait peace agreement. In 2007, Chen snubbed President Hu
Jintao’s proposal for a peace accord by calling for China to first renounce the use of force against Taiwan, including by withdrawing
its then-988 ballistic missiles opposite Taiwan; repeal its antisecession law; and discard its “one-China” framework which envisions
eventual reunification of Taiwan with the mainland under Beijing’s rule.54 Ma has been more receptive of peace talks with Beijing,
but has repeatedly reiterated that such talks would be preconditioned on the mainland’s removal or disman tling of its missiles
aimed at the island.5

Six assurances good

Yeh-Chung Lu The Wilson Center TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT: TIME FOR A CHANGE? April 2014 is
assistant professor in the

Department of Diplomacy at National Chengchi University (NCCU) in Taipei.

https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/TRAPolicyBrief.Lu__0.pdf

The China factor is a constant in the equation of U.S.-Taiwan relations . With China’s growing influence, the
United States should explicitly take Chinese intentions and capabilities into account when assessing Taiwan’s defense
needs.Reiteration of the TRA from U.S. administrations will be welcomed by Taiwan. The
Obama administration’s
mention of the Six Assurances was of significance in reminding China that there is a connection
between Taipei’s defense requirements and Beijing’s military posture. This sort of statement can
help maintain the U.S. strategy of ambiguity toward both sides of the Taiwan Strait.

TRA/Six Alliances k2 strengthening ties with Taiwan and stability

Kent Wang, 3-25-2019, "Support System: Why the Taiwan Relations Act Matters," National
Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/support-system-why-taiwan-relations-act-matters-
49022

In addition to President Ronald Reagan’s 1982 Six Assurances, the TRA forms the cornerstone of
the U.S.-Taiwan relationship, providing unequivocal guidance for relations between both allies. Moreover, Taiwan is a
U.S. ally whose progress has been an inspiration to all those still suffering under repressive
governments. Taiwan’s vibrant democracy, open society, and free market are examples to the world
of what can be achieved when innovation and human rights are allowed to flourish. For forty years, the TRA has
provided a vehicle for peace in the Pacific and a means of maintaining a direct relationship
between Washington with the more than twenty-three million Taiwanese people who are one of America’s most important
allies and trading partners. This legislation provides an institutional framework and legal basis for
continued U.S. relations with Taiwan after the end of formal diplomatic ties.
Politics Links
 Sales Unpopular In Trump Admin.
Arms sales split Trump admin – Divides Republicans and Trump hates it when
other interfere with Taiwan
Salama 6-17-19 – (Vivian Salama joined The Wall Street Journal in May 2018 to cover the White House. She previously
worked at NBC News, where she also covered the Trump White House and national politics. Vivian moved to Washington in 2016,
having worked as a foreign correspondent for over a decade, reporting from more than 60 countries. Her byline has appeared in
dozens of publications, including the Associated Press, Bloomberg News, Foreign Affairs and Time. She served as the AP's Baghdad
bureau chief from 2014 to 2016 at the height of ISIS's blitzkrieg across Iraq and Syria; “Trump Administration Is Split Over Arms Sale
to Taiwan”; Wall Street Journal; D.A. June 25th 2019; https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-administration-is-split-over-arms-sale-to-
taiwan-11560805016?scrlybrkr=bcab793c) //JM

WASHINGTON—As the U.S. pursues the sale of more than $2 billion of tanks and other weapons to
Taiwan, the Trump administration is split over the potential repercussions the deal may have on
efforts to reignite trade talks with China. Concerns are growing among some in the administration that
China’s president, Xi Jinping, may use the weapons deal as one more excuse not to meet with
President Trump later this month on the sidelines of the Group of 20 summit in Japan, according to three White House and
administration officials. One of the officials said there is already only “a 50-50 chance” of those talks
happening, given how fragile the relationship has becom e over Mr. Trump’s escalating tariffs, and the
weapons sale may jeopardize even those chances. But others, including national security adviser
John Bolton, see the sale as necessary for strengthening Washington’s alliance with Taiwan and
countering Chinese aggression. In theory, the weapons deal is a business opportunity Mr. Trump would see as bolstering
the U.S. economy. But it also could have short-term implications on his efforts to strike a deal with the world’s second-largest
economy. China sees Taiwan as a breakaway province to be reunified with the mainland one day and has never renounced the use
of force to bring the self-ruled island under its control. The U.S. is the main arms supplier to Taiwan , but recognizes
China and has formal ties with it rather than with Taiwan, in keeping with China’s “One China” policy. For a time after Mr. Trump was
elected president, this policy appeared to be on the brink of change. Weeks
after the 2016 election, Mr. Trump
spoke by telephone with Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen. That broke with decades of U.S. policy
of the president or president-elect not communicating directly with Taiwan’s leader and
infuriated the Chinese government. After taking office, Mr. Trump focused on developing a better
trade arrangement with China—albeit through the use of punitive tariffs, which he believes to be an
effective compliance mechanism—and Taiwan took a back seat. But many within the administration, including
foreign policy hawks, view closer ties with Taiwan as essential for U.S. national security interests
in Asia, mainly as a counterpoint to Chinese aggression, and have pursued this policy throughout Mr. Trump’s
time in office. Then in March a year ago, Taiwan was back on the president’s radar—in a very different light. Mr. Trump’s trade tit-
for-tat with China had begun, and he was eager to get the Chinese to the table. Beijing was already furious over a law signed by Mr.
Trump that encourages the U.S. to send senior officials to Taiwan to meet Taiwanese counterparts and vice versa. Mr.Trump
got word that a State Department diplomat, Alex Wong, had traveled to Taipei, Taiwan’s capital,
to communicate the Trump administration’s commitment to closer ties with the island. Mr. Trump sounded off to
his aides. “Who the f— is this guy?” he lashed out, referring to Mr. Wong, and questioned what
U.S. diplomats were doing in Taiwan, according to a person with direct knowledge of the discussion. The
president requested that no American diplomats travel to Taiwan while he is working on a deal
with China. Mr. Wong serves as deputy assistant secretary for North Korea in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. He is
also the deputy special representative for North Korea. While in Taipei in March last year, Mr. Wong communicated America’s
strong U.S. commitment to Taiwan and described the island as an inspiration to the rest of the Indo-Pacific region. Mr. Wong, the
State Department and the White House didn’t respond to requests for comment. Warmer relations continued to grow
with Taiwan, despite the president’s objections, according to multiple current and former
administration officials. Regional tensions over Taiwan and the South China Sea have flared up in recent months, and Mr.
Trump’s national security aides, as well as many Republican lawmakers, see closer U.S. ties to
Taiwan as imperative to regional security. Aides explained to Mr. Trump the strategic importance of Taiwan, the
officials said, persuading him that a stronger U.S. presence there counters any plans by China to expand its influence beyond the
mainland. Many Republicans also view support for Taiwan’s budding democracy as a policy priority.
It took some convincing, but Mr. Trump came around, the officials said, and he now sees the value in
using Taiwan as a bargaining chip in his talks with China . The White House didn’t respond to a request for
comment. And the administration is growing increasingly vocal in its support for Taiwan. Mr. Bolton wrote on Twitter in
April that “Chinese military provocation won’t win any hearts or minds in Taiwan, but they will
strengthen the resolve of people everywhere who value democracy.” Mr. Bolton also hosted Taiwan’s
national security chief, David Lee, last month, marking the first public visit to Washington of its kind since the two countries ended
formal diplomatic ties in 1979
 Sales Popular in Trump Admin.
Trump admin loves arms sales – they see them as a tool to win a trade war
Rapoza 4-1-19 – (Kenneth Rapoza spent 20 years as a reporter for the best in the business, including as a Brazil-based staffer
for WSJ. Since 2011, they focus on business and investing in the big emerging markets exclusively for Forbes. Thier work has
appeared in The Boston Globe, The Nation, Salon and USA Today. Occasional BBC guest. Former holder of the FINRA Series 7 and 66;
“Taiwan Just Became A Huge Variable In The China Trade War”; Forbes; D.A. June 26th 2019;
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2019/04/01/taiwan-just-became-a-huge-variable-in-china-trade-war/#2fdd78d15948)
//JM

Washington knows how to do one thing well: pick a fight. Potential sales of F-16 fighter jets and M-
1 Abrams tanks to Taiwan is a sure fire way to tick off Xi Jinping , the Chinese president with whom Donald
Trump is trying to sign a “great trade deal ” as early as this month. Following another Steve
Mnuchin/Robert Lighthizer lackluster showing in Beijing last week, all bets are off that China and
the U.S. sign anything should the two presidents meet later this month as discussed. Taiwan is a
new sticking point. The U.S. hasn’t sold fighter jets to Taiwan since 1992 in an effort to appease China, which sees Taiwan as a
breakaway province designed to sow political discord between Beijing and the West. Last week, the Trump
administration responded to the Taiwanese president’s request for some of the biggest
weapons made in the U.S., saying he was fine with the order. The formal request still needs congressional
approval. Beijing will lobby hard against it before Trump and Xi meet. No meeting date has been set. Taiwan’s request is an
unwelcome risk for ongoing U.S. China talks, says Chris Rogers, a senior analyst for Panjiva, the trade research
division of S&P Global Market Intelligence. Taiwan’s president Tsai Ing-wen seems willing to ruffle feathers
and challenge Trump, asking for the F-16 and the M-1 tank in order to “show the world the U.S.
is committed to Taiwan’s defense,” Reuters reports. “Should the U.S. approve the orders it would ... jeopardize
relations between the U.S. and China just as trade talks are due to reach a conclusion,” Rogers says.
 Arms Popular in Congress – Bipartisan
Arms sales to Taiwan are bipartisan
Reuters 5-7-19 – (Reuters is an international news organization. It is a division of Thomson Reuters and has nearly 200
locations around the world; “U.S. House passes pro-Taiwan bills, amid trade tensions with China”; Reuters; D.A. June 25th 2019;
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-taiwan-congress/us-house-passes-pro-taiwan-bills-amid-trade-tensions-with-china-
idUSKCN1SE00T?scrlybrkr=12d112b1) //JM

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The U.S. House of Representatives on Tuesday unanimously backed

legislation supporting Taiwan which faces military and diplomatic pressure from China as
members of the U.S. Congress push for a sharper approach to relations with Beijing . China expressed
anger and said the bill should be blocked. The House passed the measures as Washington and Beijing
continue months-long trade talks. China said on Tuesday Vice Premier Liu He would travel to Washington this week,
setting up a last-ditch bid for a deal that would avoid a steep increase in tariffs ordered by U.S. President Donald Trump. The
House voted 414-0 for a non-binding resolution reaffirming the U.S. commitment to Taiwan. It
also backed by unanimous voice vote the “Taiwan Assurance Act of 2019,” which supports Taiwan and urges it to increase its
defense spending, noting Washington should conduct “regular sales and defense articles” to Taiwan and back Taipei’s participation
in international organizations. There
was no word on when the Assurance Act might come up for a vote
in the Senate, which would be necessary before it could become law. Chinese foreign ministry spokesman
Geng Shuang said the bill was an interference in China’s internal affairs and China had already lodged “stern representations” with
Washington about it. China
urged the United States to block the bill’s progress and “appropriately
handle Taiwan-related issues to avoid seriously harming China-U.S. cooperation on important areas
and peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait”, he said. Taiwan’s foreign ministry said it welcomed the “positive” move and expressed
its gratitude. Taiwan would “continue to work hand-in-hand with the U.S. authorities to firmly
deepen the Taiwan-U.S. partnership”, it added in a statement. The U.S. measures reflect its concern
over any efforts by Beijing to influence Taiwan . Washington has no formal ties with Taipei, but is bound by law to
help provide the island with the means to defend itself and is its main source of arms. Beijing regards Taiwan as its
sacred territory and regularly calls it the most sensitive and important issue in ties with the
United States. The House Foreign Affairs Committee has also scheduled five hearings this week
on the relationship between the United States and China.
Arms Popular in Congress – Democrats
 Arms Popular in Congress – Republicans
Republican ‘China Hawks’ in Congress pressure Trump to continue sales and get
mad when Trump tries peace talks
Temple-West 18 – (Patrick Temple-West Patrick Temple-West is a financial services reporter for POLITICO Pro. He
previously covered tax policy for Reuters. He graduated Phi Beta Kappa from Saint Joseph's University in Philadelphia and has a
Master's degree from Northwestern University; “GOP pressures Trump on Taiwan as China issues threats”; Politco; D.A. June 25 th
2019; https://www.politico.com/story/2018/02/02/china-taiwan-trump-republicans-386449?scrlybrkr=48fb3b8e) //JM

TAIPEI — A year after a newly elected Donald Trump enraged China by taking a congratulatory
phone call from the president of Taiwan, the pro-American island nation is pleading for Trump’s protection against
Beijing’s bullying. At the same time, Republicans in Congress are pressuring Trump with pro-Taiwan
legislation that could strain his delicate relationship with China. China is already warning Trump
to back off: One senior Chinese diplomat visiting Washington in December warned that his country would invade Taiwan if U.S.
Navy ships dock in Taiwanese ports, an idea proposed in the annual defense spending bill Trump signed in December. In exclusive
interviews here with POLITICO, Taiwanese
officials urged Trump to stand firm, saying Beijing has stepped
up a campaign of political and military intimidation during the president’s first year in office .
“Mainland China has a big strategy to exercise more political pressure toward Taiwan,” said Chang Hsiao-Yueh, Taiwan’s Mainland
Affairs Council Minister. Chang
and other officials here urged the Trump administration to step up its
support for Taipei. The result is a foreign policy conundrum for Trump, who has said he wants to
stand up to China’s regional aggression — but who also wants Chinese President Xi Jinping’s
help on North Korea and trade issues. While Trump’s Taiwan policy remains unclear, Congress is taking a lead role. In
January, the House passed legislation encouraging more diplomatic contacts between Trump
officials and their Taiwanese counterparts. That, too, has angered Beijing, which considers Taiwan a “renegade
province” of China that should not have direct relations with America. A Jan. 10 editorial in the hawkish Beijing newspaper Global
Times called the measure “unimaginable in the past” and said it showed that “forces in the US are attempting to flare up the Taiwan
question … and use it as leverage against China.” Last
week, a spokesman for China’s Taiwan affairs office said
the bill “severely violates” established policy between the U.S., China and Taiwan , which has
discouraged direct contacts between officials in Washington and Taipei. Taiwan has been a thorn in U.S.-China relations for decades.
Beijing does not recognize the sovereignty of Taiwan, a holdout for anti-communist forces after China’s civil war ended in 1949.
The U.S. treats Taiwan as a sovereign nation and sells it advanced weaponry. But through a complicated
diplomatic understanding known as the “one-China” policy, the U.S. recognizes the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal
government of China and not the Republic of China (the official name of Taiwan). That’s why Trump’s Dec. 2, 2016, phone call with
Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen so angered China. Trump,
in a February call with Xi, smoothed feathers — and
disappointed some China hawks in Congress by reaffirming the U.S.’s one-China policy , though he
also suggested it could be tied to China’s willingness to bargain on trade and other issues. That, in
turn has alarmed some Taiwanese leaders who fear that Trump may see their country as a
potential bargaining chip in his dealings with Xi . Trump may be “prepared to use the fate of the 23 million people in
Taiwan as a bargaining chip to negotiate stronger Chinese assistance on resolving the North Korean nuclear issue or to rebalance the
U.S.-China economic relationship,” Paul Haenle, director of the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center, wrote last year. “Trump, being the
businessman that he is, always looking to do deals. He sees international relations as transactions,” said Jason
Hsu, a member of Taiwan’s legislature representing the opposition KMT party . “Ultimately, he is not
concerned about human rights, freedom, democracy, freedom of speech, these are not in his
thinking.” Trump has sent mixed and unclear signals about relations with Taiwan and China, said Wang
Ting-yu, a legislator and member of Tsai’s Democratic Progressive Party. “The vague message is sometimes more
dangerous than missiles,” Wang added. Trump did approve the sale of $1.4 billion in U.S. arms to
Taiwan last June. But unease on the island is growing amid what Taiwanese officials call an escalating Chinese campaign of
intimidation against its much smaller neighbor. Chinese warplanes have increased flights around Taiwan —
with sorties of fighters and bombers armed to attack, according to Taiwan’s defense ministry. In
early January, China started flying commercial jets through several lanes in the Taiwan Strait ,
violating a 2015 agreement. Taiwan calls the flights a “reckless” safety hazard. The provocations are angering Taiwan’s champions on
Capitol Hill, where Beijing is battling efforts to provide Taipei with more robust U.S. support. Sen.
Marco Rubio criticized
China’s new air routes as “a violation of the longstanding cross-strait status quo.” Another champion
of Taiwan and supporter of the travel bill, is Sen. Ted Cruz (R-Tex.), who met with Tsai in Houston on Jan. 8, 2017 despite Beijing’s
strong objections. In an interview, Cruz slammed as “absurd” a December threat by Chinese diplomat Li Kexin during an event at
Beijing’s embassy in Washington. Li told colleagues that he had warned U.S. officials against docking American warships in Taiwan.
“The day that a U.S. Navy vessel arrives in Kaohsiung is the day that our People’s Liberation
Army unifies Taiwan with military force,” Li said, according to Chinese media reports cited by Reuters. “The threat
from a low-level Chinese diplomat of a military invasion of Taiwan was absurd, unduly provocative and should be met with laughter
and derision,” Cruz said. Cruz also denounced China for “vigorously” lobbying to kill strong ports-of-call language for Taiwan that he
wanted included in the 2018 defense authorization bill, Cruz said. A
Senate version of the annual National Defense
Authorization Act from September called for the Pentagon to issue a report about the feasibility of
Navy vessel visiting Taiwanese ports. Cruz said Beijing urged the language be deleted in a House-
Senate conference committee, “and sadly the conferees acceded to that request.” The final NDAA Trump signed in
December softened the Taiwanese ports of call language the Senate had supported, dropping the requirement for a written report
and saying only that the Pentagon should "consider the advisability and feasibility of reestablishing port of call exchanges." The idea
is supported by Trump’s new assistant secretary of defense for Asia, Randall Schriver. “Such port calls would be entirely consistent
with our One China Policy as we define it,” Shriver told senators in 2017. Taiwanese officials interpreted Schriver’s Senate
confirmation in December as a strong sign of continued U.S. willingness repel China.
Arms Unpopular in Congress
Elections Links
 Arms Sales Unpopular – Public
Arms sales are unpopular
Daragahi 19 Borzou Daragahi is International Correspondent for The Independent. “Majority of Americans want congress to
cut arms sales to Saudi Arabia over Yemen war, survey finds.” The Independent.
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/saudi-arabia-arms-sales-embargo-us-yemen-civil-war-famine-trump-
congress-a8651931.html. Date Accessed: 6/28/2019. BZ.

A majority of Americans oppose the US government’s support for the ongoing Saudi-led war in
Yemen, a survey has shown. Some 58 per cent of respondents wanted lawmakers to curtail or
halt the supply of arms for a conflict considered the world’s worst ongoing humanitarian
disaster. Only 13 per cent of Americans said they want lawmakers to maintain or increase arms
sales to the US allies in the conflict – Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. But the survey,
conducted by YouGov and commissioned by the International Rescue Committee relief group, also showed striking nationwide
ignorance about the conflict. The three-year conflict in Yemen has been largely ignored by broadcast media in favour of near 24-
hour coverage of President Donald Trump’s foibles. The war has claimed tens of thousands of lives and brought the Arab world’s
poorest nation to the brink of widespread famine as winter approaches and heating and cooking fuel prices spike, according to relief
organisations. But of 1,000 Americans surveyed earlier this month, a third said they had never even heard of the Yemen war.
Among those who had an opinion on the conflict, 75 per cent opposed US involvement. “We’ve
already made the argument that this conflict is morally and strategically bankrupt," said Amanda
Catanzano, a senior director at the International Rescue Committee. "But it’s also politically
unpopular. It doesn’t reflect the perspective of the American people."

Arms sales are well hidden, the sales that are released to the public are
unpopular
Abramson 19 Jeff Abramson is a non-resident senior fellow for arms control and conventional arms transfers at the Arms
Control Association. “Proposed Small Arms Transfers: Big Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy.” Arms Control Association.
https://www.armscontrol.org/taxonomy/term/36. Date Accessed: 6/28/2019. BZ.

While the public can raise its voice against irresponsible Foreign Military Sales (FMS) because
such government-to-government negotiated sales are quickly added to a public website, the
increasingly important business-led Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) are not as transparent, in part because any public notification is
obscure or functionally comes after the initial review period has passed. Earlier this month, news broke with this exact scenario on a
missile defense sale to Saudi Arabia. Members of Congress could insist that, or possibly take it upon themselves to make, these
potential DCS transactions more transparent. Proposed sales of precision-guided munitions to Saudi Arabia via the more opaque DCS
process came to light because concerned members of Congress took the initiative to reveal them. While the notification period
garners the most attention, Congress also can block a sale up until weapons are delivered. Given how security, geopolitical, and
humanitarian realities can change between the time of notifications and often years-later deliveries, members should follow the
entire process. In 2014, Congress gave itself the authority (see Section 201) to receive from the State Department notification of an
arms shipment at least 30 days before its delivery. It is currently limited to joint requests by the chair and ranking members of the
SFRC or HFAC and may have only been used once. Those leaders should exercise it much more diligently and Congress should
In general,
consider making it much easier to use by allowing all committee members to request pre-delivery notifications.
transparency around arms deliveries remains too obscure as a New Hampshire NPR reporter
recently discovered. When U.S. census export data showed weapons worth more than $61 million had been sold from his
state to Saudi Arabia in August 2018, he could not uncover what was in the sales nor which companies provided the weapons.
Annual reports on U.S. arms transfers have grown increasingly opaque. Congress should mandate a change
demanding much greater transparency on the specifics of what is in U.S. weapons deliveries.
Finally, sometime in the first quarter of 2019, the administration is expected to publish final
rules transferring export authority on select firearms from the State Department to the
Commerce Department, despite a large number of negative public comments and a great deal
of concern. Members of Congress have raised an alarm that they will lose notifications about these sales, which in the past two
years has enabled them to forestall small arms sales to Turkey and the Philippines. Last year, legislation was introduced to stop
these changes and should again be considered. As
with Trump’s broad approach to arms sales, these changes
risk making it easier for weapons to end up in the hands of terrorists, international criminals,
and abusive regimes.
TRA and the Six Assurances, alongside the Three Joint Communiqués, the US provided 23 million people with specific security
guarantees, allowing Taiwan to develop in a stable and prosperous manner. As far as Taiwan is concerned, it cannot afford to lose
the US, but Taipei cannot forever blindly consider China a foe. If the two sides of the strait remain in confrontation, then much time
has been wasted over the past 40 years. Due to the fluctuations in cross-Strait relations, finding the best way to protect the people’s
welfare is a tremendous challenge for Taiwan. Increasingly, that security partnership will be tested by the continuing modernization
of the PLA. What Taiwan does to ensure its security is also a critical variable. Still, Washington should probably pull out the dual-
deterrence playbook and consider issuing an appropriate mix of warnings and reassurances to Beijing and Taipei, in the knowledge
that China’s military power will only grow in the years ahead . What would the US do if Beijing
decided to take Taiwan by force? Studies show only a minority of Americans would favor US
soldiers fighting to defend Taiwan, but a decision by Washington not to intervene in a Taiwan Strait conflict would
represent a dramatic shift in US strategy. In reality, China’s appetite for Taiwan will only grow and the United
States must help Taiwan resist Chinese dominance. But time is running out fast for the Trump administration to show the 23 million
people inhabiting the island that Washington supports Taiwan’s sovereignty and democratic system, and the security of the Taiwan
Strait. Asia Times is not responsible for the opinions, facts or any media content presented by contributors.

China will invade Taiwan by 2025

Matthew Burke 2/18/19, (Matthew Burke covers Okinawa and other areas in the Pacific. Burke joined Stripes in May, 2011, after
serving as a staff writer for the Cape Cod Times daily newspaper in Massachusetts and traveling abroad. After graduating from the
University of Massachusetts Amherst in 2005, he worked as a freelancer for several papers in the Boston area, including the Boston
Globe, after he which he joined a collection of local weekly papers on Cape Cod as a staff writer. “Retired Japanese General Predicts
China will invade Japan by 2025, Okinawa by 2045” Stars and Stripes https://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/retired-japanese-
general-predicts-china-will-invade-taiwan-by-2025-okinawa-by-2045-1.569228) SB

A former Japanese military officer recently made waves after saying he believes China plans to invade and
annex Taiwan by 2025 and Okinawa by 2045 . The comments by retired Lt. Gen. Kunio Orita, a 35-year
veteran of the Japan Air Self-Defense Force and a former commander of the 301st Tactical Fighter Squadron and 6th Air Wing,
appeared last month in the English-language Taiwan News. Orita, who retired in 2009 and is now a guest professor at Toyo
Gakuen University in Tokyo, recently told Stars and Stripes he expects Beijing will attempt to expand its
sphere of influence by first taking control of Taiwan and then militarizing a key disputed islet in
the South China Sea. Once that’s accomplished, he said, China will set its sights on Japan’s southern
island prefecture, which hosts about half of the approximately 54,000 U.S. troops serving in
Japan. Beijing plans to force the United States out of Okinawa by fostering negative media coverage and supporting the anti-U.S.
military protest movement on the island, the former general said. “If China can push out the U.S. military from the
region, it is possible that they can conquer the South China Sea and they will gain the power to
stop any trade between Japan and other countries, ” he said in a phone interview with Stars and Stripes on Jan.
28.
 Arms Sales Popular – Public
Arms sales are popular
Exum 17 Andrew Exum is a contributing editor at The Atlantic. From 2015 to 2016, he was the U.S. deputy assistant secretary
of defense for Middle East policy. “What Progressives Miss About Arms Sales.” The Atlantic.
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/05/americas-right-to-sell-arms/527805/. Date Accessed: 6/28/2019. BZ.

Progressives don’t like arms sales very much, but they need to pay attention to them, because
they’re one big way Republicans are fighting for—and winning— the votes of working-class
Americans who have traditionally voted for Democrats. While the president was in Saudi Arabia, the Trump
administration announced $110 billion in arms sales to Saudi Arabia—with an additional $240 billion committed over a 10-year period. If you’ve ever
worked in government, you know this is what is called a “deliverable,” the clunky management-consultantese term for a tangible outcome of a visit or
meeting. When Donald Trump is asked to justify his trip to Saudi Arabia, he’ll cite that $110 billion in arms sales. There are a few interesting things
about these sales. The first is that many of these sales were already in the works. The Obama administration spent eight years quietly selling a lot of
arms to Saudi Arabia: When President Obama left office, for example, the United States still had $100 billion in the foreign military sales pipeline with
Saudi Arabia and, in 2011, had inked what was previously the largest arms sale in U.S. history with the Kingdom—a $29 billion deal to sell F-15s to the
Saudis. Obama-era sales to Saudi Arabia were in keeping with sales to other Gulf states: Both Qatar and the United Arab Emirates bought a tremendous
amount of U.S. arms between 2009 and 2017. Qatar bought more U.S. arms than any other state in 2014 and, in the waning days of the Obama
administration, announced that it would buy nearly $4 billion in Boeing-made F-15s in addition to $19 billion in commercial aircraft , also from Boeing.
Overall, the Arab Gulf states went on a spending spree during the Obama years, and most of the money was spent on American arms. So why didn’t
you hear a lot about this from Democratic politicians during the 2016 election season? There are two main reasons—one strategic and one moral.
Strategically, not everyone is convinced that arming the Arab Gulf states to the teeth is a wise idea. Some worry that these arms might someday
endanger Israel’s security, while others worry the Arab Gulf states might be encouraged to use their new toys on disastrous military interventions
against Iran or Iranian proxies in, say, Yemen. The quick and unsatisfying answer to these concerns is the global market. The Arab Gulf states have
money, and that money will buy the weapons that are available. If U.S. arms are not for sale, fine: French, Chinese, or Russian arms will be. (And if you
don’t believe me, look at the way in which Gulf states—frustrated by U.S. export controls on drone technology—are turning to the Chinese.) Selling U.S.
arms to the Gulf states, by contrast, further ties them to U.S. interests by deepening cooperation and interoperability between the U.S. military and its
Gulf partners. One of the reasons Qatar wanted to buy U.S. fighters to partially replace its French-made fleet, for example, was because they
Arms sales
discovered how difficult it was for their existing fighter aircraft to fly with the U.S. air force as part of coalitions over Libya and Syria.

also drive down the cost of our own weapons and thus the amount of money U.S. tax-payers
have to spend on defense instead of other priorities like, say, the State Department, school
lunches, or housing subsidies. Here’s one example: Because the United States is buying fewer F-35s than originally planned and using
more of its “fourth generation” fighters (F-15s, F-16s, etc.) in the skies over Iraq and Syria than previously anticipated, the Department of Defense will
likely need to buy more of those fourth generation fighters in the coming years. The recent sales of F-15s to Qatar, F-18s to Kuwait, and F-16s to
Bahrain will drive down the cost per plane for the Pentagon. That’s a good thing—at least financially. Morally, though, many progressives just grow ill at
the idea of selling weapons abroad. Senator Chris Murphy, for example—one of the more eloquent and consistent critics of U.S. arms sales in the
Senate, even though his own state has a very robust defense industrial base— sees nothing admirable about the idea of selling weapons to the Saudis
that might be used in Yemen. Other progressives agree: Yes, they argue, we understand the demand of the market will be met by someone, but do we
have to be complicit in providing the supply? In other countries, progressives have even taken to the courts in an effort to halt sales. I have a lot of
respect for these progressives and their values. I spent too much time in Sunday School as a kid to not feel a little uneasy about the business of selling
weapons. And the angst many progressives feel about U.S. arms sales has been enough to keep many Democrats from talking up their successes in
Boeing employs 157,000 people—
helping U.S. industry abroad. I wonder, though, if there isn’t a real political cost to not doing so.

almost all of them in the United States. 14,500 people work in Boeing’s facilities in Missouri,
where the F-15 and F-18 are made, where Senator Claire McCaskill is up for reelection next year,
and where Donald Trump trounced Hillary Clinton 56 to 38 percent in 2016. (Those 14,500 people do not
include the many thousands of other Americans who make parts for the F-15 and F-18 elsewhere in America.) Lockheed Martin,

meanwhile, a huge winner in the recent arms deal with Saudi Arabia (despite ace businessman Jared Kushner
negotiating the price down on behalf of the Saudis), employs an additional 97,000 workers—again, most of them in

the United States. And Raytheon, another big winner last week, employs another 60,000 or so
Americans. Donald Trump obviously has no moral qualms about selling weapons to our partners and allies abroad. And so while Democrats leave
points on the board with working-class voters by not talking about how much Democrats do to support U.S. industry, Republicans swoop in to take
credit with assembly line workers for even those things that Obama approved and set in motion. The way in which Trump brags about U.S. arms sales,
of course, is in keeping with the strain of economic mercantilism that ran through his populist campaign message. That message worked with voters
So while progressives might have moral qualms about
throughout the Midwest, helping to cost Clinton the election.

companies that sell weapons, the roughly 1.2 million American voters who work in the
aerospace and defense sector—together with the roughly 3.2 million Americans who support
the sector indirectly—see little wrong with the sales that help ensure their livelihoods and
provide a future for their children. This might be another area in which progressive elites—who have the kinds of education and
skills that don’t require them to seek work on the assembly line—are simply out of touch with the voters they need to win back control of the Congress
And politics aside, surely even the moral calculus of arms sales
and state assemblies, never mind the presidency.

gets more complicated when you think about the millions of American mouths that are fed by
mothers and fathers who work in the aerospace and defense sector.

Taiwanese Arms sales widely popular among American citizens

American Citizens for Taiwan is a group of Americans showing their support of Taiwan consisting
of more than 500 members of congress with 2000 other non-congress affiliated members

Edward Freidman, 7-6-2018,(American Citizens For Taiwan Contributor, Edward Friedman’s teaching and research interests
include democratization, Chinese foreign policy, international political economy, revolution, and the comparative study of transitions
in Leninist States "Why Should the U.S. Protect Taiwan," Medium, https://medium.com/american-citizens-for-taiwan/why-should-
the-u-s-protect-taiwan-dd2c2a5b3730) SB

would be very natural for an American citizen to ask why their government sells weapons to
It
Taiwan, an island in the Western Pacific, north of the Philippine chain and south of the Okinawa chain of Japan, and why the U.S.
Government claims, in the 30+ year old Taiwan Relations Act law passed to establish unofficial relations with a de facto independent
Taiwan, to have a large interest in guaranteeing that Taiwan’s autonomy is not lost to coercive action by another party, meaning the
authoritarian regime headquartered in Beijing. Many pundits, such as Charles Glaser, argue against this policy, claiming that helping
to protect democratic Taiwan’s citizenry with weapons to deter attack from China angers the ever more powerful, ambitious, and
assertive regime headed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), who sit 100 miles away across the Taiwan Strait. These anti-
Taiwan commentators claim, with no evidence at all, that if America would just stop selling weapons
to Taiwan, then the CCP would no longer act in ways that would militarily challenge America . These
well-meaning policy analysts get China all wrong. The Beijing authoritarian ruling group’s number one goal is creating a world that
will help legitimize and entrench their dictatorship. As a result, from Syria and Iran to Zimbabwe and Sudan, the
CCP regime
supports anti-American tyrants and works against internationally recognized human rights. Even
if Taiwan were to sink into the ocean, the rulers in Beijing would still treat the USA as enemy
number one. A second high priority goal for the CCP is protecting China’s access to energy all around the world. As a result,
China is grabbing the seas of Southeast Asia which are rich in energy resources and whose Malacca Strait provides access to oil trade
routes to the Middle East. This Chinese expansionism worries China’s neighbors in Asia such as Vietnam, the Philippines, and India.
This China challenges the American Navy’s rights to movement in international ocean waters that the CCP claims, yet are far from
the shores of continental China. This China means to build a navy that can stand up to the American Navy. Two things are clear from
these facts. First, the U.S. Government should strive mightily to find a way to live in peace with this ever more powerful, ambitious,
and expansive China. It will not be easy. It is vital. And second, the
notion that a small, weak, un-threatening, and
democratic Taiwan is the major cause of war-prone tensions between China and the U.S. does
not stand up under logic. This Taiwan seeks peace and mutual benefit from China and has gone
out its way to prove its friendly intentions. Therefore, if there is a danger of war, it lies in the
nationalistic ambitions and politics of the CCP. Unless the U.S. Government wishes to see an
authoritarian, anti-American China dominate Asia against the wishes of Asian peoples, the U.S.
should try to help these Asian peoples maintain their independence so they can live in peace
and mutual benefit with America and with China. The Taiwanese should be seen as one of those Asian peoples.
This is how the U.S. Government should see it. This is how the U.S. Government should act. It is correct to do so.

.
China not ready to invade Taiwan
Kristen Huang 5/13/19, (Kristin Huang is a contributor to Inkstone and a senior China reporter at South China Morning Post. She
is most interested in security topics in northeast Asia and China's growing military might, “Why China isn’t ready to invade Taiwan
(at least not yet) InkStone https://www.inkstonenews.com/china/why-china-isnt-ready-invade-taiwan-least-not-
yet/article/3009948) SB

China is stepping up its military capability to invade Taiwan, but might lack the core assault landing capabilities to
conquer the self-ruled island, military experts said. The assessment follows an annual report to the US Congress saying
China was likely to be preparing a plan to take Taiwan by force, while simultaneously deterring, delaying, or denying any third-party
intervention on the island’s behalf. The 136-page report, “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of
China 2019,” was released last week and listed a number of options, including a blockade to cut off Taiwan’s imports accompanied
by large-scale missile strikes and the occupation of Taiwanese administered islands like Quemoy (also known as Kinmen) and Matsu.
An air and missile attack might aim to destroy important military and communications infrastructure, while a full-scale invasion
might start at northern or southern points along Taiwan’s west coast, according to the Pentagon report. Turning to Taiwan’s
defenses, the report noted the island’s advantages continue to decline as China’s military modernization proceeds, with significant
problems in recruiting sufficient military personnel. Taiwan also faces “considerable equipment and readiness challenges,” the
report said. Military analyst Collin Koh, from the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Singapore’s Nanyang Technological
University, said an amphibious operation to take over the island , as outlined in the report, was unlikely due
to China’s inadequate sealift capability and the inability of its amphibious forces to work in
concert with other services. “Amphibious assault landing operations are , after all, highly complex
operations that require so many moving parts across branches and services that it’ll take much
effort and time to promote and inculcate that concept and spirit of fighting jointly and in an
integrated manner,” he said. Koh’s view was echoed by Timothy Heath, a senior international defense research analyst at the
US think tank Rand, who said inadequate numbers of ships capable of transporting troops for an
invasion remained an important shortfall for any Chinese military plan to invade Taiwan .
“Amphibious assault ships and other vessels for conveying combat troops onto the beaches of Taiwan are essential because invasion
is the only way the PLA can guarantee conquest of Taiwan,” said Heath, adding that the PLA currently has a relatively modest
inventory of such ships.
 Dems Support Trade War
Dems will continue the trade war & make it worse
Knigge 5-22-19 – (Reporter for DW; “Why hoping for Donald Trump's election defeat could backfire for China”; DW; D.A. June
26th 2019; https://www.dw.com/en/why-hoping-for-donald-trumps-election-defeat-could-backfire-for-china/a-48839015?
scrlybrkr=ecdfead7) //JM

While China might be able to absorb a lot of economic hardship and eventually cope with what could amount to a decoupling of the
American and the Chinese economy, the near and midterm impact on the country's economic development are negative enough
that they could compel Beijing to seek a way out of the impasse sooner rather than later. Another
reason why putting
trade talks with Washington on the backburner until after the US presidential election could
backfire is that a Democratic victory is not only not certain, but the fact that a Democratic-led
administration might make matters even more difficult for China than the current one.
Democrats might disagree with the style and tactics of the Republican president's handling of
the trade dispute with China, but they share the underlying sentiment that the US needs to
recalibrate its relationship with the country. "I think if China decides to wait it out, that's a gamble," said Denmark.
"I think what you are going to see is that the idea that the United States is embroiled in a future
competition with China is fairly universally held by policymakers in both the Republican Party
and the Democratic Party." United front from advanced democracies While a Democratic-led
administration might be less inclined to continue certain aspects of President Trump's trade
policy towards China, for example his reliance on tariffs as a preferred tool to punish other countries including US allies in
Europe and Asia, they would likely try to do something that would only increase the pressure on China: forge an international
coalition. The only area where the Democrats have drawn a clear distinction with Trump is their
view that "if China is your main target you should be doing this in common with the other major
economies that share precisely the same concerns about China and you have more leverage if
you are able to do this collectively," said Small. "But that doesn't make things easier for China either if there is
effectively a united front from the advanced industrial democracies on this." All of this leaves Beijing in an
uncomfortable position, said the Wilson Center's Denmark: "Do you negotiate with Trump, who is
predictably unpredictable, or do you roll the dice and see what happens in the next election and
China may actually find itself in a more challenging negotiating position than they were with the
Trump administration?"
 US-China Relations matter for 2020 – Dems
US-China relations & Trump trade policy give dems a sticking point for 2020
Rampell 5-13-19 – (Catherine Rampell, Princeton University Graduate & a Gerald Loeb finalist for 4 years; “Democrats should
be shouting Trumps trade failures from the rooftops”; Washington Post; D.A. June 25th 2019;
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/democrats-should-be-shouting-trumps-trade-failures-from-the-
rooftops/2019/05/13/c1a484e4-75bb-11e9-b7ae-390de4259661_story.html?utm_term=.0759a79b20fa) //JM

Markets crashing, farmers suffering, allies seething , manufacturing workers fretting about their job security.
These were all foreseeable consequences of President Trump’s trade wars , which escalated in the past
week after Trump hiked tariffs on Chinese goods ever higher and Beijing announced tit-for-tat retaliatory duties. Such
developments reveal the risks of Trump’s protectionist instincts, his fundamental
misunderstanding of how both trade and trade negotiations work, and his inability to learn the
lessons of the trade war that deepened the Great Depression. All this should be great ammunition for Trump’s rivals. Why
isn’t it being used? Republicans, of course, are too cowardly to challenge Trump on much of anything.
But Democrats, particularly those angling for the presidency, should be shouting from the
rooftops. They should be sharing soybean-farmer sob stories and damning stats with any voter still considering following Trump
off the protectionist cliff. Especially given academic research finding that “Trump Country” has been hurt most by his trade conflicts.
Instead — with rare exceptions — Democrats have been muted or mealy-mouthed in their criticism.
Perhaps this is because, when it comes to trade policy , most of them don’t have a leg to stand on . This
weekend, when asked what she thought of Trump’s trade wars, Sen. Kamala D. Harris (Calif.) said she objected to Trump’s
preference for “conducting trade policy, economic policy, foreign policy by tweet.” She also said
Trump “failed to understand that we are stronger when we work with our allies on every issue,
China included.” So far, so good. But when pressed, she said she wouldn’t have voted for the North American Free Trade
Agreement, aligning her with Trump’s own negative assessment of the deal. And if you look back at Harris’s record in
the Senate, you’ll find that she, just like Trump, opposed then-President Barack Obama’s
strategy to “work with our allies” to keep China in line on trade. That was the 12-country pact
known as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which Trump pulled us out of with support from other 2020
Democratic candidates, too, including Rep. Tim Ryan (Ohio), and Democratic leaders such as now-House Speaker Nancy
Pelosi (Calif.). Some Democratic presidential candidates, such as Sen. Elizabeth Warren (Mass.), have also offered vague statements
of displeasure over Trump’s trade actions, then suggested Trump’s protectionism doesn’t go far enough. Diehard protectionist Sen.
Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.) endorsed Trump’s metal tariffs, even if he thought Canada and the European Union should have been
exempted. Rather than rethinking their protectionist instincts after seeing the consequences of Trump’s trade policies, some
Democrats have doubled down. Senate Minority Leader Charles E. Schumer (N.Y.) cheered on Trump’s escalation of tariffs on
Chinese goods in a tweet last week. Sanders
is trying to use Democratic front-runner and former vice
president Joe Biden’s past support for the TPP and other trade deals against him. These are bizarre
choices, and not only because economists and historians no longer have to conjure up fuzzy memories of the Great Depression to
explain why trade barriers can backfire, or reference abstract theories to illustrate why being left out of new free-trade pacts,
including the recently reconstituted TPP, puts the United States at a disadvantage .
These are also strange positions to
take because they run counter to the views of most Democratic voters. Democrats, it turns out,
have become fiercely free trade, as illustrated by recent polling compiled last fall by Cato Institute adjunct scholar Scott
Lincicome. For instance, the Pew Research Center found that 67 percent of Democrats (vs. 43 percent
of Republicans) believe that free-trade agreements have been good for the United States. A separate
question found that 77 percent of Democrats (and 18 percent of Republicans) said increased tariffs between the United States and
some trading partners will be bad for the country. To
some extent these policy positions — like all policy positions —
are influenced by respondents’ attitudes toward the polarizing guy in the White House . But even
before Trump ran for office, Democratic voters were more positive on trade than the politicians in their
own party. The issue, of course, is that even if most Democratic voters are pro-trade, trade probably isn’t the most important
issue to them. But smaller constituencies for which trade is especially important, such as organized labor, tend to be trade-skeptical.
“There are probably more voters that are litmus-test protectionist than litmus-test free traders,” Lincicome says. But pandering to
the tiny minority of protectionists is short-sighted, particularly if doing so hurts the economy in the medium term and U.S. alliances
in the long term. Democratic voters turn out to be pretty enlightened when it comes to the economic and diplomatic benefits of
trade; it’s past time that the people chosen to represent them catch up.

Democrats are focusing on domestic issues for 2020 – that’s a losing strategy but
US-China relations give them a winning point train hopping on success claiming
the preservation of the liberal order
Wright 5-14-19 – (Thomas Wright is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and the author of All Measures Short of War:
The Contest for the 21st Century and the Future of American Power; “Democrats Need to Place China at the Center of Their Foreign
Policy”; The Atlantic; D.A. June 25th 2019; https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/05/how-democrats-can-beat-trump-
foreign-policy-2020/589360/) //JM

As the 2020 presidential campaign gets under way, Democrats are beginning to think about what type of foreign-
policy message they need to defeat President Donald Trump. A recent conference organized by National Security
Action, a progressive group run by former Obama-administration officials, unveiled an early
consensus—Democrats will promise to intervene less abroad, refocus on strengthening America
at home, and work with others on shared problems, such as climate change. The first two elements have been part of the core
message of the four people to win the presidency over the past quarter century. Advisers to the Democratic
presidential campaigns expect intense fights over a small number of issues —such as Israel, which
pits younger progressives against the party’s traditional position —but otherwise they believe that
the candidates will generally agree on foreign policy , and focus instead on domestic matters. Most
will make carefully crafted set-piece speeches on foreign policy, but it will not be a part of their stump speech. There is a clear
logic to the emerging consensus, but it may not be enough . The messages that worked for Bill Clinton, George
W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump are unlikely to work to dislodge Trump. If Democrats want to beat Trump
on foreign policy, they need to place competition with China at the heart of their pitch to voters.
On military intervention, Democrats could find themselves scooped by the president. He is undoubtedly reckless and
militaristic, but he also seems acutely aware of the risks of large-scale military action. He
recently publicly rebuked John Bolton, his national-security adviser, for pushing for military
intervention in Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela. Trump’s militarism could see the United States
embroiled in a war between now and the election, but there is a strong possibility that he will
avoid one. Yes, the United States remains involved in Afghanistan and Syria, but Trump wants to pull out of both
conflicts and may ultimately insist on it as the election looms. The argument that Americans must
pivot to the home front may fare no better . This has been Trump’s mantra for years. The results of his renegotiations
of trade deals may be poor, and he has not fulfilled his promise to invest in infrastructure, but he has already made the rhetoric that
the Democrats are trying to adopt his own. Moreover, he may be able to tell many voters that he’s succeeded. Thepresent
economic boom started under Obama, but it doesn’t really matter—if it extends through next
November, voters will credit Trump. And, as David Gordon of the Eurasia Group observes, the states Trump
won in 2016, including many that suffered during the Great Recession, are experiencing higher levels of job growth than the rest
of the country. That leaves Democrats with international cooperation as their best hope of
distinguishing their foreign-policy message from Trump’s. But a recent study of public opinion by the Center for
American Progress found that this will prove a tough sell: Language from foreign policy experts about
‘fighting authoritarianism and dictatorship,’ ‘promoting democracy,’ or ‘working with allies and
the international community’ uniformly fell flat with voters in our groups. Some participants questioned
the idea that an international community actually exists. Democracy promotion reminded others of the 2003 Iraq War and the
failures of the George W. Bush administration. When asked what the phrase ‘maintaining the liberal
international order’ indicated to them, all but one of the participants in our focus groups drew a
blank. Voters across educational lines simply did not understand what any of these phrases and ideas meant or implied. The
inconvenient truth for the Democratic field is that Trump’s crude foreign-policy message could
resonate in 2020. He promises to remove constraints and use power freely, including against America’s friends, to extract
more economic benefits. The benefits may be smaller than advertised. His approach may come at the
cost of eroding America’s global influence and replacing the rules-based international order with
something temporary, fragile, and transactional . He may be even more radical in his second term. Trump’s
presidency may dramatically increase the risk of a national-security catastrophe—character is
fate. But, until the catastrophe actually arrives, Trump is unlikely to be hurt politically. Many voters
are only too pleased to have a president willing to shake things up internationally. The Democratic candidates need to
ask themselves a fundamental question: Is the minimalist foreign-policy message that has been
used repeatedly since 1992 appropriate for a moment defined by political and technological
upheaval around the world? Is there an opportunity for a candidate to offer a more comprehensive
message about why Trump is failing abroad and how it matters to Americans in their daily lives?
As long as he avoids war and recession, Trump’s political Achilles’ heel is not his aggressiveness
or ignorance, but his focus on the past, not the future . He is obsessed with the industries of the 1950s—steel,
aluminum, cars, and dishwashers—and never speaks about the industries of tomorrow. He talks about the unfairness of old security
commitments but never about how the United States must work with others on the challenges of the future. He never even
mentions the central message of his administration’s own national-security strategy, that the United States is in a new great-power
competition that supersedes terrorism and rogue states. The problem is that, on foreign policy, many Democrats are
also stuck in the past. They talk about the liberal order from the 1940s, NATO’s shared past, territorial disputes that date
back decades, and an intervention debate that began in the 1990s. But voters don’t want to embrace the past or
abstractions. They care how the world challenges their lives and those of their children , not just
now but also in the years to come. Americans have always been motivated by threats and challenges to
liberty and prosperity at home, rather than grand projects to promote democracy. This was even true
of the liberal order itself—Americans rejected the project in 1945 and 1946, only turning to it as a necessary tool to confront
communism. The challenge for the Democratic candidates is to connect all the issues, domestic and foreign, into a larger narrative
that relates to Americans’ daily lives, illuminates the future, and offers a path forward. The
most likely way to do this is
to say that the United States is losing a vitally important competition with China because the
president is obsessed with the past and ignorant about the future . China is the one thing that
connects all other things. It directly affects the economy, the financial system, technological innovation, values, and
national security. As the Center for American Progress study showed, it is the only foreign-policy issue, other than
terrorism, that voters really care about—not because they seek conflict, but because they worry about falling behind.
The United States is in a multifaceted competition with China . This is unlikely to involve military conflict,
although there is a military dimension to it. The competition is technological, economic, political, diplomatic, and ideological. It is
particularly complicated by the fact that the United States and China are interdependent and need to cooperate with each other
even as they compete. The president styles himself as tough on China, but as Ely Ratner, director of studies at the Center for a New
American Security, put it, Trump is “confrontational but not competitive.” Many of his actions are counterproductive and
irresponsible. And in some areas of the competition, such as the clash between the free world and autocracy, Trump
is on the
wrong side. Putting competition with China at the center of their foreign policy would allow
Democrats to make the case for modernization and investment in crucial sectors, most notably in
technology, which is becoming the competition’s center of gravity. The conventional wisdom is that the United States is destined to
out-innovate China, because open systems beat closed systems.
 Congress likes trade war & fight v. China
Large bipartisan movement in Congress has faith Trump can win the trade war –
ending the sale or growing closer to China decks that
Boxwell 3-15-19 – (Robert Boxwell has worked and lived in the Asia-Pacific region since the early 1990s. He is an occasional
contributor on business and regional issues to the South China Morning Post, Reuters, Financial Times and Bloomberg and is writing
a book on the recent batch of insider trading prosecutions in the US. He is a director of the international consultancy Opera Advisors;
“China and Donald Trump have a problem. On trade, US Democrats may be even more hawkish”; South China Morning Post; D.A.
June 26th 2019; https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/united-states/article/3001570/china-and-donald-trump-may-
have-bigger?scrlybrkr=93058547) //JM

On February 27, Donald Trump’s former lawyer, Michael Cohen, testified in front of the House Oversight and Reform Committee in a
hearing that could have been called “Trump Bashing Day 767” (of which, truth be told, I’m an occasional participant in the US press).
Meanwhile, US Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer was two blocks away, testifying before the
House Ways and Means Committee in a hearing called simply “US-China Trade”. Ways and Means has
jurisdiction over tariffs, which is why it was interviewing Lighthizer. Committee members were civil and polite and,
almost to a person, thanked him for the work he’s doing. Practically all of them also urged him not to go easy
on Beijing. Chairman Richard Neal opened by saying, “This hearing is our opportunity to make clear what
Congress stands for on US-China trade, and what the American people need to see” in any
agreement with China. “This administration … must hold out for a good deal – a structural deal . The
future of America’s economic prosperity is at stake.” Neal, a Democrat, had kind words and
praise for Lighthizer. He must have missed the memo that all things Trump are bad. Kevin Brady, the leading Republican on
the committee, spoke next and thanked Lighthizer for his “leadership”, adding, “We can all agree that China has
cheated on trade for decades, severely harming American businesses”. He, too, emphasised that
it was “even more important” for the US to negotiate structural changes in the relationship than
it is to simply sell more soybeans to China. It went on like that for three hours. An exchange between Lighthizer and
Democratic Congressman Lloyd Doggett of Texas highlighted why Trump might not be able to stop what he started without a hard-
nosed agreement. Doggett
asked, “What would you anticipate would be the timetable to submitting
it to Congress for approval?” Lighthizer replied, “We have no intentions of submitting it to
Congress”, and pointed out that the actions the Trump administration has taken were Trump’s
and Trump’s alone to make under the executive branch. Doggett wasn’t criticising Lighthizer for
imposing tariffs on China, which practically the whole political establishment was doing a year ago. He was doing just the opposite.
He wants to ensure that Trump doesn’t lift those tariffs prematurely. “Unless you get meaningful structural
changes to address the stealing of our intellectual property and the other issues … if all we get is the sale of a few more soybeans
and other products, then this is an agreement not worth having,” Doggett said. Then he addressed Huawei and its “ national security
threat ”, saying, “if there’s any bargaining away of our national security to get this agreement, it would be with great harm to our
country”. Manyin Congress were upset with the reprieve Trump gave Chinese telecoms company
ZTE last year after his Commerce Department banned US suppliers from selling to them. It looked
like he was using ZTE as a bargaining chip in the trade negotiations. It’s not likely they’ll let him do it again with the much larger
Huawei. Trump has started fixing a thing that public opinion in the US is not going to let him walk away from half done. He told
Americans, “Hey, look here at China!” They did. And they didn’t like what they saw. So
he can tweet all he wants about
“substantial progress” on the negotiations and his “strong and personal relationship ” with Xi
Jinping, but if he doesn’t satisfy what has grown into a broad, bipartisan swathe of Congress,
they are likely to finish the job for him. The EU, Japan and others are moving towards the US’
view, meaning a sea change is under way in how the West looks at Beijing’s trade practices . The
European Commission issued a paper this week that used terms like “rival” and “strategic competitor” when referring to China, a
hardening of rhetoric not unlike that of the US. Few
US lawmakers seem interested in a deal that relies on
Beijing to honour reform promises. Lighthizer’s team is proposing enforcement mechanisms
that include an automatic “snapback” to tariffs in the event the US determines that China is not
honouring its commitments. It’s unlikely Beijing will accept that, but for now it is proposing that,
if it does, it’ll have the right to retaliate with tariffs of its own; the US is unlikely to accept that .
Beijing has led China on a good economic run since accession to the World Trade Organisation in 2001. Many in the West consider
that run a long-lived stretch of mercantilism. It seems over. Beijing either plays by trading rules that have kept the peace and made
the world more prosperous than any time in history, or the West is likely to make it hard for China to trade in their club. Beijing’s
aversion to Western institutions like the trading system – seemingly driven by a desire to avenge past humiliations – is
counterproductive to further raising China’s wealth and living standards. There are still a billion Chinese who are some distance
away from prosperous. Many of China’s educated elite understand this. Lighthizer told the Ways and Means Committee that he’s
negotiating with “reformers in China who want to change” China’s trade behaviour. It will be interesting to see how much power
these reformers really have. Because Beijing’s
trade practices have managed to do something few thought
possible – make America’s divided politicians agree on something . And they’re demanding real, structural
change in bilateral trade, not just more soybean sales.
 Trump alone on trade
Trump has no more support on the trade war
Bernstein 5-10-19 – (Jonathan Bernstein is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist covering politics and policy. He taught political
science at the University of Texas at San Antonio and DePauw University and wrote A Plain Blog About Politics; “Trump’s Trade War
Is Terrible Politics”; Bloomberg; D.A. June 26th 2019; https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-05-10/donald-trump-s-
trade-war-with-china-is-terrible-politics?scrlybrkr=a5484794) //JM

I can't think of a recent historical parallel to President Donald Trump's continuing trade wars. Just this week, wesaw new
tariffs imposed on Chinese products, threats of retaliation, and the promise of yet another
round of punitive measures to follow. Whether this is brave or foolhardy is perhaps up for debate. But it’s certainly
unusual. While presidents are almost always the most public face of the policies they support , most will
try to find allies that allow them to depersonalize things to some extent. Normal presidents love having bipartisan
support; if that's unavailable, they'll at least fall back on their parties. Trump is out there alone
on topic after topic, from his border wall to Yemen. On trade, he’s especially isolated. Yes, he's brought a
handful of Republicans with him, and on China in particular he may have a few added allies . But
overall, Trump’s trade wars are going to result in some unusually personal successes or failures.
Even under the best of circumstances, this would be a very delicate issue for a president. Expanded trade tends to
produce overall gains for the economy at the expense of losses in specific sectors. That's dangerous enough, since
visible losses can be politically potent. But starting a trade war not only imposes specific losses when other
countries retaliate, it also risks serious damage to the broader economy. That's a whole lot of risk for a
president with very little potential reward. And that's just in the abstract; in this particular case, Trump is adding all sorts
of other problems by picking a fight that many analysts think is poorly conceived . He's taking on China
even though he still has no obvious path to getting his North American trade deal through either chamber of Congress. And he’s
doing so at a time when he’s especially in need of support from congressional Republicans who
find it hard to stick with him on trade. It's not clear what Trump is thinking, or even to what extent he understands
basic trade concepts. He certainly misstates how tariffs work, for example, although whether that's intentional spin is hard to say.
My best guess is that there's not a lot beneath the surface. Trump
really does think that “trade wars are good ,
and easy to win,” regardless of any evidence or expert analysis to the contrary. He thinks trade
deficits represent money pouring out of the country for nothing , rather than for the purchase of goods and
services. And — as he says — he just likes tariffs, and mistakenly thinks that imposing them is a way to tax foreigners. But who
knows? What’s clear is that this just isn’t the way presidents normally act.
 Trade War Matters for 2020
Plan makes trade a priority – Dems empirically ride on success for 2020 victory
Alden 5-21-19 – (Edward Alden is the Ross distinguished visiting professor at Western Washington University, a senior fellow
at the Council on Foreign Relations, and the author of Failure to Adjust: How Americans Got Left Behind in the Global Economy;
“Democrats Won’t Win by Being Trump Lite on Trade”; Foreign Policy; D.A. June 25th 2019;
https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/05/21/democrats-wont-win-by-being-trump-lite-on-trade-tariffs-china-sanders-warren-biden/?
scrlybrkr=a395728c) //JM

There are now 23 Democratic presidential candidates vying to succeed U.S. President Donald
Trump. But all of them are tongue-tied on one of the biggest foreign-policy issues of our
generation: Trump’s escalating trade wars, which are starting to resemble the disastrous beggar-thy-neighbor
policies of the 1930s. Democrats have been so suspicious of trade agreements for many decades, and
so tempted by the siren of protectionism, that they now find themselves speechless as Trump
continues on a ruinous path. If Democrats cannot find their voice on this issue, they will not only forsake a major
pocketbook issue that could work to their advantage in the campaign. They will also send a message to the world
that Trump’s trade policies—which have alienated Washington’s closest allies and are fueling a growing
confrontation with China—have broad support in the United States. This despite the three-quarters of
Americans, the highest number ever recorded, who believe that trade is an opportunity to boost
U.S. growth, not a threat to the economy . Having closely watched the Democrats twist and turn over trade since the
beginning of President Bill Clinton’s administration in 1993, I would offer the following three recommendations to help the
candidates find a voice on the issue. First, Democrats should stop being ambivalent about trade itself . Trade is
good, period. Trade has built U.S. alliances, lifted people out of poverty around the world, created huge new markets for U.S.
products, encouraged the world’s most innovative companies, and driven down the costs of food, clothing, electronics, and many of
the other necessities and pleasures of life. What
Democrats oppose, and should oppose, is Republican trade
policies that have too often empowered large corporations while negatively impacting many
American workers. And the trade policies of the United States for the past 30 years have largely been Republican trade
policies. Some might object, arguing that Clinton supported NAFTA and passed it through Congress (though with modest
amendments to strengthen labor and environmental protections). President Barack Obama concluded the Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP) with Japan and 10 other Pacific Rim nations, the deal that Trump tore up on one of his first days in office. Both
objections
are true, but it is also true that both negotiations were launched by Republican presidents and
inherited by Democrats. Walking away in the middle would have been a slap in the face to close allies, something that U.S.
presidents historically were loath to do. The elements of those deals that congressional Democrats found
most objectionable—empowering corporations to sue governments, weak labor and
environmental enforcement, sweetheart patent protection for the drug companies— were
Republican priorities. And it was Republicans who fought to slash funds for helping and retraining
workers who lost jobs to cheaper imports. Democratic presidents reluctantly accepted those
Republican priorities because it was the only way to get the Republican votes they needed in
Congress for the deals to pass. For Democrats, the choice for decades has been a Republican
trade policy or no trade policy. A truly Democratic trade agenda would have produced deals
quite different from NAFTA or the TPP. Second, Democrats must stop letting Trump dominate
the discussion on tariffs. Tariffs are import taxes. Call them taxes. And point out that tariffs are the most regressive
taxes imaginable, raising prices for all Americans on essential household items. Ordinary Americans are the ones getting hurt. They
are seeing prices soar for cars and washing machines and furniture, and they are about to see the same for clothing and shoes and
cell phones if the Trump administration imposes the next round of taxes on imports of Chinese consumer goods.
Trumps trade war is an attack on dems – stopping it cedes the way for
democrats in 2020
Scott 5-21-19 – (Dylan Scott is a policy reporter for Vox, leading the news organization’s coverage of the Republican efforts to
repeal and replace Obamacare, the 2017 tax overhaul and the 2018 midterm elections. He previously reported for STAT, National
Journal, Talking Points Memo and Governing magazine. Since coming to Washington, D.C., in 2011, he has covered the biggest
political news of the day: Supreme Court rulings; “Trump’s trade war with China is an attack on Biden”; Vox; D.A. June 25th 2019;
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/5/21/18628128/trump-tariffs-2020-presidential-election-joe-biden-bernie-sanders?
scrlybrkr=0ea39ac7) //JM

In his trade war against China, President Donald Trump’s has another, subtler, politically
motivated target: Joe Biden. Trump has been burrowing in against Biden after the president said last
week he would more than double Chinese tariffs, telling crowds foreign leaders want the former vice president to win in 2020 “so
they can continue to rip off the United States.” Biden, like many Democrats, is in a somewhat complicated
position. The former president he served under negotiated a free-trade deal that became so
unpopular even Hillary Clinton ultimately abandoned it in the 2016 presidential campaign. But he knows
unions and lefty populists want Democrats to return to their historic skepticism of free trade.
Biden is therefore caught in an awkward position: arguing Trump is focusing on the right
problem — China — but “he’s going about it all the wrong way.” Meanwhile, some of Biden’s
biggest competition in the primary, Sens. Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren, are every bit as
hawkish on China as Trump. So they’ve been left with a tricky bit of triangulation: They agree with cracking
down on China, they even agree with some of the president’s more aggressive tactics like tariffs,
but they don’t think Trump is executing his plan effectively . “We do need new trade policies that are fair to the
working people of this country, not just to the CEOs, but as usual, I think Trump gets it wrong in terms of
implementation,” Sanders said last week. The whole picture gets even weirder when you remember polling reveals
most Democratic voters simultaneously worry about Chinese economic influence while favoring
free-trade deals. Americans might not understand the finer points of trade agreements, but they know whether you’re for
them or against them — and Trump has made a big bet that no Democrat can outmaneuver him on
foolhardy belligerence toward a foreign adversary . According to the New York Times, Trump’s aggressive turn
toward China, while in keeping with some of his long-held priorities, has a political element. He sees trade as an area
where he can rile up his base and position himself as the strong America-first leader, in
contrast to the more equivocal Democrats. From the Times: Several of Mr. Trump’s current and former aides —
including Mr. Bannon and Peter Navarro, his trade adviser — have long argued that being tough with China and
never accepting a deal is the right course. They were countered by more mainstream figures like Treasury Secretary
Steven Mnuchin and Larry Kudlow, the president’s chief economic adviser, who warned Mr. Trump that a prolonged trade war
would buffet both the economy and financial markets.

Trade war matters for 2020 – Trump has support now but are losing hope in a
deal
Min Kim 5-7-19 – (Seung Min Kim, University of Iowa, BS in Journalism and Political Science ; American University, MA in
Journalism, Seung Min Kim is a White House reporter for The Washington Post, covering the Trump administration through the lens
of Capitol Hill. Before joining The Washington Post in 2018, she spent more than eight years at Politico, primarily covering the Senate
and immigration policy; “Trade war threatens to roil 2020 race as Republicans complain about the tariffs Trump loves”; The
Washington Post; D.A. June 26th 2019; https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trade-war-threatens-to-roil-2020-race-as-
republicans-complain-about-the-tariffs-trump-loves/2019/05/07/d8697ea4-70d5-11e9-8be0-ca575670e91c_story.html?
utm_term=.4801f3f554ec) //JM *ablest language changed, denoted by brackets

President Trump’s aggressive trade policies are running headlong into his campaign for reelection.
As Trump prepares to run on the economy, his threat to increase tariffs on imports from China
has sent the stock market diving and undercut a stretch of positive economic news. U.S. farmers and exporters, already
bearing the brunt of China’s retaliatory tariffs, now face the prospect of an escalated trade war in which states that Trump needs to
win reelection will be in the crosshairs. The trade war has also exposed a rift inside the White House and among the president’s allies
— with some officials pushing for a quick resolution to calm the markets ahead of 2020, and others warning the president that a
weak deal with China
could leave him politically vulnerable. “My warning has been: We don’t want
the 2020 election year to become greatly intensified friction with China over trade issues. We want
a deal that works,” said Michael Pillsbury, a China expert at the Hudson Institute who has advised the Trump administration on
trade. “One way to unite all 21 Democratic primary candidates is if the president gets a quick but
flawed deal that inevitably leads to friction when China is caught cheating next year .” However,
Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin and National Economic Council Director Larry Kudlow are among a group of Trump aides
who have encouraged the president to reach a deal with China quickly and avoid political
blowback from a full-scale trade war in 2020 , according to people familiar with the internal debate. White House
officials said Trump is prepared to take a hard line with China going into 2020 in part because he intends to
keep his 2016 campaign promise to fix what he views as bad trade deals. Trump believes strongly in the
power of tariffs to force China and other countries to negotiate and won’t sign a deal for political expediency, said two officials, who
spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss internal strategy. The two officials also played down the extent of disagreement
within the administration, saying top advisers are mostly in agreement about the need to take on China over its unfair trade
practices. Trump’s
trade agenda is likely to play a central role in the 2020 race, as Democrats seek
to challenge his economic message and compete with him in export-reliant states such as Wisconsin,
Michigan and Pennsylvania. The president is also struggling to build support in Congress for his renegotiated version of the North
American Free Trade Agreement, with some Republican lawmakers objecting to the continued use of tariffs on steel and aluminum
imports from U.S. allies. Some Democratic presidential candidates are using the turbulence around the trade talks to needle Trump
and try to undercut his messaging on the economy. “This is what happens when he tries to go at it alone and
he has no leverage,” Sen. Kamala D. Harris (D-Calif.) said in an interview. “So he has to create this kind of leverage through a
tweet. We should be sitting at that table with our allies.” Trump campaign officials recently polled trade
messaging in a multistate survey, according to people familiar with the matter. Trade and immigration
are likely to be two themes on which the president focuses as he ramps up his campaign in the coming months, officials said.
Trade talks between the United States and China faltered this week as Trump publicly voiced his
frustration by announcing plans for new tariffs on Chinese goods . “The Trade Deal with China continues, but
too slowly, as they attempt to renegotiate,” Trump tweeted Sunday, after threatening to levy tariffs on all imports of Chinese goods.
“No!” U.S.
officials accused China of reneging on prior commitments in the talks, which have
included 10 rounds over the past year. In meetings in Washington and Beijing, the Trump administration has been
pushing for significant concessions from the Chinese on issues including market access, intellectual property rights and the trade
deficit. Robert E. Lighthizer, the president’s chief trade negotiator, told reporters Monday that although Chinese officials had walked
back their previous commitments, the United States was still planning to move forward with talks. The administration expects to
host Chinese Vice Premier Liu He to continue discussions in Washington this week. Trump
has credited his previous
tariffs with bringing Beijing to the table, but China has retaliated by slapping tariffs on U.S.
agricultural products. Those tariffs and other retaliatory levies from the European Union, Canada and Mexico have sent
economic shock waves through communities that helped Trump secure his 2016 victory. Republican lawmakers have increasingly
voiced concerns to the White House about the president’s trade policy and the impact of tariffs on their states. Although many
praise Trump for his tough-on-China stance, they also say that patience is wearing thin and that the president risks losing the backing
of farmers in key presidential swing states. “If
he gets a deal, awesome. If he doesn’t, it’s going to hurt,” said
Sen. Joni Ernst (R-Iowa), who is up for reelection next year in a state that Trump won in 2016. Farmers
are “losing their
patience, yeah, but they want to see a deal.” Senate Majority Whip John Thune (R-S.D.) said that Republican
senators have tried to make the political argument against tariffs but that it seemed to fall on
deaf [silent] ears. “I just think he believes that farmers are going to be with him because they
think he’s doing the right thing,” Thune said. “And by and large, that’s true. But when you start losing the farm, that
calculation starts to change a little bit.” When Vice President Pence attended the Senate GOP lunch Tuesday, he got an earful from
senators who complained about the political ramifications of Trump’s trade approach, said Sen. Pat Roberts (R-Kan.). “There’s a
lot of feeling in farm country we’re being used as pawns in this whole business,” he said. “We will
benefit tremendously if we get a good deal, so we’re hanging in there with the president. As opposed to hanging separately.”
Pence encouraged the senators to stick with Trump, who has publicly complained about a lack
of unity in his party as he tries to negotiate trade agreements . Trump’s campaign advisers expressed
confidence that the president’s trade policies will help him connect with voters in Rust Belt states that have lost manufacturing jobs
to China. “Unlike his predecessors, President Trump has demonstrated that he has the courage to take on China’s unfair trade
practices,” Trump
campaign spokeswoman Kayleigh McEnany said in a statement that singled out
former vice president Joe Biden for saying China was “not competition” for the United States.

Trump wins the trade debate now but ending the trade war causes key dem.
victories that won Trump the election in 2016
Shephard 5-15-19 – (Alex Shephard is a staff writer at the new republic; “Democrats Already Have a Position on Tariffs... If
You Know Where to Look”; The New Republic; D.A. June 26th 2019; https://newrepublic.com/article/153907/democrats-tariffs-
trade-war) //JM

Donald Trump’s trade war with China is not going well. Weeks after assuring people that trade
negotiations between the two countries were on the “five yard line,” a sheepish Larry Kudlow,
Trump’s chief economic adviser, admitted on Sunday that we may be months away from a deal,
if not longer. Markets tumbled Monday after China increased tariffs on $60 billion of products from the United States in
response to the Trump administration’s decision to raise tariffs on $250 billion in Chinese goods. (Though indices rebounded some
on Tuesday, most are still down for the month.) Farmers, including many in electoral battleground states like
Iowa, are growing frustrated with the president; net farm income in 2018 “fell to levels last seen
during the farm financial crisis of the 1980s,” according to agricultural economists Brent Gloy and David Widmar. “I
was very patient a year ago,” Phil Ramsey, an Indiana farmer who voted for Trump in 2016, told
The New York Times last week. “I’ve gone from being very patient to being very anxious.” To top it all off, the
president either doesn’t understand how tariffs work or is repeatedly lying about their impact on American consumers. The
bungled trade war with China should be an opportunity for Democrats. But on the campaign
trail, even in agriculture-heavy states like Iowa, most presidential candidates are focusing on
other subjects—talking about health care, wages, and farm consolidation more than trade, even as the conflict with China has
escalated. Concerned about being seen as too close to the trade policies that doomed Hillary
Clinton in the upper midwest in 2016, candidates face a challenge : They don’t want to side with the
president’s tariff tantrum, but they also don’t want to appear to endorse the unpopular approach to free trade represented by
agreements like NAFTA and the Trans-Pacific Partnership. “There will be virtual unanimity that tariffs are bad,
but there will also be a strong view that we have to get tough on China and that going forward we need
better trade deals,” one Democratic strategist told the Financial Times in March. “On both of those propositions,
Democrats will be saying things that at least on the face [of it] don’t sound too different from
Trump.” But the answer to this conundrum is in front of them. If Democrats want to challenge the president on trade, they
should look to the Rust Belt. It’s understandable why Democrats are wary to take on trade. On November 8,
2016, the party watched in horror as its fabled blue wall crumbled. Wisconsin, which had not voted for a Republican president since
1984, went red. Pennsylvania and Michigan each voted for a Republican for the first time since 1988.
While Trump’s support among rural white voters is complex, his loudly stated opposition to
globalization and the free trade deals embraced by Republicans and Democrats over the past
four decades played a pivotal role in winning states like Michigan, Wisconsin, and Iowa . For Trump,
trade was the root cause of American decline . To an extent, it was an argument that summed up his candidacy:
Trade represented a bipartisan failure that only an outsider could remedy. “Throughout history, at the center of any
thriving country has been a thriving manufacturing sector,” Trump wrote in USA Today in March of 2016. “But
under decades of failed leadership, the United States has gone from being the globe’s manufacturing powerhouse—the envy of the
world—through a rapid deindustrialization that has evaporated entire communities.” During the general election, he
was able to paint Hillary Clinton—whose husband, President Bill Clinton, signed NAFTA—as the embodiment of
the bipartisan consensus on trade that had hollowed out the American middle-class. President Trump
had hoped that his trade policies in general—and more specifically the trade war with China—would carry his populist advantage
into the midterms. Instead, Democrats made significant gains in Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania.
“Trump tried hard to make the 2018 elections about him, telling voters repeatedly to act as if he were on the ballot,” the Wall Street
Journal’s Gerald Seib wrote last November. “More striking, though, is the extent to which Trump trade
policies—decrying existing free-trade agreements, renegotiating the North American Free Trade Agreement, imposing steel tariffs
on trading partners and launching a virtual trade war with China—didn’t translate into electoral success in the
states that seemed most likely to be grateful for steps designed to protect traditional industrial
areas of the country.” Still, there is broad agreement among the Democratic candidates—with the
possible exception of Joe Biden—that a return to the free trade approach previously adopted by the
leaders of both parties is not possible. But there is not a clear message from the party about how
the U.S. should deal with China, or with free trade more broadly. During a recent appearance on CNN’s State of the
Union, Kamala Harris told Jake Tapper that the trade war was a reflection of the increasing isolation the U.S. encountered under
Trump. “This
president and this administration have failed to understand that we are stronger
when we work with our allies on every issue, China included ,” she said, later specifying that the country
should address “the threat [China] presents to our economy, the threat it presents to American workers.” Of course, the TPP, which
Harris opposes, was—as presented, anyway—an attempt to work with allies to diminish the threat of China’s growing economy. But
Democrats need not be so timid. Take a look at Rust Belt Democrats who haven’t thrown their hat in the ring, like Ohio Senator
Sherrod Brown. In 2018, when neighboring midwestern senators went up for reelection —like North
Dakota’s Heidi Heitkamp—and lost despite their attacks on Trump’s trade policies, Brown was re-
elected with over 60 percent of the vote . One reason: His strident opposition to free trade. Unlike the 2020
contenders, moreover, he’s not concerned when his message overlaps with that of the president. “I will get a number of
Trump voters because I fought for the things that Trump campaigned on, long before he did,’’
Brown toldBloomberg shortly before the election. “My position on trade is the mainstream position for the
country.’’ Brown has, throughout his political career, been a vocal opponent of trade deals like NAFTA and TPP.
That’s not to say that Democrats shouldn’t fault Trump’s trade agenda, just that they need to be more
precise in their critiques—and more vocal about who is affected by bad trade deals. “China cheats, and hurts American
workers and farmers when they cheat,” Brown told the Columbus Dispatch in January. “I
supported tariffs, but [Trump] has not done this right. He has not worked with our allies. If you
do this with your allies, China knows you mean business right away, and you get them to the
table faster.” “Farmers generally don’t like tariffs,” Brown continued. “But farmers understand if you use them effectively and
cleanly as [temporary] enforcement, you have a different outcome.” The problem, as the senator sees it, isn’t with
the tariffs themselves, but how they are implemented. Some Democratic candidates are seeking
to outflank Trump on trade. Elizabeth Warren has tied trade to her anti-corruption message. “The president grabs
headlines railing against GM’s plans to axe thousands of American jobs in Ohio and Michigan,” Warren said in a November speech,
“but hisactual policies aren’t stopping them or others like them from continuing to put corporate
profits ahead of American workers.” Bernie Sanders, meanwhile, told CNBC on Tuesday, “The Trump
administration has proven itself indifferent to labor rights, and apparently would prefer that American workers are reduced to the
position of Chinese workers, rather than that labor everywhere enjoy basic protections and strong standard of living.” But, in a larger
sense, trade
has yet to be a focal point for any major Democratic candidate in the race, and that
seems like a mistake. Trump is more vulnerable than he appears on trade—if Democrats are willing to sound a little bit like
him. Embracing an anti-trade message would take away one of the few face cards left in the president’s hand, and could position the
Democratic Party to finish rebuilding their blue wall in 2020.
Taiwan Case Neg
China War
 No Impact - No US-China War
US won’t go to War over Taiwan, China already has influence
Rogin Josh, 3-28-19, Columnist covering foreign policy and national security, “The US must
Help Taiwan Resist Chinese Dominance”, Washington Post, 6-25-19,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/the-united-states-must-help-
taiwan-resist-chinese-dominance/2019/03/28/c6c07868-5188-11e9-8d28-
f5149e5a2fda_story.html?utm_term=.3269e2575dbe, AR

During a Hawaiian “transit stop” Wednesday, Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen praised the U.S.-
Taiwan relationship as “stronger than ever.” But here in Taiwan, it’s China that dominates every
discussion. Beijing’s malign influence is apparent everywhere, while the United States is seen as
largely absent. Washington must wake up to the danger of China’s massive effort to infiltrate,
undermine and eventually abolish Taiwan’s democracy. Tsai called for Washington’s help to
confront Beijing’s comprehensive campaign to exert control over Taiwanese politics and society,
which is steadily eroding a 40-year status quo that has kept a shaky peace. The 1979 Taiwan
Relations Act, which governs the U.S.-Taiwan relationship, stipulates that the United States will
“consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including
by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of
grave concern to the United States.” In 2019, those words ring hollow. Xi Jinping’s government
brazenly uses economic and political pressure to interfere in Taiwan — an attempt to turn the
Taiwanese people and their leaders toward Beijing and against the West. Xi himself smashed the
status quo in January when he publicly called for Taiwan to rejoin China under the “One
Country, Two Systems” model. One look at Hong Kong should be enough for any Taiwanese
citizen to realize that means a steady erosion of their freedoms and sovereignty.

No War
Reid and Ellyate, 6-7-19, Holly Ellyatt writes for CNBC.com focusing on European macro-
economics and politics, David Reid graduated from the University of Bath with a Masters in
Business, “China’s Xi calls Trump his friend and says the US won’t disconnect with China”, CNBC
World Economy, 6-25-19, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/06/07/chinas-xi-says-trade-war-wont-
stop-globalization.html, AR

Chinese President Xi Jinping told an audience at the annual St. Petersburg International
Economic Forum (SPIEF) on Friday that the U.S. isn’t interested in disconnecting with China and
that President Donald Trump is his friend. Xi is on the final day of a three day state-visit to Russia
during which he has exchanged warm words with host Russian President Vladimir Putin. The
meeting of the two prominent global leaders portrays a warm relationship and comes as
Russia’s relations with the U.S. are at a low ebb. But during the plenary session Xi claimed
connections between the U.S. and China would remain strong. “It’s hard to imagine a complete
break of the United States from China or of China from the United States. We are not interested
in this, and our American partners are not interested in this. President Trump is my friend and I
am convinced he is also not interested in this,” Xi said in Chinese, interpreted into Russian and
then translated into English by Reuters.
Chinese-American War is unlikely
Øystein Tunsjø, 10-17-18, contributor for the National Interest, “Another Long Peace?”, The
National Interest, 6-27-19, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/another-long-peace-33726, AR

XI JINPING is determined to take China into a new era that sets his country and the United
States apart from other powers and avoids conflict between the two. The widespread view
found in the works of, among others, Henry Kissinger, Graham Allison at Harvard University and
John J. Mearsheimer at Chicago University is that U.S.-China relations are ripe for conflict and
war. Their assumptions are based on analogies of great power conflict and power transitions
under previous multipolar systems, such as prior to World War I. However, the United States
and China are not rivals in a multipolar system. International politics has entered a new era in
which the United States and China are the two lone superpowers in a bipolar system. China has
risen to top-ranking status, and the both nations are much more powerful than any third state.
Instead of comparing U.S.-China relations to great power rivalry in the past, the question we
should ask is somewhat different: whether the superpower rivalry between the United States
and China in the first half of the twenty-first century will resemble the stability that
characterized the U.S.-Soviet Union superpower rivalry in the second half of the twentieth
century. With the return of bipolarity, we might expect another period of what historian John
Lewis Gaddis termed “the long peace” of the previous bipolar system between the United States
and Soviet Union. Political scientists have argued that a bipolar system of two is more stable
than a multipolar system of three or more, but no one has examined the relative stability of
bipolar systems. While it is important whether the international system is bipolar or has some
other structure, stability is heavily affected by geopolitics and how geography shapes the two
superpowers and their relationship. Since the previous U.S.-Soviet bipolar system and the new
U.S.-China bipolar system are concentrated on two different geographic regions, systemic
effects differ. The likelihood of limited war and instability is higher in a new U.S.-China bipolar
system in the twenty-first century compared to the old U.S.-Soviet Union bipolar system of the
twentieth. Water barriers in East Asia may prevent a third world war between the superpowers,
but since the rivalry between the United States and China is mainly at sea instead of on land in
Europe, it makes a limited war for the control and access to sea-lanes in maritime East Asia
more likely.

No War over Taiwan in the SQ

Yong, Charissa, 4-11-19, posted to the United States as The Straits Times' US Correspondent,
“US, Taiwan to grow closer amid China tensions: Experts”, Straitstimes.com, accessed 6-24-19,
file:///C:/Users/k182d265/Downloads/ProQuestDocuments-2019-06-28.pdf, AR

The United States is likely to move closer to Taiwan as Washington hardens its attitude towards
Beijing, while China is likely to continue to ratchet up its pressure on Taiwan as part of its
campaign for eventual reunification, American foreign policy watchers said. Despite these
pressures, the peaceful stalemate that has held for the past four decades is likely to continue,
they said at an event marking the 40th anniversary of a US law governing America's unofficial
relations with Taiwan. The Taiwan Relations Act allows the US to continue its commercial,
cultural and other relations with Taiwan while recognising it as a part of China. China has
recently stepped up a diplomatic and economic pressure campaign - ranging from reducing
tourist visits to Taiwan to chipping away at its international allies - to coerce Taiwan into being
more compliant and accepting of reunification, said senior political scientist Michael Chase at
Rand Corporation. Two Chinese jets crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait on March 31.
Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen, speaking via a video link at the event, said the unusual move
broke China and Taiwan's "tacit agreement" to respect the boundary to reduce the risk of
conflict. Brookings Institution foreign policy fellow Ryan Hass said: "Beijing appears very
determined to instil a sense of vulnerability and inevitability in the people of Taiwan. They want
to convince the people of Taiwan that their future lies with the mainland - the answers to their
problems are in Beijing." China will become more aggressive as it gains strength and confidence
in its approach, said Mr Hass, a former China director in the National Security Council under the
Obama administration. "But as long as it believes that time is on its side, it will avoid using force
to compel unification, given both the cost and risk of military operations and the lasting
resentment that such actions would stir in Taiwan." Recently retired senior Asia diplomat Susan
Thornton also rejected the notion that China is in a hurry for reunification. She said: "China has a
lot more urgent issues on its plate and can still afford to take a good long time to consider the
resolution of cross-strait issues." America cannot back down, nor does it want to, the experts
said. According to Mr Hass, the US would remain vigorously engaged in supporting the
maintenance of the cross-strait status quo, not in an effort to use Taiwan to challenge China but
out of recognition that America's global standing was linked to the future of Taiwan. "If the US
were to capitulate to Chinese pressure and turn its back on our friends in Taiwan, it would crater
the credibility of America's security commitments, not just in Asia but around the world. Even as
America's politics change, I don't think this will," he said. Ms Thornton argued that the cross-
strait status quo of "constrained coexistence" can continue because it was built on a stable
foundation. This foundation, she said, consists of the realities that Taiwan is in practice a self-
governing polity, that there is a global consensus around the One China principle, and that there
are de facto two systems in operation on either side of the Taiwan Strait. Given its tensions and
continued wariness towards China, Washington is less likely to worry that moving towards PDF
GENERATED BY SEARCH.PROQUEST.COM Page 1 of 3 Taiwan will spoil the US-China relationship,
said George Washington University international affairs professor Robert Sutter. Neither is it
likely to fret that doing so will make its partners in the Asia-Pacific region anxious. The US
remains committed to supporting Taiwan under the One China policy, said State Department
Asia diplomat W. Patrick Murphy at the event, adding that the US rejects the threat of the use of
force to compel the people of Taiwan
 Link Turn - Weapons Solve War
Experts agree, US must ensure Taiwan is defended in order to maintain peace
Chung Lawrence, 2-13-19, covers major news in Taiwan, most of his reports focus on Taiwan’s
relations with China, specifically on the impact and possible developments of cross-strait
relations, “US must support Taiwan with weapons against mainland aggression, Donald Trump is
told”, South China Morning Post, 6-25-19,
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/2185973/us-must-use-all-military-and-
diplomatic-means-defend-taiwan, AR

A group of US scholars has called on President Donald Trump to be ready to deter aggression by
mainland China against Taiwan, maintain a strong military presence in the Western Pacific and
help the self-ruled island develop a strategy in tackling expansionist Beijing. In a 53-page report
released by the Task Force on US-China Policy – a group of China 17 specialists formed by the
Asia Society – Washington was reminded of the long-standing American policy of insisting on a
peaceful resolution to the question of Taiwan’s future and the extent of the self-governing
island’s dependence upon US military power. The panel of experts said the United States should
not break with nearly 50 years of practice and challenge Beijing’s one-China policy, a move that
would inflame tensions across the Taiwan Strait or, worse, precipitate military force from
mainland China. The report said: “Washington must maintain a strong and credible military
presence in the Western Pacific to convince Beijing that the United States still has serious
military options,” despite China’s rapid military expansion and development of advanced
weapons. US position on Taiwan will not waver, regardless of midterm results The report,
“Course Correction: Toward an Effective and Sustainable China Policy”, addressed the gulf in
military forces between Beijing and Taipei and said it was necessary for Washington to “assist
Taiwan in developing asymmetric capabilities to hold off the massively superior mainland
military until the United States can bring forces to bear”. “Robust shore batteries, improved air
defences, mobile response units, and sea mines to counter landing craft can all pose major
problems for an invading People’s Liberation Army (PLA) force,” the report said, suggesting that
Washington ensure that Taiwan is properly equipped for self-defence.

US Arms sales key to deter China

Greer Tanner, 9-25-18, is a writer and analyst formerly based out of Beijing. His research focuses
on the evolution of East Asian strategic thought from the time of Sunzi to today. “Taiwan Can
Win a War With China”, ForeignPolicy.com, 6-25-19,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/25/taiwan-can-win-a-war-with-china/, AR

Both Westerners and Taiwanese should be more optimistic about the defense of Taiwan than is
now normal. Both Westerners and Taiwanese should be more optimistic about the defense of
Taiwan than is now normal. Yes, the Taiwanese Army projects that it can only hold off its enemy
for two weeks after the landing—but the PLA also believes that if it cannot defeat the Taiwanese
forces in under two weeks, it will lose the war! Yes, the disparity between the military budgets
on both sides of the strait is large, and growing—but the Taiwanese do not need parity to deter
Chinese aggression. All they need is the freedom to purchase the sort of arms that make
invasion unthinkable. If that political battle can be resolved in the halls of Washington, the party
will not have the power to threaten battle on the shores of Taiwan
Arms sales act as deterrent and prevent regional conflict/nuclear prolif
Richard Weitz, 1-12-2016, "Taiwan Arms Deal Aims To Reduce Cross-Strait Tensions,"
https://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/taiwan-arms-deal-aims-to-reduce-cross-strait-
tensions FH

On December 16, 2015, the U.S. State Department approved a $1.83-billion arms sale to Taiwan, the first such agreement since 2011. The weapons include mostly additional
units of systems already in the Taiwanese inventory, such as Stinger MANPADS, BGM-71 TOW 2B, AAV-7 amphibious assault vehicles, and a pair of Oliver Hazard Perry-class
frigates. The deal also includes communications and other enabling technologies. However, the current sale is considerably smaller than its recent predecessors, which included

around $6 billion worth of armaments in 2010 and in 2011, and excludes advanced warplanes, submarines, or “offensive” weapons. The United States has
been selling weapons to Taiwan for decades and the mainland government has long sought to
end them. In October 2008, for example, after the Bush administration indicated that it would sell Taiwan $6.5 billion in military equipment, the Chinese government
suspending almost a dozen China-U.S. military exchange programs—cancelling high-level defense visits, denying U.S. Navy ships access to Chinese ports, and postponing

The Chinese government’s response to the most recent

meetings on nonproliferation, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief.

U.S. government arms sales has thus far been less severe. PRC representatives criticized the
decision in public, protested directly to U.S. diplomats, and threated to retaliate against the U.S.
companies involved in the sales. But there have been no cancellation of military exchanges or
other bilateral programs. The damage was limited due to arguably excessive U.S. restraint in providing more advanced systems (even though the PLA
already has them), the improvement in cross-Strait ties seen most recently in the 2014 presidential summit in Singapore, the current Chinese government’s increased interest in
sustaining China-U.S. defense relations, and the preoccupation of both governments with other security differences, such as Chinese and U.S. military activities in the South
China Sea. The United States has assured Taiwan that it would not set a date to end these arms sales or consult in advance about these transactions and committed to Beijing to

. Future damage in relations between all three actors could be

limit these sales and support a one-China policy

reduced further if the United States made more frequent if smaller sales (yearly rather than
every few years), if Taiwanese and Chinese politicians refrain from provocative statements and
actions on this issue, and if Chinese policy makers better understand why the United States will
likely continue these sales. By waiting until 2015, the Obama administration has created the longest gap in major arms sales to the island since the White
House was congressionally mandated to support the Taiwanese military in 1979. The U.S. government has a legal obligation to continue such sales in the Taiwan Relations Act
(TRA) adopted in April of that year. Although ending the 1954 Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty, the TRA commits the United States to supply Taiwan with the weapons it
needs to maintain a “sufficient self-defense capability.” However, the legislation does not mandate any minimum volume of sales and Congress must approve each transaction.

The transfers would be seen as more normal if they occurred more regularly. The decision to finalize the more
recent arms sale so close to the January 2016 presidential legislative elections in Taiwan likely reflects a U.S. decision to reaffirm support for Taiwan’s democratic credentials,
discourage Chinese interference in Taiwan’s political process, and give Washington more leverage to influence the policies of the next Taiwanese government. From the

U.S. officials have justified these weapons sales on the grounds that they help
perspective of regional stability,

sustain the peaceful status quo in the Straits by partially balancing the PLA’s growing capabilities
and thereby discouraging either party from using military coercion or taking other unilateral
actions that threaten the other. If the Taiwanese concluded that the cross-Strait balance was
rapidly shifting against them, they might preemptively declare independence as a separate
country before the military situation became too unfavorable . In addition, Washington worries that
declining to assist the Taiwanese military could encourage Beijing to adopt aggressive policies
toward Taipei, increasing the risks of a Sino-American confrontation through miscalculation and
thereby inflicting a major economic shock on China, Taiwan, the United States, and other
countries. China’s 2005 Anti-Secession Law authorizes the use of force if Beijing concludes that peaceful reunification efforts will prove unsuccessful. U.S. officials have
also feared that stopping conventional arms sales to Taiwan could have the untoward effect of

prompting a panicky Taipei and other U.S. security partners, such as Japan and South Korea, to
pursue nuclear weapons, long-range missiles, or other destabilizing strategic weapons. Each of these
three actors has been building offensive conventional weapons and they have the capacity to make nuclear weapons. From a moral perspective, Taiwan is an attractive partner
for Americans given its democratic political system, with competitive multi-party elections in which the results are not decided in advance, and its other political and economic
freedoms. Under present circumstances, the transfer of the PRC’s political system to the island would result in a setback for the global democracy and human rights agenda

From a realpolitik perspective, Taiwan contributes to U.S. security in multiple

supported by the United States.

ways, from serving as a strategic indicator regarding how China will use its growing international
power to reinforcing the credibility of the U.S. security guarantees that underpin the East Asian
security architecture that has promote regional peace and prosperity, including to the benefit of
China and the United States. From the bargaining perspective, the U.S. administration cannot seem to yield to
Chinese threats to suspend defense exchanges or otherwise punish the United States over the
issue of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan or related questions. Not only would encourage negotiators
from China and other countries to think they can achieve more gains from further threats, but a
stream of unbalanced U.S. concessions would undermine domestic public confidence and
support for a generally cooperative U.S. government policy toward China. Fundamentally, the United
States continues its policy of strategic ambiguity, not taking sides on what Taiwan’s ultimate fate should be, but insisting that
Beijing-Taipei differences should be settled by peaceful means . U.S. arms sales policy have sought
to balance enhancing Taiwan’s defense capacity without emboldening rash Taiwanese actions, and to
deter Beijing without provoking the Chinese government. The United States could suffer as much as any actor from military conflict between China and Taiwan. By

providing the weapons, the United States has arguably made Taipei more confident about
working with Beijing to reduce cross-Strait tensions in recent years. Continuing arms sales will
help provide the reassurance the Taiwanese need to engage with Beijing in coming years
without really threatening China, as even Chinese scholars acknowledge, presenting a security threat to China. The best way to promote cross-Strait
cooperation is for China to continue its economic and political reforms and to reduce its military threat to Taipei, beginning with a reduction in the Chinese missiles aimed at
Taiwan. A constructive reunification process will require the support of a large majority of the Taiwanese people, which is currently lacking but can be achieved through wise
policies in Beijing.
 Link Turn - Arms Sales k2 Alliances
Selling arms is key to Indo-pacific stability and alliances
James Jay Carafano, is Vice President for Foreign and Defense Policy at the Heritage
Foundation, 4-7-2019, "America’s Next 5 Moves in the Indo-Pacific Region," National Interest,
https://nationalinterest.org/feature/america%E2%80%99s-next-5-moves-indo-pacific-region-
50767

The United States has to be out front, encouraging economic liberalization in the region across
all sectors—goods, services and investment. We can do that through bilateral arrangements , if the
administration and Congress prefer to go that route. This puts an especially high priority on moving forward with a
U.S.-Japan agreement and an agreement with Taiwan, as well as looking for other partners. It also makes engagement
with and reform of the WTO a high priority. Issues like China’s 5G push or its Belt and Road Initiative pose legitimate risks to U.S.
interests and national defense. But in addressing these issues, we must be careful not to constrain economic freedom beyond what
is narrowly required for our security. Looking out long term, do we want a world made up of competing mercantilist countries
essentially at war with one another, or one characterized by free exchange and peace? Forge Very Special Relationships Report
Advertisement In the Indo-Pacific region, there should be two—Taiwan and India. These
are needed to send a very
pointed message to China. Taiwan is the canary in the coal mine. The threat it faces from China
across domains—security, diplomatic and economic—has intensified over the last couple of years. In this
fortieth year of the Taiwan Relations Act, we need to help it defend itself and be in a position to make its
own decisions about the future. That means selling Taiwan the weapons it needs for defense
and supporting it diplomatically. If Taiwan cannot depend on the United States, no one can . India
is the most important long-term non-ally in the region. Things move slowly with India, but taking stock of our common interests and
projecting out, there is a huge upside in the relationship for both countries and for regional stability. We may never call India an
official “ally,” but that is really beside the point. There won’t be a free and open Indo-Pacific if India and the United States are not
strategic partners.
 No I/L – Security Guarantee Inevitable
US Security alliance with Taiwan resilient
Bush 16 (Richard, senior fellow and director of the Center for East Asia Policy Studies at
Brookings, July 2016, “The United States Security Partnership with Taiwan”) TM
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Paper-7v3.pdf

Reliance on the United States has been the constant element of Taiwan’s security strategy. The
Taiwan Relations Act provided Taipei confidence in the United States even after the termination of the U.S.-ROC
mutual defense treaty. On the American side of the coin, concern for Taiwan’s security has lasted through several
administrations due to the political support Taiwan enjoys in the United States and the knowledge that Asian allies
and partners treat Taiwan as a larger litmus test of U.S. resolve. Finally, Beijing was long discouraged from attacking
Taiwan because of the risk that capable U.S. armed forces would intervene to protect Taiwan.
Washington does not, however, explicitly commit itself to Taiwan’s defense. To do so would only unnecessarily
complicate relations with China. Instead U.S. officials cite the T aiwan Relations Act, speak in general terms about
Washington’s “abiding interest” in peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, and reiterate opposition to either side’s
unilaterally changing the status quo—without saying how the United States would respond to such an attempt. Despite
the ambiguity of public American rhetoric, the capabilities that the PRC has acquired to complicate any U.S. in tervention
suggest that it assumes the United States will in fact act to defend Taiwan. Beijing looks at both American words and
deeds to assess its intentions. The other significant element of the post-1979 U.S.-Taiwan security partnership was
sales of advanced military equipment, which continued even after Washington established diplomatic relations
with Beijing and ended the defense treaty with Taiwan . The level of arms sales has been relatively
high over the last two decades. In the first term of the Obama administration, for example, the United States transferred over $12
billion in weaponry to Taiwan. For many years, however, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan had as much a political
purpose as military one.

Even with U.S arms sales China is still a security threat

Wu 18 (Shang-Su Wu, a Research Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies-Singapore, 2018, “Taiwan’s
Defense under the Tsai Administration,” UC Press) TM https://as.ucpress.edu/content/ucpas/58/4/704.full.pdf

After Ma Ying-jeou was elected president in 2008, hostility decreased as Taipei developed rapprochement
or appeasement policies toward Beijing. These were later substantialized in bilateral agreements for cross-Strait
integration such as the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement of 2010. 8 In response to these changed attitudes,
China, including its People’s Liberation Army (PLA), somewhat relaxed the tension in its attitude to Taiwan .9
These political changes were meant to improve Taiwan’s security, but they have failed to fix the core
issue at hand: achieving a permanent settlement of the relations between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in Beijing and the
Republic of China (ROC) in Taipei. Beijing’s fundamental threat to Taipei has therefore not been removed;
it remains, although in a less obvious manner.10 The more harmonious atmosphere favors China, due to the differences between
the two sides’ military modernization efforts. Cross-Strait
arms competition has been occurring since the initial
stages of the Cold War, but Taiwan has gradually lost steam since the early 2000s. Between 2004 and 2008 Taiwan’s
Congress faced an impasse over a special defense budget. It failed to take up the rare opportunity of purchasing submarines from
the US, even though PAC-3 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and P-3C anti-submarine aircraft were later acquired, and it delayed other
projects, such as the purchase of F-16C/D fighters.11 During President Ma’s two terms, Taiwan’s
military modernization
was marginalized to a degree, with fewer projects to replace the existing platforms. Although military
procurement from the US was still considerable, the items were mainly munitions and logistical
support. In contrast to the 1980s and 1990s, the decrease in arms imports from non-US sources reveals Taipei’s difficulty in
modernization, since the indigenous defense industry provides limited alternatives. Regarding US arms sales to Taiwan ,
probably due to Washington’s concerns about Beijing’s reaction and the lukewarm nature of Taipei’s requests, most
projects are either subsystems (such as munitions) for existing assets, upgrades, or defensive
systems, such as AH-64E Apache attack helicopters.12 In other words, Taipei’s defense investment is unlikely to
match the PLA’s growing offensive capabilities. Taiwan’s poor military modernization can be attributed to various
factors, but restrictive budgets reflect an overall lack of priority assigned to defense by the political leadership.

Alt Cause- Taiwan’s own military developments are the biggest risk to their
security- not the loss of US arms
Wu 18 (Shang-Su Wu, a Research Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies-Singapore, 2018, “Taiwan’s
Defense under the Tsai Administration,” UC Press) TM https://as.ucpress.edu/content/ucpas/58/4/704.full.pdf

Apart from assets, the personnel of Taiwan’s armed forces also present at least two challenges to its security:
espionage and conscription. In the past decade, there have been frequent reports in the media of espionage in
Taiwan, revealing a serious risk.17 For a small state vis-a`-vis a great power, the largest tactical advantage is
uncertainty as to deterrence in peacetime, and surprise for defense during wartime. Espionage
has the power to neutralize both uncertainty and surprise. Technologically, if China were to obtain Taiwan’s
military electronic parameters, it could destroy Taiwan’s communication and surveillance and thus its ability to fight. But despite
the PLA’s clear military threat, limiting conscription has become a convenient policy for both KMT and DPP politicians to win
popularity. From 2000 on, administrations of both parties shortened the terms of compulsory military service
and proposed all voluntary forces (AVF) in regular units; conscripts will receive only four months of training and
then become reserves for mobilized units.18 This policy might be good for countries with a low security threat, but this is not the
case for Taiwan. There have been several delays due to insufficient recruitment , suggesting difficulty in the
transition to AVF. The training of conscripts and then reserves presents another challenge, in addition to the potential downsizing of
the armed forces. Taiwan’s
vulnerability is evident on more levels than just the military: the economy
and demography present the most salient weaknesses. Since the late 1980s, cross-Strait economic ties have rapidly
increased, with the consequent integration contributing further to Taiwan’s economic dependence on China, which is Taiwan’s
largest export market and its largest import market. Rather than suiting the goal of interdependence, China’s
globally
expansive trade and investment in fact marginalize the role of Taiwan in the Chinese economy.19 In other
words, the unilateral economic dependence that has emerged allows Beijing to use the economy as
leverage over Taipei. For example, “technical” or “bureaucratic” delays in trade are likely to have a certain psychological
impact on Taiwan’s commercial sector, not to mention potential official actions, such as sanctions. Because Beijing has used such
tactics with Manila and Tokyo in the early 2010s, it is reasonable to predict their application to Taipei if required.20 Besides trade,
cross-Strait integration has opened Taiwan up to investment from China, which could have spill-over effects on the political
sphere.21

US arms sales cause China to lash out- Plan solves for biggest threat to
Taiwanese security
Ramadhani 13 (Eryan Ramadhani, Master Student- TsingHua University, “The Arms Trade Treaty: U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan
and U.S.-China Relations,” July-December 2013) TM http://eprints.upnjatim.ac.id/4855/1/10._166-176_Eryan_Ramadhani_-
_ATT_and_US_Arm_Sales_to_Taiwan.pdf

China considers thoroughly the principle that arms exports should not undermine the peace, security,
and stability of the region concerned when assessing arms exports (Parker 2007).That is being said, China
scorns U.S. firm stance to retain the arms sales to Taiwan under the principle of stability maintenance. For
Chinese leaders, U.S. engagement in the cross-strait rapprochement confounds the stability and otherwise triggers
instability. It is obvious that China has been using international organization, particularly the UN to
alienate Taiwan. Taiwan is not de jure sovereign state based on the number of recognition of other states. The ATT is another
tool in which China can ascertain its position as the only legitimate ‘one China’. Chinese delegation (2012) states that “the ATT
should urge states to establish their effective national regulating and control mechanism …. respecting the sovereign rights of all
states to make their own arms trade decisions.” This statement entails two points. One, China implicitly bashes the U.S.
critiques over its military build-up by way of importing some weapons from advanced states like Russia side-by-side
with ample local production of such weaponry. It can also be translated into China’s rights to export arms to states that China favors.
The U.S. has long condemned China’s arms transfer to Iran and Syria which for Washington exacerbating the already grotesque
situations transpire in the volatile region of Middle East. Second, China
underlines the words of ‘sovereign rights
of all states’ which refers to all sovereign states, excluding Taiwan. It can be argued that China aims to make the ATT a
legal way to discard U.S. arms sales to Taiwan by professing that only sovereign state can have and wield the rights of arms trade.
The implication is rather stark: the U.S. bent on continued arms sales to Taiwan is practically baseless .
During the July UN Conference on the ATT, Chinese delegation (2102) avers that “the ATT mechanism should ensure the
comprehensive and effective fulfillment of the Treaty, avoiding interference with states’ sovereign decision.” By this statement,
China intends to outstrip the U.S. in Taiwan issue charging that Washington deliberately intrudes into China’s sovereign decision to
deal with Taiwan. Beijing has long been suspicious on the real motive of U.S . knit-tight involvement in the
cross-strait relationship. Chinese leaders are leery of U.S. intention to check China’s growing power and if possible
debilitate it using the old containment policy with Taiwan as a key. In simple words, China wants to kick the U.S. out of
its business in coping with Taiwan. Chinese delegation (2012) mentions “the ATT should not be misused for political
purposes to interfere with the normal arms trade and internal affairs of any state.” China bluffs the U.S. continued support to
upgrade Taiwan’s self-defense capability and charges it as an intervention. The arms trade, from China’s perspective, is also a matter
of national security. It is, in fact, closely linked to national security. This statement again pinpoints U.S. strategic relationship with
Taiwan. While the U.S. presumes that its worth of billions of dollars arms sales to Taiwan as an effective way
to preserve the stability and status quo in the region, China hardly believes that this type of relationship poses no
harms for China’s national security. For the same reason, the U.S. is regarded as a major threat to China’s
national prestige and sovereignty,

US military build up in Taiwan only leads to a self fulfilling instability prophecy

Ramadhani 13 (Eryan Ramadhani, Master Student- TsingHua University, “The Arms Trade Treaty: U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan
and U.S.-China Relations,” July-December 2013) TM http://eprints.upnjatim.ac.id/4855/1/10._166-176_Eryan_Ramadhani_-
_ATT_and_US_Arm_Sales_to_Taiwan.pdf

Taiwan will always be a point where the U.S. and China might get involved in a serious
contestation. The preceding negotiation of the ATT heated up last year unveils how each party condemns each other regarding
the arms sales to Taiwan. The U.S. vies that its support to Taiwan based on the needs to ensure
Taiwan’s self-defense capability in the face of China’s rapid military growing. This will eventually throw in the stability of
the region. President Ma Ying-jeou of Taiwan says that it is essential for the U.S. to keep the TRA
intact and alive and help Taiwan building its own military defense capability. He aims to “reassure the U.S. that Taiwan will not
free-ride on the U.S. for its own security,” (Ma 2009). With the two parties see the same necessity, the arms sales will likely to
continue with no set-up termination date. In fact, the TRA, sets in motion since 1972, is of a permanent nature and
shall remain in force indefinitely. The U.S. implicitly accuses China’s military build-up as the factor that
precipitates the region’s slippage to instability. China’s modernized military posture makes the U.S. worry
about the possibility should China resorts to war to get Taiwan back. U.S. decision concerning arms sales to Taiwan
now appear to be shaped primarily by fear of Beijing’s anticipated response rather than by Taiwan’s
needs (U.S-Taiwan Business Council 2012). Kang (2007, 5) says that for Western states, including the U.S., China’s intention to grab
Taiwan is an expansionist policy, part of China’s effort to tip the balance of power in the region that affects U.S. presence. But
Taiwan is not an issue because of power politics . It is an issue because of competing conceptions of whether
Taiwan is an independent, sovereign nation-state, or whether it is a part of China. For China, the question is nation
building, not expansion. U.S. executes a dual-face policy toward Taiwan . On one side, the U.S. stiffly maintains
its position that it does not support independence for Taiwan or unilateral moves that would change the status quo as defined by
Washington and opposes statements or actions from either side that would unilaterally alter Taiwan’s status (Kan 2012:
54).Oppositely, Washington covets to keep supporting Taiwan’s self-defense build-up in order to shield this
island from China’s attack. The
U.S. wants stability in Taiwan Strait, while at the same time lit the fire of
instability in the very place.

Post plan the US would prioritize Taiwan of Sino-US relations

Chen Kastner and Reed 17. (Ping-Kuei Chen is an assistant professor at the Department of Diplomacy- National
Chengchi University, Scott L. Kastner is a Professor in the Department of Government and Politics at University of Maryland-College
Park, William L. Reed joined the Government and Politics Department in 2009, 2017 “A Farewell to Arms? US Security Relations with
Taiwan and the Prospects for Stability in the Taiwan Strait”) TM FROM THE BOOK- Taiwan and China: Fitful Embrace DOI:
10.1525/j.ctt1w76wpm.15

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, ending arms sales to Taiwan could actually increase cc in some ways. While critics
sometimes suggest that ending arms sales might simply whet the appetite of China and encourage further
demands on the United States, it is also conceivable—as proponents such as Glaser argue—that ending arms sales
would lead to significant improvement in the US-China relationship .22 Furthermore, whether the
United States sells weapons to Taiwan or not, it is hard to imagine a strong and cooperative US-China
relationship withstanding PRC coercion against the island . Therefore, if the PRC values a stable US-China
relationship, and if ending arms sales to Taiwan does in fact lead to an improved Sino-American relationship, then ending arms
sales to Taiwan will also mean that the PRC will have more to lose (in terms of a strong US-China
relationship) by initiating conflict in the Taiwan Strait . If this sort of effect outweighs the direct effect of ending
arms sales on China’s costs of war, then ending arms sales could help to reinforce a stable status quo .

The US is obligated to maintain security ties with Taiwan- TRA

DeLisle 18 (Jacques deLisle, Professor of Political Science and the Director of the Asia Program at the Foreign Policy Research
Institute, August 2018, “United States-Taiwan Relations: Tsai’s Presidency and Washington’s Policy” China Review, DOI:
10.2307/26484531)TM

The president is not free to alter its legally binding content, and he is constitutionally obliged to execute the TRA
faithfully, including its commitments to provide Taiwan with defensive arms, to accord Taiwan state-like status in U.S. law,
and generally to maintain an informal version of the diplomatic and security ties with Taiwan that predated
the normalization of U.S.-PRC relations. To be sure, the TRA does not compel the president to do much actively to support
Taiwan, but it has been a durable statement of congressional commitment that a president openly flouts at
his political peril. Although Congress has ceded great discretion to the executive branch in foreign affairs, Congress does at times
reassert its constitutional authority, political power, and policy preferences. The TRA, and policy toward Taiwan more generally,
have been important instances. The
TRA itself began amid congressional opposition to President Jimmy
Carter’s exertion of his constitutional prerogative to terminate the Senate-approved mutual defense
treaty with the Republic of China —a power upheld by the courts in their rejection of a suit brought by members of
Congress.102 Repeated instances of introduction of (mostly unsuccessful) legislation
to enhance Taiwan’s status in
relations with the United States attest to the persistent commitment of many members of Congress to a
robust U.S.-Taiwan relationship, and serve as a warning to any president who would pursue a major downward
adjustment in U.S. support for Taiwan. The pattern has endured across periods of divided government and single-party control of
the presidency and Congress. In terms of the peculiar relationships among foreign policy, international law, and domestic law in the
U.S. system, the TRA trumps the Three Communiqués , and is effectively immune from changes that might be sought
through U.S.-PRC negotiations, including a still-highly-speculative fourth communiqué.103 In the U.S. view (and in contrast to
Beijing’s interpretation), the Three Communiqués are mere policy statements, albeit exceptionally strong and durable ones. They are
not binding, treatylike international legal commitments. Even if they were, the first would be overridden by the TRA (to the extent
the two were in conflict), the latter two would be construed (where possible) to avoid conflict with the TRA, and all three likely
would be deemed not to be received into domestic law or to override preexisting legislation. Under Trump, Republican control
of the presidency and both houses of Congress
seems unlikely to reduce the level and salience of congressional
support for Taiwan. Congress’s role in offering support for Taiwan has, if anything, surged under Trump
with the enactment of the Taiwan Travel Act and port call provisions in the National Defense Authorization Act. Even if
there were to be a Trumpian turn against continuity in Taiwan policy, it seems relatively likely that Congress
would persist in its traditional role amid strained congressional relations with the administration and notable
congressional distrust of Trump’s handling of many aspects of foreign policy.104
 AT: 6 Assurances Good
Six assurances bad- gives China claim to Taiwan
Neil Thomas Neil Thomas is a research associate at MacroPolo, the in-house think tank of the
Paulson Institute in Chicago. March 26
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/03/26/when-it-comes-negotiating-with-china-
devil-is-details/?utm_term=.59396d56642a
Fortunately for Washington, the Chinese, preoccupied with domestic development and strategic competition with the Soviet Union
and Vietnam, chose to do little as the United States turned its own understanding of the agreement into policy in the region. In April
1979, the Taiwan Relations Act created a legal basis for the de facto diplomatic relations that still exist
between the United States and Taiwan . The Six Assurances offered to Taiwan in 1982 affirmed that the
United States “would not formally recognize Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan. ” That does not mean,
however, that China’s linguistic chicanery was meaningless. Domestically, it helped fortify the legitimacy of Beijing’s
claim to Taiwan, supporting a version of China in which its Communist Party controls Taipei. And
the history of this mistake may not be over. As China seeks increasingly to “set the parameters of acceptable
discourse” in global affairs, especially with regard to its claim of sovereignty over Taiwan, the words of the normalization
communique may still become potent weapons of statecraft, diplomatic ammunition in a
potential (if contentious) case for sovereignty should Beijing ever decide to force the issue of
reunification with Taiwan. This blunder was not a one-off occurrence. Over the past 40 years, Western observers
often overlooked what Beijing was saying about its national ambitions. The policy of engagement that
Washington has pursued with China may have been its best option, but if successive administrations had taken Beijing’s words more
seriously, the United States might have been more proactive in safeguarding the international order from the political, economic and
security challenges posed by an authoritarian superpower — challenges that have necessitated a new trade agreement today.
With U.S.-China relations at their lowest ebb in two decades , and the two countries’ governments increasingly
divided over issues of trade, technology, geopolitics and human rights, the normalization communique is a lesson in the
overconfidence that led many Americans to overlook Chinese intentions
Relations Adv
 No Solvency - Trump
The problem is not Taiwan its Trump
Paul D. Gewitz 6/26/19,( Paul Gewirtz is the Potter Stewart Professor of Constitutional Law at Yale Law School and is also the
Director of Yale Law School’s Paul Tsai China Center. Professor Gewirtz teaches and writes in various legal and policy fields, including
constitutional law, federal courts, antidiscrimination law, law and literature, Chinese law, and American foreign policy. “Can the US-
China crisis be stabilized?” Brookings https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/06/26/can-the-u-s-china-crisis-be-
stabilized/ ) SB

These are just some specific examples. The deeper problem is a more fundamental change in each government’s
perception of the other. U.S. government officials are now openly calling China an adversary, seeking to undermine and displace U.S.
power and global leadership. China’s leaders have publicly used more moderate language but clearly have concluded that, at

least under the Trump administration, the U.S. is China’s enemy and is seeking to weaken China and

to bring about regime change of Chinese Communist Party rule . Perceptions are becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy, as
each country is taking actions that reflect its perceptions of the other’s hostile intentions, and these reactions themselves reinforce the other country’s
sense of enmity. Fundamental attitudinal shifts will get even worse if the relationship is not stabilized. Global dynamics will change. China will continue
moving closer to Russia —an inherently unstable but dangerous coalition, especially as our ties with our own allies are weakening. Other countries
caught up in this escalating rivalry but not wanting to take sides can easily stumble. This terrible downward spiral must be stopped. But can it be? Of
course it can. Government policies and actions are made by human beings. Structural forces affect history, but human agency—not “destiny”—
determines history’s outcomes. Whether human beings with power will in fact make appropriate choices or blunder disastrously is a separate question.
Despite the rhetoric of systemic forces and historical trends common on both sides, we must focus on the fact that human beings in the United States
and China will shape the future of the U.S.-China relationship, and neither country is synonymous with its leader or even with its government. There is
debate and fluidity in both countries about the relationship. Very significantly, the genuine enmity that is developing is very much in
the government-to-government relationship, with much more nuanced and even constructive thinking about the relationship
widely held among people of all walks of life within each country. But the latter voices in the United States, numerous and respected voices, are often
marginalized—and very regrettably the media in the United States largely focus on the harshest, loudest voices and often wrongly suggest that they
reflect a new U.S. consensus.
 No Solvency - Warming inevitable
China’s belt and road initiative, massively expands coal industry and makes
meeting global climate goals impossible
Isabel Hilton, 1-2-2019, holder two honorary doctorates and was awarded the OBE for her
work in raising environmental awareness in China. "How China’s Big Overseas Initiative
Threatens Global Climate Progress," Yale E 360, https://e360.yale.edu/features/how-chinas-big-
overseas-initiative-threatens-climate-progress FH

China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), launched by President Xi Jinping in 2013, has been described as the most ambitious infrastructure project in
history. It is a plan to finance and build roads, railways, bridges, ports, and industrial parks abroad, beginning with China’s neighbors in Central, South, and Southeast Asia and
eventually reaching Western Europe and across the Pacific to Latin America. The more than 70 countries that have formally signed up to participate account for two-thirds of the

world’s population, 30 percent of global GDP, and an estimated 75 percent of known energy reserves. The first phase — of transport and
energy infrastructure and seaports — will enable a level of industrial development and
economic integration that Beijing hopes will generate new markets for Chinese companies and
create a Chinese-dominated network of countries, tied into China’s economic and industrial
realm. If successful, it would create a sphere of technological, economic, diplomatic, and strategic power big enough to challenge that of the United States. BRI has the
potential to transform economies in China’s partner countries. Yet it could also tip the world into catastrophic climate

change. Speaking at a meeting in San Francisco in September, Nicholas Stern, the prominent British economist, laid out his concerns: “ The more than 70
countries that are signed up to the Belt and Road Initiative,” he said, “have an average GDP of
around one-third of that of China. If they adopt China’s development model, which resulted in a
doubling of China’s GHG [greenhouse gas] emissions in the first decade of the century, it would make
the emissions targets in the Paris Agreement impossible .”. Just building the land-based Silk Road Economic Belt and the
21st Century Maritime Silk Road will absorb massive amounts of concrete, steel, and chemicals, creating new

power stations, mines, roads, railways, airports, and container ports, many in countries with
poor environmental oversight. But more worrying still is the vision of industrial development to
follow, and the energy that is planned to fuel it. While China has imposed a cap on coal consumption at
home, its coal and energy companies are on a building spree overseas. Chinese companies are
involved in at least 240 coal projects in 25 of the Belt and Road countries, including in
Bangladesh, Pakistan, Serbia, Kenya, Ghana, Malawi, and Zimbabwe. China is also financing
about half of proposed new coal capacity in Egypt, Tanzania, and Zambia. While a few of these new plants will use
the latest technology — in Bangladesh, for example, China is building the country’s first “clean coal” plant — many are less advanced and are not being

planned with the carbon capture technology that would make them less threatening to efforts
to control climate change. China’s coal and energy companies have been at the heart of the country’s industrial revolution. From 1990 to 2015, China’s
annual coal consumption went from 1.05 billion tons to 3.97 billion tons and provided more than 70 percent of China’s energy in its pursuit of rapid GDP growth. The country
paid a heavy price for its coal addiction in water scarcity, acid rain, and air pollution, a price that officials routinely dismissed as rich-country concerns that China could not afford,
until public concern about choking smog forced a change in policy. Over the last decade, in an effort to reverse coal’s impacts, the government instituted a program of closure of
smaller, older plants and investment in new, advanced power stations. The share of coal in the mix began to drop, giving rise to the hope that consumption in a country that has
swallowed half the world’s coal each year since 2011 was on a downward path. Today, China’s leadership has embedded “eco-civilization” in the Communist Party’s constitution,
as the clean, green principle on which it is planning the next phase of China’s economic development. China’s planned shift away from heavy industry toward a more service-
based economy, coupled with big investments in renewables, enabled China to achieve substantial reductions in energy intensity and to envisage the moment when the
country’s coal use and carbon emissions would peak and begin to fall. In 2014 alone, China added 20 gigawatts (GW) of wind capacity, 11 GW of solar and 22 GW of hydropower
capacity, but much of the country’s renewable output was wasted because of the structure of China’s electricity market. China’s coal-fired power plants had traditionally
enjoyed fixed annual supply contracts that guaranteed them against operating losses, contracts that denied grid access to much of the output of the growing renewables sector.
In 2015, reforms to the electricity market removed coal’s guaranteed hours and grid operators were encouraged to give priority to renewable energy over coal. It was welcome
news for the global climate community as well as for China’s smog-weary urban population, but China’s giant coal and energy companies found themselves looking at a bleak

The result is that while China is making

future. Struggling to make a profit, they saw their best hopes of survival overseas.

commendable efforts to clean up at home and to reduce its carbon emissions, the Belt and Road
Initiative threatens to lock China’s partners into the same high-emission development that China
is now trying to exit. As a spokesman for the China Huaneng Group, China’s national state-owned power company , told
China Energy News in July 2015, the company was actively seeking development opportunities along the “Belt and Road.” It had a particular eye on the

coal resources of South Asia, Southeast Asia, Central and Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and
the Russian Far East. Other energy companies followed suit, supported by the third key element
in the strategy – China’s state-owned banks . Later that year, 190 countries agreed under the Paris climate accord to try to keep the global
average temperature rise below 2 degrees Celsius (C) and as close to 1.5 degrees C as possible. The energy finance think tank Carbon

Tracker estimates that this will require a complete phaseout of coal worldwide by 2040. That, in
turn, means that 100 GW a year, or one coal plant a day, will need to close from now to 2040, a
goal that is directly undercut by China’s coal investments. The average life of a coal-fired power station is around 40 years, so a
phaseout by 2040 implies that any new plant built today – and most built after the turn of the century – is unlikely to operate long enough to recover its costs. As the price of
renewables, already competitive with new coal and natural gas, is forecast to continue to drop, the point at which such plants become uneconomical could be very close. Against
that background, China’s new coal power plants and infrastructure both at home and abroad threaten both the sustainability of its partners and global efforts to contain climate
change. Chinese President Xi Jinping speaking at a summit for the Belt and Road Initiative in May 2017 in Beijing. The forum was attended by 29 foreign heads of state and
government representatives from more than 130 countries. Chinese President Xi Jinping speaking at a summit for the Belt and Road Initiative in May 2017 in Beijing. The forum
was attended by 29 foreign heads of state and government representatives from more than 130 countries. THOMAS PETER / GETTY IMAGES In 2016, Xi called for the Belt and
Road Initiative to be “green, healthy, intelligent, and peaceful” and urged participating countries to “deepen cooperation in environmental protection, intensify ecological

The government has released guidelines such as the Guidance on

preservation and build a green Silk Road.”

Promoting Green Belt and Road, which parallel domestic green finance guidelines, but they are
non-binding and appear to be little applied. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), China’s first venture into the creation of a
multilateral bank, proudly proclaims that its standards on environmental protection and climate risk are world-class, but since the AIIB is only a small player in financing the Belt
and Road Initiative, it makes little difference to the climate or the environmental outcome. The banks that matter are the 27 (mostly state-owned) banks involved in the BRI —
such as the China Development Bank, which is expected to lend $40-45 billion annually to BRI projects, the Export-Import Bank of China, and the Industrial and Commercial Bank

of China, which together account for the bulk of BRI financing to date. How much attention they pay to green guidelines may be judged by the result. So far, the
majority of BRI projects are energy-related : Since 2000, Chinese-led policy banks have invested $160 billion in overseas energy projects,
almost as much as the World Bank and regional development banks. But unlike the World Bank, 80 percent of China’s overseas energy

investments went to fossil fuels — $54.6 billion to oil, $43.5 billion to coal, and $18.8 billion to
natural gas — compared with only 3 percent to solar and wind and 17 percent to often-
controversial hydro projects. When the Global Environment Institute, a Beijing-based NGO,
reviewed China’s involvement in coal power projects in 65 countries participating in the Belt and
Road Initiative, it discovered that between 2001 and 2016 China had invested in 240 coal power
plants along the BRI, with a total generating capacity of 251 GW. Most were not the advanced installations that
China was building at home. Kelly Sims Gallagher, professor of energy and environmental policy at Tufts University, points out that of 50 Chinese-
financed, coal-fired power plants constructed overseas between 2001 and 2016, 58 percent used low-efficiency, sub-critical coal technology. Together, they

would release nearly 600 million metric tons of carbon dioxide a year, equivalent to 11 percent
of total U.S. emissions in 2015. The AIIB estimates that 460 million people in Asia still lack access to electricity, and coal advocates in participating Belt
and Road countries such as Pakistan, Indonesia, and Bangladesh still argue that coal is a cheap way of meeting urgent energy needs. It is an argument many Chinese analysts also
still support, despite China’s domestic difficulties with coal. But even leaving aside the damage that coal does to the environment and to human health, the economic case for
coal has become progressively weaker as the cost of renewables falls. Today, building new coal plants carries serious financial as well as climate risks. These new coal plants will
make it much more difficult for poor countries to meet their climate goals under the Paris Agreement. According to a new report from Carbon Tracker, which used satellite data
to estimate power plant activity, two-fifths of China’s coal power stations are already loss-making and China could save nearly $390 billion by closing them down. By 2040, they
estimate, 95 percent of China’s coal plants will be loss-making, through a combination of a rising carbon price and clean air regulation. As soon as 2021, they say, it will be
cheaper to build new onshore wind farms than to operate existing coal plants, and installing new solar PV will be cheaper than running coal plants by 2025. China’s power
companies, with their large fleets of coal-fired power stations, are carrying a high risk of stranded assets: Carbon Tracker put this risk as high as $66 billion for China’s National
Energy Investment Group, the world’s largest power company, equivalent to half its total capital. Now, by building new coal plants along the Belt and Road, China is creating

If these new coal plants continue to operate,

similar risks for the countries that host these projects, risks most of them can ill afford.

they will they make it much more difficult for poor countries to meet their climate goals under
the Paris Agreement, and, far from offering a cheap energy option, they will become a financial burden either to the governments
or consumers, even as these plants lock out cheaper and cleaner alternatives . China may be pursuing

eco-civilization at home, but it urgently needs to address the global risks it is creating in the Belt
and Road Initiative.
Warming is near irreversible– runaway feedback are already guaranteed, No
politically viable policy can solve
*Their models don’t include these feedbacks

Spratt 15 (DAVID SPRATT, is a climate activist, writer and author, who works with climate
action groups in Melbourne’s inner north. He runs the blog “Climate Code Red”, is the author
with Philip Sutton of a book of the same name, and his writings appear in ReNew Economy and
elsewhere. RECOUNT IT’S TIME TO “DO THE MATH” AGAIN,
http://media.wix.com/ugd/148cb0_bb2e61584dbb403e8e33fd65b1c48e30.pdf)

The IPCC’s published carbon budgets do not include significant events that are happening now ,
and which will accelerate in the near-term, significantly reducing the available budget. These events include
“long-term” feedbacks, in which warming produces conditions that generate more warming. Examples are changes in the large
polar ice sheets that alter the planet’s reflectivity and trigger the release of large permafrost carbon stores, and impact other carbon
cycle components so that carbon sinks such as the oceans and forests become less efficient in storing carbon. It is conventionally
considered that these feedbacks operate on millennia timescales. But the rate at which human activity is changing the Earth’s
energy balance is without precedent, and the rate of change in energy forcing is now so great that these “ long-term”
feedbacks are already occurring on short timeframes. For example, the Arctic is likely to be a carbon
source, rather than sink, by the mid-2020’s . 7 In 2007 the IPCC said that “with feedbacks included, stabilising at 450
parts per million carbon dioxide equivalent (ppm CO2e) correlates with cumulative emissions some 27 per cent lower than without
feedbacks, over a 100-year period”.8 One of the most significant research findings in 2014 was that the
“tipping point’ has
already passed for one of these “long-term” events. Scientists found that “the retreat of ice in
the Amundsen Sea sector of West Antarctica was unstoppable, with major consequences – it will
mean that sea levels will rise 1 metre worldwide… Its disappearance will likely trigger the
collapse of the rest of the West Antarctic ice sheet , which comes with a sea level rise of between 3–5 metres.
Such an event will displace millions of people worldwide ”. 9 What was also significant was the strong reaction
to this news from the climate science community, because it represented a clear case of an event generally considered to be “long
term” in nature having already occurred. Dr Malte Meinshausen called the evidence “a game changer”, and a “tipping point that
none of us thought would pass so quickly”, noting that we are “committed already to a change in coastlines that is unprecedented
for us humans”.10 NO CARBON BUDGET REMAINS FOR 2ºC CAP There is strong evidence that for a low risk of exceeding 2ºC, there
is no carbon budget remaining. • There are no scenarios available with a “very likely chance (>90%)”
of not exceeding the 2°C target without net negative industrial emissions” and “no ensemble member (including even
the most stringent mitigation scenarios) limits warming to less than 1.5°C throughout the entire century for any of the probability
options”.11 • Research by Global Carbon Project founders Raupach and Canadell show there is no carbon budget left for a 10% risk
of exceeding the target (see Figure 1. page 7).12 • “ Achieving
the 2°C warming target, requires a further
reduction in cumulative emissions of roughly 180 petagrams of carbon. This implies that we
have already surpassed the cumulative emission limit and so emissions must ramp down to zero
immediately”.13 • The IPCC reported that “to provide a 93% mid-value probability of not exceeding 2°C, the concentration (of
atmospheric greenhouse gases) would need to be stabilised at, or below, 350 ppm CO2e”, that is, below current levels, which means
no carbon budget available for 2°C.14 43 [CO2e is carbon dioxide equivalent and includes the other greenhouse gases including
methane and nitrous oxide which have a much shorter life span than CO2]. Dr Michael E. Mann shows that to limit global warming
to below 2°C forever, CO2 concentrations must be kept close to 450 ppm (for mid-range climate sensitivity). Ironically, he adds, if the
world burns significantly less coal, that would lessen CO2 emissions but also reduce aerosols in the atmosphere that block the sun
(such as sulphate particulates), so “nations will have to keep CO2 levels below 405 ppm”.15 Yet we are just three years away from
reaching the 405 ppm level! It has also been demonstrated16 that: • The upper boundary of the “likely” range (i.e. 90% chance) of
staying below 2°C means stabilisation at 378 ppm CO2e; and • Holding to 2°C is only likely at 400 ppm CO2e or below (e.g. long-term
350 ppm). This is consistent with a 2006 paper which found: If “the probability of overshooting a 2°C climate target … shall not be
increased above 30%, it seems necessary to peak CO2 equivalence concentrations around 475 ppm and return to lower levels after
peaking (below 400 ppm).”17 This is consistent with the Michael Mann result discussed above. From this we can see that: • For a
70% chance of staying below 2°C: peak at 475 ppm CO2e then return to 400 ppm CO2e; • For a 90% chance of staying
below 2°C: peak at 400 ppm CO2e then return to 350 ppm CO2e. Given that CO2e levels today
exceed 475 ppm, we can see that not only is there no carbon budget left for a 10% risk of
exceeding the target, but there may also be no carbon budget remaining for up to a 30% risk of
exceeding the target. Multiple lines of evidence lead to the conclusion that the 2°C carbon
budget has expired for the developed economies and for the fossil fuel sector , even for high
probabilities of exceeding the target: • If we make optimistic assumptions about less-developed (non-Annex 1) economies of
emission reductions peaking in 2025 and reducing by 7% per year from then on, then for the higheremitting developed (Annex 1)
economies the carbon budget remaining is… zero (as of 2010).18 • If some reasonably optimistic assumptions are made about
deforestation and food-related emissions for the rest of the century, then most emission reduction scenarios are incompatible with
holding warming to 2°C even with a high 50% probability of exceeding the target. There is certainly no budget left for fossil fuel
emissions.19 In addition, as far back as 2008, it was demonstrated that if the current greenhouse gas level was maintained over
time, it was sufficient to produce 2.4°C of warming, without taking long-term feedbacks into account.20 In summary, there is no
carbon budget: • If 2°C is considered a cap or upper boundary as per the Copenhagen Accord, rather than a hit-or-miss target which
can be significantly exceeded; • If a low risk of exceeding 2°C is required; • If higher climate sensitivities incorporating carbon cycle
feedbacks are taken into account; • For developed economies; • For fossil fuel emissions, after accounting for future food and
deforestation emissions. 5 2ºC TARGET IS NOT SAFE We have already crossed dangerous climate tipping points at just 0.8°C
warming. In the words of former senior Obama advisor John Holdren in 2008: “the world is already experiencing ‘dangerous
anthropogenic interference in the climate system”.21 Evidence includes: • At less than 1°C of warming, West Antarctic glaciers are in
“unstoppable” meltdown for 1-4 metres of sea-level rise.22 • Arctic tipping points have been crossed23 for sea-ice-free summer
conditions, with severe consequences for the future stability of permafrost and frozen methane stores, sea-levels rises, as well as
accelerated global warming as ice sheets retreat and the Earth’s albedo (reflectivity) decreases. • Extreme weather events are being
made worse, with record heat and drought such as in California at present, and more intense cyclones including Superstorm Sandy
and Typhoon Haiyan, both of whose impacts had a climate-warming component. • The paleoclimate record also tells
us that even the current level of CO2 (without accounting for 75 ppm of non-CO2 greenhouse gases we have added to
the atmosphere) is enough for 3°C or more of warming at equilibrium : • During middle Miocene, 16-
14 million years ago, when temperatures were ~3 to 6°C warmer and sea levels 25 to 40 metres
higher than at present, the CO2 level was similar to modern levels (between 350 and 400
ppm).24 • In the early-to-mid Pliocene, 5–3 million years ago, temperatures were 3°C above pre-
industrial and CO2 levels were 360-400 ppm , very similar to today. The northern hemisphere was free of glaciers
and ice sheets, beech trees grew in the Transantarctic Mountains and sea levels were 25 metres higher.25 There is also a
variety of evidence that 2°C is not safe target for significant planetary systems: • An estimated
tipping point for Greenland Ice Sheet is 1.6°C (with an uncertainty range of 0.8 to 3.2°C).26 • Preserving more than
10% of coral reefs worldwide would require limiting warming to below 1.5°C (range: 1.3–1.8°C).27 • “1.5°C appears to be
something of a tipping point” for extensive permafrost thaw .28 In the first few months of 2015, new lines of
evidence have been published suggesting that more elements of the system may be heading towards tipping points or experiencing
qualitative change, including: the slowing of the Atlantic conveyor likely linked to climate change;29 accelerating
ice mass
loss from Antarctic ice shelves;30 the vulnerability of East Antarctica glaciers;31 declining carbon
efficiency of the Amazon forests32 and other sinks;33 accelerated ice-mass loss from the
Greenland Ice Sheet;34 rapid thinning of Arctic sea-ice;35 a new record low winter maximum for
Arctic sea-ice extent;36 the vulnerability of Arctic permafrost;37 and the origins and possible
proliferation of Siberian methane crater s. In reality, 2°C is in fact the boundary between dangerous and very
dangerous climate change, and 1°C warmer than human civilisation has ever experienced. 6 REPORT CONCLUSION In the lead up to
the forthcoming Paris talks, policy makers through their willful neglect of the evidence are in effect normalising a 2.5–3°C global
warming target. It’s time to “do the math” again. Effective policy making can only be based on recognising that climate change is
already dangerous, and we have no carbon budget left to divide up. Big tipping-point events irreversible on human time scales and
large-scale positive feedbacks are already occurring at less than 1°C of warming. It is clear that 2°C of climate warming is not a safe
cap. This evidence demonstrates that action is necessary at a faster pace than most policy makers
conceive is possible. Decades of procrastination mean there is no longer sufficient time for an incremental and non-disruptive
reduction in emissions. Only a whole-of-society rescue plan, understood as action at emergency speed
outside of the business-as-usual political mode, can provide hope of retaining a livable planet for
ourselves and future generations.
Plan cannot solve global warming
Henderson 2005, (Mark Henderson is head of communications at the Wellcome Trust and former science editor of the Times.
He is the author of The Geek Manifesto: Why Science Matters, published by Bantam Press; “Global Warming ‘is not inevitable.’” The
Times, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/global-warming-is-now-inevitable-3qsxb5xz5dl) SB

GLOBAL warming is inevitable over the next century, even if all emissions of greenhouse gases ceased
today, scientists have discovered. Concentrations of carbon dioxide and other gases that contribute to climate
change are so high that their warming effects would persist if levels stabilized now . Were greenhouse
gases to remain at 2000 levels — an impossible scenario — temperatures would rise by 0.5C (0.9F) and sea levels by 11cm (4in) by
2100, the US National Centre for Atmospheric Research has found.

Climate change can only be solved internationally

Ian Johnston 2017, (Environment and science correspondent, “Devastating global warming is inevitable due to inaction of
international community, says leading economist” (William Nordhaus) The Independent,
https://www.independent.co.uk/environment/deadly-global-warming-is-inevitable-due-to-inaction-feasible-rhetoric-climate-
change-fight-paris-a7521111.html) SB

The world can no longer avoid dangerous global warming because countries have done little to tackle the problem
apart from spout “rhetoric”, a leading economist has warned. Professor William Nordhaus, of Yale University in the US, said it
was no longer practicably feasible to keep the level of warming to within two degrees Celsius above
pre-industrial levels, the point at which climatologists believe the world will start to experience particularly dangerous
climate change. This would see devastating storms, droughts, deadly heat waves and floods all become significantly more common,
making some areas of the planet increasingly difficult for humans to inhabit. The US military, among others, has expressed concern
about the security implications of the mass movements of people that such scenarios would likely bring about. Professor Nordhaus,
a noted expert on the economics of climate change, wrote in a paper called Projections and Uncertainties about Climate Change in
an Era of Minimal Climate Policies: “The international target for climate change with a limit of 2C appears to be infeasible with
reasonably accessible technologies. “And this is the case even with very stringent and unrealistically ambitious abatement strategies.
“This is so because of the inertia of the climate system, of rapid projected economic growth in the near term, and of revisions in
several elements of the model. “A
target of 2.5C is technically feasible but would require extreme
virtually universal global policy measures .” He said in all the world only the European Union had
introduced major policies designed to reduce global warming – but was scathing about what
those would actually achieve.

Climate change inevitable until at least 2100

Robert Longley 2018, (30 years of experience in municipal government and urban planning Served as liaison between Census
Bureau and city governments during 1980, 1990, and 2000 Decennial U.S. Censuses Worked as election official in multiple local,
state, and federal elections Experience Robert is a retired urban planning professional with nearly 30 years of experience in the
areas of land use planning, zoning code development and administration, and geographic information systems. He has worked as a
liaison with federal agencies such as the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Environmental Protection Agency, and
the US Census Bureau. As liaison for two cities, Robert worked directly with the U.S. Census Bureau on completion of the 1980, 1990,
and 2000 Decennial U.S. Censuses. In addition, he has worked as an election official in several local, state, and federal elections. He
has covered U.S. government, citizenship and American history for ThoughtCo. (formerly About Education) since 1997. Education
Robert earned a Bachelor of Science degree in the area of landscape architecture in the College of Architecture and Urban Planning
from Texas A&M University in 1974. “Global Warming Inevitable This Century, NSF Study Finds” ThoughtCo.
https://www.thoughtco.com/global-warming-inevitable-this-century-3322005) SB

Despite worldwide efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions ,

global warming and ever greater rises in sea levels
are inevitable during by 2100, according to research conducted by a team of climate model scientists at the
National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) in Boulder, Colorado. Indeed, say the researchers, whose work
was funded by the National Science Foundation (NSF), globally averaged surface air temperatures would still
rise one degree Fahrenheit (about a half degree Celsius) by the year 2100, even if no more
greenhouse gases were added to the atmosphere. And the resulting transfer of heat into the oceans would cause
global sea levels to rise another 4 inches (11 centimeters) from thermal expansion alone. The dire predictions come from the papers,
The Climate Change Commitment, by T. M. L. Wigley, and How Much More Global Warming and Sea Level Rise?, by Gerald A. Meehl
et al, as published in the March 17, 2005, edition of Science magazine. “This study is another in a series that employs increasingly
sophisticated simulation techniques to understand the complex interactions of the Earth,” says Cliff Jacobs of NSF’s atmospheric
sciences division in a press release. “These studies often yield results that are not revealed by simpler approaches and highlight
unintended consequences of external factors interacting with Earth’s natural systems.” “Many
people don’t realize we
are committed right now to a significant amount of global warming and sea level rise because of
the greenhouse gases we have already put into the atmosphere ,” says lead author Jerry Meehl. “Even if
we stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations, the climate will continue to warm, and there will be
proportionately even more sea level rise."

Thermal Inertia insures climate change is inevitable

Robert Longley 2018, (30 years of experience in municipal government and urban planning Served as liaison between Census
Bureau and city governments during 1980, 1990, and 2000 Decennial U.S. Censuses Worked as election official in multiple local,
state, and federal elections Experience Robert is a retired urban planning professional with nearly 30 years of experience in the
areas of land use planning, zoning code development and administration, and geographic information systems. He has worked as a
liaison with federal agencies such as the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Environmental Protection Agency, and
the US Census Bureau. As liaison for two cities, Robert worked directly with the U.S. Census Bureau on completion of the 1980, 1990,
and 2000 Decennial U.S. Censuses. In addition, he has worked as an election official in several local, state, and federal elections. He
has covered U.S. government, citizenship and American history for ThoughtCo. (formerly About Education) since 1997. Education
Robert earned a Bachelor of Science degree in the area of landscape architecture in the College of Architecture and Urban Planning
from Texas A&M University in 1974. “Global Warming Inevitable This Century, NSF Study Finds” ThoughtCo.
https://www.thoughtco.com/global-warming-inevitable-this-century-3322005) SB

Though the study finds signs that the temperature rise will level off some 100 years after the
greenhouse gases stabilize, it also finds that ocean waters will continue to warm and expand beyond then, causing global
sea level to rise unabated. According to the report, the inevitability of climate change results from thermal
inertia, mainly from the oceans, and the long lifetime of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases in
the atmosphere. Thermal inertia refers to the process by which water heats and cools more slowly than air because it is
denser than air. The studies are the first to quantify future “committed” climate change using coupled
global 3-dimensional climate models. Coupled models link major components of Earth's climate in ways that allow them to interact
with each other. Meehl and his NCAR colleagues ran the same scenario a number of times and averaged the results to create
ensemble simulations from each of two global climate models. Then they compared the results from each model. The
scientists
also compared possible climate scenarios in the two models during the 21st century in which greenhouse
gases continue to build in the atmosphere at low, moderate, or high rates . The worst-case
scenario projects an average temperature rise of 6.3 °F (3.5 °C) and sea level rise from thermal expansion of 12
inches (30 centimeters) by 2100.
 Squo solves – Trade War
Trade war on the brink of ending and even if it doesn’t end no escalation
Holly Ellyatt 6/26 2019 , (Holly Ellyatt writes for CNBC.com focusing on European macro-economics and politics. She has led
digital coverage of the Greek and Russian financial crises and broader euro zone news, as well as covering U.K. politics and
economics. Holly joined CNBC in 2012, having worked previously in digital, radio and film production. She studied European Social
and Political Studies at University College London (UCL) and then completed a MA in Broadcast Journalism at City University.
“Mnuchin: ‘We were about 90% of the way’ on China trade deal and there’s a ‘path to complete this’”
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/06/26/mnuchin-says-us-china-trade-deal-was-90-percent-complete.html) SB

Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin told CNBC on Wednesday the U.S. and China were close to a
trade deal, and he’s optimistic that progress can be made during weekend talks between President Donald Trump and China’s Xi
Jinping. “We were about 90% of the way there [with a deal] and I think there’s a path to complete
this,” he told CNBC’s Hadley Gamble in Manama, Bahrain. He said he’s confident Trump and the Chinese president can make
progress in stalled trade talks at the Group of 20 meeting. “The message we want to hear is that they want to come back to the table
and continue because I think there is a good outcome for their economy and the U.S. economy to get balanced trade and to
continue to build on this relationship.” He did not provide any detail on what the final 10% of an agreement might entail, or what
the sticking points are to completing a deal. Trump is meeting his Chinese counterpart on Saturday at the G-20 summit in Osaka,
Japan. The outcome of the meeting could be pivotal for the global economy and financial markets, which has been rattled by 18
months of trade tensions between the economic giants and an escalation of tariffs on each other’s imports. Officials have yet to
negotiate a breakthrough, but there are hopes that a meeting between the two presidents could help
the discussions. A Bank of America Merrill Lynch survey of investors found that about two-thirds
expect no deal this weekend, but there would be no new tariffs either . “I’m hopeful that we can move
forward with a plan,” Mnuchin told CNBC. “President Trump and President Xi have a very close working
relationship. We had a productive meeting at the last G-20. ” At their meeting in December at the G-20 in
Buenos Aires, Trump and Xi reached a truce in the trade war, but talks in May broke down, and the countries added additional
tariffs. Mnuchin said he was hopeful a deal could be struck by the end of the year but said, “there needs to be the right efforts in
place.” Dow futures jumped after Mnuchin’s comments and signaled a higher open for Wall Street Wednesday.
 Squo solves – Warming
Younger Generations Solving Climate Change now
Chad Frischmann 3/29/19, (A coalition-builder and systems strategist, Chad Frischmann works to reverse global warming and
build a new, regenerative future with cascading benefits to the environment and to human well-being. lead researcher and principal
architect of the methodology and models behind Project Drawdown, Chad designed sophisticated models to assess the world’s most
effective climate solutions. Chad is a key spokesperson and coalition-builder. With a multidisciplinary background in public policy,
human rights, sustainable development, and environmental conservation. Previously, Chad was the Senior Program Officer at The
Europaeum, an association of leading European universities; taught at the University of Oxford and the University of California at
Berkeley; and worked as a consultant and researcher for numerous organizations, from small grassroots non-profits to UN agencies
such as UNESCO and the International Fund for Agricultural Development.. Chad holds a master's degree in Public Policy from the
University of California at Berkeley, a master's degree in Art History from the University of Oxford, and a bachelor’s degree in
International Affairs from George Washington University. “The young minds are solving climate change” BBC
http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20190327-the-young-minds-solving-climate-change) SB

Younger generations, however, seem to be clued in to the reality that there are indeed climate solutions to this global problem.
"Theclimate crisis has already been solved . We already have all the facts and solutions. All we have to do is
to wake up and change,” said Nobel Prize nominee Greta Thunberg in her 2018 TED talk. Her bold, decisive, and informed
rhetoric has inspired a global movement of school strikes for climate called #FridaysForFuture, orchestrated by students the
worldwide. On 15 March 2019, 1.5 million young people and their allies hit the streets, striking in 2052 locations in 123 different
countries. While they are marching for a future they want, the endless debating over the different technologies needed to halt rising
temperatures delay the necessary change. Climate solutions already exist and are scaling. There is no technology or
economic barrier; rather, it is a lack of will and leadership to move farther and faster than the future of upcoming
generations demand. I lead a team of researchers from around the world, and together we map, model, and detail the world’s most
impactful solutions to try and reverse global warming. Our research at Project Drawdown shows that there
are better
technologies and practices for electricity generation, transportation, buildings, industry, the
food system, land use, and overconsumption . Climate solutions exist for nations, municipalities, businesses,
investors, homeowners, so that consumers can shift towards a system that benefits all . This is already
happening across the globe through existing solutions that promote social justice, equity, and economic development, while
restoring the planet’s natural carbon cycle. It is in younger generations that we will find the inspiration and
courage for this change. Solutions abound, both scientifically proven and financially feasible. They are interventions that
can shift the way the world does business. The global economy is based on extractive and exploitative growth models, spewing
greenhouse gases into the atmosphere through fossil fuel combustion, land conversion, and excessive consumption of everything –
but the economy does not need to be. Instead, renewable energy options, such as solar photovoltaics, wind turbines, and
geothermal plants, can produce clean, abundant access to electricity, which currently accounts for approximately 25% of global
emissions. Along with enabling technologies like energy storage and grid flexibility, renewable energy systems can fully
replace coal, oil, and gas-fired power plants . A plethora of options are available to moving people and goods from
Point A to Point B that reduce or avoid burning fossil fuels from the tailpipe. Hybrids or electric vehicles are a good
choice for medium or longer distance travel, but biking, using public transport, or walking are
better options for emissions and human health for most people’s daily lives. By reducing food loss and waste and moving
towards a healthy, plant-rich diet, all the extra emissions and energy associated with producing, processing, packaging, distributing,
cooking, and decomposing of food left uneaten or overconsumed could be avoided, while also providing sustenance to populations
in need. These are some of the most impactful decisions every individual can make every day to help solve the climate crisis Rather
than cutting down forests and degrading wetlands to supply our rapacious appetite for meat, timber, and energy, protecting
ecosystems can safeguard, expand, and create new carbon sinks. Adopting regenerative practices on current cropland, grassland and
degraded land can restore soil health and fertility, increase yield and provide the same abundance of materials without destroying
the natural systems. Taken together, implementing regenerative practices for agriculture and livestock management, adopting a
plant-rich diet, and reducing food waste, could result in enough food being produced on current farmland to feed the world’s
growing population, now until 2050 and beyond. Taking actions to change the food system from supply through demand can
prevent the need to cut down forests for food production, with enough existing cropland to produce biomass to supply feedstocks
for other materials such as bioplastics or alternative concrete. Accomplishing all this, however, requires individuals to make different
decisions every day on what is produced, purchased, and consumed. These decisions can be hard for some, but when the results
help to solve global warming, food insecurity, human health, and deforestation, they become what might be called the solution
‘duh-factor’. With enough cascading benefits, or ‘win-win-win-wins’, implementing climate solutions simply become common sense.
The growth of these interventions needs to accelerate at a much faster rate. Young people know this, perhaps because it is the only
future worth fighting for. Along with the world’s poor, women, and indigenous peoples, younger generations will disproportionately
experience the worst effects of climate change if nothing is done; or too little is accomplished too late. Acting now is essential for
everyone and everything on this planet; however, as a motivating principle, ensuring that future generations can live healthy,
meaningful lives should be humanity’s highest priority. Like Greta Thunberg, Lauren Howland is not waiting quietly for adults to
figure it all out. A 23-year-old indigenous woman from the Jicarilla Apache Nation, Lauren is a co-founder of International Indigenous
Youth Council (IIYC), which received the Robert F Kennedy Human Rights Award in 2018 for its continued work on environmental
issues. A voice for young indigenous peoples worldwide, Howland says: “Young
people are more connected and in
tune with each other and this planet than any other point in humanity's existence. We realise
we are fighting to save humanity from literal extinction , and we need the policymakers of this planet to
collectively realise this also. It is here, climate changed. We need climate policies enacted and enforced across the globe now, that
include the solutions we are already implementing in our own local communities." Other young people are jumping to into the
solution space, actively working on potential game-changing innovations. Aäron Claeys, a self-taught young entrepreneur
based in Antwerp, Belgium, works on developing nanotech solutions for sustainable materials with the aim of “reversing
global warming, improving the health, energy efficiency and quality of life, while restoring the planet's biosphere ”. He and his
team have already marketed products that can double the lifetime of textiles, leather, and
footwear to the fashion industry, which may account for up to 10% of global greenhouse gases .
He is now working on developing self-cleaning, air-purifying, and carbon-capturing building
materials.

Project Drawdown solves warming

Sam Mowe 2017, (Mowe is a writer at the Garrison Institute"100 Best Climate Solutions—And Why They’re Going to Work,"
Garrison Institute, https://www.garrisoninstitute.org/blog/100-best-climate-solutions-theyre-going-work/) SB

-its backed by like Leo DiCaprio and Robert Downey Jr.

So like its getting phat funds and popularity still

Few are optimistic about reversing the effects of global warming. And then there’s Paul Hawken, an entrepreneur and
environmentalist whose optimism runs counter to the norm. We decided it would be a good idea to with speak him about his latest
venture, ProjectDrawdown, a book and digital platform that maps, measures, and models the 100 most
substantive solutions to global warming. Each of the 100 solutions falls under one or more categories of
the three things we can do about global warming : stop the release of greenhouse gases into the
atmosphere; change to renewable energy low in carbon emissions; and sequestration, bringing carbon
back to the earth through photosynthesis . Of the three, sequestration is probably the least understood but most
important when it comes to achieving the goal stated in the project’s name: drawdown. Climate drawdown means that we not only
limit our carbon emissions, but also begin to lower greenhouse gas levels in the atmosphere. “All
of the solutions we list
and model already exist, are well understood and are scaling ,” Hawken says. “And virtually all of
them are getting less expensive and more practical every year .” What emerges from this list of solutions is some
clarity about the path forward on global warming, which, in a media landscape that tends to exacerbate fear and despair around this
topic, is a real reason for feeling optimistic. The other reason is that this is the first time we have had a complete list of the top
solutions to global warming since climate change came to the fore 40 years ago. Really, the first time. –Sam Mowe

Project Drawdown solves climate change by 2050

Deborah Williams 2018, (senior level print and digital editor with more than 10 years experience producing, writing and editing
consumer, custom and trade content. Specialties: Conceptualizing stories and integrated delivery options for print and digital
content; writing, assigning and editing engaging, audience-aware content; identifying, researching and interviewing sources and
subjects. 1-24-2018, "7 Things You Should Know About Project Drawdown Before Hearing Paul Hawken Speak at Industry Breakfast,"
Outdoor Industry Association, https://outdoorindustry.org/article/7-things-know-project-drawdown-hearing-paul-hawken-speak-
industry-breakfast/) SB

The term “drawdown” refers to the moment in time when global greenhouse gasses will stop and
reverse their current upward trajectory and will begin to decline year-over-year . If deployed over the
next 30 years, the solutions presented in Project Drawdown could realize drawdown by the year 2050. The
full title of the book is Project Drawdown: The Most Comprehensive Plan Ever Proposed to Reverse Global Warming. After
discovering that no other plan existes in the world to actually reverse global warming trends , Paul and
his team chose the title and reminded us all of the critical importance of bringing people and ideas together on a global scale. The
uniqueness of Project Drawdown is the fact that the book and the nonprofit organization of the same name come at the problem
from three unique angles: First, it evaluated hundreds of currently available solutions across eight sectors for their viability, then
used data and modeling to project their potential impacts over the next 30 years. The result is a list of 80 solutions that already exist
and are proving their value. Second, it is ongoing. The
coalition of researchers and writers who produced the
plan will continue to update, expand and share their findings to remain current with solutions as
they develop and become more viable over time . Third, it empowers change at all levels of society. It reminds us
that decisions and actions of by individuals, corporations and communities in every corner of the globe can positively impact the
future of our planet.

Trade War hasn’t changed ongoing and extensive State and private climate
coop with China
Wendy Wu, 10-2-2018, Master's degree in finance from Germany's University of Freiburg, "US
states and private firms build ties with China despite trade war," South China Morning Post,
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/2166465/us-china-trade-war-fails-
dampen-cooperation-between-states-and FH

Several US states and private businesses are pressing on with plans to work with China in fields
ranging from technology development to climate change, despite the spiralling confrontation of
the trade war. Analysts said the two countries would continue to engage strategically and in sectors
such as innovation, although the prospect of significant cooperation may be curtailed as China-US tensions move beyond economics to
security issues. Last week the United States infuriated Beijing with a proposal to sell US$330 million worth of arms to Taiwan, and US President Donald
Trump accused China of meddling in the US midterm elections. Washington has also sanctioned a Chinese defence ministry unit and its director for
buying weapons from Russia. In response, China recalled its naval chief from a visit to the US . Despite the tensions, the state of
Michigan last month signed a memorandum of understanding with China’s Ministry of Science
and Technology to jointly develop and share autonomous vehicle technology . Tom Kelly, CEO of
Michigan-based Automation Alley, a manufacturing and technology business association, was in China as part of the Michigan
delegation and also attended the World Economic Forum in Tianjin. He said that business had to continue despite the

tariff war. Speaking on the forum’s sidelines, Kelly said part of his mission was to build a bridge for business between the countries to keep his
member companies’ technology competitive in the global market. “The world will continue to integrate, especially in

manufacturing and technology. We cannot shy away from that,” he said. “At the [federal]
government level, there may be issues that are valid to work out, but from the business level,
globalisation has already occurred, especially in manufacturing .” Chicago mayor Rahm Emanuel visited China in
July, seeking to lock in a US$1.3 billion deal for a Chinese company to assemble railcars in his city . California is also trying to shore

up efforts to address climate change and cooperate on green energy with China . China and
California rise above US trade war for action on climate change Alaska governor Bill Walker led a
40-member delegation on a 10-day trip to China in May to explore opportunities in tourism and
environmental protection. Wei Jianguo, China’s former vice-minister of commerce, said that US states
were attracted by China’s market potential as it moved up the industrial chain from labour-
intensive manufacturing to greater reliance on technology . They also saw opportunities to enter China’s financial
markets, he said, while China was interested in introducing advanced manufacturing technology to its second-tier or smaller cities.
 No Impact - Trade War Doesn’t Escalate
Aff exacerbates trade wars economic impact and chances of escalation
Yujing Liu, 6/25 2019,( Yujing Liu is a business reporter with a passion for understanding and explaining the fascinating
complexities of China’s economy and society. Originally from Beijing, she joined the Post in 2017 after graduating from the
University of Hong Kong with a degree in politics and journalism.” Not every economist thinks the trade war is a huge deal; ‘look at
the numbers’, says CME executive director” South China morning Post https://www.scmp.com/business/banking-
finance/article/3015887/not-every-economist-thinks-trade-war-huge-deal-look) SB

The economic impact of the trade war is not as bad as many people think, according to some economists,
who recommend investors continue betting on China. The escalating US-China trade war and technology rivalry has hit businesses
and consumers, and shifted some supply chains away from China as companies attempt to offset risk. Growth in Chinese imports and
exports has also faltered. Many investors are worried about the prospect of a US recession too, particularly if differences between
Washington and Beijing are not resolved. Just last week the price of spot gold, typically viewed as a safe haven asset, rallied to a five-
year high. But the real impact is not actually that severe and investors should continue to bank on the strength of
China’s economy, which is unlikely to suffer a hard landing this year, some economists said. “The trade war impact is a lot smaller
than what a lot of people seem to worry about, or seem to think,” said Erik Norland, executive director and senior economist for
global markets company CME Group. “I think this is a time for bargain hunting in Chinese stocks. “People read about what is going
on, and they think it’s a really big deal, but
when you look at the numbers it’s not so big.” Without policy
adjustments by the two countries to offset the effects, Trump’s original 10 per cent tariffs created US$20
billion dollars’ worth of new tax, according to CME estimates. Half was paid by China through reduced exports to the
US, and half by US consumers through “infinitesimally higher consumer prices” According to CME, that set of tariffs
slowed China’s growth rate by about one-tenth of 1 per cent. The more recent escalations, which saw if
Washington boost tariffs to 25 per cent on US$200 billion worth of goods imported from China, increased the
total tax to US$50 billion, said Norland. The effects are not yet reflected in economic data from the US or China, but CME
predicts China’s economy will slow only by “about three-tenths of 1 per cent , approximately, assuming
they don’t do anything to offset it, which they will almost certainly do,” said Norland. In this light, China’s
economy is unlikely to suffer a hard landing this year, said Wang Qian, chief economist for Asia-Pacific at US-based asset
management giant Vanguard. Beijing, she said, “has a deep pocket of policy tools that can ensure smooth, near-term stability” even
if the trade war continues Already Beijing has cut taxes, raised spending and eased monetary policy to make sure its strong economy
keeps growing, noted CME’s Norland. Vanguard expects China to achieve 6.2 per cent GDP growth in 2019 ,
as does the International Monetary Fund, which lowered its forecast from 6.3 per cent earlier this month because of trade relation
uncertainties. The forecasts still fall within
the target range of 6 to 6.5 per cent set by the Chinese
government in March. There is much anticipation about the upcoming meeting between Presidents Trump
and Xi at the G20 summit in Japan this weekend. Both Vanguard and CME is expect it to be a turning point in
negotiations, which is unlikely to further escalate. Wang said in her base-case scenario of no trade war
escalations, Beijing in the second half of the year will probably roll out modest additional stimulus such as a downward adjustment
of interest rates, on top of the supportive policies it has already announced. Inflation is unlikely to limit the Chinese central bank’s
ability to provide monetary stimulus, because non-food inflation should remain stable given the country’s overcapacity in steel and
smaller cities’ property, she said. Thus, the People’s Bank of China could overlook the headline inflation number – which hit a 15-
month high in May on the back of surging pork prices – and focus on the growth of the economy in making policies, Wang said.
Another major risk factor that has weighed on global investment sentiment is the possibility of a US recession, as indicated by an
inverted US bond yield curve. Wang, however, said she does not see a recession in the US this year or next,
even though the GDP growth rate could slow to 3.3 per cent this year from 3.6 per cent in 2018. That is because there is no apparent
bubble in the economy, and the Federal Reserve still maintains a very accommodating policy, she said. Vanguard sees only a
30 per cent chance of a US recession this year.

Trump opening up trade deal but is fine with stagnation

Susan Heavey 6/26/19,( Washington-based journalist for @Reuters. Member @AHCJ @PressClubDC @nyguild. @AU_SOC
@AmericanU adjunct “Trump says trade deal 'possible' with China's Xi, tariffs could be lower” Reuters
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-china-trump/trump-says-possible-he-may-make-trade-deal-with-chinas-xi-
idUSKCN1TR1PU) SB
Trump, who departed for the G20 leaders’ summit in Osaka, Japan on Wednesday, also raised the possibility that he
may impose a lower, 10% duty on a $300 billion list of Chinese imports, instead of the proposed
25% rate. Trump is expected to meet with Xi on Saturday in Osaka, a conversation that could revive
stalled negotiations between the world’s two biggest economies or launch a much deeper, costlier trade war that would drag
down global growth and roil financial markets. “It’s absolutely possible ... We have to get a good deal,”
Trump said in an interview with Fox Business Network. “It’s possible that we’ll make a deal but I’m also very
happy where we are now.” Relations between Washington and Beijing have spiraled downward since talks collapsed in
May, when the United States accused China of reneging on pledges to reform its economy.

No escalation empirics prove

Paul Wiseman 6/26/19, (economic writer at the Associated Press, “Businesses hope for a truce in trade war” Weirton daily
times https://www.weirtondailytimes.com/news/local-news/2019/06/businesses-hope-for-truce-in-trade-war/) SB

If history repeats itself — and most analysts are betting it will — Trump and President Xi Jinping will
agree to some kind of cease-fire when they meet late this week at a Group of 20 international summit in Osaka, Japan.
Indeed, a senior administration official sought to downplay expectations Tuesday by suggesting that the primary goal for
the Trump-Xi meeting is simply an agreement to restart negotiations. The official, who spoke on condition
of anonymity, said the hard work of finalizing the complex details of any broad new accord would come later, when negotiating
teams for the two sides meet. Under
the cease-fire scenario, the two sides’ existing tariffs and counter-tariffs on
many of each other’s goods would
remain in place. But no additional import taxes would take effect.
This would buy time for U.S. and Chinese officials to restart talks that stalled last month after 11
rounds of negotiations. The last time Trump and Xi met — in early December at a G-20 gathering in Buenos Aires, Argentina
— they called a truce. That cease-fire injected some new momentum into the talks between the world’s two biggest economies.
“Ideally, results at this summit could match the last summit in Argentina ,” said Tu Xinquan, director of the
Institute for WTO Studies at the University of International Business and Economics in Beijing. “That is, to prevent the trade war
from escalating.”

Trade War not new Cold War

Paul D. Gewitz 6/26/19,( Paul Gewirtz is the Potter Stewart Professor of Constitutional Law at Yale Law School and is also the
Director of Yale Law School’s Paul Tsai China Center. Professor Gewirtz teaches and writes in various legal and policy fields, including
constitutional law, federal courts, antidiscrimination law, law and literature, Chinese law, and American foreign policy. “Can the US-
China crisis be stabilized?” Brookings https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/06/26/can-the-u-s-china-crisis-be-
stabilized/ ) SB

But that does not mean that China is our enemy or adversary. It does not mean we are or should be entering a “new Cold War” with
China—analogizing the U.S.-China relationship to the relationship between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in the second half of the
20th century. The “Cold War” comparison is a poor one . The U.S. and China have interdependent and
mutually beneficial economies, whereas the Soviet Union’s economy was not significant in our
relationship. The U.S. and China have a huge number of people-to-people exchanges in every walk of
life; the U.S. and Soviet Union did not . The Soviet Union’s leaders told the U nited States “we will
bury you” and the Soviet Union invaded and occupied numerous foreign countries; China may be a
tough competitor, but it is not seeking to destroy us, is not an existential threat to us, and is not invading
other countries. Its leaders are proud of what China’s system has achieved, but do not seem to be aggressively trying to export
it to other countries, at least not yet. Our Cold War strategy with the Soviet Union was “containment,” resting on
the ultimately correct assumption that the Soviet Union would collapse from within; but it’s very
unlikely that an awakened and powerful China of 1.4 billion people will self-destruct if we try to
“contain” it
Trade war doesn’t escalate to conventional war- U.S trade advantages and
changing Chinese economic infrastructure check escalation
Andrew Dobbs, 8-23-2018, Environmental activist and writer based in Austin, Texas, "How
Likely Are Trade Wars to Become Shooting Wars?," No Publication,
https://warisboring.com/how-likely-are-trade-wars-to-become-shooting-wars/ FH

The United States has experienced a wider and faster shift on basic questions of trade policy in less than two years than in the previous seven decades.
From a broad bipartisan consensus in favor of liberalized free trade guaranteed by multilateral agreements — a consensus long contested by politically
marginal elements on both the left and right — Pres. Donald Trump has reinvigorated protectionism. He rejected the most significant multilateral trade
deal in recent years, the Trans Pacific Partnership, while putting one of the U.S. economy’s bedrock trade agreements, NAFTA, on the hot seat. On top
of all of this he has raised tariffs on steel and aluminum, imposed and proposed significant new tariffs on more than $200 billion of Chinese goods,
claimed credit for devastating the Turkish economy in retaliation for their arrest of a Christian evangelist with U.S. citizenship and cancelled the Iran
Nuclear Deal, reestablishing sanctions intended to isolate that country.
The previous consensus was built in large part on
the idea that expanding global trade made the world a safer place. If countries are all customers
and vendors for each other, why would they want to go to war? Of course, whenever a smaller,
poorer country tried to support their domestic industries like the big, rich countries do, guns
started blazing, but as long as they could be called “communists” or “terrorists” nobody really
minded. Now that America is beefing with bigger, richer countries, however, it raises an important question. Will ratcheting up trade
beefs lead to more military confrontation or new kinds of conflict? How likely are trade wars to
become shooting wars? A brief look at history suggests that while it is unlikely for any particular
trade spat to lead to a real war, aggressive and protectionist trade policies can have unexpected
consequences, some of which make wars much more likely in the long run. None of Trump’s
trade moves are likely to send the bullets flying any time soon , but they all make the world a more dangerous place.
Most U.S. trade conflicts since World War II have been between the United States and friendly countries–European countries with disputes over
consumer goods, Canada with conflicts over timber, Japan and the struggle over auto imports. Prior to World War I, however, U.S. trade policy was very
different. For decades following the Civil War Congress and the White House were overwhelmingly controlled by the Republican Party. The GOP of that
era was dominated by capital-intensive manufacturing interests in the Northeast and agricultural interests in the Midwest. Both constituencies saw
themselves as threatened by European imports and sought to impose tariff barriers to those industries while securing major federal subsidies in the
form of infrastructure development — itself a form of protectionism. This attitude was reflected in Europe as well, where a series of trade disputes
helped lay the foundation for the splits in World War I. After the war, the GOP returned to power in the United States with the election of Warren G.
Harding and then Herbert Hoover. The two administrations adopted aggressive protectionist policies, all of which hastened World War II. First came the
Fordney-McCumber Trade Act in 1922. The Act was classic Republican protectionism, but it came right on the heels of a war that had left many
countries saddled with dollar-denominated debts. Fordney-McCumber choked off access to dollars, making it difficult to pay the debts. The United
States extended loans to Europe, but that only deepened the problem, akin to paying one credit card bill with another credit card. No country had a
bigger problem with war debts, of course, than Germany. In 1921 the London Ultimatum demanded that their debts and the reparations imposed by
the Treaty of Versailles be paid back in either gold or foreign currency. Great Britain had likewise engaged in protectionist policies, particularly the 1921
Safeguarding of Industries Act which imposed tariffs specifically on goods from countries with devalued currencies — countries such as Germany. The
downward spiral of Germany losing access to the currencies needed to make its debt payments, seeing its currency devalued, and then having debt
payments come due only to see their foreign reserves further stretched and the mark further devalued led to the notorious hyperinflation of the 1920s.
At top — Valletta harbor in Malta. Flickr photo. Above — a political cartoon showing Pres. Grover Cleveland trimming the “tariff protection hedge” to
reduce the “surplus.” Art via Wikipedia This was a key condition for the rise of the Nazi Party, and global economic depression in the 1930s was
responsible for the spread of fascism across the world. The passage of the Smoot-Hawley tariffs in 1931 dramatically increased U.S. tariffs on more than
20,000 goods, an action which economic historians agree exacerbated the Great Depression. Great Britain likewise imposed a 100-percent tariff on all
goods manufactured outside the British Empire, and in the wake of these decisions global trade dropped more than 66 percent. Only the industrial
demand of a total war spanning North America, Europe, Asia, Africa and the Pacific could shake the world out of its slump. By the time the war was
over U.S. industrial superiority over the devastated economies of Europe and Asia made exports the bedrock of the national economy, discouraging
protectionism. Fears of another conflict like the two that had killed 100 million people in 31 years led to a global economic alliance underpinned by the
monetary arrangements established at Bretton Woods in 1944 and the General Agreement on Tarrifs and Trade in 1947. GATT gave way to the World
Trade Organization in 1995, and this regime has ruled trade policy in the United States and around the world ever since. In terms of trade-specific
policies, as opposed to issues where trade is explicitly being used in service of larger foreign policy aims as in Turkey and Iran, Trump’s actions all boil
down to China. The aluminum and steel tariffs on Europe were targeted less at their steel industries, and more at their consumption of cheap Chinese
steel. One of the largest sticking points of the NAFTA negotiations has to do with what percentage of parts in a car have to be made in North America to
exempt it from tariffs, with the non-North American parts largely coming from China. These sorts of trade pressures designed to make the world choose
sides in a major strategic competition have a lot more in common with the sorts of economic hostilities that led up to World War I than they do the
fraternal bickering that has characterized post-war economic squabbles. Still, we have a much better understanding of how tariffs and trade wars affect
an entire economy now than we did 100 years ago. Tit-for-tat trade disputes end up harming both parties by raising costs as much as they protect
industry. The conflict comes down to which economy can take more damage because every blow
strikes in both directions. The U.S. economy, however, is two-thirds larger than China’s and
experiencing a remarkable acceleration of growth after the second longest period of economic
expansion in our history. Trump is betting that those factors make us more likely to win, and he’s probably right. China’s trade
manipulation to date has been less about tariffs or even traditional non-tariff barriers such as subsidies, and more about the strategic devaluation of
their currency. They are able to do this because they maintain massive reserves of U.S. dollars and other foreign currencies — up to $3 trillion — as well
as the largest foreign holdings of US sovereign debt. When the dollar falls against the yuan they can sell U.S. Treasury bonds to soak up extra dollars
and shore up its price; if the yuan falls too far they can buy back those treasuries and add liquidity and inflation to the dollar. This conflation of trade
pressures with currency conflicts poses particular threats.
China could conceivably dump U.S. Treasuries, crashing
their value and driving up interest rates, which move in the opposite direction of bond prices.
They could also dump dollars, causing significant inflation in the U.S. right as the Federal Reserve
has begun to raise the discount rate in response to already existing concerns about rising costs.
If either of these were to be done at a large enough scale it may be enough to prompt a military
response from the United States right away. That said, China’s economy has changed
significantly in recent years, and these sorts of responses are more counterproductive than ever
for them. The trade war has put those changes on display, as the Shanghai Stock Exchange has
seen a 17-percent drop in three months while the yuan dropped 3.7 percent in June — its
largest one-month loss ever. As China has consciously begun the shift from an export-based economy to a finance capitalist economy
the same monetary changes that used to benefit their productive sector now prompts capital flight from their securities to those priced in dollars.
U.S. fiscal policy has also dramatically expanded debt, almost all of which has been bought by
domestic holders, diluting China’s potential impact on bonds and interest rates. The bottom line
is that the present trade conflict or any other purely economic dispute with the United States is
liable to be negotiated at the boardroom table and not on the battlefield.
 No Internal Link - No Relations spillover
Trade War has exposed the divide in U.S-Sino relations, and nationalistic politics
prevent coop after the trade war
Don Lee, 6-2-2019, "For the U.S. and China, it’s not a trade war anymore — it’s something
worse," latimes, https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-us-china-trade-stalemate-
20190531-story.html
What started out two years ago as an effort by President Trump to wring better terms from China on the nuts and bolts of foreign trade now threatens
to become a far wider and more ominous confrontation. The conflict continues to be framed as a “trade war”
between the world’s two biggest economies — as Washington and Beijing pursue an escalating
series of tariff hikes and other retaliatory measures. Even as Trump moved Thursday to open a new, potentially damaging
trade war with Mexico, however, the conflict with China has widened beyond the original trade-based

issues. Beneath the surface, a new tone has begun to emerge since trade talks broke down in early May
and Trump ratcheted up tariffs on imported goods from China, an action met with retaliatory duties from Beijing. Officials on both sides

of the Pacific have begun to portray the U.S.-China relationship in nationalistic and emotion-
charged terms that suggest a much deeper conflict. Recently, for example, a private group of
American economists and trade experts with long-standing experience in China traveled to Beijing, expecting
their usual technical give-and-take with Chinese government officials. Instead, a member of the

Chinese Politburo harangued them for almost an hour, describing the U.S.-China relationship as
a “clash of civilizations” and boasting that China’s government-controlled system was far
superior to the “Mediterranean culture” of the West, with its internal divisions and aggressive foreign policy. On the
U.S. side, a senior State Department official , during a forum last month in Washington, warned of a deepening
confrontation with China that she cast in something close to racial terms. In the Cold War with the Soviet
Union, said Kiron Skinner, the State Department’s director of policy planning, Washington at least faced fellow Caucasians, whereas with Beijing,
Washington faces a nonwhite culture. “In China we have an economic competitor, we have an ideological competitor, one that really does seek a kind
of global reach, that many of us didn’t expect a couple of decades ago,” Skinner said. “And I think it’s also striking that this is the first time that we will
have a great-power competitor that is not Caucasian.” On the trade issues themselves, the two sides may still be able to reach a truce, with the best
chance coming with the economic summit of major nations at the end of June in Osaka, Japan. Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping are scheduled to
attend the meeting of Group of 20 leaders. Nothing short of a deal struck directly by the two leaders is likely to avert new rounds of punches and
counter-punches over economic and financial ties, analysts say. But whether either leader is interested in a stand-down is unclear .
The conflict,
however, now goes beyond just the escalation of tariffs. Attitudes have hardened in recent days
after the Trump administration blacklisted the telecom firm Huawei, essentially blocking one of
China’s most successful global companies from buying crucial components and software from U.S. firms. (Huawei later got a
temporary reprieve on some of the Commerce Department restrictions.) The White House is preparing similar actions

against other Chinese high-tech firms, according to news reports. “All of that would sap most of the remaining interest the
Chinese have in negotiating with the Trump administration on trade,” said Scott Kennedy, a China expert at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies. China, he added, will probably “hunker down and try to get by until either the second term of the Trump administration or the incoming new
administration.” On Sunday, China’s State Council issued an 8,300-word white paper blaming the U.S. government for escalating the trade war but
expressing a desire for continued talks. Addressing a rare news conference, Vice Minister of Commerce Wang Shouwen said that the goal of trade
negotiations should be the cancellation of tariffs by both sides, but that talks must proceed on the basis of equality. The U.S. should take “full
responsibility” for instigating and accelerating the trade war, said Guo Weimin, vice minister of the State Council Information Office. “China doesn’t
want to fight, is not afraid of fighting, but will fight if it has no choice,” Guo said. The widening friction has not yet had a big impact on financial markets
or the broader economy. But
the domestic politics, for now, seem to favor conflict, not compromise. At
home Trump mostly gets cheers for going after an adversary many Americans believe is an
unfair trading partner that has stolen valuable U.S. intellectual property in its rise to superpower
status. The political risk for Trump from potential Democratic opponents in 2020 isn’t from
hitting China too hard, but treading too softly or coming away with a weak deal. In China, the party’s
propaganda organ has dusted off old patriotic films of the Korean War — when the Chinese army pushed back American forces advancing northward —
and Xi’s recent countryside tour conveyed a message of girding up for a new “Long March” to
resist a foreign bully. At this point, many experts on U.S.-China relations say, the best one might
hope for is a temporary truce, and even that will be hard to come by if Trump keeps piling on
the pressure.

Trade War has permanently damaged US-Sino relations, both countries are
moving away from cooperation
Neal Kimberley, 10-2-2018, Commentator on macroeconomics and financial markets, "After
the trade war, US-China relations will never be the same," South China Morning Post,
https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/united-states/article/2166570/after-trade-
war-us-china-relations-will-not-be FH

“A glass is easily broken, but difficult to repair,” Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said last week in
New York, in reference to the current state of China-US relations . But, even if present differences can

ultimately be resolved, there’s no going back to how things were . The glass may not yet have shattered, but it is
cracked. US President Donald Trump railed last week about a recent China Daily-sponsored advertising supplement that ran in an Iowan newspaper, the
Des Moines Register. Trump has argued that such an action represented an attempt to interfere in next month’s US midterm congressional elections,
but the supplement’s attempt to flag up how, in particular, Iowa’s farmers have benefited from the way the China-US economic relationship has
evolved, nevertheless rings true. By extension, those farmers will lose out if that same economic relationship isn’t repaired. Last month, Iowa State
University estimated that the imposition of tariffs in 2018 on products exported by the state, of which those retaliatory imposts levied by China are a
very material part, could cost the Iowan agricultural economy up to US$2.2 billion. China
says US farmers may never regain
market share lost in trade war More pointedly, the university report said, previous trade battles
such as the Russian grain embargo of the 1980s and the 2009 dispute with China (tyres versus
chickens), show that “once trade market share is lost, it is difficult for markets to return to the
previous relationships”. Then there’s the potential inelasticity of US demand for Chinese goods. If those goods cannot be easily
substituted, either from within the United States or from an alternative overseas source not covered by Trump’s trade tariffs, the US consumer will
either have to forego those purchases or pay up for them. In the latter case, at least to some extent, the Trump tariffs could become a tax on the US
consumer that the success of its export sector in selling to US consumers has left China somewhat vulnerable. At
the same time, China
might well consider that it has allowed itself to become both overly dependent on certain
agricultural imports from the US and to the kind of tariffs imposed by the Trump administration.
Additionally, recent US sanctions on the Equipment Development Department of China’s Ministry of Defence, after Beijing bought Russian Su-35
combat aircraft and S-400 surface-to-air missile equipment, was understandably not well received in China. India is also said to be set to buy the S-400
system. Beijing’s unease will only increase if Washington then fails to sanction India over such a Russian arms purchase .
US tells China: we
want competition, not cooperation In reality, neither Beijing nor Washington may think a return
to the trade relationship of the recent past is possible or desirable. “China’s leaders have been
forced into a fundamental reassessment of the country’s development strategy ,” Larry Brainard, chief
emerging markets economist at investment research firm TS Lombard, wrote last month.
 Link Turn - Arm sales k2 trade deal
Increasing ties with Taiwan is the best way to reach a favorable trade deal with
China
Duncan DeAeth, 6-11-2019, Taiwan News, Staff Writer "After China tariffs, Trump should
recognize T...," https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3721753 FH

Trump is clearly making a full court press to get results from a very reluctant Beijing. In a press briefing on Monday (June 10), Trump even alluded to the
possibility that tariffs much higher than 25 percent may also be implemented in the coming months. While
China may dismiss these
threats, or attempt to downplay the
potential impact of such a comprehensive tariff program targeting
Chinese goods, Beijing is likely worried about a much more significant and unspoken threat to its
interests; U.S. diplomatic recognition of Taiwan as a country . As previously reported, the United States
under the Trump administration has pursued improving ties with Taiwan at a pace, and to a
degree that is unprecedented in U.S. post-cold war history . Given these trends, along with Trump’s aggressive style of
deal-making, there is a high probability Trump is already considering Taiwan as an option to press Beijing after the next major volley of tariffs have been
put in place. Recognition of Taiwan as an independent state, effectively rejecting Washington’s outdated “One China” principle, would entirely
undermine the basis of U.S.-China relations in Beijing's eyes. It is also worth remembering that upon winning the 2016 election, one of the first major
acts of foreign policy President Trump carried out, perhaps inadvertantly, was to accept a call from Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen in December 2016. In
mainstream U.S. media, controversy immediately ensued. This was exacerbated by a seemingly offhanded remark from Trump on a Fox news

program, where the then president-elect wondered if maybe the “One China” principle could be reconsidered .
“I don’t know why we have to be bound by a one-China policy unless we make a deal with China

having to do with other things, including trade.” Such a Trumpian “slip of the tongue” has no doubt been burned into the
collective memory, and possibly found its way into the nightmares, of leaders in Beijing . Simply by alluding to the possibility of

such a move, without even the need to mention it openly, Beijing would be forced to take pause
and re-assess their approach to trade war negotiations . While many media outlets have speculated on such a possibility,
often with the expression of “playing the Taiwan card,” there is ample evidence to suggest that such allusions are already being made. And it is not
Donald Trump, but rather the Pentagon, that is making them. U.S. Defense Secretary Patrick Shanahan (Associated Press Image) Over the past two
weeks, there are some visible signs coming from the Department of Defense (DoD), suggesting that
the leaders of the U.S. armed forces, as a result of their own strategic planning, may be in the midst of persuading the
White House to consider pursuing diplomatic recognition of Taiwan . The Pentaton’s recent signals began on June 1, starting
with Defense Chief Patrick Shanahan’s appearance at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, where he declared before China’s top military officer, that
the U.S. stands by its obligations to Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). U.S. support of Taiwan “empowers the people of Taiwan to
determine their own future," said Shanahan. Later that same day came the left hook, when the DoD published its annual Indo-Pacific Strategy Report.
Tucked away on page 30 of the report is a clear statement that Taiwan is a country, which is a reliable, capable, and natural partner of the U.S. While
mainstream media pundits in the U.S. might not make a fuss about what on the surface may seem trivial, rest assured that analysts in Beijing took it
much more seriously. On the following page, the report states the following. “The United States has a vital interest in upholding the rules-based
international order, which includes a strong, prosperous, and democratic Taiwan. The United States is pursuing a strong partnership with Taiwan and
will faithfully implement the Taiwan Relations Act, as part of a broader commitment to the security and stability of the Indo-Pacific.” Given such
language, the U.S. military is clearly not ambivalent about U.S. policy towards Taiwan. Although not widely reported, it is possible these pages of the
Indo-Pacific Strategy Report took some in Washington, as well as Beijing, by surprise. The report continues that it is the objective of the DoD’s defense
engagement with Taiwan to ensure the country remains “secure, confident, free from coercion” and able to engage with Beijing on its own terms. In
the week since the release of the report and Shanahan’s talk in Singapore, Stratfor reported that a delegation of over 100 people representing the U.S.
Indo-Pacific Command and the FBI arrived in Taipei for closed door talks. Interestingly, the U.S. INDO-PACOM is a co-host of the 2019 FBI National
Academy Associates Conference, which is being held for the first time in Taipei this year (June 9-14). Then on June 10, it was reported that Taiwan’s
Maj. Gen. Erh-Jung Liu had been in attendance at the annual Pacific Amphibious Leaders Symposium (PALS-19), held June 3-6. U.S. INDO-PACOM
Commander Admiral Phil Davidson, was also at the Symposium. U.S. INDO-PACOM Commander Admiral Phil Davidson (Photo from Pacific Marines
Twitter) If
the trends of U.S.-Taiwan relations under the Trump administration continue apace , then, as
CNBC reports, there is certainly a high chance that Taiwan may become more central to the conflict

brewing between the U.S. and China . But what many might not consider is that such a course is precisely the one the U.S. military
is expecting, and potentially, even encouraging. In a recent article entitled “The Navy’s War vs. Bolton’s War,” author Michael Klare makes a strong case
for the possibility of disagreement between interventionist tendencies of National Security Advisor John Bolton, and the priorities of Joint Chiefs of Staff
at the Pentagon, specifically those of the Navy and Air Force. Given recent U.S. history of wars abroad, and the decline in military spending and
organization over the Obama administration, Klare makes the case that the Pentagon has already set its priorities for the next decade on force
modernization to develop battle readiness for great power competition, which will require high-tech capabilities in scenarios of “multi-domain
warfare.” Klare notes that the
Pentagon regards China as the greatest and most immediate threat to U.S.
power in the world. “Pentagon scenarios essentially assume that a conflict with China would initially erupt in the waters of the South China
Sea or in the East China Sea near Japan and Taiwan. U.S. strategists have considered these two maritime areas America’s ‘first line of defense’ in the
Pacific.” It follows from a pragmatic approach to regional security, that the Pentagon is very keen to ensure that the region’s first line of defense not
only maintain its current level of security, but that its role as a bulwark be further strengthened via diplomatic and political channels to the greatest
extent possible. USS Carl Vinson in the Indo-Pacific (US Navy photo) And given
the current mounting tensions between
Beijing and Washington over trade, tariffs, cyber security, and the South China Sea, the current
situation offers an excellent window for the Pentagon to skillfully, and subtly exercise the power they have in
Washington to persuade the administration, and the Congress, towards the most tactically sound

approach to Taiwan relations in light of the long-term generational threats posed by China . As
Trump now prepares to head to Osaka for the G20 Summit, the threats he has made regarding
tariffs, although far more extensive than those previously implemented, are still well within the
scope of what China has come to expect from dealing with Trump over the past two years. Authors
at the National Interest are under the impression that “this is no way to win a trade war with China.” “Contrary to President Trump’s claims, it will not
be ‘easy’ to
get China to substantially dismantle its unfair trade and investment policies through the
imposition of tariffs; in fact it will be extremely difficult. Meeting U.S. demands for structural change would compromise some
of the principal levers by which the Chinese Communist Party manages its monopoly over
political power in China.” However, their observations don’t take into account that in the grand chess game being played, it stands to
reason that the full volley of tariffs to be levied are still only the frontline of the arsenal that Trump is bringing to bear on the upcoming negotiations.
The gun on top of the poker table, so to speak, not the one underneath. If
Trump hopes to raise the stakes to a level that
will get the Chinese Communist Party to snap to attention and start taking U.S. demands
seriously, then the topic of Taiwan will almost certainly find its way to the negotiating table. If
China understands that such a possibility is very real and Trump is willing to follow through with
a thorough repudiation of the U.S. “One China” principle, then Xi Jinping will likely be much
more willing to negotiate on trade, the South China Sea, and technology theft at the G20 Summit. Trump and Xi at the previous G20
Summit in Argentina (Associated Press Photo) In which case, Taiwan’s diplomatic status in Washington may remain unchanged for the time being.
However, if hubris gets the best of Beijing, then we may all soon see Taiwan relations placed on the fast track for diplomatic recognition in Washington.
This will simultaneously de-legitimize the authority of the communist government in Beijing and herald a major alteration of the geo-political landscape
of East Asia. While many may fret over the potential economic or diplomatic fallout of the U.S. changing course on Taiwan, the U.S. military has without
a doubt developed strategic contingency plans should the conflict boil over into the military realm. Given their clear language in the Indo-Pacific
Strategy Report, it seems the U.S. military may not only be anticipating official recognition of Taiwan’s independence, but given their own strategic
interests, they may themselves be lobbying for such a development in Washington as well.
 Nonux - Protectionism inevitable
Protectionism inevitable – multiple external factors
Grace Blakeley, 05-13-2019, (Grace Blakeley is the New Statesman’s economics commentator
and a research fellow at IPPR.) "The US-China trade war is another sign that protectionism is
here to stay," New Statesman America,
https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/economy/2019/05/us-china-trade-war-another-sign-
protectionism-here-stay, MMC
In its most recent economic and fiscal outlook, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) warned that the two greatest potential
dangers to global growth in 2019 were a no-deal Brexit and an escalation of the US’s trade war with China. The first issue looks
about as unlikely as it always has, but the second has heated up again. Up until today, many thought the worst of the trade war was
over. In 2018, Trump imposed tariffs on $250bn worth of Chinese imports. China retaliated with tariffs on $110bn of US products. As
tensions heated up, Trump threatened to increase the tariff rate from 10 per cent to 25 per cent, and to impose tariffs on a much
wider selection of Chinese goods. But the conflict appeared to de-escalate as the two sides came to the negotiating table. Trump’s
rhetoric became markedly tempered, and the threat of further sanctions seemed to recede. Many thought the two sides would
come to a swift agreement. But Trump defied those expectations on Friday by announcing that talks with Beijing weren’t progressing
as quickly as he would like. He has now followed through on his threat to raise the tariff rate to 25 per cent, as well as stating that he
plans to expand the now 25 per cent tariff to a further $325bn worth of Chinese goods. China is expected to retaliate soon. Looking
at trade statistics alone, it would appear that China has more to lose from the altercation. The US imports $539bn worth of goods
from China, while China only imports $120bn back. US tariffs will reduce American demand for Chinese exports, hurting demand in
an already slowing economy. But, as highlighted in a recent report from IPPR that I co-authored, the US economy is reaching the
peak of the business cycle and looks likely to fall into recession at some point over the next two years. An escalated trade war, which
would both increase uncertainty and reduce US exports, could tip the economy into an early downturn. The impact on the global
economy could also be severe. The IMF estimates that a renewed trade war could reduce global GDP by up to 0.8 per cent in 2019. If
it tips the US or China into an early recession, the effects will be much starker. Absent demand from the two main engines of growth
since the recession, the global economy’s mounting problems will start to look much more severe. Global debt is now more than
three times the size of world GDP. Globalisation – whether measured by trade or financial flows – appears
to have stalled. And monetary policy has remained extremely loose for a very long time, meaning that when the next recession
does come, there won’t be much more room to cut interest rates. Both sides stand to lose a great deal from another altercation –
which is why many still anticipate that the US and China will reach an agreement before the end of the year. But democracy may yet
prevent tensions from thawing. Workers across the global north have had just about enough of neoliberal globalisation. In the US,
most voters are now highly sceptical about the benefits of free trade. This scepticism helped to quash the Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP) in 2016 when the US Congress refused to ratify the deal. In Europe, anti-EU sentiment is on the rise. The far-right is the main
beneficiary. Nationalist parties are likely to put in a strong showing in the upcoming EU elections. TPP’s European counterpart – the
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) – was also quashed several years ago after a popular backlash. It isn’t hard to
see why these concerns have emerged. Free trade today is not free, and is not strictly about trade. TTIP, which I campaigned against
in 2015, included measures to “open up” public services like the NHS to competition from private US corporations, drive down
regulatory standards in Europe, and create international courts to allow investors to sue democratically-elected governments if they
imposed regulations that harm investors profits. The
most recent wave of globalisation – marked by a
liberalisation of financial flows – delivered few tangible benefits to workers in the global north ,
whilst actively harming the global south. It has instead driven the kind of financial integration
that helped cause the financial crisis, as well as boosting Wall Street and the City at the expense
of manufacturers and exporters. The dispute between the US and China is just the latest
manifestation of a widespread backlash against the unfair, unstable and unsustainable model of
economic integration that has emerged since the financial crisis. Even if the two sides do reach a
deal, protectionism is here to stay.
 Impact Turn – Trade War Good
Trade war is good and necessary for equitable trade agreements, and has
precedent
George Schultze, 7-18-18, George Schultze is a hedge fund manager and the founder
of Schultze Asset Management, “Trade Wars Aren't Desirable, But Sometimes They're
Necessary”, Forbes, 6-28-19, https://www.forbes.com/sites/georgeschultze/2018/07/18/trade-
wars-arent-desirable-but-sometimes-theyre-necessary/#73809bb374e4, AR

In a perfect world, everyone would play fairly and according to the same rules. Trade would freely flow across borders with
no need for restrictions. The laws of supply and demand would drive commercial behavior and set prices; companies would survive or fail based on
their own merits and the quality and value of their products and services. But the world we actually live in is not so fair ,
which is one of the reasons tariffs exist. The most basic definition of a tariff is a tax on imported goods. They can be used by
governments for a number of reasons—to make domestic products more competitive by raising the price of imports, to protect jobs or even as a
foreign policy tool to exert economic leverage on trading partners. While tariffs can be used to accomplish all the previously stated positive aims, on the
downside they can make protected domestic industries less competitive and even hurt consumers through higher prices. They can also foment investor
uncertainty when countries start going tit-for-tat, as we’re starting to see in the U.S.’s trade relationships with China, Europe and other countries. And
while trade wars are not necessarily good, sometimes tough action is warranted. It’s sometimes the
only way to bring an unwilling trading partner to the table in order to negotiate a more
equitable arrangement. A number of our international trade agreements are outdated and while they may have made sense decades ago,
in today’s world they are very one-sided. China is a much more developed country now than it was when Nixon made his historic visit to Beijing. The
same is true of Europe. After World War II, it was in America’s best interest to unilaterally help Europe and Asia rebuild. However, the economic climate
has changed considerably over the last 70 years. Since that time ,the manufacturing sector in the US has been cleaned
out and the level of US imports relative to exports is heavily weighted to imports . Now, after years of empty
threats by Washington politicians about getting tougher with our trading partners , some long-needed actions are finally being

implemented. So far, the US government has announced some $250 billion in proposed tariffs on Chinese goods. To put that into perspective, it
represents about half the value of everything we imported from China last year. Not surprisingly, China has attempt to match the actions taken by the
US but the massive imbalance limits how deeply the Chinese can respond. China can’t impose more than a certain percentage of tariffs for no other
reason than that we buy much more from then than they buy from us. On top of that, their domestic economy is already going through some
unpleasant growing pains. As a result, the Chinese stock market has moved into bear territory and is now down 20% from its peak in January of this
year. And while their official position may be that what the US is doing is unfair and they will match our tariffs
dollar-for-dollar, what’s really unfair is how the trade imbalance has operated for decades. That may be
changing, but it’s probably still too early to tell. Tesla’s recent announcement about building a plant in China without being assigned a domestic joint
venture partner is promising, but it comes with the caveat that the matter still needs to be negotiated. Such “partnerships” in the past have often been
used to unfairly access trade secrets and other proprietary intellectual property .
At this point, it’s not clear if this is only a trade skirmish or in
fact the start of an all-out war, but there was a strong need for a couple of tough initial volleys to be fired
across the Chinese bow in order to bring this rogue trading partner back to the table. We’re still in the
early innings of this ball game and it will be some time before anyone knows how this will all shake out, but over the long term we’ll

have a more balanced trade arrangement with China and probably also with Europe. I have several reasons for
being optimistic, with the foremost one being the slowdown in the Chinese economy. My hope is that our negotiators will be able to find a compromise
that allows the Chinese to save face. International trade doesn’t need to be a zero-sum game. There’s
been a lot of media
coverage about how awful this situation is and how bad a trade war could be, but not a lot of talk about
how awful our prior trade relationships were. Obviously, the markets don’t like any kind of disruption but a lot of the media
coverage has been about the potential unintended consequences of this new tariff regime. What’s been missing from the coverage is a discussion of
how lopsided the prior relationship was and what actions brought us to this point. Anyone
who has studied American
international trade history knows that the US has always imposed tariffs on other countries . One of
the first acts of Congress, following ratification of our Constitution, was passage of the Tariff of 1789. Prior to the institution of the Federal income tax
In recent
in 1913, tariffs were the primary mechanism for generating revenue for the US federal government and at times were as high as 95%.

decades, they’ve been implemented selectively as a tool for managing trade unfairness and what
we’re seeing now is just that. A free market is only good if it’s truly free. When local companies in one country are subsidized, allowed to steal
intellectual property, or unfairly advantaged through currency devaluations, their trading partners can be forced to take tough action in the interest of
fairness. Going
forward, a more balanced trade regime will likely develop between the US and all of
its trading partners. However, the road to fairness may first require unexpectedly hard-nosed negotiation
strategies.

Trade war good, it incentivizes US companies to leave China

Keith Bradsher, 5-17-19, Keith Bradsher is the Pulitzer Prize-winning Shanghai bureau chief
for The New York Times, “As Trade War Rages, China’s Sway Over the U.S. Fades”, New York
Times, 6-28-19, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/17/business/china-trade-influence.html, AR

China usually gets its way. In Washington, on Wall Street and in corporate boardrooms, Beijing has used the country’s size and promise
for decades to quell opposition and reward those who helped its rise. Those days may be coming to an end . As it struggles with

President Trump’s trade war, a maturing and debt-laden China is discovering that it no longer has the
same pull. Members of both political parties in the United States favor a tougher stance against Beijing. Some old business allies are
standing on the sidelines or even cheering the Trump administration’s strong stands . China could still prevail on the trade
war’s major issues. But the conflict’s length and severity reflect the growing perception that the country no longer holds the promise that once
enthralled politicians and businesses in the United States. Many American companies with large, profitable businesses in China do
not want to pay expensive tariffs and worry that the United States is antagonizing the Chinese public,
said Ker Gibbs, the president of the American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai . But many of the same businesses also

chafe at the numerous restrictions that China has long maintained on foreign companies . “We’re
looking at their expanding into global markets, and saying, ‘Wait a minute, why can’t we do that here?’” Mr. Gibbs said . China’s economic

slowdown, which could hinder growth globally, is a major reason its influence has ebbed . But there are other factors. The
country’s heavy debts, built up over years of lending used to spur growth, limit its options. If it retaliates against the United States sharply by devaluing
its currency or shutting factories crucial to global supply chains, the moves could ricochet and hurt its own newfound wealth. Foreign

businesses have found it less appealing to make or sell their products in China over the last
several years because of heavy restrictions on foreign businesses, stronger local competitors
and rising costs. Mr. Trump’s tariffs last year gave many businesses a final reason to look
elsewhere. Call it the ABC supply chain, as in “anywhere but China.” On Wednesday, Kelly A. Kramer, the chief financial officer of Cisco, the big
telecom equipment supplier, told investors that the company had “greatly, greatly reduced” its exposure to China because of the tariffs. Morey, a
company near Chicago that makes rugged electronics for bulldozers and other outdoor equipment, reluctantly paid more for printed circuit boards
made in China after Mr. Trump imposed 10 percent tariffs on $200 billion a year in Chinese imports last fall. With those tariffs now rising to 25 percent,
Morey executives have begun talking to suppliers in Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore . “I was thinking
this is a short-term issue that will go away,” said George Whittier, the company’s president and chief operating officer, “and I don’t think you can
rationally think that any more.” China holds a lot of cards. It remains a huge profit source for Apple, Boeing, General Motors, Starbucks and other major
corporations. It can use its substantial financial firepower and the government’s control over crucial economic levers to endure a protracted trade
conflict, while state-run media outlets help stem discontent at home. Chinese officials and experts say the country can stand firm against Western
pressure. Even some advocates of more market-oriented policies say Beijing should just make its own decisions now instead of tying them to a trade
pact with Washington. “China should focus on its own reform, which will eventually solve some current trade war contentious issues,” said Zhu Ning, a
Tsinghua University economist. Still, China has lost some of the swagger and appeal that once opened so
many doors in Washington and on Wall Street. China has long used its tremendous size and
growth potential as both carrot and stick. Companies that played by its rules could gain access to
a market of more than one billion people who were becoming increasingly affluent and eager to spend. Companies
that complained could be left out. It worked. G.M. and other companies caved in to demands like being
forced to take on local joint venture partners, knowing that they were training future
competitors. General Electric sold one complete diesel locomotive from Erie, Pa., to China, then
taught the Chinese to build their own . Apple censors its App Store in China. When Google protested
censorship and hacking, it was mostly kicked out. Businesses then helped make China’s case in Washington. When China
wanted to join the World Trade Organization, the global trade club, it enlisted Wall Street’s help. Businesses helped persuade

successive American presidents to refrain from punishing China for manipulating its currency,
even as Beijing manipulated its currency. They fought efforts to raise tariffs. China remains vital to many businesses, but the
dynamic has shifted. It still grows at a pace that developed countries envy. But its economy has slowed significantly from rates that as recently as 2010
topped 10 percent a year.
Since Xi Jinping took power in 2012, the government has taken a stronger hand in
business, requiring foreign companies to forge ties with the Communist Party and demanding access to
data. Beijing has fewer ways to strike back against the United States now . Its tremendous success in nurturing its
own homegrown industries, which has helped China’s economy rise up the value chain, has reduced its imports of American goods, giving it fewer
items to hit with tariffs. A
decade ago, China bought Jeeps made in Michigan by Chrysler, bulldozers and other
construction equipment made in Illinois by Caterpillar and huge diesel engines made in Indiana by Cummins. Now Chrysler makes Jeeps

in Changsha and Guangzhou. Caterpillar makes construction equipment in Xuzhou. And Cummins builds engines at factories in Beijing,
Chongqing, Hefei, Liuzhou, Xi’an and Xiangyang. “China has been so effective at squeezing manufactured imports out of its market that it has really
limited its options to retaliate,” said Brad Setser, a Treasury official in the Obama administration who is now an economist at the Council on Foreign
Relations. China’s imports from the United States now fall mostly into four big categories: Boeing aircraft from Washington State; semiconductors,
mainly from Intel factories in Oregon; farm products and energy from the Great Plains and Texas; and German-brand sport utility vehicles from South
Carolina and Alabama. Although China could still shake the American political system if any harsh retaliation hurt economic
growth in the United States, it has fewer opportunities to target electoral swing states and hurt Mr. Trump’s chances of re-election
next year. Slapping tariffs on those industries could also have big drawbacks. China needs those chips for its technology upgrades.
Targeting Boeing planes would shift more Chinese business to Airbus, giving the European aircraft maker more leverage in negotiations with Beijing.
On agriculture, China still does not grow enough soybeans to meet its needs, so higher tariffs on American crops might
simply mean higher food prices down the line. China has also shown surprising vulnerabilities, like its dependence on American
semiconductor technology and software. Last year, when the United States briefly prohibited American companies from selling technology to the
Chinese telecommunications giant ZTE for violating sanctions against Iran and North Korea, ZTE ground to a halt. “The trade friction has also been a
cold shower that has made us see our structural shortcomings more clearly,” said a front-page commentary in People’s Daily on Monday that bore a
pen name used to signal authoritative positions on international relations. China has options besides tariffs, but they have disadvantages as well. It
could sell a large chunk of the $1.3 trillion in United States Treasury debt that it holds. That could temporarily push up American interest rates. But it
would saddle China with large losses. Beijing would have to find someplace else to park the money. Its previous sales, undertaken mainly to shore up
the country’s currency in 2015 and early 2016, did not affect the bond market much. Another option would be for China to let its currency slide in value
against the dollar, making its goods cheaper abroad and offsetting American tariffs. Doing that could prompt the Trump administration to raise its tariffs
even higher. It might also tempt other countries to devalue their currencies, setting off a potentially costly currency war. And a Chinese devaluation
could cause Chinese families and households to send their own savings out of the country. China could crack down on American-owned factories in
China or on those crucial to the supply chains of American companies. But that could lead still more multinational companies to consider leaving the
country. The
dilemma for China is that the longer the trade war lasts, the more companies may
decide to invest elsewhere. For now, domestic politics seem more important in China, with the leadership and the general public
reacting angrily to what is portrayed in the country as peremptory American demands. “We have the confidence and ability to withstand any external
risks and impact,” Geng Shuang, the Foreign Ministry spokesman, said on Thursday

Trade War good, it encourages the digitalization of manufacturing in the US

Michael Mandel, May 14, 2019, chief economic strategist at the Progressive Policy Institute,
“How The China Trade War Will Jump Start Digital Manufacturing”, Forbes, 6-28-19,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelmandel1/2019/05/14/how-the-china-trade-war-will-
jump-start-digital-manufacturing/#170b111a6742, AR
Trade war! In my previous column on China and digital manufacturing, I observed that the low price of Chinese imports has been artificially suppressing
domestic investments in manufacturing automation. The process of digitization is expensive and risky, and rational investors and managers won't spend
money if they know they will be immediately undercut by Chinese competitors . Now President Donald Trump has amped up
a trade war with China. The new tariffs will hit consumers in their wallets, as even Trump economic advisor Larry Kudlow agrees.
Moreover, the trade war runs the risk of boosting inflation, raising interest rates, and potentially tipping the economy into recession. But for

companies in the digital manufacturing space, there's a silver lining to the dark cloud of the trade war.
Suddenly the risk-benefit calculation of investment in digitization starts to look more attractive,
purely as an economic proposition . For one, sourcing parts out of China is becoming riskier and potentially more expensive. With
perfect timing, Xometry, a Gaithersburg, Md-based manufacturing platform which calls itself "the largest on-demand manufacturing marketplace,"

with more than 2500 U.S. manufacturing partners, just announced a $50 million equity funding round to further

build out its capabilities. An article in the Wall Street Journal noted that Xometry's business "can help blunt small
companies’ exposure to price fluctuations and shortages as trade tensions and U.S. tariffs on steel and aluminum make
prices more volatile." "We’ve definitely seen more requests for reshoring but I don’t think the tides have fully turned," adds Dave Evans, CEO and co-
founder at Fictiv, a high-profile San Francisco-based manufacturing platform. Rather, says Evans, companies are "tariff engineering" their product to
reduce costs by making specific parts or assembling locally in the U.S. For manufacturers of robotics and other industrial automation equipment, the
trade war is a mixed bag. On the one hand, domestic companies are gearing up to invest more in robotics. On the
other hand, China has been investing heavily in automation, and those markets may be in trouble as the trade war heats up. For now, manufacturers
are still hoping that the China-US trade war will turn out to be only a skirmish. But at
some point, companies that have relied
on China for their production will decide that the combination of trade tensions and new
technology and new business models--what we have called the Internet of Goods--make it more profitable to
produce in the domestic market for the domestic market . And that's when the digital revolution in manufacturing will
really take off.
 Impact Turn – Trade war Solves IP
Trade war necessary to curb IP theft
Karen Yeung and Sidney Leng, 2-25-19, Karen Yeung joined the Post in 2017 after more
than 15 years' experience on global newswires in Hong Kong and Shanghai, Sidney Leng joined
the Post in 2015 after spending a year and a half working for US media, including National Public
Radio and Foreign Policy Magazine. “US-China trade war: Can China meet US demands on IP
theft and forced technology transfer?”, South China Morning Post, 6-28-19,
https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/2187312/us-china-trade-war-can-
china-meet-us-demands-ip-theft-and, AR

 . The US demand: intellectual property protection and an end to forced technology transfer Foreign companies complain
that China uses administrative tools such as foreign ownership restrictions, business licensing and product approvals to
“coerce” the firms to transfer technology and intellectual property (IP) to Chinese entities. This is
often claimed to be the key to gaining access to a huge consumer market in a nation of 1.4 billion people. Systemic IP theft in China

costs US companies at least US$50 billion per year , according to a US Trade Representative (USTR) report published in April
2018, following an investigation under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. That was the legal basis for the US’ imposing a

25 per cent tariff on US$50 billion of Chinese imports starting in July last year and an additional 10 per
cent tariff on US$200 billion of imports from September . The US claims the Chinese government
is coordinating an espionage campaign designed to capture cutting-edge technology to boost industrial
policy. Outright theft of US IP is a key part of this strategy, the US argues. In addition, the US said Beijing has

strived for years to acquire US companies to obtain trade secrets and commercial information in key
industries to gain a commercial advantage over US firms. Some foreign businesses in China are still required to form joint

ventures with Chinese companies, despite a recent relaxing of foreign ownership requirements in a few mature sectors. These joint
ventures often require some level of technology transfer. The US also charges that Chinese agents
have physically broken into US corporate offices , while China and Chinese companies have
repeatedly paid off corporate insiders at US and other Western companies to simply walk out the
door with high-value trade secrets.

IP theft causes recession and loss of US military dominance that is permanent

because of low interest rates and political gridlock
Mathews Chris, 6-4-19, Mathews is a Market Watch report and David McCormick is chief
executive of the world’s largest and arguably most successful hedge fund and a former Treasury
Department official, “Chinese IP theft is a ‘profoundly real challenge’ for U.S. economy, says
Bridgewater’s McCormick”, Market Watch, 6-28-19,
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/chinese-ip-theft-is-a-profoundly-real-challenge-for-us-
economy-says-bridgewaters-mccormick-2019-06-04, AR

David McCormick — co-chief executive of the world’s largest and arguably most successful hedge fund and a former Treasury
Department official — has a unique vantage point to judge both government policy and financial markets, which he said has left him less
than optimistic about growing trade and geopolitical tensions between the U.S. and China. Before joining Bridgewater Associates in 2009, McCormick
served as undersecretary of the Treasury for international affairs during the George W. Bush administration, where he got an upfront look at U.S. trade
policy in action, as well as the politics of crisis management during the financial crisis. The relationship between the U.S. and China will be “the defining
argued that the
relationship of our time,” McCormick said, during an interview at the Bloomberg Invest conference Tuesday in New York. He

Trump administration is right to drive a hard bargain over the issue of intellectual property theft,
with China and the rest of the world. “That challenge is a very profoundly real challenge,” McCormick said, adding that its a
problem with two facets: economic and military. Worries over an escalating U.S.-China trade war were blamed in large part
for a stock-market retreat in May that saw the S&P 500 SPX, +0.58% and Dow Jones Industrial Average DJIA, +0.28% fall more than 6%. Stocks extended
a decline on Monday in a tech-led selloff tied to worries about increased regulatory scrutiny of major industry players, but rebounded sharply on
Tuesday on more upbeat comments on trade negotiations by Chinese officials as well as remarks by Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell that were
taken as a sign the central bank is leaving the door open to rate cuts.
If the U.S. is lax about its rivals stealing intellectual
property, “it ultimately creates an indigenous capability somewhere else, and there are
economic costs associated with that,” he said. X“The other challenge is new technologies are very
difficult to define as commercial or military. Many of them are dual use, ” he said, adding that policy makers
must be vigilant in determining which technologies should be shared by U.S. corporations with partners or governments abroad, as this

technological transfer could erode U.S. military dominance . It is for this reason, McCormick argued, that the Trump
administration’s tough-on-China stance has become a bipartisan pose, pointing out that the actions aimed at Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei
Technologies Inc. were made possible by new bipartisan legislation that enhanced the U.S. government’s ability to regulate incoming investment and
exports. That doesn’t mean that he is confident that the U.S. will be able to successfully negotiate its rivalry with China, which benefits from the
cumulative wisdom of policy makers who have been managing the Chinese economy, and relations with the U.S., for decades. “There is a very
competent set of people” negotiating with the Trump administration, he said. “The continuity, the sophistication, the understanding of the US, the
understanding of the circumstances, is very significant.” Meanwhile, Americans should also be wary of whether U.S. policy makers
have the wherewithal to manage the economy through the next recession . McCormick lamented that the response to the

2008 financial crisis mounted first by the Bush administration and then continuing in the Obama years wouldn’t be possible today. “ The tools

available [to policy makers] are much more limited than they were during my time,” McCormick said. First,
already low interest rates will make it difficult for the Federal Reserve to counter a recession , given
that the fed-funds rate is not even 2.5%, and the Fed typically lowers rates by twice that much in response to recessions. “But I

think the most important thing is that they are more constrained than ever because of the politics of the day,”

McCormick said. “If you go back to those days of the financial crisis, the 2008 period, it was very controversial but

ultimately both parties came together to take the steps that happened under President Bush and President Obama,” he added.
“If you look at the level of polarization today in the United States, it’s difficult to see how you

could get the alignment that is needed.”

IP is key to sustaining the US dollar and maintaining dollar heg

Herman Mark Schwartz, 5-27-19, Herman Mark Schwartz is Professor of Politics at the
University of Virginia, “American hegemony: intellectual property rights, dollar centrality, and
infrastructural power”, Tandfonline Journal, 6-28-19,
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09692290.2019.1597754, AR
How does dollar centrality persist in the face of continuous US current account deficits and a steadily worsening net international investment position?
Two mechanisms create a structural basis for dollar centrality, explaining how dollars enter global credit markets
and why surplus countries continue to hold dollar-denominated assets. First, institutional structures deriving from late

development suppress domestic demand in major current account surplus countries, making them reliant
on external demand for growth. Local banks recycle those dollars into the global economy, creating huge dollar liabilities and assets
on their balance sheets. This locks them into continued use of the dollar and reliance on the US Federal Reserve during

crises. Second, US firms participating in the global unbundling of production have constructed commodity chains in

which they capture disproportionate shares of global profits through their control over Intellectual

property. These profits sustain valuations and thus the attractiveness of dollar-denominated
assets. Routinization in use of the dollar and compliance with Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS) and US controlled commodity chains creates infrastructural power in Michael Mann’s sense. This

routinization sustains US geo-economic power in the face of persistent current account deficits
and growing net international debt relative to US gross domestic product.
 No Internal Link – Relations Don’t Solve Warming
Increased tensions and strategic differences make U.S.-Sino climate coop
impossible-The U.S. has abandoned climate reform and China is only exporting
emissions
Somini Sengupta, 12-7-2018, Author of "The End of Karma: Hope and Fury Among India's
Young.", "U.S.-China Friction Threatens to Undercut the Fight Against Climate Change," No
Publication, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/07/climate/us-china-climate-change.html FH

They have the largest carbon footprints. Also the largest economies. Now, as diplomats meet in Poland for high-
stakes climate negotiations, a pitched standoff between the United States and China threatens to slow

global action on climate change precisely at a time when the risks of catastrophe are
accelerating. The tensions between Washington and Beijing range from trade to cybersecurity to
military rivalry in the Pacific. And while some of those issues have simmered for years, cooperation in the fight against
climate change had once been a bright spot , so much so that it propelled the creation of the landmark
global agreement in Paris in 2015 to curb greenhouse gas emissions. But then the Trump
administration announced its intention to pull out of the Paris pact altogether , rejecting the scientific
consensus that greenhouse gas emissions are warming the planet. That represented perhaps the most consequential

diplomatic reversal of the Trump era. “The biggest threats to the planet are the lack of U.S.
climate leadership at home and the unwillingness of the U.S. to engage with China ,” said Joanna
Lewis, a China specialist at Georgetown University . “The rest of the world looks to the U.S. and China for leadership, and
it has become clear that, as the alliance has waned, global momentum to address climate
change has slowed.” Taken together, the emissions produced by the United States and China account for more than 40 percent of the global
total. In both countries, emissions went up this year, according to an analysis issued this week by

the Global Carbon Project in which one scientist likened the acceleration of global emissions to
“a speeding freight train.” That fact hovers over Katowice, the Polish city where the United Nations is leading two weeks of talks to figure
out how to implement the Paris Agreement. Adding to the urgency of that meeting, the promises made so far

under the Paris pact are nowhere enough to avert the worst effects of climate change . A United
Nations scientific report issued this fall warned that, if emissions continued to rise at the current rate, the planet

would warm so fast that it could lead to widespread food shortages, wildfires, and floods. It’s hard
to imagine a worse time for the world’s two behemoths — the United States, traditionally representing the rich world

in climate negotiations, and China, representing the developing countries — to be locked in a

cycle of intense distrust at the highest levels . “The U.S.-China climate honeymoon is definitely
over. That much is very clear,” said Li Shuo, a senior policy adviser for Greenpeace Asia, based in
Beijing. “The U.S. is asking a lot but there’s nothing that the U.S. can give. That’s the fundamental

challenge.” For China’s part — even though its emissions have grown in the last two years, mainly because of continued coal use — the country is
on track to meet its modest, self-imposed Paris target, which is to reach peak emissions by 2030. In fact, it appears on track to do so ahead of schedule,
according to independent analysts. It is also ramping up renewable energy sources faster than any country in the world. The emissions intensity of its
economy, geared to manufacture goods for the rest of the world, is declining. At
the same time though, coal plants have not
closed down as fast as some had expected. Much more worrying, China is exporting coal
technology abroad, with its powerful state-owned companies proposing to build coal-fired
power plants from Kenya to Pakistan, effectively exporting its carbon footprint . Now, with additional
economic headwinds from Washington, China confronts a new debate: Should it continue to move rapidly away from its emissions-intensive industrial
economy, or should it simply slow down? Former Vice President Al Gore, who has been closely watching climate diplomacy, said in an interview last
week that although the
trade war with the United States could slow the country’s transition away from
a heavily fossil fuel based economy, he did not think that China would change course. Its leaders are under political pressure to
clean up the air. It is ramping up wind and solar energy sources. It is on track to be the world’s largest electric vehicle market. Its carbon market is to
come into effect next year, though only in a handful of sectors. “They plan their work and work their plan,” Mr. Gore said. “I expect them to continue
on the journey they mapped out regardless of what the U.S. does.” So far, there is no evidence that China is reversing course. Still, the United States
posture, and the concerns over a continued slowdown of the Chinese economy give ballast to Chinese promoters of heavy industry, some China
analysts say, putting President Xi Jinping under considerable pressure. “People are widely concerned that this trade dispute will lead to some
unemployment,” said Zou Ji, the Beijing-based head of the Energy Foundation of China, a group that calls on China to transition away from fossil fuels
to clean energy sources. “I feel the pace of emissions abatement could become slower.” Three key issues pit the United States and
China against each other in the climate negotiations, where American negotiators are participating pending the country’s
formal exit at the end of 2020. First, the United States wants robust rules across the board for all countries

to account for their own emissions and be subject to outside scrutiny. China insists on different
reporting rules for developing countries. China has India on its side on this demand, though not other vulnerable poor countries,
who are wary of looser rules for China. “We are basically designing, in Katowice, a whole set of rules that will bind China but that will not cover the
United States,” said Mr. Li of Greenpeace Asia. “It creates a fundamental sense of unfairness in the Chinese mind.” The rule book, as it’s called, is the
centerpiece of the Katowice negotiations, which began Monday and run through Dec. 14. Second ,
the United States, under the
Trump administration, has pulled back from helping poor countries adapt to the ravages of
climate change. China, which considers itself the leader of the world’s developing countries, is
goading the rich world to pony up — and be held accountable for it . And third, perhaps most importantly, the
test for China is whether, in the face of an American retreat, it will ramp up its ambition to cut emissions in the coming years. The consequences for the
world’s 7.6 billion people are enormous. “It takes the pressure off of greater ambition and faster action,” said Alex Wang, a University of California Los
Angeles law professor who follows China’s environmental policy, of the United States-China tensions. “If you’re coming from the perspective that we’re
already way behind, then the current dynamic is bad.”
Off Case
 Econ DA Link
Signal of abandoning Taiwan crushes arms sales
Chen Kastner and Reed 17. (Ping-Kuei Chen is an assistant professor at the Department of Diplomacy- National
Chengchi University, Scott L. Kastner is a Professor in the Department of Government and Politics at University of Maryland-College
Park, William L. Reed joined the Government and Politics Department in 2009, 2017 “A Farewell to Arms? US Security Relations with
Taiwan and the Prospects for Stability in the Taiwan Strait”) TM FROM THE BOOK- Taiwan and China: Fitful Embrace DOI:
10.1525/j.ctt1w76wpm.15

Likewise, it is not self-evident how large of a signaling effect arms sales have. As we show in the
next section, US arms sales send the clearest signal of US support for Taiwan when the sales are
costly for the United States to undertake. Yet it is quite clear not only that the sales do not
appear to be especially costly for Washington but also that many in the United States actually
benefit economically and politically from the sales. When the Obama administration was
considering the F-16C/D package in 2011, for instance, a large number of US senators signed a
letter to the president urging the sale to go forward; often, the signatories represented states
that stood to benefit economically from increased demand for the fighter jets.21 In other words,
so long as Chinese retaliation against the United States for selling weapons remains limited, the
costs of the policy to Washington do not appear especially high. Thus it would not appear to us
that arms sales represent an especially strong signal of US commitment to Taiwan, meaning that
ending the sales would not necessarily lead Taiwan and China to dramatically alter their
assessments of likely US behavior in the event of a cross-Strait conflict
 Regularization CP – 1nc
Text: The United States federal government should routinize the arms sale
process of Taiwan’s requests for defense articles and services.
CP solves – streamlining the process and focusing on defensive sales creates
stability and improves relations
Russell Hsiao, 4-8-2019, "The Taiwan Relations Act at 40: Reaching a New Optimal Equilibrium
in U.S.-Taiwan Policy," Foreign Policy Research Institute,
https://www.fpri.org/article/2019/04/the-taiwan-relations-act-at-40-reaching-a-new-optimal-
equilibrium-in-u-s-taiwan-policy/

Routinize Arms Sales: The United States, as stipulated under the TRA and reinforced by the recently proposed
Taiwan Assurance Act of 2019, “conducts regular transfers of defense articles to Taiwan in order to enhance its
self-defense capabilities.”[7] Just in September 2018, the U.S. State Department approved a $330 million
military sale to Taiwan.[8] However, regardless of past and recent practices of arm sales to Taiwan , the United States
should routinize the arms sale process for addressing Taiwan’s requests for defense articles and
services; provide a timely response to requests as well as commercial export licenses; and base arms sales decisions on Taiwan’s
strategic and operational requirements, which are inherently defensive in nature and serve U.S. interests.
In keeping with the terms of the Reagan’s Six Assurances, Beijing should not be consulted in
advance of arms sales to Taiwan. (5) People-to-People Exchange: The U.S. State Department should launch a new
initiative to enhance people-to-people exchanges with Taiwan, especially in the areas of education and culture. The United States
government should support the development of more nonprofit educational organizations that encourage mutual understanding
among citizens of the two nations. Adjusting
the U.S. approach toward its Taiwan policy and cross-Strait
relations to ensure that the TRA-created framework is able to manage the current and future
challenges ahead demands a new approach that fundamentally extends greater legitimacy to
democratic Taiwan politically, economically, and militarily. Sustained and high-level discussion is needed now more than ever
before between the United States and Taiwan to determine a new optimal equilibrium that best reflects the objective reality in the
Strait.
 Regularization CP - Solvency
Chinese reaction to Taiwan arm sales has significantly cooled, no risk of Chinese
aggression to increased US arms sales, regularization solves
Michal Thim, 10/08/18, Michal Thim is a Taiwan analyst at the Association for International
Affairs (Czech Republic) and an Asia-Pacific Desk contributing analyst for Wikistrat "How US’
smaller arms sales to Taiwan may mean bigger problems for China," South China Morning Post,
https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/asia/article/2166594/behind-us-smaller-
arms-package-taiwan-lie-bigger, MMC

United States arms sales to Taiwan usually provoke an angry rebuke from Beijing. The
notification, published by the Defence Security Cooperation Agency on September 24, indicating
future arms sales to Taiwan valued at some US$330 million , is a case in point. China’s foreign
ministry spokesperson Geng Shuang denounced the sale as a breach of China’s sovereignty and
demanded an end to US-Taiwan arms sales. Needless to say, Taiwan has praised the decision
and thanked Washington for its continuous support. Beijing’s go-to reaction in the past was to
suspend military exchanges with the US , knowing that the Pentagon places a high value on
military-to-military contacts with the People’s Liberation Army. Military exercises around Taiwan are another
popular item in Beijing’s toolbox. However, this time, due to an overabundance of disputes between Washington and Beijing, China
also had to respond to the US placing sanctions on the PLA’s Equipment Development Department for the purchase of Russian
Sukhoi Su-35 fighter jets and advanced air defence systems from Moscow’s state exporter Rosoboronexport, which is under US
sanctions. In response, Beijing cancelled the US Navy warship USS Wasp’s visit to Hong Kong and planned talks between the two
militaries. Onthe face of it, the content of the latest arms sale does not look particularly
concerning to Beijing. The total size of the sale is much less than the US$1.4 billion approved last
June. Unlike the sale in 2017 – which included heavyweight torpedoes for Taiwan’s submarine force - the 2018 sale does not bring
any new capability for Taiwan. The whole package is reserved for the supply of spare parts and logistics support for Taiwan’s fighter
fleet and other planes, including F-16 Vipers and indigenously developed defence fighters. The sale is part of the Cooperative
Logistics Supply Support Arrangement deal. The spare parts package may seem underwhelming considering that this is a second
arms sale to Taiwan under Donald Trump’s administration. Taipei has been reportedly considering a letter of request for M1 Abrams
battle tanks or fifth-generation F-35B stealth jets, but no official order has been placed yet. Should Taiwan be worried if it loses all its
allies? However, the content of the sale is not the most crucial aspect, although its utility to Taiwan’s air force cannot be overstated.
The fact that the sale is just about supply and logistics suggest a change in attitude on the US
side. First, the items were approved on a continuing basis and as needed and available. Second,
the Trump administration has not only moved from large bundles every few years to sales on an
annual basis, but it may also indicate a move away from bundling orders altogether. In the past,
and especially during Barack Obama’s two terms, the US government came across as too
accommodating in trying to navigate relations with Taiwan in a way that would not upset
Beijing, and Chinese leaders seized on every opportunity to capitalise . The result was that arms
sales to Taiwan were bundled into large packages and separated by long periods of no activity ,
though the ever-growing military capability of the PLA warranted a response via robust arms
sales, as presumed by the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979. Something as routine as a supply of
spare parts under the logistics agreement became subject to political considerations. Now,
Washington may be returning to normal . The arms sales notification was not the only good news for Taiwan.
Lockheed Martin announced that it had received an order for 18 Sniper advanced targeting pods from Taiwan. Taiwanese pilots
tested two sets of the pods after their sale was announced in 2015, and the new order indicates that the trials were satisfactory.
Sniper targeting pods increase Taiwan’s capability to strike targets from greater distances and in low visibility. Taiwanese President
Tsai Ing-wen inspects Mirage 2000 fighter jets in August 2017. Taiwan recently reached a deal with France on upgrades to the jets, a
sign that Europe may be more interested in working with Taipei and confronting Beijing. Taiwan recently reached a deal with France
on upgrades to the jets, a sign that Europe may be more interested in working with Taipei and confronting Beijing. However, Beijing
does not just have the US to worry about. Taiwanese media reported on September 26 about two contracts with France on training
and upgrades to nearly 50 French-made Mirage 2000 high-altitude fighter jets in Taiwan’s air force inventory. Moreover, Taiwan’s
defence ministry decided on a European design for Taiwan’s Indigenous Defence Submarine project. The media has speculated that
French shipbuilder Direction des Constructions Navales Services and German Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft were among the
contenders, and one of them is likely to be the winner. The French connection to Taiwan’s defence modernisation is a timely
reminder that European defence industry companies are present and active in Taiwan. With France and Germany leading European
resistance against adverse effects of the Belt and Road Initiative, and greater scrutiny over Chinese investment in and acquisition of
strategic industries, Europe’s arms suppliers may find the situation ripe for taking a greater share in Taiwan’s defence projects. Their
governments may very well give them the green light. It
is too early to say if the latest arms sale to Taiwan will
deliver on its promise of normalising the process of arms sales and (to the extent possible)
depoliticising decisions on arms sales by removing undue deference to Beijing’s perceptions. As
US backlash mounts, should Beijing rethink its squeeze on Taiwan? America’s Taiwan policy includes the
peaceful resolution of the dispute between Taipei and Beijing, one that will respect the will of Taiwanese people. To this end, arms
sales should be judged on their contribution to Taiwan’s defence posture and the gravity of the military threat stemming from
Beijing’s actions and the PLA’s capabilities. What
is clear is that the US is eager to reshape the whole process
of arms sales in a direction that would be beneficial for Taipei and Washington. Moreover,
recent activity from European suppliers might indicate a greater willingness to confront Beijing.
China’s proclivity for doing more of the same, including sanctions on military exchanges with the
US and military intimidation of Taiwan, seems to be working in the opposite direction .

No risk of Chinese aggression, economic pressure checks conflict

Mina E. Tanious , 2019, General Authority for Investment and Free Zones (GAFI), Giza, Egypt
and Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Cairo University, Giza, Egypt "The impact of
economic interdependence on the probability of conflict between states," No Publication,
https://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/full/10.1108/REPS-10-2018-010, MMC
A-The impact on Taiwan–China conflict: it is plausible to argue that business interests are likely to impose
restraint by both Taipei and Beijing . It is also a widely held belief among government officials and
academia that trade and investment with the mainland might reduce incentives for the PRC to
use force. In his book The Lexus and the Olive Tree, Thomas Friedman asserted that the economic ties between
mainland China and Taiwan greatly affect the possibility of military conflict between the two
sides since such a development would cause “mutual assured economic destruction”.

Regularizing arms sales solve

Piin-Fen Kok & David J. Firestein 2013 EastWest Institute Threading The Needle Proposals
for U.S. and Chinese Actions on Arms Sales to Taiwan The EastWest Institute is an international,
non-partisan, not-for-profit policy organization focused on confronting critical challenges that
endanger peace. https://www.eastwest.ngo/sites/default/files/TAS%20Final%20%2528ISSUU
%20VERSION%209_17_2013%2529.pdf

The United States should unbundle future Taiwan arms sales notifications to Congress (“Congressional
notifications”) and instead submit such notifications on a regular, predictable and normalized schedule, thus
mitigating the perception of major spikes in the sales of U.S. arms to Taiwan created by bundled notifications.
Perceptions matter. A $6 billion arms package divided into several smaller notifications appears
less attention-grabbing than the same package in one notification, even though the total dollar value is the same. While
the unbundling of Congressional notifications will not stop China from continuing to object to the very
principle of arms sales to Taiwan, it will help to ease public concerns about “overselling” (in the eyes of
the Chinese) or “underselling” (from the perspective of supporters of arms sales—including Congress—when no sales are announced
during the intervening periods between the spikes). Scheduling Congressional notifications in a regular, predictable
and normalized manner also eliminates the guesswork regarding the timing and amount of the next major sale, and injects
a
greater amount of stability and predictability in the U.S.-China (and indeed, U.S.-Taiwan) relationship.

Reducing and regularizing arms sales solves US cred, Taiwan stability, US China
Relations
Ding Yu, 12-2-17, Yu Ding is a graduate student at Elliott School of International Affairs, George
Washington University. She focuses on US-China relations, Geopolitics in Northeast Asia, “A
Smarter Way to Sell Arms to Taiwan”, International Policy Digest, 6-25-19,
https://intpolicydigest.org/2017/12/02/a-smarter-way-to-sell-arms-to-taiwan/, AR

China’s severe complaints about U.S. arms sales raise insecurity and doubts not only in Taiwan,
but also with other U.S. allies in the region: South Korea and Japan. With the suggested
approach—selling more arms, but below the radar — the United States can uphold its security
commitments as well as international obligations. It will significantly enhance U.S. credibility in
the region, especially among U.S. allies. Stabilize U.S.-Taiwan-China trilateral relations. Smaller
arms deals between the U.S. and Taiwan are much less likely to irritate China. China will find it
difficult to impose severe sanctions because of an arms deal only worth millions of dollars. The
U.S. has been balancing between China and Taiwan since 1979, and has successfully avoided
significant conflict across the strait. Peace has provided the environment for the growth of
Taiwan’s democracy, as well as the vast increase of trade between the U.S. and China. This
policy will help the U.S. to maintain the status quo. Secure Taiwan and its democracy. The
increased number of arms sold will equip Taiwan with better capability to deter China. If China
were to conduct an attack, Taiwan would be able to resist longer before the U.S. came to
rescue. Facing the rapid rise of Chinese military power and the prospect of decreased U.S. arms
sales, Taiwan has become more and more vulnerable against China. This policy will help to
secure Taiwan and its democracy.
 Grand Bargain CP – 1nc
TEXT: The United States federal government should agree to end its security
commitment to Taiwan if and only if China ends its maritime disputes and
accepts the US security role in the region.
China says yes and it solves for great power war; key to creating peace, even if
China says no U.S gains valuable information on Chinese intent.
Charles L. Glaser, Spring 2015:, A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? Wilson Center,
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/isec_a_00199.pdf
The Logic of a Grand Bargain The preceding assessment lays bare the complexity of a U.S. policy of territorial accommodation. On the one hand,
ending the U.S. commitment to Taiwan could greatly reduce and might even eliminate the
possibility of a large war between the United States and China by keeping the United States out
of a China-Taiwan conflict. In addition, accommodation could improve China’s understanding of U.S.
goals and its image of the United States, and moderate military competition in Northeast Asia ,
thereby setting U.S.-China relations on a promising trajectory that takes advantage of the relatively

benign structural environment in which China’s rise will occur. On the other hand, accommodation would be costly—running contrary
to U.S. political and ideological interests—and risky, possibly reducing U.S. security by fueling Chinese underestimates of U.S. resolve and by
encouraging China to adopt more extensive geopolitical aims. The United States’ choice of whether to end its commitment to defend Taiwan is
complicated further by uncertainty about the nature and extent of China’s goals.If China places relatively little value on
expanding its control and influence beyond Taiwan, then even if U.S. accommodation generated
doubts about U.S. resolve, they would be of little consequence . In contrast, if China highly values winning all of its
maritime disputes and pushing the United States out of Northeast Asia, then reductions in U.S. credibility would be more costly. Similarly , if

China’s aims are both limited and stable, then U.S. accommodation would not risk creating a
more dangerous China. In contrast, if China’s goals are still evolving and if U.S. accommodation would empower domestic hard-liners, then
U.S. security would be reduced. Therefore, the question arises whether policies exist that would reduce the risks while preserving the beets of U.S.
If combining certain concessions by China in an overall package—a grand
accommodation on Taiwan.

bargain, for lack of a better term—could achieve this goal, then the United States’ best option
might be to make ending its commitment to Taiwan contingent on China making concessions of
its own. The preceding analysis suggests that the United States should design such a grand bargain with a
variety of purposes in mind: to gain information about the nature and extent of China’s motives;
to demonstrate its resolve to retain U.S. security commitments in the region; and, related, to
preserve the credibility of its commitments to its allies. Likely the most common way to envision a grand bargain is as an
agreement in which two actors make concessions across multiple issue to create a fair deal—that is, one in which both benefit equally—that would
have been impossible in an agreement that dealt with a single issue. A different way to envision a grand bargain is as an agreement in which the states
trade across multiple issues, making both states better off, but not necessarily equally. A grand bargain in Northeast Asia is likely to take the latter form,
partly because the agreement would be in response to a power shift that favors China and partly because China’s interests in the region are greater
than those of the United States. The
first component of a grand bargain, and probably the most important,
would be for China to resolve its maritime disputes on “fair” terms . Oddly, there seems to be both a little and a
lot at stake in these disputes. Gaining sovereignty over the offshore islands would strengthen China’s claims to the oil and gas reserves, which have
increased the importance of the disputes. At the same time, however, the disputes have severely hindered the exploration and extraction of these
resources, and joint extraction and sharing agreements could provide all parties with substantial resource benefits. Growing nationalism has given the
disputed territorial claims importance far beyond their material and strategic value, and it has damaged the prospects for any type of agreement.
involved in these disputes, but it could encourage or pressure its allies to make compromises . An ideal solution would be for China
and its neighbors to place the territories under some sort of international control as a maritime
preserve and to share the resources. Other solutions include joint governance over the use of the islands/islets, agreement not to
object to other states’ sovereignty claims, and agreement to end unilateral military patrols near the disputed territories. China’s willingness

to reach an agreement on the offshore islands and related maritime disputes would provide the
United States with valuable information. Most obviously, it would demonstrate that China’s
aims are limited (at least for now). Closely related, it would demonstrate a degree of reasonableness in
Chinese foreign policy priorities and decision making : given that the value of Taiwan dwarfs the value of these maritime
disputes, Chinese unwillingness to reach this type of bargain would indicate deep inflexibility in its emerging foreign policy and possibly overconfidence
in its ability to use its growing power to achieve all of its aims. China’s claims in these disputes are also weaker than its claims to Taiwan: for example,
China did not claim the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands until 1970, which suggests that it should be able to moderate this claim if the benefits were sufficiently
large. In addition, an
agreement would provide the United States with insights into the balance of
power within China’s foreign policy decision making . If China’s more assertive policies have rejected the growing influence
of the People’s Liberation Army, narrow nationalist pressures, or both, then Chinese concessions would demonstrate that the country’s leaders could
control these forces when the stakes are sufficiently large. Taken as a whole, this
information about China’s goals would
make U.S. accommodation over Taiwan less risky . Insisting on Chinese concessions would also demonstrate U.S. resolve to
protect American interests. By making its willingness to end its commitment to Taiwan contingent on

Chinese concessions, the United States would make clear that it is willing to run the risk of
protecting Taiwan and its allies’ interests in the South China and East China Seas, if China were
uncompromising. Once again, the key issue from the U.S. perspective comes back to information
—if China is more likely to have unlimited aims, then the risks of U.S. accommodation are larger
and the United States should therefore be less willing to adopt this strategy . As argued above, China’s
refusal to accept a grand bargain, especially one that is so clearly weighted toward its interests (unless China is determined to push the United States
out of Northeast Asia), would indicate more ambitious Chinese aims. Thus, compared to unilateral concessions, insisting on a package deal that
included Chinese concessions would demonstrate a higher level of U.S. resolve. In addition ,
resolution of the maritime disputes
would directly increase U.S. security by eliminating disputes that, via alliance commitments,
could draw the United States into dangerous crises with China. A second component of a grand
bargain would be official Chinese acceptance of the United States’ long-term security role in East
Asia, including its alliances and forward-deployed forces. There have been periods when China viewed the U.S.-Japan
alliance relatively favorable. For example, in 1980 China’s leader, Hua Guofeng, stated: “We appreciate Japan’s efforts to strengthen its alliance with
the United States.” Since then a variety of factors, including the decline of Soviet power and the redefinition of the U.S.-Japan alliance starting in the
mid-1990s have reduced, if not eliminated, China’s positive assessment. In recent years, some Chinese elites have begun expressing harshly negative
views. For example, in 2014 the deputy chief of the general staff of the People’s Liberation Army described the U.S. alliance system as “an antiquated
relic of the Cold War that should be replaced by an Asia-centric security architecture.” Although open to varying interpretations, President Xi Jinping’s
call for an Asian security order managed by Asian countries and his criticism of “alliances as unhelpful for the region’s security” can be viewed as
offering a vision of the future in which the United States no longer plays a security role in East Asia. Increasingly, there is support in China for the
conclusion that “in Beijing’s eyes, the U.S. led security architecture is outliving the usefulness it once provided by ensuring the regional stability
necessary for China’s development. Instead, China views the alliance system as increasingly incapable of providing lasting security and itself a potential
source of threat.” Especially
in light of Beijing’s increasingly negative assessment, official recognition
and acceptance of the United States’ continuing alliance commitments would be a valuable
signal (not cheap talk). It would indicate the dominance of certain domestic forces over others
and the Chinese leadership’s willingness to accept domestic political costs to advance China’s
foreign policy. Such action would not guarantee stability in China’s policy, but it would provide greater confidence that China was willing to
accept a revised geopolitical status quo. Maybe more important, if China were unwilling (or unable) to provide this official acceptance, the United
States would have to be more worried that China’s leaders believe that its role in East Asia requires pushing the United States out of the region. A grand
bargain would not constitute the entirety of U.S. policy—unilateral measures and alliances would remain essential components of the United States’
policy toward Northeast Asia. When uncertain about an adversary’s motives or when facing a state with mixed motives—a combination of security
seeking and greed—a state should pursue a mix of cooperative and competitive policies.107 Maintaining
and enhancing U.S.
commitments to the region would provide some of the necessary balance in the overall policy of
the United States. These components of U.S. policy would be necessary and appropriate even if China were unwilling to make the types of
concessions discussed above, but they would become even more important in the context of a grand bargain. The key challenge is for the United States
to sustain its credibility for protecting its allies. As already discussed, to help accomplish this, the United States could commit additional forces to the
region, forward deploy larger forces, invest more in overall U.S. military capabilities, and increase the integration of alliance military planning. These
measures would provide the additional benefits of helping to offset increases in China’s military power and to sustain the grand bargain by enhancing
the U.S. ability to deter China from breaking the agreement. There is a potential downside, however: increased U.S. capabilities would likely appear
threatening to China. But this danger would be reduced by America’s ending its commitment to Taiwan because a U.S. buildup would no longer
threaten this vital Chinese interest and would therefore be more clearly intended only to defend U.S. allies. If, however, China wants to push the United
States out of the East Asia, then it would be strongly opposed to, and provoked by, these measures. In this case, though, given the priority that U.S.
grand strategy places on preserving the United States’ alliances in East Asia, increasing U.S. capabilities would enhance its security.
 Grand Bargain CP – Solves Resolve
Grand Bargain Solves
Chen Kastner and Reed 17. (Ping-Kuei Chen is an assistant professor at the Department of Diplomacy- National
Chengchi University, Scott L. Kastner is a Professor in the Department of Government and Politics at University of Maryland-College
Park, William L. Reed joined the Government and Politics Department in 2009, 2017 “A Farewell to Arms? US Security Relations with
Taiwan and the Prospects for Stability in the Taiwan Strait”) TM FROM THE BOOK- Taiwan and China: Fitful Embrace DOI:
10.1525/j.ctt1w76wpm.15

Doing so, proponents suggest, would remove a major irritant in the US-China relationship and would increase trust and cooperation
in bilateral relations.6 More fundamentally, proponents of a reduced US commitment to Taiwan suggest that
such a policy approach would help lower the risk of armed conflict in East Asia. This argument is developed
most fully by Charles Glaser,7 who suggests that ending the US commitment to defend Taiwan would bring
with it two significant benefits for the US-China relationship. First, it could improve US-China relations because
such a shift in US policy would remove a key source of mistrust in Beijing concerning US motivations. Second,
ending US support for Taiwan—by removing the key potential source of military conflict between China and the United States
—would reduce military competition between Washington and Beijing. Glaser thus proposes a “grand
bargain,” in which the United States would end its commitment to Taiwan in return for Chinese
willingness to “resolve its maritime disputes on ‘fair’ terms” and to accept a long-term US
security presence in East Asia.

CP Solves U.S. resolve

Glaser 15
(Charles, professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs and the Department of Political
Science at George Washington University, Spring 2015 “A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard
Choice between Military Competition and Accommodation”)
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/isec_a_00199.pdf

Insisting on Chinese concessions would also demonstrate U.S. resolve to protect American
interests. By making its willingness to end its commitment to Taiwan contingent on Chinese concessions, the United States
would make clear that it is willing to run the risk of protecting Taiwan and its allies’ interests in the
South China and East China Seas, if China were uncompromising. Once again, the key issue from the U.S. perspective comes back to
information—if
China is more likely to have unlimited aims, then the risks of U.S. accommodation
are larger and the United States should therefore be less willing to adopt this strategy.
 Grand Bargain CP AT: Japan DA
Japan is moving closer to China- not the US
Kristin Huang, June 27 2019, "China ‘wants security relationship with Japan’ as it looks for
friends," South China Morning Post,
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3016221/china-wants-new-security-
relationship-japan-us-trade-war

Against this backdrop,

Abe visited China last year, making it the first by a Japanese prime minister to China since late 2011.
Abe’s trip saw deals worth US$18 billion being signed – which Chinese Premier Li Keqiang described as a sign of the
“bright prospects” for their future economic relationship – and Xi Jinping’s visit to Japan later this week for the Group of 20 summit
could bring further progress in this area. The
two sides might use the opportunity to discuss further relaxing
the controls on Japanese food imports and Japanese involvement in Xi’s signature infrastructure policy, the Belt
and Road Initiative. They have moved closer since Donald Trump became US president in 2017 and
prompted uncertainty both in Beijing and Tokyo about their future relations with the United States – something Beijing
hopes will stop the Japanese supporting Trump’s efforts to further isolate China on the world stage. For its part, Japan fears it
will be the next target of Trump’s protectionist measures after he threatened to raise tariffs on Japanese cars
and expressed a wish to increase US food exports.

Japan and India are the bedrock of Indo-Pac stability

Ians, 1-29-2019, "India-Japan-US ties key to Indo-Pacific stability: Sasakawa," Economic Times
Mobile, https://m.economictimes.com/news/defence/india-japan-us-ties-key-to-indo-pacific-
stability-sasakawa/articleshow/67737205.cms

"India, Japan and the US are important countries of this region... and recently Australia too
joined these three countries," he said. ET Prime STRATEGY Learn ‘ABC’ before making a lithium
battery Read 2 More Stories India, the US, Japan and Australia revived a quad in 2017 that seeks
to work for peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific, a region that stretches from the east coast of
Japan to the east coast of Africa. This comes in the face of Beijing's growing influence in the
region and Beijing's belligerence n the South China Sea. Sasakawa said that the quad's work was
not going to be easy because of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). "Under the BRI, Sri Lanka
has handed over the Hambantota port to China on a 99-year lease. In the South Pacific, Tonga
with which Japan has a very good relationship, is trapped by Chinese ODA (Overseas
Development Aid) loans," he said. ADVERTISEMENT Sasakawa also referred to Beijing's growing
influence in the Maldives and Chinese ODA loans to come to African countries and warned that
it might be already too late to contain China. Speaking on the occasion, Sikkim's lone Lok Sabha
MP P.D. Rai referred to the World Economic Forum (WEF) Global Report 2019 which saw more
instability in the world and said that the world was trying to contain China in an uncertain way.
With the general election around the corner, Rai said that the world will look at India, the great
democracy, and how it continues with its democratic traditions. He described the long
relationship between India and Japan as "a bedrock of stability", adding that "it will bring a lot of
stability in South Asia and East Asia". Referring to Japan's development aid work in northeast
India, Rai said New Delhi had a strong partner in the region. "Japan plays a significant and
strategic role in the northeast. The economic ties that bring us together will play an important
role here." Founding Trustee of the Ananta Aspen Centre and former Director General CII Tarun
Das stressed on the importance of a Track II dialogue between India and Japan. Das recalled
former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh asking the Centre in 2005 to start an unofficial dialogue
with Japan on the lines of what it did with the US in the years prior to that. "But the road to
Tokyo was not direct and we had to go via Washington. We started the dialogue on a trilateral
basis and only later it became bilateral." Stating that this new initiative at both the government
and non-government levels was only a decade old, Das said that both India and Japan were
trying to build maritime, defence and nuclear cooperation under this. "We have to work
together to counter China," he stated.