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Probation Law
Probation Law
Probation is not coterminous with its period. There must be first issued by
the court of an order of final discharge based on the report and recommendation
of the probation officer. Only from such can the case of the probationer be
deemed terminated.
FACTS
penalized under Article 172 of the RPC. The respondent judge who gave the decision
granted the application for probation of the petitioner. The expiration of the probation
was set on August 10, 1983, one year from the promulgation of judgement allowing
probation. After the lapse of the period, however, the final discharge of the petitioner
was not granted since the probation officer has not submitted its final report on the
grounds that he has violated the conditions of his probation. Petitioner then argued he
was no longer in probation since the 1 year had already lapsed. Moreover, petitioner
filed a motion to dismiss against respondent’s petition since the trial court who granted
Respondent judge denied the petition. Hence, the present petition under Rule 65
ISSUE
RULING
YES. Section 16 of PD 968 states that expiration of the probation period does not
automatically terminate probation. In order for the final discharge to be granted, it must
be based on the report and recommendation of the probation officer. In the absence of
the final order of discharge the probations still subsists unless otherwise revoked.
In the case at bar, the court revokes petitioner’s probation since, he has not
subjected himself to the principles and objectives of probation. He has not been
documents which is sufficient grounds that he has not yet reformed. Therefore, it was
proper for the Court to revoke his probation and impose upon him the original sentence.
As to the question of jurisdiction, the Court did not grant the petition. Pursuant to
BP 129 the Courts in Makati and in Manila are co-equal and coordinate courts, the
totality of which is one Regional Trial Court. Hence, despite the change of venue of
petitioner’s residence, it does not hamper the Trial Court from revoking his probation.
URBANO M. MORENO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTION et al.
from running a public office because the accessory penalty of suspension from
FACTS
A case was filed against petitioner to disqualify him from running as Punong
Barangay on the grounds of conviction by final judgement from the crime of Arbitrary
Detention punished under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner Moreno
argued that the petition has no cause of action since he was already granted probation.
He cites the case of Baclayon v. Mutia, where imposition of penalties and accessory
cites Section 16 of the Probation Law, where the final discharge of probation shall
respondent argues that the grant of probation to petitioner merely suspended the
execution of his sentence, but did not affect his disqualification from running into office.
Before the Supreme Court, petitioner argues that Section 40 of the LGC does not apply
to him since he did not serve his sentence, and since he is a probationer, no sentence
or imposition of penalties was rendered. Because of this, he further argues that the
ISSUE
RULING
NO. The phrase “within two years after service of sentence” in Article 40 of the
LGC, should be interpreted and understood to apply to both those who have been
sentenced by final judgement for an offense involving moral turpitude, and to those who
have been sentenced by final judgement for an offense punishable by 1 year or more.
Likewise, the phrase “service of sentence” from the same provision, should be
The COMELEC, however, has extended the meaning of the same phrase to include
those who were granted probation. During probation, probationer is not disqualified from
running public officer because the accessory penalty of suspension from public office is
not yet imposed. Clearly, the period which a person has undergone, under probation
of liberality towards the accused. Such philosophy is not served by a harsh and
FACTS
frustrated homicide. Based on testimony of private respondent and victim Rufino that
petitioner snuck behind him and struck him with a stone on the hand. Based on the
Medico Legal Certificate, Rufino suffered two lacerations on the forehead. Petitioner in
his defense claimed self-defense against Rufino and two other mean. He stated that
private respondents along with two other men were drunk and when he asked them on
the whereabouts of the Mayor of Tigaon, Rufino pushed him and the other men boxed
Upon appeal of the decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the findings and decision of
the RTC. In addition, the CA did not grant petitioner’s prayer for a lesser penalty. Before
the Supreme Court, petitioner argues that he is entitled to apply for probation in case
the Court metes out a lesser penalty to him. On the other hand, the Solicitor General
argues that the Probation Law will not apply to him since he already perfected an
ISSUE
RULING
YES. Citing Palaganas v. People, the prosecution must establish with certainty
the nature, extent, depth and severity of the victim’s wound. In the case at bar, the
Medico Legal failed to show that Rufino’s head injuries were severe as to cause danger
to his life. With the lack of evidence to support the prosecution’s claim, the decision
erred in it decision to convict petitioner with frustrated homicide. What petition is guilty is
only attempted homicide, which is a probationable. With the new penalty, Arnel is can
probation. This Court clears out the dilution by stating that petitioner did no appeal from
a judgement that would allow him to apply for probation. He did not have a choice
between appeal and probation. Had the RTC imposed the correct penalty, then a
different situation would have happened since, petitioner is confronted with either
appeal or probation.
ARTEMIO VILLAREAL v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 1512578, 1 December, 2013, SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION, (Sereno, J.)
An application for probation must be filed with the trial court that convicted
FACTS
Petitioner filed before the Supreme Court a petition for Reconsideration and
Clarification concerning its decision modifying the judgement of the Court of Appeals,
finding Tecson and Dizon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence
punishable by Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioners seek clarification as to
the imposed penalty upon them by the Supreme Court. Since, they already filed for
probation and have been discharged, hence, the case is already disposed. The OSG
questions the jurisdiction of the Trial Court where the petitioners filed for petitioner since
it was not the court that rendered the judgement in the criminal case against them
ISSUE
RULING
NO. Pursuant to Section 4 of the Probation Law, the probation granted by RTC
Branch No. 130 will not be accepted as it is not the same court who rendered the
conviction against petitioner. Petitioners are not at liberty to choose the forum in which
they seek.
FACTS
Jalosjos and Cardino filed separate special civil actions against the resolution of
the COMELEC. Cardino asserts that Jalosjos is disqualified from running for Mayor of
Zamboanga Del Norte, since he is convicted of committing robbery, and yet he states in
his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to run. Jalosjos countered that he had
ISSUE
RULING
NO. Based from the facts of the case, the probation argued by Jalosjos was
fraudulently issued, therefore concluding that he has not yet served his sentence, which
implies that he is still serving the penalty of perpetual special disqualification, which
entails that he is prohibited from running or holding any office, pursuant to Article 40 of
the LGC.