PERFECTO FERRER et al. v. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS et al.

G.R. No. L-242267-8, 31 May, 1966, (Concepcion, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Although the Management may have had the strict legal right to take

against union members the disciplinary and other administrative measures above

referred to, there is no denying the fact that the time chosen by the Management

therefor, when considered in relation with the attending circumstances,

reasonably justified the belief of the Union that the real or main purpose of the

Management was to discourage membership in the Union, to discredit the

officers thereof, to weaken the Union and to induce or compel the same to sign

the draft of agreement Exhibit D as amended, on May 29 and 30 or 31, 1963. As

stated in the decision of His Honor, the trial Judge, said belief was confirmed by

the fact that prosecutors of the Court of Industrial Relations found sufficient

grounds to file and did file, against the Management, a complaint for unfair labor

practices

FACTS

An election has been conducted to which the winner Union entered into

negotiation with the company. As the negotiation progresses, three drafts of the

consolidated agreement were made. The first draft, the agreed terms were incorporated

which was followed by further negotiations. Upon finishing the second draft, to which

Management treated it as final, petitioner pressed for the inclusion of increase in COLA,

accumulated sick leave, etc, which was granted. In the third draft, to which management
again treated as the final draft, petitioner pushed for the inclusion of a union shop or

union security clause. This was not granted. The Union did not sign the agreement. The

Management then circularized the EEs informing the union’s refusal to sign the contract

which provoked a number of resignations from the union.

Hence, petitioner filed a notice of strike on the grounds of the employer

bargaining in bad faith, and carried out the said strike, whereas the latter filed unfair

labor practice against the union for refusal to bargain

ISSUE

WON the strike was illegal?

RULING

NO. Based on the circumstances of the case, petitioners were justified out in

staging a strike, on the belief that the respondent’s act constituted ULP. It is not true

that petitioner and the Union made new demands of the inclusion of the union security

clause, but in fact, it was part of the original list of agreement brought by them. After the

incorporation of some points, it did not mean that the Union abandoned the inclusion of

the said security clause which would be taken up later.

It appears that when the Union presented to its members the third draft which did

not contain the union security clause, the members withdrew from their representatives

the authority to sign on their behalf, the CBA with Management. Under this

circumstances, the representatives of the Union cannot validly sign the agreement

which is not tantamount to bad faith. For the Management, the argument of the Union’s

representative that they had no authority to sign the agreement was only an excuse
which led the former to issue the memorandum saying that Union refused to sign the

agreement, but also came out with a new demand of a union security clause. This led

some members of the Union to resign upon the apparent failure of the Union to enter

into a working agreement. This is false, because the Management had already yielded

to some of the benefits raised by the Union.

In light of this, it was only natural for the petitioner to believe that such

resignations had been inspired by Management, and that the latter had resorted to such

acts in order to exert pressure upon the Union to sign the third draft, without the union

security clause. Hence, it led them to file and carry out a strike on the grounds of

bargaining in bad faith

 UNION OF FILIPRO EMPLOYEES et al. v. NESTLE PHILIPPINES INC et al.

G.R. No. 88710-13, 19 December, 1990, (Medialdea, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Assumption and certification orders are executory in character, and are

strictly to be complied with by the parties even during the pendency of any

petition questioning its validity. Regardless therefore of the motives, or the

validity of their claims, the striking workers must cease/desists from any and all

acts undermining the authority of the SOLE, once an assumption and/or

certification order is issued. Also, an assumption/certification order of the SOLE

automatically results in the return to work of all striking workers, whether or not

an order has been issued. A strike that is undertaken despite the issuance of the

SOLE of an assumption/certification order becomes a prohibited activity, and

thus illegal pursuant to Article 264 of the Labor Code.

FACTS

Petitioner filed a notice of strike against respondent company on the grounds of

ULP. The Minister of Labor assumed jurisdiction over the dispute. Notwithstanding the

assumption of the Minister of Labor, petitioner staged a strike. Respondent filed a

petition to declare the strike as illegal based on the grounds of violating the CBA

provision of no-strike/no-lockout provision and the grievance machinery provisions.

Once again the Minister of Labor issued a Return to Work Order to the striking

employees, but was ignored. Eventually the striking employees conceded and followed

the order to return to work

ISSUE

WON the strike by petitioner was legal?

RULING

NO. Pursuant to Article 7 of the Civil Code, no law was ever passed repealing

Articles 263 and 264 of the Labor Code, more specifically the power of the SOLE to

assume labor disputes which could affect national interest. More so, Articles 263 and

264 are enactments of the government pursuant to their police power, which has been

defined as the power of the Government to enact laws within constitutional limits to

promote safety, health, morals, and general welfare of society

On the legality of the strike committed, the Court cites Articles 264 (g) which

states that assumption and certification order are executory in character and must be

strictly complied by the parties. In Sarmiento v. Judge Tuico, it was stated that the

return to work order does no confer a right, and it is not a matter of option or

voluntariness, but more of an obligation. Also, an assumption/certification order of the

SOLE automatically results in the return to work of all striking workers, whether or not

an order has been issued. A strike that is undertaken despite the issuance of the SOLE

of an assumption/certification order becomes a prohibited activity, and thus illegal

pursuant to Article 264 of the Labor Code.

 More so, the Court agrees with the findings of NRLC that the strike is illegal

because of the failure of the union to exhaust all provided in the grievance machinery

and also violating the no-strike/no-lockout clause.

ST. SCHOLASTICA’S COLLEGE v. HONORABLE RUBEN TORRES et al

G.R. No. 100158, 29 January, 1992, FIRST DIVISION, (Bellosillo, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The respective liabilities of striking union members and union officers who

failed to immediately comply with the return to work order is outline in Article

264. That a declaration of a strike during the assumption of jurisdiction of the

SOLE over the case is considered an illegal act. Any worker or union officer who

knowingly participates in a strike defying the RTWO may consequently be

declared to have lost his employment status.

Before the SOLE may take cognizance of an issue which is merely

incidental to the labor dispute, the same must be involved in the labor dispute as

well or otherwise submitted for resolution, otherwise it cannot decide on such

cases.

FACTS

Petitioner College and private respondent Union entered into their negotiations

wherein a deadlock occurred. This led the Union to file for a Notice to Strike. The SOLE

immediately assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute and issued a return-to-work
order. Respondent Union questioned the assumption of jurisdiction by SOLE. The

striking employees did not adhere to the several orders of return to work which led

petitioner to issue notices of termination. However, SOLE issued an order reinstating

the union members while holding the Union Officers responsible and sustained their

termination. Moreover, petitioner questions the order issued by SOLE as well as its

jurisdiction to cover and decide termination cases.

ISSUE

WON the decision of the SOLE to reinstate the union workers is valid?

RULING

NO. In International Pharmaceutical Inc v. SOLE, it was held that the SOLE was

explicitly granted to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a

strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to national interest and decide accordingly.

Necessarily, the said authority must include and extend to all questions and controversy

arising therefrom including cases where the LA has exclusive jurisdiction. Before the

SOLE may take cognizance of an issue which is merely incidental to the labor dispute,

the same must be involved in the labor dispute as well or otherwise submitted for

resolution, otherwise it cannot decide on such cases. In the case at bar, it was clear that

both petitioner and Union submitted before the SOLE, and to resolve, the issue of

termination, thus concluding that such an issue, which originally should be filed before

the LA, was submitted for resolution before the SOLE.

Pursuant to pertinent laws, like Article 263 and 264, if a strike had already taken

place at the time of assumption, the striking employees shall immediately return to work.
This means that a return-to-work order is immediately effective and executory

notwithstanding a motion for reconsideration or even the pendency of a case

questioning the same. Thus the failure of the striking employees to immediately adhere

to the RTWO constitutes a violation of Article 263 and 264, and therefore justifying their

termination as punishment provided by the same law.

Moreover, in Philippine School of Business Administration v. Noriel, it was held

that the SOLE can execute an assumption of jurisdiction over labor disputes involving

academic institutions. The on-going stoppage of the school unduly prejudices the

students and will entail gross loss.

The respective liabilities of striking union members and union officers who failed

to immediately comply with the return to work order is outline in Article 264. That a

declaration of a strike during the assumption of jurisdiction of the SOLE over the case is

considered an illegal act. Any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in a

strike defying the RTWO may consequently be declared to have lost his employment

status.

.
 SUKHOTAI CUISINE AND RESTAURANT v. COURT OF APPEALS et al.

G.R. No. 150437, 17 July, 2006, FIRST DIVISION, (Austria-Martinez, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Strikes staged in violation of agreements providing for arbitration is illegal,

since these agreements must be strictly adhered to and respected if their ends to

be achieved.

FACTS

Private respondent Union filed a Notice of Strike against petitioner on the

grounds of acts of harassment, fault-finding and union busting. A strike vote was also

conducted and submitted to the NCMB. However, both parties entered into a

Submission Agreement thereby subjecting the labor dispute for voluntary arbitration with

a view to prevent strike. During the pendency of the voluntary arbitration, petitioner

terminated members of the union which provoked the Union to stage a wildcat strike.

Petitioner then questions the legality of the strike conducted by the Union. The Union

argues that the strike was legal, since it had already complied with the requirements,
and since the grounds for the strike is union busting the cooling off period can be

dispensed.

ISSUE

WON the Strike was legal?

RULING

NO. Pursuant to Article 279 (264) of the Labor Code, no strike or lockouts shall

be conducted after assumption of jurisdiction by the President or SOLE after

certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during

the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for strike or lock out. The purpose

for this prohibition is once the labor dispute is under the jurisdiction of a competent

authority, that jurisdiction should not be interfered with the application of the coercive

processes of a strike.

In the case at bar, it is undisputed that when the strike was conducted, the labor

dispute was under voluntary arbitration. The alleged dismissal of the union members

which triggered the union to strike are not valid grounds to justify the strike. If the union

believed that the reason for the dismissal is because of unfair labor practice, then the

matter should have been raised and resolved in the voluntary arbitration that is on-going

precisely because of that matter. If the union believed that had nothing to do with the

issues involved in the voluntary arbitration, they should have availed of the remedies

provided by the Labor Code, institution of illegal dismissal cases, agreement of the

parties, and submission of cases to the grievance machinery of the CBA. For failure of

the union to exhaust arbitration proceedings, by virtue of the Submission Agreement, in

view of the proscription in Article 279 (264), the strike staged by the respondents is

illegal.

As regards to the argument that since the nature of the labor dispute is that of

union busting, the requirement of a valid strike may be dispenses, the Court finds fault

in such argument. The law leaves no room for doubt in saying that in case of union

busting, it is only the 15 day cooling off period should be dispensed, and that the other

requirements, notice, strike vote, seven day report period, must still be complied.

However, despite the validity of the strike, if accompanied by illegal acts enumerated by

law, then it is still illegal. In the case at bar, it was evident that union members

committed illegal acts during the illegal strike thus, justifying their dismissal. As to union

officers, their mere participation in the illegal strike is already grounds for their dismissal
 GOLD CITY INTERGRATED PORT SERVICE, INC. v. NATIONAL LABOR

RELATIONS COMMISSION et al.

G.R. No. 103560, 6 July 1995, THIRD DIVISION, (Romero, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The language of the law leaves no room for doubt that the cooling off

period and the seven-day ban after strike vote were intended to be mandatory.

FACTS

Respondents EEs who are members of the Union who has an existing CBA with

petitioner, gathered in mass action expressing their grievances regarding wages. On the

same day, the strikers filed individual Notices of Strike. Petitioner, after an injunction

was approved, required that the Union conduct screening before the striking workers

could return to work. Respondent EEs did not attend said screening and continued
striking. The act was declared as an illegal strike. In the decision, private respondents

should be awarded separation pay instead of reinstatement because of strained

relations.

ISSUE

WON the act conducted by the respondents is an illegal strike?

RULING

YES. In National Federation of Sugar Workers v. Overeja, it was held that the

cooling off period, and the seven-day ban after the strike vote was submitted should be

mandatory. In the case at bar, private respondents stopped working and held a mass

gathering to press for their wages which is clearly a strike, because it is a cessation of

work due to labor or industrial disputes. However, respondent EEs failed to comply with

Articles 263 (c,f) of the LC. The individual notices of strike failed to comply with what the

law demands, since they were represented by a SEBA. Neither did the respondent EEs

observe the strike vote, and the cooling off period, and the reporting requirements.

By failure to comply with such requirements, Article 265 provides for the

penalties, which also distinguishes the liability of a union member to a union officer. A

union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike may be declared to have lost

their employment status. As to union members, mere participation in an illegal strike

cannot warrant their dismissal. There must be proof that the union members committed

illegal acts during a strike to warrant their dismissal. The company has the discretion to

declare the Union officers to have lost their employment by participating in the illegal

strike, because of the use of the word “may”.

 Originally, the respondents, being union officers were entitled to reinstatement,

but since it has been a decade when the dispute happened, the Court deems it proper

that the award be separation pay.

MALAYANG SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA M. GREENFIELD v.

HONORABLE CRESENCIO J. RAMOS

G.R. No. 113907, 28 February, 2000, THIRD DIVISION (Purisima, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

With violence committed on both sides, the management and the

employees , such violence cannot be a ground to declare the strike as illegal.

FACTS

Petitioner local union conducted a general meeting. Not all members were able

to attend the meeting to which the union imposed a deduction on their compensation.

This compensation led to an intra-union conflict between petitioner local union and its

mother federation, which led the former to declare its autonomy from the latter. Taking it
as acts of loyalty, the federation expelled the union officers of the local union as well as

some members of the union. This was immediately approved by the company and

declared those EEs as dismissed from their employment. From this, the local union

staged a strike, on the grounds of ULP, wherein violence occurred. Respondent

company argues that the strike was illegal pursuant to the no-strike/no-lockout clause in

the CBA, and that the source of the strike was that of an intra-union conflict, and lastly,

the strike was attended by violence.

ISSUE

WON the strike was legal?

RULING

YES. When the company dismissed the union officers, along with other members

of the union, the conflict was transformed from an intra-union to a termination dispute.

Petitioners were led to believe in good faith that when the company dismissed the union

officers, upon request of the federation union, the company was guilty of unfair labor

practice. Hence, the strike was based on the company’s act of dismissal. Even if the

allegations of unfair labor practice were found to be untrue, the presumption of legality

of strike prevails. As to the existing no-strike/no-lockout provision of the CBA, the same

provision can only be invoked when there is an economic strike. In the case at bar, the

strike takes of the nature of an ULP strike, hence the no-strike/no-lockout provision will

not apply. Lastly, as to the violence that occurred during the strike, the violence cannot

be solely attributed to the EEs alone for the company hired men to pacify the strikers.
Hence, there was violence on both sides, which makes the defense of violence to

declare the strike illegal unavailable to the company.

TELEFUNKEN SEMICONDUCTORS EMPLOYEES UNION-FFW et al. v. THE COURT

OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 143013-14. 18 December 20, SECOND DIVISION, (De Leon, Jr., J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Defiance to the assumption and RTWO of the SOLE after he assumes

jurisdiction, it is a valid ground for loss of employment status of any striking

union member or union officer.

FACTS

The Company and the Union reached a deadlock in their negotiation for a new

CBA, to which the union filed a Notice of Strike. The Acting SOLE assumed jurisdiction
of the case and issued an assumption order. Respondent did not acknowledge receipt

of such order and continued with declaring a strike. The Acting SOLE issued a RTWO,

but was also ignored by the union members. Hence, the striking union members were

dismissed from their employment. Petitioner contends that they should not be dismissed

on the basis of a position paper submitted by the Company

ISSUE

WON the strike was legal?

RULING

NO. Pursuant to Article 263, the moment the SOLE assumes jurisdiction over a

labor dispute in an industry indispensable to national interest, such assumption shall

have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike. It was not

necessary for the SOLE to issue another order directing them to work. Mere issuance of

the assumption order operates as an automatic return-to-work order even when such

directive is not expressly stated. More so, pursuant to Article 264, jurisprudence has

upheld that defiance to the assumption and RTWO of the SOLE after he assumes

jurisdiction, it is a valid ground for loss of employment status of any striking union

member or union officer.

 INTERPHIL LABORATORIES EMPLOYEES UNION-FFW v. INTERPHIL

LABORATORIES INC et al.

G.R. No. 142424, 19 December, 2001, FIRST DIVISION, (Kapunan, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

A slowdown is a strike on an installment plan which pertains to a willful

reduction in the rate of work by concerted action of workers for the purpose of

restricting the output of the employer, in relation to a labor dispute; as an activity

by which workers without a complete stoppage of work, retard production or their

performance of duties and functions to compel management to grant their

demands.

FACTS
 Petitioner union is the SEBA of the EEs of the respondent Company. Upon the

nearing of the expiration of the CBA, the union officers approached the company to

inquire on the stand of the Company on the CBA. Due to the insistent refusal of the

Company to accede and negotiate with petitioner union, the EEs refused to follow their

scheduled work, and staged an overtime boycott and a slowdown campaign. The SOLE

assumed the dispute and ordered the petitioner union to consolidate all the cases

incident to the labor dispute. Petitioner Union was found guilty of committing an illegal

strike. Thereafter, the Union assailed the jurisdiction of the SOLE over the case,

because the case was already filed, and pending before the LA, prior to the latter’s

assumption.

ISSUE

1. WON the SOLE has jurisdiction over the case?

2. WON the acts of the union constituted work slowdown?

RULING

YES. Pursuant to the Court’s ruling in International Pharmaceutical Inc. v. SOLE,

under Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, it expressly grants the SOLE the power to

assume jurisdiction over labor disputes of industries indispensable of national interest

that may cause a strike or lockout. It also includes jurisdiction over all incidents of the

labor dispute which the LA may have jurisdiction over. In the case at bar, it is

undisputed that the labor dispute was already submitted to the LA even before the

SOLE assumed the case. However, the issues of overtime boycott and work slowdown

are intertwined with the labor dispute handled by the SOLE. Also, the fact that petitioner
union asked the LA to suspend the proceedings due to the order of the SOLE to

consolidate the case before him already proves that the petitioner union participated in

the SOLE’s order thereby acceding to the assumption of the SOLE.

YES. Based from the evidence, it is clear that members of the petitioner union’s

unilateral alteration of the 24 hour work schedule through their concerted activities of

overtime boycott and work slowdown amounted to strike on an installment basis which

is prohibited under their existing CBA which prohibits the conduct of such acts during

the existence of the CBA. Slow down is generally condemned as inherently illicit and

unjustifiable because while employees continue to work and remain at their position and

accept the wages paid to them, they at the same time select what part of their allotted

tasks they are to perform of their own volition or refuse openly or secretly to the ER’s

damage to do their work; in other words they work on their own terms.

SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

COMMISSION et al.

G.R. No. 119293, 10 June, 2003, FIRST DIVISION, (Azcuna, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The effect of that declaration where the NCMB declared that the notice of

strike as appropriate for mediation was to drop the case from the docket of notice

of strikes as provided in Rule 41 of the NCMB, as if there is no notice of strike.

During the pendency of the preventive mediation proceedings no strike could be

legally declared.

FACTS
 Petitioner Company and respondent Union (IBM) executed an CBA which

contained a no strike/no lock out provision, as well as a grievance machinery provision.

However, respondent Union filed a motion to strike to which petitioner argued was

based on non-strikeable grounds. Upon finding by the NCMB that the grounds were

non-strikeable, it immediately converted the notices of strike into a preventive

mediation. While the preventive mediation is pending, the Union declared a strike.

Petitioner then filed for the issuance of an Injunction with a TRO, arguing that said strike

is in violation of jurisprudence. However the TRO was denied based on the grounds that

the circumstances no longer constitute an actual or threatened commission of unlawful

acts. Petitioner asserts that denying the petition for injunction was grave abuse of

discretion.

ISSUE

WON the denial to grant the petition for injunction constituted grave abuse of

discretion?

RULING

YES. Citing Article 254 of the Labor Code, there are two exceptions to the

prohibition of granting an injunction: (1) Article 218 and (2) Article 264. Under Article

218 (3) the NRLC may enjoin or restrain actual or threatened commission of any or all

prohibited or unlawful acts or to require the performance of a particular act in labor

dispute which if not restrained or perform, may cause irreparable damage. Under the

same provision the coercive measure of injunction may also be used to restrain an

actual or threatened use of unlawful strike as held in several jurisprudence. In the case
at bar, petitioner filed for a permanent injunction to retrain respondent Union to strike.

As held in PAL v. Drilon, since the NCMB converted the notice to strike by the Union to

a preventive mediation, as such ground were non-strikeable, the said conversion has

the effect of dismissing the notices of strike. Simply said, since the notice to strike was

converted into a preventive mediation, when there is no notice of strike at all, and the

declaration of strike by the Union is then invalid since it did not follow the procedure laid

in Article 253. Moreover, under Article 254 of the Labor Code, a declaration of strike

without first having filed the required notice is a prohibited activity which may be

prevented into an injunction.

It is also important to note that respondent Union did not comply with the

grievance machinery provision and arbitration of the CBA. Citing the ruling in San

Miguel Corp v. NRLC, for failure to follow the grievance machinery and arbitration

proceedings provided in the CBA, the notice of strike should have been dismissed, and

it order the parties to proceed with the arbitration. In the present case, petitioner

Company was willing to negotiate with the Union but the latter already proceeded with

force through a strike which justifies the issuance of an injunction, since it is considered

illegal.
GRAND BOULEVARD HOTEL v. GENUINE LABOR ORGANIZATION OF WORKERS

IN HOTEL, RESTAURANT, AND ALLIED INSDUTRIES

G.R. No. 153663, 18 July, 2003, SECOND DIVISION, (Callejo, Sr., J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

A strike the most preeminent of the economic weapons of workers which they

unsheathe to force management to agreeto an equitable sharing of the joint product of

labor and capital. But we also emphasized that strikes exert some disquieting effects
not only on the relationship between labor and management, but also on the general

peace and progress of society, not to mention the economic well-being of the State. It is

a weapon that can either breathe life to or destroy the union and members in their

struggle with management for a more equitable due of their labors. Hence, the

decision to wield the weapon of strike must therefore rest on a rational basis, free from

emotionalism, unswayed by the tempers and tantrums of a few hotheads, and firmly

focused on the legitimate interest of the union which should not however be

antithetical to the public welfare. In every strike staged by a union, the general peace

and progress of society and public welfare are involved.

FACTS

Petitioner union placed under preventive suspension the union manager of the

respondent Union which led the latter to file a notice of strike based on violation of CBA,

illegal termination and suspension of employees. Moreover, petitioner hotel announced

that it shall pursue a retrenchment program due to the continued downturn in tourism. In

response, the SOLE issued a status quo ante bellum order certifying the case to the

NLRC for compulsory arbitration and enjoined petitioner and respondent Union from

staging a strike or lockout. Nonetheless, the respondent Union to filed another notice to

strike and on the same day stage the strike itself. Petitioner argues that the strike was

illegal for not complying with the requirement established by law. However, respondent

Union argues that the strike was legal, claiming that it had complied with the

requirements when it filed its earlier notice of strike and carries the validity over the

recent notice of strike. Furthermore, respondent Union claims that the requisites of a
valid strike can be dispensed based on good faith since they believe that the

retrenchment program of petitioner amounts to ULP.

ISSUE

WON the strike was valid?

RULING

NO. Citing Article 263 of the Labor Code, the requisites for a valid strike are: (1)

notice of strike filed with DOLE either 30 days before the intended date or 15 days in

case of ULP; (2) strike approved by majority of the total union membership in the

bargaining unit concerned obtained through a secret ballot in a meeting called for that

purpose and (3) notice given to DOLE of the results of the voting at least seven days

before the intended strike. The requisite seven day is for the DOLE to determine

whether the projected strike carries the approval of majority of the union. The notice of

strike and the cooling off period were intended to provide for an opportunity for

mediation and conciliation. Such requirements are mandatory and failure to comply will

render the strike illegal. Moreover, pursuant to the ruling in Union of Filipro Employees

v. Nestle, under Article 264 of the Labor Code, once an assumption certification order is

issued by the SOLE, strikes are enjoined or one has already taken place, all strikers

shall immediately return to work. A strike declared despite the assumption or

certification shall consider the strikers to have abandoned their employment.

In the case at bar, respondent filed its notice of strike on the same day it staged a

picket. Respondents cannot argue that since the grounds for the notice of strike was

that of the other notice of strike they filed earlier which complied with all the
requirements, the said strike was valid. The matter contained on the first notice of strike

was already cognizance of the SOLE and declared a status quo ante bellum, enjoining

the workers to strike. Despite the order of the SOLE, the Union still staged a strike,

therefore violating Article 264 of the Labor Code.

The respondent Union cannot use good faith as a defense for not complying with

the requirements set by law. In Lapanday Workers Union v. NRLC, it was held that a

strike, being the most preeminent of the economic weapons of the workers, that could

affect both Union and management, the decision to stage one must rest on a rational

basis, free from emotionalism, unswayed by tempers. Thus it needs to comply strictly

with the procedural conditions provided by law in staging a strike.

ELIZABETH C. BASCON et al. v. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 144899, 5 February, 2004, SECOND DIVISION, (Quisumbing, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Wearing up armbands and putting up placards to express one’s view

without violating the rights of third parties are legally per se and constitutionally

protected.

FACTS

There was an intra-union conflict between the mother union (NFL) and the local

union (NAMA MCCH) where the former opposed the move of the latter to renew the
CBA with the respondent hospital. In response to that, the local union staged a series of

mass actions, putting up placards, posters and wearing red and black armbands.

Petitioners, members of the local union, were notified that they were to be investigated

for their involvement in the mass action, but later on, their employment was terminated.

ISSUE

WON the petitioners were legally terminated?

RULING

NO. While a union officer can be terminated for mere participation in an illegal

action, an ordinary striking employee, must have participated in the commission of

illegal acts during the strike. There must be proof that they committed illegal acts during

the strike. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required, but substantial evidence is

sufficient to justify the imposition of the penalty of dismissal.

In the case at bar, petitioner actual participation in the illegal strike was only

limited to wearing armbands and putting up placards. There was no finding that the

armbands nor the placards contained offensive words or symbols. Neither wearing an

armband nor setting up placards can be construed as an illegal act for they are

considered protected under the freedom of speech. Also, the Court finds that there is no

willful disobedience of the employer’s order. In order to constitute willful disobedience to

justify dismissal is (1) employee’s assailed conduct must have been willful and is

characterized by a wrongful attitude, and (2) the order violated must have been

reasonable and lawful. Wearing up armbands and putting up placards to express one’s
view without violating the rights of third parties are legally per se and constitutionally

protected.

MANILA DIAMOND HOTEL EMPLOYEES’ UNION v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS

G.R. No. 140528, 16 December, 2004, FIRST DIVISION, (Azcuna, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Under Article 263(g), all workers must immediately return to work and all

employers must readmit all of them under the same terms and conditions

prevailing before the strike or lockout. This Court must point out that the law
uses the precise phrase of "under the same terms and conditions," revealing that

it contemplates only actual reinstatement. This is in keeping with the rationale

that any work stoppage or slowdown in that particular industry can be inimical to

the national economy. It is clear that Article 263(g) was not written to protect

labor from the excesses of management, nor was it written to ease management

from expenses, which it normally incurs during a work stoppage or slowdown.

FACTS

Upon denying petitioner Union’s attempt to collectively bargain with

management, the former filed a notice of strike, and thereon carried the strike itself.

Management claims that such strike was illegal and was therefore justified to dismiss

the employees involved in the strike. The SOLE assumed over the case and issued an

order sending the labor dispute for compulsory arbitration, and also a RTWO. However,

the Acting SOLE modified the order of then SOLE stating that the strikers should only

be reinstated in the payroll

ISSUE

WON the modification of the acting SOLE constituted grave abuse of discretion?

RULING

YES. There is nothing in the case at bar that justifies for payroll reinstatement as

an alternative remedy. A strained relationship between the striking employees and

management is no reason for payroll reinstatement.

As a general rule, the State encourages voluntary settlement of labor dispute.

However, Article 263 of the Labor Code empowers the SOLE to assume jurisdiction
over the case and decide the same when it involves an industry indispensable to

national interest. This power by the SOLE is viewed as an example of police power of

the State. A prolonged strike or lockout can be inimical to the national economy and

therefore the situation is imbued with public necessity and involves the right of the State

and public to self-protection. Under the same law, all workers must immediately return

to work and all employers must readmit all of them under the same conditions prevailing

before the strike or lockout. The law uses the precise words “under the same terms and

conditions” which contemplates actual reinstatement and not pay roll reinstatement. The

reason for this law is that any work stoppage or slowdown of an industry indispensable

to national interest can be inimical to the national economy. Article 263 is for the

protection of the State and not of labor and management. Therefore, the decision of the

acting SOLE is a grave abuse of discretion.

UNIVERSITY OF IMMACULATE CONCEPCION, INC. v. THE HONORABLE

SECRETARY OF LABOR et al.

G.R. No. 151379, 14, January, 2005, FIRST DIVISION (Azcuna, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

 Payroll reinstatement must rest on special circumstances that render

actual reinstatement impracticable or otherwise not conducive to attaining the

purposes of the law.

FACTS

Petitioner University and respondent Union entered into a collective bargaining

negotiation, where a matter was left unsolved, which is the inclusion or exclusion of

certain employees for the bargaining. Union filed a notice of strike on the grounds of

bargaining deadlock and unfair labor practice. The SOLE assumed the case. The

University gave the subject employees the choice to resign from the union while

remaining as confidential employees or resign as confidential employees while

remaining members of the Union. The concerned employees argued that they can both

occupy the same position. Hence, the University served their termination notices to the

said employees. The SOLE ordered the University to reinstate the terminated

employees. However, the acting SOLE modified the ruling which stated that the

terminated employees should therefore be placed under payroll reinstatement.

ISSUE

WON the order of the acting SOLE is valid?

RULING

YES. Under Article 263, the general rule is that all workers must immediately

return to work and all employers must readmit all of them under the same terms and

conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The phrase “under the same

conditions” makes it clear that it means actual reinstatement. However, this case
introduces an exception to the rule, and states that payroll reinstatement must rest on

special circumstances that render actual reinstatement impracticable or otherwise not

conducive to attaining the purpose of the law. In the case at bar, is the confidential

nature of the concerned employees who were terminated, because if they were allowed

to participate in the collective bargaining, it will exacerbate the situation

CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER, INC. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

COMMISSION et al.

G.R. No. 147080, 26 April, 2005, SECOND DIVISION, (Callejo, Sr., J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING

JACKBILT INDUSTRIES, INC. v. JACKBILT EMPLOYEES WORKERS UNION-

NAFLU-KMU

G.R. No. 171618-19, 13 March, 2009, FIRST DIVISION, (Corona, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

 An ER may terminate EEs found to have committed illegal acts in the

course of a strike.

FACTS

Because of economic crisis, petitioner decided to temporarily cease its work.

Respondent Union argues that the stoppage of work was caused by anti-union

sentiments which lead them to stage a strike and picketed on petitioner’s main gates

which prevented persons from going to and out of the compound. The NRLC ordered

the Union members to refrain from preventing access to petitioner’s property however

the respondent union members continued. Because of this incident, the NRLC found the

Union members to have committed illegal acts in the court of the strike.This prompted

petitioner to dismiss the said EEs. However, petitioner was found to have committed

illegal dismissal since he did not file a petition to declare the strike as illegal before

terminating the respondent EEs.

ISSUE

WON filing a petition for illegal strike is a condition sine qua non to terminate the

EEs?

RULING

NO. Under Section 47, Rule 39 states that parties to a case are bound by the

findings in a previous judgement with respect to matters actually raised and adjudged

therein. Moreover, pursuant to Article 264 (e) of the Labor Code, it prohibits any person

engaged in picketing from obstructing the free ingress to and egress from the ER’s

premises. Since, respondent EEs was found in the decision of the NLRC to have
prevented free entry and exit of vehicles from petitioner’s compound, they committed

illegal acts in the course of their strike Thus, their dismissal was valid.

AUTOMOTIVE ENGINE BUILDERS INC, et al. v. PROGRESIBONG UNYON NG MGA

MANGGAGAWA SA AER et al.

G.R. No. 160138, 13 July, 2011, THIRD DIVISION, (Mendoza, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

 If both parties are in pari delicto, such situation warrant s the restoration of

the status quo ante, bringing the parties back to the respective positions before

the illegal strike and illegal lockout.

FACTS

Petitioner AER is engaged in the automotive repair industry while respondent

Union is the LLO of the rank and file EEs of AER. Petitioner accuses respondent Union

of committing illegal concerted activities. EEs of AER suddenly staged a walkout and

assembled illegally in the company premises which caused the disruption of work of

some other EEs. This led the ER to terminate the services of the concerned EEs.

Moreover, the EEs staged a wildcat strike where they barricaded the company premises

and prevented the free ingress and egress of other EEs, officers and clients.

On the side of the EEs, they argued that petitioner Company committed unfair

labor practice and illegal dismissal. When they filed a PCE, AER forced its EEs to

submit their urine for drug testing. Some of the EEs were found positive and were

required to submit their medical certificate. However, while processing their medical

certificate, their were charged with insubordination. ER refused to reinstate them.

Moreover, alleging that AER was committing a run-away shop, the Union tried to

prevent the transfer of the machines which was the basis for the ER to charge them with

illegal work stoppage.

ISSUE

WON both parties were guilty of committing unfair labor practice and committing

acts of illegal strike?

RULING

YES. The court finds that both AER and the Union are in pare delicto. On the part

of the AER, the Court finds the petitioner committing unfair labor practice when it

required all of its EEs to undergo drug testing the day after the Union filed for a PCE.

AER failed to show that the drug testing was a regular company policy and that the drug

testing was conducted by authorized drug testing center as provided for by law. Such

acts were constitutive of AER’s refusal to bargain with respondent Union. In any event,

the penalty of dismissal by petitioner against the striking EEs who only staged a one

day walkout was too severe.

On the other hand, the union and the EEs were also at fault when it resorted to a

concerted work slowdown and walking out of their jobs of protest for their illegal

suspension. It was also wrong for them to have forced their way to the premises to try

and bring out the boring machine. Based from the acts of the Union, they clearly

prevented the entry and exit of non-participating EEs, officers and clients. Despite the

stoppage of work lasting a only a day, it had caused serious disturbance and tension

within AER’s premises.

Since both parties are in pari delicto, or both at fault, they should be restored to

their respective positions prior to the illegal strike and illegal lockout. Nonetheless, if

reinstatement is no longer feasible, the concerned EEs should be given separation pay

up to the date of return of the complaining EEs in lieu of reinstatement.