Philippine Immigration Act of 1940

SEC. 13. Under the conditions set forth in this Act, there may be admitted into the
Philippines immigrants, termed “quota immigrants” not in excess of five hundred of any
one nationality or without nationality for any one calendar year, except that the following
immigrants, termed “nonquota immigrants,” may be admitted without regard to such
numerical limitations:

(a) An alien coming to prearranged employment, for whom the issuance of a visa has
been authorized in accordance with section twenty of this Act, and his wife, and his
unmarried children under twenty-one years of age, if accompanying him or if following to
join him within a period of two years from the date of his admission into the Philippines
as an immigrant under this paragraph;

(b) The wife or the husband or the unmarried child under twenty-one years of age of a
Philippine citizen, if accompanying or following to join such citizen;

(c) A child of alien parents born during the temporary visit abroad of the mother, the
mother having been previously lawfully admitted into the Philippines for permanent
resident, if the child is accompanying or coming to join an parent and applies for
admission within five years from the date of its birth;

(d) A child born subsequent to the issuance of the immigration visa of the accompanying
parent, the visa not having expired;

(e) A woman who was a citizen of the Philippines and who lost her citizenship because
of her marriage to an alien or by reason of the loss of Philippine citizenship by her
husband, and her unmarried child under twenty-one years of age, if accompanying or
following to join her;

(f) The wife or the husband or the unmarried child under twenty-one years of age, of an
alien lawfully admitted into the Philippines for permanent residence prior to the date on
which this Act becomes effective and who is resident therein, if such wife, husband, or
child applies for admission within a period of two years following the date on which this
Act becomes effective.

G.R. No. 93666 April 22, 1991

Gen. Milling Corp and Earl Cone, petitioners
vs Hon. Torres in his capacity as secretary of Labor and Employment,
et. al.
Ponente: Feliciano
Earl Timothy Cone

Facts:
May 1989, the NCR-Dept.Labor and Employment issued Alien Employment
permit in favor of petitioner earl cone, a US citizen as sports
consultant and assistant coach for GMC. Dec. 1989 then GMC and Cone
entered into a contract of employment. Then January 1990, the board
of special inquiry of the commission and deportation approved Cone's
application for a change of admission status from temporary visitor
to pre-arranged employee. On Feb. 1990, GMC requested for renewal of
Cone's alien employment permit which was granted by DOLE regional
director. The alien employment is valid until December 1990.

Private respondent BCAP appealed the issuance of said alien employment

permit to the secretary of labor who issued a decision ordering the
cancellation of Cone's employment permit on the ground that there was
no showing that there is no person in the Philippines who is
competent, able and willing to perform the services required nor that
the hiring of Cone redound to the national interest.

GMC filed a motion for reconsideration and 2 supplemental motions for

reconsideration but were bothe denied by acting secretary Laguesma.

Issue:

GMC before the court on a petition for certiorari alleging that: (1)
Secretary of Labor gravely abused his discretion when he revoked the
alien employment permit and (2) labor code does not empower secretary
to determine if the employment of an alien would redound to national
interest.

Ruling: Petition dismissed.

Court considers that petitioners have failed to show any grave abuse
of discretion on the part of secretary. The alleged failure to notify
petitioners of the appeal filed by BCAP was cured when petitioners
were allowed to file their motion for reconsideration before secretary
of labor.

GMC's claim that hiring of a foreign coach is an employer's

prerogative has no legal basis at all. Under article 40 of labor
code, an employment permit is required to hire a foreigner, as it
applies to "non-resident aliens".

GMS can't claim that Secretary's decision would amount to an

impairment of the obligations of contracts because Labor code requires
alien employment permits to enter a contract of employment for
foreigners.

GMC's contention that Secretary of labor should have deferred to the

findings of Comm. On Immigration and Deportation as to the necessity
of employing Cone is also without basis. The labor code specifically
empowers secretary to make a determination as to the availability of
the services of a person in the Philippines.
DEE C. CHUAN & SONS, INC., petitioner, vs.

THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, CONGRESS OF LABOR

ORGANIZATIONS (CLO), KAISAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA KAHOY SA
PILIPINAS and JULIAN LUMANOG AND HIS WORK-CONTRACT LABORERS,
respondents.

Facts:

Dee C. Chuan & Sons, Inc. assails the validity of an order of the Court of Industrial
Relations. The order made upon petitioner's request for authority to hire" about twelve(12)
more laborers from time to time and on a temporary basis," contains the proviso that "the
majority of the laborers to be employed should be native." The petition was filed pending
settlement by the court of a labor dispute (strike) between the petitioner and Kaisahan Ng
Mga Manggagawa sa Kahoy sa Pilipinas.

It is next said that "The Court of Industrial Relations cannot intervene in questions of
selection of employees and workers so as to impose unconstitutional restrictions," and
that "The restrictions of the number of aliens that may be employed in any business,
occupation, trade or profession of any kind, is a denial of the equal protection of the laws."
Although the brief does not name the persons who are supposed to be denied the equal
protection of the laws, it is clearly to be inferred that aliens in general are in petitioner's
mind. Certainly, the order does not, directly or indirectly, immediately or remotely,
discriminate against the petitioner on account of race or citizenship. The order could have
been issued in a case in which the employer was a Filipino. As a matter of fact the
petitioner insists that 75 % of its shares of stock are held by Philippine citizens, a
statement which is here assumed to be correct.

Issue:

W/N the order of CIR is valid and constitutional.

Ruling:

Yes. Costs against petitioners.

Ratio:

An alien may question the constitutionality of a statute (or court order) only when and so
far as it is being, or is about to be, applied to his disadvantage. (16 C.J.S. 157 et seq.)
The prospective employees whom the petitioner may contemplate employing have not
come forward to seek redress; their identity has not even been revealed. Clearly the
petitioner has no case in so far as it strives to protect the rights of others, much less others
who are unknown and undetermined.
We are of the opinion that the order under consideration meets the test of reasonableness
and public interest. The passage of Commonwealth Act No. 103 was "in conformity with
the constitutional objective and . . . the historical fact that industrial and agricultural
disputes have given rise to disquietude, bloodshed and revolution in our country."
(Antamok Goldfields Mining Co. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 40 Off. Gaz., 8th Supp.,
173.)1 "Commonwealth Act No. 103 has precisely vested the Court of Industrial Relations
with authority to intervene in all disputes between employees or strikes arising from the
difference as regards wages, compensation, and other labor conditions which it may take
cognizance of." (Central Azucarera de Tarlac vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 40 Off.
Gaz., 3rd Supp., 319, 324.)2 Thus it has jurisdiction to determine the number of men to
be laid off during off-seasons. By the same token, the court may specify that a certain
proportion of the additional laborers to be employed should be Filipinos, if such condition,
in the court's opinion, "is necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling disputes or
doing justice to the parties."

We can not agree with the petitioner that the order constitutes an unlawful intrusion into
the sphere of legislation, by attempting to lay down a public policy of the state or to settle
a political question. In the first place, we believe, as we have already explained, that the
court's action falls within the legitimate scope of its jurisdiction. In the second place, the
order does not formulate a policy and is not political in character. It is not a permanent,
all-embracing regulation. It is a compromise and emergency measure applicable only in
this case and calculated to bridge a temporary gap and to adjust conflicting interests in
an existing and menacing controversy. The hiring of Chinese laborers by the petitioner
was rightly considered by the court likely to lead the parties away from the reconciliation
which it was the function of the court to effectuate.

We should not close without adverting to the fact that the petitioner does not so much as
pretend that the hiring of additional laborers is its prerogative as a matter of right. It seems
to be conceded that during the pendency of the dispute the petitioner could employ
temporary laborers only with the permission of the Court of Industrial Relations. The
granting of the application thus lies within the sound judgment of the court, and if the court
could turn it down entirely, as we think it could, its authority to quality the permission
should be undeniable, provided only that the qualification is not arbitrary, against law,
morals, or established public policy, which it is not; it is an expedient and emergency step
designed to relieve petitioner's own difficulties. Also important to remember is that it is not
compulsory on petitioner's part to take advantage of the order. Being a permute petitioner
is the sole judge of whether it should take the order as it is, or leave it if it does not suit its
interest to hire new laborers other than Chinese.

WPP MARKETING V. GALERA (G.R. NO.

169207; MARCH 25, 2010)
CASE DIGEST: WPP MARKETING COMMUNICATIONS, INC., JOHN
STEEDMAN, MARK WEBSTER, and NOMINADA LANSANG,
Petitioners, v. JOCELYN M. GALERA, Respondent.

FACTS: Petitioner is Jocelyn Galera (GALERA), an American citizen who was

recruited from the United States of America by private respondent John
Steedman, Chairman-WPP Worldwide and Chief Executive Officer of Mindshare,
Co., a corporation based in Hong Kong, China, to work in the Philippines for
private respondent WPP Marketing Communications, Inc. (WPP), a corporation
registered and operating under the laws of Philippines.

Employment of GALERA with private respondent WPP became effective on

September 1, 1999 solely on the instruction of the CEO and upon signing of the
contract, without any further action from the Board of Directors of private
respondent WPP.

Four months had passed when private respondent WPP filed before the Bureau of
Immigration an application for petitioner GALERA to receive a working visa,
wherein she was designated as Vice President of WPP. Petitioner alleged that she
was constrained to sign the application in order that she could remain in the
Philippines and retain her employment.

On December 14, 2000, petitioner GALERA alleged she was verbally notified by
private respondent STEEDMAN that her services had been terminated from
private respondent WPP. A termination letter followed the next day. Thus, a
complaint for illegal dismissal was filed against WPP.

The LA held that WPP, Steedman, Webster, and Lansang liable for illegal
dismissal and damages. Arbiter Madriaga stated that Galera was not only illegally
dismissed but was also not accorded due process. The NLRC reversed the LA
decision. The NLRC stressed that Galera was WPPs Vice-President, and
therefore, a corporate officer at the time she was removed by the Board of
Directors. Such being the case, the imperatives of law require that we hold that
the Arbiter below had no jurisdiction over Galeras case as, again, she was a
corporate officer at the time of her removal.
On appeal, the CA reversed the NLRC decision. It ruled that a person could be
considered a "corporate officer" only if appointed as such by a corporations Board
of Directors, or if pursuant to the power given them by either the Articles of
Incorporation or the By-Laws.

ISSUE: Does the LA have jurisdiction over the case?

HELD: Under Section 25 of the Corporation Code, the corporate officers are the
president, secretary, treasurer and such other officers as may be provided in the
by-laws.

An examination of WPPs by-laws resulted in a finding that Galeras appointment

as a corporate officer (Vice-President with the operational title of Managing
Director of Mindshare) during a special meeting of WPP's Board of Directors is
an appointment to a non-existent corporate office. WPPs by-laws provided for
only one Vice-President. At the time of Galeras appointment on 31 December
1999, WPP already had one Vice-President in the person of Webster. Galera
cannot be said to be a director of WPP also because all five directorship positions
provided in the by-laws are already occupied. Finally, WPP cannot rely on its
Amended By-Laws to support its argument that Galera is a corporate officer. The
Amended By-Laws provided for more than one Vice-President and for two
additional directors. Even though WPPs stockholders voted for the amendment
on 31 May 2000, the SEC approved the amendments only on 16 February 2001.
Galera was dismissed on 14 December 2000. WPP, Steedman, Webster, and
Lansang did not present any evidence that Galeras dismissal took effect with the
action of WPP's Board of Directors.

Galera being an employee, then the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC have jurisdiction
over the present case. ***

WPPs dismissal of Galera lacked both substantive and procedural due process.
Apart from Steedman's letter dated 15 December 2000 to Galera, WPP failed to
prove any just or authorized cause for Galeras dismissal.

The law further requires that the employer must furnish the worker sought to be
dismissed with two written notices before termination of employment can be
legally effected: (1) notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts or
omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and (2) the subsequent notice which
informs the employee of the employers decision to dismiss him. Failure to
comply with the requirements taints the dismissal with illegality. WPPs acts
clearly show that Galeras dismissal did not comply with the two-notice rule. ***
The employment permit must be acquired prior to employment.

The law and the rules are consistent in stating that the employment permit must
be acquired prior to employment. The Labor Code states: "Any alien seeking
admission to the Philippines for employment purposes and any domestic or
foreign employer who desires to engage an alien for employment in the
Philippines shall obtain an employment permit from the Department of Labor."

Galera cannot come to this Court with unclean hands. To grant Galeras prayer is
to sanction the violation of the Philippine labor laws requiring aliens to secure
work permits before their employment. We hold that the status quo must prevail
in the present case and we leave the parties where they are. Hence, Galera is not
entitled to monetary awards. This ruling, however, does not bar Galera from
seeking relief from other jurisdictions. GRANTED.