ACUÑA, Kaisser John P Labor Standards December 7, 2019

2018-020-0515 Usec. Jimenez

G.R. No. L-44169 December 3, 1985

ROSARIO A. GAA vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS.

FACTS: Europhil Industries Corporation (Europhil) was formerly one of the tenants in Trinity Building at
T.M. Kalaw Street, Manila, whereas petitioner Rosario A. Gaa (Gaa) was then the building administrator of
the aforementioned building. On December 12, 1973, Europhil Industries filed an action before the Court
of First Instance (CFI) of Manila for damages against petitioner for having perpetrated certain acts that
the private respondent considered a violation of its rights, namely, “cutting off of its electricity, and
removing its name from the building directory and gate passes of its officials and employees", On June 28,
1974, said court rendered judgment in favor of respondent, ordering petitioner to pay the former the sum
of P10,000.00 as actual damages, P5,000.00 as moral damages, P5,000.00 as exemplary damages and to
the costs. The said decision having become final and executory, a writ of garnishment was issued
pursuant to which Deputy Sheriff Cesar A. Roxas on August 1, 1975 served a Notice of Garnishment upon
El Grande Hotel, where petitioner was then recently employed, garnishing her "salary, commission
and/or remuneration." This causes the petitioner to file at the CFI of Manila through a motion to lift said
garnishment on the ground that her "salaries, commission and or remuneration" are exempted from
execution under Article 1708 of the New Civil Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Petitioner is covered by Article 1708 of the New Civil Code (NCC). [NO.]

LAW APPLICABLE: Art. 1708 of the New Civil Code which states that “The laborer's wages shall not be
subject to execution or attachment, except for debts incurred for food, shelter, clothing and medical
attendance.”

CASE HISTORY: On December 12, 1973, Europhil commenced an action (Civil Case No. 92744) before the
CFI of Manila for damages against Gaa. On June 28, 1974, said court rendered judgment in favor of
respondent. Petitioner then filed with the CFI of Manila a motion to lift said garnishment done by the
private respondent due to her dismissal but, it was denied by the lower court in an order dated November
7, 1975. A motion for reconsideration of said order was likewise denied, and on January 26, 1976
petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari against filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari against said order of November 7, 1975. On March 30, 1976, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition for certiorari. In dismissing the petition, the Court of Appeals held that petitioner is
not a mere laborer as contemplated under Article 1708.

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that petitioner is not covered by Article 1708 of the NCC since she
does not fall within the criteria of laborer.

Furthermore, Art. 1708 used the word "wages" and not "salary" in relation to "laborer" when it declared
what are to be exempted from attachment and execution. The term "wages" as distinguished from
"salary", applies to the compensation for manual labor, skilled or unskilled, paid at stated times, and
measured by the measurement of time, while "salary" denotes seniority, or a superior grade of services,
and implies a position of office: by contrast, the term wages " indicates considerable pay for a lower and
less responsible character of employment, while "salary" is suggestive of a larger and more important
service. Moreover, the intent of the legislature in the exemption of Article 1708 to operate in favor of any
but those who are laboring men or women in the sense that their work is manual. Persons belonging to
this class usually look to the reward of a day's labor for immediate or present support, and such persons
are more in need of the exemption than any others. Petitioner, in this case, is not an ordinary or rank and
file laborer but a responsibly place employee, of El Grande Hotel, responsible for planning, directing,
controlling, and coordinating the activities of all housekeeping personnel so as to ensure the cleanliness,
maintenance and orderliness of all guest rooms, function rooms, public areas, and the surroundings of the
hotel. Considering the importance of petitioner's function in El Grande Hotel, it is undeniable that
petitioner is in a position same as a managerial or supervisory position.
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OPINION: I agree with the ruling of the Supreme Court because they further explained the differences
between wages and salary for they are same concepts but at the same time, they are distinct. Article 1708
of the Civil Code intends to provide the less to be rich in the law and managerial or supervisory
employees are not paid by the hours of work but due to their experience in the job given in order to attain
social justice between the executives and the workers. However, it seems peculiar that the legal provision
that is applicable in a labor dispute case is the Civil Code instead of the Labor Code. For that, I would like
to suggest that there must be amendment with the Labor Code on providing a proper legal distinction
between salary and wages. But nevertheless, I agree to the decision of the Supreme Court with the
rendition of the award to the private respondents.

G.R No. 9366, April 22, 1991

GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION VS. TORRES

FACTS:

Respondent Earl Timothy Cone is a US citizen, who was hired by General Milling Corporation as a
sports consultant and assistant coach. He possessed an alien employment permit which was changed to
pre-arranged employee by the Board of Special Inquiry of the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation. General Milling Corporation requested that Cone’s employment permit be changed to a full-
fledged coach, which was contested by The Basketball Coaches Association of the Philippines. Alleging
that General Milling Corporation failed to show that there is no competent person in the Philippines to do
the coaching job. Secretary of Labor cancelled Cone’s employment permit.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Secretary of Labor act with grave abuse of discretion in revoking Cone’s
Alien Employment Permit. [NO.]

Whether or not, Section 6 (c), Rule XIV, Book I of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor
Code is null and void as it is in violation of the enabling law as the Labor Code does not empower
respondent Secretary to determine if the employment of an alien would redound to national interest.
[NO.]

LAW APPLICABLE:

a. Article 40 of the Labor Code which states that:

Employment permit of non-resident aliens. - Any alien seeking admission to the Philippines for
employment purposes and any domestic or foreign employer who desires to engage an alien for employment
in the Philippines shall obtain an employment permit from the Department of Labor.

The employment permit may be issued to a non-resident alien or to the applicant employer after a
determination of the non-availability of a person in the Philippines who is competent, able and willing at the
time of application to perform the services for which the alien is desired.

For an enterprise registered in preferred areas of investments, said employment permit may be
issued upon recommendation of the government agency charged with the supervision of said registered
enterprise.”
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b. Article 12 of the Labor Code states that:

Statement of Objectives. –– It is the policy of the State: To promote and maintain a state of full
employment through improved manpower training, allocation and utilization;

To facilitate a free choice of available employment by persons seeking work in conformity with the
national interest;

To facilitate and regulate the movement of workers in conformity with the national interest;

To regulate the employment of aliens, including the establishment of a registration and/or work
permit system;

CASE HISTORY:

Petitioner GMC filed a Motion for Reconsideration and two (2) Supplemental Motions for
Reconsideration but said Motions were denied by Acting Secretary of Labor Bienvenido E. Laguesma in an
Order dated 8 June 1990.

Thenafter, the petitioners filed before the Supreme Court on a Petition for Certiorari by which the
Court considers that petitioners have failed to show any grave abuse of discretion or any act without or in
excess of jurisdiction on the part of respondent Secretary of Labor in rendering his decision, dated 23
April 1990, revoking petitioner Cone's Alien Employment Permit.

RULING:

The Secretary of Labor did not act with grave abuse of discretion in revoking Cone’s Alien Employment
Permit. General Milling Corporation’s claim that hiring of a foreign coach is an employer’s prerogative has
no legal basis.

Under Section 40 of the Labor Code, an employer seeking employment of an alien must first obtain an
employment permit from the Department of Labor and Employment. GMC’s right to choose who to
employ is limited by the statutory requirement of an employment permit. The Labor Code empowers the
Labor Secretary to determine as to the availability of the services of a “person in the Philippines who is
competent, able and willing at the time of the application to perform the services for which an alien is
desired.” The Department of Labor and Employment is the agency vested with jurisdiction to determine
the question of availability of local workers.

The Labor Secretary has the power vested upon him by the Labor Code to determine the employment of
an alien. The argument of the petitioner is irrelevant due to the fact that the relationship between
basketball coaching and national interest is tenuous.

Moreover, the Secretary of Labor has the power to do such consideration to a non-resident alien like Cone
to be admitted and employed under the provisions of Sec. 40 par. 2 and in relation with sec. 12 that sets
the objectives of the Secretary of Labor, being part of the instrumentality of the state, to implement the
labor policies of the state.

OPINION: I agree with the ruling of the Court. the Secretary of Labor did is what the law provides and it is
the Labor Code who empowers the Secretary of Labor to determine as to the availability of the services of
a “person in the Philippines who is competent, able and willing at the time of the application to perform
the services for which an alien is desired.” Otherwise, if the plaintiff’s motion has been affirmed by the
court, it will be violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution which may lead to the
dominance of the foreign non-residential workers and the possibility of the working Filipino class’
downfall.
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