1. Almodiel vs.

NLRC
Facts:
 Farle Almodiel is hired as a Cost Accounting Manager by Raytheon Phils, Inc. A standards
Cost Accounting System was installed in the company which resulted to the abolition of his
position. Ang Tan Chai is a permanent resident born in the country. He assumed as MIS
manager. Almodiel challenges the qualification of Ang Tan Chai as the MIS manager
because he is a resident alien without working permit.
 On January 27, 1989, petitioner was summoned by his immediate boss and in the presence
of IRD Manager, Mr. Rolando Estrada, he was told of the abolition of his position on the
ground of redundancy. He pleaded with management to defer its action or transfer him to
another department, but he was told that the decision of management was final and that the
same has been conveyed to the Department of Labor and Employment. Thus, he was
constrained to file the complaint for illegal dismissal before the Arbitration Branch of the
National Capital Region, NLRC, Department of Labor and Employment.
 Labor Arbiter: Ruled in favor of petitioner.
 NLRC: Reversed the ruling of the labor arbiter.
Issues:
 Whether or not there is bad faith, malice and irregularity crept in the abolition of petitioner's
position of Cost Accounting Manager on the ground of redundancy.
 Whether or not there was a violation of Article 40 of the Labor Code on the requirement of
employment permit.
Held:
 Petition was dismissed for lack of merit. Considering further that petitioner herein held a
position which was definitely managerial in character, Raytheon had a broad latitude of
discretion in abolishing his position. An employer has a much wider discretion in terminating
employment relationship of managerial personnel compared to rank and file employees.
The reason obviously is that officers in such key positions perform not only functions which
by nature require the employer's full trust and confidence but also functions that spell the
success or failure of an enterprise.
 Likewise, destitute of merit is petitioner's imputation of unlawful discrimination when
Raytheon caused corollary functions appertaining to cost accounting to be absorbed by
Danny Ang Tan Chai, a resident alien without a working permit. Article 40 of the Labor
Code which requires employment permit refers to non-resident aliens. The employment
permit is required for entry into the country for employment purposes and is issued after
determination of the non-availability of a person in the Philippines who is competent, able
and willing at the time of application to perform the services for which the alien is desired.
Since Ang Tan Chai is a resident alien, he does not fall within the ambit of the provision.
2. General Milling Corp. vs. Torres
Facts:
 The Department of Labor issued an alien employment permit in favor of Earl Timothy Cone,
a United States citizen, as sports consultant and assistant coach for General Milling
Corporation.
 Later, the Board of Special Inquiry of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation
approved Cone’s application for a change of admission status from temporary visitor to pre-
arranged employee. A month later, GMC requested renewal of Cone’s alien employment
 permit and that it be allowed to employ Cone as full-fledged coach. The DOLE Regional
Director granted the request.
 The Basketball Coaches Association of the Philippines appealed the issuance of said
permit to the Secretary of Labor who canceled Cone’s employment permit because GMC
failed to show that there was no person in the Philippines who was competent and willing to
do the services required nor that the hiring of Cone would redound to the national interest.
Issue:
 Whether or not the Secretary of Labor acted with grave abuse of discretion in revoking
Cone's employment permit.
Held:
 The Secretary of Labor did not act with grave abuse of discretion in revoking Cone’s Alien
Employment Permit. GMC’s claim that hiring of a foreign coach is an employer’s
prerogative has no legal basis. Under Article 40 of the Labor Code, an employer seeking
employment of an alien must first obtain an employment permit from the Department of
Labor. GMC’s right to choose whom to employ is limited by the statutory requirement of an
employment permit.
 The Labor Code empowers the Labor Secretary to determine as to the availability of the
services of a “person in the Philippines who is competent, able and willing at the time of the
application to perform the services for which an alien is desired.
3. Dee Chuan and Sons vs. CIR
Facts:
 Dee C. Chuan and Sons Inc requested authority to hire 12 more laborers from time to time
and on a temporary basis pending settlement of a labor dispute between the petitioner and
Kaisahan Ng Mga Manggagawa sa Kahoy sa Pilipinas.
 The Court ordered that majority to be employed should be native. It complained that the
order restrains it in its liberty to engage the men it pleases. It also averred that the
restrictions of the number of aliens that may be employed in any business, occupation,
trade or profession of any kind, is a denial of the equal protection of the laws.
Issue:
 Whether or not the requirement that majority of laborers to be employed must be Filipino is
arbitrary.
Held:
 As far as the petitioner is concerned, the requirement that majority of the laborers to be
employed should be Filipinos is certainly not arbitrary, unreasonable or unjust.
 The petitioner is not entitled to challenge the constitutionality of an order which does not
adversely affect it, in behalf of aliens who are prejudiced thereby. It is the prospective alien
employee who may do so and only when and so far, as it is being, or is about to be, applied
to his disadvantage. The employer’s right to hire labor is not absolute. The Legislature has
the power to make regulations subject only to the condition that they pass the
“reasonableness” and “public interest” tests. And under Commonwealth Act No. 103, the
CIR may specify that a certain proportion of the additional laborers to be employed should
be Filipinos, if such condition, in the court’s opinion, is necessary or expedient for the
purpose of settling disputes, preventing further disputes, or doing justice to the parties.
4. Nitto Enterprises vs. NLRC
Facts:
 Nitto Enterprises (Nitto) is a company engaged in the sale of glass and aluminum products
while Roberto Capili was hired by Nitto as an apprentice machinist, molder and core maker.
An apprenticeship agreement was signed and filed with DOLE, which stated that Capili will
receive 75% of applicable minimum wage. Roberto was asked to resign due to negligence.
Nitto asked Capili to resign due to negligence causing injury to an office secretary and even
to himself. Capili signed the letter and executed a Quitclaim and Release in favor of
petitioner in consideration of P1,912.79. Three days after, he filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal and payment of other monetary benefits with NLRC Arbitration branch. Labor
Arbiter favored Nitto for stating that Capili violated the terms of agreement. NLRC reversed
the decision, saying that Capili is illegally dismissed being a regular employee. Nitto
contends there is a valid apprenticeship agreement. Nitto assails the NLRC’s finding that
Capili cannot be considered an apprentice since no apprenticeship program had yet been
filed and approved by DOLE when the alleged apprenticeship agreement was executed and
Capili was employed on May 28, 1990. However, the apprenticeship agreement was filed
with DOLE only on June 7, 1990. The approval by DOLE of the apprenticeship agreement
came much later.

Issue:
 Whether or not mere signing of apprenticeship agreement establishes an employer-
apprentice relationship
Held:
 Petition is dismissed for lack of merit. Prior approval of DOLE is a requisite before entering
into an apprenticeship program. In the case at bench, the apprenticeship program started
on May 28, 1990, on the day the agreement was signed. However, the agreement was filed
only on June 7, 1990. Thus, there was no valid apprenticeship.
 In the case at bench, the apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private
respondent was executed on May 28, 1990 allegedly employing the latter as an apprentice
in the trade of "care maker/molder." On the same date, an apprenticeship program was
prepared by petitioner and submitted to the Department of Labor and Employment.
However, the apprenticeship Agreement was filed only on June 7, 1990. Notwithstanding
the absence of approval by the Department of Labor and Employment, the apprenticeship
agreement was enforced the day it was signed.
 Moreover, petitioner did not comply with the requirements of the law. It is mandated that
apprenticeship agreements entered into by the employer and apprentice shall be entered
only in accordance with the apprenticeship program duly approved by the Minister of Labor
and Employment.
5. Filamer vs. IAC
Facts:
 Private respondent Potenciano Kapunan, Sr., an eighty-two-year old retired schoolteacher
(now deceased), was struck by the Pinoy jeep owned by petitioner Filamer and driven by its
alleged employee, Funtecha, as Kapunan, Sr. was walking along Roxas Avenue, Roxas
City at 6:30 in the evening of October 20, 1977. As a result of the accident, Kapunan, Sr.
 suffered multiple injuries for which he was hospitalized for a total of twenty (20) days. At the
time of the vehicular accident, only one headlight of the jeep was functioning.
 Funtecha, who only had a student driver’s permit, was driving after having persuaded Allan
Masa, the authorized driver, to turn over the wheels to him. The two fled from the scene
after the incident. A tricycle driver brought the unconscious victim to the hospital. The trial
court rendered judgment finding not only petitioner Filamer and Funtecha to be at fault but
also the Institute and its president. The SC previously rendered a decision not holding the
school liable for damages on the ground that Funtecha is not an authorized driver.
Issue:
 Whether or not the term “employer” as used in Article 2180 of the Civil Code is applicable to
petitioner Filamer with reference to Funtecha.
Held:
 Yes. It is undisputed that Funtecha was a working student, being a part-time janitor and
scholar of petitioner Filamer. He was, in relation to the school, an employee even if he was
assigned to clean the school premises for only two (2) hours in the morning of each school
day. Hence, the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting within the
scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve the petitioner of the burden of rebutting the
presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on its part either in the selection of a
servant or employee, or in the supervision over him. The petitioner has failed to show proof
of its having exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family over its employees
Funtecha and Allan.
 This case applied the provision of Article 2180 of the Civil Code instead of the Labor Code.
6. Brotherhood Labor Unity vs. Zamora
Facts:
 The petitioners are workers who have been employed at the San Miguel Parola Glass
Factory as “pahinantes” or “kargadors” for almost seven years. They worked exclusively at
the SMC plant, never having been assigned to other companies or departments of San
Miguel Corp, even when the volume of work was at its minimum. Their work was neither
regular nor continuous, depending on the volume of bottles to be loaded and unloaded, as
well as the business activity of the company. However, work exceeded the eight-hour day
and sometimes, necessitated work on Sundays and holidays. -for this, they were neither
paid overtime nor compensation.
 Sometime in 1969, the workers organized and affiliated themselves with Brotherhood Labor
Unity Movement (BLUM). They wanted to be paid to overtime and holiday pay. They
pressed the SMC management to hear their grievances. BLUM filed a notice of strike with
the Bureau of Labor Relations in connection with the dismissal of some of its members. San
Miguel refused to bargain with the union alleging that the workers are not their employees
but the employees of an independent labor contracting firm, Guaranteed Labor Contractor.
 The workers were then dismissed from their jobs and denied entrance to the glass factory
despite their regularly reporting for work. A complaint was filed for illegal dismissal and
unfair labor practices.
Issue:
 Whether or not there was employer-employee relationship between the workers and San
Miguel Corp.
Held:
 YES. In determining if there is an existence of the relationship, the four-fold test was used
by the Supreme Court. These are: (1) The selection and engagement of the employee; (2)
Payment of wages; (3) Power of dismissal; (4) Control Test- the employer’s power to
control the employee with respect to the means and methods by which work is to be
accomplished.
 In the case, the records fail to show that San Miguel entered into mere oral agreements of
employment with the workers. Considering the length of time that the petitioners have
worked with the company, there is justification to conclude that they were engaged to
perform activities necessary in the usual business or trade. Despite past shutdowns of the
glass plant, the workers promptly returned to their jobs. The term of the petitioner’s
employment appears indefinite and the continuity and habituality of the petitioner’s work
bolsters the claim of an employee status.
 As for the payment of the workers’ wages, the contention that the independent contractors
were paid a lump sum representing only the salaries the workers where entitled to have no
merit. The amount paid by San Miguel to the contracting firm is no business expense or
capital outlay of the latter. What the contractor receives is a percentage from the total
earnings of all the workers plus an additional amount from the earnings of each individual
worker.
 The power of dismissal by the employer was evident when the petitioners had already been
refused entry to the premises. It is apparent that the closure of the warehouse was a ploy to
get rid of the petitioners, who were then agitating the company for reforms and benefits.
The inter-office memoranda submitted in evidence prove the company’s control over the
workers. That San Miguel has the power to recommend penalties or dismissal is the
strongest indication of the company’s right of control over the workers as direct employer.
7. Tabas vs. California Manufacturing Inc.
Facts:
 Petitioners were the employees of Livi Manpower Services. They were assigned to the
respondent pursuant to a manpower supply agreement as “promotional merchandisers”. It
was provided in the agreement that: first, California would have no control or supervision
over the workers as to how they perform or accomplish their work; second, Livi is an
independent contractor and that it has the sole responsibility of complying with all the
existing as well as future laws, rules and regulations pertinent to employment of labor;
third, the assignment to California was “seasonal and contractual”; and, fourth, the payroll,
including COLA and holiday pay shall be delivered by Livi at California’s premises.
 Petitioners were made to sign 6-month employment contracts which were renewed for the
same period. Unlike regular employees of California, they did not receive fringe benefits
and bonuses and were paid only a daily allowance.
 Upon filing of complaint, Petitioners contend that they have become regular employees of
California. Subsequent to their claim for regularization, California no longer re-hired them.
Livi, on the other hand, claims the workers as its employees and that it is an independent
contractor. The Labor Arbiter found that no employer-employee relationship existed. The
NLRC affirmed the ruling.
Issue:
 Whether or not there is an employer-employee relationship between California and the
petitioners.
Held:
 YES. The existence of an employer-employee relationship is a question of law and cannot
be made subject to agreement. The stipulations in the manpower supply agreement will not
erase either party’s obligations as an employer.
 Livi is a labor-only contractor, notwithstanding the provisions in the agreement. The nature
of one’s business is not determined by self-serving appellations but by test provided by
statute and the prevailing case law. California’s contention that the workers are not
performing activities which are directly related to its general business of manufacturing is
untenable. The promotion or sale of products, including the task of occasional price tagging,
is an integral part of the manufacturing business. Livi as a placement agency had simply
supplied the manpower necessary for California to carry out its merchandising activities,
using the latter’s premise sand equipment. Merchandising is likewise not a specific project
because it is an activity related to the day-to-day operations of California. Based on Article
106 of the Labor Code, the labor-only contractor is considered merely an agent of the
employer and liability must be shouldered by either one or by both. Petitioners are ordered
reinstated as regular employees.
8. Sevilla vs. CA
Facts:
 A contract by and between Noguera and Tourist World Service (TWS), represented by
Canilao was executed wherein TWS leased the premises belonging to Noguera as branch
office of TWS. When the branch office was opened, it was run by appellant Sevilla payable
to TWS by any airline for any fare brought in on the efforts of Mrs. Sevilla, 4% was to go to
Sevilla and 3% was to be withheld by the TWS. Later, TWS was informed that Sevilla was
connected with rival firm, and since the branch office was losing, TWS considered closing
down its office. On January 3, 1962, the contract with appellee for the use of the branch
office premises was terminated and while the effectivity thereof was January 31, 1962, the
appellees no longer used it. Because of this, Canilao, the secretary of TWS, went over to
the branch office, and finding the premises locked, he padlocked the premises. When
neither appellant Sevilla nor any of his employees could enter, a complaint was filed by the
appellants against the appellees. TWS insisted that Sevilla was a mere employee, being
the “branch manager” of its branch office and that she had no say on the lease executed
with the private respondent, Noguera.
Issue:
 Whether or not employer employee relationship exists between Sevilla and TWS.

HELD:
 The records show that petitioner, Sevilla, was not subject to control by the private
respondent TWS. In the first place, under the contract of lease, she had bound herself in
solidum as and for rental payments, an arrangement that would belie claims of a master-
servant relationship. That does not make her an employee of TWS, since a true employee
cannot be made to part with his own money in pursuance of his employer’s business, or
otherwise, assume any liability thereof.
 In the second place, when the branch office was opened, the same was run by the
appellant Sevilla payable to TWS by any airline for any fare brought in on the effort of
 Sevilla. Thus, it cannot be said that Sevilla was under the control of TWS. Sevilla in
pursuing the business, relied on her own capabilities. It is further admitted that Sevilla was
not in the company’s payroll. For her efforts, she retained 4% in commissions from airline
bookings, the remaining 3% going to TWS. Unlike an employee, who earns a fixed salary,
she earned compensation in fluctuating amount depending on her booking successes.
 The fact that Sevilla had been designated “branch manager” does not make her a TWS
employee. It appears that Sevilla is a bona fide travel agent herself, and she acquired an
interest in the business entrusted to her. She also had assumed personal obligation for the
operation thereof, holding herself solidary liable for the payment of rentals. Wherefore, TWS
and Canilao are jointly and severally liable to indemnify the petitioner, Sevilla.
9. Continental Marble Corp vs. NLRC
Facts:
 Rodito Nasayao claimed that he was appointed plant manager of the corporation and
receiving a compensation of P3,000.00, a month or 25% of the monthly net income of the
company, whichever is greater, when the company failed to give his salary for the months
of May, June and July Nasayo filed a complaint with the NLRC.
 Continental Marble Corp., denied the claim of Rodito Nasayao, that the latter was not an
employee of the company, an undertaking agreed upon by the parties as joint venture, a
sort of partnership, wherein Rodito Nasayao was to keep the machinery in good working
condition and, in return, he would get the contracts from end-users for the installation of
marble products, in which the company would not interfere. In addition, private respondent
Nasayao was to receive an amount equivalent to 25% of the net profits that the corporation
will earn, should there be any.
 The case was submitted for voluntary arbitration and the parties selected Jose T. Collado
as voluntary arbitrator. In the course of the proceeding, Continental Marble Corp.,
challenged the arbitrator's capacity to try and decide the case fairly and judiciously and
asked him to desist from further hearing the case. But, the respondent arbitrator refused.
Later a judgement was rendered in favor of Rodito Nasayao.
 Upon receipt of the decision, Continental Marble Corp., appealed to the National Labor
Relations Commission on grounds that the labor arbiter gravely abused his discretion in
persisting to hear and decide the case notwithstanding petitioners' request for him to desist
therefrom: and that the appealed decision is not supported by evidence. Rodito Nasayao
filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the decision of the voluntary
arbitrator is final, unappealable, and immediately executory; and a motion for the issuance
of a writ of execution. The Commission, dismissed the appeal on the ground that the
decision appealed from is final, unappealable and immediately executory. Continental
Marble Corp., seek to annul and set aside the decision.
Issue:
 Whether or not there exist an employee-employer relationship between Rodito Nasayao
and Continental Marble Corp.
Held:
 No. The court relied on the so -called "control test" that is the most important element, in
determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship, the elements that are
generally considered are the following: (a) the selection and engagement of the employee;
(b) the payment of wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the employer's power to
control the employee with respect to the means and methods by which the work is to be
accomplished.
  In the instant case, it appears that the petitioners had no control over the conduct of Rodito
Nasayao in the performance of his work. He decided for himself on what was to be done
and worked at his own pleasure. He was not subject to definite hours or conditions of work
and, in turn, was compensated according to the results of his own effort. He had a free
hand in running the company and its business. The court find the version of the petitioners
to be more plausible and in accord with human nature and the ordinary course of things. As
pointed out by the petitioners, it was illogical for them to hire the private respondent Rodito
Nasayao as plant manager with a monthly salary of P3,000.00, an amount which they could
ill-afford to pay, considering that the business was losing, at the time he was hired, and that
they were about to close shop in a few months' time.
 Besides, there is nothing in the record which would support the claim of Rodito Nasayao
that he was an employee of the petitioner corporation. He was not included in the company
payroll, nor in the list of company employees furnished the Social Security System.
 Most of all, the element of control is lacking. Absent the power to control the employee with
respect to the means and methods by which his work was to be accomplished, there was
no employer- employee relationship between the parties. Hence, there is no basis for an
award of unpaid salaries or wages to Rodito Nasayao
10.