Southeast European and Black Sea Studies

ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fbss20

Multi-level Games: The Serbian Government’s

Strategy towards Kosovo and the EU under the
Progressive Party

Aleksandra Dragojlov

To cite this article: Aleksandra Dragojlov (2020): Multi-level Games: The Serbian Government’s
Strategy towards Kosovo and the EU under the Progressive Party, Southeast European and Black
Sea Studies, DOI: 10.1080/14683857.2020.1778985

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2020.1778985

Published online: 19 Jun 2020.

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SOUTHEAST EUROPEAN AND BLACK SEA STUDIES
https://doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2020.1778985

ARTICLE

Multi-level Games: The Serbian Government’s Strategy

towards Kosovo and the EU under the Progressive Party
Aleksandra Dragojlov
Department of European Studies, Cardiff University, Sarasota, Florida, USA

ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY

Since the signing of the historic ‘Brussels Agreement’ on 19 April 2013 Received 5 May 2019
on the normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia, Serbian Accepted 21 May 2020
President Aleksandar Vučić and the Progressive Party have oscillated KEYWORDS
between competing tensions emanating from seeking membership in Kosovo; european Union;
the European Union and those stemming from the retention of serbia; EU conditionality;
Kosovo, including the party’s uncompromising position on non- multi-level games; statecraft
recognition. Following two-level game theory, this paper offers
a comparative analysis of the Progressive Party’s multi-level game
strategy vis-à-vis Kosovo and the EU, arguing that while the initial
success of the Brussels Agreement can predominantly be attributed
to the rise in popular support for EU accession, Serbian policy towards
Kosovo appears to be far less clear and often contradictory and there­
fore, Serbian government strategy cannot have been influenced by
public opinion.

Introduction
The victory of the former Radicals turned Progressivists in the May 2012 Serbian
parliamentary and presidential elections brought about a shift in the country’s EU
accession process. Although with the election of ultranationalists, ‘many expected
a slowdown in European integration, complication of relations with Pristina and
a potential U-turn towards Russia,’ the Serbian Progressive Party soon found themselves
to be in the driver’s seat of Serbia’s European integration process, leading to the start of
negotiations and the opening of 12 chapters (Ejdus 2014, 3). Perhaps the key milestone in
the government’s success and the most visible policy shift came with the signing of the
EU-facilitated ‘Agreement on the Comprehensive Normalisation of Relations between
Kosovo and Serbia’ (hereafter, the ‘Brussels Agreement’) on 19 April 2013. The agree­
ment comprised 15 points that mainly dealt with finding a sustainable solution to the
Serb-dominated Northern Kosovo- an area where the jurisdictional conflict led to deep
divisions between Kosovar Serbs and Kosovar Albanians, thus preventing any forms of
peace-building that would facilitate multiethnic coexistence as it had in the South. The
new dialogue’s sole purpose, therefore, was to remove all Serbian parallel structures and
integrate the Serbian community in the North into Kosovar governance and security
structures (i.e., police, judiciary, and civil protection) in exchange for some degree of

CONTACT Aleksandra Dragojlov Aleksandra.dragojlov@gmail.com Cardiff University, Sarasota, Florida, 34233,

USA
© 2020 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
2 A. DRAGOJLOV

local autonomy envisaged by the creation of an Association/Community of Serbian

Majority Municipalities. It also foresaw the establishment and implementation of agree­
ments on energy and telecommunications and both sides agreed not to block the other’s
progress in their respective EU path. While the Agreement initially appeared to be
a success, the omission of any discussion on Kosovo’s status, proved to be its core
weakness, and as a consequence, it precluded finding a permanent solution to the
Kosovo dilemma. Moreover, five EU member states1 who continue to not recognize
Kosovo, have also complicated the status issue further and thus, have allowed Serbia to
exploit this ambiguity in a way that would serve its own national interests.
Despite its limitations surrounding the status issue, the Brussels Dialogue could be
viewed as a success as it enforced some level of partial compliance with EU conditionality
by the Serbian government, and allowed for both Serbia and Kosovo to reach and
implement agreements that would have seemed impossible in the past. Moreover, the
EU prioritized normalization of relations with Kosovo as a key condition for Serbia’s
advancement in its EU path, which was reaffirmed in the European Commission’s
Communication on a Credible Enlargement Perspective report in May 2018 (European
Commission 2018). While the new government under the leadership of the Progressive
Party and Aleksandar Vučić remained committed to European integration, the nation­
alist past of some of its members and the sensitivity of the Kosovo issue to Serbian
national discourse, would create competition between the aspiration to EU membership –
which would bring economic benefits – and the goal of retaining Kosovo in order to
satisfy their nationalist public at home. Following Putnam’s (1988) multi-level game
theory, the article argues that the Progressives have oscillated between tensions arising
from seeking both membership of the EU and the desire to retain Kosovo – this is
demonstrated through their partial compliance with the agreements in the Brussels
Dialogue between Kosovo and the EU. Confronted with external pressures from both
the EU and Kosovo and internal, domestic pressure, the Serbian government’s strategy
was to do the very minimum necessary to secure EU benefits while maintaining the
fiction that Kosovo was still an integral part of Serbia. The decision to retain some
semblance of control over Kosovo through each agreement in the Brussels Dialogue has
been supported by the majority of political parties in the Serbian parliament who have
remained against secession of Kosovo, and the Serbian government’s belief that recogni­
tion of Kosovo would reduce their public support. Public opinion also supported EU
accession, even preceding the Progressive Party’s and Vučić’s ascent to power. However,
when it came to retention of Kosovo, opinion poll research appeared contradictory –
while many Serbs were reluctant to trade Kosovo for EU membership, they also claimed
that Kosovo was not the most pressing problem for them, realizing Kosovo had been lost
with the signing of the Brussels Agreement. Therefore, this paper will seek to argue that
the often contradictory opinion poll data cannot solely account for the government’s
multi-level game strategy to pursue compliance for EU-related gains in addition to
holding their jurisdiction over Kosovo. Rather, the nationalist background of SNS
political elites would posit that public opinion was instead shaped by the Serbian
government in a bid to secure power over the state.
The purpose of this paper is three-fold: first, it seeks to demonstrate the Serbian
government’s multi-level game strategy under the Progressive Party leadership through
a brief examination of agreements from the Brussels Dialogue that have been partially or
 SOUTHEAST EUROPEAN AND BLACK SEA STUDIES 3

fully implemented and that have a fundamental bearing on the sovereignty of Kosovo,
while briefly alluding to those that have remained frozen. Second, it attempts to explain
Serbian government strategy in more depth by looking at the opinion polls between 2010
and 2018 towards recognition of Kosovo and accession to the EU, and statements from
Serbian politicians. The final section posits that the tradeoff of Kosovo for EU accession is
never a clear one, arguing that the degree of Serbian influence in Kosovo is not settled, so
some measures vis-à-vis the Brussels Agreement can be interpreted as Serbia increasing
its bargaining power to secure compensations elsewhere, including long-term influence
in Kosovo.

Statecraft and multi-level games: a theoretical analysis

In light of the major transformation that occurred in Serbia’s policy towards Kosovo,
there has been a growing field of scholarship centred around understanding and explain­
ing the factors underpinning this policy shift. Most scholars focusing on the 2013
Brussels Agreement, assume the rationalist approach according to which careful cost-
benefit calculations are the drivers of Serbian political elites’ policy change vis-à-vis
Kosovo (Ejdus 2014; Economides and Ker-Lindsay 2015; Bieber 2015) While rationalist
institutionalism serves as a good jumping-off point to explain the motivations of Serbian
political elites based on the benefits EU accession would bring, the theory remains
inadequate to offer a comprehensive understanding of the Serbian government’s complex
and often contradictory policy towards Kosovo. Thus, this article proposes Putnam’s
(1988) two-level game theory, when used together with Bulpitt’s (1986) and applied to
Serbia’s negotiations with Kosovo, provides for a useful framework for gaining a better
understanding of the constraints and thus the behaviour of the Serbian government.
Bulpitt’s (1986) concept of statecraft offers a third approach towards explaining
political actors’ motivations to Europeanize where the desire for power through the
winning of elections and demonstrating a sense of governing competence are the drivers
behind policy change (21). In line with rationalism, statecraft further posits that politi­
cians ‘rule through greed, ambition or party pressures and are mostly self-interested
actors who make decisions based on cost-benefit calculations of what will allow for them
to gain and maintain positions of power’ (James 2013, 67–68). Kosovo’s centrality to
Serbian national identity and its nation-building aspirations suggests that any indication
of a Progressive failure to retain Kosovo, i.e., through recognition, might trigger a decline
in public support. At the same time, the economic crisis coupled with the fact that a large
segment of the population is in support of Serbia’s EU membership posits the need for
the Progressives to adopt a more favourable policy towards Kosovo – one that would lead
to significant EU benefits and gradually pave the road to Serbia’s accession. This
hypothesis therefore follows Putnam’s two-level game theory in describing and under­
standing Serbian government strategy towards both Kosovo and the EU where the
Progressives and Vučić are players at two tables – the EU and domestic – and are thus
‘doubly constrained by both what is negotiable internationally and what is acceptable
domestically’ (Noutcheva 2006, 5).
Previous governments’ policies towards Kosovo have significantly complicated
Serbia’s membership prospects particularly when the Serbian Constitution was amended
in 2006 to include Kosovo as an integral part of Serbia and thus making it near impossible
4 A. DRAGOJLOV

for future Serbian ruling elites to recognize Kosovo (National Assembly of the Republic
of Serbia 2006). Kosovo had long been viewed and stressed by Serbian elites and the
public as the cradle of Serbian national identity, dating back to the myth over the Battle of
Kosovo in 1389 in which Serbia suffered military defeat against the Ottomans for
heavenly salvation. Bieber (2002) argues that ‘the insistent remembrance of the battle,
in conjunction with the importance of Kosovo for the medieval Serbian kingdom, serves
to ground a territorial claim irrespective of the facts of population distribution in the
region and impervious to subsequent historical developments’ (95–96). Thus, as
Obradović-Wochnik and Wochnik (2012) posit, ‘the changes to the constitution
‘straightjacketed’ Serbia’s actions since it required subsequent MPs to swear an oath of
loyalty which, inter alia, requests a commitment ‘to the preservation of Kosovo and
Metohija within the Republic of Serbia’ (1170–1171). In order not to risk political
backlash, Vučić and the Progressives have sought to retain some partial jurisdiction
over Kosovo in addition to reaffirming that Serbia would never recognize Kosovo in
order to maintain their position in power. However, we argue that the EU’s conditioning
of Serbia’s accession to a gradual normalization of its relations with Kosovo obligated
Serbian politicians to engage in some level of compliance to secure advancements in the
accession process. Following this strategy of two-level game playing, partial compliance
became a way to secure both EU benefits and move forward in the accession process
while simultaneously seeking ways to retain their grip on Kosovo.
While Putnam’s two-level game theory has continuously been applied to our knowl­
edge and understanding of international negotiations and would, therefore, appear to be
well suited to the Serbian case, we argue that this theory does not seem to add anything
new when it is applied to Serbian government strategy. However, when applied to
Serbia’s statecraft, the application of this theory contributes to the existing scholarship
on Serbia’s policy shift towards Kosovo because of the Progressive Party’s ambition to
remain in a position of power. This would help to account for the party’s genesis-it broke
off over pragmatic accession to the EU and not over a genuine, normative shift, as
evidenced by public opinion polls and the party’s initial leadership in 2009 when they
realized they had very little chance of gaining support if they continued to maintain
a hardline nationalist stance which went against EU membership. However, as the author
argues, it is this same EU accession that now threatens the SNS’s control of the state due
to the increasing demands vis-à-vis Kosovo. Thus, the Kosovo issue has now become
a way to reduce the attraction of the EU.
Although it can be argued that most politicians are concerned with seeking ways to gain
and maintain power through a sense of governing competence, Serbia, along with its
Balkan neighbours, is understood to be a competitive, consolidated authoritarian regime
whose dual objective is to remain in power and secure control of the state (Bieber 2018).
According to Bieber (2018), competitive authoritarian regimes like Serbia are ‘best under­
stood as being defined by the combination of two features: (1) institutional weakness that
provides insufficient democratic safeguards, and (2) authoritarian political actors who
utilise these weaknesses to attain and retain power’ (338). In such regimes, the media are
tightly controlled – as is the case of Vučić’s dominion over the media – to foster an image
that could be sold to the domestic constituency and the EU, which would allow him and his
party to engage in two-level game strategy and consecutively maintain his position of
power through winning elections. In democracies where basic media freedoms are in place,
 SOUTHEAST EUROPEAN AND BLACK SEA STUDIES 5

politicians would find it difficult to sell this strategy to their domestic sphere and would
thus only be able to hold on to power for as long as their term permitted. Therefore,
understanding the regime type of the Serbian government is critical in contributing to our
knowledge of Serbian government strategy vis-à-vis Kosovo.
Vučić and the Serbian Progressive Party’s hold on power was limited prior to 2016 and
shortly following the May 2012 election, when the party first entered into government
and the SNS had only a quarter of the votes. However, following 2016, it consolidated its
power and gained dominance in public opinion polls when it secured over 50% of the
votes. Its initial, tentative hold on government should have allowed the party to give up
less on Kosovo and be more open to negotiations with the EU; however, the opposite
happened. Once its consolidation of power was firm following 2016, the SNS was more
open to agreement with the EU for the sake of electoral gain as both the EU and Kosovo
were seen as being attractive to both the Serbian populace and the government. However,
due to increasing demands by the EU vis-à-vis Kosovo, this same EU has threatened the
Serbian government’s control of the state who, as a result of its nationalist stance coupled
with the Serbian public’s non-recognition sentiment towards Kosovo, does not wish to
give up its control over Kosovo. Moreover, there is no political party in the Serbian
government poised to compromise on Kosovo.

The implementation of kosovo-serbia agreements

Security structures: police and civil protection
One of the most important dimensions of the Brussels Agreement concerns the security
structures in Northern Kosovo. Given the history of violence and contested authority of
the divided communities in Northern Kosovo, security is a vital component for promot­
ing peacebuilding processes and ensuring regional stability, a key element of condition­
ality stemming from the Stabilization and Association Agreements relevant for all the
Western Balkan countries. Prior to the Brussels Agreement, both the United Nations
Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) and other international organizations
(EULEX and the OSCE) failed in managing security in Northern Kosovo, thus perpetu­
ating security dilemmas between security forces controlled by Belgrade and those con­
trolled by the central government in Pristina (Marković 2017, 43–44). The EU realized
that such an environment was unsustainable in the long term but did not offer prospects
for peacebuilding nor did it solve the EU’s Balkan dilemma. Moreover, if Serbia wanted
to join the EU, the government had to comply with the conditionality set forth in the
Brussels Agreement, which became part of negotiating Chapter 35 on Kosovo.
Points 7, 8, and 9 of the Brussels Agreement refer to the dismantling of Serb parallel
security structures and their subsequent integration into the Kosovo security structures.
Points 7 and 9 specifically indicate that there ‘shall be only one police force in Kosovo
called the Kosovo Police;’ that ‘all police in northern Kosovo shall be integrated in the
Kosovo Police (KP) framework’, and that ‘salaries will be only from the KP’ (Government
of Serbia 2013). Moreover, Point 9 of the Brussels Agreement refers to there being only
one ‘Police Regional Commander for the four northern Serb-majority municipalities
(Northern Mitrovica, Zvečan, Zubin Potok and Leposavić)’ who will be a ‘Kosovo Serb
nominated by the Ministry of Interior from a list provided by the four mayors on behalf
6 A. DRAGOJLOV

of the Community/Association’ (Government of Serbia 2013). Although the Brussels

Agreement makes no explicit mention of civil protection [CP], Point 8 of the Agreement
refers to ‘other Serbian security structures’ (Government of Serbia 2013).
According to the 2016 EU progress report for Serbia, the Commission claimed that
‘Kosovo Serb police and civil protection personnel are now fully integrated into the
Kosovo system’ (European Commission 2016, 24). 287 (out of 337)2 Kosovo Serb police
officers were integrated into the Kosovo police as of 31 December 2013, and the Regional
Directorate [a Kosovo Serb] was established on 22 July 2014 (Republic of Kosovo, Ministry
for Dialogue 2016a, 15). With regard to civil protection, some members have been
integrated into or employed by Kosovan institutions (i.e., the Emergency Management
Agency and the Correctional Service) (Emini and Isidora 2018). However, despite the
positive EU progress report, this was an area where the Serbian government demonstrated
partial compliance with EU conditionality established in the Brussels Agreement. In an
interview the author conducted with an MP from the Democratic Party of Kosovo, ‘the
Serbian government still compensates for the salaries of integrated Serbian CP and uses
them as a tool for political pressure in the north and all of the territory where Serbs live’.
One of the criteria for the successful integration of the former CP into Kosovan equivalent
structures stemming from Chapter 35 was that ‘Serbia adopts the necessary regulations on
the discontinuation of payment of salaries and provision of financial means to the civil
protection in Kosovo’ (Conference on Accession to the European Union-Serbia 2015, 5).
Additionally, in an interview, Nešović claimed that the integrated Serb Kosovo police in
the north also receive pensions from Belgrade on top of their salaries from the Kosovan
government. Despite this drawback, the dismantling of Serbian parallel security structures
and subsequent integration of former Serbian police and CP coincided with the opening of
accession negotiations in January 2014.
While initially, the Serbian government seemed to be cooperating with both the
Kosovan government and the EU in the area of security, the police in North Kosovo,
at the time of writing (2019), come to be seen as influenced by Belgrade. This is evidenced
by the series of police raids in May 2019 instigated by the Kosovo police in which several
members of the Kosovo Serb police force had been detained and arrested (Begisholli and
Maja 2019). Belgrade’s ambition to retain control over Kosovo in the area of security can
perhaps be attributed to the fact that the Serbian government has had a better bargaining
chip where minimal concessions to the EU resulted in the advancement of Serbia’s
progress in the accession negotiations while simultaneously satisfying the nationalist
constituency in Serbia proper. Serbia has always been far ahead of Kosovo in its member­
ship bid, becoming an EU candidate in March 2012 and receiving a green light from the
EU to commence negotiations in January 2014 while Kosovo remains a potential candi­
date, having only its Stabilization and Association Agreement enter into force in
April 2016 (European Commission 2019).

Justice
The justice agreement was also another major element of the Brussels Dialogue that
would have an impact on the security situation in the North. Antonijević (2016) posits
that ‘Serbian judicial institutions in the northern part of Kosovo were more or less shut
down in mid-2013, in accordance with the Brussels agreement’ (Antonijević 2016, 72).
 SOUTHEAST EUROPEAN AND BLACK SEA STUDIES 7

This meant that the judiciary only handled minor civil cases such as divorce and
dissolution of property and parental issues while EULEX dealt with the high profile
cases concerning war crimes, organized crime and cases dealing with high corruption,
thus leaving a backlog of other criminal cases that had yet to be resolved (cited in Anna
et al. 2016, 72). The extension of EULEX’s mandate in the North, originally set to end in
June 2016, did not create the mechanisms for establishing a unified and operational
justice system, which is a key benchmark for democracy and part of the 1993
Copenhagen criteria. Given the ethnic divisions and the legal vacuum in North
Kosovo where smuggling, organized crime and black commerce continued to be the
norm prior to and leading up to the signing of the Brussels Agreement, it became
critical to establish a unitary justice system, comprising the entire territory of Kosovo.
Thus, points 10 and 11 of the Brussels Agreement called for the integration of Serb
judicial authorities into the Kosovo justice system. Additionally, both points dealt with
the ethnic structure of (northern) district and central (Appellate) courts’ judges to
ensure minority representation and equal participation in legal procedures: the central
court in Pristina would establish a panel composed of a majority of Kosovo Serb judges
to deal with all Kosovo Serb-majority municipalities. The district court, composed of
both administrative staff and judges would sit permanently in Northern Mitrovica and
each panel would be composed of a majority of Kosovo Serb judges (Government of
Serbia 2013). The establishment of both regional and central courts was to not only
integrate the former Serbian judiciary into the Kosovan legal framework but it also
sought to ‘build a sustainable framework for cooperation between [Kosovar] Albanians
and Serbs’ (Marković 2017, 33–34). Therefore, the conditionality stemming from the
Brussels Agreement would also ensure compliance with the conditionality of regional
cooperation.
In the Kosovan government progress report of November 2016, Kosovo confirmed
that the recruitment of 45 Serb judges, 14 prosecutors and 141 administrative staff had
been completed (Republic of Kosovo, Ministry for Dialogue 2016b, 18–19). On
30 November 2016, both Kosovo and Serbia agreed on a document titled ‘Conclusions
of EU facilitators on Justice,’ which defined all the elements for the completion of
integration in the field of justice (Government of Serbia, Office for Kosovo and
Metohija 2017, 12). In this document, ‘it was agreed that the appointment of judges
and prosecutors, as well as the integration of the administrative staff into the Provisional
Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) in Pristina be scheduled for 10 January 2017ʹ
(Government of Serbia, Office for Kosovo and Metohija 2017, 12). On that day, Serbia
claimed it would comply with the EU conditionality stemming from Chapter 35 on
ending tenure for all the to-be integrated judicial personnel (Government of Serbia,
Office for Kosovo and Metohija 2017, 12). However, this process had been delayed until
a new agreement was reached with the final implementation of the justice agreement
being set for 17 October 2017, when Serbian judges, prosecutors and judicial staff were to
be fully integrated (European External Action Service 2017). Despite an additional week’s
delay due to the failure of Serb judges and prosecutors to show up at the office of Kosovo
President Hashim Thaçi to be sworn in, on 24 October 2017, 42 judges and 14 prosecu­
tors took part in the oath-taking ceremony, thus finalizing the implementation of the
justice agreement (European Western Balkans 2017).
8 A. DRAGOJLOV

An EULEX official from the North interviewed claimed that the integrated judges are
still required to undergo training to be familiarized with the Kosovan legal framework
and there is a significant backlog of cases that needed to be dealt with in order to have
a fully functioning justice system in the North. Before the backlog of cases could be dealt
with, Kosovo needed to establish ‘a clear legal framework addressing the recognition and/
or enforceability of decisions put in place by the parallel structures’ (Hoxha and Martínez
2019, 9). The justice agreement also represented a benchmark for democracy and like
police and CP, had an impact on the sovereignty of Kosovo where Serbia had de facto
recognized Kosovo through its own independent, integrated justice system in the North
that would function according to the Kosovan legal framework. However, despite the
successful implementation of the Serbian judges into the Kosovan justice system, this was
still an area that demonstrated Serbia’s multi-level games. Even now politicians and
Serbian officials in Kosovo claim that there is a lack of political will on the part of courts
to establish a fully functioning justice system. Moreover, a lawyer from Northern
Mitrovica, Nebojša Vlajić, posits that ‘some Kosovo Serb judges were receiving both
pensions from Serbia and salaries from Kosovo,’ once more demonstrating Serbia’s desire
to maintain their grip over Kosovo (Rudić 2018).

Elections
The holding of fair and free elections is another pillar constituting democracy and there­
fore, would form part of the political criteria of a country’s readiness to join the EU.
Moreover, the EU’s political conditionality posits the need for stable institutions guaran­
teeing democracy. Prior to the Brussels Agreement, Serbs living in central Kosovo only
partially took part in elections while North Kosovo boycotted elections organized by
UNMIK, only participating in those organized by Belgrade. Given the fact that this
situation was unsustainable in the long term and did not promote regional cooperation,
Point 12 of the Brussels Agreement asserted the need for municipal elections to be
organized in the northern municipalities in 2013 with the facilitation of the OSCE and in
accordance with Kosovo law and international standards (Government of Serbia 2013).
The Serbian government had encouraged participation of Kosovar Serbs in municipal
elections organized in 2013 in the North and again in the Kosovan general elections in
2014. The 2014 EU progress report for Serbia indicates positive developments in the field
of elections indicating that:
For the first time, local elections were held Kosovo-wide with the facilitation of the OSCE in
November 2013 (and repeated in North Mitrovica in February 2014) and, again for the first
time, municipalities in the north of Kosovo were inaugurated in conformity with Kosovo
law. Kosovo Serbs from both north and south of the Ibar River took part in the early general
elections in June 2014 (European Commission 2014, 5).

The success of the elections in Kosovo was mainly due to Belgrade’s influence over the
politicians loyal to them (i.e., the Srpska List/Serb List) in Kosovo. Orosz (2016) argues
that ‘the elections in Kosovo gave an opportunity to Belgrade to foster changes in the
Serbian elite in Kosovo through the Serb List and to fill in positions with Serbian
politicians that are loyal to Belgrade and through whom it could directly influence
politics and decision-making in Kosovo’ (cited in Anna et al. 2016, 19). The Serbian
 SOUTHEAST EUROPEAN AND BLACK SEA STUDIES 9

government exerted pressure on the Kosovo Serbs to participate in the elections and vote
for their Serb representatives on the Serb List. Examples of such measures of external
pressure were expressed by the Kosovar Serbs where some argued that free sugar, cooking
oil and cash were reportedly traded in exchange for votes. Another Kosovo Serb added,
‘welfare workers offered around twenty euros to people with social needs in exchange for
their votes’ (Salem 2013). Other Kosovar Serbs that had been pressured to vote by
Belgrade also reported to Balkan Insight that they had been ordered to show up and
cast ballots, or risked losing their jobs (Salem 2013). Thus, similar to the areas of police
and civil protection, the Serbian government ceded control to Kosovo with compliance to
EU conditionality in the area of elections, therefore integrating the Kosovar Serbs into
Kosovan political structures.
The elections were another example of the government’s multi-level game strategy
towards Kosovo and the EU. Participation in Kosovo’s elections implies integration into
Kosovo because the Serbian government’s pressuring Kosovar Serbs to vote is de facto
recognition of Kosovo as a state. However, the Progressives have discursively denied any
such recognition of Kosovo as a state in addition to claiming that they have not
abandoned the Kosovar Serbs, when they have done exactly this by trading compliance
on Kosovo for EU-related gains. Thus, according to the concept of two-level games, by
pressuring Serbs to vote for politicians the Serbian government controls, the government
can claim they are defending Serbian national interest as the Srpska List is expected to
protect Serb interests and act in Belgrade’s favour, while simultaneously fulfiling EU
conditionality. The Serbian Foreign Minister [Prime Minister at the time]: Ivica Dačić
told the Kosovar Serbs: ‘You need to help us in order to help yourselves, so that we can
continue helping you. That is why you need to go to the polls’ (Salem 2013). He also
expressed the ‘need to win these elections and then constitute the Community of Serbian
Municipalities, which means Serbian authorities, police and judiciary’ (Salem 2013).
Additionally, the Serbian government succeeded in exerting pressure on the Kosovar
Serbs to participate in both the June 2014 and 2017 parliamentary elections in Kosovo,
fulfiling conditionality of the Brussels Agreement. However, this could have negative
implications for Kosovo as Serb politicians backed by Belgrade would be expected to lead
to their blocking of any decisions not in favour of the Serbs (Prelec and Rashiti 2015, 13).

Telecommunications and energy

The Brussels Agreement had additionally foreseen discussions on energy and telecom­
munications which had led to the establishment of agreements in both fields: one in
energy in September 2013, with a revitalized agreement in August 2015, and one in
telecommunications in August 2015. Both the energy and telecommunications agree­
ments called for subsidiary companies of the energy and telecom companies in Serbia to
be established and licenced to operate in Kosovo according to the Kosovan regulatory
and legal framework, which would imply Serbia’s de facto recognition of Kosovo as
a state. The EU praised Serbian government efforts in fully implementing the telecom­
munications agreement with Kosovo in December 2016 while the energy agreement
remains frozen and unimplemented. Serbia’s willingness to implement one agreement
and not the other is an example of the government’s strategy of partial compliance in
which the Progressives are attempting to achieve as little as possible that would allow for
10 A. DRAGOJLOV

the EU to be satisfied, thus leading to advancement in rewards such as the opening of

chapters in the accession negotiations. Regarding the energy and telecommunication
agreements, in particular, the Serbian government’s decision to implement the telecom
agreement while failing to implement the energy agreement, was for reasons of owner­
ship where both sides claimed that the property inside of Kosovo to be in their respective
ownership (Sovrlić and Snežana 2018, 26). While both agreements posed issues of
ownership, Serbia was successful in preserving the ownership of the new telecom
company which would be a subsidiary of Telekom Serbia, but the agreement on energy
was more complex because the value of ownership was greater than with telecom.
The telecommunications agreement signed in August 2015 between Kosovo and
Serbia under the auspices of the EU and implemented in December 2016, was one of
the most significant success stories of the Brussels Dialogue. The agreement called for the
establishment of a new telecom company, which would be a subsidiary of the Serbian,
state-owned Telekom Serbia. According to a source interviewed from the European
Commission:

This operator will be licensed by the Kosovan regulator to operate throughout all of Kosovo.
It is a company that will provide fixed and mobile services. The fixed services can be
provided in the entire territory of Kosovo, but the mobile operation is a ‘temporary
authorisation’ that covers only the existing Serbian infrastructure on the ground
(European Commission 2016).

With the agreement, Serbia would give its consent to the International Telecommunication
Union (ITU) for Kosovo to receive its own dialling code of +383 while the usage of the
other dialling codes would cease after a waiting period. The dialling code would be,
according to Serb and EU officials, a regional code instead of an international one, which
would imply that Kosovo was not recognized as an independent state (European
Commission 2016). In this regard, the entire process of normalization thus allowed
Serbia to maintain the fiction of retaining Kosovo while implementing agreements along
the way and thus progressing with EU negotiations. In a press release, the European
External Action Service (EEAS) confirmed the full implementation of the telecommunica­
tions agreement by both sides. According to the report, Kosovo was granted a dialling code
by the ITU and the subsidiary company of Telekom Serbia was given a licence and
established according to the Kosovan legal framework (European Western Balkans 2016).
Before the Brussels agreement on energy, Kosovo was ‘dependent upon two main power
stations which do not meet the growing electricity needs of Kosovo’s economy’ (Marković
2017, 52). Coupled with that, the political division of the electricity network between
Belgrade-owned Elektroprivreda Srbije (EPS) and Pristina-controlled Korporata
Energjetike e Kosovë (KEK) indicated that Kosovo could not cope with its poor efficiency
in terms of electricity production (Marković 2017, 52). Therefore, as Marković (2017) argues,
the Brussels agreement on energy sought to unify the energy system of Kosovo in addition to
expanding and promoting cooperation between Belgrade and Pristina in areas of trade and
joint production of electricity (52). In line with the agreement, the Serbian company, EPS,
would be integrated within the Kosovo energy system, which essentially meant that ‘the
electricity network previously controlled by Belgrade should be managed by Pristina but
while granting executive autonomy to Serb-dominated areas in the North of Kosovo’
(Marković 2017, 52). In order to achieve this, two energy companies (one for trade and the
 SOUTHEAST EUROPEAN AND BLACK SEA STUDIES 11

other for supply and distribution) were to be established and integrated into Kosovo’s energy
system and be licenced to operate under Kosovo’s legal and regulatory framework. These two
energy companies would also be subsidiaries of the Serbian energy company EPS. According
to the most recent (2017) Kosovan government report, ‘Serbia is blocking the energy
agreement by not allowing the new company [for supply and distribution] to be registered
in Kosovo in accordance with Kosovo Law as provided by the energy agreement reached in
2013ʹ (Republic of Kosovo, Ministry for Dialogue 2017, 2). The Kosovan government
stipulates that this is due to the fact that the new company is refusing to mention Kosovo
as the country of operation in its statute, which is mainly for political reasons of not
recognizing Kosovo as a state (Republic of Kosovo, Ministry for Dialogue 2017, 2).
While both energy and telecommunications agreements emphasize issues of ownership,
the Serbian government was able to fully implement the telecom agreement while failing to
implement the agreement on energy. According to Putnam’s (1988) concept of two-level
games, the Serbian government was able to preserve its property in both areas while
simultaneously advancing in its EU path. The telecom agreement allowed Serbia to main­
tain the status quo as it essentially ‘enabled the transfer of assets to the new subsidiary
company of Telekom Serbia without any customs, taxes or charges’ (European External
Action Service 2016). Therefore, through the telecom agreement, which had allowed for
Kosovo to be granted a ‘regional code,’ Serbian officials managed to retain some semblance
of control over Kosovo, while simultaneously receiving a green light from the EU to open
additional chapters in the negotiation process. Serbia has since opened two additional
chapters as of February 2017: Chapter 20 on Enterprise and Industrial Policy and Chapter
26 on Education and Culture, with Chapter 26 being ‘provisionally’ (or temporarily) closed
(Delegation of the European Union to Serbia 2017).

The association/community of serbian municipalities

One of the most controversial parts of the Brussels Agreement was the Association/
Community of Serbian Municipalities [ASM]. The ASM, first envisioned in the Ahtisaari
Plan, was supposed to grant more autonomy to the Serbs living in Kosovo and to include all
of the northern as well as southern Serbian municipalities. It would replace the individual
competences of the municipalities where the ASM would have executive authority in the
areas of health, education, urban and regional development and economic development
(Government of Serbia, Office for Kosovo and Metohija 2015a, 2015b). According to
a Balkan Investigative Reporting Network report, ‘it will also allow Serbia to contribute
money – in a transparent manner – to the body’ which is of vital interest to the Serbs
residing in North Kosovo who rely on money coming from Belgrade (Balkan Investigative
Reporting Network 2015, 36). However, as with the energy agreement, the ASM has
remained frozen, due to conflicting interpretations by both the Kosovan and Serbian
governments regarding its competences and organizational structure:

While Serbia emphasised that the Community should operate as a new level of government
that has executive powers in the fields of health, education, urban and rural planning, and
economic development, Kosovo argues that the Association would not have such compe­
tences as it would not be in line with the legal order of Kosovo (Anna et al. 2016, 20).
12 A. DRAGOJLOV

The lack of progress regarding the ASM can also be attributed to Kosovo’s reluctance in
implementing the ASM where Kosovo had further ruled in a Constitutional Court
hearing, that the ASM went against Kosovo law (European Parliament 2019).
Moreover, Kosovo has conditioned the establishment of the Association on Serbia’s
full removal of parallel structures which still remain operational in the North (Republic
of Kosovo, Ministry for Dialogue 2016a, 11–12). A member of the NGO Advocacy
Centre for Democratic Culture claimed that the Serbian government has not dismantled
the parallel structures as ‘they are not parallel, they are the only institutions which
operate in the north.’ Therefore, Belgrade’s continued maintenance of these structures
supports the government’s statecraft in the need to appeal to a large sector of the Serbian
population, for whom the removal of these structures represents a security issue for Serbs
living in Kosovo as well as suggesting Serbia’s recognition of Kosovo.
Aside from Belgrade’s maintenance of the parallel structures, the Serbian government
has increased its efforts in establishing the ASM, as was visible in the elections mentioned
earlier, in which the Serbian government removed all Serbian political opponents and
installed their own Serb List which would allow them to control the Serbian seats in the
Kosovan Parliament. Serbia’s efforts to maintain its influence through the ASM in turn
has contributed to the fears of Kosovar Albanians who believe that the ASM will allow the
Serbian government to build a state within Kosovo, bringing all public institutions under
this autonomous body backed and controlled by Belgrade.
While the agreements have a fundamental bearing on the sovereignty of Kosovo and
according to an EU official interviewed, assume Serbia’s de facto recognition of its
southern region, statecraft theory would argue that the government’s policy shift was
in fact based on pragmatism and political opportunism. Due to the support for the EU
among Serbian citizens and the economic ‘carrot’ of accession, the Progressives had to
comply with EU demands on Kosovo in order to advance in the accession negotiations
and continue receiving structural funds through the Instrument for Pre-Accession.
However, the nationalist background of the Serbian Progressive Party coupled with the
salience of Kosovo to Serbs, posited the need for the government to effectively manage
the Kosovo issue in a way that would satisfy both the nationalist camp at home and the
European Union for the sake of not losing domestic support. This government strategy of
two-level games can be explained through a comprehensive analysis of the domestic side
of the bargaining relationship.

The serbian government’s statecraft

The Progressive Party’s decision to engage in multi-level games, oscillating between both
seeking membership of the EU and the retention of Kosovo, can be explained by the
party’s desire to maintain in a position of power. Opinion poll research would seem to
suggest initially the Serbian public’s support played an important factor in the govern­
ment’s objective to seek EU accession, coupled with the economic benefits accession
would bring to a small and economically disadvantaged Balkan country. However, results
of opinion poll data indicate that the loss of jurisdiction over Kosovo, including recogni­
tion, in exchange for EU membership is perceived to be unacceptable to both the general
public and a majority of political parties in government. This animosity towards the
tradeoff between Kosovo and the EU, where Serbian citizens were unwilling to trade
 SOUTHEAST EUROPEAN AND BLACK SEA STUDIES 13

Kosovo for membership of the EU has grown in the past two years, also contributing to
the decline in support for the EU. While the Serbian government’s effective management
of their policy towards both Kosovo and the EU contributed to the overall, initial success
of the normalization process, the recent heightened tensions and freezing of negotiations
between both Serbia and Kosovo would seem to suggest that the Serbian government
never had any genuine intention to trade Kosovo for EU membership. In order to offer
a comprehensive understanding of Serbian government strategy, the article first exam­
ines the significance of both the EU and Kosovo to Serbia as revealed through opinion
poll research and statements by journalists, followed by an analysis of the Serbian
Progressive Party’s pragmatism in shaping public opinion to suit their own interests,
among which include the desire for power.
Preceding the Progressives ascent to power, Serbia’s accession to the EU was sup­
ported by nearly half the population according to the results from opinion poll research
published by the Serbian Ministry for European Integration as shown in Figure 1. The
salience of EU membership for a small and economically dysfunctional country like
Serbia is regularly emphasized by the Serbian government, particularly from the Serbian
President and leader of the Progressive Party: Aleksandar Vučić. A former journalist of
the Serbian popular daily, Politika, notes that ‘Vučić will not change the European
agenda. He was built on it, aware that there is no political future without the EU’.
Therefore, the decision to engage in some level of partial compliance to EU demands
on Kosovo for advancement in the accession negotiations supports the rationalist cost-
benefit argument where the material incentives of membership had been the main
driving force behind Serbian government strategy at the start of the Brussels Dialogue
in 2013.
(Source: Government of Serbia, Ministry of European Integration 2010–2018).

Figure 1. Serbian citizens’ attitudes towards Serbian accession.

14 A. DRAGOJLOV

In terms of benefits, accession to the EU was believed to bring tangible economic and
social benefits to Serbia and its citizens. These benefits are extremely significant for
a country like Serbia where in the second quarter of 2019, the unemployment rate for
young people (aged 15–24) was 24.4% and for the working (aged 15–64) was 10.8%
(Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia 2019). According to Economides and Ker-
Lindsay (2015), ‘both publicly and privately, the EU has come to be seen by officials as the
key to national economic growth’ and is thus tied to the Progressive Party’s programme
(1037). The former President of Serbia, Tomislav Nikolić, had declared to a Serbian
audience as far back as 2012 when he had been elected that ‘we want to get into the EU,
because it has projects, jobs and investments for us’ (AlJazeera 2012). The country’s
Foreign Minister, Ivica Dačić had also emphasized that: ‘our aim is to get into the EU and
consolidate the economic system as soon as possible’ (cited in Economides and Ker-
Lindsay 2015, 1037). According to an offcial from the Serbian Ministry of European
Integration, the EU is seen as being ‘the main economic partner of Serbia, the access to
a 500-million-people market will be a significant boost for the domestic economy.’ Thus,
Aleksandar Vučić’s and the Serbian government’s objective of accession to the EU can
partly account for Serbia’s initial policy shift vis-à-vis Kosovo.
However, opinion poll data published by several NGOs, Demostat and the Institute for
European Affairs seem to indicate the fact that Serbian citizens were unwilling to trade
Kosovo for EU membership as shown in Figure 2.
(Source: Taken from three opinion polls: International Republican Institute 2015;
Demostat 2018; Institute for European Affairs 2019).
The opinion poll published by the International Republican Institute showed that the
majority (57% in July and November 2015) affirmed that Serbia should refuse to accept
recognition of Kosovo at the expense of staying out of the EU while the survey conducted
by the Serbian Demostat company, claimed that 76% of respondents stated that Kosovo
should never be recognized as independent (International Republican Institute 2015;
Demostat 2018). A more recent opinion poll carried out on behalf of the Belgrade-based
NGO, Institute for European Affairs, shows that 78% of Serbian citizens would not
support the decision to recognize the independence of Kosovo in exchange for faster
EU membership (Bjelotomić 2019). However, when asked what they personally per­
ceived to be the biggest problem, the majority stated unemployment and standard of
living while only 4% claimed Kosovo was the most pressing issue (Simić 2018).
Furthermore, in order to gauge the significance of Kosovo to Serbs, Faktor Plus Agency
asked Serbian citizens whether they would be willing to suffer personal consequences for
Serbia to keep Kosovo, to which 48% responded no and 16% said yes (Europe Elects
2019). The results of the opinion poll data seem to suggest that the majority of Serbian
citizens are more concerned with issues in Serbia proper that would affect them directly,
elucidating the fact that the government should focus their efforts on the current
economic crisis which has resulted in high unemployment rates and low standards of
living. Moreover, nearly half of Serbian citizens believe Kosovo to be lost (Bjelotomić
2019). As a consequence, the Serbs’ unwillingness to recognize Kosovo appears to be
more symbolic, particularly when the Brussels Agreement indicates that Serbia had de
facto recognized Kosovo. This notion is supported by the majority of agreements
themselves in the Brussels Dialogue, such as the dismantlement of Serbian parallel
security structures (i.e., police, CP, and justice) and their subsequent integration into
 SOUTHEAST EUROPEAN AND BLACK SEA STUDIES 15

Figure 2. Kosovo independence.

Kosovan structures. It is therefore apparent that public opinion research regarding the
shifting attitudes of Serbian citizens towards Kosovo do not present a concise, clear
explanation for Vučić’s multi-level game strategy of appealing to both the Serbian
populace and the EU.
Thus, in order to account for the confusing and often contradictory Serbian policy
towards Kosovo and the EU, it is important to take into consideration the nationalist
background of the Serbian Progressive Party which developed from a schism of the
hardline nationalist Serbian Radical Party that had not only advocated an uncompromis­
ing position on Kosovo’s non-recognition but also carried out paramilitary operations of
ethnic cleansing during the Yugoslav civil war in the 1990 s, particularly targeting
Kosovar Albanians in an quest for a Greater Serbia. Vučić and the SNS’s political shift
to advocates of EU integration was based on pragmatism in a bid to come to power while
the initial success of the Brussels Dialogue suggests the rational use of their bargaining
power to secure more concessions on Kosovo or greater compensations elsewhere (i.e.,
increase of financial aid to Serbia from the EU through the IPA or through structural
funds). Thus, this seems to indicate that the ‘trade-off’ of Kosovo for EU accession is not
so clear-cut.
Referring back to our theoretical analysis, the Serbian government under Vučić and
the Progressives embodies a consolidated semi-authoritarian regime. According to
Bieber and Kmezić (2015), ‘these regimes exercise control informally rather than through
constitutional and legal change, taking control of the media and the state institutions’ (as
cited in Bieber 2018, 340). The Serbian president has been skilful in using the media to
shape public opinion to suit his own interests in maintaining a position of power as
posited by statecraft theory. Various statements indicating the respect for Serbia’s
boundaries have been made such as a more recent one proclaimed by the Vice
16 A. DRAGOJLOV

President of the SNS, Marko Djurić: ‘Kosovo and Metohija, according to Resolution 1244
and the Serbian Constitution, is an integral part of Serbian state territory, and talks on
resolving problems in our southern province can be held only with this fact’
(Government of Serbia, Office for Kosovo and Metohija 2020). Thus, it is clear by this
statement that the Serbian government remains firm in their non-recognition policy
while EU states (i.e., particularly Germany) seem to be pushing for the recognition
agenda, claiming that Serbia cannot accede to the EU without recognizing Kosovo.
Moreover, it is interesting to note that Vučić made a similar statement to a Greek
newspaper, claiming that ‘Serbia is ready to negotiate a compromise solution, but if
anyone thinks of coming to Belgrade and telling us to recognise Kosovo’, it will not
happen (Pajaziti 2019). Greece remains one of the five non-recognizer EU states, thus,
Vučić’s appeal to the Greek media to confirm the government’s non-recognition policy
represents the pragmatic use of their bargaining power to convey that the EU cannot
make recognition of Kosovo a precondition for membership. While the Serb President is
aware that a final agreement would have to be made that would be acceptable to both
Serbian and Kosovan governments, he has placed greater emphasis on securing Serbian
concessions from Kosovo as is evidenced by a statement he made on 5 March 2019 in
which he claimed that Belgrade ‘cannot recognise Kosovo’ as an independent state unless
Serbia gets something in return from Pristina as part of a larger deal (Radio Free Europe/
Radio Liberty 2019). A few months preceding that statement in September 2018, Vučić
had accused the EU of not being clear with to regards to what it wanted from Serbia, once
more ‘re-shaping’ public opinion in order to be less under pressure domestically to
pursue EU integration:
The EU has to tell me what it wants. If it wants for Serbia to be humiliated, itwill not
see that and I will not agree to that . . . I am always for dialogue – but I willnot go if they
tell me that I have to recognize Kosovo to be a great and respectedworld leader
(Živanović 2018).
While public opinion poll data on Kosovo appears contradictory and does not
represent a clear explanation for the Serbian government’s multi-level game strategy, it
is apparent that Vučić and the Progressives are careful not to give too many concessions
to Kosovo and not to compromise too much on the principle that ‘Kosovo is Serbia’, even
if they know it is a myth. We argue that this is in part due to the nationalist background of
the Progressives who held positions of power in the Serbian Radical Party during the time
of Milošević and had thus advocated hardline nationalist campaigns against Kosovo,
among which include ethnic cleansing. Additionally, the Progressives believe that it
would be political treason to recognize Kosovo as supported by the Serbian 2006
Constitution which required MPs to swear an oath to preserve Kosovo and Metohija
within the Republic of Serbia (National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia 2006).
Currently, there is no political party in Serbia willing to accept compromises on
Kosovo nor is prepared to recognize it as a state instead of a province that forms an
integral part of Serbia. There remain only two minor political parties, the LDP (or Liberal
Democratic Party of Serbia) and the LSV (League of Social Democrats of Vojvodina) who
have expressed their positions that Kosovo should be recognized for the sake of EU
accession; however, both are in the opposition with very little chance of gaining power or
governmental support for their policy. In consolidated authoritarian regimes, the gov­
ernment’s strict control of the media, as is especially prominent in Serbia under Vučić,
 SOUTHEAST EUROPEAN AND BLACK SEA STUDIES 17

serves to delegitimise and demobilize the opposition in Vučić’s bid to maintain his
position of power (Bieber 2018, 345–347).
The salience of both the EU and particularly, Kosovo to the Serbian public and
political parties, initially compelled the Progressive Party to build a policy package that
had been acceptable to both the EU and the nationalist constituency in Serbia that
remained against any type of recognition, including any move that could potentially be
viewed as the government’s relinquishing its jurisdiction over Kosovo. This was parti­
cularly problematic in the north as the south of Kosovo had more or less integrated into
Kosovan governance structures following Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of indepen­
dence in February 2008. Due to the initial support of the Serbian public for EU accession
coupled with the tangible economic benefits membership would bring, the Progressives
engaged in a strategy of partial implementation of agreements in the Brussels Dialogue
while maintaining the fiction of retention of Kosovo, particularly through public dis­
course. However, the support for the EU has started to decline as early as June 2014
according to the opinion polls published by the Serbian Ministry for EU Integration.
Coupled with the decline in support for accession, there has been a striking decline in
Serbian citizens who would be willing to trade Kosovo for EU membership: that number
had been equal in 2014 (with 44% being both for and against) but had dropped in 2019 to
a staggering 78% claiming that they would not trade Kosovo for the EU with only 13%
stating they would. This shift cannot be explained by events in Kosovo, where the
position of Serbs has not changed, but through the policies of the Serbian government
and the messages on Kosovo, including Vučić’s various statements affirming Serbia
would never recognize Kosovo and multiple incidents that have kept tensions high. It
would thus seem plausible to argue that the government has not only contributed to
reducing the attractiveness of the EU but also encouraged a less compromising position
on Kosovo. This would appear to suggest that Vučic and the SNS are not engaging in
multi-level games due to public opinion but vice versa, where public opinion is shaped by
the government to make a compromise less likely. This paradox confirms the govern­
ment’s strategy in ‘re-shaping’ public opinion to be less under pressure domestically to
pursue EU integration.
Although the Brussels Agreement was initially seen as a success, recent disputes
centring around the status issue have put the entire Brussels Dialogue on hold,
leading to increased uncertainty surrounding the future of the normalization process
and making it more imperative to find a solution to Kosovo’s status. One of the
prime instances of the Progressive Party’s ambition to retain their grip on Kosovo in
a bid for power dates to the beginning of January when the Serbian government
sent a train to North Mitrovica covered with the slogan, ‘Kosovo is Serbia’ in 21
different languages, including Albanian, leading to heightened tensions between
Belgrade and Pristina (Morina 2017). In 2018, hostilities between the two govern­
ments have come at an all-time high when Kosovo called an increase in taxes on
Serbian and Bosnian imports to 100% after Kosovo lost its Interpol membership bid
for which it blamed Serbia (Isufi 2018). As a consequence of these heightened
tensions and the freezing of agreements, the Serbian government is faced with
finding a permanent solution to Kosovo’s status that could potentially risk political
backlash.
18 A. DRAGOJLOV

Conclusion
The Brussels Agreement signed in 2013 on the Normalization of Relations between
Kosovo and Serbia marked a significant policy shift on Serbia’s relations with its
southern region. It paved the way for a gradual but nonetheless, visible process of
normalization and regional cooperation with agreements stemming from the dialo­
gue being implemented in a number of areas that had a fundamental impact on the
sovereignty of Kosovo. Even though the Serbian government had discursively denied
that the Brussels Agreement represented de facto recognition of Kosovo’s statehood,
according to EU officials, it was the first time the Serbian government had recog­
nized that Kosovo was not Serbia. While Serbian political elites seemed to initially
engage in compliance with EU conditionality stemming from Chapter 35 on Kosovo
for economic benefits accession would bring, it can be argued that the tradeoff of
Kosovo for EU membership has never been a clear one. Some of the most pertinent
agreements (i.e., the ASM) which had been expected to bring a great deal of
autonomy to the Serb-majority communities in Kosovo, have not been settled.
Thus, it would make sense to posit that through partial compliance Serbian politi­
cians had sought to increase their bargaining power in order to gain more conces­
sions on Kosovo so as to maintain their power. In addition, partial compliance with
EU conditionality had also allowed Serbian politicians to gain concessions elsewhere
(i.e., through structural funds) while simultaneously enjoying the external legitimacy
the EU had provided, often ignoring democratic shortcomings that are typical of
semi-authoritarian regimes, for the sake of normalization with Kosovo, which can
have irreversible consequences. Even now and despite EU efforts in offering Serbia
awards for compliance on Kosovo, Vučić’s mixed nationalist rhetoric on Kosovo
including Serbia’s uncompromising non-recognition policy presented by the media
he controls, has led to renewed, heightened tensions between both sides and the
freezing of crucial agreements in the Brussels Dialogue (i.e., energy and the ASM).
While member states in the EU continue to push for Serbia’s recognition of Kosovo
as a precondition for accession, Vučić and the SNS have been skilful in using the
media to shape public opinion to reduce the attractiveness of the EU, therefore
making any final compromise on Kosovo less likely.

Notes
1. Four of the EU member states (Spain, Slovakia, Romania and Cyprus) who do not recognize
Kosovo all have substantial minorities while Greece has neither and has not recognized
Kosovo mostly out of support for the Cypriot position.
2. Twenty-seven former Ministry of Interior employees had withdrawn from the process while
23 had been refused for ‘security reasons.’

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
 SOUTHEAST EUROPEAN AND BLACK SEA STUDIES 19

Notes on contributor
Dr Aleksandra Dragojlov was awarded her PhD in October 2018 from Cardiff University School of
European Studies. Originally from Serbia, she specializes in Southeast European politics and EU
integration. She focuses on how the semi-authoritarian regimes of Western Balkan states have
hindered their prospects for EU integration as a result of political elites’ hardline nationalism that
is still evident in these countries today despite their ‘political shift’ to being advocates of EU
integration. Having received her Bachelor’s in foreign languages, Dr Dragojlov speaks Spanish and
Italian with native proficiency, along with Serbo-Croatian and has a basic, beginner knowledge of
French and Korean.

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Appendix
List of Interviewees
European Commission Official X, face-to-face interview, 23 June 2015.
European Commission Official X, email communication, 22 April 2016.
European Commission Official X. email communication, 24 April 2016.
European Commission Official Y. email communication, 17 February 2016.
Former Journalist from Politika, email interview, 14 February 2016.
Member of Democratic Party of Kosovo, email interview, 8 October 2017.
Member of NGO Advocacy Centre for Democratic Culture, Skype interview, 3 March 2016.
Government of Serbia, Ministry of European Integration official, face-to-face interview,
23 July 2015.
EULEX Official in North Kosovo, Skype interview, 28 November 2017.
Branislav Nešović, former member of NGOAktiv, email communication, 15 November 2019.