MASARYK UNIVERSITY BRNO

Faculty of Social Sciences

Department of International Relations and European Studies

The Visegrad Co-operation Since EU Accession

Successes and Failures 2004-2014
EUP401 International/Transnational Organizations and European Politics

Author:

Dniel Pter (432433)

M.A. in European Politics

Professors:

JUDr. Mgr. Ivo Pospsil, Ph.D. (lecturer)

PhDr. Petr Suchy, Ph.D. (lecturer)
Mgr. et Mgr. Petr Vilmek, Ph.D. (lecturer)

Brno, 14 December, 2014

Introduction
During the past 23 years of its existence, the Visegrad co-operation has received a great
variety of remarks concerning its roles and activities. It was proclaimed dead, dysfunctional,
redundant and ineffective just as often as it was praised for its constant ability to renew itself
and participate in a growing number of fields, thereby earning the respect of the EU and its
close neighbours. In a range of articles and studies written about the Visegrad Group in the
last two decades, both viewpoints have been vindicated by relevant arguments. Based on my
research about the topic, I have come to the conclusion that the evaluation and the final
verdict over any Visegrad policies or actions is highly dependent on how we define success
and how we perceive the purpose and the functioning of the Visegrad Group.
Right from the moment of its creation, the Visegrad co-operation was designed to be a forum
for coordination with the explicit aim of full involvement in the European political and
economic system. (Visegrad Declaration, 1991) Although this target has been reached and the
fields of co-operation were largely extended over the years, the basic logic of the group is still
the same: consultation instead of regular harmonization, flexibility instead of permanent
institutions, unanimous decision-making instead of the supremacy of majority interests and
exclusive membership instead of further expansion. If we accept the existing framework of
the Visegrad as it is and disregard the recurring critics about the lack of institutionalization
and openness1, we can perceive the results of the V4 in a different, and maybe more realistic
way.
Taking this into consideration, the purpose of this paper is to provide a short, but realistic
description about certain aspects of the Visegrad co-operation and to draw a conclusion about
its (in)effectiveness in a number of policy areas. Based on the aforementioned reasons, this
particular work does not question the current structure of the V4 and its mechanisms, and
does not concentrate on bilateral relations inter alia, or on the EUs relations with the
individual member states, but tries, instead, to reveal the strength and the weaknesses of the
co-operation within its current limits.
In order to be able to answer the main question of whether the V4 can be considered
successful in a particular area, it is necessary to define, how success can be measured.
Therefore, the methodology and the structure of this paper is, as follows. Based on the

Not addressing the questions of institutionalization and the expansion of the V4 does not mean that the author
would not consider such issues relevant. However, the current paper attempts to address the topic from a
different perspective.

available literature, I have chosen four areas2 of co-operation that the majority of the authors
consider the most visible examples of the V4s joint work. The choice was made within the
time span of 2004-2014, thus covering only the post-accession period. The analysed areas are
the following:
1. Co-operation in Justice and Home Affairs: The Schengen Case
2. Co-operation within the Eastern Partnership: The Case of Ukraine
3. Co-operation in the field of transportation policy
4. Co-operation in the field of energy security
The different characters and scope of these issues make it possible to compare them in
multiple dimensions. While the first and partially the second cases are connected to the initial
years of EU membership, the remaining two originate from the second half of the covered
period. In this sense, the time dimension is covered. Moreover, the Eastern Partnership and
the common energy security policy indicate a much deeper and long-term engagement,
whereas the Schengen Case and the transportation policy were based on short-term ad-hoc
interests3. Thus, the dimension of policy engagement is covered.
During the description of the individual cases, I will mainly use the official documents
statements, declarations of the Visegrad Group as primary sources. To understand the context
and to compare the viewpoints of different experts, I have accessed a rich variety of articles
found mainly on the websites of Visegrad-related online journals, namely the Visegrad Insight
and the Visegrad Revue.
Based on the flexible framework of the Visegrad co-operation and presuming that joint
initiatives are implemented only on those fields which are equally important to every partner,
my hypothesis is, that the V4 is more successful in less-engaging and short-term issues,
whereas keeping up a common interest and group solidarity is more difficult in the long run.
Thus, I expect that the current analysis will show that the Schengen Case and the co-operation
in the field of transportation were more successful than the other two cases. The success of the
each policy area will be determined on the condition, whether the Visegrad Group was able to
take actions according to its declarations and statements and whether a joint group spirit could
be maintained throughout coordination and implementation.

The reason for such a low number of areas is attributed to the limited scope of this paper
Clearly, the area of transport infrastructure is not a short-term issue, but the particular issue covered in this case
did not require repeated negotiations.
3

1. Co-operation in Justice and Home Affairs: The Schengen Case

Several authors agree that the joint lobbying and coordination for a quick entry into the
Schengen zone was one of the Visegrads earliest examples of effective results. (Drulkov,
2007; Fawn, 2013; Stray, 2014; Zelenick, 2009) Thus, already before the accession to the
EU, the V4 Interior Ministers decided to establish a common working group to examine the
conditions of a joint application to the Schengen system. (Drulkov, 2007: 11) When parallel
screenings were already underway in all four countries, they agreed to set October 2007 as a
deadline for full integration. However, due to technical difficulties connected to the
modernization of the Schengen Information System, some of the old member states indicated
that there might be a delay in accession, postponing the original date to 2009. (Fawn, 2013:
345; Zelenick, 2009: 57) As a reaction, the V4 issued a declaration during their annual
meeting, in which they expressed concerns that any delay in Schengen entry would lead to a
serious crisis of confidence for the populations in the new EU Member States. (Visegrad
Statement, 2006a) On behalf of the V4, the Czech President emphasised that all four
presidents see entry into the Schengen zone as an absolute priority and would view it as
discrimination if it were delayed. (EurActiv, 2006) A month later their standpoint was
repeated, but this time the Baltic-3 Foreign Ministers were also involved in a joint statement,
reaffirming their commitment to the original date. (Visegrad Statement, 2006b)
Although the joint efforts of the V4 were eventually successful and the postponement of entry
was revised in Brussels, Austria still insisted on a delay. In December 2006, the Austrian
Interior Minister pointed out that Slovakia bought the wrong systems and they were needed
to be tested for a few more months. (Novinky.cz, 2006) Some days later the Czech
Ambassador to the EU stated that in case Slovakia was unable to meet the entry requirements
(the disputed issue was mainly the Slovak-Ukrainian border), the Czech Republic would still
proceed with accession and would be ready to impose tough border controls on Slovakia
together with Poland and Hungary (Drulkov, 2007: 11-12; Grohov, 2006) Fortunately,
Slovakia was able to overcome the difficulties and the V4 could assert its position against
Austria one more time in June 2007. In a press statement, the Prime Ministers confirmed
their strong commitment towards the planned entry and consider[ed] unhelpful any
statements and intentions from any third party going against this objective. (Visegrad
Statement, 2007)
Based on the eventual success of the V4 in keeping the original date, Fawn (2013) and
Stray (2014) considers the case of Schengen a great example of fruitful co-operation. On
4

the other hand, we cannot help noticing that the group spirit of the Four was quickly
abandoned when one of them had temporarily failed to comply with the regulations.
Consequently, regardless of the positive outcome of joint lobbying, the supremacy of the
individual approach over group solidarity can be traced in this early phase of group cooperation, therefore it can be deemed only as a partial success.

2. Co-operation within the Eastern Partnership: The Case of Ukraine

Having incorporated 10 new member states in 2004, the EU no longer had to concentrate the
bulk of its resources on expansion and could finally look for new foreign policy goals. Instead
of searching for more candidate states, Brussels decided to put emphasis on the neighbouring
countries, who either didnt seek membership or their orientation was not sure yet. Aiming at
these states, the EU started to create a security and a democracy belt around itself by building
up closer economic and political relations with them. (Gerasymchuk, 2014: 43) This new
Neighbourhood Policy was targeted at the Mediterranean, the Caucasus and the three
remaining Eastern European states without membership candidacy: Belarus and Ukraine and
Moldova.
The turn in the EUs foreign policy was in accordance with the goals of the Visegrad Group.
Already in the Krom declaration4, the Four has declared that they are ready to use their
unique regional and historical experience and to contribute to shaping and implementing the
European Union's policies towards the countries of Eastern and Southeastern Europe.
(Visegrad Declaration, 2004) It was clear that the Eastern dimension of the Neighbourhood
Policy meant a huge opportunity for the Visegrad to become an active player and gain
influence through their geographic proximity and historical experience with Ukraine and
Belarus. On the other hand, the bilateral principle of the Neighbourhood Policy towards these
countries was perceived as inefficient, especially compared to the emerging Mediterranean
Union. Therefore, in 2008 Poland and Sweden made a joint proposal to initiate a multilateral
scheme of co-operation on the fields of migration, visa-free travel, free-trade and the
environment, and to create a forum where the EU and the six members of the Eastern
Partnership could discuss these issues. (Rahimov, 2010: 24) The initiative was endorsed by
the Czech EU Presidency and it became a core element in the programme of subsequent
Visegrad Presidencies as well. (Fawn, 2013: 346)

The Krom Declaration was a milestone in the history of the Visegrad, as it proposed new areas for cooperation after EU accession, thus giving a clear signal that the V4 will not disintegrate.

The success of the V4s collective involvement in the Eastern Partnership is, on the other
hand, ambiguous. While Fawn (2014) or Stray (2011) consider the group as a successful
mediator to promote democratisation in the participating countries mainly because of their
better understanding and experience of communist past, others emphasise the lack of tangible
results in the fields of visa policy and democratic achievements, not to mention inconsistent
reactions in the case of Ukraine and Georgia. (Kobzov, 2012; Sobjk, 2012; Zelenick,
2009)
Indeed, it was the Orange Revolution in Ukraine that first tested the limits of common
Visegrad approach. Being the biggest Eastern European state and lying in the conflict zone of
EU and Russian interests, Ukraine and its swinging foreign policy orientation can easily
lead to security problems for the Visegrad countries, of whom Poland, Slovakia and Hungary
share a border with Ukraine. Yet, it was Poland alone and not the V4 that tried to settle the
crisis in Ukraine with the help of Javier Solana and the Lithuanian president. (Gerasymchuk,
2014: 46) A common statement from the Four came only afterwards, in which the parties
expressed support for democratization and willingness to share their unique experience
gained within the consistent processes of transition. (Visegrad Statement, 2004) It was
followed months later by another statement that promised co-operation in implementing the
EU-Ukraine Action Plan, which was devised to enhance democratic principles in Ukrainian
public life. (Visegrad Statement, 2005) However, as Zelenick points out, common statements
did not result in well-coordinated actions. She mentions the lack of any official support for the
pro-EU presidential candidate Yuschenko and the controversial issue of visa introduction
towards Ukrainian citizens as examples. In the latter case, the V4 became divided over the
time frame of visa application: while the Czechs and the Slovaks wanted visas to be
introduced immediately, Poland and Hungary strived for the latest possible application.
(Zelenick, 2009: 65) All in all, we can say that the Visegrad Group was rather reluctant to act
quickly and actively during the political changes in Ukraine in 2004-2005. Meanwhile,
Poland undoubtedly made itself visible as a strong advocate of a pro-Western Ukraine.
Stability and pro-EU orientation after the Orange Revolution didnt last long. Visegrads
biggest neighbour became once again the centre of attention in late 2013, when Yuschenkos
successor, the pro-Russian Yanukovich decided not to sign the Association Agreement with
the EU at the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius. His move provoked angry protests,
which soon transformed into mass demonstrations in Kyiv and lasted until February 2014,
when Yanukovich was effectively forced to leave the country. (Gerasymchuk, 2014: 49) The
first reaction from the side of the Visegrad came already in December 2013 in the form of a
6

joint statement issued by the four Ministers of Foreign Affairs. It called on all parties to stop
violence and urged the Ukrainian government to start peaceful negotiations with the civil
society. In another statement from February 2014, more specific actions were proposed: coordinated humanitarian aid, the maintenance of reverse gas flow to Ukraine, the speeding-up
of visa liberalization and an increase in the International Visegrad Funds budget allocation to
support Ukrainian mobility. (Jarbik, 2014; Visegrad Statement, 2014a)
Despite the joint rhetoric, the level of individual participation of the V4 countries showed
diverging trends. While the Czech and the Polish government expressed their support for the
opposition parties and the EU-friendly demonstrators, Slovakia and Hungary remained silent.
As for the latter, Orbns government made it quite clear from the beginning that its utmost
priority is the well-being of the Hungarian minority living in Ukraine. (Gerasymchuk, 2014:
50) Still, the annexation of Crimea by Russia in March 2014 was an issue that temporarily
united the Visegrad again, resulting in a series of declarations both on group level and
together with the Nordic-Baltic 8 regional format. In these documents the countries strongly
condemned Russias unauthorized action as an act against international law and called for
immediate withdrawal of armed forces from the occupied areas. (Visegrad Statement, 2014b)
When tensions did not ease in connection with Crimea and the situation was further
exacerbated by the rise of separatist militias in the Southern and Eastern part of the country,
the direct involvement of Russia in both cases could not be left without adequate reaction any
more. To put pressure on Putin, the EU decided to impose economic sanctions against the
country. (EU Newsroom, 2014)
During the negotiations, three out of V4 states expressed concerns regarding the sanctions and
only reluctantly agreed on them while positioning themselves against any further measures of
economic nature. (Markovic, 2014) The opposing stances of the Czech, Slovak and Hungarian
government indicated that the Visegrad spirit is valid only so far as the individual interests of
the parties are not endangered. As an important trading partner and almost exclusive gas
supplier for the Visegrad states, Russia was and certainly will be able to undermine the V4s
common goals in connection with the Eastern Partnership. Its influence is the clearest in the
case of Hungary and to a lesser extent in Slovakia.
Already at the 2008 NATO Summit, Hungarys maverick character became apparent, when it
alone opposed the accession of Ukraine and Georgia to the alliance, while the remaining three
Visegrad states supported expansion. Moreover, the Hungarian government was much more

moderate in condemning the Russian aggression in Georgia5 than the others. (Rcz, 2012: 40)
Slovakias rather reserved behaviour in case of the two Ukrainian crises also raises questions.
According to Markovic (2014), the pragmatic and sometimes neutral approach towards
Russian actions derives from the similarity of the Orbn and Fico governments interest-based
politics, and a certain level of distrust towards the West and Western values.
Based on the examples presented above, we can draw at least two conclusions regarding the
reactions and common position of the V4 in the Eastern Partnership. First of all, it has become
clear that beyond common declarations and encouraging words, the countries of the Visegrad
Four failed to act unilaterally. Poland the biggest and the most influential of the V4 often
engaged in mediation and diplomatic actions alone or with other European partners
(especially with Germany or the Baltic states) in the region. In several cases, the Poles were
supported by the Czechs, who try to uphold democratic values and human rights and view the
Eastern European countries through the prism of common European values. As for Slovakia
and Hungary, their pragmatic attitude and the pursuit of self-interest restrain them from more
active participation. It is worth mentioning here that for these two states, the Western Balkans
represent a more relevant region than Eastern Europe a factor that might also influence their
behaviour. (Sobjk, 2012: 125)
The second conclusion is centred on the role of Russia. My point here is that the bilateral
relations of the Visegrad countries with Russia greatly determine how the V4 perceive their
possible scope of actions within the Eastern Partnership. In this sense, I do not personally see
any possibilities for a stronger and more united Visegrad approach towards either Ukraine or
the other participating states in the near future. Thus, the V4s common participation in the
Eastern Partnership so far can not be considered successful.

3. Co-operation in the field of transportation policy

To commemorate the 20th anniversary of Visegrads existence, the Prime Ministers of the
Four met in Bratislava in February 2011, where they issued the third Visegrad Declaration.6
Compared to the previous one in Krom, the document emphasised further co-operation in
additional policy fields, including among others the development of transport infrastructure.
(Visegrad Declaration, 2011)
According to Fawn (2013: 345), Visegrad has been lobbying on transportation already since
2009, making clear that financing and planning had to take into consideration the overall
5
6

what happened in Georgia

The first was issued in 1991 as the founding declaration, the second in 2004, in Krom

balance of Europe, and not simply, for example, population density. The main concern of the
V4 was that some of the important transport corridors in the region had been degraded and put
into a lower classification, resulting in less cohesion support from the EU budget for
infrastructure. Consequently, the Czech EU Presidency in 2011-2012 declared that it would
enforce common Visegrad interests during the negotiations of the new Trans European
Transport Network guidelines. Thereafter, the EU Commissioner responsible for transport
was invited to a V4+ meeting in Prague, together with other interested member states. In a
subsequent press statement, the Hungarian State Secretary for Infrastructure commented
positively on the meeting, praising the consistent co-operation of the V4 and the flexibility of
the Commission that contributed to relevant policy changes in sensitive areas. (IHO, 2012) As
one of the results, a freight railway between Prague and Slovakia was agreed as part of the
European transport network. (Fawn, 2013: 345)
Lately, in an annual International Transport Conference held in Ostrava in November 2014,
three Visegrad states also agreed to support the Baltic-Adriatic corridor a transnational
network of multidimensional transport routes linking the Baltic countries with Italy through
Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Austria. (Janowska, 2014) Considering that
transport connections between the V4 states are still relatively scarce and cover mainly the
West-East routes, this area should - and probably will - remain among the priorities of the
Four in the future. More successful lobbying is needed, because the lack of coordinated
approach may lead to a disproportionate transport policy which would only favour the
Western part of the EU. (Fawn, 2013: 345; Manga, 2014)
As we can see, co-operation in the case of transportation was rather easy and no particular
problems occurred among the V4 states, thus this ad-hoc coordination could be described as a
success.

4. Co-operation in the field of energy security

Whereas the idea of a common transportation lobby emerged as a natural interest, a joint V4
policy for energy security was triggered by an unexpected crisis. When a dispute between
Russia and Ukraine broke out about gas prices in January 2009, Russia stopped gas flow to
Ukraine completely, resulting in a halt to all gas supplies towards the countries of Central and
South Eastern Europe. The crisis revealed the vulnerability of the Visegrad in terms of energy
dependency and forced them to start elaborating a strategy to diversify their energy portfolio.
The main focus, of course, has been put on the search for different gas sources, given that
90% to 100% of the imported gas in the case of Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia and
9

around 70% in case of Hungary is covered from Russian import. (Pavol, 2012) Thus, the first
step of the Visegrad after the crisis was to create a permanent High Level Group on Energy
Security already in 2009. Then, it was followed by a V4 Extended Energy Security Summit,
organized by the Hungarian Presidency in February 2010. In the declaration following the
summit, the represented parties7 endorsed the proposal of a new supply triangle in Central
and Eastern Europe, consisting of the Nabucco pipline as an Eastern, and the LNG8 terminals
in Poland, Croatia and Romania as a Northern and a Southern source of gas input, while also
initiating the North-South corridor - an interconnected pipeline network that links the whole
region together. (Fawn, 2013: 345, Rcz, 2012: 41, Visegrad Statement, 2010) The
importance of the initiative is marked by the fact that it has reached EU level and became a
priority of the Commissions Energy Infrastructure Package, which was created to realise the
EUs energy and climate targets. (European Commission, 2011) The participating countries
signed the final agreement in Brussels in the beginning of 2011, thus the preparation for
constructions of grids connecting the national pipelines could begin. (EurActiv, 2011)
As far as the Visegrad countries are concerned, the grid linking the Slovak and the Hungarian
lines has already been finished, though it is currently non-functional. Considering that the
Polish-Slovak interconnection is yet in its preparation phase, the Slovak-Hungarian link could
only be used at the moment for reversing the gas that still comes from Russia to both
countries. (OrientPress, 2014; The Slovak Spectator, 2014) Let us not forget, however, that
even if all the links are established between the V4 and the other states, the North-South
corridor could only be effective if the proposed alternative gas routes and sources become
available. With the failure of the Nabucco project, one element of the triangle is already
out, giving the planned LNG terminals an even higher priority. The Polish terminal is still
under construction but plans have already been revealed to further expand its capacity.
(Koper, 2014) Once its finished, the Visegrad countries and their partners will become one
step closer to be more independent from Russian gas import.
Bearing this in mind, the common energy policy of the V4 regarding a united gas market even if its only in the initial phase - could be considered an undoubted success, which is
proven by the fact that the EU and several other member states play an active part in it.

7
8

including the V4 + Austria, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia and Romania
Liquid Natural Gas

10

Conclusion
Throughout the previous pages I attempted to give a short insight into the functioning of the
Visegrad co-operation by roughly describing four areas of joint interest. My intent was to find
out, whether the V4 is able to effectively coordinate its moves on different policy areas as far
as we consider consistency between proposals and their implementation on one hand, and the
maintenance of group solidarity on the other. It can be noticed that the results are rather
ambiguous. If we summarize the conclusions of the individual cases, the following trends
could be observed:
1. The first two cases were less successful in terms of maintaining group solidarity, than
the other ones.
2. Co-operation in the field of energy security was much more successful than within the
Eastern Partnership, both in terms of realised steps and the prevalence of group
interest.
What can we draw from these observations? First of all, it became visible that those initiatives
that belong to the second part of the analysed period (2008/9-2014) can be considered more
effective than the ones from around 2004-2005. The only exception can be found in the V4s
activity in relation to Ukraine during the recent crisis. The failure of proper coordination in
this case can be attributed to the different relationships of the four countries with Russia.
From this last example we can draw one more conclusion: it is not the level of required
engagement that determines the outcome of a long-term policy goal, but rather the nature of
the issue itself. Namely, when the foreign policy goals of the V4 states are much divergent in
a question, there is little chance that they will successfully embark on a common platform.
Thus, it is evident that my original hypothesis was not proven: the success of a particular
policy area within the Visegrad is not dependant on the time scope or the level of engagement.
Both ad-hoc and long-term co-operation can be fruitful if the foreign policy goals and
external relations of the V4 countries are not substantially divergent.
Of course, this final conclusion cannot be accepted as a universal principle valid for all
Visegrad actions. Although the four cases that have been described in this paper could be used
as indicators, they nonetheless cover only a very limited area and time span of the Visegrad
co-operation. More research on the field is needed, analysing joint proposals on the area of
security policy (with a special emphasis on the planned Visegrad Battle Group), or the cooperation in connection with the EUs financial framework. Moreover, the V4s relations with

11

Russia and the USA must also be studied in order to determine the reasons behind different
reactions from the side of the individual states.
Regardless of the results and conclusions described above, I think that the Visegrad cooperation has made huge progress since its foundation and keeping it alive and active after
obtaining EU membership was one of the biggest achievements of Poland, the Czech
Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. Although problems and differences exist among the
members, one thing is for sure: without the Visegrad and its open format, the Visegrad Plus,
Central Europe would be much more divided and would certainly lack any real chances to
actively participate in the EUs decision-making and foreign policy. It has great potential if
the states are ready to recognise the opportunities it offers and use it even more wisely in the
future.

12

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14

Visegrad
Declaration
(2004):
Krom
declaration.
http://www.visegradgroup.eu/2004/declaration-of-prime (14.12.2014)

Accessible:

Visegrad Declaration (2011): The Bratislava Declaration of the Prime Ministers of the Czech
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http://www.visegradgroup.eu/2011/the-bratislava (14.12.2014)
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the
situation
in
Ukraine
(7
December
2004).
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http://www.visegradgroup.eu/2004/statement-of-the (14.12.2014)
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Dolny
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10,
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(14.12.2014)

15