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In his broadcast to the nation on 26 March 1969, Yahya called for the return of sanity and
conditions conducive to Constitutional government. He promised direct elections based on
universal adult franchise and a Constitution that would be framed by the elected representatives
of the people. On the question of administrative shortcomings which had figured so prominently
during the previous months of agitation, he took a firm stand: "We have had enough
administrative laxity and chaos and I shall see to it that this is not repeated in any form or
manner”. .
The proclamation of martial law, notwithstanding the abrogation of the Constitution and subject
to regulations and orders made by the CMLA, allowed all laws (including Acts, ordinances,
notifications) in force immediately before the abrogation of the Constitution to continue in force
and all courts and tribunals were allowed to continue and exercise all their powers and
jurisdiction which they exercised before the abrogation. However, no court could call in question
any martial law regulation or order or any judgment of a military court. No write or any other
order could issue against the CMLA and anyone exercising power under his authority
Action was initiated against a large number of people, notoriously known by the number 303,
and orders of dismissal, removal, and premature retirement were made against them. Mr. Altaf
Gauhar, who was very close to Ayub throughout his regime and was considered his favourite,
was also removed from service though he was not known to be either corrupt or inefficient. He
was indeed one of the few men reputed for their intellect in the civil service.
Martial law arises from State necessity, and is justified as the common law by necessity,
and by necessity alone, quod necessity as cognity, defendity, (what necessity forces, it
justifies), where the case is a case of riot rather than a case of rebellion, as the necessity is
less, so the discretion of these concerned is limited.
Where the courts are sitting, there is no doubt that
i. it is a time of peace,
ii. they are sitting in their own right.
iii. not merely as licensees of the military power. The jurisdiction of the ordinary
courts, therefore, continues to vest in them and the same cannot and has not been
taken away by the proclamation of martial law.
The Provisional Constitution Order is in addition to the provisions of the proclamation
and neither in derogation of it nor subject to it. It can, therefore, be amended not by a
martial law regulation or order but by amendment of Provisional Constitution Order
itself. Whether the President and Chief Martial Law Administrator, who is himself not
above the law, can now at all amend it is a question which will be answered when the
time comes to do so.
It was no coincidence that the judgment in Mir Hassan's case and Jurisdiction of Courts
(Removal of Doubts) Order 1969 came on the same date, 30 June 1969.
The two decisions taken by Yahya of dispensation with the principle of parity between the two
wings of the country ending One Unit in West Pakistan were hurried and unilateral. He had no
mandate to make these basic constitutional changes which went to the roots of the understanding
between the two wings of the country were made by one of the wings of the country, West
Pakistan. Much could be said against the creation of One Unit in West Pakistan by an unpopular
Governor-General in 1955, yet this was adopted as a constitutional measure by the second
Constituent Assembly and was incorporated in the first 1956 Constitution of Pakistan. In fact,
One Unit and parity between the two wings of Pakistan were the basic cornerstones of
constitution-making and were more or less wedded to one another. West Pakistan, as one
province with 46 per cent of the population and 85 per cent of the land area, and East Pakistan,
with 54 per cent of the population and 15 per cent of the land area, somehow balanced one
another and parity between the two provinces a natural and reasonable arrangement In any case,
the fate of One Unit was sealed by a military dictator, Yahya, whose role was purely transitional.
He had no mandate whatsoever to tinker with the One Unit, leave alone of dissolving it
altogether.
After the announcement. Yahya made a presidential order for the dissolution of the province of
West Pakistan. Four provinces: namely Balochistan, the NWFP, the Punjab, and Sindh, were
carved out of West Pakistan, keeping the Islamabad capital territory and the centrally
administered tribal areas out of these reconstituted provinces. Pakistan Western Railway, running
through all four provinces, was vested in the President. West Pakistan Water and Power
Development Authority (WAPDA) continued as before. Certain corporations set up under the
West Pakistan laws and administered by the West Pakistan government were not divided and
were allowed to continue, with the President exercising the powers of the provincial government
in relation to these corporations. However, the High Court of West Pakistan had to be split into
separate High Courts, one each for the four provinces, leaving more than one province sharing a
common High Court A separate Public Service Commission for each province was to be
established. Civil servants belonging to provincial services were to be allocated to the new
provinces. The existing laws of the West Pakistan province were to continue and duly adapted by
the new provinces. Territories assigned to each new reconstituted province were described in the
schedule to the dissolution order.
The Legal Framework Order, 1970, in laying down the fundamental principles which would be
incorporated in the new Constitution, stated:
1. The National Assembly would consist of 313 members, of whom 300 would be elected
to fill general seats and 13 to fill seats reserved for women. East Pakistan was allocated
162 general seats and 7 women seats. The Punjab was allocated 82 general seats and 3
women seats, Sindh 27 general seats and 1 women seat, the NWFP 18 general seats and
1 women seat, and Balochistan 4 general seats and 1 women seat. The tribal areas were
allocated 7 general seats.
2. There would be a Provincial Assembly for each province, consisting of a number of
members elected to fill general seats and a number to fill seats reserved for women. East
Pakistan would again hold the largest number of seats. The seats were allocated as under:
GENERAL WOMEN
Mr Justice Abdus Sattar of the Supreme Court was appointed Chief Election Commissioner to
prepare for and hold elections to the National and the Provincial Assemblies.
Critics of the Awami League and its political opponents found it impossible to voice their views
in public because the Awami League supporters or their hired hoodlums broke up the meetings
of other parties, particularly Council Muslim League and the Jamaat-e-Islami, and their workers
were beaten up. All potential political rivals were silenced and terrorized by these strong-arm
tactics of the Awami League who had a campaign of intimidation in full swing by the time
elections were announced.
There was, however, a militant element in the Awami League which believed in socialism as the
solution to the poverty in East Pakistan and which argued that only in an independent East
Bengal or Bangladesh would it be possible to set up a socialist order. The nucleus of this group
was formed in 1962 in Dhaka University and it obtained control of the East Pakistan Students
League (EPSL) which, along with the pro-Beijing East Pakistan Students Union (EPSU), played
a leading role in the presidential elections of 1965 and in the agitation against Ayub in 1969.
Until the emergence of Bangladesh, it posed as an integral, though radical, part of the Awami
League. Other leftists gave priority to a revolutionary class struggle of the masses whose
interests, they argued, were being jeopardized by promoting the secession of East Pakistan under
bourgeois leadership. They eventually chose to boycott the poles but the radicals in the Awami
League regarded elections as a step towards the final goal of independence and threw themselves
wholeheartedly into the campaign under a bourgeois leadership. The election campaign enabled
them to organize a party cadre of thousands of urban educated youth for mass contact in the
villages. By 6 June 1970, their group had drafted a declaration of independence and prepared the
design for a new national flag. On 12 August, six months prior to the elections, the Central
Committee of the EPSL adopted a resolution for a Swadhin Samajtantrik Bangladesh
(Independent Socialist Bangladesh).
The election campaign and the voting took place in a peaceful atmosphere and all parties,
including those that were defeated, agreed that the elections were both free and fair in nine
constituencies in East Pakistan, voting had been postponed until 17 January 1971 due to the
effects of the cyclone, and all of these were taken by the Awami League. In East Pakistan, only
57 per cent of the registered voters cast their votes as against 69 per cent in the Punjab, 60 per
cent in Sindh, 48 perent in the NWFP, and 40 per cent in Balochistan Of the 57 per cent of the
electorate who voted in East Pakistan, the Awami League gained 75 per cent, so that in fact it
owed its massive victory, which eventually gave it 167 out of 169 seats allocated to the East
Pakistan in a National Assembly of 31.3. to only 41 per cent of the East Pakistan electorate. Why
the turnout was so poor in East Pakistan is not clear, but it is conjectured that this was due to the
strong arm tactics of the hired hoodlums of the Awami League.
The results of 1970 general elections for the National Assembly held on 7 December 1970, are
given in Table
3. Two currencies one for East Pakistan and the other for West Pakistan or effective measures to
halt the flight of capital from the Eastern wing . A separate monetary and fiscal policy and bank
to the Western reserve for East Pakistan.
4. Powers for levying taxes to be invested in the Provinces which would central
5. Separate trade links with foreign countries along with separate accounts for foreign exchange
earnings.
Constitutional breakdown
Yahya also held discussions with Bhutto in Larkana who cleverly tried to drag the army into the
situation as the third party in addition to the Awami League and the Peoples' Party. Bhutto raised
his concern about the implication of the six points. He indicated the possibility of an agreement
if Mujib compromised on two points, foreign trade and foreign aid as well as taxation. As they
stood, he thought the Six Points were bound to lead to secession. Bhutto's articulation of the
dangers arising from them to the country and to army must have created a deep impression on
the Generals. He gave an impression to Yahya that the army was with him on this issue. This
meeting between Bhutto and Yahya and his Generals, particularly in the hometown of Bhutto in
a relaxed atmosphere, must have created suspicions in Bengali minds of the army and Bhutto
trying to deprive East Pakistanis of their electoral victory. Bhutto and his delegation did visit
Dhaka at the end of January and heid a series of meetings with Mujib. He conveyed to Mujib that
the general impression of the people of West Pakistan was that the Six Points spelt the end of
Pakistan. He offered to go as far as possible to meet the essential demands. On the date of
summoning the meeting of the Assembly, the two of them differed. Mujib wanted the earliest
possible session of the National Assembly, not later than 15 February. Bhutto wanted more time.
On his return, Bhutto informed Yahya that the Awami League had already prepared its draft of
the Constitution which it would no doubt get passed by the Assembly. He assumed. without
sufficient evidence, that the Awami League sought to impose constitutional obligations of
intolerable financial burdens on the West Pakistan provinces to compensate East Pakistan for
past inequalities. He advised Yahya not to call the Assembly session until he had made one more
attempt to negotiate a settlement with Mujib.
Mujib grew more and more adamant over the Six Points, and it became painfully clear that he
had lost interest in anything but the future of East Pakistan. He consistently referred to the East
Wing as Bangladesh' and refused to visit West Pakistan or to meet Yahya for further talks,
sending him a message to the effect that if the Six Points were not accepted in their entirety,
rivers of blood will flow. Meanwhile, the political leaders of the western wing who had been
elected to the National Assembly became more and more uneasy at the uncompromising attitude
of Mujib. Yahya finally decided on 13 February to summon the National Assembly to meet in
Dhaka on 3 March to which Bhutto announced on 15 February that the PPP would not attend the
National Assembly session if Awami League was not flexible. He demanded an adjustment on
the Six Points. Mujib again reiterated that the Constitution would be based on the Six Points
because such a mandate was given to him by the people. Wali Khan announced the participation
of NAP in the National Assembly session because, he said, constitution-making should be above
party politics He said that the Awami League would not impose the Six Points on the West wing
and additional powers to the centre could be given if the units so desired. Awami League
prepared a draft Constitution incorporating the Six Points which was adopted by the parliamen
tary committee of the Awami League on 27 February 1971. The West wing was left to choose its
own kind of autonomy. The salient features of the draft constitutional principles were as under:
The announcement of the postponement of the National Assembly session was received in East
Pakistan with fierce resentment. The conclusions formed in East Pakistan were (a) the army was
determined to frustrate all effective moves towards democratic transfer of power, and (b) there
was collusion between Yahya and Bhutto. In West Pakistan, public reactions were mainly
gloomy. It was said openly that each time the military interfered in politics, the result was worse.
On 1 March, Awami League militants looted and burned many shops and houses and raided the
Narayanganj Rifle Club for arms. Almost all the students of Dhaka University, except committed
militants, Iqbal Hall and Jagannath Hal were used as centres from which armed gangs went out
to collect arms, vehicles, and money. On 1 March, two firearms shops were looted and taken to
an arsenal in Jagannath Hall. Practice firing was heard all day in the University grounds. On the
previous night, there had been looting and arsen Encouraged by the fact that the troops were
confined to the barracks on the orders of the Governor, mos armed with firearms, staves, and
iron bars raided business premises in Jinnah Avenue and Bat Mukarram. The Shalimar Hotel and
Gulistan Cinema were attacked and set on fire. Police office reported that they could no longer
trust their rank and file to deal with the mobs and asked for the assistance of the military. This
was granted, and i curfew was imposed. An army unit was attacked Sadarghat and six rioters
were killed in the firing There was extensive defiance of the curfew, and inspite of the efforts of
the military, arson and looting continued throughout the night. Os March, mob violence spread to
other parts of Dhaka. Mujib must thus have felt completely secure even if it came to a clash of
arms, with the support of the police, most of whom were with him. So Mujib could count on
some 176,000 armed Bengalis as against only 10,000 soldiers from West Pakistan. Moreover
with the ban on over-flying Mujib was confident that, there would be no reinforcements coming
from West Pakistan. Accordingly on 7 March he announced plans for setting up a parallel
government of his own. These included the complete closure of all educational institutions,
government offices and courts; the stoppage of any remittances to West Pakistan; and the
organization of revolutionary councils in every union, mohalla, thana, sub-division and district
who were to take over the administration under the direction of local Awami League units. Later,
the original directive to pay no taxes to the western wing was modified to ensure that taxes were
collected but paid into two private banks. Detailed directives were issued to the Press and to the
radio and TV stations ensuring that nothing went out which did not conform to the liking of the
Awami League. There seems to have been little trace of religious intolerance about the killings,
beatings, and burnings. The criterion was political, and Muslims suffered as much as Hindus.
The Particularly serious rioting took place in Chittagong on 3 March and in Khulna on 5 March
resulting in hundreds of casualties. To add to the growing anarchy, the East Bengal Regiment,
the East Pakistan Rifles, and the bulk of the para-military frontier security guards, far from using
their strength to restore law and order, expressed their sympathy with the local Awami League.
On 23 March there were armed rallies and demonstrations and the 'Bangladesh' flag was hoisted,
the constitutional discussions continued. The Awami League refused to work on the draft
proclamation which until then had been the working paper, and produced one of their own. In
this new draft, which did not seem to take account of the legal difficulties already under
discussion, several novel proposals were put forward. It was proposed that members of the
National Assembly elected from the state of Bangladesh' and the states of West Pakistan were to
be sworn and set up separately to frame. Constitutions for the 'state of Bangladesh and for the
states of West Pakistan. There was an alteration in the oath of office laid down in the Legal
Framework Order. More revealing still, was the suggestion that the National Assembly should
proceed to frame a Constitution of the 'Confederation of Pakistan, an expression applicable only
to an agreement between independent sovereign states to join together for certain purposes. This,
along with other provisions which would have left the central government a mere ghost without
taxation-powers to raise funds even for the shadowy functions allowed to it, ran clearly contrary
both to the Legal Framework Order and even to Mujib's own Six Points, one of which provided
that Pakistan should be a federal republic. The serious implication of a proclamation of this kind
which intended to serve the purpose of an interim Constitution, were pointed out both by Yahya's
advisers and by the representatives of the West wing political parties, but the Awami League
representatives refused to modify even a single point. Tajuddin Ahmad went so far as to say that
even this proclamation would be redundant if it was not issued within the following forty-eight
hours. It was in vain that a number of distinguished political leaders called upon Mujib in the
hope that he would adopt an attitude which would have room for the views of other people. They
found him completely inflexible, elevated in spirit by a vast procession of armed volunteers
parading past his house. It was on the evening of 24 March that Yahya held his last meeting with
the Awami League leaders. They declined to alter their stand as set out in their own draft
proclamation, and in a subsequent news conference Tajuddin Ahmad announced: "From our side
there is no need for further meetings. In other words, their proclamation was their ultimatum.
While political negotiations were going on in Dhaka, the situation both in the capital and in the
outlying cities and districts of East Pakistan was deteriorating rapidly because of the Awami
League's persistent defiance of authority and determination to establish its own system of
government. Supporters of Bangladesh were now claiming that Mujib's followers maintained
perfect order, better order than was customary under Yahya's administration.
The Government of Pakistan declared the seats of absconding Awami League members of the
National Assembly as vacant and held by-elections to these seats. Consequently, a national
government was installed with Nur-ul-Amin as the Prime Minister and Z... Bhutto as the Foreign
Minister of Pakistan. In East Pakistan, General Tikka Khan took stem measures. Many
infiltrators were killed and a large number of traitors were sent to jail. In the meantime,
thousands of Awami League workers escaped to India. They were imparted guerilla training and
sent back to East Pakistan with the name of 'Mukti Bahni'. The members of Mukti Bahni joined
hands with the subversive elements who were working against the integrity of the country. India
was backing all the anti Pakistan activities. She had actually prepared a calculated plan for the
dismemberment of Pakistan. In July 1971, on the pretext of a hijacked plane to Lahore, India
banned all flights of Pakistani aircraft over her territory in order to stop all supplies to East
Pakistan. However, the circumstances took a new turn on 3rd November, 1971, when India
violated all international laws demanding withdrawal of Pakistani troops from East Pakistan.
The 1971 war between India and Pakistan started on 22nd November, 1971, when Indian Forces
launched an all out attack on East Pakistan. The Pakistani Forces there put up a gallant resistance
and inflicted heavy losses on the Indian forces. However, they could not continue their defensive
operations without supplies and reinforcements from distant West Pakistan. The Pakistan Army
tried to exert pressure on the West Pakistan Front but no substantial advance could be made due
to a large number of Bengali soldiers. The P.A.F too could not deliver the goods due to the
Bengali pilots and officers in it. The war continued amidst attempts in the Security Council for a
ceasefire which could not be achieved due to Russian veto on many occasions, Consequently,
Dacca fell on 16th December, 1971, and the Pakistani troops surrendered to the Indian Army. ()
Separation of East Pakistan: The fall of Dacca on 16th December, Pakistan. Following were the
causes which led to 1971, led to the separation of East separation of Eastern wing of the country:
After the fall of East Pakistan on 16th December, 1971, Gen. A.M. Yahya Khan decided to step
down from his office.