Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies v.

POEA

 Petitioner Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc a licensed manning agencies

which hire and recruit Filipino seamen for and in behalf of their respective foreign
FACTS shipowner-principals, urge us to annul Resolution No. 01, series of 1994, of the
Governing Board of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)
Memorandum Circular No. 05, series of 1994. One of the reasons being that the
resolution and the memorandum circular are unconstitutional because they violate the
equal protection and non-impairment of obligation of contracts clauses of the
Constitution.
 The public respondents contend that the petition is without merit and should be
dismissed because
 The constitutional challenge of the rule-making power of the POEA based on
impermissible delegation of legislative power had been, as correctly contended by the
public respondents, brushed aside by this Court in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. POEA.
6 The petitioner in that case assailed the constitutionality of Memorandum Circular No.
02 of the POEA (effective 1 February 1984) which prescribed a standard contract to be
adopted by both foreign and domestic shipping companies in the hiring of Filipino
seamen for overseas employment.
Whether or not Resolution No. 1 of Memorandum Circular No. 5 is unconstitutional
ISSUE

 Petition is Dismissed.
 There is no merit to the claim that the resolution and memorandum circular violate the
RULING contract clause of the Bill of Rights.
 The executive order creating the POEA was enacted to further implement the social
justice provisions of the 1973, Constitution, which have been greatly enhanced and
expanded in the 1987 Constitution by placing them under a separate Article. The Article
on Social Justice was aptly described as the "heart of the new Charter" by the President
of the 1986 Constitution Commission, retired Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma. Social justice
is identified with the broad scope of the police power of the state and requires the
extensive use of such power.
 In Calalang vs. Williams: Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor
atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and
economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular
conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the
welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to
insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the
maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the
members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally
justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the
existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema
lex.
Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of
interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that
should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social
and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the
state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about
 "the greatest good to the greatest number.
 The constitutional prohibition against impairing contractual obligations is not absolute
and is not to be read with literal exactness. It is restricted to contracts with respect to
property or some object of value and which confer rights that may be asserted in a
court of justice; it has no, application to statutes relating to public subjects within the
domain of the general legislative powers of the State and involving the public rights and
public welfare of the entire community affected by it. It does not prevent a proper
exercise by the State of its police power by enacting regulations reasonably necessary to
secure the health, safety, morals, comfort, or general welfare of the community, even
though contracts may thereby be affected, for such matters cannot be placed by
contract beyond the power of the State to regulate and control them.
 the freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and all rights are subject to the
police power of the State and not only may regulations which affect them be
established by the State, but all such regulations must be subject to change from time to
time, as the general well-being of the community may require, or as the circumstances
may change, or as experience may demonstrate the necessity.
 Under the Civil Code, contracts of labor are explicitly subject to the police power of the
State because they are not ordinary contracts but are impressed with public interest.

ARTICLE 1700 . The relations between capital and labor are not merely contractual. They
are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts must yield to the common
good. Therefore, such contracts are subject to the special laws on labor unions,
collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts, closed shop, wages, working conditions,
hours of labor and similar subjects.

 The challenged resolution and memorandum circular being valid implementations of

E.O. No. 797, which was enacted under the police power of the State, they cannot be
struck down on the ground that they violate the contract clause. To hold otherwise is to
alter long-established constitutional doctrine and to subordinate the police power to
the contract clause.
The prohibition against impairing contractual obligations, although it is guaranteed by the
Constitution, it is not absolute. It is limited by the police power of the State.
SYNTHESIS All contracts and all rights are subject to the police power of the State and not only may
regulations which affect them be established by the State, but all such regulations are subject to
change based on what is required for the general well-being of the community.
The Civil Code states that labor contracts are subject to the police power of the state because
they are not ordinary contracts since they involve public interest.

ARTICLE 1700 . The relations between capital and labor are not merely contractual. They are so
impressed with public interest that labor contracts must yield to the common good. Therefore,
such contracts are subject to the special laws on labor unions, collective bargaining, strikes and
lockouts, closed shop, wages, working conditions, hours of labor and similar subjects.

Thus, in the case of Conference Maritime Manning Agencies, the POEA resolution which allowed
the adjustment of workers; compensation and benefits was valid through the State’s police
power. Thus, it does not violate the non-impairment clause. In the case of Social Weather
 Stations and Pulse Asia v. COMELEC, Commission on Elections’ Resolution No. 9674 is a valid
implementation pursuant to Sec. 5.2 (a) of the Fair Election Act. It is an exercise of the State’s
police power, thus, it prevails over the non-impairment clause.

Social Weather Stations v. COMELEC

 praying that respondent Commission on Elections' Resolution No. 9674 2 dated April 23,
2013 be nullified and set aside and that the Commission on Elections be permanently
FACTS enjoined from enforcing the same Resolution, as well as prosecuting Social Weather
Stations, Inc. and Pulse Asia, Inc. for violating it or otherwise compelling compliance
with it.
 Commission on Elections' (COMELEC) Resolution No. 9674 directed Social Weather
Stations, Inc. (SWS) and Pulse Asia, Inc. (Pulse Asia), as well as "other survey firms of
similar circumstance" to submit to COMELEC the names of all commissioners and payors
of all surveys published from February 12, 2013 to April 23, 2013, including those of
their "subscribers."
 SWS and Pulse Asia are social research and public polling firms. Among their activities is
the conduct of pre-election surveys. As recounted by SWS and Pulse Asia, on February
15 to February 17, 2013, SWS conducted a pre-election survey on voters' preferences
for senatorial candidates.
 Representative Tobias M. Tiangco, Secretary-General of the United Nationalist Alliance
(UNA), wrote Atty. Esmeralda Ladra, Director of COMELEC's Law Department. In his
letter, Tiangco asked COMELEC to "compel [SWS] to either comply with the directive in
the Fair Election Act and COMELEC Resolution No. 9[6]1[5] and give the names or
identities of the subscribers who paid for the [pre-election survey conducted from
February 15 to February 17, 2013], or be liable for the violation thereof, an act
constitutive of an election offense.”
 the Commis[s]ion RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to DIRECT the SWS, Pulse Asia and
other survey firms of similar circumstance to submit within three (3) days from receipt
of this Resolution the names of all commissioners and payors of surveys published from
February 12, 2013 to the date of the promulgation of this Resolution for copying and
verification by the Commission. The submission shall include the names of all
"subscribers" of those published surveys. Such information/data shall be for the
exclusive and confidential use of the Commission; RESOLVED FURTHER, that all surveys
published subsequent to the promulgation of this Resolution must be accompanied by
all the information required in Republic Act No. 9006, including the names of
commissioners, payors and subscribers.
 As basis for Resolution No. 9674, COMELEC cited Article IX-C, Section 2 (1) 19 of the
1987 Constitution and Sections 5.1 to 5.3 of Republic Act No. 9006, otherwise known as
the Fair Election Act, as implemented by COMELEC Resolution No. 9615.
 SWS and Pulse Asia alleged that following the issuance of Resolution No. 9674 and as of
their filing before this court of the present Petition, they had not been furnished copies
of Resolution No. 9674.
 SWS and Pulse Asia informed COMELEC Chairman Brillantes that they had not received a
copy of Resolution No. 9674. They also articulated their view that Resolution No. 9674
was tainted with irregularities, having been issued ultra vires (i.e., in excess of what the
Fair Election Act allows) and in violation of the non-impairment of contracts clause of
 the Constitution. They also expressed their intention to bring the matter before this
court on account of these supposed irregularities. Thus, they requested that COMELEC
defer or hold in abeyance Resolution No. 9674's enforcement.
 The COMELEC Law Department issued a Notice to SWS (and also to Pulse Asia) directing
it to furnish COMELEC with a list of the names of all "commissioners, subscribers, and
payors of surveys published from February 12, 2013 until April 23, 2013." SWS was
warned that failure to comply with the Notice shall constitute an election offense
punishable under the Omnibus Election Code.
 Petitioners Social Weather Stations, Inc. and Pulse Asia, Inc. filed the present Petition.
They assail Resolution No. 9674 as having been issued ultra vires. They are of the
position that Resolution No. 9674, in requiring the submission of information on
subscribers, is in excess of what the Fair Election Act requires. Likewise, they assert that
Resolution No. 9674 transgresses the Fair Election Act in making itself executory
immediately after publication. Moreover, they claim that it violates the non-impairment
of contracts clause of the Constitution, and was enforced in violation of their right to
due process (as they were charged with its violation despite not having been properly
served with copies of the complaint filed against them). Petitioners pray for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction in the interim.

Whether or not Resolution No. 9674 violates the constitutional provision against the
ISSUE impairment of contracts ( as it compels petitioners to submit the names of their subscribers)

 We sustain the validity of Resolution No. 9674. The names of those who commission or
pay for election surveys, including subscribers of survey firms, must be disclosed
RULING pursuant, to Section 5.2 (a) of the Fair Election Act. This requirement is a valid
regulation in the exercise of police power and effects the constitutional policy of
"guarantee[ing] equal access to opportunities for public service." Section 5.2 (a)'s
requirement of disclosing subscribers neither curtails petitioners' free speech rights nor
violates the constitutional proscription against the impairment of contracts.
 Petitioners argue that Resolution No. 9674 violates Article III, Section 10 of the 1987
Constitution. They claim that it "unduly interferes with [their] existing contracts . . . by
forcing [them] to disclose information that, under the contracts, is confidential or
privileged."
 For its part, COMELEC argues that "[t]he non-impairment clause of the Constitution
must yield to the loftier purposes sought to be achieved by the government." It adds
that "[p]etitioners' existing contracts with third parties must be understood to have
been made in reference to the possible exercise of the COMELEC's regulatory powers."
 It is settled that "the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment . . . is limited by the
exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, morals
and general welfare." "It is a basic rule in contracts that the law is deemed written into
the contract between the parties." The incorporation of regulations into contracts is "a
postulate of the police power of the State.
 The principle of non-impairment of contracts was thoroughly explained in Ortigas and
Co. v. Feati Bank: While non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the
rule is not absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police
power, i.e., "the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people." Invariably described
 as "the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers" and "in a sense, the greatest
and most powerful attribute of government," the exercise of the power may be
judicially inquired into and corrected only if it is capricious, whimsical, unjust or
unreasonable, there having been a denial of due process or a violation of any other
applicable constitutional guarantee. As this Court held through Justice Jose P. Bengzon
in Philippine Long Distance Company vs. City of Davao, et al. police power "is elastic and
must be responsive to various social conditions; it is not confined within narrow
circumscriptions of precedents resting on past conditions; it must follow the legal
progress of a democratic way of life." We were even more emphatic in Vda. de Genuino
vs. The Court of Agrarian Relations, et al., when We declared: "We do not see why
public welfare when clashing with the individual right to property should not be made
to prevail through the state's exercise of its police power.”
 This case does not involve a "capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable" regulation.
We have demonstrated that not only an important or substantial state interest, but
even a compelling one anchors Resolution No. 9674's requirement of disclosing
subscribers to election surveys. It effects the constitutional policy of "guarantee[ing]
equal access to opportunities for public service" and is impelled by the imperative of
"fair" elections.
 As a valid exercise of COMELEC's regulatory powers, Resolution No. 9674 is correctly
deemed written into petitioners' existing contracts.
 Parenthetically, the obligations of agreements manifested in the concept of contracts
are creations of law. This right to demand performance not only involves its requisites,
privileges, and regulation in the Civil Code or special laws, but is also subject to the
Constitution. The expectations inherent in a contract may be compelling, but so are the
normative frameworks demanded by law and the provisions of the Constitution.

Petition Partially granted.

SYNTHESIS

Federico Miguel Olbes v. Hon. Danilo Buemio

 Federico Miguel Olbes (petitioner) was indicted for Grave Coercion before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila by Information 1 dated June 28, 2002 which
FACTS was raffled to Branch 22 thereof.
 Judge Hipolito dela Vega proceeded with petitioner's arraignment on February 12, 2003
in which he pleaded not guilty to the charge. Pre-trial was thereupon set to May 28,
2003 which was, however, declared a non-working day due to the occurrence of
typhoon "Chedeng." The pre-trial was thus reset to October 23, 2003
 At the scheduled pre-trial on October 23, 2003, petitioner failed to appear, prompting
the trial court to issue a warrant for his arrest, which warrant was, however, later
recalled on discovery that neither petitioner nor his counsel was notified of said
 schedule.
 Before the scheduled pre-trial on January 21, 2004 or on November 3, 2003, petitioner
filed a Motion to Dismiss the Information on the ground of violation of his right to a
speedy trial under Republic Act No. 8493 or the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 and Supreme
Court Circular (SCC) No. 38-98. He argued that "considering that [he] was not — without
any fault on his part — brought to trial within 80 days from the date he was arraigned,
this case should be dismissed pursuant to Rule…… 119, Section 9 in relation to Rule 119,
Section 6 of the Rules."
 The trial court denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss by Order of December 5, 2003,
holding that petitioner played a big part in the delay of the case, and that technical rules
of procedure were meant to secure, not override, substantial justice.
 Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied by Order 11 of March 3, 2004 after
respondent judge noted that during petitioner's arraignment on February 12, 2003, he
interposed no objection to the setting of the pre-trial to May 28, 2003.
 Respondent judge held, strict compliance with the Speedy Trial Act was improbable,
given the volume of cases being filed with the MeTC. Additionally respondent judge held
that the term "speedy trial" as applied in criminal cases is a relative term such that the
trial and disposition of cases depended on several factors including the availability of
counsel, witnesses and prosecutor, and weather conditions.
 Petitioner challenged respondent judge's orders via certiorari and prohibition before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, alleging that not only was he (petitioner) not
brought to trial within 80 days from the date of his arraignment as required under
Section 6, Rule 119, but the prosecution had failed to establish the existence of any of
the "time exclusions" provided under Section 3 of the same Rule to excuse its failure to
bring him to trial within the 80-day period.
 The RTC denied the petition, holding that Section 9 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court
does not call for the automatic dismissal of a case just because trial has not commenced
within 80 days from arraignment; that the proceedings before the MeTC were not
attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays; and that the concept of a
speedy trial is not a mere question of numbers that could be computed in terms of
years, months or days but is understood according to the peculiar circumstances of each
case, citing SPO1 Sumbang, Jr. v. Gen. Court Martial PRO-Region 6.
 The RTC further held that in "determining whether petitioner's right to speedy trial was
violated," the circumstances that respondent judge was the pairing judge of Br. 22 of
the MeTC who "may be assumed also [to] preside over his own regular court and
devotes limited time to his pairing court" and that first level courts in Manila have an
excessive load of cases should also be taken into consideration.
Whether or not the Judge correctly rules that Rule 119, Section 9 of the Rules is not Mandatory
ISSUE

 It bears noting, however, that on his arraignment on February 12, 2003, petitioner
interposed no objection to the setting of the pre-trial to May 28, 2003 which was, as
RULING earlier stated, later declared a non-working day. Inarguably, the cancellation of the
scheduled pre-trial on that date was beyond the control of the trial court.
 Petitioner argues, however, that the lapse of 253 days (from arraignment to October 23,
2003) was not justified by any of the excusable delays as embodied in the time
exclusions specified under Section 3 of Rule 119. The argument is unavailing.
  In Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Judge How, the Court stressed that the exceptions
consisting of the time exclusions provided in the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 reflect the
fundamentally recognized principle that "speedy trial" is a relative term and necessarily
involves a degree of flexibility. This was reiterated in People v. Hernandez: Sec. 6, Rule
119. Extended time limit. — Notwithstanding the provisions of section 1(g), Rule 116
and the preceding section 1, for the first twelve-calendar-month period following its
effectivity on September 15, 1998, the time limit with respect to the period from
arraignment to trial imposed by said provision shall be one hundred eighty (180) days.
For the second twelve-month period, the time limit shall be one hundred twenty (120)
days, and for the third twelve-month period, the time limit shall be eighty (80) days. R.A.
No. 8493 and its implementing rules and the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
enumerate certain reasonable delays as exclusions in the computation of the prescribed
time limits. They also provide that "no provision of law on speedy trial and no rule
implementing the same shall be interpreted as a bar to any charge of denial of speedy
trial as provided by Article III, Section 14(2), of the 1987 Constitution." Thus, in spite of
the prescribed time limits, jurisprudence continues to adopt the view that the concept
of "speedy trial" is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.
 The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of the case against
him was designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding criminal
prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time, and to prevent delays in the
administration of justice by mandating the courts to proceed with reasonable dispatch
in the trial of criminal cases. Such right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of a
case is violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and
oppressive delays.
 It must be borne in mind that the rights given to the accused by the Constitution and
the Rules of Court are shields, not weapons; hence, courts are to give meaning to that
intent.
 A balancing test of applying societal interests and the rights of the accused necessarily
compels the court to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.
 In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy
disposition of the case and to a speedy trial, four factors must be considered: (a)
length of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c) the defendant's assertion of his right;
and (d) prejudice to the defendant.
 The time limits set by the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 do not thus preclude justifiable
postponements and delays when so warranted by the situation. To the Court, the
reasons for the postponements and delays attendant to the present case reflected
above are not unreasonable. While the records indicate that neither petitioner nor his
counsel was notified of the resetting of the pre-trial to October 23, 2003, the same
appears to have been occasioned by oversight or simple negligence which, standing
alone, does not prove fatal to the prosecution's case. The faux pas was acknowledged
and corrected when the MeTC recalled the arrest warrant it had issued against
petitioner under the mistaken belief that petitioner had been duly notified of the
October 23, 2003 pre-trial setting.
 The Court does not find petitioner to have been unduly and excessively prejudiced by
the "delay" in the proceedings, especially given that he had posted bail.
Petition Denied
 SYNTHESIS

Lenido Lumanog and Augusto Santos vs. People of the Philippines

 Abadilla left his house at Soliven I, Loyola Grand Villas, Loyola Heights, Quezon City and
drove his car, a black Honda Accord. Soon after he left, his wife Susan Abadilla received
FACTS a phone call from him and they briefly talked. Just a few minutes after their
conversation, she received another phone call from Abadilla's tailor who was asking
about her husband because, according to him, he heard a radio broadcast report that
Abadilla met an accident.
 Senior Police Officer (SPO) 2 Arthur Ortiz, the desk officer on duty at Station 8 of the
Central Police District Command (CPDC) located at P. Tuazon Blvd., Quezon City,
answered a telephone call from a male person who reported a shooting incident along
Katipunan Avenue.
 Upon reaching the area at 8:45 a.m., they saw several onlookers around and near a
black Honda Accord with Plate No. RNA-777. They found the victim's bloodied and
bullet-riddled body partly slumped onto the pavement at the car's left door, which was
open.
 The witnesses gave their respective statements before the Criminal Investigation
Division of the Central Police District Command, PNP-National Capital Region (NCR) at
Camp Karingal, Sikatuna Village, Quezon City.
 Based on their accounts, the black Honda Accord with Plate Number RNA-777 was
caught in traffic while traversing Katipunan Avenue going to Santolan at past 8:00
o'clock on the morning of June 13, 1996. Four (4) men armed with handguns
surrounded the said car and fired several successive shots at the man inside it. One of
the men who were positioned at the left side of the car opened its door and took
something inside.
 The victim was pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital. The victim's identity was
confirmed by Susan Abadilla who had rushed to the hospital.
 CPDC, PNP-NCR at Camp Karingal were already coordinating with investigators of
Station 8-CPDC who had turned over to said office the evidence gathered and referred
the witnesses present at the crime scene. As a result of follow-up operations, Joel de
Jesus, alias "Tabong," was apprehended.
 Joel de Jesus narrated that on June 13, 1996 in the morning he was fetched by Lorenzo
"Larry" delos Santos who was his neighbor. Larry was accompanied by his nephew Ogie,
and a certain "Tisoy" who drove the owner-type jeep. Larry told him they were going to
kill a big-time personality.
 According to Joel, he only acted as lookout; Lorenzo, Ram and Cesar were the ones who
fired shots, while Tisoy focused on a security guard at a store. After the shooting, they
separated ways.
 Joel further stated that the ambush-slay of Abadilla was planned by the group three (3)
days before, when they met at the house of Ram de Jesus also in Fairview near his
house.
  pointing to Rameses de Jesus as the mastermind and also named the following suspects


ISSUE

 This protection extends to all citizens and covers the periods before, during and after
trial, affording broader protection than Section 14 (2), which guarantees merely the
RULING right to a speedy trial. However, just like the constitutional guarantee of "speedy trial,"
"speedy disposition of cases" is a flexible concept. It is consistent with delays and
depends upon the circumstances. What the Constitution prohibits are unreasonable,
arbitrary and oppressive delays, which render rights nugatory.
 The case remained unresolved due to a number of factors, such as the CA internal
reorganization and inhibition of some Justices to whom the case was re-raffled.
 In the determination of whether the right to speedy disposition of cases has been
violated, particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each
case. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved would not be sufficient.
Under the circumstances, we hold that the delay of (4) four years during which the case
remained pending with the CA and this Court was not unreasonable, arbitrary or
oppressive.
 In several cases where it was manifest that due process of law or other rights
guaranteed by the Constitution or statutes have been denied, this Court has not faltered
to accord the so-called "radical relief" to keep accused from enduring the rigors and
expense of a full-blown trial. In this case, however, appellants are not entitled to the
same relief in the absence of clear and convincing showing that the delay in the
resolution of their appeal was unreasonable or arbitrary.

SYNTHESIS

In Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies v. POEA, supra., the POEA resolution and memorandum
circular increasing and adjusting rates of compensation and other benefits in the POEA Standard
Employment Contracts for seafarers, being a valid implementation of E.O. 797 which was enacted under
the police power of the State, prevail over the non-impairment clause.