CHAPTER VIII

STRICT AND LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES

GENERAL PRINCIPLES
- If a statute should be strictly construed, nothing should be included within the scope that
does not come clearly within the meaning of the language used. Each language must be
given its exact and technical meaning, with no extension on account of implications or
equitable considerations; or, as ha been aptly asserted, its operation be confined to cases
coming clearly within the letter of the statute as well as within its spirit or reason.
- But the rule of strict construction is not applicable where the meaning of the statute is certain
and unambiguous, for under these circumstances, there is no need for construction. If the
language is clear, it is conclusive of the legislative intent, for the object of all construction is
simply to ascertain that intent, and, of course, the rule of strict construction is subordinate
thereto.
- Sutherland in his work on statutory construction lists some guidelines on whether a statute
or some of its provisions should be liberally or strict construed such as:
1. The former law on matter;
2. Persons or rights with which it deals;
3. The letter or language of the law; and
4. The purpose and objects of the statute.

- In our jurisdiction, some of our laws expressly provide whether the construction should be
liberally or strictly interpreted.
- The Labor Code if the Philippines expressly provides that all doubts in the implementation
and interpretation of the provision of this code, includes implementing rules and regulations,
shall be resolved in favor of labor.
- The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure shall be liberally construed in order to promote their
objective of securing a just speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding.
- The COMELEC rules of procedure shall be liberally construed in order to promote the
effective and efficient implementation of the objectives of ensuring the holding of free, orderly,
honest, peaceful and credible elections and to achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive
determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the Commission.
- Liberal interpretation or construction of the law or rules, however, is not a free commodity
that maY be availed of in all instances under cloak or rendering justice. Liberality in the
interpretation and application of Rules applies only in proper cases and under justifiable
causes and circumstances. While it is true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance
with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.

PENAL STATUTES
- It is a well-entrenched rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly against the state and
in favor of the accused. They are not to be extended or enlarged by implications,
intendments, analogies or equitable considerations. They are nit ti be strained by construction
to spell out a new offense, enlarge the field of crime or multiply felonies. Hence, in the
interpretation of penal statue, the tendency is to subject it to careful scrutiny and to construe it
with such strictness as to safehuard the rights if the accused.
- The maxim that penal statutes should be stricken construed against the state and liberally in
favor of the accused, truly, may not be a mere cliche but, so also, is not meant to wrongly
shield an accused from criminal liability.

ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:
Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos

G.R. No.: 113092; September 1, 1994

FACTS:

Sometime in 1985, the officers of a civic organization known as the Samahang Katandaan ng
Nayon ng Tikay launched a fund drive for the purpose of renovating the chapel of Barrio
Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan.

With this motive in mind, herein petitioner, Martin Centeno, the Chairman of the organization,
and Vicente Yco approached Judge Adoracion Angeles to solicit the amount of P1,500.00.
Judge Angeles then filed a complaint against the petitioner for violating Presidential Decree
No. 1564 (Solicitation Permit Law) before the Municipal Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan. The
MTC found the petitioner to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt and was ordered to pay the
fine of P200.00. The MTC nevertheless recommended that the accused be pardoned since it
found the petitioner to be in good faith.Petitioner appealed the case to the Regional Trial
Court of Malolos, Bulacan. The RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC and modified the
penalty increasing it to P1,000.00 and imposing an additional penalty of six-month
imprisonment without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The petitioner’s
subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC.

Petitioner avers that solicitations for religious purposes cannot be penalized under the law for
otherwise, it will constitute an abridgement or restriction on the free exercise clause
guaranteed under the constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Presidential Decree 1564 (Solicitation Permit Law) when applied to “religious”
solicitations violates the constitutional guarantee on the freedom of religion.
RULING:

The constitutional inhibition of legislation on the subject of religion has a double aspect. On
one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any
form of worship. Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organization
or form of worship as the individual may choose cannot be restricted by law. On the other
hand, it safeguards free exercise of the chosen form of religion. Thus, the constitution
embraces two concepts—that is, Freedom to believe and Freedom to act. The first is absolute
but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject for regulation for
the protection of society. The freedom to act must have appropriate definitions to preserve the
enforcement of that protection. In every case, the power to regulate must be so exercised, in
attaining a permissible end, as not to unduly infringe on the protected freedom. Therefore, PD
1564 does not violate the freedom of religion.

TAX LAWS

- As a general rule, the power to tax is an incident of sovereignty and is unlimited in its range,
acknowledging in its very nature no limits, so that security against its abuse is to be found
only in the responsibility of the legislature which imposes the tax on the consistency who are
to pay it. Nevertheless, effective limitations thereon may be imposed by the people through
their constitutions. Our Constitution, for instance t, provides that the rule taxation shall be
uniform and equitable and Congress shall evolve a progress system of taxation.

- The power to tax is primarily vested in the Congress; however, in our jurisdiction, it may be
exercised by local legislative bodies, no longer merely by virtue of a valid delegation as
before, but pursuant to direct authority conferred by Section 5, Article X of the Constitution.

ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:

- Taxes must not be imposed beyond what the law expressly and clearly declares as tax laws
must be construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the taxpayer.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS. LA TONDEÑA DISTILLERS, INC. G.R. NO.

175188, JULY 15, 2015

Facts: La Tondeña entered into a merger with SBC, SMCJI and MBWC. So, the assets and
liabilities of the absorbed corporations were transferred to LT as surviving corporations.
LT requested from from the BIR a confirmation of tax-free nature of the merger process. BIR
confirmed that no gain or loss shall be recognized by the absorbed corporations as
transferors of all assets and liabilities. Hence, tax-free. However, BIR insisted that the transfer
of assets, such as real properties, shall be subject to DST.

BIR posits that DST is levied on the exercise of the privilege to convey real property
regardless of the manner of conveyance. LT, on the other hand, contends that DST is
imposed only on conveyances, deeds, instruments, or writing, where realty sold shall be
conveyed to a purchaser or buyer.

Issue: Is transfer of real property to a surviving corporation pursuant to merger subject to

DST?

Ruling: NO, it is not subject to DST. The DST law under the Tax Code does not include the
transfer of real property from one corporation to another pursuant to a merger.

In a merger, the real properties are not deemed “sold” to the surviving corporation and the
latter should not be considered as “purchaser” of realty since the real properties subject of the
merger were merely absorbed by the surviving corporation by operation of law and these
properties are deemed automatically transferred to and vested in the surviving corporation
without further act or deed. Therefore, the transfer or real properties to the surviving
corporation in pursuance of a merger is not subject to documentary stamp tax.

INSURANCE LAW

- Contracts of insurance are to be construed liberal’s in favor of the insured and strictly
against the insurer.

FINMAN GENERAL INSURANCE CORPORATION VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO.

100970, SEPTEMBER 2, 1992, 213 SCRA 493

FACTS:

Petitioner filed this petition alleging grove abuse of discretion on the part of the appellate court
in applying the principle of “expresso unius exclusio alterius” in a personal accident insurance
policy since death resulting from murder and/or assault are impliedly excluded in said
insurance policy considering that the cause of death of the insured was not accidental but
rather a deliberate and intentional act of the assailant in killing the former as indicated by the
location of the lone stab wound on the insured. Therefore, said death was committed with
deliberate intent which, by the very nature of a personal accident insurance policy, cannot be
indemnified.

ISSUE:

Whether or not death petitioner is correct that results from assault or murder deemed are not
included in the terms “accident” and “accidental”.

HELD:

NO. Petition for certiorari with restraining order and preliminary injunction was denied for lack
of merit.

RATIO:

The terms “accident” and “accidental” as used in insurance contracts have not acquired any
technical meaning, and are construed by the courts in their ordinary and common
acceptation. Thus, the terms have been taken to mean that which happen by chance or
fortuitously, without intention and design, and which is unexpected, unusual, and unforeseen.
An accident is an event that takes place without one’s foresight or expectation — an event
that proceeds from an unknown cause, or is an unusual effect of a known cause and,
therefore, not expected.

It is well settled that contracts of insurance are to be construed liberally in favor of the insured
and strictly against the insurer. Thus ambiguity in the words of an insurance contract should
be interpreted in favor of its beneficiary.

LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION

The official agents charged by law to implement social justice guaranteed by the Constitution
should adopt a liberal attitude in favor of the employee in deciding claims for compensability.

GOVERNMENTSERVICEINSURANCESYSTEM,Petitioner, vs. MARIAN T.

VICENCIOR e s p o n d e n t G . R . No. 176832, May 21, 2 0 0 9 , Roderico U
Bongoyan Jurisprudence: Under Section 1 (b), Rule III, of the Amended Rules on
Employees' Compensation, for the s i c k n e s s a n d t h e r e s u l t i n g d i s a b i l i t y o r
d e a t h t o b e c o m p e n s a b l e , t h e s a m e m u s t b e a n "occupational disease"
included in the list provided (Annex "A"), with the conditions set therein satisfied;
Facts: This is the case brought by Respondent Mrs. Vicencio, wife of the late Judge
Vicencio who suffered loss of consciousness due to pericardial effusion and was died due
to Cardiopulmonary Arrest against the GSIS. Respondent Mrs. Vicencio applied for the
death benefits of her late husband with petitioner Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) but her application was denied by Mr. Marcelino S. Alejo, Manager of the
GSIS Employees Compensation Department, on the ground that the illness is not
considered an occupational disease and there is no showing that his work as RTC
Judge has increased his risk of contracting said ailment. But respondent Mrs. Vicencio
appealed to the ECC and the same was dismissed. Respondent Mrs. Vicencio filed a petition
for review with the CA. The CA reversed and set aside the Decision of the ECC and the
GSIS is ORDERED to grant the claim for the death benefits of Judge Honorato S.
Vicencio under the Employees Compensation Act.
Issue: Whether or not respondent Mrs. Vicencio’s claim for death benefits under
Presidential Decree No. 626 (P.D. No. 626), as amended, is compensable
Ruling: Yes. Respondent Mrs. Vicencio’s claim for death benefits under Presidential
Decree No. 626 is tenable. It us a well-settled rule that P.D. No. 626, as amended,
defines compensable sickness as "any illness definitely accepted as an occupational
disease listed by the Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to
proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same is increased by the working
conditions. Moreover, It must be remembered that P.D. No. 626, as amended, is a social
legislation whose primordial purpose is to provide meaningful protection to the working
class against the hazards of disability, illness and other contingencies resulting in the loss of
income WHEREFORE: The petition isDENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is
affirmed.

RETIREMENT LAWS
- Well-settled is the rule that retirement laws are liberally interpreted in favor of the retiree
because the intention is to provide for the retiree’s sustenance and comfort, when he is no
longer capable of earning his livelihood.

FRANCISCO S. TANTUICO, JR. VS. HON. EUFEMIO DOMINGO G.R. NO. 96422,
FEBRUARY 28, 1994, 230 SCRA 391

FACTS:

Petitioner applied for clearance from all money, property and other accountabilities in
preparation for his retirement. He obtained the clearance applied for. The clearance had all
the required signatures and bore a certification that petitioner was “cleared from money,
property and/or other accountabilities by this Commission”. Petitioner argues that
notwithstanding the clearances previously issued (by COA), and respondent Chairman’s
certification that petitioner had been cleared of money and property accountability,
respondent Chairman still refuses to release the remaining half of his retirement benefits — a
purely ministerial act.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the withholding of one-half of petitioner’s retirement benefits is valid.

HELD:
NO. Petition was granted insofar as it seeks to compel respondent Chairman of the COA to
pay petitioner’s retirement benefits in full and his monthly pensions.

RATIO:

Under Section 4 of R.A. No. 1568 (An Act to Provide Life Pension to the Auditor General and
the Chairman or Any Member of the Commission of Elections), the benefits granted by said
law to the Auditor General and the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Elections
shall not be subject to garnishment, levy or execution. Likewise, under Section 33 of P.D. No.
1146, as amended, the benefits granted thereunder “shall not be subject, among others, to
attachment, garnishment, levy or other processes.”

ELECTION RULES

- Laws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the
people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections.

Facts: Marcelina Engle and Winston Menzon vied for the position of Vice-Mayor of the
Municipality of Babatngon, Province of Leyte in the 2013 Elections. Petitioner's late husband,
James L. Engle, was originally a candidate for said contested position; however, he died of
cardiogenic shock on February 2, 2013 to which petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy as
a substitute for her deceased spouse on February 22, 2013.
Menzon filed Petition to Deny Due Course and/or Cancel the COC of petitioner arguing in the
main that the latter misrepresented that she is qualified to substitute her husband, who was
declared an independent candidate by the COMELEC. It appears that Lakas-CMD to which
James L. Engle's was a member failed to submit to the COMELEC Law Department the
authorization of Romualdez (Leyte chapter president) to sign the Certificate of Nomination
and Acceptance of Lakas-CMD candidates in Babatngon as prescribed by Section 6 (3) of
COMELEC Resolution No. 9518. Thus, the COMELEC Law Department considered all
Lakas-CMD candidates whose CONAs were signed by Romualdez as independent
candidates. For this reason, private respondent charged petitioner with violation of Section
15, COMELEC Resolution No. 9518 which disallows the substitution of an independent
candidate.
In the meantime Engle then won the May 13, 2013 elections as vice-mayor. It was only on
July
5, 2013 did the COMELEC Second Division promulgate the Resolution which denied due
course to and cancelled petitioner's COC resulting in the annulment of petitioner's previous
proclamation as duly- elected Vice Mayor of Babatngon, Leyte and the declaration of Menzon
as winner of the contested position.
Engle filed an MR with Comelec en banc which the latter denied for lack of merit.
Hence this appeal.
Issue: W/N James Engle was an independent candidate that may not be substituted by his
wife, Marcelina.
Held: No. Verily, it was publicly known that James L. Engle was a member of Lakas-CMD. As
far as the party and his wife were concerned, James L. Engle, as a member of Lakas CMD,
may be substituted as a candidate upon his death. There was no evidence on record that the
party or petitioner had notice or knowledge of the COMELEC's classification of James L.
Engle as an independent candidate prior to February 22, 2013 when petitioner filed her COC
as a substitute for her deceased husband. The only document in the record indicating that
Lakas-CMD had been notified of James L. Engle's designation as an independent candidate
is the Letter dated March 21, 2013 sent by the COMELEC Law Department.
The COMELEC Law Department's letter is not binding and at most, only recommendatory. It
is
settled in jurisprudence that the denial of due course or cancellation of one's COC is not
within the administrative powers of the COMELEC, but rather calls for the exercise of its
quasi-judicial functions. We have also previously held that the COMELEC, in the exercise of
its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers, is mandated by the Constitution to hear and decide
such cases first by Division and, upon motion for reconsideration, by the En Banc. In
resolving cases to deny due course to or cancel certificates of candidacy, the COMELEC
cannot merely rely on the recommendations of its Law Department but must conduct due
proceedings through one of its divisions. Returning to the case at bar, the COMELEC Second
Division only formally ruled on the status of James L. Engle as an independent candidate and
the invalidity of petitioner's substitution on July 5, 2013, months after the May 13, 2013
Elections. Under these premises, the COMELEC did not correctly cancel petitioner's COC on
the ground of false material representation as there was none.
WHEREFORE, Petitioner Marcelina S. Engle is declared the duly-elected Vice-Mayor of
Babatngon, Leyte during the May 13, 2013 Elections