OCEJO, PEREZ & CO.

, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs. THE INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION, defendant-appellant.
FRANCISCO CHUA SECO, as assignee, intervener-appellant.

(c) Was the commencement of a replevin suit by the seller equivalent to the rescission of the sale?

FACTS: A few days after, the plaintiff firm took advantage of those provisions of the procedural law
which permit a plaintiff to replevin personal property. Subsequently, by agreement of the parties, the
sugar was sold and the proceeds of the sale deposited in the bank, subject to the order of the court
upon the final disposition of the case. After the answer of the defendant bank was filed, a complaint
in intervention was filed by Chua Seco, in which he asserts a preferential right to the sugar, or to the
proceeds of its sale, upon the ground that the delivery of the sugar by plaintiff, by virtue of which it
passed into the possession and control of Chua Teng Chong, had the effect of transmitting the title
of the pledge asserted by the bank was null and void. Upon these allegations the interveners
contends that the sugar is the property of the insolvent estate represented by him. The lower court
rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and from this decision appeals have been taken by the
bank and by the intervener.

In the brief filed on behalf of the bank it is argued that in no case may a revindicatory action be maintained when the plaintiff attempts to exercise the right to rescind the sale for nonpayment of
the purchase price and that therefore a replevin suit will not lie. But as it is held that the bank has no interest in this matter, as its alleged contract of pledge is utterly unavailing, it is evident that
the question of procedure does not affect it. It appears that by reason of the insolvency of the buyer Chua Teng Chong an insolvency proceeding was commenced in a court of competent
jurisdiction and in that proceeding Francisco Chua Seco was appointed assignee of the property of the insolvent. As such assignee Chua Seco filed a complaint in intervention in this suit, in
which he contends that by reason of its sale and delivery by plaintiff to the insolvent, title to the sugar passed to the latter and that the pledge set up by the bank is void as to third persons.
Standing in the place of the insolvent buyer, the assignee asks that he be recognized in his representative capacity as the owner of the sugar in question. The voluntary intervention of the
assignee of the insolvent buyer cures the defect of nonjoiner of the latter as a party defendant, and all parties in interest have been heard in this proceeding.

The judgment of the court below awards the plaintiff the product of the sale of the sugar, it having been so disposed of by agreement by the parties during the pendency of the suit. The
intervener excepted to the decision and joined in the bank's appeal. In his brief in this court the intervener raises a question as to the sufficiency of the complaint to support the decision of the
court below, adopting the argument of the bank upon this point. That is, assuming that by reason of the nonpayment of the purchase price, the seller is entitled to elect to rescind the sale, is the
rescission effected ipso facto by such election, or is it necessary for him to bring an action of rescission? The action of replevin, the intervener contends, is based (Code of Civil Procedure, sec.
263) upon the assumption that the plaintiff at the time of bringing the action is either the owner of the thing which is the subject matter of the suit or entitled to its possession. But the question
presented is whether, in cases in which title has passed by delivery and in which the buyer has failed to pay the purchased price on demand, title is revested in the seller by the mere fact that
he has mentally determined to elect to rescind? In its brief the plaintiff partnership contends for the affirmative, saying that the acts of the seller — the filing of its complaint — imply that it has
made the election. But the intervener, adopting the argument of the bank, contends that the party to whom article 1124 of the Civil Code grants the right to rescind "must apply to the court for
a decree for the rescission of the contract. . . ." (Scaevola, vol. 19, p. 673); and this conclusion is supported by the last paragraph of the article cited. Of course, if the action of the court is
necessary in order to effectuate the rescission of the sale, such rescission does not follow ipso jure by reason of nonpayment and the determination of the seller to elect to rescind.
Consequently, the action of replevin cannot be maintained. The right to rescind a sale, established by article 1506, in no wise differs from that which is established, in general terms, with
respect to reciprocal obligations, by article 1124 in "true event that one of the obligors fails to perform the obligation incumbent upon him." But the right so conferred is not an absolute one. The
same article provides that "the court shall decree the rescission demanded, unless there are causes which justify him in allowing a term."

Therefore, it is the judgment of the court and not the mere will of the plaintiff which produces the rescission of the sale. This being so, the action of replevin will no lie upon the theory that the
rescission has already taken place and that the seller has recovered title to the thing sold.

OSCAR C. FERNANDEZ and NENITA P. FERNANDEZ, petitioners,

vs. THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE BANK, now UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES; and PREMIERE INSURANCE & SURETY CORP., respondents.

Why is jurisdiction based on the amount alleged in the claim

Assuming it was a foreclosure action, it would now be the amount of the fair market value would determine jurisdiction.

A petition for foreclosure of real estate mortgage is a real action and the assessed value of the property determines

jurisdiction while location of the property determines the venue.

Cause of action??? - subject matter: in a foreclosure action, cause of action is

What do you think of the real estate mortgage in relation to the loan? Replevin actions are typically initiated when a person serves papers showing why he or she has a claim
in the property -- in which case a sheriff seizes the property and delivers it to the person claiming rights to it until a hearing is held.

Pero delivery of money man ang gusto ni petitioner unta supposedly

When you file an action for foreclosure, it now becomes a real action so far as it is against the property, and seeks the judicial recognition of a property debt

To question the action of replevin, petitioners may file certiorari

Is it appropriate to assume Sir that the action for foreclosure is incapable of pecuniary
estimation

It is worthy to mention that the essence of a contract of mortgage indebtedness is that a property
has been identified or set apart from the mass of the property of the debtor-mortgagor as
security for the payment of money or the fulfillment of an obligation to answer the amount of
indebtedness, in case of default in payment.[4] Foreclosure is but a necessary
consequence of non-payment of the mortgage indebtedness.[5] In a real estate
mortgage when the principal obligation is not paid when due, the mortgagee has the right to
foreclose the mortgage and to have the property seized and sold with the view of applying the
proceeds to the payment of the obligation.[6] Therefore, the foreclosure suit is a real action so
far as it is against property, and seeks the judicial recognition of a property debt, and an order
for the sale of the res.[7]
A writ of replevin issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City may be served and enforced anywhere in the Philippines. Moreover, the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the amount
of the claim alleged in the complaint, not by the value of the chattel seized in ancillary proceedings.

Under the Resolution of the Supreme Court en banc dated January 11, 1983, providing for the interim rules and guidelines relative to the implementation of BP 129, a writ of replevin like the
one issued in the present case may be served anywhere in the Philippines. Specifically, the said Resolution states:

3. Writs and processes. —

(a) Writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo, warranto, habeas corpus and injunction issued by a regional trial court may be enforced in any part of the
region.

(b) All other processes, whether issued by a regional trial court or a metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court or municipal circuit trial court may be served
anywhere in the Philippines, and, in the last three cases, without a certification by the judge of the regional trial court. 10

Thus, the Writ of Replevin issued by Judge Paas, which obviously does not fall under item "a" of the above-cited Rule, may be validly enforced anywhere in the Philippines. Petitioners confused
the jurisdiction of a court to hear and decide a case on the one hand with, on the other, its power to issue writs and processes pursuant to and in the exercise of said jurisdiction. Applying the
said Rule, Malaloan v. Court of Appeals   reiterated the foregoing distinction between the jurisdiction of the trial court and the administrative area in which it could enforce its orders and
11

processes pursuant to the jurisdiction conferred on it:

We feel that the foregoing provision is too clear to be further belabored or enmeshed in unwarranted polemics. The rule enumerates the writs and processes
which, even if issued by a regional trial court, are enforceable only within its judicial region. In contrast, it unqualifiedly provides that all other writs and processes,
regardless of which court issued the same, shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. No legal provision, statutory or reglementary, expressly or impliedly
provides a jurisdictional or territorial limit [to] its area of enforceability. On the contrary, the above-quoted provision of the interim Rules expressly authorizes its
enforcement anywhere in the country, since it is not among the processes specified in paragraph (a) and there is no distinction or exception made regarding the
processes contemplated in paragraph (b).

https://www.projectjurisprudence.com/2020/02/foreclosure-real-action-or-incapable-of-
pecuniary-estimation.html