G.R. No.

179090               June 5, 2009

LEONILO SANCHEZ alias NILO, Appellant,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF APPEALS, Appellees.

RESOLUTION

NACHURA, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking the
reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision 2 dated February 20, 2007 which affirmed the Decision3 dated July 30,
2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagbilaran City, Bohol, convicting appellant Leonilo Sanchez alias Nilo
(appellant) of the crime of Other Acts of Child Abuse punishable under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610 4 in relation to
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 603,5 with a modification of the penalty imposed.

The Facts

Appellant was charged with the crime of Other Acts of Child Abuse in an Information6 dated August 29, 2001 which
reads:

The undersigned, Second Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, hereby accuses Leonilo Sanchez alias Nilo of Lajog,
Clarin, Bohol of the crime of Other Acts of Child Abuse, committed as follows:

That on or about the 2nd day of September, 2000 in the municipality of Clarin, province of Bohol, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, acting as a Family Court, the above-named accused, with intent to
abuse, exploit and/or to inflict other conditions prejudicial to the child's development, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously abuse physically one [VVV],7 a sixteen (16) year old minor, by hitting her thrice in the upper
part of her legs, and which acts are prejudicial to the child-victim's development which acts are not covered by the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, but the same are covered by Art. 59, par. 8 of P.D. No. 603 as amended; to the
damage and prejudice of the offended party in the amount to be proved during the trial.

Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Section 10(a) in relation to Sections 3(a) and 3(b) No. 1 of Rep. Act No.
7610 and Sec. 59(8) of PD 603, amended.

Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits ensued. In the course of the trial, two varying
versions emerged.

Version of the Prosecution

Private complainant VVV was born on March 24, 1984 in Mentalongon, Dalaguete, Cebu to FFF and MMM.8

On September 24, 1997, VVV's father, FFF, started leasing a portion of the fishpond owned by Escolastico Ronquillo
(Escolastico), located at Lajog, Clarin, Bohol. FFF and his family occupied the house beside the fishpond which was
left by the former tenant.9

On September 2, 2000 at around 7:00 in the morning, while VVV was cutting grass in their yard, appellant arrived
looking for FFF who was then at another fishpond owned by Nilda Parilla located in Boacao, Clarin, Bohol. VVV knew
appellant because he is the husband of Bienvenida Ronquillo (Bienvenida), one of the heirs of Escolastico. 10 She
noticed that appellant had a sanggot (sickle) tucked in his waist.

Appellant then went to VVV’s house and inquired from VVV’s younger brother, BBB, the whereabouts of the latter’s
father. BBB did not answer but his mother, MMM, told appellant that FFF was not around. Right then and there,
appellant told them to leave the place and started destroying the house with the use of his sickle. As a result,
appellant destroyed the roof, the wall and the windows of the house. 11 MMM got angry and told appellant that he
could not just drive them away since the contract for the use of the fishpond was not yet terminated. VVV was then
sent by MMM to fetch a barangay tanod. She did as ordered but barangay tanod Nicolas Patayon refused to oblige
because he did not want to interfere in the problem concerning the fishpond. On her way back to their house, VVV
saw appellant coming from his shop with a gallon of gasoline, headed to their house. Appellant warned VVV to better
pack up her family’s things because he would burn their house.12

Upon reaching their house, VVV saw her brother, BBB, get a piece of wood from the back of their house to defend
themselves and their house from appellant. However, appellant approached BBB, grabbed the piece of wood from
the latter and started beating him with it.13 At the sight, VVV approached appellant and pushed him. Irked by what she
did, appellant turned to her and struck her with the piece of wood three (3) times, twice on the left thigh and once
below her right buttocks. As a result, the wood broke into several pieces. VVV picked up some of the broken pieces
and threw them back at appellant. MMM restrained BBB, telling him not to fight back. After which, appellant left,
bringing with him the gallon of gasoline.14

FFF arrived at about 10:00 in the morning of that day. When he learned about what had happened, FFF brought his
daughter to the Clarin Health Center for medical attention and treatment. 15 Dr. Vicente Manalo (Dr. Manalo) attended
to VVV and issued her a medical certificate16 dated September 2, 2000, stating that VVV sustained the following:

CONTUSION WITH HEMATOMA PROXIMAL

LATERAL PORTION OF THIGH, RIGHT

TIME TO HEAL: 3-4 DAYS, BARRING COMPLICATIONS

From the health center, FFF and VVV went to the Clarin Police Station where they had the incident
blottered.17 Thereafter, FFF requested Eliezer Inferido to take pictures of the injuries sustained by VVV.18

Version of the Defense

Appellant and his wife, Bienvenida, developed and operated the fishpond from 1982 to 1987. Sometime in 1997, FFF
occupied the fishpond and the nipa hut beside the same, by virtue of a Memorandum of Agreement 19 (MOA) entered
into by FFF with the Heirs of Escolastico, as represented by Segundino Ronquillo. After the MOA expired in 1998,
appellant and his wife, Bienvenida, decided to discontinue the lease because they did not understand the
management and accounting of FFF. They made several demands on him to return possession of the fishpond but
FFF refused, asking for a written termination of the contract from all the heirs of Escolastico. To solve the problem,
appellant and Bienvenida engaged the services of FFF as caretaker of the fishpond, providing him with fingerlings,
fertilizers and all necessary expenses.

This notwithstanding, FFF still failed to make an accounting. Thus, on September 2, 2000, at around 7:00 in the
morning, after pasturing his cattle, appellant dropped by the house of FFF to ask him to make a detailed accounting
because he and his wife were not satisfied with the harvest in August of 2000. MMM, however, retorted, saying that
they would no longer make any accounting, as Benny Ronquillo, brother of appellant’s wife, would finance the next
cropping. Displeased with MMM's statement, appellant got angry and demanded that they leave the fishpond. FFF's
family resented this demand and a commotion ensued. BBB got a piece of wood and struck appellant but the latter
was able to parry the blow. Appellant got hold of the piece of wood which actually broke. Intending not to hurt
anybody, appellant threw the same behind him. Suddenly from behind, VVV appeared, got hold of the said piece of
wood and hit appellant once at the back of his shoulder. Appellant testified that the blow was not strong enough to
injure him.20

Appellant claimed that he was surprised that a criminal case was filed by VVV against him for allegedly beating her.
Appellant denied that he beat VVV, saying that the instant case was fabricated and was being used as a means to
extort money from him.21 Moreover, appellant asseverated that Ronald Lauren22 (Ronald) witnessed the incident.

Ronald testified that he saw BBB strike appellant with a piece of wood but appellant was able to parry the blow; that
appellant threw away the piece of wood; that when appellant threw the piece of wood, there was no one there at the
time; and that appellant left the place immediately.23

The RTC's Ruling

On July 30, 2003, the RTC found that at the arraignment, appellant, through former counsel Atty. Theodore Cabahug
(Atty. Cabahug), admitted that he hit VVV, although unintentionally. Thus, appellant had the burden of proving that, at
the time VVV was hit, appellant was performing a lawful act. The RTC ruled that the evidence did not favor appellant
because his demand for FFF's family to vacate the fishpond, coupled with threats and punctuated with actual use of
force, exceeded the limits allowed by law. The RTC also held that the injuries sustained by VVV were distinguishable,
indicating that the blow was forceful, and that the force used was strong. Thus, the RTC disposed in this wise:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds LEONILO SANCHEZ y Aranas guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of violating paragraph (a), Section 10 of Republic Act No. 7610, and applying in his favor the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, this Court imposes on him the indeterminate sentence of an imprisonment of Six (6) years
of prision [correccional] as minimum to seven (7) years and four (4) months of prision mayor as maximum, with costs
against him. The Court orders him to pay [VVV] the sum of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (₱10,000.00) for civil indemnity
and the sum of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (₱10,000.00) for damages; the awards for civil indemnity and damages are
without subsidiary penalties in case of insolvency.

IN ACCORDANCE with letter (f) of Section 31 of Republic Act No. 7610, the Court exercising its discretion also
imposes on Leonilo Sanchez y Aranas the penalty of a fine of Two Thousand Pesos (₱2,000.00) without subsidiary
penalty in case of insolvency.

SO ORDERED.24

Appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration25 contending that appellant never admitted that he hit VVV. The RTC,
however, denied the motion in its Order26 dated August 8, 2003 for being pro forma. Aggrieved, appellant appealed to
the CA.27

The CA's Ruling

On February 20, 2007, the CA held that the record of the proceedings taken during appellant's arraignment before
the RTC belied appellant's contention that his defense was one of absolute denial. The CA pointed to a manifestation
of appellant's counsel, Atty. Cabahug, in open court that appellant was putting up an affirmative defense because the
act of hitting VVV was unintentional. Furthermore, the defense of absolute denial interposed by appellant cannot
prevail over the positive and categorical statements of VVV and her witnesses, giving full credence to the factual
findings of the RTC. The CA also ruled that the Information filed against appellant was not defective inasmuch as the
allegations therein were explicit. In sum, the CA held that the prosecution had fully established the elements of the
offense charged, i.e., Other Acts of Child Abuse under R.A. No. 7610 and P.D. No. 603. However, the CA opined that
the RTC erred in applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law because R.A. No. 7610 is a special law. Lastly, the CA
deleted the award of civil indemnity and damages for utter lack of basis. The fallo of the CA decision reads:

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the appealed Judgment dated July 30, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court
of Bohol, Branch 1, Tagbilaran City in Criminal Case No. 11110 finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Other Acts of Child Abuse under Republic Act No. 7610 and Presidential Decree No. 603 is
hereby UPHELD with MODIFICATION as to the penalty imposed. Accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day as minimum to eight (8) years as maximum of prision mayor.
The fine imposed is retained.

The Order dated August 8, 2003 denying appellant's motion for reconsideration is hereby AFFIRMED.

The award of civil indemnity and damages in the assailed Decision is deleted.

With costs.

SO ORDERED.28

Appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration29 which the CA denied in its Resolution30 dated July 11, 2007.

Hence, this Petition claiming that the CA erred:

 1. IN SUSTAINING THE CONVICTION OF THE ACCUSED DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE STATE TO
PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT[;]

2. IN SUSTAINING THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT IT HAD JURISDICTION [OVER] THE
CASE DESPITE A DEFECTIVE INFORMATION WHICH ALLEGED THAT THE ACTS COMPLAINED OF IS
(sic) NOT COVERED BY THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AS AMENDED[; AND]

3. IN SUSTAINING THE CONVICTION OF THE ACCUSED OF THE CRIME CHARGED (VIOLATION OF

SECTION 10(a) OF R.A. NO. 7610) NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE ACT COMPLAINED OF IS
OBVIOUSLY COVERED BY THE REVISED PENAL CODE (Act No. 3815) AS SLIGHT PHYSICAL
INJURY.31

Appellant posits that his conviction is not supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt; that the RTC erred when it
shifted the burden of proof to appellant; that the RTC and CA erred in ruling that appellant interposed an affirmative
defense when, all throughout his testimony before the RTC, he denied having inflicted any injury on VVV; and that
appellant and his counsel did not sign any written stipulation for appellant to be bound thereby, hence, the burden of
proof still rests in the prosecution. Moreover, appellant claims that VVV and her family had ill motive to implicate him
because of the pressure he exerted against them to give up the fishpond. Appellant pointed out that VVV, in her
testimony, made material inconsistencies as to who got the piece of wood at the back of their house. Appellant also
claims that he had no motive or intention of harming anyone, otherwise, he would have done so earlier that day; that
if BBB was also beaten, he should have submitted himself for medical treatment and examination; and that the
Information charging appellant was substantially and jurisdictionally defective as the acts complained of were covered
by the provisions of the Revised Penal Code. Appellant submits that, if duly proven, the acts complained of are
clearly constitutive of Slight Physical Injuries punishable under Article 26632 of the Revised Penal Code.

Appellant, likewise, posits that the instant case is not one for child abuse, since VVV was neither punished in a cruel
and unusual manner nor deliberately subjected to excessive indignities or humiliation. The act was not cruel since the
injury was merely slight per medical findings; the location of the injury was on the thigh which is not unusual; and VVV
was not beaten in front of many people as to humiliate her. Lastly, no evidence was submitted by the prosecution,
such as a testimony of a child psychologist, or even of VVV's teacher who could have observed changes in the
victim's behavior, as to prove that the injury was prejudicial to the victim's development. Appellant alleges that the
charge was obviously made as one for child abuse, instead of slight physical injuries, in order to subject him to a
much heavier penalty. Appellant prays for acquittal based on reasonable doubt and, in the alternative, if found guilty,
he should be convicted only of the crime of slight physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code.33

On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) asseverates that the instant Petition is fatally defective
because it raises purely factual issues contrary to the mandatory provisions of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court; that the
Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN) taken during appellant's arraignment on November 6, 2001 clearly shows
that appellant, through Atty. Cabahug, raised an affirmative defense, hence, appellant cannot now change his theory;
that the prosecution established the fact that appellant committed the acts complained of by virtue of the direct,
positive and categorical testimonies of VVV, corroborated by MMM and duly supported by the medical examination
conducted by Dr. Manalo and the entry in the police blotter; that VVV's and MMM's statements are consistent with
their allegations in their respective complaint-affidavits; and that appellant failed to present any reason or ground to
set aside the decisions of the RTC and the CA. Furthermore, the OSG argues that there is no ambiguity in the
Information as the allegations are clear and explicit to constitute the essential elements of the offense of child abuse,
to wit: (a) minority of the victim; (b) acts complained of are prejudicial to the development of the child-victim; and (c)
the said acts are covered by the pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 7610 and P.D. No. 603. The OSG submits that
appellant cannot now feign ignorance of the offense under which he was specifically charged, and to which he
voluntarily entered a plea of not guilty when arraigned.34

However, the OSG opines that the CA erred in modifying the indeterminate sentence imposed by the RTC. The
offense of Other Acts of Child Abuse as defined and punished under Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610, a special law,
carries the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period which is a penalty defined in the Revised Penal Code. The
OSG states that the RTC correctly applied the first part of Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, sentencing
appellant to an indeterminate sentence of six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to seven (7) years and
four (4) months of prision mayor, as maximum, the minimum term thereof being within the range of the penalty next
lower in degree to the prescribed penalty, as there were no attendant mitigating and/or aggravating circumstances.
Thus, the OSG prays that the instant petition be denied and the assailed CA Decision be modified as aforementioned
but affirmed in all other respects.35
Our Ruling

The instant Petition is bereft of merit.

Under Subsection (b), Section 3 of R.A. No. 7610, child abuse refers to the maltreatment of a child, whether habitual
or not, which includes any of the following:

(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment;

(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child
as a human being;

(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or

(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious impairment of his
growth and development or in his permanent incapacity or death.36

In this case, the applicable laws are Article 5937 of P.D. No. 603 and Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610. Section 10(a) of
R.A. No. 7610 provides:

SECTION 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions Prejudicial to the Child's
Development. —

(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be responsible for other
conditions prejudicial to the child's development including those covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603,
as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its
minimum period.

In this connection, our ruling in Araneta v. People38 is instructive:

As gleaned from the foregoing, the provision punishes not only those enumerated under Article 59 of Presidential
Decree No. 603, but also four distinct acts, i.e., (a) child abuse, (b) child cruelty, (c) child exploitation and (d) being
responsible for conditions prejudicial to the child’s development. The Rules and Regulations of the questioned statute
distinctly and separately defined child abuse, cruelty and exploitation just to show that these three acts are different
from one another and from the act prejudicial to the child’s development. Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, an
accused can be prosecuted and be convicted under Section 10(a), Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610 if he
commits any of the four acts therein. The prosecution need not prove that the acts of child abuse, child cruelty and
child exploitation have resulted in the prejudice of the child because an act prejudicial to the development of the child
is different from the former acts.

Moreover, it is a rule in statutory construction that the word "or" is a disjunctive term signifying dissociation and
independence of one thing from other things enumerated.lavvphi1 It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense
which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of "or" in Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610 before the phrase "be
responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child’s development" supposes that there are four punishable acts
therein. First, the act of child abuse; second, child cruelty; third, child exploitation; and fourth, being responsible
for conditions prejudicial to the child’s development. The fourth penalized act cannot be interpreted, as petitioner
suggests, as a qualifying condition for the three other acts, because an analysis of the entire context of the
questioned provision does not warrant such construal.39

Appellant contends that, after proof, the act should not be considered as child abuse but merely as slight physical
injuries defined and punishable under Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code. Appellant conveniently forgets that
when the incident happened, VVV was a child entitled to the protection extended by R.A. No. 7610, as mandated by
the Constitution.40 As defined in the law, child abuse includes physical abuse of the child, whether the same is
habitual or not. The act of appellant falls squarely within this definition. We, therefore, cannot accept appellant's
contention.
In the same manner, we reject appellant's claim that the Information filed against him was defective. In Resty
Jumaquio v. Hon. Joselito C. Villarosa,41 we held that what controls is not the title of the information or the
designation of the offense but the actual facts recited therein. Without doubt, the averments in the Information clearly
make out the offense of child abuse under Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610. The following were alleged: (1) the
minority of VVV; (2) the acts constituting physical abuse, committed by appellant against VVV; and (3) said acts are
clearly punishable under R.A. No. 7610 in relation to P.D. No. 603. Indeed, as argued by the OSG, the commission of
the offense is clearly recited in the Information, and appellant cannot now feign ignorance of this.

Appellant could only proffer the defense of denial. Notably, the RTC found VVV and MMM to be credible witnesses,
whose testimonies deserve full credence. It bears stressing that full weight and respect are usually accorded by the
appellate court to the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, since the trial judge had the opportunity
to observe the demeanor of the witnesses.42 Equally noteworthy is the fact that the CA did not disturb the RTC's
appreciation of the witnesses’ credibility. Thus, we apply the cardinal rule that factual findings of the trial court, its
calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses, and its conclusions anchored on such findings, are accorded respect,
if not conclusive effect, especially when affirmed by the CA. The exception is when it is established that the trial court
ignored, overlooked, misconstrued, or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances which, if considered, will
change the outcome of the case. We have reviewed the records of the RTC and the CA and we find no reason to
deviate from the findings of both courts and their uniform conclusion that appellant is indeed guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense of Other Acts of Child Abuse.43

However, the penalty imposed upon appellant by the CA deserves review. The imposable penalty under Section
10(a), Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610 is prision mayor in its minimum period. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the RTC imposed upon appellant the penalty of six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to
seven (7) years and four (4) months of prision mayor, as maximum. The CA modified this by imposing upon appellant
the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to eight (8) years, as maximum, of prision
mayor,  postulating that since R.A. No. 7610 is a special law, the RTC should have imposed on appellant an
indeterminate sentence, "the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the
minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same."44 On the other hand, the OSG contends
that the RTC appropriately applied the Indeterminate Sentence Law, citing our ruling in People v. Simon.45

We agree with the OSG.

Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended, provides:

SECTION 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its
amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be
that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and
the minimum of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the
offense; and if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate
sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be
less than the minimum term prescribed by the same.

To repeat, the penalty for Other Acts of Child Abuse is prision mayor in its minimum period. This penalty is derived
from, and defined in, the Revised Penal Code. Although R.A. No. 7610 is a special law, the rules in the Revised
Penal Code for graduating penalties by degrees or determining the proper period should be applied. Thus, where the
special law adopted penalties from the Revised Penal Code, the Indeterminate Sentence Law will apply just as it
would in felonies.46 In People v. Simon,47 the Court  applied the first clause of Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law to cases of illegal drugs. In Cadua v. Court of Appeals,48 the Court applied the same principle to cases involving
illegal possession of firearms. In those instances, the offenses were also penalized under special laws. Finally,
in Dulla v. Court of Appeals,49 a case involving sexual abuse of a child as penalized under Section 5(b), Article III of
R.A. No. 7610, the Court likewise applied the same first clause of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. This case should
be no exception.

In the absence of any modifying circumstances, and because it is favorable to appellant, we find the penalty of four
(4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years, eight (8) months
and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, proper.lawphi1

As a final word, we reiterate our view in Araneta,50 to wit:

Republic Act No. 7610 is a measure geared towards the implementation of a national comprehensive program for the
survival of the most vulnerable members of the population, the Filipino children, in keeping with the Constitutional
mandate under Article XV, Section 3, paragraph 2, that "The State shall defend the right of the children to assistance,
including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and
other conditions prejudicial to their development." This piece of legislation supplies the inadequacies of existing laws
treating crimes committed against children, namely, the Revised Penal Code and Presidential Decree No. 603 or the
Child and Youth Welfare Code. As a statute that provides for a mechanism for strong deterrence against the
commission of child abuse and exploitation, the law has stiffer penalties for their commission, and a means by which
child traffickers could easily be prosecuted and penalized.51

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated February 20, 2007 in CA-G.R. CR No.
27817 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that appellant Leonilo Sanchez is hereby sentenced to four (4) years, nine
(9) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years, eight (8) months and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as maximum. Costs against appellant.

SO ORDERED.
July 24, 2019

G.R. No. 235662

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
XXX, Accused-Appellant

DECISION

LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:

Prefatory

This appeal assails the Decision1 dated August 3, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 08486 entitled
"People of the Philippines v. XXX," convicting appellant XXX of two (2) counts of qualified rape and one (1) count of
lascivious conduct.

The Proceedings Before the Trial Court

The Charges

Appellant XXX was indicted for two (2) counts of rape in Criminal Case Nos. 08-0581-2013 (rape of his daughter
AAA) and 08-0631-2013 (rape of his daughter BBB), viz:

Criminal Case No. 08-0581-2013

That on or about the 14th day of March, 2009 in ███████████, Lipa City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, through force, threat, or intimid

Contrary to law.2

xxx

Criminal Case No. 08-0631-2013

That sometime in 2009 at ██████████████████████, Lipa City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, the biological father of BBB, without any justifiable cause with intent to
abuse, arouse and gratify for sexual desire, through force, threat and intimidation or grave abuse of authority, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of said BBB, a fourteen (14) years old
minor, against her will and consent, which acts, debase, humiliate, degrade and demean the intrinsic worth and
dignity of said BBB.

The aggravating/qualifying circumstance of minority, the victim being under 18 years of age and the offender being
the biological father of the victim, attended the commission of the offense.

Contrary to law.3

Additionally, in Criminal Case No. 08-0630-2013, appellant was indicted for lascivious conduct on his daughter
BBB, viz:

Criminal Case No. 08-0630-2013

That sometime in 2009 at ███████████, Lipa City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, being the father of BBB, without any justifiable cause, with intent to abuse, arouse and
gratify his sexual desire, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit lascivious conduct upon said
BBB, a fourteen (14) year old minor, by touching her private parts, kissing her lips and breast and trying to insert his
penis into her vagina, which acts debase, humiliate, degrade and demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of said BBB.

Contrary to law.4

The three (3) cases were consolidated before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 13, Lipa City.

On arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to all three (3) charges.5 The cases were, thereafter, jointly tried.

The Prosecution's Evidence

Complainants AAA and BBB are appellant's daughters with MMM. AAA was born on August 12, 1993, 6 and BBB, on
February 7, 1996.7 Appellant was a tricycle driver while their mother, MMM, was an Overseas Filipino Worker.8

AAA testified that on March 14, 2009, she was alone with appellant in their home. He brought her to a room, laid her
down on the bed, and undressed her. Appellant took off his shorts and inserted his penis into her vagina. She felt
pain and blood came out of her vagina and she could not do anything. After sexually ravishing her, appellant told her
to put on her dress while he also put on his shorts. Appellant also promised to give her money.9

AAA further recounted that appellant sexually abused her many times more but she could not remember the dates. In
some instances, her younger sister BBB was even in the room. She kept her silence for three (3) years because her
mother MMM did not believe her. Eventually, she left their house and told her aunt what appellant had done to her.
Her aunt rescued her.10

While intensely crying, BBB testified that sometime in 2009, she and appellant were left alone in their house.
Appellant asked her if she wanted money then suddenly pulled down her shorts and panty and raised her t-shirt,
exposing her breasts. She resisted but appellant did not stop touching and kissing her private parts. He then took off
his t-shirt, shorts, and brief. As he was about to insert his penis into her vagina, CCC, her younger brother arrived.
Appellant hurriedly dressed and told her to do the same.11

BBB added that appellant would usually move from his room into theirs while they were asleep. Appellant would
usually lie beside them and touch her and AAA's private parts. Eventually, he would have carnal knowledge of her
even though AAA and CCC were in the same room. She knew that appellant also raped AAA. Appellant would wake
her up by holding her hands while raping AAA. They could not do anything because they were so scared of
appellant.12

The prosecution and the defense stipulated that AAA and BBB are appellant's legitimate children.13

The Defense's Evidence

Appellant denied the charges. He claimed he was at work during those times when he allegedly raped and sexually
molested his daughters. His daughters were very mad at him because he had another woman. His wife was also mad
at him so she asked their daughters to concoct the charges against him.14

The Trial Court's Ruling

By Decision15 dated June 21, 2016, the trial court found appellant guilty of two (2) counts of rape and one (1) count of
lascivious conduct. The trial court gave full faith and credence to the respective testimonies of AAA and BBB on how
each of them was sexually ravished by their own father. BBB was also credited for giving credible and positive
testimony on how appellant performed lascivious conduct on her sometime in 2009. In light of the positive and
categorical testimonies of these children, the trial court rejected appellant's unsubstantiated defense of alibi. The trial
court decreed:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing and the prosecution having established to a moral certainty the guilt of the
accused XXX, the Court hereby finds said accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal, for two (2) counts
of Rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code and for Lascivious Conduct under Section 5 (b) of Republic
Act No. 7610 otherwise known as the "Special Protection of Children against Abuse, Exploitation, and Discrimination
Act" and hereby sentences him as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. 08-0581-2013 to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua without eligibility of parole and to
pay the minor victim AAA the sum of Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (Php 75,000.00) as civil indemnity, Seventy Five
Thousand Pesos (Php 75,000.00) as moral damages and Thirty Thousand Pesos (Php 30,000.00) as exemplary
damages.

2. In Criminal Case No. 08-0630-2013, to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of Ten (10) years and One (1) day
of Prision Mayor, as minimum, to Seventeen (17) years and Four (4) months of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum.
Accused is likewise ordered to pay BBB the sum of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (Php 15,000.00) as moral damages.

3. In Criminal Case No. 08-0631-2013, to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua without eligibility of parole and to
pay the minor victim BBB the sum of Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (Php 75,000.00) as civil indemnity, Seventy Five
Thousand Pesos (Php 75,000.00) as moral damages and Thirty Thousand Pesos (Php 30,000.00), as exemplary
damages.

The period which the accused has undergone preventive imprisonment during the pendency of these cases shall be
credited to him provided he agreed in writing to abide by and comply strictly with the rules and regulations imposed
upon committed prisoners.

The Jail Warden of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP), Lipa City, Batangas, is hereby directed to
immediately commit herein accused to the National Penitentiary, Muntinlupa City, for him to serve his sentence.

SO ORDERED.16

The Proceedings before the Court of Appeals

On appeal, appellant faulted the trial court for rendering a verdict of conviction against him despite the following
alleged circumstances: a) he was not armed when the alleged incidents happened; b) mere moral ascendancy should
not prevail over his presumption of innocence; and c) the comportment of AAA and BBB in resuming their usual
routines and not asking for help belies the charges against him. They did not fight back, shout, or strongly resist his
supposed sexual advances. It was also remarkable that AAA and BBB did not immediately report what they had
experienced to their mother MMM.17

On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), through Assistant Solicitor General John Emmanuel
Madamba and Associate Solicitor Dominic Victor C. De Alban, riposted that complainants' failure to immediately
report the sex crimes perpetrated on them by appellant is not enough to discredit them. The truth is, they reported the
same to their mother way before but the latter did not believe them. Their three (3) years of suffering in silence before
they jointly mustered the courage to report appellant's despicable crimes is understandable. To begin with, it was
unreasonable to demand a standard rational reaction to a rather irrational experience, especially from young victims
of incestuous rape. Actual force or intimidation need not be employed in cases of incestuous rape of minors for moral
dominion is sufficient to cow victims to submission. Young rape victims should not be expected to act like mature
individuals do.18

The Court of Appeals' Ruling

By its assailed Decision19 dated August 3, 2017, the Court of Appeals found appellant guilty of two. (2) counts of
qualified rape. The Court of Appeals correspondingly increased the monetary awards given to the two (2) minor
victims. It also noted that appellant's lascivious conduct was aggravated by the alternative circumstance of
relationship, thus, making reclusion perpetua as the proper imposable penalty. The Court of Appeals decreed:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The assailed RTC Decision dated June 21, 2016
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS in that: 1) In Criminal Case Nos. 08-0581-2013 and 08-0631-2013, the award of
civil indemnity is increased from Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos(Php75,000.00) to One Hundred Thousand
Pesos(Php100,000.00), moral damages of Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos(Php75,000.00) is increased to One
Hundred Thousand Pesos(Php100,000.00), and exemplary damages of Thirty Thousand Pesos(Php30,000.00) is
increased to One Hundred Thousand(Php100,000.00); and 2) In Criminal Case No. 08-0630-2013, the Accused-
Appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay BBB the amounts of Fifty
Thousand Pesos(Php50,000.00) as civil indemnity, Thirty Thousand Pesos(Php30,000.00) as exemplary damages,
and Fifty Thousand Pesos(Php50,000.00) as moral damages.

All awards for damages shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent(6%) per annum from the date of the finality
of this decision until fully paid. Costs against the Accused-Appellant.

SO ORDERED.20

The Present Appeal

Appellant now seeks affirmative relief from the Court and prays anew for his acquittal. For the purpose of this appeal,
the OSG21 and appellant22 both manifested that in lieu of supplemental briefs, they were adopting their respective
briefs in the Court of Appeals.

Issue

Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming the trial court's verdict of conviction against appellant for two (2) counts of
qualified rape and one (1) count of lascivious conduct?

Ruling

The appeal must fail.

Appellant essentially assails the credibility of AAA and BBB for not acting in accordance with his personal standard of
behavior for victims of incestuous rape, i.e. 1) their behavior after their alleged rape or sexual molestation was not the
behavior of victims who had experienced trauma; 2) they did not exert any effort to defend their honor; and 3) they
waited three (3) years before they finally reported on what they had allegedly suffered in his hands.

The Court is not convinced.

AAA and BBB

are credible witnesses

First. The fact that AAA and BBB still went on with their respective daily routines should not dent their
credibility. People v. Prodenciado23 is apropos:

This hardly convinces. It has been held that "different people react differently to different situations and there is no
standard form of human behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience,"
such as rape. Verily, some victims choose to suffer in silence; while others may be moved to action out of a need to
seek justice for what was done to them. Then there are those who opt not to dwell on their experience and try to live
as though it never happened. To the Court's mind, this is how "AAA" tried to cope with the harrowing experience that
befell her. Moreover, since she was just a young girl when all these rapes were committed against her, "AAA" simply
knew no other way of life than what she was accustomed to.

Second. Rape victims react differently. Some may offer strong resistance while others may be too intimidated to offer
any resistance at all. There is no standard form of reaction for a woman when facing a shocking and horrifying
experience such as a sexual assault. The workings of the human mind placed under emotional stress are
unpredictable. People react differently - some may shout, some may faint, and some may be shocked into
insensibility, while others may openly welcome the intrusion. But any of these reactions does not impair the credibility
of a rape victim. Additionally, failure to physically resist the attack does not detract from the established fact that a
reprehensible act was done to a child-woman by her own biological father. Lastly, failure to shout or offer tenuous
resistance does not make voluntary the victim's submission to the criminal acts of the accused.24
Indeed, just because AAA or BBB did not offer tenacious resistance nor even shout whenever their father sexually
ravished them did not make them less credible as witnesses.

Third. It is not true that AAA and BBB took three (3) years before they reported the sex crimes appellant perpetrated
on them. As aptly observed by the trial court, AAA confided in their mother their sexual ravishment in appellant's
hands but their mother did not believe her. They were young and helpless victims of their own father's bestiality. He
treated them like sex slaves in never ending horrendous ways. The person they thought would protect them did not
even care to believe them. Where else would they go? Who else could help them? They were obviously driven into
helplessness and cowed silence.

But things did change. Young girls also grow up. So did AAA and BBB. After going through innumerable counts of
sexual violence through all the three (3) traumatic years of their lives, the grown-up girls can take no more. AAA left
their home and went to her aunt who rescued her. Then she was vindicated; so was her sister, BBB. On this
score, People v. Lantano25 instructs:

To begin with, the prosecution is under no burden to establish acceptable reasons or satisfactory explanation for the
delay in reporting a rape. Settled is the rule that delay or hesitation in reporting a case of rape due to threats of the
assailant is justified and must not be taken against the victim. Neither does such delay indicate deceit or a fabricated
insinuation inasmuch as it is common that a rape victim prefers silence because of fear of her aggressor and the lack
of courage to face the public stigma stemming from the abuse. With particular regard to incestuous rapes, since the
perpetrator in these cases is a parent of the victim, he is able to pervert whatever moral ascendancy and influence he
has over the victim in order to intimidate the latter. Hence, even in the absence of verbal threats against the victim's
life, the parent molester's moral ascendancy and influence take the place of intimidation, especially so when they are
living under the same roof.

So must it be.

Appellant is guilty of
two (2) counts of qualified rape in
Criminal Case Nos. 08-0581-2013
and 08-0631-2013

On qualified rape, Article 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code ordain:

Article 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. - Rape is committed:

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances
mentioned above be present.

xxx

Article 266-B Penalty - x x x

xxx

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of
the victim;

xxx

The elements of qualified rape are: (1) sexual congress; (2) with a woman; (3) done by force and without consent; (4)
the victim is under eighteen [18] years of age at the time of the rape; (5) the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-
parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the
parent of the victim.

At the outset, AAA and BBB were young girls under the age of eighteen (18) when they were sexually ravished by
appellant in 2009.1âшphi1 All three (3) Informations bore the twin circumstances of minority and relationship. As
proven by the prosecution's documentary evidence.26 AAA was born on August 12, 1993 and BBB, on February 7,
1996. In 2009, AAA was fifteen (15) and BBB, fourteen (14). As for the element of relationship, the prosecution and
the defense stipulated that AAA and BB were appellant's legitimate children.

Regarding the elements of carnal knowledge and force or intimidation, or exertion of moral ascendancy, the trial court
aptly summarized AAA's testimony on how she was sexually ravished by appellant on March 14, 2009, thus:

There is adequate and satisfactory evidence that on March 14, 2009, at around 1:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, AAA was resting on the sofa after washing clothes, when her father ordered her to go to the room. While
inside the room, accused lied (sic) down on the bed beside her and undressed her. Accused then took off his shorts
and inserted his penis into her vagina. AAA felt pain and blood came out of her private part but she could not do
anything other than cry. After the sexual act, accused told AAA to put on her dress. (TSN, February 26, 2014, pp. 5-
10)27

AAA narrated in detail that appellant ordered her to go inside a room, lay on the bed beside her, and inserted his
penis in her vagina. Although appellant did not threaten or force AAA to engage in sexual congress with him, it is
settled that where the rape is committed by a close kin, such as the victim's father, stepfather, uncle, or the common-
law spouse of her mother, it is not necessary that actual force or intimidation be employed; moral influence or
ascendancy takes the place of violence or intimidation.28

Too, the trial court summed up BBB's vivid testimony on how appellant had carnal knowledge of her against her will
sometime in 2009 and on so many more occasions she already lost count of, thus:

There is likewise sufficient evidence that sometime in the year 2009, herein accused would transfer from his room to
the room where BBB was sleeping. Initially, said accused would lie down beside BBB and would touch her private
parts. Eventually, he will have carnal knowledge of her, even at (sic) the presence of his other daughter AAA and son
CCC. BBB cannot do anything out of fear of his (sic) father-accused. (TSN, March 26, 2014, pp. 9-10)29

The trial court keenly noted that BBB was intensely crying while she narrated the sordid details of her sexual
devastation in the hands of her own father. She described how appellant shamelessly satiated his lust, sexually
ravishing her even in the presence of his other children, AAA and CCC. BBB also recalled that she could not do
anything whenever appellant had his way with her because she was so scared of him. To repeat, although there is no
showing of force, threat or intimidation, appellant's moral ascendancy over BBB took the place of violence or
intimidation.

Appellant was only charged with a single count of rape in each of the twin cases below. This is because both AAA
and BBB could no longer recall the dates and the details of the so many rape incidents they experienced in the hands
of their own father. AAA could only vividly recall the rape incident on March 14, 2009, and BBB, only the rape incident
which happened sometime in 2009.

Even then, the testimonies of AAA and BBB pertaining to the twin rape incidents are clear, categorical, and
consistently convincing. They are credible witnesses. These two (2) minor girls would not have publicly accused their
father of the despicable act of incestuous rape if it were not true. On this score, People v. Marmol30 enunciated:
More importantly, it is highly inconceivable for a daughter like AAA to impute against her own father a crime as
serious and despicable as incest rape, unless the imputation was the plain truth. In fact, it takes a certain amount of
psychological depravity for a young woman to concoct a story that would put her own father to jail for the rest of his
remaining life and drag the rest of the family including herself to a lifetime of shame. Filipino children have great
respect and reverence for their elders. For this reason, great weight is given to an accusation a child directs against a
close relative, especially the father. A rape victim's testimony against her father goes against the grain of Filipino
culture as it yields unspeakable trauma and social stigma on the child and the entire family.

The absence of medical certificates indicating the extent of the injury sustained by AAA and BBB as a result of their
father's wicked bestiality does not diminish their worth as witnesses. A medical certificate is merely corroborative and
not indispensable to the prosecution of rape cases.31 Where the testimony of a rape victim is credible, natural,
convincing and otherwise consistent with human nature, it is sufficient to support a verdict of conviction.32

Appellant's defense of denial is the weakest of all defenses. It easily crumbles in the face of complainant's positive
identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime.33

All told, the Court of Appeals correctly convicted appellant of two (2) counts of qualified rape. Under Article 266-B of
the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty is death where the victim is below eighteen (18) years of age and the
violator is the victim's own biological father, thus:

Article 266-B. Penalty. - x x x

xxx

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:

1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of
the victim;

By virtue of RA 9346, however, the death penalty is reduced to reclusion perpetua.

Appellant is liable for ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱100,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱100,000.00 as
exemplary damages for each count of qualified rape in conformity with prevailing jurisprudence.34

Appellant is guilty of
lascivious conduct in
Criminal Case No. 08-0630-2013

The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of RA No. 7610 are as follows: 1) the accused commits the act of
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; 2) the said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected
to other sexual abuse; and 3) the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.35

"Lascivious conduct" means the intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin,
breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person,
whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the
sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person.36

Meanwhile, "Sexual abuse" includes the employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a child
to engage in, or assist another person to engage in, sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or the molestation,
prostitution, or incest with children.37

BBB recalled an instance in 2009 when appellant commenced to sexually ravish her and was about to penetrate her
vagina but was abruptly interrupted when CCC arrived home. The trial court accurately synthesized BBB's testimony,
in this wise:
It is evident from the testimony of herein private complainant BBB that all the above-mentioned elements and
requirements of the law for the crime of Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610 have been
fully established by the prosecution. BBB maintained that sometime in the year 2009, while at home for being sick,
accused suddenly put down her shorts and underwear to her knee and raised her t-shirt up to her breast. Accused
then proceeded to touch and kiss her on her private parts despite her resistance. Not satisfied, accused took off his t-
shirt, shorts and brief and was about to insert his penis into her vagina, when her younger brother CCC arrived and
abruptly stopped the advances of the accused. (TSN, March 26, 2014, pp. 7-9)38

Indubitably, appellant committed lascivious conduct when he performed acts of lasciviousness by pulling down AAA's
shorts and underwear, touching and kissing her private parts, and attempting to insert his penis into her vagina.
Notably, BBB was a minor, being only fourteen (14) years old at that time.

We reiterate that appellant's denial and alibi cannot prevail over the positive and categorical testimony of BBB. Bare
assertion of alibi and denial cannot prevail over the categorical testimony of a victim.39 Denial, if unsubstantiated by
clear and convincing evidence, is a self-serving assertion that deserves no weight in law, as in this case. Likewise,
alibi is one of the weakest defenses not only because it is inherently frail and unreliable, but also because it is easy to
fabricate and difficult to check or rebut.40

Since appellant is BBB's father, the alternative circumstance of relationship should be credited against him in
Criminal Case No. 08-0630-2013. Consequently, appellant should suffer reclusion perpetua and fine of ₱15,000.00.
Section S(b) and Section 31 (f) of RA 7610 provide:

SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any
other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse
or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.

The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:

xxx

(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other sexual abuse: Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators
shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the
Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious
conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period.

xxx

Sec. 31. Common Penal Provisions. -

xxx

(f) A fine to be determined by the court shall be imposed and administered as a cash fund by the Department of
Social Welfare and Development and disbursed for the rehabilitation of each child victim, or any immediate member
of his family if the latter is the perpetrator of the offense.

People v. Caoili41 applied the foregoing provisions in this wise:

Considering that AAA was over 12 but under 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the lascivious act, the
imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua.

Since the crime was committed by the father of the offended party, the alternative circumstance of relationship should
be appreciated. In crimes against chastity, such as acts of lasciviousness, relationship is always aggravating. With
the presence of this aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstance, the penalty shall be applied in its
maximum period, i.e., reclusion perpetua, without eligibility of parole. This is in consonance with Section 31(c) of R.A.
No. 7610 which expressly provides that the penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period when the perpetrator
is, inter alia, the parent of the victim.
Likewise, Section 31 (f) of R.A. No. 7610 imposes a fine upon the perpetrator, which jurisprudence pegs in the
amount of Php 15,000.

As for the appropriate monetary awards, Caoili decreed:

Parenthetically, considering the gravity and seriousness of the offense, taken together with the evidence presented
against Caoili, this Court finds it proper to award damages.

In light of recent jurisprudential rules, when the circumstances surrounding the crime call for the imposition
of reclusion perpetua, the victim is entitled to civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages each in the
amount of Php 75,000.00, regardless of the number of qualifying aggravating circumstances present.

The fine, civil indemnity and all damages thus imposed shall be subject to interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.

All told, the Court of Appeals correctly sentenced appellant to reclusion perpetua. Appellant should be ordered to pay
BBB ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as exemplary damages, and ₱75,000.00 as moral damages.

ACCORDINGLY, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated August 3, 2017

is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.

In Criminal Case Nos. 08-0581-2013 and 08-0631-2013, appellant XXX is found GUILTY of QUALIFIED RAPE and
sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUA without eligibility of parole for each count.

He is further required TO SEPARATELY PAY AAA and BBB each ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱100,000.00 as
moral damages, and ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages.

In Criminal Case No. 08-0630 2013, appellant XXX is found GUILTY of LASCIVIOUS CONDUCT and sentenced
to RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay a FINE of ₱15,000.00. He is required TO PAY BBB ₱75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as exemplary damages, and ₱75,000.00 as moral damages.

All monetary awards in Criminal Case Nos. 08-0581-2013, 08-0631-2013, and 08-0630-2013 are subject to six
percent (6%) interest from finality of this decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-44096 April 20, 1983

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MANUEL MORALES y ALAS, defendant-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Alfredo L. Nieva for defendant-appellant.

PER CURIAM:

The criminal perversity exhibited in these charges for Infanticide and Rape, which were jointly tried, argues strongly
against the abolition of capital punishment from our statute books.

In Criminal Case No. 906 filed on April 1, 1976 before the former Court of First Instance of Oriental Mindoro, Branch
II, the accused was charged with the rape of his own daughter, with the Information alleging:

That sometime in the month of December, 1974, at around 12:00 o'clock midnight, in the Barrio of
Maluanluan, Municipality of Pola, Province of Oriental Mindoro, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, thru force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously lay and have carnal knowledge with his own 14 years old daughter
Maria Morales against the will on consent of the latter.

CONTRARY TO Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.

Pinamalayan, Or. Mindoro, April 1, 1976. 1

In another Information filed in Criminal Case No. 904 against the same accused on the same date and before the
same Court, he was charged with Infanticide committed as follows:

That on or about the 19th day of March, 1976, at around 8:00 o'clock in the evening, in the barrio of
Maluanluan, Municipality of Pola, Province of Oriental Mindoro, and within the jurisdiction of this
honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent to kill, motivated with his
diabolical desire to conceal the offense of rape he had committed against Maria Morales his
very own daughter, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously bury alive a baby girl,
christened Mary Morales y Morales, a child born out of his carnal relationship with Maria
Morales, who then was only an hour old from birth, as a result of which caused the former her
unexpected and untimely demise.

CONTRARY TO Article 255 of the Revised Penal Code.

Pinamalayan, Or. Mindoro, April 1, 1976. 2

The accused pleaded guilty to both charges upon arraignment. Notwithstanding, the lower Court followed the
proper and prudent course and ordered the taking of the accused's testimony pursuant to the doctrines enunciated by
this Court.

Considering that the accused then gave conflicting testimonies as to whether or not the baby was still alive
when he buried her, 3 the lower court substituted pleas of not guilty in both cases and set them jointly for
trial. At the trial, the accused again admitted the commission of the charges as alleged in the Information as
well as the contents of his extrajudicial confession (Exhibit "E").

After hearing, the Trial Court rendered a joint Decision, with the following decretal portion:
 WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Manuel Morales y Alas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of rape as defined and penalized in Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code in the
information filed by the Provincial Fiscal under Criminal Case No. P-905 and is hereby sentenced
to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to indemnify Maria Morales, the offended
party in the amount of P10,000.00. Said accused is also found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of infanticide in Criminal Case No. P904, as defined and penalized in Article 255 of the
Revised Penal Code, with evident premeditation and qualified by the use of superior strength of the
accused and by nocturnity, with only one mitigating circumstance which is his plea of guilty, and is
hereby sentenced to suffer the capital punishment of DEATH and to indemnify the heirs of the
victim Mary Morales y Morales the sum of P12,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency in view of the nature of the principal penalty. The said accused is condemned likewise to
pay the costs in both cases.

xxx xxx xxx

IT IS SO ORDERED. 4

The accused did not appeal from the conviction for Rape. It is the imposition of the death penalty in the
Infanticide case that is now before the SC on automatic review.

We quote the evidence for the prosecution from the People's Brief:

Sometime in the month of December, 1974, at around midnight at Maluanluan, Pola, Oriental
Mindoro, accused-appellant Manuel Morales, through force and intimidation, was able to
have carnal knowledge of his unmarried daughter Maria Morales. Thereafter, the appellant
repeated his misdeeds several times (p. 5, tsn, April 30, 1976; Answer to Question No. 3,
Affidavit of Maria Morales, Record, p. 14). Consequently, Maria Morales got pregnant and on
March 19, 1976, at around 7:00 o'clock P.M., with the help of the appellant, she gave birth to a
live baby girl named Mary Morales inside their house in Barrio Maluanluan. About an hour later,
the appellant took the baby from the mother, brought her out of the house, and buried her
alive near their house (Answer to Questions Nos. 4, 5, 6, 8, and 11, Affidavit of Manuel Morales,
Record, p. 13; pp. 3-4, 8, tsn, April 20, 1976; pp. 5-8, tsn, April 30, 1976). To cover the place
where he buried the baby, the appellant built a fire over it (p. 14, tsn, April 21, 1976; Answer to
Question No. 4, Affidavit of Delfin Dris, Record, p. 15).

At about 7:00 P.M. of the following day, Jesus Aytona, an uncle of Maria Morales went to the
office of Orlando Lara, the Station Commander of Pola, Oriental Mindoro and reported to
him that as per information his niece delivered a baby but that the latter could not be found.
Then Lara, together with some members of the police, proceeded to Barrio Maluanluan. A
neighbor of the appellant, Delfin Dris, reported to Lara that in the night of March 19, 1976, he
heard the crying of a baby but that later it stopped (pp. 12-13, tsn, April 21, 1976).

In the morning of the next day, Lara invited the appellant to the station to which the latter
agreed (p. 14, tsn, Ibid). Thereafter, Lara returned to the scene of the crime and investigated
the matter. With the help of Dris, Lara found the baby buried a foot deep in a place about 15
meters from the appellant's house (pp. 14-16, tsn, Ibid).

Lara then summoned the help of Dra. Alamar who conducted an autopsy on the body of the
baby. He also ordered a sergeant to fetch the appellant so that the latter could Identify the
body of the baby (p. 15, tsn, April 21, 1976).

Appellant arrived and then Identified the body of the baby as his daughter by Maria Morales,
his own daughter, whom he buried alive to cover the shame of his family because of what
he did to the latter (pp. 17-18, tsn, Ibid). Pictures were also taken at the scene of the crime (pp.
13-21, tsn, April 21, 1976; Exhibits 'C' and 'D').

The 'Post Mortem Findings' on baby Mary Morales stated:

 I. EXTERNAL FINDINGS:
a) A dead new born baby girl with the placenta still attached was dug up approximately 100 meters
away from the residence of Manuel Morales under a banana tree.
b) Purplish black cynosis of the face, neck and all parts of the body were clearly observed.
c) At the early stage of decomposition, there is still the evidence of the caput succedanum and the
baby is covered with vernix cascosa. The head is covered with fine lanuge hair and the nails
projected from the fingers.
d) CHEST-There is arching of the chest.

II. INTERNAL FINDINGS:

a) Lungs filled the thoracic cavity and overlaps the heart. Edges are rounded and vermillion red
(pinkish mottled color) in color. It crepitates on pressure: On section it exudes froth. A piece of the
lungs floated on water showing that air had probably entered in the lungs air sacs. It is spongy. It
weighs more or less 900 gms.
b) Stomach and intestines-contains mucus and air bubbles and saliva.

III. CONCLUSION:

MOST PROBABLY CARDIO RESPIRATORY FAILURE DUE TO ASPHYXIATION CAUSED THE

DEATH OF THE CHILD. (Exhibit 'A', Record, p. 9).

Thereafter, the appellant was brought back to the municipal building where he executed an
affidavit admitting that he buried his baby daughter alive (pp. 19, 21-22, tsn, April 21, 1976;
Exhibit 'E', Record, p. 13).

On August 22 and 23, 1976, the affidavit of Maria Morales, declaring, among others, that on March
19, 1976 she gave birth to a live baby girl whom the appellant took away from her and whom she
was not able to see thereafter, and that of Delfin Dris about the hearing of the crying of a newly
born baby in the house of the appellant on the evening of March 19, 1976 were taken by the police,
respectively (pp. 25-26, tsn, April 21, 1976; Exhibits 'F' and 'G', Record, pp. 14-15). 5

In this appeal, de officio counsel maintains:

I. The Court erred in finding that the accused mercilessly killed the baby girl Mary Morales by burying her alive.

II. The Court erred in giving credit to the testimony of Dr. Mercedes Alamar, that the baby girl when buried was still
alive.

III. The Court erred in not appreciating the unstable mind of the accused, which fact could have been favorably
interpreted in his favor.

IV. The Court erred in imposing the capital punishment of death.

We are far from persuaded.

That the accused had killed baby Mary Morales by burying her alive is admitted by him in his extrajudicial
confession, given two days after the incident, or on March 21, 1976, as follows:

3. T Ikaw ay naririto ngayon sa aming Tanggapan at iniimbestigahan sa isang

kaso na naganap sa Maluanluan, Pola, Silangang Mindoro, nalalaman mo ba
kung ano ang nagawa mong kasalanan?

S Opo, nabuntisan ko po iyong aking anak na si MARIA MORALES at noong ito'y

umanak ay ibinaon ko iyong bata.

4. T Kailan naman nanganak itong si Maria?

 S Noon pong ika-19 ng Marso, 1976, humigit kumulang sa ika- 7:00 ng gabi.

5. T Kailan mo naman ibinaon ang nasabing bata?

S Noon din pong gabing iyon, humigit kumulang sa ika-8:00 ng gabi.

6. T Noon bagang ibaon mo ang naging anak nitong si Maria ay patay na ito

S Buhay pa po ang bata.

7. T Anong tauhin itong anak na ito ni Maria?

S Babae po. 6

On the witness stand, the accused also admitted:

Q Likewise, stated in that information is the allegation that after your daughter
Maria Morales have delivered that baby daughter of whom you are the father and
finding that she was delivered alive, you buried your own daughter to hide your
wrongdoing, is that the true or untrue?

A That is true, sir. 7

Orlando Lara, the Station Commander of Pola, Oriental Mindoro, who investigated the case, also testified that
the accused admitted that he buried his child while still alive. Lara testified as follows:

Q After Manuel Morales, the accused, had Identified the child as his, did you ask
Manuel Morales in your capacity as investigator, who buried that child?

A I asked him and he told me that he was the one who buried the child, sir.

Q Did you ask him why he buried the child?

A He told me that to evade the shame of his family, he does not like that the baby
live, sir.

Q Did you ask Manuel Morales if he buried the child already dead or still alive?

A He told me that when he buried the child, the latter was still alive, sir. 8

In addition to Lara's foregoing corroborative testimony, Dr. Mercedes Alamar, the medico-legal officer,
declared:

Q In your autopsy findings, can you determine or were you able to determine that
at the time of burial of the child she was still alive?

A There were evidence that the baby was alive when she was buried. In the
first place in the 'External Findings' there is one stated there that there is
arching of the chest and arching of the chest means that respiration had
been established. In the 'Internal Findings' 'Lungs filled the thoracic cavity
and overlaps the heart'- showing also that respiration had been
established. Edges are rounded and vermillon red (pinkish mottled color) in
color. It shows again that the lungs had expanded. It crepitates on
pressure, it shows again that there is presence of air in the lungs. On
section it exudes froth. This is also an evidence that there had been a respiration.
 A piece of lung was floated on water showing that air had probably entered in the
lungs air sacs. That the lungs when floated on water show that air entered
the lungs. Stomach and intestines contains mucus and air bubbles and
saliva. These are all evidence that respiration had been established before
the baby's death and that the baby was still alive when she was buried. 9

The sworn statement of Maria Dolores further disclosed that the baby girl she delivered on that night of March
19, 1976, without her father calling a "hilot" despite her request, was "buhay po at mabilog at malakas ang uha na
malusog  ..."; that her father, the accused, took away said baby from her; and that, thereafter, she was not
able to see her baby anymore. 10

There is not the shadow of a doubt, therefore, that the infant girl, who was subsequently called Mary Morales,
was buried alive by the accused, her father, approximately one hour after her birth.

With the exception of evident premeditation, the lower Court correctly appreciated, for having been proven at
the trial although not alleged in the Information 11, the aggravating circumstances of advantage taken of
superior strength and nocturnity.

Evident premeditation, however, has not been sufficiently established. There is no evidence of planning on the
part of the accused to kill his infant daughter. It is not enough that premeditation be surmised; the criminal intent
must be evidenced by notorious outward acts evincing the determination to commit the crime. 12 There should be
evidence of a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution to allow him to reflect on the
result of his act. 13 Such evidence is wanting herein. The baby was born about 7:00 o'clock in the evening and
was buried alive about 8:00 o'clock that same night. Where the accused had only about an hour or half an
hour for meditation and reflection, there is no evident premeditation. 14

But the accused took advantage of his superior strength when he took the infant from her mother
immediately after her birth, naked, placenta and all, and subsequently buried the baby alive.

Nighttime was likewise properly appreciated for although, subjectively, it was not purposely sought,
objectively, it was a circumstance that facilitated the commission of the crime and which the accused took
advantage of for purpose of impunity. 15 He could not have buried the infant with facility and with minimum
fear of detection had it not been for the cover of night.

The accused's testimony that he had suffered a mental blackout and did not know what he was doing at the
time he buried his daughter, which condition, it is alleged, should have impelled the lower Court to order his
confinement in a hospital for treatment and for determination of whether or not he was insane, is untenable.
The act of the accused in refusing to call a "hilot" to help his daughter deliver, and his insistence to act as
such himself, betrays a conscious and deliberate intent to hide the fact of birth from other eyes. The act of
the accused in building a fire over the grave where he buried his infant daughter in order to camouflage it
and to deflect it from suspicion belies his protestations that he had suffered a mental blackout at the time.
On the contrary, they show deliberateness and full possession of his mental faculties to prevent discovery of
a dastardly crime. It is more likely that the accused was wavering between remorse of conscience and a lurking
desire to disown the crime and go scot-free if it could be proven that the child had been born dead and lifeless.
Besides, the law presumes every man to be sane. 16 When a defendant in a criminal case interposes the defense of
mental incapacity, the burden of establishing that fact rests upon him. 17

With two aggravating circumstances and only one mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty, the imposition of capital
punishment is inescapable 18 for this heinous, outrageous and cruel crime without parallel in Philippine jurisprudence.

WHEREFORE, except with respect to the finding by the lower Court of evident premeditation, the judgment in
Criminal Case No. P-904 is hereby affirmed.

Costs against the accused Manuel Morales y Alas.

SO ORDERED.