CASE DIGESTS IN

CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW

(2015-2019)

Mendoza, Emiaj Francinne M.

2017-0244

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BENITO LABABO 3

ALIAS "BEN," WENEFREDO LABABO, JUNIOR LABABO (AL), AND
FFF, Accused-Appellants.

2. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CRESENCIO CAMPIT 17

Y CRISTO AND EMILIO MACAWILI, ACCUSED, CRESENCIO CAMPIT Y
CRISTO, Accused-Appellant.

3. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.CARLITO CLARO y 26

MAHINAY, Accused-Appellant.

4. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, thru Private Complainant BRIAN 36

VICTOR BRITCHFORD, Petitioner v. SALVADOR ALAPAN, Respondent

5. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee v. NANCY LASACA 43

RAMIREZ A.K.A. "ZOY" OR "SOY", Accused-Appellant

6. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee v. BENJAMIN A. 51

ELIMANCIL, Accused-Appellant

7. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee v. RENATO GALUGA y 59

WAD-AS, Accused-Appellant PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee, vs. BENJAMIN CASAS y VINTULAN, Accused-Appellant.

8. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JULIE GRACE K. 81

VILLANUEVA, Accused-Appellant.

9. CHERRY ANN M. BENABAYE, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE 91

PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

10. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BAYANI DE LEON, 98

ANTONIO DE LEON, DANILO DE LEON and YOYONG DE
LEON, Accused-Appellants.

11. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. 108

ALBERTO ALEJANDRO y RIGOR and JOEL ANGELES y DE JESUS,
Accused-Appellants
12. JOHN DENNIS G. CHUA, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES 116
AND CRISTINA YAO, Respondents.
13. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee v. DIOSCORO COMOSO 125
TUREMUTSA, Accused-Appellant
14. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee v. ZZZ, Accused- 138
Appellant
15. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee vs. ROGER RACAL @ 149
RAMBO, Accused-Appellant

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BENITO LABABO ALIAS
"BEN," WENEFREDO LABABO, JUNIOR LABABO (AL), AND FFF, Accused-
Appellants.

DECISION

VELASCO JR., J.:

The Case

For consideration is an ordinary appeal from the August 31, 2016 Decision 1 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01992, entitled "People of the Philippines v.
Benito Lababo alias "Ben", Wenefredo Lababo, Junior Lababo (Al) and FFF".

The Facts

Accused-appellants Benito, Wenefredo, Junior, and FFF, all surnamed "Lababo," were
charged in an Information for the crime of Murder before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 19 of Catarman, Northern Samar, docketed as Criminal Case No. C-4460, the
accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 27th day of October 2007, at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon at
(portion deleted) Province of Northern Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring with, confederating and
mutually helping one another, armed with an unlicensed homemade shotgun locally
known as "bardog" and with a long bolo, with deliberate intent to kill thru treachery,
evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and shoot AAA2 with the use of said weapons
which the accused had provided themselves for the purpose, thereby inflicting upon
said AAA a gunshot wound which directly caused the death of said victim.
Additionally, accused-appellants Benito and Wenefredo were likewise indicted with the
crime of Frustrated Murder before Branch 20, RTC of Catarman, or Northern Samar.
Docketed as Criminal Case No. C-4479, the Information reads:

That on or about the 27th day of October, 2007, at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, in
(portion deleted) Province of Northern Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused armed with a homemade shotgun,
conspiring with (sic) confederating, and mutually helping each other, with deliberate
intent to kill thru treachery and evident premeditation did, then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot BBB4 with the use of said weapon
which the accused had provided themselves for the purpose, thus the accused having
performed all the acts of execution which could have produced the crime of murder but
did not produce it by reason of some cause independent of the will of the (sic) herein,
accused, that is the timely and (sic) medical attendance to said BBB which prevented
his death.

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That the commission of the crime was aggravated with the use of an unlicensed firearm.
On January 26, 2009, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge of murder in
Criminal Case No. C-4460. As for Criminal Case No. C-4479, Benito and Wenefredo
pleaded not guilty to the charge of frustrated murder on April 21, 2009. Junior, however,
remained at large.6 Upon joint motion of the prosecution and the defense, the cases
were consolidated.

Prosecution's version

According to the prosecution, the facts surrounding the incident are as follows:

On October 27, 2007, at around 3:00 in the afternoon, BBB, his wife CCC,7 and their
son AAA, alighted from a motorcycle in front of Benito's house, some fifty (50) meters
away from their residence, and proceeded directly to go to their house. A few minutes
later, CCC heard a gunshot accompanied by a child's scream emanating from near
Benito's house. When she went outside to check, she saw her husband and son lying
on the ground, wounded. Within close proximity is Benito holding a 29-inch gun locally
known as "bardog" together with Wenefredo, FFF, and Junior, all armed with bolos.
Jesus Caparal corroborated these accounts, saying that he was nearby when the
incident occurred and that after hearing gunshots, he proceeded to his house. On the
way there, he saw Benito holding a "bardog", with the three each holding a bolo, while
AAA and BBB were lying on the ground. He reported the incident to the Barangay
Tanod.8

CCC ran towards Barangay Malobago to seek help from Vice Mayor Diodato Bantilo.
The latter went to the crime scene with CCC, at which point, CCC lost consciousness.
Vice Mayor Bantilo brought the two (2) victims to the hospital. AAA was declared dead
on arrival. BBB survived the gunshot wounds on his left wrist, right leg, and left buttock,
but was confined at the hospital for one (1) month. DDD, CCC's adopted daughter,
reported the incident to the police authorities of Northern Samar.9

Dr. Candelaria Castillo, the attending physician of the victims, issued the Post Mortem
Report on AAA declaring that he sustained a single but fatal gunshot wound on his
back, injuring his lungs, which resulted in cardiopulmonary arrest, leading to his
immediate death.10

As for her finding on BBB, in the Medico-Legal Certificate, it is stated that he sustained

eight (8) non-fatal gunshot wounds in the different parts of his body, signifying that he
was moving at the time of the shooting. The doctor stated that if BBB was not given
timely medical attention, he would have died from his wounds.11

CCC suggested that the possible cause for the shooting was the boundary dispute
between BBB and his brothers, Benito and Wenefredo.
Version of the defense

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For their part, the three denied the charges against them. According to Wenefredo, he
was fishing with a certain Rudy Castro at the time of the incident. He claims that it was
only around 6:00 pm of that day when he learned of the shooting when DDD came to
his house to borrow money for the hospital expenses.13
As for Benito, he claims that he was at home fixing his motorcycle with FFF's help when
the incident happened. According to him, their house is at least twelve (12) kilometers
away from (information deleted). He also posits that he only knew of the incident three
(3) days later. As for the alleged boundary dispute, Benito states that he was not
involved therein.14

In his defense, FFF claimed that on the day of the incident, he was helping with the
chores in their house.15

RTC Ruling

In its Decision16 dated July 8, 2014, the RTC found accusedappellants guilty of murder.
Benito and Wenefredo were also found guilty for the crime of frustrated murder.
According to the trial court, despite the fact that there was no eyewitness to the actual
commission of the crime, the combination of the circumstantial evidence points out to
accused-appellants as the perpetrators and conspirators.17 The fallo of the Decision
reads:

From all the foregoing, the Court finds the accused BENITO LABABO @ BEN,
WENEFREDO LABABO and FFF, in Crim. Case No. C-4460 are also (sic) found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Murder and hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay the private complainant each the amount of
P50,000.00 civil indemnity, P50,000.00 moral damages, P25,000.00 exemplary
damages and to pay the costs.
Accused BENITO LABABO @ BEN and WENEFREDO LABABO in Crim. Case No. C-
4479 are also found guilty of the (sic) frustrated murder beyond reasonable doubt, and
are sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of EIGHT (8) YEARS
and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor medium as minimum to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS,
EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to pay
the amount of P25,000.00 as temperate damages, P40,000.00 as moral damages,
P30,000.00 exemplary damages and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.18

CA Ruling

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC's findings. According to the CA, convictions may
be anchored on circumstantial evidence as long as the series of circumstances duly
proved are consistent with each other and that each and every circumstance is
consistent with the accused's guilt and inconsistent with his innocence. Applying this,
the CA found that the circumstances proved by the prosecution lead to no other

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conclusion than that the accused-appellants were the assailants and are, therefore,
guilty of the crimes charged.19

The CA likewise found that the elements for the crime of murder are all present in the
killing of AAA, noting that it was done with treachery, the attack being sudden and
unexpected, leaving AAA defenseless. As for the charge of frustrated murder, the CA
agreed with the finding of the RTC that although the wounds sustained by BBB were not
fatal, the sheer number thereof made the totality of said injuries fatal. The CA noted the
attending physician's testimony that one of the wounds, located at the posterior lumbar
area, was located in the area of a vital organ which could cause his death if it would not
be treated.20

Anent the theory that the accused-appellants conspired to kill the victims, the CA held
that the pieces of circumstantial evidence establish a common criminal design-that is, to
harm and kill the victims. The appellate court added that although the victims only
sustained gunshot wounds from Benito's bardog, and not from the bolos held by the
three, the fact that they stayed together while wielding said bladed weapons are enough
to demonstrate their common evil intent to threaten, harm, and eventually assault the
victims.21

With respect to the penalties and damages imposed, the CA affirmed the penalty meted
upon Benito and Wenefredo. But for FFF, the appellate court noted that he was 17
years old at the time of the commission of the crime thus, being a minor, Article 68 (2) of
the Revised Penal Code, which states that the penalty next lower than that prescribed
by law shall be imposed upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen, but always in
the proper period, shall apply to him. After following said provision and the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the CA held, the range of penalty for FFF is prision
mayor in any of its period, as minimum, to reclusion temporal in its medium period, as
maximum.22 The CA thus modified the RTC's ruling by imposing upon FFF for his
commission of the crime of murder the penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one
(1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

As to the damages awarded, the CA modified the amounts thereof to the following to
conform to recent jurisprudence and imposed legal interest at the rate of six percent
(6%) per annum on all damages awarded, from the date of finality of the judgment until
fully paid.23 The fallo of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed 8 July
2014 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, of Catarman, Northern Samar
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS as follows:

In Criminal Case No. C-4460, accused-appellants Benito Lababo, Wenefredo Lababo

and FFF are held GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder. Accused-
appellants Benito Lababo and Wenefredo Lababo are sentenced to suffer the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua while FFF, being a minor at the time of the commission of the

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crime, shall suffer the penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal as maximum. Said accused-appellants are also ordered to pay private
complainant the amounts of Php75,000.00 as civil indemnity, Php75,000.00 as moral
damages, Php30,000.00 as exemplary damages, and Php25,000.00 as temperate
damages.

In Criminal Case No. C-4479, accused-appellants Benito Lababo and Wenefredo

Lababo are held GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Frustrated Murder and are
hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal as maximum. They are also ordered to pay private complainant
the amounts of Php40,000.00 as moral damages, Php25,000.00 as temperate
damages, and Php20,000.00 as exemplary damages.

All monetary awards for damages shall earn interest at the legal rate of 6% per
annum from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.24

The Issue

Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC's finding that accused-appellants are
guilty of the crimes charged.

Our Ruling

The instant appeal is without merit.

Conviction anchored on circumstantial evidence

Murder is defined and penalized under Art. 248 of the RPC, as amended, which
provides:
ART. 248. Murder. Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall
kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to
death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:

1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or
employing means to weaken the defense, or of means or persons to insure or afford
impunity;
2. In consideration of a price, reward, or promise;
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel,
derailment or assault upon a railroad, fall of an airship, by means of motor vehicles, or
with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin;

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4. On occasion of any calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an
earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic, or any other public
calamity;
5. With evident premeditation;
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or
outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.
The elements of murder are:
1. That a person was killed.
2. That the accused killed him.
3. That the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Art.
248.
4. The killing is not parricide or infanticide.
Thus, for the charge of murder to prosper, the prosecution must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that: (1) the offender killed the victim, (2) through treachery, or by any
of the other five qualifying circumstances, duly alleged in the Information.25
In the case at hand, the fact of AAA's death is undisputed. Similarly, there is no question
that the killing is neither parricide nor infanticide. It has also been sufficiently established
that the killing is attended with treachery. In People v. Camat, this Court expounded on
the qualifying circumstance of treachery in this wise:

There is treachery or alevosia when the offender commits any of the crimes against the
person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly
and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense
which the offended party might make. For alevosia to qualify the crime to Murder, it
must be shown that: (1) the malefactor employed such means, method or manner of
execution as to ensure his or her safety from the defensive or retaliatory acts of the
victim; and (2) the said means, method and manner of execution were deliberately
adopted. Moreover, for treachery to be appreciated, it must be present and seen by the
witness right at the inception of the attack.26 (Citations omitted)
Here, the prosecution sufficiently proved that AAA, an unarmed minor, sustained a
single, but fatal wound on his back through from a firearm. This, to Us, is more than
sufficient to prove that the killing is treacherous since the attack was so sudden and
unexpected that AAA was not given an opportunity to defend himself.

As for BBB's case, We agree with the RTC and CA's factual finding that the eight
gunshot wounds sustained by BBB, as contained in the Medico-Legal Certificate, would
have caused his death if he was not given timely medical attention. 27 Furthermore, it
does not appear that BBB was armed or was in a position to deflect the attack. As a
matter of fact, based on CCC's narration of the events that transpired, the suddenness
of the attack upon AAA and BBB cannot be denied. Only that, unlike AAA, BBB
survived.
The act of killing becomes frustrated when an offender performs all the acts of
execution which could produce the crime but did not produce it for reasons independent

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of his or her will.28

Here, taking into consideration the fact that BBB was shot eight times with the use of a
firearm and that AAA, who was with him at that time, was killed, convinces Us that the
malefactor intended to take EBB's life as well. However, unlike in AAA's case, BBB
survived. It was also established that he survived not because the wounds were not
fatal, but because timely medical attention was rendered to him. Definitely, EBB's
survival was independent of the perpetrator's will. As such, this Court is convinced that
the attack upon BBB qualifies as frustrated murder.

What is left to be determined, therefore, is whether indeed it was Benito who fired the
shot that took AAA's life and inflicted upon BBB eight wounds that could have killed him
as well. In this respect, for one reason or another, no eyewitness was presented. The
evidence to support accused appellant's conviction are, therefore, circumstantial
evidence.

Convictions based entirely on circumstantial evidence are not new. In People v.

Evangelio,29 We detailed the instances when a judgment of conviction can be sustained
on the basis of circumstantial evidence. Thus:
Circumstantial evidence, also known as indirect or presumptive evidence, refers to proof
of collateral facts and circumstances whence the existence of the main fact may be
inferred according to reason and common experience. Circumstantial evidence is
sufficient to sustain conviction if (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts
from which the inferences are derived are proven; (c) the combination of all
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. A judgment
of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be sustained when the
circumstances proved form an unbroken chain that results in a fair and reasonable
conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator.

Thus, for as long as the prosecution is able to meet the requirements for a finding of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt anchored purely on circumstantial evidence, there is
nothing to prevent a court from handing out a judgment of conviction.

In the present case, We are sufficiently convinced that accused-appellant Benito is

guilty of the crimes charged. As found by the RTC and affirmed by the CA, the
prosecution were able to establish the following facts:

1. On October 27, 2007, gunshots, accompanied by a child's scream, were heard

emanating from near Benito's house;

2. After such, the victims AAA and BBB were seen lying on the ground, wounded;

3. While the victims were sprawled on the ground, Benito was seen standing near
them, holding a 29-inch "bardog" together with Wenefredo, FFF, and Junior, all
armed with bolos;

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 4. AAA died from a single gunshot wound to the back; and

5. BBB sustained eight (8) gunshot wounds.

Basic is the rule that findings of fact of the trial court, as affirmed by the appellate court,
are conclusive absent any evidence that both courts ignored, misconstrued, or
misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances of substance which, if considered, would
warrant a modification or reversal of the outcome of the case. 30 Since the
aforementioned exceptions are not present, We are inclined to agree with the findings of
the RTC and the CA.

Furthermore, although none of the witnesses were able to testify on the actual shooting
and BBB was not presented as a witness, still, the prosecution's evidence formed a
coherent narration of the events that transpired that the only logical conclusion thereon
is that it was Benito who shot the two victims. Aside from Benito being seen standing
near the sprawled bodies of the victims while holding a firearm and that the wounds
sustained by the victims emanated from a firearm, there is no evidence that there was
another person there who was wielding a firearm and who could have fired the shots at
the victims.

With these, We find no error on the ruling of both the RTC and the CA that it was Benito
who attacked AAA and BBB.

On the alleged conspiracy

Having settled the issue on whether it was indeed Benito who fired at the victims, We
shall now determine whether, as held by the RTC and the CA, accused-appellants
conspired to commit the crimes charged.

Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that conspiracy exists when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it. To prove conspiracy, the prosecution must establish the following three
requisites: (1) two or more persons came to an agreement, (2) the agreement
concerned the commission of a crime, and (3) the execution of the felony was decided
upon. Once conspiracy is established, the act of one becomes the act of all.31

In Bahilidad v. People,32 the Court summarized the basic principles in determining

whether conspiracy exists or not. Thus:
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy is not presumed. Like the
physical acts constituting the crime itself, the elements of conspiracy must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt. While conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence,
for it may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the
commission of the crime, all taken together, however, the evidence must be strong
enough to show the community of criminal design. For conspiracy to exist, it is essential
that there must be a conscious design to commit an offense. Conspiracy is the product
of intentionality on the part of the cohorts.

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It is necessary that a conspirator should have performed some overt act as a direct or
indirect contribution to the execution of the crime committed. The overt act may consist
of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself, or it may consist of
moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the commission of the crime
or by exerting moral ascendancy over the other co-conspirators. Hence, the mere
presence of an accused at the discussion of a conspiracy, even approval of it, without
any active participation in the same, is not enough for purposes of conviction.
Here, it was established that Wenefredo and FFF were present at the scene of the
crime, both wielding a bolo. However, it was also established that their alleged
participation thereat did not go beyond being present and holding said weapons. As a
matter of fact, both the victims only sustained gunshot wounds. The question now is
this: Is Wenefredo and FFF's mere presence at the scene of the crime, while armed with
bolos, sufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt that they conspired with Benito to
commit the crimes imputed against them?

We rule in the affirmative.

While it is true that mere presence at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission, without actively participating in the conduct thereof, is insufficient to prove
that the accused conspired to commit the crime, Wenefredo and FFF's act of standing
near the victims and Benito, while wielding bolos, does not partake of this nature.

To Our mind, their overt act of staying in close proximity while Benito executes the
crime served no other purpose than to lend moral support by ensuring that no one could
interfere and prevent the successful perpetration thereof.33 We are sufficiently
convinced that their presence thereat has no doubt, encouraged Benito and increased
the odds against the victims, especially since they were all wielding lethal weapons.

Indeed, one who participates in the material execution of the crime by standing guard or
lending moral support to the actual perpetration thereof is criminally responsible to the
same extent as the actual perpetrator, especially if they did nothing to prevent the
commission of the crime.34 Under the circumstances, there is no evidence to support a
conclusion that they have nothing to do with the killing. We are, therefore, convinced
that indeed, the three conspired to commit the crimes charged.

On the penalties imposed

Finding that the RTC erred in the penalty imposed on FFF, the CA made the following
modifications, noting at FFF was 17 years old at the time of the commission of the
crime, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed 8 July
2014 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, of Catarman, Northern Samar
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS as follows:

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In Criminal Case No. C-4460, accused-appellants Benito Lababo, Wenefredo Lababo
and FFF are held GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder. Accused-
appellants Benito Lababo and Wenefredo Lababo are sentenced to suffer the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua while FFF being a minor at the time of the commission of the
crime shall suffer the penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of  prision mayor as
minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal as maximum. Said accused-appellants are also ordered to pay private
complainant the amounts of Php75,000.00 as civil indemnity, Php75,000.00 as moral
damages, Php30,000.00 as exemplary damages, and Php25,000.00 as temperate
damages.

In Criminal Case No. C-4479, accused-appellants Benito Lababo and Wenefredo

Lababo are held GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Frustrated Murder and are
hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal as maximum. They are also ordered to pay private complainant
the amounts of Php40,000.00 as moral damages, Php25,000.00 as temperate
damages, and Php20,000.00 as exemplary damages.

All monetary awards for damages shall earn interest at the legal rate of 6% per
annum from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.35 (underscoring ours)

We sustain the CA's modification of the penalty imposed on FFF. The CA correctly took
into account FFF's minority, he being 17 years old at the time of the commission of the
crime, in reducing the period of imprisonment to be served by him. Being of said age,
FFF is entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority under Article 68(2) of
the RPC which provides that the penalty to be imposed upon a person under 18 but
above 15 shall be the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law, but always in the
proper period.36
Murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.37 However, pursuant to RA No.
9346, proscribing the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty to be imposed on
appellant should be reclusion perpetua. Applying Article 68 (2), the imposable penalty
must be reduced by one degree, i.e., from reclusion perpetua, which is reclusion
temporal. Being a divisible penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable. To
determine the minimum of the indeterminate penalty, reclusion temporal should be
reduced by one degree, prision mayor, which has a range of from six (6) years and
one (1) day to twelve (12) years. The minimum of the indeterminate penalty should
be taken from the full range of prision mayor. Furthermore, there being no modifying
circumstances attendant to the crime, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty
should be imposed in its medium period38 which is 14 years, eight months, and one
day to 17 years and four months.39

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The CA thus correctly imposed the penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal as maximum to FFF.
As for the penalties imposed on Benito and Wenefredo anent their conviction for Murder
and Frustrated Murder, there is no reason to disturb the RTC and CA's ruling thereon.

Suspended sentence
We note, however, that FFF, being a minor at the time of the commission of the offense,
should benefit from a suspended sentence pursuant to Section 38 of RA 9344, or
the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006. Said provision reads:
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is under eighteen
(18) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the
offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may
have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the
judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law
under suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided, however, That
suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already
eighteen years (18) of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her
guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the
child, the court shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the
Supreme Court Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law. (emphasis ours)
It is well to recall that Section 38 of the law applies regardless of the imposable penalty,
since R.A. No. 9344 does not distinguish between a minor who has been convicted of a
capital offense and another who has been convicted of a lesser offense. We, therefore,
should also not distinguish and should apply the automatic suspension of sentence to a
child in conflict with the law who has been found guilty of a heinous crime.40

Furthermore, the age of the child in conflict with the law at the time of the promulgation
of judgment of conviction is immaterial. What matters is that the offender committed the
offense when he/she was still of tender age. The promotion of the welfare of a child in
conflict with the law should extend even to one who has exceeded the age limit of
twenty-one (21) years, so long as he/she committed the crime when he/she was still a
child. The offender shall be entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation and
reintegration in accordance with the Act in order that he/she is given the chance to live a
normal life and become a productive member of the community.41

FFF may thus be confined in an agricultural camp or any other training facility in
accordance with Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344, which provides that "[a] child in
conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve
his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural
camp and other training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and
controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD." The case shall thus be
remanded to the court of origin to effect appellant's confinement in an agricultural camp
or other training facility, following the Court's pronouncement in People v. Sarcia.42

13
On the damages awarded

Lastly, We find the need to modify the damages awarded for both crimes,
following People v. Jugueta.43 Thus,
I. For those crimes like, Murder, Parricide, Serious Intentional Mutilation, Infanticide,
and other crimes involving death of a victim where the penalty consists of indivisible
penalties:

1.1 Where the penalty imposed is death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of
RA 9346:

a. Civil indemnity - P100,000.00

b. Moral damages - P100,000.00

c. Exemplary damages - P100,000.00

1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated:

a. Frustrated:

i. Civil indemnity - P75,000.00

ii. Moral damages - P75,000.00

iii. Exemplary damages - P75,000.00.

It is well to mention that for FFF, Section 6 of RA 9344 expressly provides that the child
in conflict with the law is still civilly liable for the crime committed.44 Accordingly, FFF
shall pay the same amount of damages as shall be meted upon his co-accused-
appellants.

Thus, applying Our pronouncement in People v. Jugueta,45 in Criminal Case No. C-4460
[Murder], accused-appellants shall each pay civil indemnity in the amount of
P100,000.00, P100,000.00 as moral damages, and P100,000.00 as exemplary
damages.

As for their conviction for Frustrated Murder in Criminal Case No. C-4479, Benito and
Wenefredo shall pay the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as
moral damages, and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED. The August 31, 2016
Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01992 is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The dispositive portion of the assailed
Decision, as modified, shall read:
In Criminal Case No. C-4460, accused-appellants Benito Lababo, Wenefredo Lababo
and FFF are held GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder. Accused-
appellants Benito Lababo and Wenefredo Lababo are sentenced to suffer the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua, [while the case against FFF, being a minor at the time of the

14
commission of the crime, shall be remanded to the court of origin for appropriate
disposition in accordance with Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.]

Each of the accused-appellants are ordered to pay private complainant the amounts of
[P100,000.00] as civil indemnity, [P100,000.00] as moral damages, [P100,000.00] as
exemplary damages.

In Criminal Case No. C-4479, accused-appellants Benito Lababo and Wenefredo

Lababo are held GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Frustrated Murder and are
hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal as maximum. They are also ordered to pay private complainant
the amounts of [P75,000.00] as civil damages, [P75,000.00] as moral damages, and
[P75,000.00] as exemplary damages.

All monetary awards for damages shall earn interest at the legal rate of 6% per
annum from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.

15
FACTS

Accused-appellants Benito, Wenefredo, Junior, and FFF, all surnamed "Lababo," were
charged in an Information for the crime of Murder before the RTC of Catarman,
Northern Samar.

According to the prosecution, on October 27, 2007, at around 3:00 in the afternoon,
CCC, wife of BBB, heard a gunshot accompanied by a child's scream emanating from
near Benito's house. She saw her husband and son lying on the ground, wounded.
Within close proximity is Benito holding a "bardog" together with Wenefredo, FFF, and
Junior, all armed with bolos.

The Post Mortem Report on AAA (child of BBB and CCC) declared that he sustained a
single but fatal gunshot wound on his back, injuring his lungs, which resulted in
cardiopulmonary arrest, leading to his immediate death.

As for BBB’s Medico-Legal Certificate, it is stated that he sustained eight non-fatal

gunshot wounds in the different parts of his body, signifying that he was moving at the
time of the shooting. The doctor stated that if BBB was not given timely medical
attention, he would have died from his wounds.

ISSUE

Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC's finding that accused-appellants are
guilty of the crimes charged.

RULE

The instant appeal is without merit.

While it is true that mere presence at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission, without actively participating in the conduct thereof, is insufficient to prove
that the accused conspired to commit the crime, Wenefredo and FFF's act of standing
near the victims and Benito, while wielding bolos, does not partake of this nature.

16
Their overt act of staying in close proximity while Benito executes the crime served no
other purpose than to lend moral support by ensuring that no one could interfere and
prevent the successful perpetration thereof. Their presence thereat has no doubt,
encouraged Benito and increased the odds against the victims, especially since they
were all wielding lethal weapons.

Indeed, one who participates in the material execution of the crime by standing guard or
lending moral support to the actual perpetration thereof is criminally responsible to the
same extent as the actual perpetrator, especially if they did nothing to prevent the
commission of the crime. Under the circumstances, there is no evidence to support a
conclusion that they have nothing to do with the killing. We are, therefore, convinced
that indeed, the three conspired to commit the crimes charged.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CRESENCIO CAMPIT Y
CRISTO AND EMILIO MACAWILI, ACCUSED, CRESENCIO CAMPIT Y
CRISTO, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

MARTIRES, J.:

On appeal is the 16 July 2015 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 06800, which affirmed the 20 March 2014 Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court
of Calauag, Quezon, Branch 63, in Criminal Case No. 5323-C finding herein accused-
appellant Cresencio Campit y Cristo (Cresencio) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC).

THE FACTS

In an Information,3 dated 16 September 2008, Campit and accused Emilio

Macawili (Emilio) were charged for the murder of Leon Capanzana, Jr. (Leon)
committed as follows:

That on or about the 27th day of July 2008, at Barangay Silang, Municipality of Lopez,
Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused who were both armed with deadly weapons, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping each other, with intent to kill, and with
evident premeditation and treachery, and taking advantage of their superior strength,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with their
weapons one Leon Capanzana, Jr., inflicting upon the latter fatal wound on his body,
causing his untimely death.

On 17 April 2011, Cresencio was arrested in Camarines Norte,5 while Emilio remains at-
large.

17
On 11 May 2011, Cresencio, with the assistance of his counsel de officio, was arraigned
and pleaded not guilty to the charge.6 Trial on the merits ensued thereafter.

Evidence for the Prosecution

The prosecution presented four (4) witnesses, namely: eyewitnesses Ma. Kristine
Capanzana Hernandez (Kristine) and Leonisa Capanzana Hernandez (Leonisa), the
granddaughter and daughter of the victim, respectively; Dr. Jose M. Mercado (Dr.
Mercado), the Municipal Health Officer of Lopez, Quezon, who conducted the post
mortem examination on Leon's cadaver; and Carlos Dacanay Capanzana (Carlos), the
son of the deceased. Their combined testimonies tended to establish the following:

On 27 July 2008, at about 2:30 p.m., at Barangay Silang, Lopez, Province of Quezon,
Leonisa and Kristine were tending to their store when Leon arrived and told them that
Cresencio was asking to borrow money.7 Leon was engaged in the business of buying
copra and owned a bodega adjacent to Leonisa's store.8 After a while, Cresencio and
Emilio, who were apparently drunk because they reeked of alcohol, passed by the store.
Emilio stayed on the other side of the road, while Cresencio approached Leon, who was
then in his bodega arranging documents and was about to leave. Cresencio pressed
Leon to lend him money but the latter did not heed his request.9 Suddenly, Cresencio
pulled out a knife from his waist and repeatedly stabbed Leon five (5) times, more or
less. Leon tried to parry the thrusts with his hand but he was eventually stabbed on his
stomach.10 Leon turned away from Cresencio and attempted to escape, but he was met
by Emilio who grabbed his left shoulder and stabbed him on his chest.11 Leon fell on his
back in front of the bodega,12 while Cresencio and Emilio ran away and fled.13

Meanwhile, Leonisa and Kristine came out of their store and rushed towards the bodega
when they heard that Cresencio was pestering Leon for a loan.14 They stood just about
three (3)-arms' length away from Leon and his assailants. They were shouting "Tama
na" when Leon was being stabbed by his assailants.15 They were, however, unable to
help Leon for fear of being harmed as well. After Cresencio and Emilio fled, Leonisa
rushed her father to the Holy Rosary Hospital in Lopez, Quezon, where he was
pronounced dead on arrival.16

The post-mortem examination conducted by Dr. Mercado revealed that Leon sustained
four (4) stab wounds on his body and an incised wound on his right hand small
finger.17 Dr. Mercado further testified that the proximate cause of Leon's death is the
multiple stab wounds he sustained.18

Evidence for the Defense

The defense presented Cresencio as its lone witness. In his testimony, Cresencio
interposed the defense of denial, as follows:

On 27 July 2008, at around 3:00 p.m., Cresencio was buying rice at the store of one
Myrna Argamosa (Argamosa) in Barangay Silang, Lopez, Quezon, when he saw Leon

18
handing P1,000.00 to Argamosa. Cresencio then uttered "daming pera po ah" and
asked P200.00 from Leon as part of the payment for the charcoal he delivered to the
latter.19 Leon, who apparently did not appreciate the remark, got mad at Cresencio,
grabbed his shirt, and punched him on the face. Cresencio did not fight back and simply
told Leon "huwag po, hindi ako lalaban." Leon then left and proceeded towards his
bodega located about 60 meters from Argamosa's store.20 After about 15 minutes,
Cresencio left for home.21 On his way, he saw Leon in his bodega weighing copra. Leon
approached Cresencio after noticing the latter. However, Cresencio backed away after
sensing Leon's hostile behavior.22 At this moment, Emilio suddenly appeared and
stabbed Leon. Cresencio pleaded with Emilio to stop, but the latter merely told him
"wala kang pakialam."23 After the incident, Emilio fled while Cresencio went
home.24 After learning that he was implicated in Leon's killing, Cresencio left and stayed
with his brother-in-law in Camarines Norte to hide for fear of being arrested for a crime
he did not commit.25

The RTC Ruling

In its decision, the RTC found Cresencio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder. The trial court gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
Leonisa and Kristine who vividly described how Cresencio and Emilio attacked and
killed the victim. It observed that the testimonies of the eyewitnesses were clear and
categorical, and were given in a straightforward manner. It further opined that the
positive identification of Cresencio by the eyewitnesses prevails over the former's
defense of denial.

The trial court likewise appreciated the attendant qualifying circumstance of taking
advantage of superior strength in the commission of the felony, finding that there was
notorious inequality of force between the victim who was old and unarmed and the two
aggressors who were both armed with knives. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court hereby renders judgment finding

CRESENCIO CAMPIT y Cristo @ Jun GUILTY of MURDER for the killing of Leon
Capanzana, Jr. upon proof beyond reasonable doubt. He is hereby sentenced to
Reclusion Perpetua without eligibility for parole in line with the provisions of R.A. No.
9346. He is likewise ordered to pay the family of the deceased the following amounts:
P75,000.00 for death indemnity; P75,000.00 for and as moral damages; P30,000.00 for
exemplary damages; P48,000.00 to reimburse the cost of full memorial service; and
P25,000.00 for and as temperate damages.

SO ORDERED.26

Aggrieved, Cresencio appealed before the CA.27

The CA Ruling

19
In its assailed decision, the CA affirmed the RTC decision. The appellate court held that
the trial court correctly gave full credence to the testimonies of Leonisa and Kristine
noting that their respective narrations of the incident were candid and unwavering. It
agreed that the qualifying circumstance of taking advantage of superior strength
attended the killing of Leon. The dispositive portion of the assailed decision provides:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED. The

Decision dated March 20, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63, Calauag,
Quezon is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.28

Hence, this appeal.

THE ISSUE

WHETHER THE TRIAL AND APPELLATE COURTS ERRED IN CONVICTING THE

ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

THE COURT'S RULING

The Court finds no reason to reverse the conviction of the accused-appellant.

No reason to disturb factual findings by the trial court; Prosecution witnesses

are credible.

Cresencio insists that the trial and appellate courts erred in giving full credence to the
testimonies of Kristine and Leonisa as they were tainted with inconsistencies and
contradictions. He averred that Kristine and Leonisa's testimonies that they witnessed
the stabbing of Leon but failed to help him are incredible and do not deserve any
consideration. He claimed that such actions or lack thereof belie common experience as
held in People v. Benjamin Reyes (Benjamin Reyes).29

The Court is not persuaded.

Findings of fact by the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court, are given great
weight and credence on review.30 Equally settled is the rule that the assessments made
by the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are accorded great weight and respect.31

As explained in a plethora of cases, the issue of credibility of witnesses is a question

best addressed to the province of the trial court because of its unique position to
observe that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses' deportment on the
stand while testifying. Absent any substantial reason to justify the reversal of the trial
court's assessment and conclusion, the reviewing court is generally bound by the
former's findings, particularly when no significant fact or circumstance is shown to have

20
been overlooked or disregarded which, if considered, would have affected the outcome
of the case.32

The Court finds no reason to depart from the factual findings by the trial court,
especially considering that the same were affirmed by the appellate court.

As aptly found by the trial court, the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Kristine and
Leonisa were clear, candid, straightforward, and credible. They positively identified
Cresencio as among the two perpetrators of the crime. Their respective narrations of
the incident were consistent in all respects material to the case. Moreover, their
accounts relating to the number and location of the stab wounds were substantially
corroborated by the post mortem examination conducted on the deceased.

Time and again, the Court has held that the testimony of even a single eyewitness, if
positive and credible, is sufficient to support a conviction even in a charge of
murder.33 Moreover, considering that Cresencio assailed the credibility of the witnesses
against him, it is incumbent upon him to show that Kristine and Leonisa were impelled
by ill motives in falsely accusing him of the crime charged.34 Unfortunately for
Cresencio, there was no showing of any ill motive on the part of any of the
eyewitnesses. Where there is no evidence to show any dubious reason or improper
motive on why a prosecution witness would testify falsely against an accused or falsely
implicate him in a heinous crime, the testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.35

Similarly, Cresencio's reliance in Benjamin Reyes is misplaced. In said case, the mother
of the victim testified that she saw her husband stab her daughter but, instead of helping
her, she went home. While sustaining the conviction of the accused, the Court agreed
with the defense's submission that the testimony of the victim's mother was not credible.

A reading of the said case, however, would reveal that the witness' account was
regarded by the Court to be against common experience not because of her failure to
help her daughter during the stabbing incident, but because of the peculiarity of her
behavior immediately after the incident which included, among others, the fact that she
did not shout and ask her neighbors for help; that when she arrived home, she casually
brushed her teeth and slept with her husband, who was also her daughter's killer; and
that she remained silent when the police came to their house despite the fact that her
husband was not present; and was, thus, not under threat at that time. More
importantly, the Court declared therein that her testimony regarding the stabbing
incident did not deserve any credit because she categorically stated that she did not
witness the killing of her daughter.

None of the circumstances in Benjamin Reyes which justified the finding of the witness's
lack of integrity is present in this case. To recall, Leonisa and Kristine did not remain
silent during the felonious deed. They were shouting and begging for Leon's assailants
to stop. Clearly, while they were crushed by the spectacle of Leon being stabbed to
death, fear prevailed upon them preventing them from doing anything to aid their loved
one. Likewise, after Cresencio and Emilio fled, Leonisa immediately rushed her father to

21
the hospital in the hope that he would survive. Leonisa's behavior is directly opposed to
that of the witness in Benjamin Reyes who did not even bother to check on her daughter
after allegedly witnessing her being stabbed.

Furthermore, and as held in People v. Romeo Fernandez,36 it would be unfair to gauge

the actions of the eyewitnesses as incredible for there is no prescribed behavior when
one is suddenly confronted with a startling or frightening event. Different people react
differently to a given stimulus or situation, and there is no standard form of behavioral
response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience. Thus,
Kristine and Leonisa's inability to help and defend Leon due to their fear of reprisal is
understandable and not at all contrary to common experience.

Thus, the Court finds no reason to disturb the trial court's full faith in Kristine and
Leonisa's testimonies given that they were clear, credible, categorical, and positive.
Needless to state, their testimonies prevail over Cresencio's defense of denial which
has been repeatedly considered as a weak defense.37

The crime committed is only homicide; abuse of superior strength not

established

The circumstance of abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is inequality

of force between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of
strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor, and the latter takes advantage of
it in the commission of the crime.38

Nevertheless, it must be stressed that superiority in number does not necessarily

amount to abuse of superior strength.39 For the qualifying circumstance to be
appreciated, it must be shown that the aggressors combined forces in order to secure
advantage from their superiority in strength. Differently stated, it must be proven that the
accused simultaneously assaulted the deceased.40 Furthermore, the evidence must
establish that the assailants purposely sought the advantage, or that they had the
deliberate intent to use this advantage. After all, to take advantage of superior strength
means to purposely use excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense
available to the person attacked.41 Thus, it had been held that when the victim was
attacked by the assailants alternatively, the claim that the accused abused their superior
strength could not be appreciated.42

In this case, the evidence adduced by the prosecution established that only Cresencio
approached Leon while the latter was in his bodega. Thereafter, Cresencio, following an
argument, stabbed Leon multiple times. It was only when Leon escaped from Cresencio
that Emilio appeared and stabbed the victim on his chest. Considering that the
perpetrators attacked the victim alternatively and did not combine their superior strength
to overwhelm the victim, they could not be said to have taken advantage of their
superior strength.

22
Furthermore, the events leading to the stabbing negate the attendance of the qualifying
circumstance of abuse of superior strength. From the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, as well as, to some extent, from the accounts of Cresencio, it could be
gathered that the quarrel started when Cresencio felt offended after Leon repeatedly
rejected his request for a loan. Clearly, the incident was unplanned and unpremeditated.
When the quarrel between the victim and his assailants arose unexpectedly, the
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength could not be appreciated43 as
the same requires some degree of prior deliberation or meditation.44

From the foregoing, it is clear that abuse of superior strength did not attend the
commission of the felony. The prosecution failed to prove that the numerical superiority
was purposely sought by the assailants to perpetrate the crime with impunity; and that
there was blatant disparity in strength between Leon and his assailants.

Penalties

In the absence of any qualifying aggravating circumstance, the crime committed by

Cresencio is homicide and the penalty should be reclusion temporal as provided in
Article 249 of the RPC. Considering that there is neither aggravating nor mitigating
circumstances, the penalty should be imposed in its medium period pursuant to Article
64(1) of the RPC. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, Cresencio should be
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty the minimum of which should be within the range
of the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the offense, that
is, prision mayor (6 years and 1 day to 12 years); and the maximum of which should be
within the range of reclusion temporal in its medium period (14 years 8 months and 1
day to 17 years and 4 months). Accordingly, the Court imposes the indeterminate
penalty ranging from eight (8) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14)
years eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

WHEREFORE, accused-appellant Cresencio Campit y Cristo is found GUILTY beyond

reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide, defined and penalized under Article 249 of
the Revised Penal Code. He is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8)
years of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years eight (8) months and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. He is further ordered to pay the heirs of the
deceased Leon Capanzana, Jr., the following amounts: (1) P75,000.00, as civil
indemnity; (2) P75,000.00, as moral damages; and (3) P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages. All monetary awards shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum reckoned from the finality of this decision until its full payment.45

SO ORDERED.

23
FACTS

The combined witnesses for the prosecution established that on 27 July 2008, at about
2:30 p.m., at Barangay Silang, Lopez, Province of Quezon, Leonisa and Kristine were
tending to their store when Leon arrived and told them that Cresencio was asking to
borrow money. After a while, Cresencio and Emilio, who were apparently drunk, passed
by the store. Cresencio approached Leon, who was then in his bodega the former
pressed the latter to lend him money but the latter did not heed his request. Suddenly,
Cresencio pulled out a knife from his waist and repeatedly stabbed Leon five (5) times,
more or less. Leon tried to parry the thrusts with his hand but he was eventually stabbed
on his stomach. Leon turned away from Cresencio and attempted to escape, but he was
met by Emilio who grabbed his left shoulder and stabbed him on his chest. Leon fell on
his back in front of the bodega while his perpetrators fled.

Meanwhile, Leonisa and Kristine came out of their store and rushed towards the bodega
when they heard that Cresencio was pestering Leon for a loan. For the assailants to
stop but were unable to help Leon for fear of being harmed as well. After Cresencio and
Emilio fled, Leonisa rushed her father to the hospital where he was pronounced dead on
arrival.

Meanwhile, in his testimony, Cresencio interposed the defense of denial as he stated

that it was Leon who punched the accused first because the former alleged that he was
only asking for payment for the coal that Leon bought from earlier. However, when he
noticed that that Leon was becoming hostile, Cresencio claims that he began to head
home. It was at this moment that Emilio allegedly appeared and stabbed Leon. After the
incident, Emilio fled while Cresencio went home. After learning that he was implicated in
Leon's killing, Cresencio left and stayed with his brother-in-law in Camarines Norte to
hide for fear of being arrested for a crime he did not commit.

ISSUE

24
Whether the trial and appellate courts erred in convicting the accused of murder due to
the qualifying circumstance of superior strength

RULE

It must be stressed that superiority in number does not necessarily amount to abuse of
superior strength. For the qualifying circumstance to be appreciated, it must be shown
that the aggressors combined forces in order to secure advantage from their superiority
in strength. Furthermore, the evidence must establish that the assailants purposely
sought the advantage, or that they had the deliberate intent to use this advantage. After
all, to take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use excessive force out
of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked. Thus, it had
been held that when the victim was attacked by the assailants alternatively, the claim
that the accused abused their superior strength could not be appreciated.

The events leading to the stabbing negate the attendance of the qualifying circumstance
of abuse of superior strength. From the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, as
well as, to some extent, from the accounts of Cresencio, it could be gathered that the
quarrel started when Cresencio felt offended after Leon repeatedly rejected his request
for a loan. Clearly, the incident was unplanned and unpremeditated. When the quarrel
between the victim and his assailants arose unexpectedly, the aggravating
circumstance of abuse of superior strength could not be appreciated as the same
requires some degree of prior deliberation or meditation.44

From the foregoing, it is clear that abuse of superior strength did not attend the
commission of the felony. The prosecution failed to prove that the numerical superiority
was purposely sought by the assailants to perpetrate the crime with impunity; and that
there was blatant disparity in strength between Leon and his assailants.

25
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. CARLITO CLARO y
MAHINAY, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

In every criminal case where the accused enjoys the presumption of innocence, he is
entitled to acquittal unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt.

The Case

The accused seeks to undo the decision promulgated on March 24, 2011 in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 03702,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the judgment
rendered on November 17, 2008 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 21, in
Manila convicting him of rape. 2

Antecedents

The accused was charged with rape under the following information, to wit:

That on or about March 14, 2006, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd designs and by means of
force, violence and intimidation, and fraudulent machination, have carnal knowledge
with said AAA, 3 by then and there texting the latter to see each other at the corner of
Augusto Francisco Street, inviting her for a stroll at Rizal A venue, ordering food from
Jollibee, bringing her at Aroma Motel under the pretext that they will just talk and eat
their food thereat, entering a room at said motel and locking the door, pulling her on the
bed and kissing her,underssing (sic) her and thereafter inserting his penis into her
vagina then succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her, against her will and consent.

Contrary to law.4

26
Evidence of the Prosecution

At around 9:00 o'clock in the morning of March 14, 2006, AAA, a housemaid, received a
text message from the accused asking if they could meet. He was then working as a
security guard near AAA's place of work. AAA accepted his invitation and met with him
on Augusto San Francisco Street, Sta. Ana, Manila, where they boarded a passenger
jeepney bound for Rizal A venue in Sta. Cruz, Manila. Arriving in Sta. Cruz, they
entered a Jollibee restaurant on Rizal Avenue and ordered food. They later on went to a
nearby house, later identified as the Aroma Motel. She refused to go up the stairs of the
motel, which impelled him to hold her by the hand and pull her upstairs, insisting that
they would only talk and eat. He then talked to a male attendant who ushered them into
a room.

Upon entering the room, AAA tried to leave, but the accused closed the door and
pushed her towards the bed. She still attempted to leave but the door was locked. He
pulled her back to the bed, telling her that he loved her. Instead of responding to him,
she said that she needed to go to the toilet. Once inside the toilet, she called her cousin,
Alberto German (German), a police officer, but she was unable to give him her exact
location after her phone ran out of charge. It was then when the accused barged inside
the toilet and again pulled her back to the bed. He forcefully undressed her completely,
went on top of her, and forcibly inserted his penis inside her vagina. She kept on
punching to try to stop him, but to no avail. After he was done, she immediately put on
her clothes and left the room. But she was compelled to ride with him in the same
passenger jeepney because she did not know her way back.

Upon arriving home, she promptly reported the incident to German, who instructed her
to contact the accused and agree to meet with him again so that they could apprehend
him. She did as instructed. Just as they agreed, the accused went to the meeting place,
where German quickly approached him and introduced himself as a police officer. The
accused tried to run away, but German seized him and brought him to the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for investigation.

Dr. Wilfredo E. Tierra, the NBI medico-legal officer, conducted the medico-genital
examination of AAA. He found the presence of fresh deep hymenal laceration at 5
o'clock position with edges bleeding; abrasion measuring 1.3 cm. on the left breast; and
contusion measuring 1.5 cm. on the right hand of AAA. 5

Evidence of the Defense

The accused denied the accusation.

The accused claimed that he and AAA had first met on January 6, 2006, and became
friends; that their friendship had blossomed into romance, with them becoming lovers
after two months; that they had gone out once on a date on March 6, 2006, and had
agreed to go out on a date again on March 14, 2006; that on the latter date, they had
met at Augusto San Francisco Street, Sta. Ana Manila, and had proceeded on board a

27
passenger jeepney to the Jollibee restaurant on Rizal Avenue; that at the Jollibee
restaurant, he ordered food and asked her whether they would push through with their
plan to go to a motel; that after she assented, they walked together to the motel, where
a room boy led them to their designated room, which had a doorknob that could be
locked from the inside; that once they entered the room, she went to the restroom and
later came out wearing only a towel; that she told him that she loved him, and they
started kissing each other; that she took off the towel, while he undressed; that she did
not resist when he went on top of her and inserted his penis in her vagina, but he
stopped when she told him that she was not yet ready; that they then got dressed, left
the motel together, and boarded a passenger jeepney; that after parting ways, she
called him through his cellphone and asked if they could see· each other again; and that
once he arrived at the meeting place, a police officer later identified as German arrested
and handcuffed him.

Also testifying for the Defense was the mother of the accused. She asserted that AAA
was already her son's girlfriend prior to the incident; that when she went to the police
headquarters upon learning of her son's arrest, she saw AAA but the latter asked her to
talk to German instead; that German told her: Wala nang madami pang usapan, basta
mangako ka sa akin na magbibigay ka ng ₱200, 000. 00; and that she asked AAA
about what had really happened, but the latter refused to answer her query.6

Ruling of the RTC

As stated, the RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape,
decreeing:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused CARLITO CLARO Y

MAHIN A Y GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of

reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay the victim, AAA the total amount of
₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages. With costs. It
appearing that accused is detained, the period of his detention shall be credited in the
service of his sentence.

SO ORDERED.7

Decision of the CA

On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction, disposing:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant APPEAL is DENIED. Accordingly,

the Decision dated November 17, 2008 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
in Criminal Case No. 06-242729 convicting accused-appellant of the crime of rape is
hereby AFFIRMED.

28
SO ORDERED.

The CA regarded AAA's testimony as credible; and ruled that the presence of bruises
and abrasions on the body of AAA proved that she had been subjected to bodily harm
before he accomplished his lustful desires. It observed that the fact that the parties had
gone home together after the incident was sufficiently explained by AAA's statement
that she had no choice but to go with him because she did not know her way back.

Issue

Did the R TC and the CA correctly find and pronounce the accused guilty of rape
beyond reasonable doubt?

Ruling of the Court

The Court acquits the accused on the ground of reasonable doubt.

It is noticeable that the versions of AAA and the accused ultimately contradicted each
other on whether rape or consensual sex had transpired between them. Their
contradictions notwithstanding, the circumstances - whether based on her recollection
or on his - indicated that she had willingly met with him on March 14, 2006 in order to go
on a lovers' date. Their meeting on Augusto San Francisco Street in Sta. Ana, Manila,
and their going together by jeepney to Rizal Avenue, where they entered the Jollibee
restaurant to share the meal were undoubtedly by their prior agreement. It was while
they were in the restaurant when they discussed checking in at the Aroma Motel, but
once she assented to their checking in the Aroma motel, they walked together towards
the motel, and entered together.

The sweetheart defense is not usually regarded with favor in the absence of strong
corroboration. 9 This is because the mere fact that the accused and the victim were
lovers should not exculpate him from criminal liability for rape. In People v.
Orquina,  10 the Court observed that an allegation of a "love relationship" between the
parties, even if found to be true, did not eliminate the use of force to consummate the
crime because the gravamen of rape is the carnal knowledge of a woman against her
will and without her consent. As declared in People v. Gecomo:  11

It should be borne in mind that love is not a license for carnal intercourse through force
or intimidation. Even granting that appellant and complainant were really sweethearts,
that fact alone would not negate the commission of rape. A sweetheart cannot be forced
to have sex against her will. From a mere fiancee, definitely a man cannot demand
sexual submission and, worse, employ violence upon her on a mere justification of love.
A man can even be convicted for the rape of his common-law wife.

It is a time-honored tenet that the appreciation and assessment by the trial judge of the
credibility of witnesses are accorded respect primarily because the trial judge personally
observed the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses as to enable him or her to

29
determine whether they were telling the truth or merely fabricating it. 12 Another tenet of
long standing is that the factual findings of the CA affirming those of the trial judge are
generally binding upon the Court, which is not a trier of facts. 13 Based on these tenets,
it would be easy to simply affirm the conviction of the accused herein especially
considering that both the RTC and the CA regarded AAA as a credible witness whose
testimony was worthy of belief.

Yet, it is not fair and just to quickly reject the defense of consensual sexual intercourse
interposed by the accused. To be noted first and foremost is that he and AAA were
adults capable of consenting to the sexual intercourse. The established circumstances -
their having agreed to go on a lovers' date; their travelling together a long way from their
meeting place on board the jeepney; their alighting on Rizal Avenue to take a meal
together; their walking together to the motel, and checking in together at the motel
without the complainant manifesting resistance; and their entering the designated room
without protest from her - indicated beyond all doubt that they had consented to
culminate their lovers' date in bed inside the motel.

Although she claimed that he had held her by the hand and pulled her upstairs, there is
no evidence showing that she resisted in that whole time, or exhibited a reluctance to
enter the motel with him. Instead, she appeared to have walked with him towards the
motel, and to have entered it without hesitation. What she did not do was eloquent proof
of her consent.

Noting the medico-legal findings of bruises and abrasions on AAA, the CA concluded
that she had been subjected to some "bodily harm" by the accused to force himself on
her, to wit:

x x x In the case before Us, We are convinced that the element of force was present.
This is shown by the fact that the accused-appellant held private complainant's hands to
the point of dragging her up the stairs of the motel, and by the fact that he pushed
private complainant to the bed when the latter tried to escape. Moreover, as We have
mentioned above, the presence of bruises and abrasions on private complainant's body
evince the fact that latter was subjected to bodily harm before accused-appellant
succeeded in having carnal knowledge with her. 14

That the medico-legal examination of March 14, 2006 turned up with the findings of
abrasions on AAA's left breast and contusions on her right hand did not necessarily
mean that the accused had applied force in the context of forcing her to have sex with
him. The conclusion of the CA was, therefore, too sweeping, for it inexplicably ignored
the probability of consensuality between the parties. Such findings did not justify the full
rejection of the demonstrable consensuality of their sexual intercourse. Moreover, the
mere presence of abrasions and contusions on her did not preclude the giving of her
consent to the sexual intercourse, for abrasions and contusions could also be
suffered during voluntary submission of the partners to each other's lust. Such
possibility calls for us to open our minds to the conclusion that the sexual intercourse
resulted from consensuality between them.

30
In every criminal case, the accused is entitled to acquittal unless his guilt is shown
beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a
degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Only
moral certainty is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind. 15

In the face of all the foregoing, we have reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused for
rape. Reasonable doubt –

x x x is not mere possible doubt; because everything relating to human affairs, and
depending on moral evidence, is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. It is that
state of the case which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the
evidence, leaves the minds of jurors in such a condition that they cannot say they
feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge . The
burden of proof is upon the prosecutor. All the presumptions of law independent of
evidence are in favor of innocence; and every person is presumed to be innocent until
he is proved guilty. If upon such proof there is reasonable doubt remaining, the
accused is entitled to the benefit of it by an acquittal. For it is not sufficient to
establish a probability, though a strong one arising from the doctrine of chances,
that the fact charged is more likely to be true than the contrary; but the evidence
must establish the truth of the fact to a reasonable and moral certainty; a
certainty that convinces and directs the understanding and satisfies the reason
and judgment of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it. This we
take to be proof beyond reasonable doubt; because if the law, which mostly
depends upon considerations of a moral nature, should go further than this, and
require absolute certainty, it would exclude circumstantial evidence altogether. 16

The requirement of establishing the guilt of the accused in every criminal proceeding
beyond reasonable doubt has a long history that even pre-dates our Constitutions. As
summed up by jurisprudence of American origin:

The requirement that guilt of a criminal charge be established by proof beyond a

reasonable doubt dates at least from our early years as a Nation. The 'demand for
a higher degree of persuasion in criminal cases was recurrently expressed from
ancient times, (though) its crystallization into the formula 'beyond a reasonable
doubt' seems to have occurred as late as 1798. It is now accepted in common law
jurisdictions as the measure of persuasion by which the prosecution must
convince the trier of all the essential elements of guilt.' C. McCormick, Evidence
321, pp. 681-682 (1954); see also 9 J. Wigmore, Evidence, 2497 (3d ed.1940).
Although virtually unanimous adherence to the reasonable-doubt standard in common-
law jurisdictions may not conclusively establish it as a requirement of due process, such
adherence does 'reflect a profound judgment about the way in which law should be
enforced and justice administered.' Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155' 1451
(1968).

31
Expressions in many opinions of this Court indicate that it has long been
assumed that proof of a criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt is
constitutionally required. See, for example, Miles v. United States, 103 U.S. 304, 312
(1881); Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 488 , 358 (1895); Holt v. United States,
218 U.S. 245, 253, (1910); Wilson v. United States, 232 U.S. 563, 569 -570, 349, 350
(1914); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174, 1310 (1949); Leland v. Oregon,
343 U.S. 790, 795, 1005, 1006 (1952); Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 138,
136, 137 (1954); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-526, 1342 (1958). Cf. Coffin v.
United States, 156 U.S. 432 (1895). Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated that '(i)t the duty
of the Government to establish ... guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This notion-
basic in our law and rightly one of the boasts of a free society-is a requirement
and a safeguard of due process of law in the historic, procedural content of 'due
process." Leland v. Oregon, supra, 343 U.S., at 802 -803 (dissenting opinion). In a
similar vein, the Court said in Brinegar v. United States, supra, 338 U.S., at 174 , that
'(g)uilt in a criminal case must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and by
evidence confined to that which long experience in the common-law tradition, to
some extent embodied in the Constitution, has crystallized into rules of evidence
consistent with that standard. These rules are historically grounded rights of our
system, developed to safeguard men from dubious and unjust convictions, with
resulting forfeitures of life, liberty and property.' Davis v. United States, supra, 160
U.S., at 488 stated that the requirement is implicit in 'constitutions ... (which) recognize
the fundamental principles that are deemed essential for the protection of life and
liberty.' In Davis a murder conviction was reversed because the trial judge instructed the
jury that it was their duty to convict when the evidence was equally balanced regarding
the sanity of the accused. This Court said: 'On the contrary, he is entitled to an acquittal
of the specific crime charged, if upon all the evidence, there is reasonable doubt
whether he was capable in law of committing crime .... No man should be deprived of
his life under the forms of law unless the jurors who try him are able, upon their
consciences, to say that the evidence before them .. .is sufficient to show beyond a
reasonable doubt the existence of every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged.'
Id., at 484, 493, 360.

The reasonable-doubt standard plays a vital role in the American scheme of

criminal procedure. It is a prime instrument for reducing the risk of convictions
resting on factual error. The standard provides concrete substance for the
presumption of innocence-that bedrock 'axiomatic and elementary' principle
whose 'enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal
law.' Coffin v. United States, supra, 156 U.S., at 453. As the dissenters in the New York
Court of Appeals observed, and we agree, 'a person accused of a crime ... would be at
a severe disadvantage, a disadvantage amounting to a lack of fundamental fairness, if
he could be adjudged guilty and imprisoned for years on the strength of the same
evidence as would suffice in a civil case.' 24 N.Y.2d, at 205, 299 N.Y.S.2d, at 422, 247
N.E.2d, at 259.

The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt has this vital role in our
criminal procedure for cogent reasons. The accused during a criminal

32
prosecution has at stake interest of immense importance, both because of the
possibility that he may lose his liberty upon conviction and because of the
certainty that he would be stigmatized by the conviction. Accordingly, a society
that values the good name and freedom of every individual should not condemn a
man for commission of a crime when there is reasonable doubt about his guilt. As
we said in Speiser v. Randall, supra, 357 U.S., at 525 -526: 'There is always in litigation
a margin of error, representing error in factfinding, which both parties must take into
account. Where one party has at stake an interest of transcending value-as a criminal
defendant his liberty-this margin of error is reduced as to him by the process of placing
on the other party the burden of . . . persuading the factfinder at the conclusion of the
trial of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Due process commands that no man
shall lose his liberty unless the Government has borne the burden of ...
convincing the factfinder of his guilt.' To this end, the reasonable-doubt standard
is indispensable, for it 'impresses on the trier of fact the necessity of reaching a
subjective state of certitude of the facts in issue.' Dorsen & Rezneck, In Re Gault
and the Future of Juvenile Law, 1 Family Law Quarterly, No. 4, pp. 1, 26 (1967).

Moreover, use of the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable to command the

respect and confidence of the community in applications of the criminal
law.1avvphi1 It is critical that the moral force of the criminal law not be diluted by
a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being
condemned. It is also important in our free society that every individual going
about his ordinary affairs have confidence that his government cannot adjudge
him guilty of a criminal offense without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt
with utmost certainty.

Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasonable-
doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the
accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. 17

Requiring proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt necessarily means that mere
suspicion of the guilt of the accused, no matter how strong, should not sway judgment
against him. It further means that the courts should duly consider every evidence
favoring him, and that in the process the courts should persistently insist that accusation
is not synonymous with guilt; hence, every circumstance favoring his innocence should
be fully taken into account. 18 That is what we must be do herein, for he is entitled to
nothing less.

Without the proof of his guilt being beyond reasonable doubt, therefore, the presumption
of innocence in favor of the accused herein was not overcome. His acquittal should
follow, for, as we have emphatically

reminded in Patula v. People:  19

33
x x x in all criminal prosecutions, the Prosecution bears the burden to establish the guilt
of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. In discharging this burden, the Prosecution's
duty is to prove each and every element of the crime charged in the information to
warrant a finding of guilt for that crime or for any other crime necessarily included
therein. The Prosecution must further prove the participation of the accused in the
commission of the offense. In doing all these, the Prosecution must rely on the
strength of its own evidence, and not anchor its success upon the weakness of
the evidence of the accused. The burden of proof placed on the Prosecution
arises from the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused that no less
than the Constitution has guaranteed. Conversely, as to his innocence, the
accused has no burden of proof, that he must then be acquitted and set free
should the Prosecution not overcome the presumption of innocence in his favor.
In other words, the weakness of the defense put up by the accused is
inconsequential in the proceedings for as long as the Prosecution has not
discharged its burden of proof in establishing the commission of the crime
charged and in identifying the accused as the malefactor responsible for it. 20

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETSASIDE the decision of the Court of

Appeals promulgated on March 24, 2011 affirming the conviction for rape
of CARLITOCLAROy MAHINAY under the judgment rendered by the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 21, in Manila; ACQUITS CARLITO CLARO y MAHINAY for failure to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt; ORDERS his immediate release from the
National Penitentiary unless there are other lawful causes warranting his continuing
confinement thereat; and DIRECTS the Director of the Bureau of Corrections to
implement the release of CARLITO CLARO y MAHINAY in accordance with this
decision, and to report on his compliance within l 0 days from receipt.

No pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

34
FACTS
Mahinay was accused of sexually assaulting AAA during their date which he claims to
be was a consensual decision between the two. According to AAA, she reported the
incident to a cousin, who instructed her to contact the accused so that they could
apprehend him. The accused was apprehended and was brought to the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for investigation.
Dr. Wilfredo E. Tierra, the NBI medico-legal officer, conducted the medico-genital
examination of AAA. He found the presence of fresh deep hymenal laceration at 5
o'clock position with edges bleeding; abrasion measuring 1.3 cm. on the left breast; and
contusion measuring 1.5 cm. on the right hand of AAA.
The accused denied the accusation claiming that he and AAA became lovers in March
2006. According to him, they had previously gone out on one date and that everything
that transpired during their date was agreed to by AAA.
ISSUE
Whether the lower courts correctly pronounced that the accused was guilty beyond
reasonable doubt
RULE
The Court acquits the accused on the ground of reasonable doubt.

35
The established circumstances indicated beyond all doubt that they had consented to
culminate their lovers' date in bed inside the motel. Although she claimed that he had
held her by the hand and pulled her upstairs, there is no evidence showing that she
resisted in that whole time, or exhibited a reluctance to enter the motel with him.
Instead, she appeared to have walked with him towards the motel, and to have entered
it without hesitation. What she did not do was eloquent proof of her consent.
The medico-legal examination turned up with the findings of abrasions on AAA's left
breast and contusions on her right hand did not necessarily mean that the accused had
applied force in the context of forcing her to have sex with him. The conclusion of the
CA was, therefore, too sweeping, for it inexplicably ignored the probability of
consensuality between the parties.
The requirement that guilt of a criminal charge be established by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt dates at least from our early years as a Nation. The 'demand for a
higher degree of persuasion in criminal cases was recurrently expressed from ancient
times, (though) its crystallization into the formula 'beyond a reasonable doubt' seems to
have occurred as late as 1798. It is now accepted in common law jurisdictions as the
measure of persuasion by which the prosecution must convince the trier of all the
essential elements of guilt.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, thru Private Complainant BRIAN VICTOR

BRITCHFORD, Petitioner
vs.
SALVADOR ALAPAN, Respondent

DECISION

MARITRES, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Resolution, dated 22 November

2011, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 118333, which dismissed the
petition seeking the imposition of subsidiary imprisonment for nonpayment of fine in
eight (8) cases of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22).

THE FACTS

In an Information, dated 26 May 2006, respondent Salvador Alapan (respondent) and

his wife Myrna Alapan (Myrna) were charged with eight (8) counts of violation of B.P.
Blg. 22. Upon arraignment on 1 September 2006, they pleaded not guilty to the
charges.

In August 2005, the Spouses Alapan borrowed ₱400,000.00 from petitioner Brian Victor
Britchford (petitioner) with a promise that they would pay the said amount within three
(3) months. To secure the indebtedness, respondent issued eight (8) postdated checks.

36
When the checks matured, petitioner deposited then at the Philippine National
Bank (PNB), Olongapo City branch. One week thereafter, PNB informed petitioner that
the checks were dishonored for the reason that the account against which the checks
were drawn was closed. Petitioner immediately informed respondent of the dishonor of
the checks.

On their part, the Spouses Alapan averred that their account was closed only on the last
week of October 2005 because they suffered business reverses. They nonetheless
stated that they were willing to settle their monetary obligation.

The MTC Ruling

In a decision,1 dated 4 February 2009, the Municipal Trial Court, San Felipe,

Zambales (MTC), convicted respondent of eight (8) counts of violation of B.P. Big. 22. It
imposed a penalty of fine instead of imprisonment considering that respondent's act of
issuing the bounced checks was not tainted with bad faith and that he was a first-time
offender. On the other hand, the MTC acquitted Myrna because she did not participate
in the issuance of the dishonored checks. The fallo reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the evidence of the prosecution to have established the
guilt of Accused Salvador Alapan of the eight (8) counts of Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 and
imposes upon the aforenamed accused to pay a fine of ₱30,000.00 for each case or
total of ₱240,000.00 and to indemnify the offended party, Mr. Brian Victor Britchford the
sum of FOUR HUNDRED ELEVEN THOUSAND (₱411,000.00) Philippine Currency,
representing the face value of the dishonored checks, with legal interest per
annum commencing from March 8, 2006, when demand was made, until fully paid, and
to pay attorney's fees of ₱15,000.00 and to pay the costs.2

After the MTC judgment became final and executory, a writ of execution was issued.
The writ, however, was returned unsatisfied. Petitioner thus filed a Motion to Impose
Subsidiary Penalty3 for respondent's failure to pay the fine imposed by the MTC.

In its Order,4 dated 24 September 2010, the MTC denied the motion on the ground that
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency was not imposed in the judgment of
convicion.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed an appeal before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 69, Iba,
Zambales (RTC).

The RTC Ruling

In a decision,5 dated 25 January 2011, the RTC dismissed the appeal for lack of
jurisdiction. It held that respondent could not be made to undergo subsidiary
imprisonment because the judgment of conviction did not provide for such penalty in
case of non-payment of fine. The RTC further opined that the MTC decision which

37
already attained finality could no longer be altered or modified. It disposed the case in
this wise:

IN VIEW THEREOF, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.6

Undeterred, petitioner filed a petition for review before the CA.

The CA Ruling

In a Resolution, dated 22 November 2011, the CA dismissed the petition. It ruled that
the petition was filed without the intervention of the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) which was contrary to Section 35, Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the
Administrative Code. The dispositive portion reads:

In view of the foregoing and finding the Manifestation (in lieu of Comment) filed by the
OSG to be well-founded, the petition is hereby DISMISSED pursuant to Section 3, Rule
43 of the 1997 Rules of Court.7

Hence, this petition.

ISSUES

I. WHETHER PETITIONER MAY ASSAIL THE PENALTY IMPOSED IN THE

JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION;

II. WHETHER RESPONDENT MAY UNDERGO SUBSIDIARY IMPRISONMENT FOR

FAILURE TO PAY THE FINE.

Petitioner argues that Section 35, Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative
Code is applicable only in cases wherein the government or any of its branches or
instrumentalities is directly involved; that the said law does not cover matters wherein it
is the interest of the private complainant that is directly affected; and that Administrative
Circular No. 13-2001 expressly states that there is no legal obstacle to the application of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC) provisions on subsidiary imprisonment should only a
fine be imposed and the accused be unable to pay the fine.8

In his comment, respondent counters, citing Gonzales v. Chavez, 9 that it is mandatory

upon the OSG to represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or
matter requiring the services of a lawyer; that it is only the State, through its appellate
counsel, the OSG, which has the sole right and authority to institute criminal
proceedings before the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court;10 that the imposition or
the non-imposition of subsidiary penalty is a matter that involves the interest of the
State, thus, the private offended party is without legal personality to bring an appeal on
the criminal aspect of the case; and that the imposition of subsidiary imprisonment must
be clearly stated in the judgment.11

38
In his reply, petitioner avers that Administrative Circular No. 13-2001 categorically
implies that subsidiary imprisonment could be resorted to even if the penalty provided
by the trial court is limited only to fine; and that the imposition of subsidiary
imprisonment would emphasize the gravity of the offense committed by respondent and
would serve as a deterrent to others not to emulate this malicious act.12

OUR RULING

Petitioner lacks legal standing to question the trial court's order.

In the appeal of criminal cases before the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, the
authority to represent the People is vested solely in the Solicitor General. This power is
expressly provided in Section 35, Book IV, Title III, Chapter 12 of the Revised
Administrative Code.13 Without doubt, the OSG is the appellate counsel of the People of
the Philippines in all criminal cases.14

Jurisprudence has already settled that the interest of the private complainant is limited
only to the civil liability arising from the crime.1âwphi1 Thus, in Bautista v. Cuneta-
Pangilinan, 15 the Court ruled:

Thus, the Court has definitively ruled that in a criminal case in which the offended party
is the State, the interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is
limited to the civil liability arising therefrom. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial
court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal of the criminal aspect may be undertaken,
whenever legally feasible, only by the State through the solicitor general. As a rule, only
the Solicitor General may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal. The private
offended party or complainant may not undertake such appeal.16

In this case, respondent was convicted of eight (8) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 for
which he was imposed the penalty of fine instead of imprisonment pursuant to
Administrative Circulars No. 12-2000 and 13- 2001. Thus, the penalty of fine and the
imposition of subsidiary imprisonment in case of nonpayment thereof pertain to the
criminal aspect of the case. On the other hand, the indemnification for the face value of
the dishonored checks refers to the civil aspect of the case. Consequently petitioner
could not appeal the imposition of fine as penalty which was not even questioned by the
People through the OSG. "While a private prosecutor may be allowed to intervene in
criminal proceedings on appeal in the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, his
participation is subordinate to the interest of the People, hence, he cannot be permitted
to adopt a position contrary to that of the Solicitor General. To do so would be
tantamount to giving the private prosecutor the direction and control of the criminal
proceeding, contrary to the provisions of law."17 Hence, the CA properly dismissed the
petition for review.

Subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency must be expressly stated in the

judgment of conviction.

39
Another reason which militates against petitioner's position is the lack of provision
pertaining to subsidiary imprisonment in the judgment of conviction. People v.
Fajardo, 18 in relation to Republic Act. No. 5465 which amended Article 39 of the RPC,
discusses the rationale behind the necessity for expressly imposing subsidiary
imprisonment in the judgment of conviction, viz:

The first paragraph of article 39 of the Revised Penal Code reads as follows:

ART. 39. Subsidiary penalty. - If the convict has no property with which to meet the fine
mentioned in paragraph 3 of the next preceding article, he shall be subject to a
subsidiary personal liability at the rate of one day for each eight pesos, subject to the
following rules: ...

Article 78 of Chapter V of the same Code, in its pertinent part, which deals with the
execution and service of penalties, provides:

ART. 78. When and how a penalty is to be executed. - No penalty shall executed except
by virtue of a final judgment.

A penalty shall not be executed in any other form than that prescribed by law, nor with
any other circumstances or incidents than those expressly authorized thereby.

It is a fundamental principle consecration in section 3 of the Jones Law, the Act of

Congress of the United States of America approved on August 29, 1916, which was still
in force when the order appealed from was made, that no person may be deprived of
liberty without due process of law. This constitutional provision was in a sense
incorporated in article 78 of the Revised Penal Code prescribing that no penalty shall be
executed except by virtue of a final judgment. As the fact show that there is no judgment
sentencing the accused to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvent to pay the
fine imposed upon him, because the said subsidiary imprisonment is not stated in the
judgment finding him guilty, it is clear that the court could not legally compel him to
serve said subsidiary imprisonment. A contrary holding would be a violation of the laws
aforementioned. That subsidiary imprisonment is a penalty, there can be no doubt, for,
according to article 39 of the Revised Penal Code, it is imposed upon the accused and
served by him in lieu of the fine which he fails to pay on account of insolvency. There is
not a single provision in the Code from which it may be logically inferred that an
accused may automatically be made to serve subsidiary imprisonment in a case where
he has been sentenced merely to pay a fine and has been found to be insolvent. Such
would be contrary to the legal provisions above-cited and to the doctrine laid down in
United States vs. Miranda (2 Phil., 606, 610), in which it was said: "That judgment of the
lower court fails to impose subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency for
indemnification to the owner of the banca, but only imposes subsidiary punishment as to
the costs. In this respect the judgment is erroneous and should be modified."

We, therefore, conclude that an accused who has been sentenced by final judgment to
pay a fine only and is found to be insolvent and could not pay the fine for this reason,

40
cannot be compelled to serve the subsidiary imprisonment provided for in article 39 of
the Revised Penal Code. [emphasis supplied]19

Indeed, Administrative Circular No. 13-2001 provides that "should only a fine be
imposed and the accused be unable to pay the fine, there is no legal obstacle to the
application of the Revised Penal Code provisions on subsidiary imprisonment."
However, the Circular does not sanction indiscriminate imposition of subsidiary
imprisonment for the same must still comply with the law.

Here, the judgment of conviction did not provide subsidiary imprisonment in case of
failure to pay the penalty of fine. Thus, subsidiary imprisonment may not be imposed
without violating the RPC and the constitutional provision on due process.

The final and executory decision of the MTC can no longer be modified.

Finally, the time-honored doctrine of immutability of judgment precludes modification of

a final and executory judgment:

A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. This quality of
immutability precludes the modification of a final judgment, even if the modification is
meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law. And this postulate holds true
whether the modification is made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court in
the land. The orderly administration of justice requires that, at the risk of occasional
errors, the judgments/resolutions of a court must reach a point of finality set by the law.
The noble purpose is to write finis to dispute once and for all. This is a fundamental
principle in our justice system, without which there would be no end to litigations.
Utmost respect and adherence to this principle must always be maintained by those
who exercise the power of adjudication. Any act, which violates such principle, must
immediately be struck down. Indeed, the principle of conclusiveness of prior
adjudications is not confined in its operation to the judgments of what are ordinarily
known as courts, but extends to all bodies upon which judicial powers had been
conferred.

The only exceptions to the rule on the immutability of final judgments are (1) the
correction of clerical errors, (2) the so-called nunc pro tune entries which cause no
prejudice to any party, and (3) void Judgments.20

There is no doubt that the MTC decision has long attained finality and that none of the
aforementioned exceptions finds application in this case. Hence, the MTC decision
stands and any other question involving the said decision must now be put to rest.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The 22 November 2011 Resolution of the Court

of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 118333 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

41
FACTS
In an Information, dated 26 May 2006, respondent Salvador Alapan (respondent) and
his wife Myrna Alapan (Myrna) were charged with eight (8) counts of violation of B.P.
Blg. 22.
Spouses Alapan borrowed ₱400,000.00 from petitioner Brian Victor
Britchford (petitioner) with a promise that they would pay the said amount within three
(3) months. To secure the indebtedness, respondent issued eight (8) postdated checks.
When the checks matured, petitioner deposited then at the Philippine National
Bank (PNB), Olongapo City branch. One week thereafter, PNB informed petitioner that
the checks were dishonored for the reason that the account against which the checks
were drawn was closed. Petitioner immediately informed respondent of the dishonor of
the checks.
On their part, the Spouses Alapan averred that their account was closed only on the last
week of October 2005 because they suffered business reverses. They nonetheless
stated that they were willing to settle their monetary obligation.

42
ISSUE
Whether respondent may undergo subsidiary imprisonment for failure to pay the fine.
RULE
It is a fundamental principle consecration in section 3 of the Jones Law, the Act of
Congress of the United States of America approved on August 29, 1916, which was still
in force when the order appealed from was made, that no person may be deprived of
liberty without due process of law. This constitutional provision was in a sense
incorporated in article 78 of the Revised Penal Code prescribing that no penalty shall be
executed except by virtue of a final judgment.
We, therefore, conclude that an accused who has been sentenced by final judgment to
pay a fine only and is found to be insolvent and could not pay the fine for this reason,
cannot be compelled to serve the subsidiary imprisonment provided for in article 39 of
the Revised Penal Code.
Indeed, Administrative Circular No. 13-2001 provides that "should only a fine be
imposed and the accused be unable to pay the fine, there is no legal obstacle to the
application of the Revised Penal Code provisions on subsidiary imprisonment."
However, the Circular does not sanction indiscriminate imposition of subsidiary
imprisonment for the same must still comply with the law.
Here, the judgment of conviction did not provide subsidiary imprisonment in case of
failure to pay the penalty of fine. Thus, subsidiary imprisonment may not be imposed
without violating the RPC and the constitutional provision on due process.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee v. NANCY LASACA RAMIREZ

A.K.A. "ZOY" OR "SOY", Accused-Appellant

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

This is an Appeal assailing the Court of Appeals October 23, 2014 Decision1 in CA-G.R.
CEB-CR HC No. 01655, which affirmed the Regional Trial Court January 9, 2013
Judgment2 in Crim. Case No. R-LLP-09-05622-CR. The trial court found Nancy Lasaca
Ramirez a.k.a. "ZOY" or "SOY" (Ramirez) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified
trafficking of persons in relation to Section 4(e)3 of Republic Act No. 9208, or the Anti-
Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003.

In an Information, Ramirez was charged with qualified trafficking of persons in relation

to Section 4(e) of Republic Act No. 9208. It read:

43
That on the 5th day of December, 2009, at or about 9:45 o'clock (sic) in the evening, in
████████████, Lapu-Lapu City, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the aforenamed accused, did then and there willfully and unlawfully maintain or
hire Nica Jean U. Goc-ong, 20 years old, AAA, 16 year old minor, Cindy Pancho, 20
years old and BBB, 15 year old minor, to engage in prostitution and offered them for sex
or any form of sexual exploitation to poseur customers.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

Ramirez pleaded not guilty on arraignment. Trial on the merits ensued.5

The prosecution alleged that at around 9:45 p.m. on December 5, 2009, Police Officer 1
Nef Nemenzo (PO1 Nemenzo) and 13 other members of the Regional Anti-Human
Trafficking Task Force conducted an entrapment operation in ████████████, Lapu-
Lapu City. The operation was "based on their surveillance of a widespread sexual
service for sale by young girls"6 in the area.7

The operation was divided into two (2) groups. PO1 Nemenzo's group targeted the area
of █████████ KTV Bar in front of █████ Grill. He would be disguised as a
customer negotiating for the prices of the minors' services.8

In the bar, PO1 Nemenzo and a team member, Police Officer 1 Llanes (PO1 Llanes),
ordered beers and waited for the pimps. Two (2) women approached them and
introduced themselves as AAA and BBB.9 Upon hearing that they would need two (2)
more girls, another woman approached them and introduced herself as Nancy, who was
later identified as Ramirez. She told the police officers that she could provide the girls.
Then, BBB and Ramirez left, and after a while, returned with two (2) more girls. They
agreed that each girl would cost ₱600.00 as payment for sexual services.10

After Ramirez provided the four (4) girls, the group left and hailed a taxi heading for
████████ Motel. Ramirez had told the girls to accept the money that they would be
given. In the taxi, PO1 Llanes handed ₱2,400.00 to one (1) of the girls. As soon as the
girl received it, PO1 Nemenzo and PO1 Llanes introduced themselves as police
officers, and turned the girls over to their team leader in a civilian van parked near them.
The police officers were told to return to the area and await the other teams' return.
Later, Ramirez was arrested when BBB pointed to her as the pimp.11

The prosecution also presented the testimony of BBB, a minor, who testified knowing
Ramirez and that she herself was pimped out by Ramirez several times already. BBB
stated that on the night of the incident, Ramirez approached her and asked if she
wanted to have sex for ₱200.00. She accepted and later, she and another girl, AAA,
approached two (2) customers. The men said that they needed two (2) more girls, so
Ramirez instructed BBB to get a couple more. She came back with two (2) girls, Nica
and Cindy. After the deal was made, the six (6) of them boarded a taxi.12

44
Before they left, Ramirez instructed BBB to get the money from the two (2) men. While
in the taxi, one (1) of the men handed her ₱2,400.00. She received the money and told
her companions to set aside ₱400.00 as their pimp's share. Instead of going to the
motel, the taxi stopped and the men introduced themselves as police officers.13

The prosecution likewise presented the testimony of AAA, a minor, who testified that
she had already been pimped by Ramirez twice. On the night of the incident, AAA
testified that Ramirez pimped her and three (3) other girls out to two (2) customers for
₱2,400.00. She stated that she knew Ramirez to be a pimp because Ramirez would
look for customers, negotiate prices, get girls to have sex with the customers, and get
commission from it.14

In her defense, Ramirez testified that at about 9:00p.m. on December 5, 2009, she and
her sister, Francy Ramirez, were at █████ Grill watching a live band when two (2)
men rushed to them, arrested her, and pushed her into a van. She asked why she was
being arrested but the men just laughed. In the van, she saw BBB, who told her that
police officers were around the area to arrest prostitutes. The men then brought her to a
gas station, where they were made to board another van with other women and two (2)
gay men. They were brought to the police station in █████████, Cebu City, where
they were investigated for prostitution.15

In its January 9, 2013 Judgment,16 the Regional Trial Court found Ramirez guilty. The
dispositive portion read:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered finding

the accused, Nancy Lasaca Ramirez guilty of the crime of Qualified Trafficking of
Person in Relation to Sec. 4 (e) of R.A. 9208 beyond reasonable doubt and sentences
her to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of Two million pesos
(P2,000,000.00).

SO ORDERED.17

Ramirez appealed before the Court of Appeals.18 She argued that she does not work at
█████████ KTV Bar, and that it was BBB who negotiated with the poseur customers
about the girls' prices and received the supposed payment for sexual services. 19 She
posits that the advanced payment made to BBB was "contrary to human nature and
natural course of events"20 since no sexual activity had occurred yet. She insists that
she was in the area just to watch a live band.21

In its October 23, 2014 Decision,22 the Court of Appeals denied the Appeal and affirmed
the Regional Trial Court January 9, 2013 Judgment. It highlighted the trial court's finding
of overwhelming evidence against Ramirez, as two (2) of the minor victims positively
identified her as their pimp.23

The Court of Appeals held that Ramirez not being employed at the █████████ KTV
Bar was irrelevant. It also found that even if BBB initiated the negotiation with the

45
poseur customers, the deal was only closed when Ramirez brought another pair of
girls.24 It further noted that it was not uncommon for the payment to be received by the
hired girls instead of the pimps. In any case, BBB testified that ₱400.00 had already
been earmarked from the ₱2,400.00 payment as Ramirez' commission. This was
enough to conclude that she was the girls' pimp.25

Ramirez filed a Notice of Appeal,26 to which the Court of Appeals gave due
course,27 elevating the case records to this Court.28

In its June 29, 2015 Resolution,29 this Court noted the elevation of records and directed
the parties to file their supplemental briefs. Both parties manifested that they were no
longer submitting supplemental briefs and moved that this Court instead consider the
arguments in their briefs submitted before the Court of Appeals.30

While the case was pending, accused-appellant sent a handwritten letter31 to this Court,
insisting that on the night of the incident, she was merely in the area with her sister to
watch a live band. She claims that she only met BBB that night, and that BBB suddenly
dragged her to look for two (2) more girls. She further alleges that it was BBB who
negotiated with the two (2) customers and that she had no idea what was going
on.32 She submits that BBB pointed to her as a pimp only because the police officers
were threatening to detain her instead.33

This Court is confronted with the sole issue of whether or not the prosecution proved
accused-appellant Nancy Lasaca Ramirez' guilt beyond reasonable doubt of qualified
trafficking of persons.

Republic Act No. 9208 defines trafficking in persons as:

SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. — As used in this Act:

(a) Trafficking in Persons — refers to the recruitment, transportation, transfer or

harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim's consent or knowledge, within
or across national borders by means of threat or use of force, or other forms of
coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage
of the vulnerability of the persons, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to
achieve the consent of a person having control over another person for the purpose of
exploitation which includes at a minimum, the exploitation or the prostitution of others or
other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the
removal or sale of organs.

The crime is still considered trafficking if it involves the "recruitment, transportation,

transfer, harboring[,] or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation" even if it does
not involve any of the means stated under the law. 34 Trafficking is considered qualified
when "the trafficked person is a child[.]"35

46
In People v. Casio,36 this Court enumerated the elements that must be established to
successfully prosecute the crime:

The elements of trafficking in persons can be derived from its definition under Section 3
(a) of Republic Act No. 9208, thus:

(1) The act of "recruitment, transportation, transfer or harbouring, or receipt of persons

with or without the victim's consent or knowledge, within or across national borders."

(2) The means used which include "threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion,
abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the
vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve
the consent of a person having control over another["]; and

(3) The purpose of trafficking is exploitation which includes "exploitation or the

prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services,
slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs."37

Republic Act No. 9208 has since been amended by Republic Act No. 10364 38 on
February 6, 2013. In recognition of the amendments to the law, Casio clarifies that
crimes prosecuted under Republic Act No. 10364 must have the following elements:

Under Republic Act No. 10364, the elements of trafficking in persons have been
expanded to include the following acts:

(1) The act of "recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing, offering, transportation,

transfer, maintaining, harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim's
consent or knowledge, within or across national borders[";]

(2) The means used include "by means of threat, or use of force, or other forms of
coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage
of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to
achieve the consent of a person having control over another person"[;]

(3) The purpose of trafficking includes "the exploitation or the prostitution of others or
other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the
removal or sale of organs[.]"39 (Emphasis in the original)

Here, accused-appellant was charged with having violated qualified trafficking in relation
to Section 4(e) of Republic Act No. 9208, which provides that it is unlawful for anyone
"[t]o maintain or hire a person to engage in prostitution or pornography[.]"

The prosecution established that on the night of December 5, 2009, accused-appellant

approached PO1 Nemenzo and offered him the sexual services of four (4) girls, two (2)
of whom were minors, for ₱2,400.00. The police operation had been the result of
previous surveillance conducted within the area by the Regional Anti-Human Trafficking

47
Task Force. Both minor victims testified that this incident was not the first time that
accused-appellant pimped them out to customers, and that any payment to them would
include the payment of commission to accused-appellant.

This Court in People v. Rodriguez40 acknowledged that as with Casio, the corroborating

testimonies of the arresting officer and the minor victims were sufficient to sustain a
conviction under the law. In People v. Spouses Ybanez, et al.,41 this Court likewise
affirmed the conviction of traffickers arrested based on a surveillance report on the
prostitution of minors within the area. In People v. XXX and YYY,42 this Court held that
the exploitation of minors, through either prostitution or pornography, is explicitly
prohibited under the law. Casio also recognizes that the crime is considered
consummated even if no sexual intercourse had taken place since the mere transaction
consummates the crime.43

Here, accused-appellant cannot use as a valid defense either BBB's and AAA's consent
to the transaction, or that BBB received the payment on her behalf. In Casio:44

The victim's consent is rendered meaningless due to the coercive, abusive, or deceptive
means employed by perpetrators of human trafficking. Even without the use of coercive,
abusive, or deceptive means, a minor's consent is not given out of his or her own free
will.45

Similarly, in People v. De Dios:46

It did not matter that there was no threat, force, coercion, abduction, fraud, deception or
abuse of power that was employed by De Dios when she involved AAA in her illicit
sexual trade. AAA was still a minor when she was exposed to prostitution by the
prodding, promises and acts of De Dios. Trafficking in persons may be committed also
by means of taking advantage of the persons' vulnerability as minors, a circumstance
that applied to AAA, was sufficiently alleged in the information and proved during the
trial. This element was further achieved through the offer of financial gain for the illicit
services that were provided by AAA to the customers of De Dios.47

Accused-appellant hired children to engage in prostitution, taking advantage of their

vulnerability as minors.1âшphi1 AAA's and BBB's acquiescence to the illicit transactions
cannot be considered as a valid defense.

Accused-appellant initially used the defense of denial, testifying that she was merely in
the area to listen to a live band when the police rushed to her and arrested her. Denial,
however, becomes a weak defense against the positive identification by the poseur-
buyer and the minor victims.48

Moreover, accused-appellant, in her handwritten letter to this Court,49 seemingly

abandoned her earlier statement that she was just in the area to watch a live band when
the police rushed to and arrested her. This time, she alleged that it was BBB who
approached and dragged her to the police officers, and who also started negotiating

48
prices.50 This contradicts her earlier statement that she had no knowledge of the
transaction. Worse, this appears to corroborate the prosecution witnesses' testimonies
that she was indeed at the transaction.

In any case, PO1 Nemenzo had categorically testified that he and PO1 Llanes were
approached by accused-appellant, who had negotiated prices on AAA and BBB's
behalf.51 Accused-appellant has not alleged any ill motive on PO1 Nemenzo's part to
testify against her.

This Court, therefore, affirms the trial court and the Court of Appeals' conviction of
accused-appellant in violation of Republic Act No. 9208, Section 4(e), as qualified by
Section 6(a) and punished under Section 10(c).52 In Casio,53 however, this Court held
that moral damages and exemplary damages must also be imposed. In People v.
Aguirre:54

The criminal case of Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute is an analogous case to the

crimes of seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts. In fact[,] it is worse, thus,
justifying the award of moral damages. Exemplary damages are imposed when the
crime is aggravated, as in this case.55

Thus, in line with jurisprudence, this Court deems it proper to impose moral damages of
₱500,000.00 and exemplary damages of ₱100,000.00.

WHEREFORE, the Appeal is DISMISSED. The Court of Appeals October 23, 2014
Decision in CA-G.R. CEB-CR HC No. 01655 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Accused-appellant Nancy Lasaca Ramirez a.k.a "ZOY" or "SOY" is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of having violated Republic Act No. 9208,
Section 4(e), as qualified by Section 6(a). She is sentenced to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of Two Million Pesos (₱2,000,000.00). She is further
ordered to pay Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00) as moral damages and
One Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱100,000.00) as exemplary damages to each of the
minor victims, AAA and BBB.

All damages awarded shall be subject to the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from
the finality of this Decision until its full satisfaction.56

SO ORDERED.

49
FACTS
The prosecution alleged that at around 9:45 p.m. on December 5, 2009, Police Officer 1
Nef Nemenzo (PO1 Nemenzo) and 13 other members of the Regional Anti-Human
Trafficking Task Force conducted an entrapment operation in Lapu-Lapu City, Cebu.
The operation was "based on their surveillance of a widespread sexual service for sale
by young girls" in the area.
The operation was divided into two (2) groups. PO1 Nemenzo's group targeted the area
of a KTV Bar. He would be disguised as a customer negotiating for the prices of the
minors' services.
After the entrapment operation, four girls were rescued, together with their pimp
Ramirez.

50
The prosecution presented the testimony of BBB, a minor, who testified knowing
Ramirez and that she herself was pimped out by Ramirez several times already and the
testimony of AAA, a minor, who testified that she had already been pimped by Ramirez
twice.
ISSUE
Whether or not the prosecution proved accused-appellant Nancy Lasaca Ramirez' guilt
beyond reasonable doubt of qualified trafficking of persons.
RULE
The prosecution established that on the night of December 5, 2009, accused-appellant
approached PO1 Nemenzo and offered him the sexual services of four (4) girls, two (2)
of whom were minors, for ₱2,400.00. The police operation had been the result of
previous surveillance conducted within the area by the Regional Anti-Human Trafficking
Task Force. Both minor victims testified that this incident was not the first time that
accused-appellant pimped them out to customers, and that any payment to them would
include the payment of commission to accused-appellant.
Here, accused-appellant cannot use as a valid defense either BBB's and AAA's consent
to the transaction, or that BBB received the payment on her behalf. Accused-appellant
likewise hired children to engage in prostitution, taking advantage of their vulnerability
as minors.1âшphi1 AAA's and BBB's acquiescence to the illicit transactions cannot be
considered as a valid defense.
In any case, PO1 Nemenzo had categorically testified that he and PO1 Llanes were
approached by accused-appellant, who had negotiated prices on AAA and BBB's
behalf. Accused-appellant has not alleged any ill motive on PO1 Nemenzo's part to
testify against her.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee v. BENJAMIN A. ELIMANCIL,

Accused-Appellant

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is to resolve the appeal of appellant Benjamin A. Elimancil that seeks to reverse
and set aside the Decision1 dated July 14, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR-HC No. 07588, affirming the Decision2 dated May 20, 2015 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 4, Mariveles, Bataan, finding appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Simple Rape under Article 266--A, par. 1 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC).

51
The facts follow.

AAA,3 the victim, was alone inside her boarding house in Mariveles, Bataan on the night
of August 14, 2000 because her board-mate, Agnes Dacuro, was out visiting friends.
AAA then fell asleep with the lights' on after she ckaned the house and waited for
Agnes.

Later, around 11:30 p.m., AAA felt someone lie beside her and she was immediately
awakened. She saw appellant, Benjamin Elimancil, poking a knife on her left side. She
knew Benjamin because both of them grew up in Abucay, Bataan, and was a friend of
her brother.

Thereafter, Benjamin pulled down AAA's pajama and panty while still poking the knife at
her.1âшphi1 AAA tried to resist, but all she could do was cry because appellant was still
holding the knife. Appellant proceeded to remove his pants and underwear and placed
himself on top of her. Afterwards, he forced his penis in AAA's vagina and made a push-
and-pull movement for more than one minute. AAA felt pain and cried until she felt a hot
liquid come out from appellant's penis. When AAA looked down, she saw blood in her
vagina. Before appellant left, he told AAA not to mention to anybody what transpired
between them or something bad would happen to her.

AAA remained at her boarding house and cried until her board-mate Agnes arrived past
midnight. AAA told Agnes what transpired and on the following day, AAA went to her
hometown in Abucay, Bataan and also told her parents what happened.

The father of AAA immediately went to the Mariveles Police Station and asked
assistance from the authorities to look for appellant. The policemen found appellant in
Mariveles, Bataan and the latter promised to go to AAA's parents' house in Abucay,
Bataan, but did not do so.

On August 17, 2000, AAA went to the Bataan Provincial Hospital and was examined by
Dr. Neriza A. Paguio. AAA's examination yielded the following medico-legal findings:

Pertinent Physical Findings:

 Patient is conscious, coherent, ambulatory

Breast - globularly enlarged with brownish aerola and overted nipples

Axilla - (-) axilliary hair flat

Genitalia - well distributed pubic hair

Labia majora and minora closely apposed

(+)superficial healed lacerations at 1, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10 o'clock position.

52
Hence, an Information was filed against appellant for the crime of Rape which reads as
follows:

That on or about 14 August 2000, in Mariveles, Bataan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, by means of force, threat, and
intimidation, armed with a bladed weapon, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously lie and succeed in having sexual intercourse with AAA, against her will and
consent, to her damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Appellant pleaded not guilty during his arraignment, thus, trial on the merits ensued.

Appellant denied raping AAA. According to him, AAA invited him at her boarding house
for a birthday party. When appellant arrived, he saw five women, including AAA and her
board-mate, Agnes Dacuro. Appellant slept over, while the other three left the boarding
house. The following day, appellant claimed that AAA and Agnes went to their
respective jobs. He added that it was impossible for him to sexually assault AAA,
considering that the occupant of the adjacent room, Joel Malate, could have easily
heard any commotion.

The RTC, on May 20, 2015, rendered its Judgment and found appellant

guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape. The dispositive portion

of the decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds accused BENJAMIN A. ELIMANCIL guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the Revised
Penal Code and there being an aggravating circumstance of the use [sic] a deadly
weapon, a bladed weapon in the commission of the offense without the presence of any
mitigating circumstance to offset the same, the Court hereby sentences said accused
BENJAMIN A. ELIMANCIL to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility
for parole.

In addition, accused BENJAMIN A. ELIMANCIL is hereby ordered to pay the victim

"AAA" the amount of Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as civil indemnity,
Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as moral damages and the amount of
Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.4

The RTC, aside from ruling that the elements of the crime of rape was proven beyond
reasonable doubt, also held that appellant was not able to present any proof as to the ill
motives of AAA.

53
Thus, appellant elevated the case to the CA, and the latter, on July 14, 2017,
promulgated its Decision affirming the decision of the RTC, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, the instant APPEAL is hereby
DENIED and the Decision dated May 20, 2015 in Criminal Case No. ML-1731 of the
Regional Trial Court of Mariveles, Bataan is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.5

The CA, in affirming the Decision of the RTC, also ruled that the medico-legal findings
are consistent with the claim of the victim AAA that she was raped and that her
straightforward, positive, and spontaneous testimony prevails over appellant's surmises.

Hence, the present appeal.

The appeal is unmeritorious.

In reviewing rape cases, this Court has constantly been guided by three principles, to
wit: (1) an accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more
difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic
nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony
of the complainant .must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for
the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot draw strength from the
weakness of the evidence for the defense. And as a result of these guiding principles,
credibility of the complainant becomes the single most important issue. If the testimony
of the victim is credible, convincing and consistent with human nature, and the normal
course of things, the accused may be convicted solely on the basis thereof.6

The determination of the credibility of the offended party's testimony is a most basic
consideration in every prosecution for rape, for the lone testimony of the victim, if
credible, is sufficient to sustain the verdict of conviction. 7 As in most rape cases, the
ultimate issue in this case is credibility. In this regard, when the issue is one of credibility
of witnesses, appellate courts will generally not disturb the findings of the trial court,
considering that the latter is in a better position to decide the question as it heard the
witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during
trial.8 The exceptions to the rule are when such evaluation was reached arbitrarily, or
when the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or
circumstance of weight and substance which could affect the result of the case.9 In the
present case, the said circumstances are not present, thus, it does not warrant an
exception to the coverage of the rule.

A review of the testimony of AAA would clearly show its consistency and
straightforwardness, a matter which the trial court correctly appreciated, thus:

FISCAL VELASCO:

54
Q What was that unusual incident that happened that you remember?

A On August 14, 2000, sir, I was sleeping in my boarding house. I was awaken (sic)
when I felt somebody lied beside me.

Q And when you felt somebody lied beside you, what did you do?

A I woke up sir, and when I was surprised when he poked a knife on my side.

Q And who was this person who lied beside you and who poked a knife on your left
side?

A Benjamin Elimancil, sir.

Q And why did you say that it was Benjamin Elimancil who lied beside you and poked a
knife on you?

A Because we have a light on then (sic), sir, and I know him.

Q How long have you known Benjamin Elimancil?

A I knew him, sir, because he is a [friend] of my brother and we both live in the same
place.

Q And when you felt a knife on your side and the accused Benjamin Elimancil besides
(sic) you, what happened next?

A He told me not to shout, sir or else something bad will happen to me.

Q And after saying those things, what happened next?

A He forcibly removed my pajama and my panty, sir.

Q Was he able to pull your pajama and your panty down?

A Yes, sir.

Q Up to where was your panty and your pajama pulled down?

A Middle of my legs, sir.

Q And when he was able to pull down your panty and your pajama, what did Benjamin
Elimancil do?

A He removed his pants and his brief, sir.

55
Q And after removing his pants and brief, what else did he do, if any?

A He lied on top of me, sir. I cannot fight him because he was poking a knife on my
side. I was so afraid that I just cried.

xxxx

Q And while forcing his organ unto your private part, what did you do, if any?

A I cried, sir. I tried to resist but I cannot do anything.

Q Despite the fact that you were crying, what did you do next when he was forcing his
organ onto your sex organ, what else happened, if any?

A After he was able to insert his organ into my private part, sir, he made a push-and-pull
motion and I got shocked.

Q And how long did he stay on top of you when he was making a motion of up and
down?

A For more than one (1) minute, sir.

Q And what did you feel when his organ is inside your sex organ?

A I got hurt and I continued crying, sir.

Q And after a minute as you have stated, what did you feel when he was making that up
and down motion, what did you feel?

A I just felt that there was this hot liquid that came from him, sir.

Q And after that, what happened next?

A I looked and I saw that the front portion of my body is bloodied, sir.

Q And what did Benjamin Elimancil do after that?

A He told me not to mention to anybody about it or else something bad will happen to
me, sir.

Q After uttering those remarks to you, what did he do next, if any?

A He left, sir.10

56
Based on the testimony of AAA, she was able to narrate convincingly to the trial court
the crime that was committed, hence, the trial court's assessment of AAA's credibility
must not be disturbed. As ruled by this Court in People of the Philippines v. Castel:11

Findings of facts and assessment of credibility of witnesses are matters best left to the
trial court. What militates against the claim of appellant is the time-honored rule that the
findings of facts and assessment of credibility of witnesses ·are matters best left to the
trial court. The trial court has the unique position of having observed that elusive and
incommunicable evidence of the witnesses' deportment on the stand while testifying,
which opportunity is denied to the appellate courts. Only the trial judge can observe the
furtive glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering tone,
calmness, sigh, or the scant or full realization of an oath - all of which are useful aids for
an accurate determination of a witness' honesty and sincerity.

Unless certain facts of substance and value were overlooked which, if considered, might
affect the result of the case, the trial court's assessment must be respected, for it had
the opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses while testifying
and to detect if they were lying.

To discredit AAA, appellant raises the argument that the crime of rape could not have
happened since another person was inside an adjacent room and any commotion would
have easily been noticed by the latter. Such reasoning is unacceptable. In a long line of
cases, this Court has ruled that a small living quarter has not been considered to be a
safe refuge from a sexual assault.12 Rape can be committed in the same room with the
rapist's spouse or where other members of the family are also sleeping,13 in a house
where there are other occupants or even in places which to many might appear unlikely
and high-risk venues for its commission.14 Lust, it has been said before, is apparently no
respecter of time and place.15 Neither is it necessary for the rape to be committed in an
isolated place, for rapists bear no respect for locale and time in carrying out their evil
deed.16

It must be remembered that denial and alibi are viewed by this Court with
disfavor,17 considering these are inherently weak defenses,18 especially in this case
where AAA positively identified appellant19 as the one who committed the crime against
her, as well as her straightforward and convincing testimony detailing the circumstances
and events leading to the rape.20

The penalty imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the CA is proper, except for the award
of exemplary damages. Per recent jurisprudence, the amount of exemplary damages
awarded should be ₱75,000.00, instead of ₱30,000.00.21

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated July 14, 2017 of the

Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 07588, affirming the Decision dated May 20,
2015 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 4, Mariveles, Bataan, finding Benjamin A.
Elimancil guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Simple Rape under Article 266-A, par. 1 of
the Revised Penal Code, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellant

57
is ORDERED to PAY the victim· AAA, aside from the earlier awarded civil and moral
damages, the amount of P75,000.00 as exemplary damages, with interest at the rate of
six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this Decision until said amounts are fully
paid.

SO ORDERED.

FACTS
AAA, was sleeping alone inside her boarding house in Mariveles, Bataan when she felt
someone lie beside her and was immediately awakened. She saw appellant, Benjamin
Elimancil, poking a knife on her left side.
Thereafter, Benjamin started to rape her while holding her at knife point. AAA felt pain
and cried until she felt a hot liquid come out from appellant's penis. When AAA looked

58
down, she saw blood in her vagina. Before appellant left, he told AAA not to mention to
anybody what transpired between them or something bad would happen to her.
When her board-mate Agnes arrived past midnight, AAA told Agnes what transpired
and on the following day, AAA went to her hometown in Abucay, Bataan and also told
her parents what happened.
ISSUE
Whether the lower courts erred in convicting the accused
RULE
The appeal is unmeritorious.
A review of the testimony of AAA would clearly show its consistency and
straightforwardness, a matter which the trial court correctly appreciated. She was able
to narrate convincingly to the trial court the crime that was committed, hence, the trial
court's assessment of AAA's credibility must not be disturbed.
The argument that the crime of rape could not have happened since another person
was inside an adjacent room and any commotion would have easily been noticed by the
latter is unacceptable. Lust, it has been said before, is apparently no respecter of time
and place. Neither is it necessary for the rape to be committed in an isolated place, for
rapists bear no respect for locale and time in carrying out their evil deed.
It must be remembered that denial and alibi are viewed by this Court with
disfavor, considering these are inherently weak defenses, especially in this case where
AAA positively identified appellant as the one who committed the crime against her, as
well as her straightforward and convincing testimony detailing the circumstances and
events leading to the rape.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee v. RENATO GALUGA y WAD-AS,

Accused-Appellant

DECISION

HERNANDO, J:
Challenged in this appeal is the Decision dated June 9, 2015[1] of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05592, which affirmed with modification the Decision[2] dated

59
November 15, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 19 of Cauayan City,
Isabela, in Criminal Case No. 19-1972, finding accused-appellant Renato
Galuga y Wad-as guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape committed
against AAA.[3]

Accused-appellant was charged before the RTC with violating Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, and further amended by
R.A. No. 8353, in relation with R.A. No. 7610, Article III, Section 5, paragraph b, in an
Information[4] that reads:

That on or about the 16th of April, 2002, in the municipality of x x x, province of Isabela,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, by
means of force and intimidation and with lewd designs, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, lay with, and have carnal knowledge [of] one [AAA], a minor
girl of 12 years of age, thereby subjecting her to exploitation and sexual abuse, against
her will and consent.

With the aggravating circumstance, that the victim [AAA], is a minor below 18 years of
age, during the commission of the crime.

Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.

[5]
 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

Private complainant herself, AAA; AAA's mother, BBB; AAA's father, CCC; Mitchell
Garlitos (Garlitos); and Joselito Borja (Borja), appeared as witnesses for the
prosecution. Dr. Ramon Hilomen, who allegedly conducted the physical examination of
AAA, failed to appear before the RTC despite several subpoenas sent to him.

The evidence for the prosecution presented the following version of events:
In the evening of April 16, 2002, after an altercation with her father CCC, 12-year-old
AAA left home and went to the barangay hall of Barangay II, San Mateo, Isabela. After
10 minutes, AAA proceeded to the park, sat beside the fountain, and cried for about 30
minutes. Accused-appellant approached AAA and introduced himself as "Jun-jun."
When AAA refused his invitation for them to go to the plaza, he then invited her to the
market place but, again, the latter refused. Accused-appellant then forcibly pulled AAA
towards the market place. AAA tried to free herself from accused-appellant's grasp but
she was unable to escape. At that time, there were about 12 people nearby but AAA did
not cry out for help because accused-appellant threatened to kill her.

Accused-appellant managed to pull AAA towards a parlor in the market place. The
parlor was already closed and had no lights on. Accused-appellant removed his clothes,
laid AAA on the ground, and started removing her shorts and shirt. AAA tried to resist
but accused-appellant threatened to kill her with a knife that was protruding from his
bag. After removing AAA's clothes, accused-appellant went on top of her and inserted
his penis into her vagina. AAA tried to push accused-appellant away but was
unsuccessful. AAA cried because she was overwhelmed by fear and she could not do
anything to free herself from her assailant.

60
At the time of the incident, witness Borja was driving his tricycle, with a passenger on-
board, witness Garlitos, when they saw accused-appellant pulling AAA towards the
market place. They immediately reported the incident to the victim's parents and also
accompanied AAA's father, CCC, to the place where they last saw AAA, which was in
front of Joy's Canteen (J's Canteen). The trio saw AAA and accused-appellant sitting on
a wooden bench outside Naty's Restaurant (N's Restaurant). They confronted accused-
appellant and brought him to the police station. AAA was crying and her hair was
rumpled; she also appeared to be in a state of confusion.

When AAA's mother, BBB, arrived at the police station, she asked AAA what happened
but she did not respond. Only when a lady police officer arrived did AAA disclose that
she was raped by accused-appellant.

On the other hand, the defense presented the accused-appellant himself, accused-
appellant's live-in partner, Realyn Acosta (Acosta), and Teddy Santos (Santos) as
witnesses.

According to the evidence for the defense, accused-appellant was on his way home
from work on April 16, 2002 when he saw AAA crying beside a fountain at the public
park. Accused-appellant asked AAA to come with him to N's Restaurant, which was just
across the fountain. She agreed and went with him. She then asked him to buy bread
because she was hungry. However, after a few minutes, AAA's father and his two
companions arrived and suddenly boxed accused-appellant. Thereafter, accused-
appellant was brought to the municipal police station. Acosta and Santos both testified
that many people go to the park at night since there are several mini-stores and eateries
in the area.

On November 15, 2011, the RTC rendered a Decision convicting accused-appellant for
the crime of rape.

The RTC found that AAA testified in open court in a straightforward and unequivocal
manner and positively identified accused-appellant as the one who raped her. AAA also
willingly pursued the case for three years just to finish her testimony in court despite the
lengthy delay in the proceedings caused by the defense. The trial court gave greater
weight to AAA's testimony as no woman would be willing to undergo a public trial, along
with the shame, humiliation, and dishonor of exposing her own degradation. The fact
that the doctor who allegedly examined her failed to testify in court did not destroy the
prosecution's case against accused-appellant.
Moreover, the RTC adjudged that accused-appellant's denial and his self-serving
assertions could not overcome AAA's affirmative, categorical, and convincing testimony.
Also, accused-appellant did not deny the fact that he was with AAA during the incident
which made the testimonies of defense witnesses Acosta and Santos inconsequential.

The fallo of the RTC judgment reads:

61
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused RENATO GALUGA
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE and hereby sentences him to
suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua without eligibility for parole and to pay
complainant AAA the amount of P75,000.00 as moral damages, P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.[6]

Accused-appellant filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals.

In its assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals denied accused-appellant's appeal.

According to the appellate court, AAA's straightforward testimony satisfactorily
established the elements of rape: AAA testified that the accused-appellant had carnal
knowledge of her by forcibly laying her down on the floor, inserting his penis into her
vagina, and threatening to kill her if she made a sound, and that she tried to push
accused-appellant away but did not succeed. AAA's positive testimony thus prevailed
over accused-appellant's plain denial.

The Court of Appeals ultimately affirmed with modification the RTC Decision dated
November 15, 2011 as follows:

ACCORDINGLY, the appeal is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated November 15,

2011 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The awards of moral damages and civil
indemnity are REDUCED from P75,000.00 to P50,000.00, each. The award of
exemplary damages is INCREASED from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00.[7]

Hence, the present appeal.[8]

Accused-appellant and plaintiff-appellee adopted their respective briefs before the Court
of Appeals.[9] Accused-appellant reiterates the following assignment of errors on the part
of the RTC, and subsequently also of the Court of Appeals:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-

APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED ALTHOUGH HIS GUILT HAS NOT BEEN
PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL CREDENCE TO THE

TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES DESPITE THEIR PATENT
INCONSISTENCIES.[10]

Accused-appellant claims that the RTC gravely erred in giving credence to AAA's
testimony despite numerous inconsistencies and contradictions in her testimony. He

62
points out that the complainant claimed that there were a number of people in the park
who saw them together at the time of the incident. Even the prosecution witnesses,
Borja and Garlitos, narrated that they merely saw accused-appellant with AAA at the
park. He additionally highlights AAA's failure to immediately inform her parents that she
was raped by accused-appellant.

We find no merit in accused-appellant's contentions; hence, his appeal must be denied,

subject to modification as to the amount of damages as shall hereafter be discussed.

In resolving this case, we refer to the time-tested principles in deciding rape cases, to
wit:

In the review of rape cases, we continue to be guided by the following principles: (1) an
accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for
the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the nature of the crime
of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant is
scrutinized with extreme caution; and, (3) the evidence for the prosecution stands or
falls on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the
defense. Thus, in a prosecution for rape, the complainant's credibility becomes the
single most important issue.[11] (Citation omitted.)

Taking into consideration the aforementioned principles, we have carefully reviewed the
records of this case and saw no compelling reason to reverse or modify the factual
findings of the RTC, particularly since the Court of Appeals had affirmed the same with
modification only as to the amount of damages awarded to AAA.

We will not disturb the weight and credence accorded by both the RTC and the Court of
Appeals with respect to AAA's testimony. When it comes to credibility, the assessment
by the trial court deserves great weight, and even conclusive and binding effect, unless
the same is tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of
weight and influence. Since it had the full opportunity to observe directly the deportment
and the manner of testifying of the witnesses before it, the trial court is in a better
position than the appellate court to properly evaluate testimonial evidence. The rule
finds an even more stringent application where the Court of Appeals sustained said
findings,[12] as in this case.

The records of this case clearly bear out that accused-appellant had carnal knowledge
of AAA through the use of force, threat, and intimidation. AAA categorically narrated that
accused-appellant had inserted his penis into her vagina against her will, thus:

PROSECUTION:

Q: Now, after meeting Junjun, did you go somewhere else?

63
A: He invited me x x x to go to plaza, sir.

Q: And did you accede with his invitation?

A: No, sir.

Q: And so when you turned down his invitation what if any [did] Junjun do?
A: He asked me if I want to go to the public market, sir.

Q: And what was your reply?

A: I did not accede, sir.

Q: And when you again declined the offer of Junjun, what if any did Junjun do?

A: He [held] me and brought me to the public market, sir.

Q: By the way, if that Junjun is in court, will you please identify?

A: Yes, sir, he is the one. (Witness pointing to a man who previously entered the
courtroom wearing a green choleko (sic) and when asked by the Court
Interpreter he gave his name as Renato Galuga y [Wad]-as).

Q: You said a while ago [that] when you refused to go [to] the public market, the
accused held your arms[.] [W]hat next did he do aside from holding your arms?
A: He pulled me and brought me to the public market, sir.

Q: And did you not resist when he pulled you?

A: I resisted, sir, but he [was] stronger than me.

Q: [Were] there other people around when the accused pulled you?
A: There were, sir.

Q: How many?

64
A: About twelve (12) persons, sir.

Q: And did you not shout, AAA?

A: I was then confused, sir.

xxxx

A: I was threatened by the accused and if I will shout he will kill me, sir.

xxxx

Q: Was the accused holding anything at that time?

A: There was, sir.

Q: What?
A: He was holding a bag and inside the bag there was a protruding knife, sir.

Q: Did he bring out the knife?

A: No, sir.

Q: And did the accused succeed in bringing you to the market from the fountain?
A: Yes, sir.

xxxx

Q: While the accused was taking you to the public market, what if any did you do,
AAA?
A: I was struggling and pulling away my hands from him, sir.

65
Q: And did you succeed?
A: No, sir.

xxxx

Q: Upon reaching the public market, what if any [did] the accused do?
A: We stopped at the parlor place, sir.

Q: And was that parlor [open]?

A: No, sir.

Q: What did you do then?

A: He removed his clothes, sir.

xxxx

Q: And when the accused was removing his clothes, what did you do?
A: I was trying to pull my hand from him but still he was removing my clothes, sir.

Q: [Were] there people around [at or] near the parlor x x x?

A: None, sir.

xxxx

Q: And after the accused [removed] his clothes, what did you do next?
A: He placed his clothes [on] the ground floor and he layed (sic) me down, sir.

Q: When the accused was already naked and when he laid you down on the
ground, what occurred [in] your mind, AAA?

66
A: I was crying, sir.

Q: And so was the accused able to lay you down on the ground?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: Did you not resist?

A: I tried to push him, sir, but he was still strong, sir.

Q: Did you not shout?

A: If I will shout he will kill me, sir.

Q: What was your attire at that time?

A: Shorts and shirt, sir.

Q: What happened to your attire when you were already laid to the ground by the
accused AAA?
A: He removed, sir.

Q: Who removed?
A: Junjun, sir.

Q: And when you were already naked, what if any [did] the accused do?
A: He went on top of me, sir.

Q: And when he was already on top of you, what if any did [he] do?
A: He inserted his penis [into] my vagina, sir.

Q: And could you tell us your x x x exact position when the accused inserted his
penis [into] your vagina?
A: I was lying down, sir.

67
Q: What about the accused?
A: He was on top of me, sir.

Q: And could you tell us how was he able to insert his penis [into] your vagina?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: While the accused was inserting his penis [into] your vagina, did you not resist?
A: I was crying and tried to push him, sir.

Q: And did you succeed?

A: No, sir.

Q: And was he able to insert his penis [into] your vagina?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And was he still on top of you when the accused inserted his penis into your
vagina?
A: Yes, sir.

xxxx

Q: But did you push him all the time?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: So after the accused inserted his penis into your vagina, AAA, what if any did
he tell you?
A: I was crying, sir, and he threatened me that if I will make any noise he will kill
me.[13]

The RTC found, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, that AAA's testimony was

68
straightforward, convincing, and consistent. Indeed, AAA described vividly how
accused-appellant deflowered her and we cannot imagine how a child, as young in
years as AAA, could directly and consistently recount in open court such an ordeal,
unless she, in fact, had experienced the same. Between accused-appellant's plain
denial and AAA's categorical testimony, we give weight to the latter, especially because
accused-appellant admitted that he was actually found together with AAA in front of N's
Restaurant by AAA's father and prosecution witnesses Borja and Garlitos.

AAA could not have been compelled by a motive other than to bring to justice the
despoiler of her virtue. There was no showing that she was moved by anger or any ill
motive against accused-appellant or that she was unduly pressured or influenced by
anyone to charge accused-appellant with the serious crime of rape. Where there is no
evidence that the principal witness for the prosecution was actuated by improper
motive, the presumption is that he/she was not so actuated and his/her testimony is
entitled to full credence.[14]

Relevant herein are our declarations in People v. Magtibay[15]:

The trial court correctly gave full faith and credence to Rachelle[']s testimony. There was
no showing that Rachelle had an improper motive to testify against accused-appellant.
The non-attendance of any ill motive on the part of Rachelle gains more weight in the
light of Merlyn Magtibay[']s description of Rachelle as a nice person. Accused-appellant
also had no reason why Rachelle would falsely accuse [him] of such serious crime as
rape if she were not motivated to bring her perpetrator to justice. Needless to say, it is
settled jurisprudence that testimonies of child-victims are given full weight and
credit, since when a woman, more so if she is a minor, says she has been raped,
she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed. Youth
and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity.

A girl of such age as the victim would not concoct a tale of defloration, allow the
examination of her private parts, make public the offense, undergo the trouble and
humiliation of a public trial, and endure the ordeal of narrating all its gory details, if she
had not in fact been raped. If the accused-appellant had really nothing to do with the
crime, it would be against the natural order of events and of human nature, and against
the presumption of good faith, that a prosecution witness would falsely accuse him of
such a serious crime as rape. (Emphasis ours, citations omitted.)

In an attempt to raise doubts as to the credibility of AAA's testimony, accused-appellant

points out that (a) AAA did not shout for help during the time of the incident; and (b) she
failed to immediately inform her parents that she was raped. We have always held that
there is no standard behavior expected of rape victims. Depending on the
circumstances and their personal and emotional situation, victims react differently. In
this case, AAA explained that she was confused at the time of the incident and afraid
that if she shouted for help, accused-appellant would kill her. Also, it is not rare for
young girls to hide for some time the violation of their honor because of the threats on
their lives.[16] As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals:

69
[BBB], the victim's mother, saw her daughter at the police precinct in a state of
confusion. AAA did not respond immediately after she was asked what happened. AAA
was crying. It was only when a policewoman arrived that AAA confessed to having been
raped by appellant, in the presence of her mother. AAA's initial silence, her state of
confusion, and crying are natural reactions of a rape victim who suffered pain, trauma
and shame in appellant's brutal hands. Besides, AAA was only a 12-year-old child at the
time she got raped. Be that as it may, different people react differently to the same
situation, and not every victim of a crime can be expected to act reasonably and
conformably to the expectations of everyone. In any event, this matter is post facto and
totally irrelevant to the fact that appellant raped the victim. [17]

Since accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, we

affirm the imposition by the RTC and the Court of Appeals of the penalty
of reclusion perpetua under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code. However, in line
with recent jurisprudence,[18] we increase the awards for civil indemnity, moral damages,
and exemplary damages to PhP75,000.00 each. In addition, ve impose interest at the
rate of six percent (6%) per annum on all monetary awards from date of finality of this
Decision until fully paid.

As a final matter, a pending incident in this case is accused-appellant's Letter dated

March 20, 2017, which was received by this Court on March 25, 2017, in which he
pleads for the withdrawal of his appeal, asserting that he is eligible for parole and/or
probation.

We deny accused-appellant's prayer for withdrawal of his appeal as he is ineligible to

apply for either parole or probation.

Accused-appellant, as he is sentenced herein to suffer the penalty

of reclusion perpetua, cannot apply for parole because Section 3 of R.A. No.
9346[19] explicitly states that "[p]ersons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion
perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this
Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended."

Accused-appellant is likewise disqualified from applying for probation as Section 9(a) of

the Probation Law[20] is clear that the benefits of probation shall not extend to those
sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six (6) years.
Irrefragably, the sentence of reclusion perpetua imposed on accused-appellant in this
case exceeds six (6) years of imprisonment.

Furthermore, Section 4 of the Probation Law, as amended, reads:

SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. – Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court
may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant for a probationable
penalty and upon application by said defendant within the period for perfecting an
appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation

70
for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best. No
application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has
perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction: Provided, That when a
judgment or conviction imposing a non-probationable penalty is appealed or reviewed,
and such judgment is modified through the imposition of a probationable penalty, the
defendant shall be allowed to apply for probation based on the modified decision before
such decision becomes final. The application for probation based on the modified
decision shall be filed in the trial court where the judgment of conviction imposing a non-
probationable penalty was rendered, or in the trial court where such case has since
been raffled. In a case involving several defendants where some have taken further
appeal, the other defendants may apply for probation by submitting a written application
and attaching thereto a certified true copy of the judgment of conviction. (Emphasis
ours.)

Section 4 of the Probation Law, as amended, intends to put a stop to the practice of
appealing from judgments of conviction even if the sentence is probationable, for the
purpose of securing an acquittal and applying for the probation only if the accused fails
in his bid. An accused must not have appealed his conviction before he can avail
himself of probation. Jurisprudence treats appeal and probation as mutually exclusive
remedies because the law is unmistakable about it. The law is very clear and a contrary
interpretation would counter its envisioned mandate.[21] Thus, even assuming that herein
accused-appellant is qualified to apply for parole, he has already availed himself of the
remedy of appeal twice, by appealing the RTC judgment of conviction before the Court
of Appeals, and then appealing the Court of Appeals decision affirming his conviction
before this Court, which already proscribes him from applying for probation.

WHEREFORE, we hereby RESOLVE to:

(a) DISMISS the instant appeal and to AFFIRM with MODIFICATION the Decision

dated June 9, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05592 as to the
monetary awards, by ordering accused-appellant Renato Galuga y Wad-as to pay the
private complainant AAA the amounts of PhP75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
PhP75,000.00 as moral damages, and PhP75,000.00 as exemplary damages, and
imposing interest of six percent (6%) per annum on all monetary awards from date of
finality of this Decision until fully paid; and

(b) DENY the plea of accused-appellant Renato Galuga y Wad-as to withdraw his

appeal.

SO ORDERED.

FACTS

71
Accused-appellant, aged 12, was at the park alone when she was approached by AAA
who invited her to go to different places but AAA refused. When accused-appellant then
forcibly pulled AAA towards the market place, AAA tried to free herself from accused-
appellant's grasp but she was unable to escape. At that time, there were about 12
people nearby but AAA did not cry out for help because accused-appellant threatened
to kill her.
Upon reaching the market place, they went to the parlor which was already closed and
had no lights on. Accused-appellant removed his clothes, laid AAA on the ground, and
started removing her shorts and shirt and began to rape her. AAA cried because she
was overwhelmed by fear and she could not do anything to free herself from her
assailant.
A witness who saw AAA being pulled to the market place immediately reported the
incident to the victim's parents and also accompanied AAA's father, CCC, to the place
where they last saw AAA. When they saw accused-appellant with AAA, the latter was
crying and her hair was rumpled and appeared to be in a state of confusion.
Upon arrival at the police station, AAA was asked what happened but she did not
respond. Only when a lady police officer arrived did AAA disclose that she was raped by
accused-appellant.
ISSUE
Whether the trial court gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime
charged although his guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
RULE
The records of this case clearly bear out that accused-appellant had carnal knowledge
of AAA through the use of force, threat, and intimidation. AAA categorically narrated that
accused-appellant had inserted his penis into her vagina against her will.
The R TC found, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, that AAA's testimony was
straightforward, convincing, and consistent as she described vividly how accused-
appellant deflowered her and we cannot imagine how a child, as young in years as
AAA, could directly and consistently recount in open court such an ordeal, unless she,
in fact, had experienced the same.
AAA could not have been compelled by a motive other than to bring to justice the
despoiler of her virtue. There was no showing that she was moved by anger or any ill
motive against accused-appellant or that she was unduly pressured or influenced by
anyone to charge accused-appellant with the serious crime of rape. Where there is no
evidence that the principal witness for the prosecution was actuated by improper
motive, the presumption is that he/she was not so actuated and his/her testimony is
entitled to full credence.

72
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BENJAMIN CASAS y
VINTULAN, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is an ordinary appeal 1 filed by accused-appellant Benjamin Casas y

Vintulan (Casas) assailing the Decision2 dated November 20, 2013 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC. No. 05313 which affirmed the Decision 3 dated
November 4, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 160 (RTC) in Crim.
Case Nos. 136842 and 136843, finding Casas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes of Murder and Attempted Homicide under Articles 248 and 249 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC), respectively.

The Facts

Two (2) criminal Informations were filed before the RTC charging Casas of the Murder
of Joel Tabile y Gulla4 (Joel) and the Frustrated Murder of Eligio5 Ruiz y
Ricardo6 (Eligio), the pertinent portions of which respectively read:

Crim. Case No. 136842

That, on or about the 24th day of December, 2007, in the City of San Juan, a place
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, in conspiracy
with another person, whose true identity and present whereabouts are unknown, with
the use of a bladed weapon, a deadly weapon, with intent to kill and by means of the
qualifying circumstance treachery (sic), evident premeditation and abuse of superior
strength, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab
one Joel Tabile y Gulla, thereby inflicting upon the latter several stab wounds on the
different parts of his body, which directly caused his death.

Crim. Case No. 136843

That, on or about the 24th day of December, 2007, in the City of San Juan, a place
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, in conspiracy
with another person, whose true identity and present whereabouts are unknown, with
intent to kill and by means of the qualifying circumstance treachery, evident
premeditation and abuse of superior strength, which qualifies the crime to frustrated
murder, with the use of a bladed weapon, a deadly weapon, did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one Elegio Ruiz y Ricardo, thereby
inflicting upon the latter several stab wounds on the different parts of his body, which
ordinarily would have caused his death, thus, performing all the acts of execution which
would produce the crime of murder as a consequence but which nevertheless, did not
produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the accused, that is, due to the

73
timely medical assistance rendered unto said Elegio Ruiz y Ricardo, which prevented
his death. CONTRARY TO LAW.8

During arraignment, Casas entered a plea of not guilty. After which, joint trial on the
merits ensued.9

The prosecution’s version of the facts is as follows:

On December 24, 2007, between 1 to 2 o’ clock in the afternoon, Casas, accompanied

by a certain "Ron-Ron" (Ron-Ron), went to a certain taho factory located at 313 F.
Roman Street, San Juan City, looking for a certain Jesus. Failing to find the person he
was looking for, Casas brandished a knife and stuck it into a pail used for making taho.
Consequently, Eligio, an employee of the tahofactory, confronted Casas, saying to the
latter, "Benjie[(referring to Casas)], bakit ang yabang mo? Kung hindi mo makita ang
kalaban mo, dapat hanapin mo na lang." Casas replied "Gusto mo ito? (referring to his
knife)." Eligio told Casas to get rid of the knife, which the latter gave to Ron-Ron. Eligio
and Casas then had a fistfight. During the ensuing melee, Casas took the knife from
Ron-Ron and stabbed Eligio twice while the latter was fleeing. Casas, during his
continued pursuit of Eligio, then ran into Joel, who, for his part, tried to help Eligio with
the use of a bamboo pole. However, Joel slipped, fell face first on the floor, and was
prostrate. There and then, Casas stabbed him twice, the first blow entering his back and
exiting at the front of his torso, and the second blow hitting the left side of his abdomen.
Casas managed to overtake Eligio, and stabbed him again on the stomach. Fearing that
Casas would kill him, Eligio grabbed a plastic stool and hit Casas on the head with it,
forcing the latter to drop the knife and cease the attack. PO1 Silverio R. Fuentes (PO1
Fuentes) claimed that he was riding his motorcycle on the date of the incident when he
met PO3 Eduardo Fronda (PO3 Fronda) who asked for assistance as the latter saw a
bloodied male. The two immediately proceeded towards the victim, who turned out to be
Casas, and asked him what happened. The latter replied that he had just stabbed
someone. After confirming that there was indeed a stabbing incident nearby, PO1
Fuentes and PO3 Fronda arrested Casas.10

After the prosecution rested its case, Casas filed a demurrer to Evidence11 on the basis
of the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, which the
RTC denied in an Order12 dated December 30, 2010.13 With the demurrer’s denial, the
defense changed its theory as Casas admitted that he stabbed both Joel and Eligio but
interposed self-defense to justify his actions.14 In particular, Casas claimed that he was
a former employee of the taho factory and that on December 24, 2007, the date of the
incident, his former employer asked him to get the remainder of his salary. While at the
factory, Joel challenged him to a fight. Casas averred that he refused to accept Joel’s
challenge, but the latter took a knife and attacked him. During the alleged attack, Casas
posited that he suffered minor injuries when he disarmed and stabbed Joel. Eligio and
one Rolando Jaronel witnessed the fight, and when they saw that Casas stabbed Joel
they began to attack him also. In order to protect himself, Casas repeatedly stabbed
Eligio. He maintained that he did not intend to kill Joel.15

74
The RTC Ruling

In a Decision16 dated November 4, 2011, the RTC convicted Casas of the following:

(a) in Crim. Case No. 136842, Murder (of Joel), thereby sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with all the concomitant accessory penalties,
and ordering him to pay the amounts of ₱50,000.00 in civil indemnity,
₱12,500.00 in actual damages, ₱37,200.00 in loss of earning capacity,
₱30,000.00 in moral damages, ₱30,000.00 in exemplary damages, and costs;
and

(b) in Crim. Case No. 136843,Attempted Homicide (of Eligio), thereby sentencing
him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six (6) months of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to three (3) years and six (6) months of prision
correccional, as maximum, and ordering him to pay the amount of ₱14,000.00 as
temperate damages, and costs.17

It declared that the evidence on record did not support Casas’s theory of self-defense,
observing that the victims showed no unlawful aggression towards Casas. On the other
hand, the prosecution’s witnesses invariably testified that it was Casas who wielded a
knife, brought it to bear on Eligio, then on Joel as he lay prostrate, and again on Eligio
as he was fleeing, establishing that Casas was the aggressor. Further, it was pointed
out that Casas suffered only nine (9) injuries, consisting of three (3) abrasions, one (1)
contusion, and five (5) incised wounds, which did not, collectively or individually,
threaten his life at any time.18 Conversely, Joel was killed because of the stab wounds
that Casas inflicted, while Eligio was stabbed multiple times. As such, the second
requirement under Article 11 (1) of the RPC, i.e., the reasonable necessity of the means
employed to repel the unlawful aggression, was non-existent.19

Meanwhile, the RTC found that Casas stabbed Joel twice when the latter slipped, fell,
and lay prostrate, and in that position Joel could not defend himself. Accordingly, it ruled
that Casas employed treachery in killing Joel, and thus should be convicted for
Murder.20

As for Eligio, the RTC opined that though Casas’s intent to kill the former was present
(as shown by the weapon he used, the number of wounds he inflicted, his resolution to
chase and harm Eligio after the latter fled, and the parts of Eligio’s body that Casas
injured), the circumstances that would qualify the case to Murder were not attendant;
therefore, Casas should be convicted only of Homicide in such respect. The RTC also
ruled that the said crime was only in its attempted stage given that the prosecution was
not able to prove that he performed all the acts of execution which would consummate
the Homicide,21 nor show the nature of Eligio’s wounds.22

Dissatisfied, Casas appealed23 to the CA.

The CA Ruling

75
In a Decision24 dated November 20, 2013, the CA affirmed the RTC’s conviction of
Casas but modified the amounts awarded to ₱75,000.00 in civil indemnity, ₱12,500.00
in actual damages, ₱37,200.00 in loss of earning capacity, ₱30,000.00 in moral
damages, and ₱30,000.00 in exemplary damages for the Murder of Joel. As for the
Attempted Homicide of Eligio, it awarded ₱25,000.00 in temperate damages, and
₱10,000.00 in moral damages, in order to conform with recent jurisprudence.

Aggrieved, Casas filed the instant appeal.25

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not Casas’s conviction for the crimes
of Murder and Attempted Homicide should be upheld.

The Court’s Ruling

The appeal is partly meritorious.

The Court first rules on the existence of criminal liability.

Essentially, Casas, in a sudden change of theory from the denial of his demurrer, banks
on the justifying circumstance of self-defense in order to overturn his conviction for the
crimes of Murder and Attempted Homicide. The statutory basis therefor is Article 11 (1)
of the RPC which reads:

Art. 11. Justifying circumstances.— The following do not incur any criminal liability:

1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following
circumstances concur:

First. Unlawful aggression;

Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;

Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

After a careful review of the records, the Court is satisfied that the RTC, as affirmed by
the CA, correctly pronounced that the above-mentioned requirements were not present
in this case. It is significant to point out that upon invoking the justifying circumstance of
self-defense, Casas assumed the burden of proving the justification of his act with clear
and convincing evidence. This is because his having admitted the killing required him to
rely on the strength of his own evidence, not on the weakness of the prosecution’s
evidence, which, even if it were weak, could not be disbelieved in view of his
admission.26

76
Preliminarily, Casas failed to prove any unlawful aggression on the part of either Joel or
Eligio, which is a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstance of self-defense
to obtain. As case law puts it, there can be no self-defense unless the victim committed
unlawful aggression against the person who resorted to self-defense.27 As shown by the
records, it was Casas who was actually the aggressor, as he was the one who wielded
a knife, brought it to bear on Eligio, then on Joel as he lay prostrate, and again on Eligio
as he was fleeing.28 Being the party initiating the attack, and overbearing with a deadly
weapon, Casas cannot successfully claim that there was unlawful aggression. Verily, for
unlawful aggression to be appreciated, there must be an actual, sudden and
unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, not merely a threatening or intimidating
attitude,29 as against the one claiming self-defense. Evidently, the contrary happened in
this case.

It bears clarification that the initial fistfight between Eligio and Casas does not indicate
that unlawful aggression was employed by the former against the latter considering that
Eligio had already yielded from the brawl and, in fact, proceeded to flee. It is well-settled
that the moment the first aggressor runs away – if and so such was the case with
respect to Eligio – unlawful aggression on the part of the first aggressor ceases to exist;
and when unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no longer has any right to kill or
wound the former aggressor; otherwise, retaliation, and not self-defense, is committed.
Retaliation is not the same as self-defense. In retaliation, the aggression that was
begun by the injured party already ceased when the accused attacked him, while in self-
defense the aggression was still existing when the aggressor was injured by the
accused.30

Thus, given that the core element of unlawful aggression was not proven, Casas’s claim
of self-defense falters and his criminal liability stands.

This notwithstanding, the Court, however, disagrees that Casas should be convicted of
the crime of Murder with respect to the incidents in Crim. Case No. 136842, i.e., the
death of Joel, considering the prosecution’s failure to prove the existence of treachery.
The Court expounds. The elements of Murder that the prosecution must establish are:
(a) that a person was killed; (b) that the accused killed him or her; (c) that the killing was
attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC;
and (d) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide.

Among the qualifying circumstances thus enumerated in Article 248 is

treachery.1âwphi1 Under Article 14 of the RPC, "[t]here is treachery when the offender
commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in
the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without
risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make." In other
words, to appreciate treachery, it must be shown that: (a) the means of execution
employed gives the victim no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (b) the
methods of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted;31 indeed, treachery
cannot be presumed, it must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.32

77
In People v. Se,33 the Court explained that the essence of treachery is the sudden,
unexpected, and unforeseen attack on the victim, without the slightest provocation on
the latter’s part. The victim must not have known the peril he was exposed to at the
moment of the attack. Should it appear, however, that the victim was forewarned of the
danger he was in, and, instead of fleeing from it he met it and was killed as a result,
then the qualifying circumstance of treachery cannot be appreciated.34

In People v. Discalsota,35 the Court held that treachery cannot be appreciated in

instances when the victim had the opportunity to flee or defend himself.36

In this case, the records show that a fistfight ensued between Eligio and Casas.37 Joel,
seeing that Casas had stabbed Eligio, wanted to help the latter by using a bamboo pole
but slipped and fell.38 As he was lying prostrate on the floor, Casas delivered the blows
that ended Joel’s life. Under these circumstances, it is the Court’s observation that Joel
was fully aware of the danger posed in assisting Eligio. He knew that Casas was armed
with a knife and had just used the same on Eligio. Joel elected to intervene, and even
armed himself with a bamboo pole. Accordingly, it is rather obvious that Joel was aware
of the danger to his life. Further, acting in the heat of the moment, and there being no
showing that no appreciable interval of time had elapsed from Joel’s mishap to his
stabbing so as to allow for the assailant’s careful reflection, it does not equally appear
that Casas deliberately adopted means in order to ensure that Joel had no opportunity
to defend himself or retaliate. Palpably, Casas just happened to stab Joel as the latter
had just slipped on the floor when the former caught up with him (Joel). Evidently, this
lack of deliberation on the part of Casas, as well as Joel’s obvious awareness of the
danger to his life, prompts this Court to discount treachery as a qualifying circumstance.
Thus, insofar as the incidents in Crim. Case No. 136842 go, the Court downgrades the
conviction to the crime of Homicide. In consequence, Casas is instead meted with the
penalty of imprisonment with an indeterminate period of six (6) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, with all the concomitant accessory penalties, for the Homicide of Joel.

The downgrading of Casas’s conviction in Crim. Case No. 136842 results in the deletion
of the award of ₱30,000.00 in exemplary damages.39 Further, keeping with recent
jurisprudence, the Court is impelled to increase the award of moral damages from
₱30,000.00 to ₱75,000.00,40 as well as delete the award of ₱12,500.00 in actual
damages and, in lieu thereof, award temperate damages in the higher amount of
₱25,000.00.41 The Court also perceives error in the award of ₱37,200.00 in loss of
earning capacity since the established formula thereof was incorrectly applied.

The formula for the computation of loss of earning capacity is as follows:42

Net earning capacity = Life Expectancy x [Gross Annual Income - Living Expenses
(50% of gross annual income)], where life expectancy = 2/3 (80 - the age of the
deceased).

78
Thus, operating under the established facts as found by the RTC that Joel was 22 when
he was killed by Casas, and that he had monthly salary of 1,000.00 to 1,500.00 as a
utility man,43 the loss of earning capacity is computed as such:

Net earning capacity = [2/3(80-22)] x [(1500 x 12) - ((1,500 x 12) x 50%)]

= [2/3(58)] x [₱18,000.00 - ₱9,000.00]

= ₱348,000.00

Accordingly, the award of loss of earning capacity is increased from ₱37,200.00 to

₱348,000.00 as above-computed. Meanwhile, the civil indemnity award of ₱75,000.00
stands.44

In similar light, the Court modifies the award of moral damages in Crim. Case No.
136843from ₱10,000.00 to ₱20,000.00 to conform with recent jurisprudence.45

Finally, interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be imposed on all
damages awarded, in both Crim. Case Nos. 136842 and 136843, from the date of
finality of judgment until fully paid.46

WHEREFORE, the Court ADOPTS the findings of fact and conclusions of law in the
Decision dated November 20, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC.
No. 05313 with MODIFICATION in that, in Crim. Case No. 136842, considering that the
qualifying circumstance of treachery was not proven, accused-appellant Benjamin
Casas y Vintulan is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt only of the crime of
Homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code and is therefore sentenced to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment with an indeterminate period of six (6) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, with all the concomitant accessory penalties.

Further, in order to conform with existing jurisprudence, the following monetary awards
are MODIFIED: in Crim. Case No. 136842, (a) the award of ₱12,500.00 in actual
damages is deleted and, in lieu thereof, ₱25,000.00 in temperate damages is awarded;
(b) the award of loss of earning capacity is increased from ₱37,200.00 to ₱348,000.00;
(c) the award of ₱30,000.00 in moral damages is increased to ₱75,000.00; and (d) the
award of ₱30,000.00 in exemplary damages is deleted; and in Crim. Case No. 136843,
the award of ₱10,000.00 in moral damages is increased to ₱20,000.00. In addition, all
awards for damages, in Crim. Case Nos. 136842 and 136843, shall bear legal interest
at the rate of six percent ( 6%) per annum from the date of finality of judgment until fully
paid.

The rest of the CA Decision stands.

SO ORDERED.

79
FACTS
On December 24, 2007, Casas allegedly stabbed Eligio while the latter was fleeing from
their fight. Casas continued his pursuit of Eligio, who, then ran into Joel and tried to help
Eligio but to no avail. When he caught up with Eligio, Casas stabbed the latter twice, the
first blow entering his back and exiting at the front of his torso, and the second blow
hitting the left side of his abdomen. Casas managed to overtake Eligio, and stabbed him
again on the stomach. Fearing that Casas would kill him, Eligio grabbed a plastic stool
and hit Casas on the head with it, forcing the latter to drop the knife and cease the
attack.
PO1 Fuentes claimed that he was riding his motorcycle on the date of the incident when
he met PO3 PO3 Fronda who asked for assistance as the latter saw a bloodied male.
The two immediately proceeded towards the victim, who turned out to be Casas, and
asked him what happened. The latter replied that he had just stabbed someone. After
confirming that there was indeed a stabbing incident nearby, PO1 Fuentes and PO3
Fronda arrested Casas.
After the prosecution rested its case, Casas filed a demurrer to Evidenceon the basis of
the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, which the
RTC denied in an Order. With the demurrer’s denial, the defense changed its theory as
Casas admitted that he stabbed both Joel and Eligio but interposed self-defense to
justify his actions.
Casas was convicted of Murder and Attempted Homicide on the ground that the
evidence on record did not support Casas’ theory of self-defense, observing that the
victims showed no unlawful aggression towards Casas. Casas appealed to the CA but
the previous ruling was affirmed.
ISSUES
1. Whether the lower courts erred in convicting Casas based on the ground of self
defense
2. Whether the lower courts erred in convicting the accused of Murder
RULE
1. Essentially, Casas, banks on the justifying circumstance of self-defense in order
to overturn his conviction for the crimes of Murder and Attempted Homicide. The
RTC, as affirmed by the CA, correctly pronounced that the requirements for self-
defense were not present in this case.

80
Casas failed to prove any unlawful aggression on the part of either Joel or Eligio. As shown by the
records, it was Casas who was actually the aggressor, as he was the one who wielded a knife, brought it
to bear on Eligio and Joel. For unlawful aggression to be appreciated, there must be an actual, sudden
and unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, not merely a threatening or intimidating
attitude, as against the one claiming self-defense. Evidently, the contrary happened in
this case.
The initial fistfight between Eligio and Casas does not indicate that unlawful aggression
was employed by the former against the latter. It is well-settled that the moment the first
aggressor runs away, unlawful aggression on the part of the first aggressor ceases to
exist; and when unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no longer has any right to kill
or wound the former aggressor; otherwise, retaliation, and not self-defense, is
committed. Retaliation is not the same as self-defense. In retaliation, the aggression
that was begun by the injured party already ceased when the accused attacked him,
while in self-defense the aggression was still existing when the aggressor was injured
by the accused.
Thus, given that the core element of unlawful aggression was not proven, Casas’s claim
of self-defense falters and his criminal liability stands.
The Court disagrees that Casas should be convicted of the crime of Murder considering
the prosecution’s failure to prove the existence of treachery under Article 248. To
appreciate treachery, it must be shown that: (a) the means of execution employed gives
the victim no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (b) the methods of execution
were deliberately or consciously adopted; indeed, treachery cannot be presumed, it
must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.
In this case, the records show that a fistfight ensued between Eligio and Casas. It does
not appear that Casas deliberately adopted means in order to ensure that Joel had no
opportunity to defend himself or retaliate. Casas just happened to stab Joel as the latter
had just slipped on the floor when the former caught up with him (Joel). Evidently, this
lack of deliberation on the part of Casas, as well as Joel’s obvious awareness of the
danger to his life, prompts this Court to discount treachery as a qualifying circumstance.

81
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. JULIE GRACE K.
VILLANUEVA, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Under review is the decision promulgated on May 25, 2004,1 whereby the Court of
Appeals (CA) affirmed with modification the judgment rendered on January 24, 2002 by
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 60, in Makati City convicting Julie Grace K.
Villanueva of estafa as defined and penalized under Article 315, paragraph 2 (d) of the
Revised Penal Code.2 The decretal portion of the assailed decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from convicting accused-appellant Julie Grace K.

Villanueva of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code is
AFFIRMED, with MODIFICATION as to the penalty imposed as hereinabove indicated.
The Resolution of January 15, 2004 granting her bail pending appeal is REVOKED and
her profferred bail bond is REJECTED. Pursuant to Section 13, second paragraph, Rule
124 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the case, inclusive of the entire
record thereof, is CERTIFIED and ELEVATED to the Supreme Court for review. Costs
against the accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.3

Antecedents

Villanueva stands charged with estafa as defined and penalized under Article 315,
paragraph 2 (d), of the Revised Penal Code under the information that reads:

That on or about the 16th day of August 1994, in the City of Makati, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously by means of deceit, false pretenses and
fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud,
following PNB checks, [to] wit:

Check No. Date Amount

031526 9-02-94 ₱185,000.00
031527 9-17-94 185,000.00
031528 10-02-94 185,000.00

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 031529 10-17-94 185,000.00
031532 9-16-94 85,000.00
031533 10-16-94 85,000.00
031534 11-16-94 85,000.00

as payment for various jewelries (sic) purchased to (sic) the said complainant, the
accused well knowing that at the time of issue thereof, the said checks have no
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank to cover the amount of the said
checks, neither will said checks be honored or paid upon presentment, the bank
dishonored and returned the said checks for the reason "account closed" or "stopped
payment" or should have been dishonored for insufficiency of funds had not the said
accused, without any valid reason, ordered her drawee bank to stop payment and
despite repeated demands accused failed and refused to deposit the amount necessary
to cover the aforesaid check or to pay the value thereof, to the damage and prejudice of
the said complainant in the aforesaid amounts.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

Version of the Prosecution

In August 1994, Loreto Madarang met Villanueva through a townmate. The latter was
interested in buying jewelry. Being then engaged in the business of selling jewelry,
Madarang went to Villanueva's residence at the Galeria de Magallanes, and was able to
sell to Villanueva five sets of jewelry worth ₱1,010, 000. 00.5 Villanueva made out nine
checks drawn against Philippine National Bank (PNB), eight of which were postdated.
Villanueva signed a receipt reading as follows:6

August 16, 1994

Received from MRS. LORETO A. MADARANG the following jewelries (sic) with the
corresponding amount

1 set diamond - ₱70,000

1 set South Sea Black
w/ necklace & bracelet - 220,000
1 set heart shape diamond
w/ pendant (4.56 cts) - 450,000
1 set marquee xxx dia. 2 cts. - 220,000
1 bracelet diamond - 50,000

₱1,010,000

83
paid by the following checks issued by me

PNB #031501 - August 6, 1994 ₱5,000

PNB #031531 - August 19, 1994 10,000
PNB #031526 - Sept. 2, 1994 185,000
PNB #031527 - Sept. 17, 1994 185,000
PNB #031528 - Oct. 2, 1994 185,000
PNB #031529 - Oct. 17, 1994 185,000
PNB #031532 - Sept. 16, 1994 85,000
PNB #031533 - Oct. 16, 1994 85,000
PNB #031534 - Nov. 16, 1994 85,000

₱1,010,000

with a total of One Million Ten Thousand pesos.

(sgd)
JULIE GRACE K. VILLANUEVA

Madarang received the checks because of Villanueva's assurance that they would all be
honored upon presentment.7 However, the drawee bank paid only PNB Check No.
031501 and PNB Check No. 131531, the remaining seven checks being dishonored
either by reason of Account Closed or Drawn Against Insufficient Funds. 8 Madarang
tried to call and see Villanueva at her residence to inform her of the dishonored checks,
but Madarang was barred by security guards from reaching Villanueva. 9 Madarang
resorted to sending demand letters, but her effort to contact Villanueva proved
futile.10 After Villanueva did not settle her obligations, Madarang brought the criminal
complaint for estafa,11 and the corresponding information for estafa was ultimately filed
in court on September 4, 1995. On arraignment, Villanueva pleaded not guilty.12

Version of the Defense

Villanueva denied the accusation. She claimed that she met Madarang three times. The
first was at the residence of Cheng Diaz Davis, where Madarang was then selling
jewelry. The second time was at her residence in the Galeria de Magallanes where
Madarang arrived without prior notice at around 7:00 or 7:30 in the evening. Madarang
was persistent that Villanueva buy jewelry on credit, and even assured Villanueva that
she could replace the same if she was dissatisfied with her purchase. Madarang
prevailed on Villanueva to buy six pieces of jewelry, for which she issued six checks as
payment, five of which were postdated. On August 16, 1994, Villanueva saw Madarang
for the last time to have the jewelry replaced. Villanueva retrieved the checks she had

84
previously issued and replaced them with another set of postdated checks that were the
subject of the criminal case against her. Villanueva maintained that the second set of
checks were issued as guarantee under the agreement that they were not to be
deposited until Villanueva advised Madarang of the sufficiency of funds in her account.
Villanueva insisted that she did not receive any notice from Madarang regarding the
dishonor of the checks.13 Ruling of the RTC

On January 24, 2002, the RTC rendered its judgment finding Villanueva guilty as
charged,14 viz:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing this Court finds accused Julie Grace K.
Villanueva GUILTY of the crime of estafa as punished under Art. 315 par. 2( d) of the
Revised Penal Code in relation to Presidential Decree No. 818, said crime having been
committed in the manner described in the information filed on September 4, 1995.

As a consequence of this judgment, accused shall suffer the penalty of punishment for a
period of Fourteen Years Eight Months and One Day to Twenty Years which is within
the range of Reclusion Temporal in its medium and maximum periods.

She is also ordered to pay the private complainant Mrs. Loreto Madarang the sum of
Nine Hundred Ninety Five Thousand Pesos (₱995,000.00) plus interest at the legal rate
of 12% per annum until the mount is fully paid with said interest accruing at the time the
information was filed on or October 25, 1995.

The period of accused's detention shall be credited in her favor conformably with Art. 29
of the Revised Penal Code.

She shall serve her entire sentence at the Correccional Institute for Women at
Mandaluyong City.

SO ORDERED.15

Decision of the CA

On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction but differed on the application of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, to wit:

Nonetheless, the indeterminate penalty imposed by the trial court, which is 14 years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day to twenty (20) years, both of reclusion temporal, is
erroneous. Said court did not pay obeisance to the teaching of People v. Hernando, viz:

Presidential Decree No. 818 provides:

"SECTION 1. Any person who shall defraud another by means of false pretenses or
fraudulent acts as defined in paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by Republic Act No. 4885, shall be punished by:

85
1st. The penalty of reclusion temporal of the amount of fraud is over 12,000 pesos but
does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty
provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for
each additional 10,000 pesos but the total penalty which may be imposed shall in no
case exceed thirty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties
which may be imposed under the Revised Penal Code, the penalty shall be termed
reclusion perpetua;

x x x x."

"x x x x

Hence, if the amount of the fraud exceeds twenty two thousand pesos, the penalty of
reclusion temporal is imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each
additional ten thousand (₱10,000.00) pesos but the total penalty shall not exceed thirty
(30) years, which shall be termed reclusion perpetua. As used herein, reclusion
perpetua is not the prescribed penalty for the offense. It merely describes the penalty
actually imposed on account of the amount of the fraud involved, which exceeds twenty
two thousand (₱22,000.00) pesos.

"Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, if the offense is punished by the Revised
Penal Code, such as estafa, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate
penalty, the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the Revised Penal Code,
and the minimum term of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to
that prescribed by the Code for the offense." "The penalty next lower should be based
on the penalty prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first considering any
modifying circumstance attendant to the commission of the crime. The determination of
the minimum penalty is left by law to the sound discretion of the court and it can be
anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower without any reference to the periods
into which it might be subdivided. The modifying circumstances are considered only in
the imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence." Here, complainant
was defrauded in the amount of seven hundred [thousand] (₱700,000.00) pesos. The
fact that the amount involved in the instant case exceeds ₱22,000.00 should not be
considered in the initial determination of the indeterminate penalty; instead the matter
would be so taken as analogous to modifying circumstances in the imposition of the
maximum term of the full indeterminate sentence. This accords with the rule that penal
laws are construed in favor of the accused.

Applying the above-cited provision, accused shall be meted an indeterminate sentence,

the maximum of which shall be taken from the maximum period of the basic penalty,
that is, reclusion temporal, to be imposed in its maximum period, plus one (1) year for
each additional ₱10,000.00 of the amount of the fraud, but the total penalty shall not
exceed thirty (30) years. On the other hand, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence
shall be within the range of the penalty next lower in degree to that prescribed by the
Code for the offense, without first considering any modifying circumstance nor the

86
incremental penalty for the amount of the fraud in excess of twenty two thousand
(₱22,000.00) pesos. Such penalty is prision mayor, with a duration of six ( 6) years and
one ( 1) day to twelve (12) years."

Accordingly, the accused-appellant in the case at bar should be, as she is hereby,
sentenced to suffer the penalty of EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
mayor, as minimum, to THIRTY (30) YEARS of reclusion perpetua as maximum.

x x x x.16

The CA then certified the case to the Court pursuant to Section 13 of Rule 124, Rules of
Court.

Issues

Villanueva submits the following errors for our consideration:

THE LOWER COURT ORA VEL Y ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSEDAPPELLANT

GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED.

II

THE LOWER COURT ORA VEL Y ERRED IN NOT GIVING FULL CREDENCE
TO THE DEFENSE OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

III

WHETHER THERE WAS FRAUD PRIOR TO OR SIMULTANEOUS WITH THE

ISSUANCE OF THE SUBJECT POST-DATED CHECKS.

IV

WHETHER THE ACCUSED APPELLANT IS GUILTY, BEYOND REASONABLE

DOUBT, OF EST AF A.17

Villanueva insists on the absence of fraud when she drew the postdated checks,
averring that: (a) the checks were issued as replacement; (b) the checks could only be
deposited or encashed after Madarang was notified of the sufficiency of funds; and (c)
the receipt presented by the Prosecution failed to embody the real intention of the
parties.18 She argues that estafa under paragraph 2( d), Article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code was not committed because the checks were not executed prior to or
simultaneous with the alleged fraud; and because Madarang had instigated her to issue
the checks.19

87
Did Villanueva commit estafa punishable under Article 315, paragraph 2(d), of the
Revised Penal Code in issuing the seven postdated checks?

Ruling of the Court

We affirm the conviction.

Article 315, paragraph 2(d), of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Article 315. Swindling (estafa) - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the
means mentioned hereinbelow x x x:

xxxx

2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to
or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:

xxxx

(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the

offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to
cover the amount of the check. The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the
amount necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of notice from
the bank and/or the payee or holder that said check has been dishonored for lack or
insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense
or fraudulent act.

The estafa charged in the information may be committed, therefore, when: (1) the
offender has postdated or issued a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the
time of the postdating or issuance; (2) at the time of postdating or issuance of said
check, the offender has no funds in the bank, or the funds deposited are not sufficient to
cover the amount of the check; and (3) the payee has been defrauded. 20 The deceit
should be the efficient cause of the defraudation, and should either be prior to, or
simultaneous with, the act of the fraud.21

All the elements of estafa were present. The first element was admitted by Villanueva,
who confirmed that she had issued the checks to Madarang in exchange for the jewelry
she had purchased. There is no question that Madarang accepted the checks upon the
assurance of Villanueva that they would be funded upon presentment. It is clear that
Madarang would not have parted with and entrusted the pieces of valuable jewelry to
Villanueva whom she barely knew unless Villanueva gave such assurance to her. The
second element was likewise established because the checks were dishonored upon
presentment due to insufficiency of funds or because the account was already closed.
The third element was also proved by the showing that Madarang suffered prejudice by
her failure to collect from Villanueva the balance of ₱995,000.00.

88
In her defense, Villanueva adverts to an agreement with Madarang whereby the latter
would deposit or encash the checks only after being informed of the sufficiency of funds
in Villanueva's account. Villanueva posits that the receipt the Prosecution presented in
evidence did not embody such agreement.

This defense of Villanueva is actually anchored on the rule that estafa will not lie when
the parties waive the negotiable character of the check, and instead treat the same as
proof of an obligation. For instance, when there is an agreement between the parties at
the time of the issuance and postdating of the checks that the obligee shall not encash
or present the same to the bank, the obligor cannot be prosecuted for estafa because
the element of deceit is lacking. When the payee was informed that the checks are not
covered by adequate funds, bad faith or estafa shall not arise.22

Villanueva does not impress. Her defense crumbles because she did not present proof
of the supposed agreement.1âwphi1 The receipt signed by her proved the transaction
and her issuance of the postdated checks by listing the items bought and the postdated
checks issued as payment. If the parties really agreed for Madarang to deposit the
checks only after notice of the sufficiency of funds, then such agreement should have
been incorporated in the receipt as an integral part of the transaction, or simply written
in another document with Madarang's express conformity for Villanueva's protection.
We simply cannot accept that Villanueva signed the receipt despite not including the
supposed agreement that would shield her from probable criminal prosecution. In that
regard, her being a businesswoman23 presumably made her aware of the
consequences of issuing unfunded checks.24 All that she is claiming here is that the
receipt did not express the true intention of the parties, implying that no written
document substantiated her alleged defense. She did not claim at all that she had been
coerced or intimidated into signing the receipt as written. Her self-serving statements on
the agreement were entirely inadequate to establish her assertions, for they were not
proof.25

Under Article 315 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by P.D. 818, the penalty
for estafa when the total value of the checks exceed ₱22,000.00 is reclusion temporal in
its maximum period (i.e., 17 years, four moths and one day to 20 years), plus one year
for each additional Pl0,000. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum
term shall be from six years and one day to 12 years of prision mayor. In imposing the
indeterminate sentence of eight years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum, to
thirty years of reclusion perpetua as maximum, the CA correctly applied the
Indeterminate Sentence Law. It is well to state that reclusion perpetua merely describes
in this instance the penalty actually imposed on account of the amount of the fraud
involved.26

We note, however, that the CA affirmed the imposition by the RTC of 12% interest
accruing from the time that the information was filed until the full satisfaction of the
obligation in the amount of ₱995,000.00. Conformably with the ruling in Nacar v. Gallery
Frames27 applying Resolution No. 796 of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary
Board (BSP-MB), said amount should earn interest of 12% per annum from the filing of

89
the information on September 4, 1995 until June 30, 2013, and interest of 6% per
annum from July 1, 2013 until its full satisfaction. WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS
the decision promulgated on May 25, 2004 by the Court of Appeals, subject to the
MODIFICATION that the amount of ₱995,000.00 shall earn interest 12% per annum
from the filing of the information on September 4, 1995 until June 30, 2013, and interest
of 6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until its full satisfaction.

The petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

90
FACTS
In August 1994, Villanueva made out nine checks drawn against Philippine National
Bank, eight of which were postdated as payment for five sets of jewelry worth more than
Php 1,000,000. Madarang received the checks because of Villanueva's assurance that
they would all be honored upon presentment. However, the drawee bank paid only two
checks, the remaining seven checks being dishonored either by reason of Account
Closed or Drawn Against Insufficient Funds. Madarang tried to call and see Villanueva
at her residence to inform her of the dishonored checks, but Madarang was barred by
security guards from reaching Villanueva. Madarang resorted to sending demand
letters, but her effort to contact Villanueva proved futile. After Villanueva did not settle
her obligations, Madarang brought the criminal complaint for estafa.
ISSUE
Did Villanueva commit estafa punishable under Article 315, paragraph 2(d), of the
Revised Penal Code in issuing the seven postdated checks?
RULE
All the elements of estafa were present. The first element was admitted by Villanueva,
who confirmed that she had issued the checks to Madarang in exchange for the jewelry
she had purchased. There is no question that Madarang accepted the checks upon the
assurance of Villanueva that they would be funded upon presentment. It is clear that
Madarang would not have parted with and entrusted the pieces of valuable jewelry to
Villanueva whom she barely knew unless Villanueva gave such assurance to her. The
second element was likewise established because the checks were dishonored upon
presentment due to insufficiency of funds or because the account was already closed.
The third element was also proved by the showing that Madarang suffered prejudice by
her failure to collect from Villanueva the balance of ₱995,000.00.
Villanueva’s defense crumbles because she did not present proof of the supposed
agreement that she claims to have happened.1âwphi1 The receipt signed by her proved
the transaction and her issuance of the postdated checks by listing the items bought
and the postdated checks issued as payment. If the parties really agreed for Madarang
to deposit the checks only after notice of the sufficiency of funds, then such agreement
should have been incorporated in the receipt as an integral part of the transaction, or
simply written in another document with Madarang's express conformity for Villanueva's
protection.

91
CHERRY ANN M. BENABAYE, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated August 31, 2011
and the Resolution3 dated September 6, 2012 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR No. 00722-MIN which sustained the conviction of petitioner for the crime of
Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

The Facts

Petitioner Cherry Ann Benabaye (Benabaye) was the Loans Bookkeeper of Siam Bank
Inc., Iligan City Branch (Siam Bank). As such, she was authorized to collect and/or
accept loan payments of Siam Bank's clients and issue provisional receipts
therefor,4 accomplish a cash transfer s lip at the end of each banking day detailing the
amounts of money that she has received, and remit such payments to Jenkin U. Tupag
(Tupag), her supervisor.5

Sometime in 2001, Siam Bank conducted an audit investigation of its loan transactions
for the period December 1, 2000 to June 15, 2001, and thereby found out that fraud and
certain irregularities attended the same. Specifically, it discovered the non-remittance of
some loan payments received from its clients based on the provisional receipts issued
by its account officers, as well as the daily collection reports corresponding to the said
provisional receipts.6 Based on the audit, 853 provisional receipts in the aggregate
amount of ₱470,768.00 were issued by Benabaye but were unreported, and, more
significantly, the corresponding payments were unremitted based on the daily collection
reports on file.7

Thus, in a memorandum8 dated July 13, 2001, Siam Bank directed Benabaye to

explain, among others, the discrepancies between the provisional receipts she had
issued and the unremitted money involved. Likewise, Siam Bank made a final demand
upon her to return the amount of the money involved. In her written explanation9 dated
July 18, 2001, Benabaye claimed, among others, that the discrepancies could be
clarified by her supervisor, Tupag, to whom she had submitted her daily cash transfer
slips together with the corresponding provisional receipts.

Meanwhile, Siam Bank also sent a memorandum10 dated July 13, 2001 to Tupag
requiring him to explain, among others, the same discrepancies between the provisional
receipts and daily collection reports that were submitted to him; it further demanded the
return of the amount involved. In his written explanation 11 dated July 16, 2001, Tupag
admitted his accountability and, while claiming that some of his co-employees were
privy to the acts which resulted in the discrepancies, he did not disclose their identities.

92
Apparently dissatisfied with their explanations, Siam Bank Terminated12 the employment
of both Benabaye and Tupag and subsequently filed a criminal case for Estafa before
the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 4 (RTC), docketed as Crim. Case No.
9344, against them. On March 5, 2002, they were charged in an Information 13 which
reads:

That sometime between the period from December 1, 2000 up to June 15, 2001, in the
City of Iligan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, with unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously defraud Siam Bank, Inc. in the following manner, to wit: the said accused
being then employed as Micro Finance Unit Supervisor and Loans Bookkeeper,
respectively of Siam Bank, Inc.-Iligan Branch and authorized to collect and receive
payments of loans, did collect and receive payments from the bank's borrowers or
clients in the total amount of ₱688,833.00, under the express obligation on the part of
said accused to remit the amount collected to the bank, but once in possession of said
amount and far from complying with their obligation, said accused converted,
misapplied said amount to their own use and benefit, and despite repeated demands,
they failed and refused and still fails and refuses to pay the said amount of
₱688,833.00, to the damage and prejudice of the said Siam Bank, Inc. in the aforesaid
amount of ₱688,833.00, Philippine currency.

Contrary to and in violation of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.14

In her defense, Benabaye reiterated15 the contents of her written explanation dated July
18, 2001 that she remitted the provisional receipts together with the corresponding
amounts collected, as well as the daily cash transfer slips, to her supervisor, Tupag, at
the end of each banking day. Unfortunately, she was required to make only one (1)
copy of the daily cash transfer slips, which were all remitted to and remained in the
possession of Tupag.16 She asseverated, however, that when she was allowed to
inspect the files of the bank after the audit, she learned that Tupag had reissued several
provisional receipts, for which she had previously issued provisional receipts, which
were unremitted to the bank.17 At the dorsal portion of the reissued provisional receipts,
Tupag had annotated the numbers of the unremitted ones that she had issued. 18 She
also claimed that other Siam Bank employees were authorized to issue provisional
receipts, e.g. their janitor, the bank manager, and even on-the-job trainees (OJTs),
asserting that it was the bank's standard operating procedure.19

As for Tupag, he was unable to testify, hence, the trial was concluded sans his
testimony.20

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision21 dated July 31, 2000, the RTC found both Benabaye and Tupag guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b ), and sentenced
each of them to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years and

93
one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum. They were likewise ordered to indemnify Siam Bank the total amount of
₱688,833.00 as actual damages.22

In so ruling, the RTC found that all the elements of the crime charged have been
established, to wit: (a) that any goods or other personal property is received by the
offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any obligation
involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same; (b) that there be
misappropriation or conversion of such money or property to the offender or denial on
his part of such receipt; (c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the
prejudice of another; and (d) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the
offender.23 From the evidence presented, the RTC found that both Benabaye and Tupag
held.the loan payments of Siam Bank's clients in trust for the latter, with the obligation to
remit it to the Bank, in the total amount of ₱688,833.00 insofar as Benabaye is
concerned and ₱25,955.00 on the part of Tupag.24 However, they misappropriated the
same to the damage and prejudice of Siam Bank, and despite demand, failed to
account for the money. As for Benabaye, while she claimed that she remitted the loan
payments to Tupag, she failed to offer evidence that Tupag had actually received the
said amount.25

Dissatisfied, Benabaye appealed26 her conviction to the CA, maintaining her innocence

on the grounds that: (a) her possession of the money comprising the loan payments of
Siam Bank's clients was merely material, not juridical, hence, she cannot be validly
indicted for Estafa; ( b) the R TC erred in holding that the acts described in the
Information constituted only one (1) single offense; and ( c) there was no conspiracy
between her and Tupag.27

On the other hand, Tupag likewise appealed28 his conviction, but was however denied
by the RTC in an Order29 dated October 9, 2009. The RTC held that Tupag lost his
remedy to appeal under Section 6, Paragraph 5, Rule 12030 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure. Records of this case were then elevated to the CA.31

The CA Ruling

In a Decision32 dated August 31, 2011, the CA affirmed Benabaye's conviction in toto,

similarly finding that all the elements of Estafa through misappropriation have been
established. It ruled that Benabaye, together with Tupag, held the money collected in
trust for Siam Bank.33 Likewise, the CA found that while there were 853 unremitted
provisional receipts involved in this case, Benabaye's "continuing intention to commit
Estafa constituted a single intention although committed on different dates."34 Thus, her
crime was a "continuing offense" as all the acts of misappropriation were part of a
"single criminal design."35 Finally, the CA ruled that conspiracy between Benabaye and
Tupag was sufficiently established, considering that both had access and facility to
determine if payments made by Siam Bank's clients were properly remitted. 36 As such, if
there were unremitted payments, both of them would likewise be aware thereof.
Moreover, while Benabaye claimed that she remitted the provisional receipts and

94
corresponding payments to Tupag, she however failed to show, through sufficient
evidence, that Tupag actually received the same.37

Benabaye moved for reconsideration,38 which the CA denied m a Resolution39 dated

September 6, 2012, hence, this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The sole issue to be resolved by the Court is whether or not the CA erred in sustaining
Benabaye's conviction for the crime of Estafa through misappropriation.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the RPC, as amended, under which Benabaye was
charged and prosecuted, states:

Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any means
mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:

1st. The penalty of pr is ion correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed
22,000 pesos; and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this
paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional
10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty
years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be
imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be
termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be[.]

xxxx

1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:

xxxx

(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods or any

other personal property received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to
return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a
bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property[.]

The elements of Estafa under this provision are: (a) the offender's receipt of money,
goods, or other personal property in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligation involving the duty to deliver, or to return, the same; (b)
misappropriation or conversion by the offender of the money or property received, or

95
denial of receipt of the money or property; (c) the misappropriation, conversion or denial
is to the prejudice of another; and (d) demand by the offended party that the offender
return the money or property received.40

Under the first element, when the money, goods, or any other personal property is
received by the offender from the offended party (1) in trust or (2) on commission or (3)
for administration, the offender acquires both material or physical possession and
juridical possession of the thing received. Juridical possession means a possession
which gives the transferee a right over the thing which the transferee may set up even
against the owner.41

It bears to stress that a sum of money received by an employee on behalf of an

employer is considered to be only in the material possession of the employee. 42 The
material possession of an employee is adjunct, by reason of his employment, to a
recognition of the juridical possession of the employer. So long as the juridical
possession of the thing appropriated did not pass to the employee-perpetrator, the
offense committed remains to be theft, qualified or otherwise.43 Hence, conversion of
personal property in the case of an employee having mere material possession of the
said property constitutes theft, whereas in the case of an agent to whom both material
and juridical possession have been transferred, misappropriation of the same property
constitutes Estafa.44

In this case, Benabaye maintains that the first element of Estafa through
misappropriation has not been established, insisting that her possession of the collected
loan payments was merely material and not juridical; therefore, she cannot be convicted
of the said crime.45

The Court agrees.

Records show that Benabaye was merely a collector of loan payments from Siam
Bank's clients.1âwphi1 At the end of every banking day, she was required to remit all
cash payments received together with the corresponding cash transfer slips to her
supervisor, Tupag.46 As such, the money merely passes into her hands and she takes
custody thereof only for the duration of the banking day. Hence, as an employee of
Siam Bank, specifically, its temporary cash custodian whose tasks are akin to a bank
teller,47 she had no juridical possession over the missing funds but only their physical or
material possession.

In Chua-Burce v. CA,48 the Court acquitted therein petitioner Cristeta Chua-Burce

(Chua-Burce) of Estafa on the ground that the element of juridical possession was
absent. As a bank cash custodian, the Court ruled that she had no juridical possession
over the missing funds. Relative thereto, in Guzman v. CA,49 where a travelling sales
agent was convicted of the crime o f Estafa for his failure to return to his principal the
proceeds of the goods he was commissioned to sell, the Court had occasion to explain
the distinction between the possession of a bank teller and an agent for purposes of
determining criminal liability for Estafa, viz.:

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There is an essential distinction between the possession of a receiving teller of funds
received from third persons paid to the bank, and an agent who receives the proceeds
of sales of merchandise delivered to him in agency by his principal. In the former case,
payment by third persons to the teller is payment to the bank itself; the teller is a mere
custodian or keeper of the funds received, and has no independent right or title to retain
or possess the same as against the bank. An agent, on the other hand, can even
assert, as against his own principal, an independent, autonomous, right to retain the
money or goods received in consequence of the agency; as when the principal fails to
reimburse him for advances he has made, and indemnify him for damages suffered
without his fault.50 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)

Thus, being a mere custodian of the missing funds and not, in any manner, an agent
who could have asserted a right against Siam Bank over the same, Benabaye had only
acquired material and not juridical possession of such funds and consequently, cannot
be convicted of the crime of Estafa as charged. In fine, the dismissal of the Estafa
charge against Benabaye should come as a matter of course, without prejudice,
however, to the filing of the appropriate criminal charge against her as may be
warranted under the circumstances of this case.

Separately, in light of the foregoing, Benabaye's supervisor and co-accused in this case,
Tupag, who likewise was not appointed as an agent of Siam Bank and thus had no
juridical possession of the subject sums, must also be discharged of the same Estafa
charge in view of Section 11 (a), Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
as amended, which states:

SEC. 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused.-

(a) An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did
not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and
applicable to the latter. While it is true that only Benabaye was able to successfully
perfect her appeal, the rule is that an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole
case open for review of all its aspects, including those not raised by the
parties.51 Considering that under Section 11 (a), Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure as above-quoted, a favorable judgment, as in this case, shall benefit
the co-accused who did not appeal or those who appealed from their judgments of
conviction but for one reason or another, the conviction became final and
executory,52 Benabaye's discharge for the crime of Estafa is likewise applicable to
Tupag. Note that the dismissal of the Estafa charge against Tupag is similarly without
prejudice to the filing of the appropriate criminal charge against him as may be
warranted under the circumstances pertinent to him.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 31, 2011 and the
Resolution dated September 6, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 00722-
MIN are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The criminal charges against petitioner
Cherry Ann M. Benabaye and her co-accused, Jenkin U. Tupag, in Crim. Case No.
9344, are DISMISSED without prejudice.

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SO ORDERED. Republic of the Philippines

FACTS
Siam Bank conducted an audit investigation of its loan transactions and thereby found
out that fraud and certain irregularities attended the same. Based on the audit, 853
provisional receipts in the aggregate amount of ₱470,768.00 were issued by Cherry
Ann Benabaye, the Loans Bookkeeper, but were unreported, and, more significantly,
the corresponding payments were unremitted based on the daily collection reports on
file.
Benabaye was directed to explain the discrepancies between the provisional receipts
she had issued and the unremitted money involved. Likewise, Siam Bank made a final
demand upon her to return the amount of the money involved. In her written explanation
Benabaye claimed, among others, that the discrepancies could be clarified by her
supervisor, Tupag, to whom she had submitted her daily cash transfer slips together
with the corresponding provisional receipts.
Tupag admitted his accountability and, while claiming that some of his co-employees
were privy to the acts which resulted in the discrepancies, he did not disclose their
identities.
Siam Bank Terminated the employment of both Benabaye and Tupag and subsequently
filed a criminal case for Estafa
ISSUE
The sole issue to be resolved by the Court is whether or not the CA erred in sustaining
Benabaye's conviction for the crime of Estafa through misappropriation.
RULE
The petition is meritorious.
A sum of money received by an employee on behalf of an employer is considered to be
only in the material possession of the employee. Conversion of personal property in the
case of an employee having mere material possession of the said property constitutes
theft, whereas in the case of an agent to whom both material and juridical possession
have been transferred, misappropriation of the same property constitutes Estafa.
In this case, Benabaye is correct in maintaining that the first element of Estafa through
misappropriation has not been established, insisting that her possession of the collected
loan payments was merely material and not juridical; therefore, she cannot be convicted
of the said crime. Benabaye was merely a collector of loan payments from Siam Bank's
clients.1âwphi1 At the end of every banking day, she was required to remit all cash

98
payments received together with the corresponding cash transfer slips to her
supervisor, Tupag. As such, the money merely passes into her hands and she takes
custody thereof only for the duration of the banking day. Hence, as an employee of
Siam Bank, specifically, its temporary cash custodian whose tasks are akin to a bank
teller, she had no juridical possession over the missing funds but only their physical or
material possession.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BAYANI DE LEON, ANTONIO
DE LEON, DANILO DE LEON and YOYONG DE LEON, Accused-Appellants.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

For review is the conviction for the crime of Murder of accused-appellants BAYANI DE
LEON (Bayani), ANTONIO DE LEON (Antonio), DANILO DE LEON (Danilo), and
YOYONG DE LEON (Yoyong) by the Regional Trial Court (RTC),1 in Criminal Case No.
Q-02-113990, which Decision2 was affirmed with modifications by the Court of Appeals.

The accused-appellants were charged with Robbery with Homicide under an

Information which reads:

That on or about the 2nd day of March, 2002, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-
named accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one
another, with intent to gain, by means of violence and/or intimidation against [sic]
person, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously rob one EMILIO A.
PRASMO, in the following manner, to wit: on the date and place aforementioned, while
victim/deceased Emilio A. Prasmo was walking along A. Bonifacio Street, Barangay Sta.
Lucia, Novaliches, this City, together with his wife and daughter in-law, accused
pursuant to their conspiracy armed with sumpak, samurai, lead pipe and .38 cal.
revolver rob EMILIO A. PRASMO and took and carried away ₱7,000.00, Philippine
currency, and by reason or on the occasion thereof, with evident premeditation, abuse
of superior strength and treachery, accused with intent to kill[,] attack, assault and
employ personal violence upon EMILIOA. PRASMO by then and there shooting and
hacking the victim with the use of said weapons, thereby inflicting upon him serious and
grave wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his untimely death, to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of said Emilio A. Prasmo.3

When arraigned, all the accused-appellants entered a plea of not guilty except accused
Antonio. Thus, the RTC ordered a reverse trial in so far as Antonio is concerned.

Evidence of the Prosecution

The prosecution presented Erlinda A. Prasmo (Erlinda), wife of the victim, Emilio
Prasmo (Emilio), who testified that on 2 March 2002, while they were walking along Sta.
Lucia Street, Novaliches, on their way to RP Market, the accused-appellants, who are

99
siblings, blocked their way. Accused-appellant Danilo, armed with a "sumpak", suddenly
hit Emilio with a "bakal" while accused-appellant Antonio, who was armed with a
"samurai", hacked Emilio in the forehead and struck him with a lead pipe at the right
back portion of his legs and middle back portion of his torso. Accused-appellant Danilo
then took Emilio’s money in the amount of ₱7,000.00 and thereafter aimed the
"sumpak" at the lower portion of Emilio’s chest and fired the same, causing Emilio to
slump on the ground. Accused-appellant Yoyong also hit Emilio with a lead pipe at the
back of the neck and middle portion of his back.

As accused-appellants attacked and mauled Emilio, Erlinda, seeing her husband

sprawled motionless on the ground, shouted for help, but nobody dared to help because
accused-appellant Bayani, armed with a gun, was shouting "walang lalapit". The
accused-appellants immediately left and Emilio was brought to the FEU Fairview
Hospital, where Emilio died.

Gina Prasmo, Emilio’s daughter, testified that at the time of the incident, she was at
their house when she was informed of the news. She immediately went to the hospital
where she learned that her father was already dead.

The testimony of Dr. Editha Martinez, a medico-legal officer of the Medico-Legal

Division, Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory, Camp Crame, Quezon City, was
dispensed with because she was not the one who performed the autopsy on the
cadaver of Emilio, but nevertheless, she identified such documents as Medico-Legal
Report, Autopsy Report, Sketch of the head showing contusion, anatomical sketch
showing the gunshot wound on the right portion of the chest, and the anatomical sketch
of Emilio.

Evidence of the Defense

Carmelita de Leon (Carmelita), sister of the accused-appellants, testified that on the

evening of 1 March 2002, she was at her house when her brothers, accused-appellants
Danilo and Antonio, arrived. Upon observing that the heads of Antonio and Danilo were
bleeding, she was informed that Emilio and his son, Edgardo Prasmo (Edgardo),
attacked and mauled them, which caused their injuries. They reported the incident to a
"tanod" in the barangay hall, Julio Batingaw, who told them to return in the afternoon so
they could have a meeting with Emilio and Edgardo. When they returned, Emilio and
Edgardo did not appear.

In the evening, at around 7 o’clock, fifteen (15) men carrying firearms, who included
Jerry and Edgar, sons of Emilio, stormed her house looking for accused-appellants and
threatened to kill her if she will not disclose their whereabouts. To support her
testimony, the defense offered in evidence the medical certificates for the injuries
sustained by accused-appellants Antonio and Danilo dated 1 March 2002 and the entry
in the barangay blotter book dated 2 March 2002,about the mauling of accused-
appellants Antonio and Danilo.

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The accused-appellants gave their testimonies that follow:

Jose de Leon, also known as Yoyong, was at the house of his brother-in-law, Willie
Bandong, in Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City to discuss the schedule of the "pabasa". He
stayed there between 8:00 to 9:00 o’clock in the evening. Danilo, at that time, was with
his mother in Pugad Lawin in Quezon City, to accompany his mother in doing her work
as a "manghihilot". They left Pugad Lawin between 8:00 to 9:00 o’clock in the evening
and went home. Bayani, a police civilian agent, at the night of the crime, was at the
Police Station No. 5 in Fairview, Quezon City, talking to a police officer.

Antonio, in the morning of 2 March 2002, went to the barangayhall with his mother,
Carmelita, and accused-appellant Danilo, to file a complaint against Emilio and Emilio’s
son, Edgardo, due to the mauling incident the previous evening. In the barangayhall,
they were told to return in the afternoon so they could have a meeting with Emilio and
Edgardo. They returned as told. Emilio and Edgardo did not.

On the way home, accused-appellant Antonio met Emilio, Erlinda, and Gina, Emilio’s
daughter, walking along A. Bonifacio Street. Emilio, upon seeing Antonio, immediately
opened his jacket and tried to pull "something" out. Antonio then instantlytried to grab
that "something" from Emilio. While grappling for the possession of that "something",
which turned out to be a "sumpak", it fired.

Bernaly Aguilar, while on her way to the market in Sta. Lucia, witnessed a fight involving
accused-appellant Antonio and another man, who were grappling for the possession
over a "bakal". After walking a few meters away from the incident, she heard a shot.

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

According to the accused-appellants, Erlinda is not a credible witness and that her
testimony is barren of probative value for having grave and irreconcilable
inconsistencies, as opposed to accused-appellant Antonio’s testimony which
supposedly established the presence of all the essential requisites of self-defense.
Accused-appellants referred to the inconsistency between Erlinda’s court testimony and
her Sinumpaang Salaysay. In her Sinumpaang Salaysay, she identified accused-
appellant Antonio as the one who fired the "sumpak" at the lower chest of Emilio and
took Erlinda’s money. However, during her direct examination, she testified that it was
accused-appellant Danilo who shot Emilio with a "sumpak" and thereafter, took his
wallet.

Accused-appellants further argued that Erlinda could not have mistaken Danilo for
Antonio, because she knew them both as they reside six (6) houses away from the
house of the Prasmos and that accused-appellant Antonio has a distinctive feature —
having a cleft palate or is "ngongo".

The RTC rejected accused-appellants’ contentions. According to the RTC, Erlinda’s

narration of the incident is clear and convincing. While her testimony has some

101
inconsistencies, they refer only to collateral and minor matters, which do not detract
from the probative value of her testimony.

The trial court found established the circumstances of abuse of superior strength and
treachery, abuse of strength absorbed by the aggravating circumstance of treachery:4

These requisites are obviously present in this case considering that the evidence shows
that after Danilo suddenly fired at Emilio’s lower portion of the chest accused Antonio
and Yoyong ganged up on Emilio, with Antonio hitting him with a lead pipe on the right
back portion of his legs and in the middle back torso and hacking him with a samurai,
and accused Yoyong hitting also (sic) him with a lead pipe on the right back leg and
middle portion of his back. Said action of the four (4) accused rendered it difficult for the
victim to defend himself.5

However, citing People v. Nimo,6 the RTC ruled that because robbery was not duly
established, it cannot convict accused-appellants for robbery with homicide. It relied on
the principle that in order to sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, robbery must
be proven as conclusively as the killing itself. 7 Thus, as opposed to the Information
which charged the accused-appellants of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, the RTC
found accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder by
conspiracy. The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused BAYANI DE LEON, ANTONIO DE LEON,

DANILO DE LEON and YOYONG DE LEON guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of MURDER defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
as amended and are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA with all the accessory penalties provided by law and to jointly and severally
indemnify the heirs of the late EMILIO PRASMO the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as
indemnity for his death and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.8

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of the accused-appellants. Contrary to the
accused-appellants’ contention that the trial court committed a reversible error when it
gave credence to Erlinda’s testimony, the Court of Appeals considered Erlinda’s
recollection of the events as direct, positive and convincing manner, unshaken by a
tedious and grueling cross-examination.9

With regard to the crime charged, the Court of Appeals agreed that the accused-
appellants are guilty of the crime of Murder instead of Robbery with Homicide. As borne
by the records, the only intent of the accused-appellants was to kill Emilio. The
"accused-appellants had an axe to grind against Emilio x x x. The means used by the
accused-appellants as well as the nature and number of wounds - debilitating, fatal and
multiple – inflicted by appellants on the deceased manifestly revealed their design to kill
him. The robbery committed by appellant Danilo [was on] the spur of the moment or
[was] a mere afterthought."10

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Also, the Court of Appeals found accused-appellant Danilo guilty of Robbery for
unlawfully divesting Emilio of ₱7,000.00, which it considered as an action independent
of and outside the original design to murder Emilio. The dispositive portion of the Court
of Appeals Decision reads: WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated May 25, 2007
of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 81 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto with
the added MODIFICATION that accused-appellant Danilo de Leon is also found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery defined under Article 293 and
penalized under Article 294 (5) of the Revised Penal Code, and is sentenced to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and seven (7) months of prision correccional,
as minimum, to eight (8) years and ten (10) days of prision mayor, as maximum. He is
ordered to return to the heirs of Emilio Prasmo the cash of ₱7,000.00, representing the
amount he took from said victim.11

Now, before the Court on automatic review, accused-appellants contend, by way of

assignment of errors, that the appellate court gravely erred when:

1. it gave full credence to the inconsistent testimony of the alleged eyewitness

Erlinda Prasmo; and

2. it disregarded the self-defense interposed by Antonio De Leon and the denial

and alibi interposed by Bayani, Danilo, and Yoyong, all surnamed De Leon.12

Our Ruling

The accused-appellants’ attempt to discredit Erlinda’s testimony must fail.

Inconsistencies between the declaration of the affiant in her sworn statements and
those in open court do not necessarily discredit the witness; 13 it is not fatal to the
prosecution’s cause. In fact, contrary to the defense’s claim, discrepancies erase
suspicion that the witness was rehearsed or that the testimony was fabricated. As
correctly held by the Court of Appeals, despite minor inconsistencies, Erlinda’s narration
revealed each and every detail of the incident, which gave no impression whatsoever
that her testimony is a mere fabrication. As we already enunciated in previous rulings,
"[i]t is a matter of judicial experience that affidavits or statements taken ex parte are
generally incomplete and inaccurate. Thus, by nature, they are inferior to testimony
given in court, and whenever there is inconsistency between the affidavit and the
testimony of a witness in court, the testimony commands greater weight."14

Before us is a reversed trial. As one of the accused-appellants, Antonio, pleaded self-

defense, he admitted authorship of the crime. At this juncture, the burden of proof is
upon the accused-appellants to prove with clear and convincing evidence the elements
of self-defense: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the attack; and (3) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself, 15 which the defense failed to
discharge.

Unlawful Aggression

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Unlawful aggression refers to an assault to attack, or threat in an imminent and
immediate manner, which places the defendant’s life in actual peril. Mere threatening or
intimidating attitude will not suffice. There must be actual physical force or actual use of
weapon.16

Applying the aforesaid legal precept, Emilio’s act of pulling "something" out from his
jacket while he was three (3) to four (4) meters away from accused-appellant Antonio
cannot amount to unlawful aggression. Neither can the act of pulling "something" out
amount to physical force or actual use of weapon, or even threat or intimidating attitude.
Even if accused-appellant Antonio’s account of the incident is truthful, that Emilio had
motive to kill accused-appellant Antonio, giving accused-appellant reasonable grounds
to believe that his life and limb was in danger, and that the "something" was indeed a
"sumpak", it can hardly be recognized as unlawful aggression to justify self-
defense.17 There is no showing that accused-appellant Antonio’s life was in peril by the
act of pulling "something" out. As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, "it must
be noted that appellant never said that Emilio aimed or pointed the "sumpak" at him or
at least made an attempt to shoot him".18 The threat on accused-appellant Antonio’s life
is more imagined than real. As we already held in a catena of cases, the act of pulling
"something" out cannot constitute unlawful aggression.19

Accused-appellant Antonio cannot allege that it was Emilio who instigated the incident;
that Emilio’s fate was brought about by his own actuations. There is no sufficient
provocation, nay, provocation at all in the act of pulling "something" out.

Contrary to accused-appellant Antonio’s contention that he acted in self-defense, the

Medico-Legal Report No. M-685-02 dated 12 March 2002 proved otherwise. As borne
by the records, Emilio sustained numerous wounds, including the fatal gunshot wound
in the chest, which belie accused-appellants’ defense that Antonio was alone at the
scene of the crime and acted in self-defense. The Medico-Legal Report No. M-685-02
dated 12 March 2002 revealed that the victim sustained the following multiple injuries:

HEAD AND NECK:

1. Lacerated wound, right parietal region, measuring 4 x 3 cm, 7 cm from the

mid-sagittal line.

2. Contusion, right mandibular region, measuring 11 x 2 cm, 7 cm from the

anterior midline.

3. Contusion, nasal region, measuring 3 x 2.5 cm, along the anterior midline.

4. Hematoma, left parietal region, measuring 5 x 4 cm, 8 cm from the anterior

midline.

5. Contusion, left cheek, measuring 11 x 3 cm, 8 cm from the anterior midline.

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 6. Contusion, left lateral neck region, measuring 6 x 3 cm, 4 cm from the anterior
midline.

7. Lacerated wound, occipital region, measuring 5 x 1.8 cm, bisected by the

anterior midline.

8. There is a scalp hematoma at the right parieto-occipital region.

9. There are subdural, sub arachnoid hemorrhages at the right celebrum.

10. The right parietal bone is fractured.

TRUNK AND ABDOMEN:

1. Gunshot wound, right chest, measuring 2.6 cm x 2.3 cm, 4 cm from the
anterior midline, 112 cm from the right heel, directed posteriorwards, downwards,
and slightly lateralwards, fracturing the 6th and 7th ribs, lacerating the lower lobe
of the right lung, diaphragm, right lobe of the liver with the deformed plastic wad
embedded, right kidney with 2 lead pellets found embedded and the aorta with 3
pellets embedded thereat and 2 lead pellets found at the right thoracic cavity.

2. Contusion, right shoulder region, measuring 12 x 3 cm, 8 cm from the posterior

midline.

3. Abrasion, right shoulder region, measuring 3.5 x 2 cm, 12 cm from the

posterior midline.

4. Contusion, left shoulder region, measuring 4 x 2 cm, 6 cm from the posterior

midline.

EXTREMITIES:

1. Contusion, left elbow, measuring 8 x 2 cm, 5 cm medial to its posterior midline.

2. Abrasion, dorsal aspect of the left hand, measuring 0.6 x 0.3 cm, 3 cm medial
to its posterior midline.20

As we already held, the nature and location of wounds are considered important
indicators which disprove a plea of self-defense. 21 A perusal of the evidence would
depict the presence of a deliberate onslaught against Emilio. The means used by
accused-appellants as shown by the nature, location and number of wounds sustained
by Emilio are so much more than sufficient to repel or prevent any alleged attack of
Emilio against accused-appellant Antonio. Evidently, the accused-appellants’ intent to
kill was clearly established by the nature and number of wounds sustained by Emilio.
The wounds sustained by Emilio indubitably reveal that the assault was no longer an act

105
of self-defense but a homicidal aggression on the part of accused-appellants. 22 Double
Jeopardy

The RTC did not find the accused guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide as
charged in the Information, but found all the accused guilty of the crime of murder.
According to the RTC, contrary to the charge of robbery with homicide, the accused is
guilty of the crime of murder because the prosecution failed to establish the crime of
robbery. The RTC, citing People v. Nimo,23 ratiocinated that in order to sustain a
conviction for robbery with homicide, robbery must be proven as conclusively as the
killing itself.

On the other hand, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modifications the ruling of the
RTC and found all of the accused guilty of the crime of murder. However, contrary to the
findings of the RTC with regard to the crime of robbery, the Court of Appeals reversed
the ruling of the RTC and found accused Danilo guilty of the separate crime of robbery.
We find that the appellate court erred for violating the constitutional right of Danilo
against double jeopardy as enshrined in Section 21, Article III of the 1987 Constitution,
to wit:

Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense.1âwphi1 If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal
under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.24

Double jeopardy attaches if the following elements are present: (1) a valid complaint or
information; (2) a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the defendant had pleaded to the
charge; and (4) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted or the case against him was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.25

In case at bar, it is undisputed the presence of all the elements of double jeopardy: (1) a
valid Information for robbery with homicide was filed; (2) the Information was filed in the
court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge; and (4)
the RTC acquitted Danilo for the crime of robbery for lack of sufficient evidence, which
amounted to an acquittal from which no appeal can be had. Indeed the conviction for
murder was premised on the fact that robbery was not proven. The RTC Decision which
found accused guilty of the crime of murder and not of robbery with homicide on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence is a judgment of acquittal as to the crime of robbery
alone.

As the first jeopardy already attached, the appellate court is precluded from ruling on
the innocence or guilt of Danilo of the crime of robbery. To once again rule on the
innocence or guilt of the accused of the same crime transgresses the Constitutional
prohibition not to put any person "twice x x x in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense."26 As it stands, the acquittal on the crime of robbery based on lack of sufficient
evidence is immediately final and cannot be appealed on the ground of double
jeopardy.27 A judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable. In fact, the Court cannot,
even an appeal based on an alleged misappreciation of evidence, review the verdict of

106
acquittal of the trial court28 due to the constitutional proscription, the purpose of which is
to afford the defendant, who has been acquitted, final repose and safeguard from
government oppression through the abuse of criminal processes.29 The crime of robbery
was not proven during the trial. As we discussed, the acquittal of the accused-appellant,
including Danilo, is not reversible.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with

MODIFICATIONS. Accused-Appellants BAYANI DE LEON, ANTONIO DE LEON,
DANILO DE LEON and YOYONG DE LEON are hereby declared guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime

of Murder and are sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The accused-
appellants are ordered to pay Emilio Prasmo's heirs the following amounts: ₱75,000.00
as civil indemnity for Emilio Prasmo's death, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages, and
₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages.

All monetary awards shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of
finality until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

107
FACTS
Erlinda, wife of the victim, Emilio, testified that on 2 March 2002, while they were on
their way to RP Market, the accused-appellants, blocked their way and attacked them
using different weapons in different parts of his body. Erlinda, seeing her husband
sprawled motionless on the ground, shouted for help, but nobody dared to help because
accused-appellant Bayani, armed with a gun, was shouting "walang lalapit". The
accused-appellants immediately left and Emilio was brought to the FEU Fairview
Hospital, where Emilio died.
The trial court found established the circumstances of abuse of superior strength and
treachery, abuse of strength absorbed by the aggravating circumstance of treachery
and convicted the accused of murder, which the CA affirmed on appeal.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in convicting the accused on the basis of giving credence to the
testimony of an alleged eyewitness and disregarding the argument of self-defense by
the accused
RULE
The accused-appellants’ attempt to discredit Erlinda’s testimony must fail.
Inconsistencies between the declaration of the affiant in her sworn statements and
those in open court do not necessarily discredit the witness. As correctly held by the
Court of Appeals, despite minor inconsistencies, Erlinda’s narration revealed each and
every detail of the incident, which gave no impression whatsoever that her testimony is
a mere fabrication.
Emilio’s act of pulling "something" out from his jacket while he was three (3) to four (4)
meters away from accused-appellant Antonio cannot amount to unlawful aggression.
Neither can the act of pulling "something" out amount to physical force or actual use of
weapon, or even threat or intimidating attitude. Even if accused-appellant Antonio’s
account of the incident is truthful, that Emilio had motive to kill accused-appellant
Antonio, giving accused-appellant reasonable grounds to believe that his life and limb
was in danger, and that the "something" was indeed a "sumpak", it can hardly be
108
recognized as unlawful aggression to justify self-defense. There is no showing that
accused-appellant Antonio’s life was in peril by the act of pulling "something" out. As
correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, "it must be noted that appellant never said
that Emilio aimed or pointed the "sumpak" at him or at least made an attempt to shoot
him".
Contrary to accused-appellant Antonio’s contention that he acted in self-defense; the
Medico-Legal Report proved otherwise. As borne by the records, Emilio sustained
numerous wounds, including the fatal gunshot wound in the chest, which belie accused-
appellants’ defense that Antonio was alone at the scene of the crime and acted in self-
defense.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee v. ALBERTO ALEJANDRO y
RIGOR and JOEL ANGELES y DE JESUS, Accused Appellants
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an ordinary appealfiled by accused-appellants Alberto
Alejandro y Rigor (Alejandro) and Joel Angeles y de Jesus (Angeles; collectively,
accused-appellants) assailing the Decision2 dated June 3, 2015 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06495, which affirmed with modification the Joint
Decision3 dated August 20, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court of Baloc, Sto. Domingo,
Nueva Ecija, Branch 88 (RTC) in Crim. Case Nos. 72-SD(96), 73-SD(96), and 74-
SD(96) convicting accused-appellants of the crimes of Simple Rape and Homicide,
defined and penalized under Articles 3354 and 249 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC),
respectively.
The Facts
On March 28, 1996, a total of three (3) separate Informations were filed before the R
TC, each charging accused-appellants of one (1) count of Simple Rape and one (1)
count of Homicide, viz.:5
Crim. Case No. 72-SD(96)
That on or about the 5th day of January 1996, at around 2:30 o'clock [sic] in the
morning, at Brgy. [Collado], Municipality of [Talavera], Province of Nueva Ecija,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused [Alejandro], with lewd design, by means of force, violence and intimidation, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge of one
[AAA6 ]gainst her will and consent, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended
party.
Contrary to law.
Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96)
That on or about the 5111 day of January 1996, at around 2:30 o'clock [sic] in the
morning, at Brgy. [Collado], Municipality of [Talavera], Province of Nueva Ecija,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named

109
accused [Angeles], with lewd design, by means of force, violence and intimidation, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge of one AAA
against her will and consent, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party.
Contrary to law.
Crim Case No. 74-SD(96)
That on or about the 5th day of January 1996, at Brgy. [Collado], Municipality of
[Talavera], Province of Nueva Ecija, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused [Alejandro and Angeles], together with two
(2) other persons whose identities are still unknown (John Doe and Peter Doe),
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, box, beat and stab one [BBB] on
the different parts of her body with the use of a pointed instrument, thereby causing her
instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of the said victim.
Contrary to law.
Upon Alejandro's arrest, he pleaded not guilty to the charges against him as stated in
Crim. Case Nos. 72-SD(96) and 74-SD(96).7
While Angeles was still at large, the prosecution sought for the amendment of the
Informations in Crim. Case Nos. 72-SD(96) and 73- SD(96) to convey a conspiracy
between accused-appellants in the rape cases against AAA. The R TC allowed the
amendment of the Information in Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96) to include Alejandro therein
as a conspirator; however, it disallowed the proposed amendment in Crim. Case No.
72-SD(96) to include Angeles therein as conspirator on the ground that Alejandro had
already been arraigned in the latter case.8 The amended Information in Crim. Case No.
73-SD(96) reads:
That on or about the 5th day of January 1996, at around 2:30 o'clock in the morning, at
Brgy. [Collado], Municipality of [Talavera], Province of Nueva Ecija, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused [Angeles], with
lewd design, and in conspiracy with one ALBERTO ALEJANDRO Y RIGOR @
"JESUS'', by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with one [AAA] against her will and
consent, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party.
Contrary to law.9
Eventually, Angeles was arrested and arraigned in connection with Crim. Case Nos. 73-
SD(96) and 74-SD(96), to which he pleaded not guilty. Alejandro was likewise arraigned
in Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96) and pleaded not guilty as well.10
The prosecution alleged that on December 12, 1995, AAA joined her co-worker for a
vacation in the province of Nueva Ecija as they were both laid off from work, and they
stayed at the one-storey house of the latter's 62- year old mother, BBB. Thereat, AAA
would sleep at the papag while BBB slept on a mattress on the floor. At around 2:30 in
the morning of January 5, 1996, AAA awoke to the sound of BBB's pleas for mercy.
Aided by the kerosene lamp placed on the floor, AAA saw BBB being mauled and

110
stabbed to death by Alejandro and Angeles. Thereafter, Angeles approached AAA and
restrained her arms, while Alejandro pulled AAA's pants and underwear down and
started having carnal knowledge of her. After Alejandro was done, he switched places
with Angeles and the latter took his turn ravishing AAA. As AAA was able to fight back
by scratching Angeles' s back, Angeles punched her on the left side of her face while
Alejandro hit her left jaw with a piece of wood. AAA then lost consciousness and woke
up in a hospital, while BBB succumbed to her injuries.11
At the hospital, the police officers interviewed AAA and showed her several mugshots in
order for her to identify her assailants. AAA was then able to recognize Alejandro and
Angeles from said mugshots and positively identified them as the perpetrators of the
crime. Medical records also revealed that AAA was indeed sexually assaulted, while
BBB died due to "neurogenic shock" or severe pain secondary to "multiple blunt injury
and fracture of the mandibular and facio-maxillary bones."12
In his defense, Angeles denied the charges against him and presented an alibi. He
averred that on the night before the incident, he was at home with his wife and slept as
early as eight (8) o'clock in the evening. Upon waking up at seven (7) o'clock in the
morning of the next day, he was informed by his brother-in-law of BBB's death. He
further averred that his relationship with BBB was like that of a mother and son.13
Similarly, Alejandro invoked the defenses of denial and alibi. He claimed that at around
nine (9) o'clock in the evening prior to the incident, he went home and slept. As testified
by Noel Mendoza (Mendoza), Alejandro's relative by affinity, he asked Alejandro to help
him irrigate the rice field, but the latter declined. At around midnight, Mendoza went to
Alejandro's house to personally fetch Alejandro, but considering that the house was
closed, Mendoza peeped through a hole and there he saw Alejandro soundly asleep.
Alejandro further claimed that he does not know both AAA and Angeles until the filing of
the charges against him.14
The RTC Ruling
In a Joint Decision15 dated August 20, 2013, the RTC found accused-appellants guilty
as charged and, accordingly, sentenced them as follows: (a) in Crim. Case No. 72-
SD(96), Alejandro was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
ordered to pay AAA the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages; (b) in Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96),
accused-appellants were each sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and each ordered to pay AAA the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (c) in
Crim. Case No. 7 4-SD(96), accused-appellants were sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, and ordered to pay BBB's heirs the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity
for the latter's death.16
In so ruling, the RTC gave credence to AAA's positive identification of accused-
appellants as the perpetrators of the crimes charged, expressly noting that AAA had no
ill motive to falsely testify against them.1âwphi1 In this light, the RTC found untenable

111
accused-appellants' defenses of denial and alibi, considering too that they have failed to
show that it was physically impossible for them to be at the crime scene when the
crimes against AAA and BBB were committed.17
Aggrieved, accused-appellants appealed18 to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision19 dated June 3, 2015, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling with the following
modifications: (a) in Crim. Case No. 72-SD(96), Alejandro was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Simple Rape and, accordingly, was sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay AAA the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary
damages; (b) in Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96), Alejandro was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of one (1) count of Simple Rape, while Angeles was found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of the same crime, and accordingly, were
separately sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay
AAA the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and
₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages for each count of Simple Rape; and (c) in Crim.
Case No. 74- SD(96), accused-appellants were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of Homicide and, accordingly, were each sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and ordered to solidarily pay BBB's heirs the
amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and
P525,000.00 as temperate damages. In addition, accused-appellants are likewise
ordered to pay legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum on all monetary awards from
date of finality of judgment until fully paid.20
It held that the prosecution had proven beyond reasonable doubt accused-appellants'
complicity to the crimes charged, as they were positively identified by AAA who had an
unobstructed view of their appearance when said crimes were being committed. It
likewise found the existence of conspiracy in the commission of said crimes,
considering that accused-appellants: (a) cooperated in stabbing and mauling BBB,
resulting in her death; and (b) took turns in having carnal knowledge of AAA without her
consent, while the other restrained her arms to prevent her from resisting.21
Hence, the instant appeal.
The Issue Before the Court
The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not accused-appellants are guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the aforesaid crimes
The Court's Ruling
At the outset, the Court notes that during the pendency of the instant appeal, Alejandro
filed a Motion to Withdraw Appeal22 dated January 19, 2017, stating that despite
knowing the full consequences of the filing of said motion, he still desires to have his
appeal withdrawn. In view thereof, the Court hereby grants said motion, and

112
accordingly, deems the case closed and terminated as to him. Thus, what is left before
the Court is the resolution of Angeles's appeal.
In criminal cases, "an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and the
reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or
even reverse the trial court's decision based on grounds other than those that the
parties raised as errors. The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the
case and renders such court competent to examine records, revise the judgment
appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law."23
Proceeding from the foregoing, the Court deems it proper to modify accused-appellants'
convictions, as will be explained hereunder.
Article 249 of the RPC states:
Article 249. Homicide. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246,
shall kill another without the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in the
next preceeding article, shall be deemed guilty of homicide and punished by reclusion
temporal.
"To successfully prosecute the crime of homicide, the following elements must be
proved beyond reasonable doubt: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused
killed that person without any justifying circumstance; (3) that the accused had the
intention to kill, which is presumed; and (4) that the killing was not attended by any of
the qualifying circumstances of murder, or by that of parricide or infanticide. Moreover,
the offender is said to have performed all the acts of execution if the wound inflicted on
the victim is mortal and could cause the death of the victim without medical intervention
or attendance."24
On the other hand, pertinent portions of Article 335 of the RPC (the controlling provision
as the rapes were committed prior to the enactment of Republic Act No. [RA] 835325 in
1997) read:
Article 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or
more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
xxxx
"Under this provision, the elements of Rape are: (a) the offender had carnal knowledge
of the victim; and (b) said carnal knowledge was accomplished through the use of force
or intimidation; or the victim was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or when

113
the victim was under twelve (12) years of age or demented. The provision also states
that if the act is committed either with the use of a deadly weapon or by two (2) or more
persons, the crime will be Qualified Rape, necessitating the imposition of a higher
penalty."26
In this case, both the RTC and the CA were one in giving credence to AAA's positive
identification that accused-appellants conspired in stabbing and mauling BBB, resulting
in the latter's death; and that thereafter, Angeles proceeded to rape her while Alejandro
restrained her arms to prevent her from resisting. Absent any cogent reason to the
contrary, the Court defer to the findings of fact of both courts and, thereby, upholds
Angeles's conviction for Rape in Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96) and Homicide in Crim. Case
No. 74-SD(96), given that the elements of said crimes square with the established
incidents. In People v. Antonio:27
It is a fundamental rule that the trial court's factual findings, especially its assessment of
the credibility of witnesses, are accorded great weight and respect and binding upon
this Court, particularly when affirmed by the [CA]. This Court has repeatedly recognized
that the trial court is in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies because of its unique position of having observed that elusive and
incommunicable evidence of the witnesses' deportment on the stand while testifying,
which opportunity is denied to the appellate courts. Only the trial judge can observe the
furtive glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering tone,
calmness, sigh, or the scant or full realization of an oath. These are significant factors in
evaluating the sincerity of witnesses, in the process of unearthing the truth. The
appellate courts will generally not disturb such findings unless it plainly overlooked
certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result of the
case.28
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court deems it appropriate to modify Angeles's
conviction in Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96), as ruled by the CA. As adverted to earlier, the
CA convicted Angeles for two (2) counts of Simple Rape in Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96)
alone, ratiocinating that "Angeles must be held liable for two (2) counts of simple rape in
Crim. Case No. 73- SD(96) for raping AAA and for aiding (or conspiring with) Alejandro
in raping her."29
The CA erred on this matter.
The accusatory portion of the amended Information in Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96) states
that "[Angeles], with lewd designs, and in conspiracy with one [Alejandro], by means of
force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
had carnal knowledge of one [AAA] against her will and consent, to the damage and
prejudice of the said offended party."30 Plainly, the wording of the amended Information
reveals that it charged accused-appellants with only one (1) count of Rape. As such, it
was error for the CA to convict Angeles with two (2) counts. Thus, Angeles must be
convicted with one (1) count of Rape in relation to Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96).
On a related matter, since the Information in Crim. Case No. 73- SD(96) was allowed to
be amended to include Alejandro as a co-accused and that accused-appellants were
convicted of such charge, the Court deems it proper to upgrade the conviction in said

114
case from Simple Rape to Qualified Rape. As adverted to earlier, Article 335 of the RPC
states that if the rape is committed under certain circumstances, such as when it was
committed by two (2) or more persons, the crime will be Qualified Rape, as in this
instance. Notably, this will no longer affect Alejandro as he had already withdrawn his
appeal prior to the promulgation of this decision.
In sum, Angeles should be convicted of one (1) count of Qualified Rape and one (1)
count of Homicide.
Anent the proper penalties to be imposed on Angeles, the CA correctly imposed the
penalty of reclusion perpetua in connection with Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96), and the
penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six (6) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal, as maximum, as regards Crim. Case No. 74-SD(96).
Finally, in line with existing jurisprudence, the Court deems it proper to adjust the award
of damages as follows: (a) in Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96), Angeles is ordered to pay AAA
the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages, and
₱75,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (b) in Crim. Case No. 74-SD(96), Angeles is
ordered to pay the heirs of BBB the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱50,000.00 as temperate damages, all with legal
interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of judgment until fully
paid.31
WHEREFORE, accused-appellant Alberto Alejandro y Rigor's Motion to Withdraw
Appeal is GRANTED. Accordingly, the instant case CLOSED and TERMINATED as to
him.
On the other hand, the appeal of accused-appellant Joel Angeles y de Jesus (Angeles)
is DENIED. The Decision dated June 3, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-
HC No. 06495 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS as to him, as follows:
(a) In Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96), accused-appellant Angeles is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Rape defined and penalized under Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, he is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay AAA the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱75,000.00 as exemplary damages,
with legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum on all monetary awards
from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid; and
(b) In Crim. Case No. 74-SD(96), accused-appellant Angeles is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide defined and penalized under Article 249 of
the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, he is sentenced to each suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and ordered to pay the heirs of BBB the amounts of
₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱50,000.00 as
temperate damages, with legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum on all
monetary awards from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid.

115
SO ORDERED.

FACTS
The prosecution alleged that AAA joined her co-worker for a vacation in the province of
Nueva Ecija as they were both laid off from work, and they stayed at the one-storey
house of the latter's 62- year old mother, BBB. Thereat, AAA would sleep at
the papag while BBB slept on a mattress on the floor. At around 2:30 in the morning,
AAA awoke to the sound of BBB's pleas for mercy. Aided by the kerosene lamp placed
on the floor, AAA saw BBB being mauled and stabbed to death by Alejandro and
Angeles. Thereafter, Angeles approached AAA and restrained her arms, while
Alejandro pulled AAA's pants and underwear down and started having carnal
knowledge of her. After Alejandro was done, he switched places with Angeles and the
latter took his turn ravishing AAA. As AAA was able to fight back by scratching Angeles'
s back, Angeles punched her on the left side of her face while Alejandro hit her left jaw
with a piece of wood. AAA then lost consciousness and woke up in a hospital, while
BBB succumbed to her injuries.
Similarly, Alejandro invoked the defenses of denial and alibi. He claimed that at around
nine (9) o'clock in the evening prior to the incident, he went home and slept. As testified
by Noel Mendoza (Mendoza), Alejandro's relative by affinity, he asked Alejandro to help
him irrigate the rice field, but the latter declined. At around midnight, Mendoza went to
Alejandro's house to personally fetch Alejandro, but considering that the house was
closed, Mendoza peeped through a hole and there he saw Alejandro soundly asleep.
Alejandro further claimed that he does not know both AAA and Angeles until the filing of
the charges against him.
ISSUE
Whether or not accused-appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the aforesaid
crimes
RULING
The elements of Rape are: (a) the offender had carnal knowledge of the victim; and
(b) said carnal knowledge was accomplished through the use of force or intimidation; or
the victim was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or when the victim was

116
under twelve (12) years of age or demented. The provision also states that if the act is
committed either with the use of a deadly weapon or by two (2)
Since the Information in Crim. Case No. 73- SD(96) was allowed to be amended to
include Alejandro as a co-accused and that accused-appellants were convicted of such
charge, the Court deems it proper to upgrade the conviction in said case from Simple
Rape to Qualified Rape. As adverted to earlier, Article 335 of the RPC states that if the
rape is committed under certain circumstances, such as when it was committed by two
(2) or more persons, the crime will be Qualified Rape, as in this instance.
In sum, Angeles should be convicted of one (1) count of Qualified Rape and one (1)
count of Homicide.

JOHN DENNIS G. CHUA, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND

CRISTINA YAO, Respondents.
MARTIRES, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Orders,1 dated 15 June 2010 and
28 December 2010 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 160, Pasig City (RTC), in SCA
No. 3338, which affirmed the Decision,2 dated 15 April 2009, of the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch 58, San Juan City (MeTC), in Criminal Case No. 80165-68 finding
petitioner John Dennis G. Chua (petitioner) guilty of four (4) counts of violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22).
THE FACTS

Respondent Cristina Yao (Yao) alleged that she became acquainted with petitioner
through the latter's mother. Sometime in the year 2000, petitioner's mother mentioned
that her son would be reviving their sugar mill business in Bacolod City and asked
whether Yao could lend them money. Yao acceded and loaned petitioner P1 million on
3 January 2001; P1 million on 7 January 2001; and P1.5 million on 16 February 2001.
She also lent petitioner an additional P2.5 million in June 2001. As payment, petitioner
issued four (4) checks in these amounts but which were dishonored for having been
drawn against a closed account. Upon dishonor of the checks, Yao personally delivered
her demand letter to the office of the petitioner which was received by his secretary.3

Petitioner was thus charged with four (4) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The cases
were raffled to Branch 58, then presided by Judge Elvira DC Castro (Judge Castro). On
16 September 2004, petitioner pleaded "not guilty." After mediation and pre-trial
conference, trial ensued before Pairing Judge Marianito C. Santos (Judge Santos) as
Judge Castro was promoted to the RTC of Quezon City.4 On 25 July 2007, Judge Philip
Labastida (Judge Labastida) was appointed Presiding Judge of Branch 58 and took
over trial proceedings.5 Since petitioner failed to present evidence, the cases were
submitted for decision and promulgation of judgment was set on 30 September

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2008.6 Sometime in December 2008, Judge Labastida died.7 On 20 February 2009,
Judge Mary George T. Cajandab-Caldona (Judge Caldona) was designated Acting
Presiding Judge of Branch 588 and she assumed office on 1 April 2009.9
The MeTC Ruling
In a decision, dated 15 April 2009, signed by Judge Santos as the pairing judge, the
MeTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of violation of
B.P. Blg. 22, and sentenced him to pay a fine of P200,000.00 for each count.

The MeTC ruled that the prosecution was able to establish that the checks issued by
petitioner were payments for a loan; and that upon dishonor of the checks, demand was
made upon petitioner through his personal secretary. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. FINDING the accused JOHN DENNIS CHUA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt [of)
having violated the crime of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 for which he is hereby sentenced
to pay a FINE of TWOHUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P200,000.00) for each count,
with subsidiary imprisonment not to exceed SIX (6) MONTHS for each count in case of
insolvency;

2. HOLDING the accused civilly liable to the extent of the value of the four (4) subject
checks or in the total amount of P6,082,000.00 with twelve (12%) interest per annum
reckoned from date of extrajudicial demand which was made on April 2002 until the
whole obligation shall have been fully paid and satisfied;
3. ORDERING the accused to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.10
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the RTC assailing Judge Santos'
authority to render the decision.
The RTC Ruling
In an Order, dated 15 June 2010, the RTC affirmed the conviction of petitioner. It held
that the expanded authority of pairing courts under Supreme Court Circular No. 19-98,
dated 18 February 1998, clearly gave Judge Santos authority to resolve the criminal
cases which were submitted for decision when he was still the pairing judge. The RTC
added that Judge Santos was in a better position to resolve and decide the cases
because these were heard arid submitted for decision prior to the appointment of Judge
Caldona as acting presiding judge on 20 February 2009 and her assumption to office on
1 April 2009. It observed that the promulgation of judgment was delayed merely
because a motion for reconsideration was filed which was later denied. The RTC
disposed the case thus:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.11

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Unconvinced, petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the
RTC in an Order, dated 28 December 2010.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUES
I.

WHETHER OR NOT A DECISION PROMULGATED AND EXECUTED BY A PAIRING

JUDGE, DESPITE THE APPOINTMENT OF A PERMANENT JUDGE TO A COURT, IS
VALID;
II.

WHETHER OR NOT A DECISION ADMITTING THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO

PROVE ALL THE ELEMENTS OF A CRIME, BUT STILL CONVICTING AN ACCUSED
IN A CRIMINAL CASE IS AN ACT TANTAMOUNT TO GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO A LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION;
III.

WHETHER OR NOT A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 OF THE

REVISED RULES OF COURT IS THE PROPER REMEDY FOR ACTS DONE BY A
PRESIDING JUDGE SHOWING GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO A
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION.12
Petitioner argues that pursuant to Circular No. 19-98, decisions rendered by pairing
judges are valid only when the same are promulgated at the time when no presiding
judge has been appointed, thus, the authority of pairing judges automatically ceases
upon the appointment and assumption to duty of the new presiding judge; that Judge
Caldona assumed office on 1 April 2009; that on 15 April 2009, when the assailed
decision was promulgated, only Judge Caldona had the authority to promulgate a
decision on the case; and that the prosecution failed to prove that a notice of dishonor
was properly served upon petitioner.

In its comment,13 respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of the

Solicitor General (OSG), avers that the cases were submitted for decision as early as
30 September 2008 and that Judge Caldona had not presided in a single hearing; that
in view of these circumstances, Judge Caldona was not familiar enough with the facts of
the case to enable her to competently render a decision; that Judge Caldona did not
raise any opposition to the promulgation of the 15 April 2009 decision; that Circular No.
5-98 provides that "cases submitted for decision and those that passed the trial stage,
i.e., where all the parties have finished presenting their evidence before such
Acting/Assisting Judge at the time of the assumption of the Presiding Judge or the
designated Acting Presiding Judge shall be decided by the former", that from the time of

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the untimely demise of Judge Labastida, Judge Santos was tasked to take over the
cases as the designated pairing judge of Branch 58; and that Judge Santos was clothed
with authority to promulgate the assailed 15 April 2009 decision.

In his reply,14 petitioner counters that Circular No. 5-98 is not applicable to the case as
Circular No. 19-98 provides that "the judge of the paired court shall take cognizance of
all the cases thereat as acting judge therein until the appointment and assumption to
duty of the regular judge or the designation of an acting presiding judge", that the
authority of Judge Santos was derived as a pairing judge, not as acting or assisting
judge, of Branch 58; and that his authority automatically ceased on 20 February 2009,
when Judge Caldona was designated as Acting Presiding Judge of Branch 58.
THE COURT'S RULING

Appeal, not certiorari, is the proper remedy to question the MeTC decision.

At the outset, petitioner availed of the wrong remedy when he sought to assail the
MeTC decision. First, it has been consistently held that where appeal is available to the
aggrieved party, the special civil action of certiorari will not be entertained - remedies of
appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive. The proper
remedy to obtain a reversal of judgment on the merits, final order or resolution is
appeal. This holds true even if the error ascribed to the court rendering the judgment is
its lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or the exercise of power in excess thereof,
or grave abuse of discretion in the findings of fact or of law set out in the decision, order
or resolution. The existence and availability of the right of appeal prohibits the resort to
certiorari because one of the requirements for the latter remedy is the unavailability of
appeal.15

Second, even if a petition for certiorari is the correct remedy, petitioner failed to comply
with the requirement of a prior motion for reconsideration. As a general rule, a motion
for reconsideration is a prerequisite for the availment of a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65.16 The filing of a motion for reconsideration before resort to certiorari will lie is
intended to afford the public respondent an opportunity to correct any actual or fancied
error attributed to it by way of reexamination of the legal and factual aspects of the
case.17

Third, petitioner was not able to establish his allegation of grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the MeTC. Where a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
alleges grave abuse of discretion, the petitioner should establish that the respondent
court or tribunal acted in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the
exercise of its jurisdiction as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.18 In Yu v. Judge
Reyes-Carpio,19 the Court explained:
The term "grave abuse of discretion" has a specific meaning. An act of a court or
tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done

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in a "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction." The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
"evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to
act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility." Furthermore, the use of a petition
for certiorari is restricted only to "truly extraordinary cases wherein the act of the lower
court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void." From the foregoing definition, it is clear that
the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 can only strike an act down for having
been done with grave abuse of discretion if the petitioner could manifestly show that
such act was patent and gross x x x.20
As will be discussed, there was no hint of whimsicality, nor of gross and patent abuse of
discretion as would amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law on the part of
Judge Santos.21 He was clothed with authority to decide the criminal cases filed
against petitioner.

In addition, considering that petitioner filed with the RTC a petition for certiorari which is
an original action, the proper remedy after denial thereof is to appeal to the Court of
Appeals (CA) by way of notice of appeal.22 Hence, when petitioner filed a petition for
review before this Court, not only did he disregard the time-honored principle of
hierarchy of courts, he also availed of the wrong remedy for the second time.
Notwithstanding the foregoing procedural lapses committed by petitioner, in the interest
of prompt dispensation of justice and to prevent further prolonging the proceedings in
this case, the Court resolves to give due course to his petition and rule on the merits
thereof.

Judge Santos had authority to render the assailed decision even after the assumption to
office of the designated presiding judge of Branch 58.
Petitioner cites Circular No. 19-98 to support his contention that Judge Santos no longer
had the authority to render the assailed decision at the time of its promulgation on 15
April 2009. The circular reads:
In the interest of efficient administration of justice, the authority of the pairing judge
under Circular No. 7 dated September 23, 1974 (Pairing System for Multiple Sala
Stations) to act on incidental or interlocutory matters apd those urgent matters requiring
immediate action on cases pertaining to the paired court shall henceforth be expanded
to include all other matters. Thus, whenever a vacancy occurs by reason of resignation,
dismissal, suspension, retirement, death, or prolonged absence of the presidingjudge in
a multi-sala station, the judge of the paired court shall take cognizance of all the cases
thereat as acting judge therein until the appointment and assumption to duty of the
regular judge or the designation of an acting presiding judge or the return of the regular
incumbent judge, or until further orders from this Court. (emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, the OSG avers that Judge Santos was in due exercise of his
authority as provided by Circular No. 5-98, viz:

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Unless otherwise ordered by the Court, an Acting/Assisting Judge shall cease to
continue hearing cases in the court where he is detailed and shall return to his official
station upon the assumption of the appointed Presiding Judge or the newly designated
Acting Presiding Judge thereat. Cases left by the former shall be tried and decided by
the appointed Presiding Judge or the designated Acting Presiding Judge.
However, cases submitted for decision and those that passed the trial stage, i.e. where
all the parties have finished presenting their evidence before such Acting/Assisting
Judge at the time of the assumption of the Presiding Judge or the designated Acting
Presiding Judge shall be decided by the former. This authority shall include resolutions
of motions for reconsideration and motions for new trial thereafter filed. But if a new trial
is granted, the Presiding Judge thereafter appointed or designated shall preside over
the new trial until it is terminated and shall decide the same.
If the Acting/Assisting Judge is appointed to another branch but in the same station,
cases heard by him shall be transferred to the branch where he is appointed and he
shall continue to try them. He shall be credited for these cases by exempting him from
receiving an equal number during the raffle of newly filed cases. x x x (emphasis
supplied)
Both circulars are applicable in the case at bar in that Circular No. 5-98 complements
Circular No. 19-98. Undoubtedly, the judge of the paired court serves as acting judge
only until the appointment and assumption to duty of the regular judge or the
designation of an acting presiding judge. Clearly, the acting judge may no longer
promulgate decisions when the regular judge has already assumed the position.
Circular No. 5-98, however, provides an exception, i.e., the acting judge, despite the
assumption to duty of the regular judge or the designation of an acting presiding judge,
shall decide cases which are already submitted for decision at the time of the latter's
assumption or designation.

In this case, Judge Santos, as judge of the paired court, presided over the trial of the
cases which commenced with the presentation of the prosecution's first witness on 7
June 2006.23 On 25 July 2007, Judge Labastida was appointed Presiding Judge of
Branch 58 and he took over the trial of the cases.24 The promulgation of judgment was
tentatively set on 30 September 2008.25 Unfortunately, sometime in December 2008,
Judge Labastida died.26 Hence, it was incumbent upon Judge Santos to serve as
acting judge of Branch 58 as a result of Judge Labastida's untimely death. When Judge
Caldona assumed the position of Acting Presiding Judge on 1 April 2009,27 the cases
already passed the trial stage as they were in fact submitted for decision. Further, it is
worthy to note that Judge Santos presided over a significant portion of the proceedings
as compared to Judge Caldona who assumed office long after the cases were
submitted for decision. Finally, the use of the word "shall" in Circular No. 5-98 makes it
mandatory for Judge Santos to decide the criminal cases against petitioner. Clearly,
Judge Santos had the authority to render the assailed decision on 15 April 2009
notwithstanding Judge Caldona's assumption to office.
Failure to prove petitioner's receipt of notice of dishonor warrants his acquittal.

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To be liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, the following essential elements must be
present: (1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for
value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he
does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the
check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the
drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not
the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.28
Here, the existence of the second element is in dispute. In Yu Oh v. CA,29 the Court
explained that since the second element involves a state of mind which is difficult to
establish, Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 created a prima facie presumption of such
knowledge, as follows:
SEC. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. - The making, drawing and
issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient
funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date
of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds
or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon,
or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5)
banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.

Based on this section, the presumption that the issuer had knowledge of the
insufficiency of funds is brought into existence only after it is proved that the issuer had
received a notice of dishonor and that within five days from receipt thereof, he failed to
pay the amount of the check or to make arrangement for its payment. The presumption
or prima facie evidence as provided in this section cannot arise, if such notice of non-
payment by the drawee bank is not sent to the maker or drawer, or if there is no proof
as to when such notice was received by the drawer, since there would simply be no way
of reckoning the crucial 5-day period.
x x x x

Indeed, this requirement [on proof of receipt of notice of dishonor] cannot be taken
lightly because Section 2 provides for an opportunity for the drawer to effect full
payment of the amount appearing on the check, within fivbanking days from notice of
dishonor. The absence of said notice therefore deprives an accused of an opportunity to
preclude criminal prosecution. In other words, procedural due rcrocess demands that a
notice of dishonor be actually served on petitioner.30 (emphasis supplied and citations
omitted)
The Court finds that the second element was not sufficiently established. Yao testified
that the personal secretary of petitioner received the demand letter,31 yet, said personal
secretary was never presented to testifY whether she in fact handed the demand letter
to petitioner who, from the onset, denies having received such letter. It must be borne in
mind that it is not enough for the prosecution to prove that a notice of dishonor was sent
to the accused. The prosecution must also prove actual receipt of said notice, because
the fact of service provided for in the law is reckoned from receipt of such notice of
dishonor by the accused.32

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In this case, there is no way to ascertain when the five-day period under Section 22 of
B.P. Blg. 22 would start and end since there is no showing when petitioner actually
received the demand letter. The MeTC, in its decision, merely said that such
requirement was fully complied with without any sufficient discussion. Indeed, it is not
impossible that petitioner's secretary had truly handed him the demand letter.
Possibilities, however, cannot replace proof beyond reasonable doubt.33 The absence
of a notice of dishonor necessarily deprives the accused an opportunity to preclude a
criminal prosecution.34 As there is insufficient proof that petitioner received the notice of
dishonor, the presumption that he had knowledge of insufficiency of funds cannot
arise.35
Nonetheless, petitioner's acquittal for failure of the prosecution to prove all elements of
the offense beyond reasonable doubt does not extinguish his civil liability for the
dishonored checks. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the
extinction of the civil action where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as
only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the
accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not
based upon the crime of which the accused was acquitted.36

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The 15 June 2010 and 28 December 2010
Orders of the Regional Trial Court in SCA No. 3338 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioner John Dennis G. Chua is ACQUITTED of the crime of violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 on four (4) counts on the ground that his guilt was not established
beyond reasonable doubt. He is, nonetheless, ordered to pay complainant Cristina Yao
the face value of the subject checks in the aggregate amount of P6,082,000.00, plus
legal interest of 12% per annum from the time the said sum became due and
demandable until 30 June 2013, and 6% per annum from 1 July 2013 until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.

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FACTS
Respondent Cristina Yao (Yao) alleged that she became acquainted with petitioner
through the latter's mother. Sometime in the year 2000, petitioner's mother mentioned
that her son would be reviving their sugar mill business in Bacolod City and asked
whether Yao could lend them money. Yao acceded and loaned petitioner P1 million on
3 January 2001; P1 million on 7 January 2001; and P1.5 million on 16 February 2001.
She also lent petitioner an additional P2.5 million in June 2001. As payment, petitioner
issued four (4) checks in these amounts but which were dishonored for having been
drawn against a closed account. Upon dishonor of the checks, Yao personally delivered
her demand letter to the office of the petitioner which was received by his secretary.
Petitioner was thus charged with four (4) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. MeTC found
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
RTC affirmed the conviction of petitioner.
Petitioner argued that the prosecution failed to prove actual receipt of the notice.
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioner is guilty of B.P.22.
RULING
Failure to prove petitioner's receipt of notice of dishonor warrants his acquittal.
To be liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, the following essential elements must be
present: (1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for

125
value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he
does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the
check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the
drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not
the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.
The presumption that the issuer had knowledge of the insufficiency of funds is brought
into existence only after it is proved that the issuer had received a notice of dishonor
and that within five days from receipt thereof, he failed to pay the amount of the check
or to make arrangement for its payment.
The Court finds that the second element was not sufficiently established. Yao testified
that the personal secretary of petitioner received the demand letter, yet, said personal
secretary was never presented to testify whether she in fact handed the demand letter
to petitioner who, from the onset, denies having received such letter. It must be borne in
mind that it is not enough for the prosecution to prove that a notice of dishonor was sent
to the accused. The prosecution must also prove actual receipt of said notice, because
the fact of service provided for in the law is reckoned from receipt of such notice of
dishonor by the accused.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DIOSCORO COMOSO
TUREMUTSA, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Failure to comply with the chain of custody requirements in drugs cases will result in an
accused's acquittal.

This resolves an appeal of the October 9, 2015 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05992, which affirmed the Regional Trial Court January 22, 2013
Decision.2 The trial court convicted accused-appellant Dioscoro Comoso y Turemutsa
(Comoso) for violation of Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165, or the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

In a March 27, 20053 Information, Comoso was charged with violation of the

Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, particularly for the illegal sale of dangerous
drugs. The Information read:

That on or about the 26th day of March 2005, more or less 2:30 o'clock in the
afternoon, (sic) at Quim[s]on, Barangay Bagong Sikat, Puerto Princesa City, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, convey, distribute and deliver one (1) piece
transparent plastic sachet containing dried Marijuana leaves/flowering tops, a
dangerous drug weighing more or less 1.1 grams to one poseur-buyer for a

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consideration of Four Hundred (P400) Pesos, (sic) without being authorized by law to
convey, distribute and deliver the same, which act is penalized under Section 5, Article
II of Republic Act No. 9165.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

Upon arraignment, Comoso pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Trial on the merits
then ensued.5

Prosecution witnesses testified that on March 26, 2005, the Anti-Drug Special Operation
Task Force and Drug Enforcement Action Division planned a buy-bust operation after
receiving information from their civilian asset that a certain "Coro" was selling illegal
drugs in Quimson, Barangay Bagong Sikat, Puerto Princesa City. The team prepared
four (4) P100.00 bills, with Serial Nos. KU494857, MB020653, QQ011743, and
DD744924.6

At around 2:30 p.m., Police Officer 2 Ferdinand Aquino (PO2 Aquino) and Police Officer
3 Jose Fernandez (PO3 Fernandez) proceeded to the area of the operation. They
parked their motorcycle and walked about 50 meters to the target area, where the asset
told them to wait since their target, later identified as Comoso, was still playing tong-
its. The police officers waited by a store, while their asset waited in front of Comoso's
house.7

Soon after, Comoso arrived. There, he handed a plastic sachet supposedly containing
marijuana in exchange for the asset's buy-bust money. The asset, in turn, removed his
hat—the pre-arranged signal that the transaction had been consummated.8

Upon seeing the pre-arranged signal, PO2 Aquino and PO3 Fernandez rushed to the
scene and arrested Comoso and the asset. PO2 Aquino recovered the plastic sachet
from the asset, while PO3 Fernandez frisked Comoso and recovered the buy-bust
money, one (1) used marijuana stick, and a lighter. PO2 Aquino then marked both the
plastic sachet and the buy-bust money with his initials "FJA."9

As they reached the police station, PO2 Aquino also marked the used marijuana stick
and lighter. He then prepared an Inventory of Confiscated Items.10

On April 8, 2005, about two (2) weeks after the buy-bust operation, Police
Superintendent Julita T. De Villa (Superintendent De Villa), a forensic chemist at the
Philippine National Police Regional Crime Laboratory Office, MIMAROPA, received the
samples of seized items and a letter-request for laboratory examination. In Chemistry
Report No. D-017-05, she found that the specimens tested positive for marijuana.11

Comoso, a fisher residing on Liberty Road, Barangay Bagong Sikat, Puerto Princesa
City, solely testified in his defense. He alleged that in the afternoon of March 26, 2005,
on his way home from delivering his catch, he was grabbed and frisked by two (2)

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armed men, whom he figured were police officers. They first brought Comoso to the
airport, then to the police station, where he would be detained.

The police officers recovered from Comoso P420.00, the money he had earned from
selling fish. He denied having sold illegal drugs.12

In its January 22, 2013 Decision,13 the Regional Trial Court found Comoso guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Article II, Section 5 of the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act. The dispositive portion of the Decision read:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the prosecution having satisfactorily proven the
guilt of the accused DIOSCORO COMOSO y TUREMUTSA, the Court hereby found
him GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Violation of Section 5, Article II of
R.A. 9165 for illegal sale of dangerous drugs and to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and a fine of five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00).

The confiscated marijuana used in prosecuting this case is hereby ordered to be turned
over to the local office of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for proper
disposition.

SO ORDERED.14

Comoso appealed before the Court of Appeals, arguing that: (1) the poseur-buyer, the
sole witness to the transaction, was never presented as a witness; and (2) the identity
and integrity of the corpus delicti was not properly established.15

In its October 9, 2015 Decision,16 the Court of Appeals dismissed Comoso's appeal and
affirmed his conviction.

According to the Court of Appeals, the prosecution's failure to present the informant in
court was not fatal to the case since the informant's testimony would merely be
corroborative. It held that the testimony of the arresting officer, who witnessed the
transaction, was sufficient to prove the prosecution's version of events.17

Maintaining that the chain of custody was established, the Court of Appeals excused the
absence of photographs of the seized items since there were justifiable reasons for
noncompliance. It found that the prosecution had duly established that PO2 Aquino had
custody of the seized items from their seizure until their turnover to the crime
laboratory.18 Since Comoso failed to present any evidence that the prosecution
witnesses had ill motives against him, the Court of Appeals held that the regularity in the
performance of official duty should be presumed.19

Comoso filed a Notice of Appeal.20 His appeal having been given due course the Court
of Appeals elevated the records of this case to this Court.21

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In its December 5, 2016 Resolution,22 this Court noted the records and directed the
parties to file their supplemental briefs. The Office of the Solicitor General, representing
plaintiff-appellee People of the Philippines, manifested that it would no longer submit a
supplemental brief and moved that this Court instead consider the arguments in its Brief
submitted before the Court of Appeals.23 Accused-appellant, on the other hand,
submitted a Supplemental Brief.24

The Office of the Solicitor General argues that the prosecution has sufficiently
established accused-appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt since PO2 Aquino
witnessed the entire exchange and was able to testify to the sequence of events. It
claims that in drugs cases, the police officers' narration of facts should be given
credence as they are presumed to have regularly performed their duties.25

The Office of the Solicitor General further asserts that despite changes in the seized
item's custody and possession, their identity had been proven by the totality of the
prosecution's evidence. Maintaining that the chain of custody remained unbroken, it
argues that the "integrity of the evidence is presumed preserved unless there is a
showing of bad faith, ill will[,] or proof that evidence has been tampered with[.]"26

Accused-appellant, on the other hand, counters that PO2 Aquino did not testify that the
seized items were marked or inventoried in front of him. He points out that there were
no photographs of the seized items taken, and that he did not sign the inventory of
seized items. Moreover, he claims that the prosecution failed to prove that there was no
"possibility of switching, planting, or contamination."27

Accused-appellant contends that the chain of custody was not established, pointing out
that there was no transfer of the seized items from the arresting officer to the
investigating officer. He further notes that it was not explained how the seized items
were handled from the crime laboratory to the forensic chemist, the transfer of which
took 11 days from March 28 to April 8, 2005. This, he argues, puts a "cloud of doubt and
suspicion as to the supposed preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value" 28 of
the corpus delicti.29

The sole issue for this Court's resolution is whether or not the prosecution proved
accused-appellant Dioscoro Comoso y Turemusta's guilt beyond reasonable doubt for
violating Article II, Section 5 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act despite not
strictly complying with the requisites for preserving the integrity and evidentiary value of
the corpus delicti.

An accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is proven.30 To secure conviction,

the prosecution must overcome this presumption by presenting evidence of the
accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. Rule 133, Section 2 of
the Rules of Court provides:

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SECTION 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. — In a criminal case, the accused is
entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof
beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding
possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that
degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.

A guilty verdict relies on the strength of the prosecution's evidence, not on the
weakness of the defense:31

Proof beyond reasonable doubt is ultimately a matter of conscience. Though it does not
demand absolutely impervious certainty, it still charges the prosecution with the
immense responsibility of establishing moral certainty. Much as it ensues from
benevolence, it is not merely engendered by abstruse ethics or esoteric values; it arises
from a constitutional imperative[.]32

The burden of proof lies with the prosecution. Failure to discharge this burden warrants
an accused's acquittal.

II

The sale of illegal drugs is punished under Article II, Section 5 of the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act:
SECTION 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and
Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals. — The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be
imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer,
dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any
dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity
and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.

To secure conviction, the prosecution must prove the following elements: "(1) proof that
the transaction or sale took place[;] and (2) the presentation in court of the corpus
delicti or the illicit drug as evidence."33

Evidence proving that a transaction took place "must be credible and complete."34 In
buy-bust operations, this is usually proven by the testimony of the poseur-buyer.

In People v. Andaya35 the prosecution failed to present their informant, who was also
their poseur-buyer, to testify on the sale of illegal drugs. Despite the police officers
occupying "different positions where they could see and observe the asset[,]"36 this
Court noted that none of them had witnessed the transaction and only acted upon the

130
informant/poseur-buyer's pre-arranged signal. This proved fatal to the prosecution's
case:

Here, the confidential informant was not a police officer. He was designated to be the
poseur buyer himself. It is notable that the members of the buy-bust team arrested
Andaya on the basis of the pre-arranged signal from the poseur buyer. The pre-
arranged signal signified to the members of the buy-bust team that the transaction had
been consummated between the poseur buyer and Andaya. However, the State did not
present the confidential informant/poseur buyer during the trial to describe how exactly
the transaction between him and Andaya had taken place. There would have been no
issue against that, except that none of the members of the buy-bust team had directly
witnessed the transaction, if any, between Andaya and the poseur buyer due to their
being positioned at a distance from the poseur buyer and Andaya at the moment of the
supposed transaction.37

Andaya recognized that not presenting the informant was different from not presenting
the poseur-buyer. As held in prior cases,38 there was no need to present the confidential
informant since the testimony would merely corroborate the testimonies of those who
actually witnessed the transaction. The case is different, however, if the confidential
informant and the poseur-buyer were one and the same person:

The presentation of the confidential informants as witnesses for the Prosecution in

those instances could be excused because there were poseur buyers who directly
incriminated the accused. In this case, however, it was different, because the poseur
buyer and the confidential informant were one and the same. Without the poseur
buyer's testimony, the State did not credibly incriminate Andaya.39

As with Andaya, the confidential informant here, despite also acting as the poseur-

buyer, was never presented to testify to the transaction. Nonetheless, PO2 Aquino
testifying that he had witnessed the entire transaction40 suffices to prove the offense's
first element—that the transaction took place absent any irregularity in the performance
of law enforcers' duties.

This, however, does not suffice to overcome the presumption of innocence. To do so,
the prosecution must prove the second element of the offense, or the existence of
the corpus delicti.

In proving the second element of the offense, the prosecution must establish
compliance with the chain of custody requirements outlined in Section 21 of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 10640:

SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered

Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and
Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. — The

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PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or
surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct a
physical inventory of the seized items and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the persons from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, with an elected public official and a representative of
the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall be required to sign the copies
of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, That the physical inventory and
photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at
the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team,
whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures: Provided, finally, That
noncompliance of these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures and custody
over said items[;]
(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, the same shall be submitted to
the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative examination;

(3) A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which shall be done by
the forensic laboratory examiner, shall be issued immediately upon the receipt of the
subject item/s: Provided, That when the volume of dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and essential chemicals does not allow the
completion of testing within the time frame, a partial laboratory examination report shall
be provisionally issued stating therein the quantities of dangerous drugs still to be
examined by the forensic laboratory: Provided, however, That a final certification shall
be issued immediately upon completion of the said examination and certification[.]
(Emphasis in the original)

Chain of custody in the seizure of illegal drugs is defined as:

... the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled
chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage,
from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping
to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of
seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary
custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made
in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition.41

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Moreover, every link in the chain of custody, as summarized in People v. Nandi,42 must
be established:

[F]irst, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the
accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by
the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the
investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination;
and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the
forensic chemist to the court.43

Here, PO2 Aquino, the apprehending officer, testified that he had seized the plastic
sachet from accused-appellant and marked it with his own initials, "FJA." He added that
he had also prepared the Inventory of Confiscated Items and brought the seized items
to the crime laboratory.44

However, it remained unclear from PO2 Aquino's testimony if: (1) he conducted the
inventory before accused-appellant; (2) the inventory was signed by accused-appellant;
and (3) PO2 Aquino turned the items over to an investigating officer. He testified:

Q Now, Mr. Witness, you said that you got the plastic sachet containing this illegal
drug from your civilian asset, could you tell us what did you do to this plastic
sachet containing illegal drug (sic) or marijuana leaves?
A I marked it with my initials and brought it in (sic) the crime lab.
Q What mark did you place, Mr. Witness?
A My initials.45 (Emphasis supplied)

The prosecution further presented evidence that Superintendent De Villa, the forensic
chemist, only received the seized items on April 8, 2005,46 or 10 working days after the
buy-bust operation on March 26, 2005. This is obviously beyond the 24-hour period
required by law, a delay for which the prosecution has not been able to explain. This
creates reasonable doubt on whether the illegal drug turned over to the forensic chemist
was the same illegal drug seized from accused-appellant:

This break in the chain of custody opens up the possibility of substitution, alteration, or
tampering of the seized drugs during the turn over to the chemist, especially since the
amount was as little as 0.02 grams. Thus, the illegal drugs tested by the chemist may
not be the same items allegedly seized by the buy-bust team from accused-appellant.
The doubt that the break created should have been enough to acquit accused-
appellant.47

Worse, nothing in the records shows that the witnesses required to be present and sign

133
the inventory—an elected public official and a representative of the National
Prosecution Service or the media—were present, even though this was a pre-planned
entrapment operation. Moreover, the prosecution did not justify the law enforcement
officers' noncompliance with the chain of custody. It merely stated that "the integrity of
the evidence is presumed preserved unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill will[,] or
proof that the evidence has been tampered with."4

Generally, noncompliance with these requirements would not have rendered the search
and seizure invalid "under justifiable grounds."49 However, the absence
of any justification only serves to magnify the irregularity of the police officer's
performance of their official duties:

To sanction non-compliance, two requisites must be satisfied. First, the prosecution

must identify and prove "justifiable grounds." Second, it must show that, despite non-
compliance, the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were properly
preserved. To satisfy the second requirement, the prosecution must establish that
positive steps were observed to ensure such preservation. The prosecution cannot rely
on broad justifications and sweeping guarantees that the integrity and evidentiary value
of seized items were preserved.50

The prosecution cannot merely sweep the police officers' lapses under the mantle of the
presumption of regularity in the performance of their official duties. This presumption
only applies when nothing in the evidence shows that the police officers deviated from
the standard procedures required by law. In People v. Kamad:51

Given the flagrant procedural lapses the police committed in handling the seized shabu
and the obvious evidentiary gaps in the chain of its custody, a presumption of regularity
in the performance of duties cannot be made in this case. A presumption of regularity in
the performance of official duty is made in the context of an existing mle of law or
statute authorizing the performance of an act or duty or prescribing a procedure in the
performance thereof. The presumption applies when nothing in the record suggests that
the law enforcers deviated from the standard conduct of official duty required by law;
where the official act is irregular on its face, the presumption cannot arise. In light of the
flagrant lapses we noted, the lower courts were obviously wrong when they relied on the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty.52

The law's stringent requirements are not designed to hamper police operations with
needless procedural minutiae. They merely ensure that courts can, with reasonable
moral certainty, guarantee that the illegal drug presented by the prosecution is the same
illegal drug that was seized from the accused:

Compliance with Section 21's chain of custody requirements ensures the integrity of the
seized items. Conversely, non-compliance with it tarnishes the credibility of the corpus
delicti around which prosecutions under the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
revolve. Consequently, they also tarnish the very claim that an offense against the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act was committed.

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Fidelity to chain of custody requirements is necessary because, by nature, narcotics
may easily be mistaken for everyday objects. Chemical analysis and detection through
methods that exceed human sensory perception (such as, specially trained canine units
and screening devices) are often needed to ascertain the presence of dangerous drugs.
The physical similarity of narcotics with everyday objects facilitates their adulteration
and substitution. It also makes conducive the planting of evidence. In Mallillin v. People:

A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not readily identifiable as
in fact they are subject to scientific analysis to determine their composition and nature.
The Court cannot reluctantly close its eyes to the likelihood, or at least the possibility,
that at any of the links in the chain of custody over the same there could have been
tampering, alteration or substitution of substances from other cases by accident or
otherwise - in which similar evidence was seized or in which similar evidence was
submitted for laboratory testing. Hence, in authenticating the same, a standard more
stringent than that applied to cases involving objects which are readily identifiable must
be applied, a more exacting standard that entails a chain of custody of the item with
sufficient completeness if only to render it improbable that the original item has either
been exchanged with another or been contaminated or tampered with.

People v. Holgado, et al., recognized that:

Compliance with the chain of custody requirement. . . ensures the integrity of

confiscated, seized, and/or surrendered drugs and/or drug paraphernalia in four (4)
respects: first, the nature of the substances or items seized; second, the quantity (e.g.,
weight) of the substances or items seized; third, the relation of the substances or items
seized to the incident allegedly causing their seizure; and fourth, the relation of the
substances or items seized to the person/s alleged to have been in possession of or
peddling them. Compliance with this requirement forecloses opportunities for planting,
contaminating, or tampering of evidence in any manner.

When the identity of corpus delicti is jeopardized by non-compliance with Section 21,
the second element of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs remains wanting. It
follows then, that this non-compliance justifies an accused's acquittal. In People v.
Lorenzo:

In both illegal sale and illegal possession of prohibited drugs, conviction cannot be
sustained if there is a persistent doubt on the identity of the drug. The identity of the
prohibited drug must be established with moral certainty. Apart from showing that the
elements of possession or sale are present, the fact that the substance illegally
possessed and sold in the first place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit
must likewise be established with the same degree of certitude as that needed to
sustain a guilty verdict.53 (Emphasis supplied)

Indeed, the often minuscule amounts of dangerous drugs seized by law enforcement
officers compel courts to be more circumspect in the examination of the evidence.
Reasonable doubt arises in the prosecution's narrative when the links in the chain of

135
custody cannot be properly established. There is no guarantee that the evidence had
not been tampered with, substituted, or altered. In People v. Holgado:54

Trial courts should meticulously consider the factual intricacies of cases involving
violations of Republic Act No. 9165. All details that factor into an ostensibly
uncomplicated and barefaced narrative must be scrupulously considered. Courts must
employ heightened scrutiny, consistent with the requirement of proof beyond
reasonable doubt, in evaluating cases involving miniscule amounts of drugs. These can
be readily planted and tampered. Also, doubt normally follows in cases where an
accused has been discharged from other simultaneous offenses due to mishandling of
evidence. Had the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals been so judicious in
this case, a speedier resolution would have been handed to Holgado and Misarez
whose guilt beyond reasonable doubt was not established.55
This Court has already recognized the numerous "orchestrated or poorly built up drug-
related cases"56 that have been languishing in the clogged dockets of our lower courts.
Thus, in People v. Lim,57 this Court mandated the policy that must be followed in
prosecuting drugs cases:

[T]o weed out early on from the courts' already congested docket any orchestrated or
poorly built up drug-related cases, the following should henceforth be enforced as a
mandatory policy:

1. In the sworn statements/affidavits, the apprehending/seizing officers must state their

compliance with the requirements of Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165, as amended, and
its IRR.
2. In case of non-observance of the provision, the apprehending/seizing officers must
state the justification or explanation therefor as well as the steps they have taken in
order to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized/confiscated items.
3. If there is no justification or explanation expressly declared in the sworn statements
or affidavits, the investigating fiscal must not immediately file the case before the court.
Instead, he or she must refer the case for further preliminary investigation in order to
determine the (non) existence of probable cause.
4. If the investigating fiscal filed the case despite such absence, the court may exercise
its discretion to either refuse to issue a commitment order (or warrant of arrest) or
dismiss the case outright for lack of probable cause in accordance with Section 5, Rule
112, Rules of Court.58 (Citation omitted)

Lim serves as a clarion call to law enforcement officers and those involved in the
prosecution of drugs cases to be more circumspect in the performance of their duties.
Because the prosecution was unable to establish accused-appellant's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, the presumption of innocence must prevail. Accused-appellant must,
thus, be acquitted.

136
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals October 9, 2015
Decision in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05992 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-
appellant Dioscoro Comoso y Turemutsa is ACQUITTED for the prosecution's failure to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He is ordered immediately RELEASED unless
he is confined for any other lawful cause.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Superintendent of the Iwahig Prison and
Penal Farm, Puerto Princesa City for immediate implementation. The Superintendent
is ORDERED to REPORT the action he or she has taken to this Court within five (5)
days from receipt of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

FACTS

Police Officer 2 Ferdinand Aquino (PO2 Aquino) and Police Officer 3 Jose Fernandez
(PO3 Fernandez) proceeded to the area of the operation. They parked their motorcycle
and walked about 50 meters to the target area, where the asset told them to wait since
their target, later identified as Comoso, was still playing tong-its. The police officers
waited by a store, while their asset waited in front of Comoso's house.

Upon seeing the pre-arranged signal, PO2 Aquino and PO3 Fernandez rushed to the
scene and arrested Comoso and the asset. PO2 Aquino recovered the plastic sachet
from the asset, while PO3 Fernandez frisked Comoso and recovered the buy-bust
money, one (1) used marijuana stick, and a lighter. PO2 Aquino then marked both the
plastic sachet and the buy-bust money with his initials "FJA."

As they reached the police station, PO2 Aquino also marked the used marijuana stick
and lighter. He then prepared an Inventory of Confiscated Items.

On April 8, 2005, about two (2) weeks after the buy-bust operation, Police
Superintendent Julita T. De Villa, a forensic chemist at the Philippine National Police

137
Regional Crime Laboratory Office, MIMAROPA, received the samples of seized items
and a letter-request for laboratory examination. In Chemistry Report No. D-017-05, she
found that the specimens tested positive for marijuana.

Comoso alleged that in the afternoon of March 26, 2005, on his way home from
delivering his catch, he was grabbed and frisked by two (2) armed men, whom he
figured were police officers. They first brought Comoso to the airport, then to the police
station, where he would be detained.

The police officers recovered from Comoso P420.00, the money he had earned from
selling fish. He denied having sold illegal drugs.

ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution proved accused-appellant Dioscoro Comoso y

Turemusta's guilt beyond reasonable doubt for violating Article II, Section 5 of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act despite not strictly complying with the requisites
for preserving the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti

RULING

The prosecution did not prove accused-appellant Dioscoro Comoso y Turemusta's guilt
beyond reasonable doubt for violating Article II, Section 5 of the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act.

To secure conviction, the prosecution must prove the following elements: "(1) proof that
the transaction or sale took place[;] and (2) the presentation in court of the corpus
delicti or the illicit drug as evidence."

Here, PO2 Aquino, the apprehending officer, testified that he had seized the plastic
sachet from accused-appellant and marked it with his own initials, "FJA." He added that
he had also prepared the Inventory of Confiscated Items and brought the seized items
to the crime laboratory.
However, it remained unclear from PO2 Aquino's testimony if: (1) he conducted the
inventory before accused-appellant; (2) the inventory was signed by accused-appellant;
and (3) PO2 Aquino turned the items over to an investigating officer.
The prosecution further presented evidence that Superintendent De Villa, the forensic
chemist, only received the seized items on April 8, 2005, or 10 working days after the
buy-bust operation on March 26, 2005. This is obviously beyond the 24-hour period
required by law, a delay for which the prosecution has not been able to explain. This
creates reasonable doubt on whether the illegal drug turned over to the forensic chemist
was the same illegal drug seized from accused-appellant.

This break in the chain of custody opens up the possibility of substitution, alteration, or
tampering of the seized drugs during the turn over to the chemist, especially since the
amount was as little as 0.02 grams. Thus, the illegal drugs tested by the chemist may
not be the same items allegedly seized by the buy-bust team from accused-appellant.

138
The doubt that the break created should have been enough to acquit accused-
appellant.

Worse, nothing in the records shows that the witnesses required to be present and sign
the inventory—an elected public official and a representative of the National
Prosecution Service or the media—were present, even though this was a pre-planned
entrapment operation. Moreover, the prosecution did not justify the law enforcement
officers' noncompliance with the chain of custody. It merely stated that "the integrity of
the evidence is presumed preserved unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill will[,] or
proof that the evidence has been tampered with."

Generally, noncompliance with these requirements would not have rendered the search
and seizure invalid "under justifiable grounds." However, the absence
of any justification only serves to magnify the irregularity of the police officer's
performance of their official duties:

Given the flagrant procedural lapses the police committed in handling the seized shabu
and the obvious evidentiary gaps in the chain of its custody, a presumption of regularity
in the performance of duties cannot be made in this case.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ZZZ, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Recantations are viewed unfavorably especially in rape cases. Circumstances in which

the recantation was made are thoroughly examined before the evidence of retraction
can be given any weight.

Before this Court is a criminal case for rape committed by the common-law spouse of
the victim's mother. Accused-appellant ZZZ assails the September 30, 2016
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01769, which affirmed his
conviction in the June 25, 2013 Judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court.

On May 23, 2006, an Information3 was filed against ZZZ charging him with the crime of
rape:

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That on or about 11:00 o'clock (sic) on the morning of the 12th day of April 2006, in the
City of xxxxxxxxxxx, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused, the live-in partner of the mother of the victim, by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of the victim [AAA], a minor fourteen (14) years old, against her will.
Contrary to Article 266-A, in relation to 266-B of the Revised Penal Code.4
ZZZ pleaded not guilty to the crime charged during his arraignment on July 19, 2006.
Pre-trial was held on October 25, 2006. Trial on the merits then ensued.5

The prosecution presented AAA6 and Dr. Edalin Dacula (Dr. Dacula) as its witnesses.7

AAA narrated that in the afternoon of April 12, 2006, she had fallen asleep after doing
laundry, while her stepfather, ZZZ, was doing carpentry works. Suddenly, she woke up
and found ZZZ on top of her, his lower body naked. He then sat on the floor with his
penis showing and removed her short pants and underwear, after which he went back
on top of her and masturbated. He took AAA's hands and put them on his penis, 8 telling
her that if she became pregnant, "he [would] be happy." 9 ZZZ then inserted his penis
into her vagina "and sat, kissed her face, touched her vagina[,] and kissed her breast."10

AAA later reiterated on cross-examination that ZZZ put his penis into her vagina. She
failed to see the act, but felt it. She also felt pain on her vagina's side, caused by the
penis' insertion.11

Dr. Dacula, who conducted the medical examination on AAA, testified that she had
found redness and abrasion on the right side of the victim's labia minora, "caused by a
smooth, soft object"12 as indicated in the Medico-Legal Report.13

Meanwhile, the defense presented as witnesses: (1) AAA's mother BBB; (2) ZZZ; and
(3) AAA, on her affidavit of recantation.14

BBB testified that ZZZ had been her common-law spouse for four (4) years. At 10:00
a.m. on April 12, 2006, she and her stepdaughter, CCC, went for a 30-minute walk to
the barangay hall to request a toilet bowl, as instructed by ZZZ. They went back home
after being told that the toilet bowl was not yet available.15

When she arrived at their house, BBB was surprised to see that the door and window
were shut. Upon opening the door, she saw AAA sitting and ZZZ standing, both silent.
BBB got mad and whipped ZZZ with a plastic hose, but he remained silent. 16

Thinking that her daughter was raped, BBB brought AAA to the barangay hall. Then,
with the assistance of the Department of Social Welfare and Development and the
police, they went to xxxxxxxxxxx City for AAA's physical examination.17

On cross-examination, BBB stated that she brought AAA to the barangay hall "because
her vision at that time was blurred as if she cannot notice a person[.]"18 Maintaining that

140
their house was closed when she first arrived from the barangay hall, she reiterated
seeing ZZZ and AAA inside when she opened the door and thinking that her daughter
was raped.19

ZZZ testified that he was BBB's common-law spouse. He took AAA as his stepdaughter,
supporting her since childhood. He narrated that at 6:00 a.m. on April 12, 2006, he was
working on the kitchen in their house while AAA and DDD did the laundry. Meanwhile,
BBB proceeded to the barangay hall to check if the toilet bowl they requested was
already available.

ZZZ further narrated that at around 10:00 a.m. on April 12, 2006, DDD and AAA were
eating breakfast after they had finished washing clothes. AAA then went up the second
floor of their house and slept, while he was then Installing an electric bulb in the kitchen.
When BBB arrived, she opened the door at once.20 AAA "was surprised because [BBB]
was shouting as if she was dreaming."21 BBB asked ZZZ if he raped AAA, which he
denied. He was around 12 meters away from AAA, holding a hammer on the window.
BBB then went to AAA and pinched her "bulog[.]" 22 Afterwards, BBB grabbed a hose
and whipped ZZZ, who was able to parry the strike. BBB then went out with AAA only to
return the following morning.23

ZZZ claimed that BBB was influenced by her cousins to accuse him.24 The cousins were
allegedly mad at him and wanted BBB and him to separate since he was "not a useful
person."25

On cross-examination, ZZZ stated that the house's window and door were always shut
because the house was still unfinished. He restated that when BBB arrived, she saw
him standing by the window and AAA sitting at a corner of their house. He reiterated
that BBB whipped him with a hose.26 He added that when he saw AAA crying, he
thought that she would not pinpoint him as her rapist "because her conscience [was]
bothered."27

On August 8, 2008, AAA executed her Affidavit of Recantation and

Desistance,28 praying that the rape case be dismissed. She claimed that her
declarations during the direct and cross-examinations "were done under duress and that
she was afraid of the authorities at that time[.]" 29 Maintaining that ZZZ did not rape her,
she claimed that she was forced by a certain EEE to file the rape case.

On cross-examination, AAA testified that she was not compelled by the prosecutor to
testify. Contrary to her Affidavit, she also admitted that she was not under duress when
she was presented as a witness. She recalled crying during the direct examination and
pointing to ZZZ as her rapist when she was asked. EEE, she added, was their
neighbor.30

In its June 25, 2013 Judgment,31 the Regional Trial Court found ZZZ guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of simple statutory rape.32

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The trial court found that the prosecution failed to establish AAA's minority. It did not
present documentary evidence, such as her birth certificate, or even testimonial
evidence to prove that AAA was a minor when the crime was committed.33

The trial court further gave weight to AAA's declaration that she was raped. It noted her
sincerity during trial and her candid and straightforward manner in giving her testimony.
It held that her allegations were corroborated by Dr. Dacula's findings and BBB's
subsequent acts in bringing AAA to the barangay officials, the Department of Social
Welfare and Development, and the police.34

The trial court did not give merit to ZZZ's denial for being unsubstantiated. It further held
that instead of discrediting the prosecution's evidence, AAA's Affidavit of Recantation
and Desistance bolstered her earlier statements by reaffirming that: (1) ZZZ sexually
molested her; (2) the prosecutor did not force her to testify; and (3) she was not put
under duress.35

The dispositive portion of the Regional Trial Court Judgment read:

WHEREFORE, based on the prevailing facts, evidences, law and jurisprudence
applicable, the court finds accused [ZZZ] GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of
the crime of simple statutory rape and hereby sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of reclusion perpetua. He is hereby ordered to pay to the victim civil
indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 and moral damages in the amount of
P50,000.00 without proof of its basis.
SO ORDERED.36
ZZZ appealed37 before the Court of Appeals. In turn, the People of the Philippines,
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its Brief.38

In its September 30, 2016 Decision,39 the Court of Appeals denied the appeal and
affirmed the trial court Judgment with modification. 40 It declared that the trial court
erroneously used the word "statutory" since it was not established that AAA was below
12 years old when the crime was committed. Nonetheless, the error was harmless
because the penalty meted and the monetary awards granted were for the crime of
simple rape.41 It sustained ZZZ's conviction based on AAA's "vivid recollection"42 of how
rape was committed against her.43

The Court of Appeals did not give merit to ZZZ's argument that the prosecution failed to
prove the presence of force, intimidation, threat, fraud, or grave abuse of
authority.44 Citing People v. Arpon,45 it held that the moral influence or ascendancy of
the common-law spouse of the victim's mother replaced the elements of violence and
intimidation.46

Likewise, the Court of Appeals gave no merit to either AAA's recantation or the
argument that her lack of hymenal laceration negated the crime of rape.47

The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision read:

142
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Judgment dated June 25, 201.3, of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 63, Bayawan City, in Criminal Case No. 529 is hereby
AFFIRMED, but with modification only in that the word "statutory" in the dispositive
portion thereof is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.48
Hence, ZZZ appealed his case before this Court.49

On April 5, 2017, this Court issued a Resolution50 requiring the parties to file their
supplemental briefs. The parties filed their respective Manifestations,51 stating that they
would no longer file their supplemental briefs as they had sufficiently exhausted their
arguments in their Briefs before the Court of Appeals.52

Accused-appellant argues that the crime of statutory rape was not proven because the
prosecution failed to sufficiently establish AAA's minority, which the trial court also
noted.53

Assuming that the prosecution established her age, accused-appellant contends that he
was still wrongly convicted of statutory rape. Pointing out that AAA's alleged age in the
Information was 14 years old, he argues that under the law and jurisprudence, the
victim must be below 12 years old for the crime to be statutory rape.54

Accused-appellant avers that since the case does not involve statutory rape, the
presence of force, intimidation, threat, fraud, or grave abuse of authority must be
established in the alleged crime's commission. He contends that the prosecution failed
to show these circumstances.55

Moreover, accused-appellant alleges that AAA's "[inconsistent and improbable

statements[,]"56 particularly on direct examination and on her Affidavit of Recantation
and Desistance, raised doubts on the credibility of her allegations.57

Accused-appellant also points out that Dr. Dacula only found redness and abrasion, and
not hymenal laceration, which should have been present had there been sexual
intercourse.58 These manifestations "could have been easily caused by pinching,
scratching, or wearing very tight underwear."59

Lastly, accused-appellant argues that the prosecution should not draw its strength on
the alleged weakness of the defense.60 He maintains that he should be acquitted
considering that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.61

Plaintiff-appellee counters that accused-appellant was actually convicted not of statutory

rape, but of simple rape, and was meted with the penalty of simple rape. Hence, even if
the trial court erroneously included the word "statutory" in describing the crime, there
was no effect in the imposed penalty.62

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Plaintiff-appellee insists that accused-appellant's guilt was proven beyond reasonable
doubt.63 It was able to establish the following elements:
First. [AAA] was then 14-year old when appellant had sexual intercourse with her.

Second. Appellant who is the common-law husband of [AAA's] mother exercises moral
ascendancy and authority over her.
Third. [AAA] testified that appellant had carnal knowledge of her on April 12, 2006 at
about 11:00 o'clock (sic) in the morning while her mother went to the Barangay Hall to
do an errand for appellant.64 (Emphasis in the original)
Plaintiff-appellee maintains that AAA's narration of the incident proves that accused-
appellant raped her.65 It adds that recantations are usually viewed unfavorably since it
can be secured by intimidating the witness or in exchange of monetary
consideration.66 It alleges that AAA's recantation was doubtful because BBB and
accused-appellant continued their common-law relationship and AAA's new claim "was
a mere legal conclusion, bereft of any details or other indicia of credibility, much less
truth."67

Finally, plaintiff-appellee contends that AAA's intact hymen is not fatal to its cause. In
the crime of rape to be consummated, it is sufficient that the penis touched the
pudendum or the labia.68

In arguing for his innocence, accused-appellant maintains that the element of force,
intimidation, threat, fraud, or grave abuse of authority in the crime of rape was not
established, and that the element of the victim's minority in the crime of statutory rape
was not proven. Moreover, AAA's recantation and her intact hymen both negate the
allegation of rape.

Accused-appellant's contentions have no merit.

Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code defines rape as:

Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. — Rape is committed —

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:

a Through force, threat, or intimidation;

)
b When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
)
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
) though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.

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2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1
hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person's
mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of
another person.
After a careful examination of the case records, this Court holds that the prosecution
has established beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant is guilty of raping
AAA. The trial court also found AAA's testimony credible and supported by evidence:
The candid, straightforward and unrehearsed testimony of victim [AAA] who declared
against the bestial acts of the accused on her person and maintained that she was
required to hold his penis and thereafter, again, rode on top of her placing his penis on
her vagina is corroborated by the unrefuted findings of Dr. Edalin L. Dacula who found
that the abrasion and redness in color on the right side of the labia minora is caused by
a smooth, soft object. A smooth, soft object is a penis and that the abrasion and
redness in color on the right side of the labia minora is caused probably by the friction of
the hardened and erected penis of the accused. That was why the victim complained
that she felt pain on her vagina.69
The Court of Appeals, likewise, found that AAA's testimony during the direct
examination showed that she clearly remembered how accused-appellant committed
the crime:
PROS. BALBUENA
ON DIRECT
EXAMINATION:
(COURT
INTERRUPTED)
COURT . . . Which come (sic) first, the raping or the masturbating?
WITNESS The raping.
Q How did he rape --- How did the accused rape you?
....
A First, he positioned himself on top of me and then he
undressed me, and then he sat on the floor and masturbated.
He let me hold his penis, kissed me. On top of me, he kissed
me, and he undressed me, sat on the floor and masturbated,
and then he let me hold his penis, and then he again
positioned himself on top of me.
Q Court. Tell in straight words; answer 'yes' or 'no'. Did he place his
penis inside your vagina?
A Yes.
....

145
[ON CROSS
EXAMINATION]
(COURT
INTERRUPTED)
Q Did you feel?
A Yes.
Q And what was your feeling?
A Pain
Q What was painful?
A At the side
Q Of what?
A The side of my vagina.
Q Why?
A Because his penis [was] in my vagina. 70 (Emphasis in the
original)
This Court finds no reason to disturb the findings of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals. In People v. Quintos:71
The observance of the witnesses' demeanor during an oral direct examination, cross-
examination, and during the entire period that he or she is present during trial is
indispensable especially in rape cases because it helps establish the moral conviction
that an accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. Trial provides
judges with the opportunity to detect, consciously or unconsciously, observable cues
and microexpressions that could, more than the words said and taken as a whole,
suggest sincerity or betray lies and ill will. These important aspects can never be
reflected or reproduced in documents and objects used as evidence.
Hence, "[t]he evaluation of the witnesses' credibility is a matter best left to the trial court
because it has the opportunity to observe the witnesses and their demeanor during the
trial. Thus, the Court accords great respect to the trial court's findings," more so when
the Court of Appeals affirmed such findings.72 (Citations omitted)
There is also no merit in accused-appellant's argument that force, intimidation, threat,
fraud, or grave abuse of authority was not present. In People v. Gacusan,73 this Court
reiterated that "[t]he abuse of moral influence is the intimidation required in rape
committed by the common-law father of a minor."74

As to the inclusion of the word "statutory" in the dispositive portion of the trial court
Judgment, this Court holds that it was erroneously added by the trial court judge.

In People v. Dalan:75

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The gravamen of the offense of statutory rape, as provided for in Article 266-A,
paragraph 1 (d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is the carnal knowledge of a
woman below 12 years old. To convict an accused of the crime of statutory rape, the
prosecution must prove: first, the age of the complainant; second, the identity of the
accused; and last but not the least, the carnal knowledge between the accused and the
complainant.76 (Citation omitted)
Here, the Information against accused-appellant did not allege AAA to be below 12
years old, but 14 years old, when the crime was committed upon her. The trial court
even held that without documentary or testimonial evidence, the prosecution failed to
substantiate the qualifying circumstance of minority. Despite this, it still found him guilty
of simple statutory rape and imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Nonetheless, this Court finds that the penalty imposed on accused-appellant is correct
as it is the penalty for offenders who were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
simple rape under Article 266-B77 of the Revised Penal Code.78

II

As a rule, affidavits of desistance are viewed with skepticism and reservation because
they can be "easily obtained for monetary consideration or through intimidation." 79

If the crime did not really happen, AAA would have made the Affidavit at the earliest
instance—but she did not. Instead, she executed it more than two (2) years after the
crime had been committed. If the crime did not really happen, she would not have
submitted herself to physical examination or hours of questioning—but she did.

Moreover, her recollection on how accused-appellant committed the crime was detailed;
her testimony, consistent. There was no evidence that AAA was forced or pressured by
the prosecutor to take the witness stand, as manifested by her answer during the cross-
examination:
PROS. BALBUENA ON CROSS
EXAMINATION:
Q: Now, Mrs. (sic) Witness, can you recall
having testified in this case?
A: Yes.
Q: In fact, it was I who presented you as our
witness, Mrs. (sic) Witness?
A: Yes.
Q: And when you testified Mrs. (sic) Witness,
of course, this Fiscal did not force you to
testify, is that not right?

147
A: I was not forced.
Q: So, in your testimony when you were
presented by the prose[cu]tion as our
witness[,] you were not under duress
then, Mrs. (sic) Witness?
ATTY. CABUSAO: Objection Your honor.
What has be[e]n testified by the witness,
Your Honor, it is not the Prosecutor who
forced her, Your Honor.
PROS. BALBUENA: I am on cross
examination, Your Honor and the
credibility of this witness is questioned,
Your Honor.
COURT: Okay, let her answer.
....
WITNESS:
A: I was not forced by the
Fiscal.80 (Emphasis in the original, citation
omitted)
Likewise, the absence of hymenal laceration fails to exonerate accused-appellant. As
explained in People v. Osing:81
[M]ere touching, no matter how slight of the labia or lips of the female organ by the male
genital, even without rupture or laceration of the hymen, is sufficient to consummate
rape. The absence of fresh hymenal laceration does not disprove sexual abuse,
especially when the victim is a young girl[.]82 (Citation omitted)
This Court has consistently held that an intact hymen does not negate the commission
of rape.83 The element of rape does not even include hymenal laceration:
The absence of external signs or physical injuries on the complainant's body does not
necessarily negate the commission of rape, hymenal laceration not being, to repeat, an
element of the crime of rape. A healed or fresh laceration would of course be a
compelling proof of defloration. What is more, the foremost consideration in the
prosecution of rape is the victim's testimony and not the findings of the medico-legal
officer. In fact, a medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution
for rape; the victim's testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict.84 (Citations
omitted)
The guilt of accused-appellant having been proven beyond reasonable doubt for the
crime of rape, the penalty of reclusion perpetua was correctly imposed. However, in line
with prevailing jurisprudence,85 this Court increases the amount of civil indemnity to
P75,000.00 and moral damages to P75,000.00. Exemplary damages of P75,000.00
shall also be awarded to AAA.86

148
Finally, a six percent (6%) per annum legal interest shall be imposed on all the
damages awarded to AAA from the date of finality of the judgment until fully paid. 87

WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals' September 30, 2016 Decision in CA-G.R. CR-HC
No. 01769 is AFFIRMED. Accused-appellant ZZZ is found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of rape, as punished under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code. He is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Accused-appellant is further DIRECTED to pay AAA: (1) Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos

(P75,000.00) as moral damages; (2) Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as
civil indemnity; and (3) Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as exemplary
damages.

All damages awarded shall be subject to interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from the finality of this Decision until its full satisfaction.

SO ORDERED.

FACTS

AAA narrated that in the afternoon of April 12, 2006, she had fallen asleep after doing
laundry, while her stepfather, ZZZ, was doing carpentry works. Suddenly, she woke up
and found ZZZ on top of her, his lower body naked. He then sat on the floor with his
penis showing and removed her short pants and underwear, after which he went back
on top of her and masturbated. He took AAA's hands and put them on his penis, telling
her that if she became pregnant, "he [would] be happy." ZZZ then inserted his penis into
her vagina "and sat, kissed her face, touched her vagina[,] and kissed her breast."

AAA later reiterated on cross-examination that ZZZ put his penis into her vagina. She
failed to see the act, but felt it. She also felt pain on her vagina's side, caused by the
penis' insertion.

Dr. Dacula, who conducted the medical examination on AAA, testified that she had
found redness and abrasion on the right side of the victim's labia minora, "caused by a
smooth, soft object" as indicated in the Medico-Legal Report.

ISSUE

Whether or not accused-appellant ZZZ's guilt for the crime of rape has been proven
beyond reasonable doubt

RULING

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After a careful examination of the case records, this Court holds that the prosecution
has established beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant is guilty of raping
AAA.

Based on the circumstances here, this Court cannot give any weight to AAA's Affidavit
of Recantation and Desistance. If the crime did not really happen, AAA would have
made the Affidavit at the earliest instance—but she did not. Instead, she executed it
more than two (2) years after the crime had been committed.

Moreover, her recollection on how accused-appellant committed the crime was detailed;
her testimony, consistent. There was no evidence that AAA was forced or pressured by
the prosecutor to take the witness stand, as manifested by her answer during the cross-
examination:

Likewise, the absence of hymenal laceration fails to exonerate accused-appellant. The

absence of external signs or physical injuries on the complainant's body does not
necessarily negate the commission of rape, hymenal laceration not being, to repeat, an
element of the crime of rape. A healed or fresh laceration would of course be a
compelling proof of defloration. What is more, the foremost consideration in the
prosecution of rape is the victim's testimony and not the findings of the medico-legal
officer. In fact, a medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution
for rape; the victim's testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee v. ROGER RACAL @ RAMBO,
Accused-Appellant
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is an ordinary appeal filed by accused-appellant, Roger Racal @
Rambo (Racal), assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated February
27, 2015, in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01450, which affirmed, with modification, the
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 18, in Criminal Case
No. CBU-77654, finding herein appellant guilty of the crime of murder and imposing
upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The antecedents are as follows:
In an Information filed by the Cebu City Prosecutor's Office on August 15, 2006, Racal
was charged with the crime of murder as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended. The accusatory portion of the Information
reads, thus:
That on or about the 19th day of April 2006, at about 4:20 A.M., more or less, in the City
of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, armed with a knife, with deliberate intent, with treachery and evident
premeditation, and with intent to kill, did then and there, suddenly and unexpectedly,
attack, assault, and use personal violence upon the person of one Jose "Joe" Francisco
by stabbing the latter, at his body, thereby inflicting a fatal wound and as a
consequence of which he died.

150
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Upon arraignment, Racal entered a plea of not guilty.4 Subsequently, trial on the merits
ensued.
The evidence for the prosecution established that around 4 o'clock in the morning of
April 19, 2006, "trisikad" drivers were lining up to pick passengers along Lopez St. at
Sitio Alseca in Cebu City. Among the "trisikad" drivers was Jose Francisco (Francisco).
Also present at that place during that time was Racal, who was then standing near
Francisco. While the "trisikad" drivers were waiting for passengers, Racal spoke in a
loud voice, telling the group of drivers not to trust Francisco because he is a traitor.
Francisco, who was then holding a plastic container in one hand and a bread in another,
and was eating, retorted and asked Racal why the latter called him a traitor. Without
warning, Racal approached Francisco and stabbed him several times with a knife,
hitting him in the chest and other parts of his body. Francisco, then, fell to the
pavement. Immediately thereafter, Racal stepped backwards and upon reaching a dark
portion of the street, he hailed a "trisikad" and sped away. Thereafter, one of
the "trisikad" drivers called the barangay tanod, but by the time they arrived, Francisco
was already dead.
Racal, on his part, did not deny having stabbed Francisco. However, he raised the
defense of insanity. He presented expert witnesses who contended that he has a
predisposition to snap into an episode where he loses his reason and thereby acts
compulsively, involuntarily and outside his conscious control. Under this state, the
defense argued that Racal could not distinguish right from wrong and, thus was not
capable of forming a mental intent at the time that he stabbed Francisco.
After Trial, the RTC rendered judgment convicting Racal as charged. The dispositive
portion of the RTC Decision, dated September 14, 2011, read as follows:
WHEREFORE, on the following considerations, the court renders judgment finding
accused ROGER RACAL @ RAMBO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder and
sentences him to the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all its accessory penalties. He is
likewise directed to pay the heirs of the late Jose "Joe" Francisco the amount of Thirty
Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as actual damages, Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos
(P75,000.00) as civil indemnity, and Fifty Thousand Pesos (PS0,000.00) as moral
damages.
SO ORDERED.5
The RTC ruled that the evidence for the defense is insufficient to convince the court that
Racal was indeed deprived of his mind and reason at the time when he committed the
crime as to exempt him from criminal liability becaµse his depression and psychotic
features are not the kind of insanity contemplated by law. The trial court found the
circumstance of treachery to be present, but ruled out the presence of the aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation.
Racal filed a Motion for Reconsideration6 contending that the trial court failed to
appreciate the mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation on the part of the

151
offended party and voluntary confession of guilt on the part of Racal. However, the RTC
denied the Motion for
Reconsideration in its Order7 dated December 15, 2011. Aggrieved by the ruling of the
RTC, Racal appealed to the CA. In his Appellant's Brief, Racal reiterated his defense of
insanity contending that, at the time he stabbed the victim, he snapped into a fatal
episode of temporary loss of rational judgment and that such a predisposition to "snap"
was testified upon by his expert witnesses.
In its assailed Decision, the CA affirmed the conviction of Racal but modified the
judgment of the RTC by imposing interest on the damages awarded. The CA disposed,
thus:
WHEREFORE, the September 14, 2011 Judgment in Criminal Case No. CBU-77654,
convicting accused-appellant Roger Racal @ Rambo of Murder and sentencing him
with reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Accused-appellant is also ORDERED to pay the heirs of Jose "Joe" Francisco, interest
on damages awarded, the amount of 6% from the date of finality of the judgment until
fully paid, and to pay costs.
SO ORDERED. 8
The CA held that the prosecution proved all the elements of the crime necessary to
convict Racal for the murder of Francisco. The CA gave credence to the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses. It also affirmed the presence of the qualifying circumstance
of treachery and affirmed the trial court in ruling out the presence of the aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation. As to Racal's defense of insanity, the CA held
that he failed to rebut the presumption the he was sane at the time of his commission of
the crime. The CA, nonetheless, appreciated the mitigating circumstance which is
analogous to an illness of the offender that would diminish the exercise of his will-
power.
Racal filed a Motion for Reconsideration,9 questioning the penalty imposed upon him,
but the CA denied it in its Resolution 10 of October 22, 2015.
Thus, on November 23, 2015, Racal, through counsel, filed a Notice of
Appeal 11 manifesting his intention to appeal the CA Decision to this Court.
In its Resolution 12 dated March 16, 2016, the CA gave due course to Racal's Notice of
Appeal and directed its Archives Section to transmit the records of the case to this
Court.
Hence, this appeal was instituted.
In a Resolution13 dated July 20, 2016, this Court, among others, notified the parties that
they may file their respective supplemental briefs, if they so desire.
In its Manifestation and Motion, 14 filed on September 23, 2016, the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) manifested that it will no longer file a supplemental brief
because it had already adequately addressed in its brief filed before the CA all the
issues and arguments raised by accused-appellant in his brief.

152
On the other hand, Racal filed a Supplemental Brief15 dated October 21, 2016,
reiterating his defense of insanity by contending that at the time of the commission of
the crime, expert evidence demonstrates that he had, within him, predisposing factors
that cause insanity. He also argues that the lower courts failed to appreciate the
mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation on the part of the victim and voluntary
confession of guilt on his part.
The basic issue for the Court's resolution in the present appeal is whether or not the CA
correctly upheld the conviction of herein appellant, Racal, for murder.
The Court rules in the affirmative.
At the outset, it bears to reiterate that in the review of a case, the Court is guided by the
long-standing principle that factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by
the CA, deserve great weight and respect.16 These factual findings should not be
disturbed on appeal, unless there are facts of weight and substance that were
overlooked or misinterpreted and that would materially affect the disposition of the
case.17
In the present case, after a careful rading of the records and pleadings, this Court finds
no cogent reason to deviate from the RTC’s factual findings. There is no indication that
the trial court, overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied the surrounding facts and
circumstances of the case. Moreover, the factual findings of the RTC are affirmed by the
CA. Hence, the Court defers to the trial court in this respect, especially considering that
it was in the best position to assess and determine the credibility of the witnesses
presented by both parties.
In any case, the Court will proceed to resolve the present appeal on points of law.
The Information in the instant case charged appellant with the crime of murder, for
stabbing the victim, Francisco, which offense was alleged to have been attended by
treachery and evident premeditation.
Murder is defined and punished by Article 248 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act
No. 7659, to wit:
Article 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246,
shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua,
to death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or
employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford
impunity;
xxx
2. With evident premeditation;
xxx
To successfully prosecute the crime of murder, the following elements must be
established: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed him or her; (3) that

153
the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248
of the RPC; and (4) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide.18
In the present case, the prosecution was able to clearly establish that (1) Francisco was
stabbed and killed; (2) appellant stabbed and killed him; (3) Francisco's killing was
attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery as testified to by prosecution
eyewitnesses; and, (4) the killing of Francisco was neither parricide nor infanticide.
Paragraph 16, Article 14 of the RPC defines treachery as the direct employment of
means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime against persons which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the
defense which the offended party might make. The essence of treachery is that the
attack is deliberate and without warning, done in a swift and unexpected way, affording
the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. 19 In
order for treachery to be properly appreciated, two elements must be present: (1) at the
time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) the
accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods, or forms
of attack employed by him.20 These elements are extant in the facts of this case and as
testified to by the prosecution witnesses. To emphasize, the victim, Francisco, was
caught off guard when appellant attacked him. As testified to by a prosecution witness,
Francisco was then holding a plastic container containing bread and was eating. The
stealth, swiftness and methodical manner by which the attack was carried out gave the
victim no chance at all to evade when appellant thrust the knife to his torso. Thus, there
is no denying that appellant's sudden and unexpected onslaught upon the victim, and
the fact that the former did not sustain any injury, evidences treachery. Also, the fact
that appellant was facing Francisco when he stabbed the latter is of no consequence.
Even a frontal attack could be treacherous when unexpected and on an unarmed victim
who would be in no position to repel the attack or avoid it,21 as in this case.
Undoubtedly, the RTC and the CA correctly held that the crime committed was murder
under Article 248 of the RPC by reason of the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
Appellant, nonetheless, insists on his defense of insanity. In this regard, the Court's
pronouncement in the case of People v. Estrada22 is instructive, to wit:
The basic principle in our criminal law is that a person is criminally liable for a felony
committed by him. Under the classical theory on which our penal code is mainly based,
the basis of criminal liability is human free will. Man is essentially a moral creature with
an absolutely free will to choose between good and evil. When he commits a felonious
or criminal act (delito doloso), the act is presumed to have been done voluntarily, i.e.,
with freedom, intelligence and intent. Man, therefore, should be adjudged or held
accountable for wrongful acts so long as free will appears unimpaired.
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the law presumes that every person is of
sound mind and that all acts are voluntary. The moral and legal presumption under our
law is that freedom and intelligence constitute the normal condition of a person. This
presumption, however, may be overthrown by other factors; and one of these is insanity
which exempts the actor from criminal liability.
The Revised Penal Code in Article 12 (1) provides:

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ART. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. The following are exempt
frorri criminal liability:
1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval.
When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law defines as
a felony (delito), the court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums
established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave without
first obtaining the permission of the same court.
An insane person is exempt from criminal liability unless he has acted during a lucid
interval. If the court therefore finds the accused insane when the alleged crime was
committed, he shall be acquitted but the court shall order his confinement in a hospital
or asylum for treatment until he may be released without danger. An acquittal of the
accused does not result in his outright release, but rather in a verdict which is followed
by commitment of the accused to a mental institution.
In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of
intelligence in committing the act. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not
exclude imputability. The accused must be "so insane as to be incapable of entertaining
a criminal intent." He must be deprived of reason and act without the least discernment
because there is a complete absence of the power to discern or a total deprivation of
freedor~/ of the will.
Since the presumption is always in favor of sanity, he who invokes insanity as an
exempting circumstance must prove it by clear and positive evidence. And the evidence
on this point must refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or to the very
moment of its execution.
To ascertain a persons mental condition at the time of the act, it is permissible to
receive evidence of the condition of his mind within a reasonable period both before and
after that time. Direct testimony is not required. Neither are specific acts of derangement
essential to establish insanity as a defense. Circumstantial evidence, if clear and
convincing, suffices; for the unfathomable mind can only be known by overt acts. A
person's thoughts, motives, and emotions may be evaluated only by outward acts to
determine whether these conform to the practice of people of sound mind.23
In the present case, the defense failed to overcome the presumption of sanity. The
testimonies of Dr. Preciliana Lee Gilboy (Dr. Gilboy) and Dr. Andres Suan Gerong (Dr.
Gerong), as the defense's qualified expert witnesses, failed to support appellant's claim
of insanity. As correctly observed by the CA, the separate psychiatric evaluations of
appellant were taken in June 2009 and July 2010, which are three and four years after
the crime was committed on April 19, 2006. In People v. So,24 which is a case of recent
vintage, this Court ruled that an inquiry into the mental state of an accused should relate
to the period immediately before or at the very moment the felony is
committed.25 Hence, the results of the psychiatric tests done on appellant and testified
to by the defense witnesses, may not be relied upon to prove appellant's mental
condition at the time of his commission of the crime.

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In any case, during cross-examination, Dr. Gilboy testified that for a number of years up
to the time that appellant killed Francisco, he had custody of and served as the guardian
of his sister's children.26 He took care of their welfare and safety, and he was the one
who sends them to and brings them home from school. Certainly, these acts are not
manifestations of an insane mind. On his part, Dr. Gerong testified, on direct
examination, that he found appellant to have "diminish[ ed] capacity to discern what was
wrong or right at the time of the commission of the crime."27 "Diminished capacity" is
not the same as "complete deprivation of intelligence or discernment." Mere abnormality
of mental faculties does not exclude imputability. 28 Thus, on the basis of these
examinations, it is clearly evident that the defense failed to prove that appellant acted
without the least discernment or that he was suffering from a complete absence of
intelligence or the power to discern at the time of the commission of the crime.
Furthermore, appellant's act of treachery, that is by employing means and methods to
ensure the killing of Francisco without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
victim might make, as well as his subsequent reaction of immediately fleeing after his
commission of the crime and, thereafter, evading arrest, is not the product of a
completely aberrant mind. In other words, evidence points to the fact that appellant was
not suffering from insanity immediately before, simultaneous to, and even right after the
commission of the crime.
In his Supplemental Brief, appellant cites the "Durham Rule" which was used in criminal
courts in the United States of America. This rule postulated that an accused is not
criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the result of a mental disease or defect at
the time of the incident.29 However, in subsequent rulings, US Federal Courts and
State Courts, even by the court which originally adopted it, rejected and abandoned this
rule for being too broad and for lacking a clear legal standard for criminal
responsibility. 30 As earlier discussed, in the Philippines, the courts have established a
clearer and more stringent criterion for insanity to be exempting as it is required that
there must be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, i.e., the
accused is deprived of reason; he acted without the least discernment because there is
a complete absence of the power to discern, or that there is a total deprivation of the
will.31 Thus, appellant's reliance on the Durham Rule is misplaced and, thus, may not
be given credit.
Having been shown beyond doubt that the prosecution was able to prove with certainty
all the elements of the crime charged, the Court will now proceed to determine the
correctness of the penalty and the civil liabilities imposed upon appellant.
As to the penalty, the crime of murder qualified by treachery is penalized under Article
248 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, with reclusion perpetua to
death. As to the alleged aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation, this Court
has ruled that for it to be considered as an aggravating circumstance, the prosecution
must prove (a) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime, (b) an act
manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination, and (c) a sufficient
lapse of time between the detennination and execution, to allow him to reflect upon the
consequences of his act and to allow his conscience to overcome the resolution of his
will.32 In the instant case, no proof has been adduced to establish that appellant had

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previously planned the killing of Francisco. There is no evidence when and how he
planned and prepared for the same, nor was there a showing that sufficient time had
lapsed between his determination and execution. In this respect, the Court quotes with
approval the disquisition of the CA, to wit:
The circumstances that transpired immediately before and after the stabbing negate
evident premeditation. The time when accused-appellant conceived the crime cannot be
determined. Even assuming that there was an altercation that arose between the
accused-appellant and the victim due to the remarks made by the former to the latter,
this is not the overt act indicative of his criminal intent. Simply put, the prosecution failed
to establish that there was a sufficient lapse of time for accused-appellant to reflect on
his decision to kill the victim and the actual execution thereof. 33
Thus, the RTC and the CA are correct in not considering the aggravating circumstance
of evident premeditation.
The Court likewise agrees with the RTC and the CA in not appreciating the mitigating
circumstances of sufficient provocation on the part of the offended party and voluntary
plea of guilt on the part of appellant.
With respect to the alleged mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation on the part
of Francisco, the rule is that, as a mitigating circumstance, sufficient provocation is any
unjust or improper conduct or act of the victim adequate enough to ~xcite a person to
commit a wrong, which is accordingly proportionate in gravity.34 In the present case,
appellant asserts that several days before he stabbed the victim, the latter teased
appellant to be "gay" and taunted him that the girl whom appellant courted rejected him.
However, the Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the ruling of the RTC on this
matter, to wit:
For sufficient provocation under Article 13, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code of
the Philippines to apply, three requisites must be present:
a) provocation must be sufficient;
b) it must be immediate to the commission of the crime; and
c) it must originate from the offended party.
"Sufficient" according to jurisprudence means adequate to excite a person to commit
the crime and must accordingly be proportionate to its gravity. In Bautista v. Court of
Appeals [G.R. No. L-46025, September 2, 1992], the mitigating circumstance did not
apply since it is not enough that the provocating act be unreasonable or annoying.
Certainly, calling a person gay as in this case is not the sufficient provocation
contemplated by law that would lessen the liability of the accused.
"Immediate" on the other hand means that there is no interval of time between the
provocation and the commission of the crime. Hence, in one case [People v. Co, 67
O.G. 7451] the Supreme Court ruled that provocation occurring more than one hour
before the stabbing incident is not immediate and in People v. Benito [62 SCRA 351] 24
hours before the commission of the crime. Per admission of the defense witnesses, the
taunting done by the victim occurred days before the stabbing incident hence the

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immediacy required by law was absent. The lapse of time would have given the
accused [chance] to contemplate and to recover his serenity enough to refrain from
pushing through with his evil plan. 35
Anent the supposed voluntary plea of guilt on appellant's part, it is settled that a plea of
guilty made after arraignment and after trial had begun does not entitle the accused to
have such plea considered as a mitigating circumstance.36 Again, the Court quotes
with approval the RTC's disquisition, thus:
The second mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilt. claimed by the accused
could likewise not be considered.1âwphi1 The voluntary plea of guilt entered by the
accused is not spontaneous because it was made after his arraignment and only to
support his claim of the exempting circumstance of insanity. The voluntary plea of guilt
required by law is one that is made by the accused in cognizance of the grievous wrong
he has committed and must be done as an act of repentance and respect for the law. It
is mitigating because it indicated a moral disposition in the accused favorable to his
reform. It may be recalled that accused in the case at bar did not change his plea from
"not guilty" to "guilty". In a last ditch effort to elude liability, however, accused claimed
the defense of admitting the act of [stabbing].37
The Court, however, agrees with the CA in appreciating the mitigating circumstance of
illness as would diminish the exercise of willpower of appellant without, however,
depriving him of the consciousness of his acts, pursuant to Article 13, paragraphs 9 and
10 of the RPC, as he was found by his examining doctors to have "diminish[ ed]
capacity to discern what was wrong or right at the time of the commission of the
crime."38 Thus, on the basis of the foregoing, appellant was correctly meted the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, conformably with Article 63, paragraph 3 of the RPC.
With respect to appellant's civil liability, the prevailing rule is that when the
circumstances surrounding the crime call for the imposition of reclusion perpetua only,
there being no ordinary aggravating circumstance, as in this case, the proper amounts
should be ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages and
₱75,000.00 as exemplary damages, regardless of the number of qualifying aggravating
circumstances present.39 In conformity with the foregoing rule, the awards granted by
the lower courts must, therefore, be modified. Thus, the award of moral damages
should be increased from ₱50,000.00 to P75,000.00. Appellant should also pay the
victim's heirs exemplary damages in the amount of P75,000.00. The award of
₱75,000.00, as civil indemnity, is sustained.
As regards the trial court's award of actual damages in the amount of P30,000.00, the
same must, likewise, be modified. The settled rule is that when actual damages proven
by receipts during the trial amount to less than the sum allowed by the Court as
temperate damages, 40 the award of temperate damages is justified in lieu of actual
damages which is of a lesser amount.41 Conversely, ifthe amount of actual damages
proven exceeds, then temperate damages may no longer be awarded; actual damages
based on the receipts presented during trial should instead be granted.42 The rationale
for this rule is that it would be anomalous and unfair for the victim's heirs, who tried and
succeeded in presenting receipts and other evidence to prove actual damages, to
receive an amount which is less than that given as temperate damages to those who
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are not able to present any evidence at all.43 In the present case, Francisco's heirs
were able to prove, and were awarded, actual damages in the amount of ₱30,000.00.
Since, prevailing jurisprudence now fixes the amount of ₱50,000.00 as temperate
damages in murder cases, the Court finds it proper to award temperate damages to
Francisco's heirs, in lieu of actual damages.
The imposition of six percent (6%) interest per annum on all damages awarded from the
time of finality of this decision until fully paid, as well as the payment of costs, is likewise
sustained.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated
February 27, 2015, in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01450, finding accused-appellant Roger
Racal @ Rambo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, with the
following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) The award of moral damages is INCREASED to Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos
(₱75,000.00);
(2) Accused-appellant is DIRECTED TO PAY the heirs of the victim Jose "Joe"
Francisco exemplary damages in the amount of Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos
(₱75,000.00); and (3) The award of actual damages is DELETED and, in lieu
thereof, temperate damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) is
awarded to the heirs of the victim.
SO ORDERED.

FACTS
In an Information filed by the Cebu City Prosecutor's Office, Racal was charged with the
crime of murder as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), as amended. The accusatory portion of the Information reads that the said
accused, armed with a knife, with deliberate intent, with treachery and evident
premeditation, and with intent to kill, did then and there, suddenly and unexpectedly,
attack, assault, and use personal violence upon the person of one Jose "Joe" Francisco
by stabbing the latter, at his body, thereby inflicting a fatal wound and as a
consequence of which he died.
The evidence for the prosecution established that while the “trisikad” drivers were
waiting for passengers, Racal told the group of drivers not to trust Francisco because he
is a traitor. Francisco asked Racal why the latter called him a traitor. Without warning,
Racal approached Francisco and stabbed him several times with a knife, hitting him in
the chest and other parts of his body.
Racal, on his part, did not deny having stabbed Francisco. However, he raised the
defense of insanity. He presented expert witnesses who contended that he has a
predisposition to snap into an episode where he loses his reason and thereby acts
compulsively, involuntarily and outside his conscious control. Under this state, the

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defense argued that Racal could not distinguish right from wrong and, thus was not
capable of forming a mental intent at the time that he stabbed Francisco
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA correctly upheld the conviction of herein appellant, Racal, for
murder
RULING
In the present case, the prosecution was able to clearly establish that (1) Francisco was
stabbed and killed; (2) appellant stabbed and killed him; (3) Francisco's killing was
attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery as testified to by prosecution
eyewitnesses; and, (4) the killing of Francisco was neither parricide nor infanticide.
In order for treachery to be properly appreciated, two elements must be present: (1) at
the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) the
accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods, or forms
of attack employed by him.20 These elements are extant in the facts of this case and as
testified to by the prosecution witnesses. To emphasize, the victim, Francisco, was
caught off guard when appellant attacked him. As testified to by a prosecution witness,
Francisco was then holding a plastic container containing bread and was eating. The
stealth, swiftness and methodical manner by which the attack was carried out gave the
victim no chance at all to evade when appellant thrust the knife to his torso. Thus, there
is no denying that appellant's sudden and unexpected onslaught upon the victim, and
the fact that the former did not sustain any injury, evidences treachery. Also, the fact
that appellant was facing Francisco when he stabbed the latter is of no consequence.
Even a frontal attack could be treacherous when unexpected and on an unarmed victim
who would be in no position to repel the attack or avoid it,21 as in this case.

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