The mauling of Salcedo was witnessed by bystanders and
several press people, both local and foreign. The press
EVIDENCE
Atty. Joseph Randi Torregosa
Midterm Coverage
3RD BATCH
Sison v. People
250 SCRA 58 (1995)
Moscoso
PRINCIPLE RELATED TO EVIDENCE:
Photographs can be identified by the photographer or by
any other competent witness who can testify to its
exactness and accuracy.
FACTS:
Several informations were filed in court against eleven
persons identified as Marcos loyalists charging them with
the murder of Salcedo. On July 27, 1986, a rally was
scheduled to be held at the Luneta by the Marcos loyalists.
They applied for a permit to hold such rally but their
application was denied by the authorities. Despite the
setback, 3000 of them gathered at the Rizal Monument of
the Luneta at 2:30 in the afternoon of the scheduled day.
The authorities arrived and gave them ten minutes to
disperse. A commotion ensued and Renato Banculo, a
cigarette vendor, saw the loyalists attacking persons in
yellow, the color of the “Coryistas.” He then saw a man
wearing a yellow t-shirt being chased by a group of
persons. The man in the yellow shirt was Salcedo and his
pursuers appeared to be Marcos loyalists. They caught
Salcedo and boxed and kicked and mauled him. Salcedo
tried to extricate himself from the group but they again
pounced on him and pummelled him with fist blows and
kicks hitting him on various parts of his body. Banculo saw
Ranulfo Sumilang, an electrician at the Luneta, rush to
Salcedo’s aid and tried to pacify the maulers so he could
extricate Salcedo from them, but the maulers pursued
Salcedo unrelentingly, boxing him with stones in their fists.
Salcedo somehow managed to get away from his attackers
and wipe off the blood from his face. He sat on some
cement steps and then tried to flee towards Roxas
Boulevard to the sanctuary of the Rizal Monument but
accused Joel Tan and Nilo Pacadar pursued him, mauling
Sumilang in the process. Salcedo pleaded for his life
exclaiming “Maawa na kayo sa akin. Tulungan ninyo ako.”
He cried: “Pulis, pulis. Wala bang pulis?” The mauling
continued until Salcedo collapsed and lost consciousness.
Sumilang flagged down a van and with the help of a traffic
officer, bought Salcedo to the Medical Center Manila but he
was refused admission. So they took him to the Philippine
General Hospital where he died upon arrival. Salcedo died
of “hemorrhage, intracranial traumatic.”
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took pictures and a video of the event which became front
page news of the following day, capturing national and
international attention. This prompted President Aquino to
order the Capital Regional Command and the Western
Police district to investigate the incident. Several persons,
including Sumilang and Banculo, cooperated with the
police, and on the basis of their identification, several
persons, including the accused, were apprehended and
investigated. For their defense, the principal accused
denied their participation in the mauling of the victim and
offered their respective alibis.
The trial court rendered a decision finding Sison, Pacadar,
Tan, de los Santos and Tamayo guilty as principals in the
crime of murder qualified by treachery. Ferrer was
convicted as an accomplice. Billosos, Nery, Fernandez,
Lozano and Nuega were acquitted.
The CA modified the decision of the trial court acquitting
Ferrer but increasing the penalty of the rest of the accused
to reclusion perpetua, except for Tamayo who was
convicted of homicide.
ISSUES:
1. WON the CA erred in sustaining the testimonies of
the two prosecution eyewitnesses, Ranulfo
Sumiland and Renato Banculo, because they are
unreliable, doubtful, suspicious and inconclusive.
NO.
2. WON the photographs of Salcedo and the mauling
were inadmissible for lack of proper identification
by the person or persons who took the same. NO.
RULING:
WON the CA erred in sustaining the testimonies of the two
prosecution eyewitnesses, Ranulfo Sumiland and Renato
Banculo, because they are unreliable, doubtful, suspicious
and inconclusive. NO.
The Supreme Court sustains the lower court’s findings that
the witnesses’ testimonies corroborate each other on all
important and relevant details of the principal occurrence.
Except for compelling reasons, the Supreme Court cannot
disturb the way trial courts calibrate the credence of
witnesses considering their visual view of the demeanor of
witnesses when on the witness stand. As trial courts, they
can best appreciate the verbal and non-verbal dimensions
of a witness’ testimony.
The records show that Sumilang was admonished several
times by the trial court on the witness stand for being
argumentative and evasive. This is not enough reason to
reject Sumilang’s testimony for he did not exhibit the
undesirable conduct all throughout his testimony. On the
other hand, Banculo’s mistake in identifying another
person as one of the accused does not make him an
entirely untrustworthy witness. It does not make his whole
testimony a falsity. An honest mistake is not inconsistent
with a truthful testimony.
WON the photographs of Salcedo and the mauling were
inadmissible for lack of proper identification by the person
or persons who took the same. NO.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that photographs, when
presented in evidence, must be identified by the
photographer as to its production and testified as to the
circumstances under which they were produced. Its
admissibility is determined by its accuracy in portraying
the scene at the time of the crime. The photographer,
however, is not the only witness who can identify the
pictures he has taken. The correctness of the photograph
as a faithful representation of the object portrayed can be
proved prima facie, either by the testimony of the person
who made it or by other competent witnesses.
Photographs, therefore, can be identified by the
photographer or by any other competent witness who can
testify to its exactness and accuracy.
This court notes that when the prosecution offered the
photographs as part of its evidence, appellants, through
counsel Atty. Lazaro, Jr. objected to their admissibility for
lack of proper identification.
However, when the accused presented their evidence, Atty.
Dumayas, counsel for accused Tamayo and Neri used the
photographs to prove that his clients were not in any of the
pictures and therefore could not have participated in the
mauling of the victim. The objection of Atty. Lazaro to the
admissibility of the photographs is anchored on the fact
that the person who took the same was not presented to
identify them. It was ruled that the used of these
photographs by some of the accused to show their alleged
non-participation in the crime is an admission of the
exactness and accuracy thereof.
The decision appealed from is hereby affirmed and
modified that the accused-appellants Sison, Pacadar, Tan
and de los Santos are found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Murder without any aggravating or mitigating
circumstances, and Tamayo is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide.
State vs. Tatum
58 Wash. 2d 73,360 P. 2d 754 WASH. 1961
Orig
PRINCIPLE RELATED TO EVIDENCE:
The quantum of authentication required for admissibility of
a photograph in evidence is simply that some witness (not
necessarily the photographer) be able to give some
indication as to when, where, and under what
circumstances the photograph was taken, and that the
photograph accurately portray the subject or subjects
illustrated.
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FACTS:
One William Tousin, of Pasco, received monthly welfare
checks from the state of Washington. In February, 1960,
Tousin did not receive his check (the checks were generally
mailed to a rooming house in Pasco where Tousin resided).
The mail was normally left on a window ledge in the
hallway of the rooming house. Appellant resided at the
same place.
Tousin's February check for $28.90 was endorsed and
cashed at Sherman's Food Store in Pasco by someone
other than the payee, Tousin. An employee of the store,
Caroline Pentecost, testified that, although she could not
specifically recall the above-mentioned transaction, the
initials appearing on the face of the check were hers. She
also testified that whenever a check was presented to her
for payment at the store, the store manager had instructed
her to initial it and then insert it into a "Regiscope"
machine. This machine is designed to simultaneously
photograph, through two separate lenses, both the check
and the person facing the machine.
When it was discovered that the endorsement of the payee
was a forgery, the Regiscope film of the transaction was
sent to the Regiscope distributor in Portland to be
developed. The processed film shows both the check and
the person of appellant (from his waist up) with the food
store in the background. Upon the trial, both the negative
and the print therefrom were admitted in evidence, over
appellant's objection.
ISSUES:
1. Were the Regiscope films the negative
authenticated sufficiently to warrant their
admission into evidence? YES.
2. Did Philip Dale, the Regiscope distributor, qualify
as an expert witness with respect to the filming
process despite the fact that he was not a
photographer by profession? YES.
RULING:
Were the Regiscope films the negative authenticated
sufficiently to warrant their admission into evidence? YES.
The admission or rejection of photographs as evidence lies
within the sound discretion of the court. Some witness, not
necessarily the photographer, be able to give some
indication as to when, where, and under what
circumstances the photograph was taken, and that the
photograph accurately portray the subject or subjects
illustrated. The photograph need only be sufficiently
accurate to be helpful to the court and the jury.
Pentecost (store's employee) testified that she recognized
the background shown in the picture as that of the food
store, and the standard procedure when it comes to
Regiscoping. Dale testified concerning the Regiscope
process. The testimony of these two witnesses taken
together amounted to a sufficient authentication to warrant
the admission of the photograph into evidence.
The authentication supplied by the testimony above, did
not preclude Tatum from attempting to prove that the
individual portrayed was someone other than him. But
these arguments go to the weight rather than to the
admissibility to the exhibits in question. The Regiscope
exhibits, coupled with the other evidence produced by the
state, sufficed to establish a prima facie case of first-
degree forgery.
Did Philip Dale, the Regiscope distributor, qualify as an
expert witness with respect to the filming process despite
the fact that he was not a photographer by profession?
YES.
That fact that Dale was not a professional photographer did
not, from evidentiary standpoint, disqualify him from
expressing an opinion in his testimony as to possibility of
altering a given Regiscope print. Dale's testimony that he
personally had developed "four to five hundred thousand"
individual Regiscope films, the Court found his testimony
credible.
Lucas v. Lucas
G.R. No. 190710, 6 June 2011
Piñol
PRINCIPLE RELATED TO EVIDENCE:
To warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there
must be a show cause hearing wherein the applicant must
first present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie
case or a reasonable possibility of paternity or "good
cause" for the holding of the test.
FACTS:
Petitioner, Jesse U. Lucas, filed a Petition to Establish
Illegitimate Filiation with a Motion for the Submission of
Parties to DNA Testing before the RTC of Valenzuela City.
Petitioner alleged that his mother, Elsie Uy (Elsie),
migrated to Manila from Davao and stayed with a certain
"Ate Belen (Belen)" who worked in a prominent nightspot
in Manila. Elsie would oftentimes accompany Belen to
work. On one occasion, Elsie got acquainted with
respondent, Jesus S. Lucas, at Belen's workplace, and an
intimate relationship developed between the two. Elsie
eventually got pregnant and, on March 11, 1969, she gave
birth to petitioner.
The name of petitioner's father was not stated in
petitioner's certificate of live birth. However, Elsie later on
told petitioner that his father is respondent.
According to Elsie, respondent allegedly extended financial
support to her and petitioner for a period of about two
years. However, when the relationship of Elsie and
respondent ended, Elsie refused to accept respondent's
offer of support and decided to raise petitioner on her own.
While petitioner was growing up, Elsie made several
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attempts to introduce petitioner to respondent, but all
attempts were in vain.
The RTC, acting on respondent’s motion for
reconsideration, dismissed the case. However, upon the
timely motion for reconsideration of the petitioner, the RTC
reversed its previous ruling.
The CA on the other hand held that the RTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over the person of respondent, as no summons
had been served on him. It further noted that petitioner
failed to show that the four significant procedural aspects
of a traditional paternity action, which are: a prima facie
case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and
physical resemblance between the putative father and the
child, as laid down in Herrera v. Alba, had been met.
Additionally, the CA held that a DNA testing should not be
allowed when the petitioner has failed to establish a prima
facie case.
ISSUES:
1. WON the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the respondent?
2. WON the reliance on the case of Herrera v. Alba
with respect to the four significant procedural
aspects of a traditional paternity action was
proper?
RULING:
WON the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the person
of the respondent?
SC held that the petition to establish illegitimate filiation is
an action in rem. Hence jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the
court, provided that the latter has jurisdiction over the res.
In this case, by the simple filing of the petition to establish
illegitimate filiation before the RTC, which undoubtedly had
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition, the
latter thereby acquired jurisdiction over the case.
If at all, service of summons or notice is made to the
defendant, it is not for the purpose of vesting the court
with jurisdiction, but merely for satisfying the due process
requirements. Hence, failure to serve summons will not
deprive the court of its jurisdiction to try and decide the
case.
WON the reliance on the case of Herrera v. Alba with
respect to the four significant procedural aspects of a
traditional paternity action was proper?
The Court held that the statement in Herrera v. Alba that
there are four significant procedural aspects in a traditional
paternity case which parties have to face has been widely
misunderstood and misapplied in this case. A party is
confronted by these so-called procedural aspects during
trial, when the parties have presented their respective
evidence. They are matters of evidence that cannot be
determined at this initial stage of the proceedings, when
only the petition to establish filiation has been filed. The
CA's observation that the petitioner failed to establish a
prima facie case — the first procedural aspect in a
paternity case — is therefore misplaced. A prima facie case
is built by a party's evidence and not by mere allegations
in the initiatory pleading.
Clearly then, it was also not the opportune time to discuss
the lack of a prima facie case vis-à-vis the motion for DNA
testing since no evidence has, as yet, been presented by
petitioner. More essentially, it is premature to discuss
whether, under the circumstances, a DNA testing order is
warranted considering that no such order has yet been
issued by the trial court. In fact, the latter has just set the
said case for hearing.
However, the CA's view that it would be dangerous to allow
a DNA testing without corroborative proof was well taken
by the Court. In light of this observation, the SC found that
there is a need to supplement the Rule on DNA Evidence to
aid the courts in resolving motions for DNA testing order,
particularly in paternity and other filiation cases.
Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely provides for
conditions that are aimed to safeguard the accuracy and
integrity of the DNA testing. This does not mean, however,
that a DNA testing order will be issued as a matter of right
if, during the hearing, the said conditions are established.
In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing
order, there must be a show cause hearing wherein the
applicant must first present sufficient evidence to establish
a prima facie case or a reasonable possibility of paternity
or "good cause" for the holding of the test. In these states,
a court order for blood testing is considered a "search,"
which, under their Constitutions (as in ours), must be
preceded by a finding of probable cause in order to be
valid. Hence, the requirement of a prima facie case, or
reasonable possibility, was imposed in civil actions as a
counterpart of a finding of probable cause.
The same condition precedent should be applied in our
jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere
harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion
for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie
evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.
Air France v. Carrascoso
18 SCRA 155 (1966)
Quevedo
PRINCIPLE RELATED TO EVIDENCE:
The presumption is that evidence willfully suppressed
would be adverse if produced.
FACTS:
The CFI of Manila sentenced Air France to pay respondent
Rafael Carrascoso damages. On appeal, the CA slightly
reduced the amount of refund.
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Air France, through its authorized agent, PAL, Inc., issued
to Carrascoso a 'first class' round trip airplane ticket from
Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff traveled
in 'first class', but at Bangkok, the Manager of the
defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the 'first class'
seat that he was occupying because, in the words of the
witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a 'white man', who,
the Manager alleged, had a 'better right’ to the seat.
A commotion ensued with Carrascoso eventually giving his
seat. Air France tried to prove by the testimony of its
witnesses Luis Zaldariaga and Rafael Altonaga that
although plaintiff paid for, and was issued a 'first class'
airplane ticket, the ticket was subject to confirmation in
Hongkong.
ISSUE:
Whether Air France is liable for damages to Carrascoso as
proven by the evidence. YES.
RULING:
The court cannot give credit to the testimony of said
witnesses. Oral evidence cannot prevail over written
evidence, and plaintiff's Exhibits 'A’, 'A-1', 'B', 'B-1', 'C’ and
'C-1’ belie the testimony of said witnesses, and clearly
show that the plaintiff was issued, and paid for, a first class
ticket without any reservation whatever. Furthermore, as
hereinabove shown, defendant's own witness Rafael
Altonaga testified that the reservation for a 'first class'
accommodation for the plaintiff was confirmed. The court
cannot believe that after such confirmation defendant had
a verbal understanding with plaintiff that the 'first class’
ticket issued to him by defendant would be subject to
confirmation in Hongkong."
If there was a justified reason for the action of the
defendant's Manager in Bangkok, the defendant could have
easily proven it by having taken the testimony of the said
Manager by deposition, but defendant did not do so; the
presumption is that evidence willfully suppressed would be
adverse if produced [Sec. 69, par. (e), Rules of Court];
and, under the circumstances, the Court is constrained to
find, as it does find, that the Manager of the defendant
airline in Bangkok not merely asked but threatened the
plaintiff to throw him out of the plane if he did not give up
his 'first class’ seat because the said Manager wanted to
accommodate, using the words of the witness Ernesto G.
Cuento, the 'white man’
Petitioner charges that the finding of the Court of Appeals
that the purser made an entry in his notebook reading
"First class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class
against his will, and that the captain refused to intervene"
is predicated upon evidence [Carrascoso's testimony]
which is incompetent. We do not think so. The subject of
inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster incident. Testimony
on the entry does not come within the proscription of the
best evidence rule. Such testimony is admissible. Besides,
from a reading of the transcript just quoted, when the
dialogue happened, the impact of the startling occurrence
was still fresh and continued to be felt. The excitement had
not as yet died down. Statements then, in this
environment, are admissible as part of the res gestae. For,
they grow "out of the nervous excitement and mental and
physical condition of the declarant". The utterance of the
purser regarding his entry in the notebook was
spontaneous, and related to the circumstances of the
ouster incident. Its trustworthiness has been guaranteed.
It thus escapes the operation of the hearsay rule. It forms
part of the res gestae. We, therefore, hold that the
transcribed testimony of Carrascoso is admissible in
evidence.
On balance, we say that the judgment of the Court of
Appeals does not suffer from reversible error. We
accordingly vote to AFFIRM the same.
People v. Tan
105 Phil. 1242 (1959)
Quinanola
PRINCIPLE RELATED TO EVIDENCE:
If the documents or papers to be introduced in evidence
were produced by the use of carbon sheets, and which
thereby produced a facsimile of the originals including the
figures and the signatures on the originals, they are
regarded as duplicate originals and may be introduced as
such, even without accounting for the non-production of
the other originals.
FACTS:
Private respondents Pacita Madrigal-Gonzales and others
were charged with the crime of falsification of public
documents in their capacities as public officials, by having
made it appear that certain relief supplies and/or
merchandise were purchased by Pacita for distribution to
calamity indigents when in fact and in truth, no such
distribution had been made.
In order to prove the charge, the prosecution presented to
a witness a booklet of receipts containing blue
invoices numbered 101301 to 101400 of the Metro
Drug Corp. The booklet contained the triplicate copies
because according to the witness, the original invoices
were sent to the Manila office of the company, the
duplicates to the customers so the triplicate copies
remained in the booklet.
Witness(salesman) explained that in preparing receipts for
the sales, two carbons were used between the 3 sheets so
that the duplicates and the triplicates were filled out by the
use of the carbons.
Hon. Tan, interrupted the proceeding holding that the
triplicates are inadmissible unless it is first proven that the
originals were lost and cannot be produced.
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The accountant of Metro Drug was also called to testify and
he declared that the originals are given to the customers,
while only the duplicate or pink copies are submitted to the
central office in Manila.
ISSUE:
Are the invoices admissible in evidence? YES.
RULING:
As the commentator of the Rules of Court has explained it:
“when carbon sheets are inserted between 2 or more
sheets of writing paper and produces facsimile upon the
sheets beneath, such signature being reproduced by the
same stroke of the pen are regarded as duplicate originals
and either of them may be introduced in evidence as such
without accounting for the nonproduction of the others”.
It has also been decided in the case of People v Quinones
that a confession being carbon copy of the original and
bearing as it does the signature of appellant, is admissible
in evidence and possesses all the probative value of the
original and does not require an accounting for the non-
production of the original.
Two principal authors on the law of evidence have also
sustained the theory of admissibility of duplicate originals.
Therefore, the triplicates formed by the use of carbon
papers are admissible in evidence, without accounting first
for the loss of the originals.
Jessie Flores v. People
G.R. No. 222861, 23 April 2018
Reserva
PRINCIPLE RELATED TO EVIDENCE:
non-presentation of the original pieces of the marked
money is not fatal to the cause of the prosecution.
Moreover, there is no rule requiring that the police officers
must apply fluorescent powder to the buy-bust money to
prove the commission of the offense.
FACTS:
June 26, 2000 at around 6 in the evening, private
complainant France figured in a vehicular collision with a
passenger jeepney at the corner of E. Rodriguez and
Aurora Blvd., Quezon City. Soon thereafter, a traffic
enforcer arrived at the vicinity and prepared a sketch of
the incident. Then, France and the jeepney driver
proceeded at Station 10, Kamuning Police Station. At the
station, appellant PO2 Flores investigated the incident.
The jeepney river was told to go home while France was
asked to remain at the station. He was told to return to the
station after two days and prepare the amount of Php,
2,000.00 so he can get back his driver’s license. Because
France could not raise the said amount in two days, he was
told by PO2 Flores to just return on the third day in the
evening because he was on a night shift duty then.
Subsequently, a Traffic Violation Receipt No 1022911 was
issued and signed by PO2 Flores who told France that the
same would serve as the latter’s temporary driver’s
license.France became suspicious as he recalled that on a
previous occasion when his driver’s license was confiscated
due to a traffic violation the same was claimed from the
office of the MMDA and not from the officer who
confiscated his license.
On June 29, 2000, petitioner was arrested via an
entrapment operation conducted by the Presidential Anti-
Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) pursuant to a
compliant lodged by private complainant France. The
PAOCTF team proceeded to Station 10, Kamuning Police
Station together with France. When France entered the
station, PO2 Flores asked him if he brought with him the
money. After an hour, PO2 Flores called France to hiss
table. He opened a drawer and told France to drop the
money inside. PO2 Flores then counted the money inside
the drawer using his left hand. As soon as France asked for
his driver’s license, the PAOCTF team suddenly materlized
at the scene through PO2 llao’s pre-arranged signal. They
arrested P02 Flores and confiscated the things inside his
drawer including the marked money.
To exculpate himself from criminal liability, Flores
interposed the defense of denial and fram up. The RTC
found petitioner guilty of simple robbery. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration but it was denied in the RTC’s
order. Aggrieved, petitioner appealed before the CA.
ISSUE:
1. CA grievously erred and abused its prerogatives
when it affirmed the petitioner’s conviction,
despite that it is glaring from the evidence on
record that the respondent miserably failed to
establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
2. 2he CA committed a palpable mistake when it
unceremoniously overlooked that under the
principle of conclusiveness of judgment, the issue
on the alleged taking of the property subject of
this accusation can no longer be re-litigated in this
criminal action.
RULING:
The petition has no merit.
In petitions for review under RULE 45 of the Rules of
Court, only questions of law may be raised, not issues of
fact.
The prosecution sufficiently established all the elements of
the crime charged. Petitioner succeeded in forcing France
to choose between parting with his money or have his
driver’s license confiscated or cancelled.
Non-presentation of the original pieces of the marked
money is not fatal to the cause of the prosecution. The
best evidence rule applies only when the contents of the
document are the subject of inquiry. Where the issue is
only as to whether or not such document was actually
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executed, or exists, or in the circumstances relevant to or
surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not
apply and testimonial evidence is admissible.
Compania Maritima v. Allied
77 SCRA 24 (1977)
Roque
PRINCIPLE RELATED TO EVIDENCE:
“What applies to this case is the general rule "that an audit
made by, or the testimony of, a private auditor, is
inadmissible in evidence as proof of the original records,
books of accounts, reports or the like"
FACTS:
The Compania Maritima and the Allied Free Workers Union
entered into a written contract whereby the union agreed
to perform arrastre and stevedoring work for the
consignees vessels at Iligan City. The contract was to be
effective for one month. It was stipulated that the
company could revoke the contract before the expiration of
the term if the union failed to render proper service. The
contract could be renewed by agreement of the parties.
The issue of whether the company should pay for the
stevedoring service became a sore point of contention
between the parties. The union members labored under
the impression that they were not being compensated for
their stevedoring service as distinguished from arrastre
service. Although the arrastre and stevedoring contract
was disadvantageous to the union, it did not terminate the
contract because its members were in dire need of work
and work, which was not adequately compensated, was
preferable to having no work at all.
Upon the expiration of the one-month period, the said
contract was verbally renewed. The company allowed the
union to continue performing arrastre and stevedoring
work.In 1954, Maritima entered into a stevedoring
agreement with the Iligan Stevedoring Association. The
union picketed in the wharf for nine days and prevented
Iligan Stevedoring from performing its services. Maritima
retaliated by filing an action with the union for the
rescission of the 1952 contract, for injunction against the
union workers and for damages. This initiated a protracted
litigation between the two. The amended decision of the
trial court rendered among others money judgment against
the union. The appeal made by the union attacked the
manner in which the trial court arrived the sum of 450,000
which Maritima allegedly suffered because of lost
freightage, inefficiency in the services of the union
workers, among other causes attributable to the union.
ISSUE:
WON the trial court erred in awarding to the plaintiff
company actual damages, moral damages and attorney’s
fees on the ground that the auditor’s report on which they
were based was hearsay.
RULING:
The company argues that the accountants' reports are
admissible in evidence because of the rule that "when the
original consists of numerous accounts or other documents
which cannot be examined in court without great loss-of
time and the fact sought to be established from them is
oth the general result of the whole", the original writings
need not be produced (Sec. 2[e], Rule 130, Rules of
Court).
That rule cannot be applied in this case because the
voluminous character of the records, on which the
accountants' reports were based, was not duly established.
It is also a requisite for the application of the rule that the
records and accounts should be made accessible to the
adverse party so that the company, of the summary may
be tested on cross-examination.
What applies to this case is the general rule "that an audit
made by, or the testimony of, a private auditor, is
inadmissible in evidence as proof of the original records,
books of accounts, reports or the like" That general rule
cannot be relaxed in this case because the company failed
to make a preliminary showing as to the difficulty or
impossibility attending the production of the records in
court and their examination and analysis as evidence by
the court.
Consolidated Bank v. Del Monte Motor Works
465 SCRA 117
Rosal
PRINCIPLE RELATED TO EVIDENCE:
The "best evidence rule" as stated in our Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure is not absolute. The rule accepts exceptions
- one of which is when the original of the subject document
is in the possession of the adverse party.
FACTS:
Consolidated Bank (petitioner) filed a complaint for
recovery of sum of money against Del Monte Motor Works
(defendants) for the amount of P1Million which was loaned
to them. The loan was supposed to be payable with 40k a
month under 25 installments and with 23% interest per
annum. They based their action on a promissory note that
was procured on the day of the execution of the loan.
Upon the defendant’s failure to make good with the
monthly payments, the whole amount became due and
demandable. Thus, the petitioner sent the defendants
several demand letters. The petitioner attached to its
complaint a photocopy of the promissory note marked as
Exhibit A. As the original copy of the promissory note could
no longer be found, the petitioner instead sought the
admission of the duplicate original of the promissory note,
marked as Exhibit E. Trial court initially admitted Exhibit E
to evidence. The defendants filed a motion for
reconsideration claiming that the photocopy (Exhibit E)
was immaterial, irrelevant, was not properly identified and
hearsay evidence. Further, as there were markings in
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Exhibit A which were not contained in Exhibit E, the latter
could not possibly be considered an original copy of Exhibit
A. The trial court granted the defendant's motions for
reconsideration, applying the best evidence rule. The
defendant then filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
that with the exclusion of Exhibits A and E, petitioner no
longer possessed any proof of respondents alleged
indebtedness. The Trial Court dismissed the case without
hearing the petitioner’s contention that the reason why
they could not procure the original is because the same
was in possession of the defendants.
ISSUES:
1. WON the document was specifically denied. NO.
2. WON the photocopy of the promissory note can be
admitted as evidence. YES.
RULING:
WON the document was specifically denied. NO.
The document was not specifically denied.
SEC. 8. How to contest such documents. - When an action
or defense is founded upon a written instrument, copied in
or attached to the corresponding pleading as provided in
the preceding section, the genuineness and due execution
of the instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the
adverse party, under oath, specifically denies them and
sets forth what he claims to be the facts; but the
requirement of an oath does not apply when the adverse
party does not appear to be a party to the instrument or
when compliance with an order for an inspection of the
original instrument is refused
With respect to the defendants’ contentions, they only
asserted that: (1) Mr. Nograles (one of the defendants) did
not personally sign the document; and (2) Defendants did
not receive consideration for the said loan.
The contents of the promissory note therein were not
disputed whatsoever. In effect, it was admitted that the
contents of such documents were accurate.
WON the photocopy of the promissory note can be
admitted as evidence. YES.
Under Rule 130 of the Rules of Civil Procedure (where the
"best evidence rule" is encapsulated) when the subject of
inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself.
However,the rule admits exceptions, one of which is when
the original of the subject document is in the possession of
the adverse party.
In the case at bar, had X been given the opportunity by
the trial court, it would have sufficiently established that
the original of Exhibit A was in the possession of Y which
would have called into application one of the exceptions to
the best evidence rule.
 Arceo v. Pp
G.R. No. 142641, 17 July 2006
Sabusay
PRINCIPLE RELATED TO EVIDENCE:
Rule 130, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, otherwise known
as the best evidence rule (now original document rule)
applies only where the content of the document is the
subject of the inquiry. Where the issue is the execution or
existence of the document or the circumstances
surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not
apply and testimonial evidence is admissible.
FACTS:
Petitioner Arceo obtained two separate loans from private
complainant Josefino Cenizal, for a total of Php150,000.
Arceo thereafter issued in favor of Cenizal, a BPI Check
post dated August 4, 1991 corresponding to the amount of
the loan. When August 4, 1991 came, Cenizal did not
deposit the check immediately because Arceo promised
that he would replace the check with cash. Such a promise
was made verbally seven (7) times.
Due to Arceo’s failure to fulfill his promise, Cenizal’s
patience ran out. So, he brought the check to the bank for
encashment. The head office of BPI through a letter dated
December 5, 1991, informed him that the check bounced
because of insufficient funds.
He went to Arceo’s house to inform him of such dishonor
but found out that Arceo had left the place. Cenizal
through his lawyer wrote a letter of demand giving Arceo
three (3) days to pay upon receipt thereof. His demand
was left unheeded, so as a consequence, Cenizal executed
before the office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City his
affidavit and submitted documents in support of his
complaint for estafa and violation of [BP 22] against Arceo.
After due investigation, a case for violation of BP 22 was
filed. While trial was still ongoing, the check in question
and the return slip were however lost by Cenizal as a result
of a fire that occurred near his residence. Cenizal then
executed an Affidavit of Loss regarding the loss of the
check in question and the return slip. After trial, Arceo was
found guilty as charged. The appellate court affirmed the
trial court's decision in toto.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the RTC & CA erred in
convicting Petitioner Arceo despite the
failure of the prosecution to present the
dishonored check during the trial. (Evidence-
related issue) NO.
2. Whether or not he should be liable for the
dishonored check since it was presented to the
bank beyond the 90-day period provided under
the law. YES
3. Whether or not the notice requirement was
complied with since the notice of dishonor and
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demand letter required him to pay within three
days only, not five banking days as required by
law. YES
RULING:
NO. The RTC & CA did not err in convicting Petitioner
despite the failure of the prosecution to present the
dishonored check during trial. (Applicability of Best
Evidence Rule)
Petitioner's insistence on the presentation of the check in
evidence as a condition sine qua non for conviction under
BP 22 is wrong. He anchors his argument on Rule 130,
Section 3 of the Rules of Court, otherwise known as the
best evidence rule. This applies only where the content of
the document is the subject of the inquiry. Where the issue
is the execution or existence of the document or the
circumstances surrounding its execution, the best evidence
rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible.
The gravamen of the offense is the act of drawing and
issuing a worthless check. Hence, the subject of the inquiry
is the fact of issuance or execution of the check, not its
content. Here, the due execution and existence of the
check were sufficiently established. Cenizal testified that he
presented the originals of the check, the return slip and
other pertinent documents before the Office of the City
Prosecutor when he executed his complaint-affidavit during
the preliminary investigation. The City Prosecutor found a
prima facie case against the petitioner for violation of BP
22 and filed the corresponding information based on the
documents.
Although the check and the return slip were lost by Cenizal
in a fire while trial was still ongoing, he was nevertheless
able to adequately establish the due execution, existence
and loss of the check and the return slip in an affidavit of
loss as well as in his testimony during the trial of the case.
Moreover, petitioner himself admitted that he issued the
check. He never denied that the check was presented for
payment to the drawee bank and was dishonored for
having been drawn against insufficient funds. HCS
YES. Arceo is liable for the dishonored check even if it was
presented to the bank beyond the 90-day period as
provided under BP 22 Law.
In Wong v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that the 90-
day period provided in the law is not an element of the
offense. According to current banking practice, the
reasonable period within which to present a check to the
drawee bank is six months. Thereafter, the check becomes
stale and the drawer is discharged from liability thereon to
the extent of the loss caused by the delay.
Thus, Cenizal's presentment of the check to the drawee
bank 120 days (four months) after its issue was still within
the allowable period. Petitioner was freed neither from the
obligation to keep sufficient funds in his account nor from
liability resulting from the dishonor of the check.
YES. The notice requirement under the law was complied
with in this case.
Cenizal's counsel had informed petitioner in writing of the
check's dishonor and demanded payment of the value of
the check. Despite receipt of the notice of dishonor and
demand for payment, he still failed to pay the amount of
the check. While petitioner may have been given only
three days to pay the value of the check, the trial court
found that the amount due thereon remained unpaid even
after five banking days from his receipt of the notice of
dishonor. This negated his claim that he had already paid
Cenizal and should therefore be relieved of any liability.
Moreover, petitioner's claim of payment was nothing more
than a mere allegation. He presented no proof to support
it. If indeed there was payment, petitioner should have
redeemed or taken the check back in the ordinary course
of business. Instead, the check remained in the possession
of the payee who demanded the satisfaction of petitioner's
obligation when the check became due as well as when the
check was dishonored by the drawee bank.
Lamsen v. People
G.R. No. 227069, 22 November 2017
Salgarino
PRINCIPLE RELATED TO EVIDENCE:
1. The genuineness and due execution of a
photocopy could not be competently established
without a copy of the original. Photocopies are
considered secondary evidence which can be
rendered inadmissible absent any proof that the
original was lost, destroyed, or in custody or
under the control of the party against whom the
evidence is offered.
2. Circumstantial evidence on record is sufficient to
convict the accused is that the series of
circumstances duly proven must be consistent
with each other and that each and every
circumstance must be consistent with the
accused's guilt and inconsistent with his
innocence.
FACTS:
On April 21 1993 private individual Lamsen prepared,
forged and falsified, or caused to be prepared, forged
and falsified, a Deed of Absolute Sale. It was stated in
the said deed that Spouses Dela Cruz and Tandas, as
registered owner of a parcel of land, transferred and
conveyed to him for and in consideration of P150k. It
appears that Lamsen forged the signatures of the
registered owners appearing on the lower left portion of
the said document. He made it appear that the
registered owner of the property participated and
intervened in the signing of the Deed of Sale. Where
in fact the registered owner did not sell the property to the
accused much less did they authorize Lamsen or anybody
else to sign their names or affix their signature.
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On September 7, 2001, Aniceta Dela Cruz passed away,
leaving behind her nieces and surviving heirs, Teresita and
Camelita. After Aniceta's death, Teresita went to the
former's house to look for the owner's duplicate title of the
subject property, but the same was allegedly nowhere to
be found.
Teresita filed a petition for the issuance of the second
owner's duplicate copy before the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela City. The said petition, however, was dismissed
on the basis of the opposition of Lamsen, who claimed that
the original copy of the owner's duplicate title could not
have been lost because it was with him. Thereafter, she
went to the Notarial Section of Manila to get a certified true
copy of the subject deed but was given a mere photocopy
thereof, since the original was no longer on file. She then
submitted the photocopy of the deed to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for examination of the signatures of Spouses
Tandas. Upon examination, Document Examiner II
Batiles confirmed that the subject deed was indeed
falsified. He revealed that there were dissimilarities
between the questions and standard signatures of
Aniceta and Nestor (spouses Tandas), and that they were
not written by one and the same person.
Lamsen claimed that while he was renting the place of his
uncle Nestor sometime in 1993, he validly bought and
acquired the subject property from spouses Tandas in the
amount of P150,000.00.
MeTC found Lamsen guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Falsification of Public Document.
RTC affirmed the MeTC ruling in toto on the basis of
prescription and circumstantial evidence.
CA affirmed the RTC ruling. With the subsequent denial of
his motion for reconsideration/new trial. Lamsen filed the
instant petition before the Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lamsen is guilty of the crime charged. NO.
RULING:
NO. Lamsen is ACQUITTED of the crime of Falsification of
Public Document
The elements of the said crime are as follows: (a) the
offender is a private individual; (b) the offender committed
any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171;
and (c) the falsification was committed in a public
document.
Relatedly, the prosecution must likewise establish the
fact of falsification or forgery by clear, positive, and
convincing evidence, as the same is never presumed.
The fact of forgery can only be established by a
comparison between the alleged forged signature and the
authentic and genuine signature of the person whose
signature is theorized to have been forged.
"Under Rule 132, Section 22 of the Rules of Court, the
genuineness of handwriting may be proved in the following
manner:
1. by any witness who believes it to be the
handwriting of such person because he has seen
the person write; or he has seen writing
purporting to be his upon which the witness has
acted or been charged;
2. by a comparison, made by the witness or the
court, with writings admitted or treated as
genuine by the party, against whom the evidence
is offered, or proved to be genuine to the
satisfaction of the judge.
In this case, the prosecution presented an expert
witness, Batiles, to prove its allegation of falsification or
forgery. While Batiles testified during cross-examination
that the questioned signatures were not written by
one and the same person, and that there is a
certainty that the subject deed was falsified.
However, the Court finds this declaration unreliable
and inconclusive, as it is inconsistent with Batiles
statement issued after examining the allegedly falsified
subject deed. Batiles said that no definite conclusion
can be rendered due to the fact the questioned
signatures are photocopies (Xerox) wherein minute
details are not clearly manifested.
The genuineness and due execution of a photocopy could
not be competently established without a copy of the
original. Photocopies are considered secondary evidence
which can be rendered inadmissible absent any proof that
the original was lost, destroyed, or in custody or under the
control of the party against whom the evidence is offered.
Here, not only did the prosecution fail to present the
original copy of the subject deed in court, it likewise
did not provide ample proof that the same was lost,
destroyed, or in custody or under the control of
Lamsen.
Since mere photocopies of the subject deed were used to
examine the questioned and standard signatures of
spouses Tandas, no valid comparison can be had
between them, thereby rendering Batiles' declaration
inconclusive to support a finding of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt against Lamsen.
On its reliance to circumstantial evidence, while it is true
that the courts can rely on circumstantial evidence in
order to establish the guilt of the accused, the
circumstantial evidence which the courts a quo relied upon
in this case did not sufficiently create moral certainty,
since they appear to be too insignificant and
unconvincing. Firstly, the Notarial Law does not require
the parties to have the subject deed notarized in the place
of their residence. Secondly, the issue on the date when
the supposed witnesses signed the subject deed is
immaterial. Thirdly, having the subject deed registered
with the RD after an unreasonable length of time from its
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execution and notarization does not necessarily imply that
the subject deed was actually forged. Lastly, the supposed
belated payment of the corresponding capital gains and
documentary stamp taxes has no relevance at all with the
supposed act of falsification.
Therefore, Lamsen is ACQUITTED of the crime of
Falsification of Public Document on the ground of
reasonable doubt.
De Vera v. Aguilar
218 SCRA 602
Salvador
PRINCIPLE RELATED TO EVIDENCE:
Secondary evidence is admissible when the original
documents were actually lost or destroyed. But prior to the
introduction of such secondary evidence, the proponent
must establish the former existence of the instrument. The
correct order of proof is as follows: Existence; Execution;
Loss; Contents, although this order may be changed if
necessary at the discretion of the court.
FACTS:
Petitioners Basilio, Luis, Felipe, Eustaquia and Maria, all
surnamed de Vera and respondent Leona, married to
respondent Mariano Aguilar, are the children and heirs of
the late Marcosa.
Marcosa owned the disputed parcel of land which was
mortgaged by petitioners. When the mortgage had
matured, the respondents redeemed the property and in
turn Marcosa sold the same to them.
The respondents registered the deed with the Registry of
Deeds. From then on, the Aguilars have been paying taxes
on the land.
Petitioners then claimed that as children of Marcosa
Bernabe, they were co-owners of the property and
demanded partition. They also alleged that the
respondents resold the property to Marcosa Bernabe on
April 28, 1959.
Petitioners then filed a suit for reconveyance of the lot
where the trial court ruled in their favor and ordered the
respondents to reconvey the property in question to the
plaintiffs.
In ruling in favor of the petitioners, the trial court admitted
Exhibit A purporting to be a xeroxed copy of an alleged
deed of sale executed on April 28, 1959 by the
respondents selling, transferring and conveying unto
Marcosa Bernabe the disputed parcel of land. The
admission of such evidence was objected upon by the
respondents.
The respondents appealed to the CA contending that since
the petitioners failed to produce the original of the alleged
deed of sale dated April 28, 1959, the same was not the
best evidence of the alleged sale hence it should not have
been accorded any evidentiary value.
The petitioners claimed that the existence of the document
of sale dated April 28, 1959 had been duly established by
the testimony of the notary public before whom it was
acknowledged and by Luis de Vera who was present during
its execution.
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision and
found that the loss or destruction of the original deed of
sale has not been duly proven by the petitioners. Hence,
secondary evidence, i.e., presentation of the xeroxed copy
of the alleged deed of sale is inadmissible.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners have satisfactorily proven
the loss of the original deed of sale so as to allow the
presentation of the xeroxed copy of the same? NO.
RULING:
The Court ruled that under the Rules of Court, when the
original writing has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, upon proof of its execution and loss or
destruction, or unavailability, its contents may be proved
by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic
document, or by the recollection of witnesses.
The Court emphasized that secondary evidence is
admissible when the original documents were actually lost
or destroyed. But prior to the introduction of such
secondary evidence, the proponent must establish the
former existence of the instrument.
The correct order of proof is as follows: existence;
execution; loss; contents although this order may be
changed if necessary in the discretion of the court.
In this case, the existence of an alleged sale of a parcel of
land was proved by the presentation of a xeroxed copy of
the alleged deed of absolute sale.
In establishing the execution of a document, the same
may be established by the person or persons who executed
it, by the person before whom its execution was
acknowledged, or by any person who was present and saw
it executed or who, after its execution, saw it and
recognized the signatures; or by a person to whom the
parties to the instrument had previously confessed the
execution thereof.
The Court agreed that the petitioners have sufficiently
established the due execution of the alleged deed of sale
through the testimony of the notary public.
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After the due execution of the document has been
established, it must next be proved that said document has
been lost or destroyed. The destruction of the instrument
may be proved by any person knowing the fact.
The loss may be shown by any person who knew the fact
of its loss, or by any one who had made, in the judgment
of the court, a sufficient examination in the place or places
where the document or papers of similar character are
usually kept by the person in whose custody the document
lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made
any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the
court that the instrument is indeed lost.
However, all duplicates or counterparts must be accounted
for before using copies. For, since all the duplicates are
parts of the writing itself to be proved, no excuse for non-
production of the writing itself can be regarded as
established until it appears that all of its parts are
unavailable.
In this case, Atty. Emiliano Ibasco, Jr., the notary public,
testified that the alleged deed of sale has about four or five
original copies. Hence, all originals must be accounted for
before secondary evidence can be given of anyone. The
petitioners failed to do this as the petitioners merely
accounted for three out of four or five original copies.
The Court also pointed out the fact that when asked on the
witness stand where the original document was, plaintiff
Luis de Vera testified that his sister Maria borrowed from
him the original document and brought them to the Office
of the Register of Deeds in Malolos to register the
document. With the testimony, the Court ruled that the
original of the deed of sale in question, has not been lost
or destroyed as it was submitted to the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Malolos for registration.
Therefore, the appellees should have asked the office to
produce it in court and if it could not be produced, they
should have called the Register of Deeds to explain why.
The petitioners failed to do this so the loss or destruction
of the original of the document in question has not been
established. Hence, secondary evidence of it is
inadmissible.
EDSA Shangri-la Hotel v. BF Corporation
G.R. No. 145842, 27 June 2008
Suan
PRINCIPLE RELATED TO EVIDENCE:
Secondary evidence of the contents of a written instrument
or document refers to evidence other than the original
instrument or document itself.
A party may present secondary evidence of the contents of
a writing not only when the original is lost or destroyed,
but also when it is in custody or under the control of the
adverse party. In either instance, however, certain
explanations must be given before a party can resort to
secondary evidence.
FACTS:
EDSA Shangri-la Hotel and Resort (ESHRI) and BF
Corporation (BF) entered into a construction agreement.
The contract stipulated for the payment of the contract
price on the basis of the work accomplished as described in
the monthly progress billings. Under this arrangement, BF
shall submit a monthly progress billing to ESHRI which
would then re-measure the work accomplished and prepare
a Progress Payment Certificate for that month's progress
billing.
From May 1, 1991 to June 30, 1992, BF submitted a total
of 19 progress billings following the procedure agreed
upon. Based on Progress Billing Nos. 1 to 13, ESHRI paid
BF PhP86,501,834.05.
According to BF, however, ESHRI, for Progress Billing Nos.
14 to 19, did not remeasure the work done, did not
prepare the Progress Payment Certificates, let alone remit
payment for the inclusive periods covered. In this regard,
BF claimed to have been misled into working continuously
on the project by ESHRI which gave the assurance about
the Progress Payment Certificates already being processed.
After several futile attempts to collect the unpaid billings,
BF filed before the RTC a suit for a sum of money and
damages.
ESHRI claimed to have overpaid BF for Progress Billing
Nos. 1 to 13 and, by way of counterclaim with damages,
asked that BF be ordered to refund the excess payments.
The lower court admitted into evidence photocopies of the
progress billings, PMIs, and WVOs.
BF explained that it could not present the original
documents since they were in the possession of ESHRI
which refused to had them over despite demands.
ISSUE:
Admissibility of Photocopies of Progress Billing Nos. 14 to
19. ADMISSIBLE
RULING:
The only actual rule that the term "best evidence" denotes
is the rule requiring that the original of a writing must, as a
general proposition, be produced and secondary evidence
of its contents is not admissible except where the original
cannot be had.
Rule 130, Section 3 of the Rules of Court enunciates the
best evidence rule:
SEC. 3. Original document must be produced;
exceptions. — When the subject of inquiry is the
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contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself,
except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or
cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on
the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under
the control of the party against whom the
evidence is offered, and the latter fails to
produce it after reasonable notice.
Clearly, the circumstances obtained in this case fall under
the exception under Sec. 3 (b) of Rule 130. In other words,
the conditions sine qua non for the presentation and
reception of the photocopies of the original document as
secondary evidence have been met. These are:
1. there is proof of the original document's execution
or existence;
2. there is proof of the cause of the original
document's unavailability; and the offeror is in
good faith
Four factual premises are readily deducible from the above
exchanges, to wit:
1. the existence of the original documents which
ESHRI had possession of;
2. a request was made on ESHRI to produce the
documents;
3. ESHRI was afforded sufficient time to produce
them; and
4. ESHRI was not inclined to produce them.
People v. Enojas
G.R No. 204894, 10 March 2014
Tan
PRINCIPLE RELATED TO EVIDENCE:
1. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction
if: 1) there is more than one circumstance; 2) the
facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and 3) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.
2. Under the Rules on Electronic Evidence, text
messages are to be proved by the testimony of a
person who was a party to the same or has
personal knowledge of them.
FACTS:
PO2 Gregorio, Jr. testified that at around 10:30 in the
evening of August 29, 2006, he and PO2 Pangilinan (were
patrolling the vicinity of Toyota Alabang and SM Southmall
when they spotted a taxi that was suspiciously parked in
front of the Aguila Auto Glass shop near the intersection of
BF Almanza and Alabang-Zapote Roads. The officers
approached the taxi and asked the driver, later identified
as accused Enojas, for his documents. The latter complied
but, having entertained doubts regarding the veracity of
documents shown them, they asked him to come with
them to the police station in their mobile car for further
questioning.
Accused Enojas voluntarily went with the police officers
and left his taxi behind. On reaching the 7-11 convenience
store on the Zapote-Alabang Road, however, they stopped
and PO2 Pangilinan went down to relieve himself there. As
he approached the store's door, however, he came upon
two suspected robbers and shot it out with them. PO2
Pangilinan shot one suspect dead and hit the other who
still managed to escape. But someone fired at PO2
Pangilinan causing his death.
On hearing the shots, PO2 Gregorio came around and fired
at an armed man whom he saw running towards Pilar
Village. He saw another man, who came from the Jollibee *
outlet, run towards Alabang-Zapote Road while firing his
gun at PO2 Gregorio. The latter returned fire but the men
were able to take a taxi and escape. PO2 Gregorio radioed
for help and for an ambulance. On returning to his mobile
car, he realized that accused Enojas, the taxi driver they
had with them had fled.
P/Insp. Torred, the Chief of Investigation Division of the
Las Piñas Police, testified that he and PO2 Rosarito
immediately responded to PO2 Gregorio's urgent call.
Suspecting that accused Enojas, the taxi driver who fled,
was involved in the attempted robbery, they searched the
abandoned taxi and found a mobile phone that Enojas
apparently left behind. P/Ins. Torred instructed PO3 Cambi
to monitor its incoming messages.
PO3 Cambi and PO2 Rosarito testified that they monitored
the messages in accused Enojas' mobile phone and, posing
as Enojas, communicated with the other accused. The
police then conducted an entrapment operation that
resulted in the arrest of accused Santos and Jalandoni.
Subsequently, the police were also able to capture accused
Enojas and Gomez. The prosecution presented the
transcripts of the mobile phone text messages between
Enojas and some of his co-accused.|||
ISSUES:
1. WON the prosecution failed to present direct
evidence that the accused took part in shooting
PO2 Pangilinan dead. NO.
2. WON the evidence of text messages were
inadmissible not having been properly identified.
NO.
RULING:
It has been held that circumstantial evidence is sufficient
for conviction if: 1) there is more than one circumstance;
2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and 3) the combination of all the circumstances is
such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
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Here the totality of the circumstantial evidence the
prosecution presented sufficiently provides basis for the
conviction of all the accused. Thus:
1. PO2 Gregorio positively identified accused Enojas
as the driver of the taxicab suspiciously parked in
front of the Aguila Auto Glass shop. The officers
were bringing him with them to the police station
because of the questionable documents he
showed upon query. Subsequent inspection of the
taxicab yielded Enojas' mobile phone that
contained messages which led to the entrapment
and capture of the other accused who were also
taxicab drivers.
2. Enojas fled during the commotion rather than
remain in the cab to go to the police station where
he was about to be taken for questioning, tending
to show that he had something to hide. He
certainly did not go to the police afterwards to
clear up the matter and claim his taxi.
3. PO2 Gregorio positively identified accused Gomez
as one of the men he saw running away from the
scene of the shooting.
4. The text messages identified "Kua Justin" as one
of those who engaged PO2 Pangilinan in the
shootout; the messages also referred to "Kua
Justin" as the one who was hit in such shootout
and later died in a hospital in Bacoor, Cavite.
These messages linked the other accused.
5. During the follow-up operations, the police
investigators succeeded in entrapping accused
Santos, Jalandoni, Enojas, and Gomez, who were
all named in the text messages.
6. The text messages sent to the phone recovered
from the taxi driven by Enojas clearly made
references to the 7-11 shootout and to the
wounding of "Kua Justin," one of the gunmen, and
his subsequent death. ASTcaE
7. The context of the messages showed that the
accused were members of an organized group of
taxicab drivers engaged in illegal activities.
8. Upon the arrest of the accused, they were found
in possession of mobile phones with call numbers
that corresponded to the senders of the messages
received on the mobile phone that accused Enojas
left in his taxicab.
On admissibility of text messages
The RTC admitted them in conformity with the Court's
earlier Resolution applying the Rules on Electronic Evidence
to criminal actions. Text messages are to be proved by the
testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has
personal knowledge of them. Here, PO3 Cambi, posing as
the accused Enojas, exchanged text messages with the
other accused in order to identify and entrap them. As the
recipient of those messages sent from and to the mobile
phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi had personal
knowledge of such messages and was competent to testify
on them.
The text messages to and from the mobile phone left at
the scene by accused Enojas provided strong leads on the
participation and identities of the accused. Indeed, the
police caught them in an entrapment using this
knowledge.|||
People v. Navarro
23 December 2008
Togonon
PRINCIPLE RELATED TO EVIDENCE:
A voice recording is authenticated by the testimony of a
witness (1) that he personally recorded the conversation;
(2) that the tape played in court was the one he recorded;
and (3) that the voices on the tape are those of the
persons such are claimed to belong.
FACTS:
Stanley Jalbuena and Enrique "Ike" Lingan, who were
reporters of the radio station DWTI in Lucena City,
together with one Mario Ilagan, went to the Entertainment
City following reports that it was showing nude dancers.
After the three had seated themselves at a table and
ordered beer, a scantily clad dancer appeared on stage and
began to perform a strip act. As she removed her
brassieres, Jalbuena brought out his camera and took a
picture.
At that point, the floor manager, Dante Liquin, with a
security guard, Alex Sioco, approached Jalbuena and
demanded to know why he took a picture. Jalbuena
replied: "Wala kang pakialam, because this is my job."
Sioco pushed Jalbuena towards the table as he warned the
latter that he would kill him. When Jalbuena saw that Sioco
was about to pull out his gun, he ran out of the joint
followed by his companions.
An altercation ensued which resulted to the death of
Lingan because of his injuries. Unknown to petitioner
Navarro, Jalbuena was able to record on tape the exchange
between petitioner and the deceased.
ISSUE:
Whether the tape is admissible in view of R.A. No. 4200,
which prohibits wire tapping.
RULING:
Since the exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan
was not private, its tape recording is not prohibited.
Nor is there any question that it was duly authenticated. A
voice recording is authenticated by the testimony of a
witness (1) that he personally recorded the conversation;
(2) that the tape played in court was the one he recorded;
and (3) that the voices on the tape are those of the
persons such are claimed to belong. In the instant case,
Jalbuena testified that he personally made the voice
recording; that the tape played in court was the one he
recorded; and that the speakers on the tape were
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petitioner Navarro and Lingan. A sufficient foundation was
thus laid for the authentication of the tape presented by
the prosecution.
The voice recording made by Jalbuena established: (1) that
there was a heated exchange between petitioner Navarro
and Lingan on the placing in the police blotter of an entry
against him and Jalbuena; and (2) that some form of
violence occurred involving petitioner Navarro and Lingan,
with the latter getting the worst of it.
Yu Tek & Co v. Gonzales
G.R. No. 9935, 1 February 1915
Yang
PRINCIPLE RELATED TO EVIDENCE:
Parol evidence is not admissible to serve the purpose of
incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous
conditions which are not mentioned at all in the writing,
unless there has been fraud or mistake.
FACTS:
Plaintiff Yu Tek and Defendant Gonzales agreed to enter
into a contract wherein Yu Tek would lend Gonzales P3,000
pesos in exchange of 600 piculs of sugar.
During trial, plaintiff proved that no sugar had been
delivered to it under the contract nor had it been able to
recover the P3,000. Plaintiff prayed for judgment for the
P3,000 and, in addition, for P1,200 under paragraph 4,
supra. Judgment was rendered for P3,000 only, and from
this judgment both parties appealed.
The defendant alleges that the court erred in refusing to
permit parol evidence showing that the parties intended
that the sugar was to be secured from the crop which the
defendant raised on his plantation, and that he was unable
to fulfill the contract by reason of the almost total failure of
his crop.
ISSUE:
WON Parol evidence can be received as evidence of the
agreement of the parties NO.
RULING:
Parties are presumed to have reduced to writing all the
essential conditions of their contract. While parol evidence
is admissible in a variety of ways to explain the meaning of
written contracts, it cannot serve the purpose of
incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous
conditions which are not mentioned at all in the writing,
unless there has been fraud or mistake.
In the case at bar, it is sought to show that the sugar was
to be obtained exclusively from the crop raised by the
defendant. There is no clause in the written contract which
even remotely suggests such a condition. The defendant
undertook to deliver a specified quantity of sugar within a
specified time. The contract placed no restriction upon the
defendant in the matter of obtaining the sugar. He was
equally at liberty to purchase it on the market or raise it
himself. It may be true that the defendant owned a
plantation and expected to raise the sugar himself, but he
did not limit his obligation to his own crop of sugar. Our
conclusion is that the condition which the defendant seeks
to add to the contract by parol evidence cannot be
considered. The rights of the parties must be determined
by the writing itself.
Cruz v. Court of Appeals
192 SCRA 209 (1990)
Abella
PRINCIPLE RELATED TO EVIDENCE:
Rule 130, Sec. 7, of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 7. Evidence of Written Agreements. — When the
terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is
to be considered as containing all such terms, and
therefore, there can be, between the parties and their
successors in interest, no evidence of the terms of the
agreement other than the contents of the writing, except in
the following cases:
a. When a mistake or imperfection of the writing or
its failure to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties, or the validity of the
agreement is put in issue by the pleadings;
b. When there is an intrinsic ambiguity in the
writing. The term “agreement” includes wills.
FACTS:
The plaintiff claimed that of this amount, only P20,000.00
had been paid, leaving a balance of P10,000.00; that in
August 1982, he and the defendant agreed that the latter
would grant him an exclusive right to purchase the harvest
of certain fishponds leased by Cruz in exchange for certain
loan accommodations; that pursuant thereto, Salonga
delivered to Cruz various loans totaling P15,250.00,
evidenced by four receipts and an additional P4,000.00,
the receipt of which had been lost; and that Cruz failed to
comply with his part of the agreement by refusing to
deliver the alleged harvest of the fishpond and the amount
of his indebtedness. Cruz denied having contracted any
loan from Salonga.
By way of special defense, he alleged that he was a lessee
of several hectares of a fishpond owned by Nemesio Yabut
and that sometime in May 1982, he entered into an
agreement with Salonga whereby the latter would
purchase (pakyaw) fish in certain areas of the fishpond
from May 1982 to August 15, 1982. They also agreed that
immediately thereafter, Salonga would sublease
(bubuwisan) the same fishpond for a period of one year.
Cruz admitted having received on May 4, 1982, the
amount of P35,000.00 and on several occasions from
August 15, 1982, to September 30, 1982, an aggregate
amount of P15,250.00. He contended however, that these
amounts were received by him not as loans but as
consideration for their “pakyaw” agreement and payment
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for the sublease of the fishpond. He added that it was the
private respondent who owed him money since Salonga
still had unpaid rentals for the 10-month period that he
actually occupied the fishpond. Cruz also claimed that
Salonga owed him an additional P4,000.00 arising from
another purchase of fish from other areas of his leased
fishpond.
ISSUE:
WON Parol Evidence Rule will apply. NO.
RULING:
The rule is not applicable in the case at bar, Section 7,
Rule 130 is predicated on the existence of a document
embodying the terms of an agreement, but Exhibit D does
not contain such an agreement. It is only a receipt
attesting to the fact that on May 4, 1982, the petitioner
received from the private respondent the amount of
P35,000. It is not and could have not been intended by the
parties to be the sole memorial of their agreement. As a
matter of fact, Exhibit D does not even mention the
transaction that gave rise to its issuance. At most, Exhibit
D can only be considered a casual memorandum of a
transaction between the parties and an acknowledgment of
the receipt of money executed by the petitioner for the
private respondent's satisfaction. A writing of this nature,
as Wigmore observed is not covered by the parol.
The "pakyaw" was mentioned only in Exhibit I, which also
declared the petitioner's receipt of the amount of
P28,000.00 as consideration for the agreement. The
petitioner and his witnesses testified to show when and
under what circumstances the amount of P28,000.00 was
received. Their testimonies do not in any way vary or
contradict the terms of Exhibit I. While Exhibit I is dated
May 14, 1982, it does not make any categorical declaration
that the amount of P28,000.00 stated therein was received
by the petitioner on that same date. That date may not
therefore be considered conclusive as to when the amount
of P28,000.00 was actually received.
A deed is not conclusive evidence of everything it may
contain. For instance, it is not the only evidence of the date
of its execution, nor its omission of a consideration
conclusive evidence that none passed, nor is its
acknowledgment of a particular consideration an objection
to other proof of other and consistent considerations; and,
by analogy, the acknowledgment in a deed is not
conclusive of the fact.
RATIO: Rule 130, Sec. 7, of the Revised Rules of Court
provides: Sec. 7. Evidence of Written Agreements. — When
the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it
is to be considered as containing all such terms, and
therefore, there can be, between the parties and their
successors in interest, no evidence of the terms of the
agreement other than the contents of the writing, except in
the following cases: a) When a mistake or imperfection of
the writing or its failure to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties, or the validity of the agreement
is put in issue by the pleadings; b) When there is an
intrinsic ambiguity in the writing.
The term "agreement" includes wills. The reason for the
rule is the presumption that when the parties have reduced
their agreement to writing they have made such writing
the only repository and memorial of the truth, and
whatever is not found in the writing must be understood to
have been waived or abandoned.
A receipt — i.e. a written acknowledgment, handed by one
party to the other, of the manual custody of money or
other personality — will in general fall without the line of
the rule; i.e. it is not intended to be an exclusive memorial,
and the facts may be shown irrespective of the terms of
the receipt. This is because usually a receipt is merely a
written admission of a transaction independently existing,
and, like other admissions, is not conclusive A distinction
should be made between a statement of fact expressed in
the instrument and the terms of the contractual act. The
former may be varied by parol evidence but not the latter.
5 Section 7 of Rule 130 clearly refers to the terms of an
agreement and provides that "there can be, between the
parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of the
terms of the agreement other than the contents of the
writing."
The statement in Exhibit I of the petitioner's receipt of the
P28,000.00 is just a statement of fact. It is a mere
acknowledgment of the distinct act of payment made by
the private respondent. Its reference to the amount of
P28,000.00 as consideration of the "pakyaw" contract does
not make it part of the terms of their agreement.
Parol evidence may therefore be introduced to explain
Exhibit I, particularly with respect to the petitioner's
receipt of the amount of P28,000.00 and of the date when
the said amount was received. Even if it were assumed
that Exhibits D and I are covered by the parol evidence
rule, its application by the Court of Appeals was improper.
The record shows that no objection was made by the
private respondent when the petitioner introduced
evidence to explain the circumstances behind the execution
and issuance of the said instruments.
The rule is that objections to evidence must be made as
soon as the grounds therefor become reasonably apparent.
He is deemed to have waived his benefit of the parole
evidence rule. it has been repeatedly laid down as a rule of
evidence that a protest or objection against the admission
of any evidence must be made at the proper time, and that
if not so made it will be understood to have been waived.
The proper time to make a protest or objection is when,
from the question addressed to the witness, or from the
answer thereto, or from the presentation of proof, the
inadmissibility of evidence is, or may be inferred.
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Lechugas v. Court of Appeals
143 SCRA 335 (1986)
Archival
PRINCIPLE RELATED TO EVIDENCE:
The parol evidence rule does not apply, and may not
properly be invoked by either party to the litigation against
the other, where at least one of the parties to the suit is
not party or a privy of a party to the written instrument in
question and does not base a claim on the instrument or
assert a right originating in the instrument or the relation
established thereby.
FACTS:
Petitioner Victoria filed a complaint for forcible entry with
damages and recovery and possession against the
Respondents over the property which she allegedly owned
(Lot 5456).
Victoria contended that she bought the land from Leoncia
(her first cousin) as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale
(DAS) registered in the Registry of Deeds.
Respondents on the other hand countered that the land
which Victoria bought from Leoncia was different from the
land in controversy. Leoncia testified for the respondents
and declared that the lot she sold to Victoria was not Lot
5456 but another lot (Lot 5522). She testified that because
she was illiterate, she was only made to sign the DAS
which was prepared by Victoria. It was clear that she did
not intend to sell the piece of land already sold by her
father to the respondent’s predecessors-in-interest.
The trial court and appellate court admitted and upheld the
testimony of Leoncia. Victoria argued that the Respondents
should be bound by the DAS applying the Parol Evidence
Rule.
ISSUE:
WON the Parol Evidence Rule binds the respondents. NO.
RULING:
The petitioner's reliance on the parol evidence rule is
misplaced.
The rule applies, that as between parties to a written
agreement, or their privies, parol evidence cannot be
received to contradict or vary its terms. Strangers to a
contract are, of course, not bound by it, and the rule
excluding extrinsic evidence in the construction of writings
is inapplicable in such cases; and it is relaxed where either
one of the parties between whom the question arises is a
stranger to the written agreement, and does not claim
under or through one who is party to it. In such case the
rule is binding upon neither.
The rule is not applicable where the controversy is between
one of the parties to the document and third persons. The
deed of sale was executed by Leoncia in favor of Victoria.
The dispute over what was actually sold is between the
petitioner and the respondents. In the case at bar, through
the testimony of Leoncia, it was shown that what she really
intended to sell was Lot No. 5522 but not being able to
read and write and fully relying on the good faith of
Victoria, the petitioner, she just placed her thumbmark on
a piece of paper which petitioner told her was the
document evidencing the sale of land. The deed of sale
described the disputed lot instead.
Heirs of Pacres v. Heirs of Ygona
G.R. No. 174719, 5 May 2010
Archival
PRINCIPLE RELATED TO EVIDENCE:
Under the Parol Evidence Rule, when the terms of an
agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered
as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be,
between the parties and their successors in interest, no
evidence of such terms other than the contents of the
written agreement.
The Parol Evidence Rule applies to "the parties and their
successors in interest." Conversely, it has no application to
a stranger to a contract.
FACTS:
Lot No. 9 is a parcel of land in Cebu fronting the provincial
highway. The lot originally belonged to Pastor Pacres
(Pastor) who left it intestate to his heirs (petitioners'
predecessor-in-interest). Petitioners admitted that at the
time of Pastor's death, his heirs were already occupying
definite portions of Lot No. 9 as confirmed by petitioner
Valentina's testimony.
The heirs leased the ground floor of the ancestral home
together with a lot area of 300 square meters including the
area occupied by the house to respondent Ramirez, who
immediately took possession thereof. Subsequently, four of
the Pacres siblings sold their shares in the ancestral home
and the lot on which it stood to Ramirez represented by
deeds of sale. With the sale, respondent Ramirez's
possession as lessee turned into a co-ownership with the
petitioners (two other siblings) who did not sell their
shares in the house and lot.
The four siblings also sold their remaining shares in Lot 9
to respondent Ygona who became co-owners of the entire
lot along with the remaining Pacres siblings who did not
sell their shares.
DPWH then expropriated the front portion of Lot 9 for the
expansion of the Cebu south road. As occupant of the
expropriated portion, Ygoña moved to withdraw her
corresponding share in the expropriation payment.
Petitioners opposed the said motion.
The petitioners who were now represented by their heirs
then executed a Confirmation of Oral Partition/Settlement
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of Estate of Pastor Pacres in opposition to the withdrawal
of respondent’s share in the expropriation payment..
Petitioners’ Arguments (LOST): Petitioner heirs filed a
complaint for specific performance against Ygona and
Ramirez. They insist that the heirs agreed on an oral
partition prior to the sale. They seek the compliance with
such agreement from their siblings' vendees, Ygoña and
Ramirez, on the basis that the two were privy to these
agreements, hence were bound to comply. In compliance
with such partition, Ygoña and Ramirez should desist from
claiming any portion of the expropriation payment for the
front lots.
Petitioners further alleged that when Ygoña bought
portions of Lot No. 9 from petitioners' four siblings, aside
from paying the purchase price, she also bound herself to
survey Lot No. 9 including the shares of the petitioners
(the non-selling siblings); to deliver to petitioners, free of
cost, the titles corresponding to their de nite shares in Lot
No. 9; and to pay for all their past and present estate and
realty taxes. According to petitioners, Ygoña agreed to
these undertakings as additional consideration for the sale,
even though they were not written in the Deeds of Sale.
Respondent’s Arguments: Respondents denied privity with
the heirs' oral partition. They further maintained that no
such partition took place and that the portions sold to and
occupied by them were located in front of Lot No. 9; hence
they are the ones entitled to the expropriation payment.
To discredit petitioners' assertion of an oral partition,
respondents presented Exhibit No. 1, which petitioner
Valentina herself executed during her testimony.
Demonstrating her recollection of the actual occupation of
the Pacres siblings, their heirs and vendees. The sketch
undermined petitioners' allegation that the heirs
partitioned the property and immediately took possession
of their allotted lots/shares. Ygoña also denied ever
agreeing to the additional obligations being imputed
against her (payment of taxes, conduct of survey of land
for partition, etc.).
Ruling of the RTC: RTC ruled in favor of the respondents. It
held that the parties' actual occupation of their portions in
Lot No. 9, as evidenced by petitioner Valentina's sketch, is
the real agreement to which the parties are bound.
Ruling of the CA: CA sustained the ruling of the RTC. It
ruled that Ygoña's sole undertaking under the deeds of sale
was the payment of the purchase price. Since petitioners
did not question the validity of the deeds and did not assail
its terms as failing to express the true intent of the parties,
the written document stands superior over the allegations
of an oral agreement.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioners were able to prove the existence of the
alleged oral agreements such as the partition and the
additional obligations of surveying and titling. NO.

RULING:
SC upheld that the existence of an oral partition was not
proven.
On the existence of the alleged oral partition
Petitioners' only piece of evidence to prove the alleged oral
partition was the joint affidavit (entitled "Confirmation of
Oral Partition/Settlement of Estate") supposedly executed
by some of the Pacres siblings and their heirs, to the effect
that such an oral partition had previously been agreed
upon. Petitioners did not adequately explain why the
affidavit was executed only several years after respondents
Ygoña and Ramirez took possession of the front portions of
Lot No. 9. They only asserted their ownership over the
front lots beginning (with the execution of their joint
affidavit) when expropriation became imminent and was
later led in court.
Petitioner Valentina herself drew a sketch showing the
location of the actual occupants of Lot No. 9, but the actual
occupation shown in her sketch is not in accordance with
the terms of the alleged oral partition. According to the
terms of the alleged oral partition, the front portions of Lot
No. 9 were supposed to have been occupied by petitioners,
but Valentina's sketch indicates that the actual occupants
of the said portions were the respondents.
On the alleged additional obligations (Evidence-related)
With respect to the alleged additional obligations (conduct
of survey, payment of estate and realty taxes) which
petitioners seek to be enforced against respondent Ygoña,
SC ruled that the trial and appellate courts did not err in
rejecting them.
In the first place, under Article 1311 of the Civil Code,
contracts take effect only between the parties, their
assigns and heirs. Thus, only a party to the contract can
maintain an action to enforce the obligations arising under
said contract. Consequently, petitioners, not being parties
to the contracts of sale between Ygoña and the petitioners'
siblings, cannot sue for the enforcement of the supposed
obligations arising from said contracts.
It is true that third parties may seek enforcement of a
contract under the second paragraph of Article 1311, which
provides that "if a contract should contain some stipulation
in favor of a third person, he may demand its fulfillment."
This refers to stipulations pour autrui, or stipulations for
the benefit of third parties. However, the written contracts
of sale in this case contain no such stipulation in favor of
the petitioners. While petitioners claim that there was an
oral stipulation, it cannot be proven under the Parol
Evidence Rule. Under this Rule, "when the terms of an
agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered
as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be,
between the parties and their successors in interest, no
evidence of such terms other than the contents of the
written agreement." While the Rule admits of exception,
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no such exception was pleaded, much less proved, by
petitioners.
The Parol Evidence Rule applies to "the parties and their
successors in interest." Conversely, it has no application to
a stranger to a contract. For purposes of the Parol
Evidence Rule, a person who claims to be the beneficiary of
an alleged stipulation pour autrui in a contract (such as
petitioners) may be considered a party to that contract. It
has been held that a third party who avails himself of a
stipulation pour autrui under a contract becomes a party to
that contract. This is why under Article 1311, a beneficiary
of a stipulation pour autrui is required to communicate his
acceptance to the obligor before its revocation.
Moreover, to preclude the application of Parol Evidence
Rule, it must be shown that "at least one of the parties to
the suit is not party or a privy of a party to the written
instrument in question and does not base a claim on the
instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument or
the relation established thereby." A beneficiary of a
stipulation pour autrui obviously bases his claim on the
contract. He therefore cannot claim to be a stranger to the
contract and resist the application of the Parol Evidence
Rule.
Thus, even assuming that the alleged oral undertakings
invoked by petitioners may be deemed stipulations pour
autrui, still petitioners' claim cannot prosper, because they
are barred from proving them by oral evidence under the
Parol Evidence Rule.
Given the finding that petitioners failed to prove the
existence of the alleged oral partition and the alleged
additional consideration for the sale, they cannot compel
respondents to comply with these inexistent obligations.
Robles v. Lizarraga Hermanos
G.R. No. 26173, 13 July 1927
Carreon
PRINCIPLE RELATED TO EVIDENCE:
ORAL CONTRACT INCONSISTENT WITH WRITTEN
CONTRACT - The rule excluding parol evidence to vary or
contradict a writing does not extend so far as to preclude
the admission of extrinsic evidence to show prior or
contemporaneous collateral parol agreements between the
parties, but such evidence may be received, regardless of
whether or not the written agreement contains reference
to such collateral agreement.
FACTS:
Hacienda "Nahalinan," belonged originally to the spouses
Zacarias Robles and Anastacia de la Rama, parents of the
present plaintiff, Zacarias Robles. Upon the death of
Zacarias Robles, sr., his widow Anastacia de la Rama was
appointed administratrix of his estate; she leased the
hacienda to the plaintiff, Zacarias Robles, for the period of
six years.
The plaintiff accordingly entered upon the property, in the
character of lessee; and, in order to put the farm in good
condition, he found it necessary to make various
improvements and additions to the plant. Three years
before the lease was to expire, Anastacia de la Rama died,
leaving as heirs Zacarias Robles. At this juncture Lizarraga
Hermanos came forward with a proposal to buy from these
three all of the property belonging to the Robles estate.
In course of the negotiations an obstacle was encountered
in the fact that the lease of Zacarias Robles still had over
two years to run. It was accordingly proposed that he
should surrender the last two years of his lease and permit
Lizarraga Hermanos to take possession as purchaser.
The plaintiff alleges that in consideration that the plaintiff
should shorten the term of his lease to the extent stated,
the defendant agreed to pay him the value of all
betterments that he had made on the hacienda.
However, in the clauses of conveyance to Lizarraga, no
reference is made in this conveyance to the surrender of
the plaintiff's rights as lessee, nor is anything said
concerning the improvements or the property of a personal
nature which the plaintiff had placed on the hacienda.
Upon calling attention to this, the representative of the
defendant explained that this was unnecessary in view of
the confidence existing between the parties.
Lizarraga later on said that they would not be buying the
crops, which caused the plaintiff to lose money by virtue of
the delay. During the trial, Lizarraga contended that they
had not come into an agreement regarding the crops.
ISSUE:
WON the contract may be proved by oral evidence. YES.
RULING:
The rule excluding parol evidence to vary or contradict a
writing does not extend so far as to preclude the admission
of extrinsic evidence to show prior or contemporaneous
collateral parol agreements between the parties, but such
evidence may be received, regardless of whether or not
the written agreement contains any reference to such
collateral agreement, and whether the action is at law or in
equity.
In the case before us the deed of conveyance purports to
transfer to the defendant only such interests in certain
properties as had come to the conveyors by inheritance.
Nothing is said concerning the rights in the hacienda which
the plaintiff had acquired by lease or concerning the things
that he had placed thereon by way of improvement or had
acquired by purchase. The verbal contract which the
plaintiff has established in this case is therefore clearly
independent of the main contract of conveyance, and
evidence of such verbal contract is admissible under the
doctrine above stated.
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Enriquez v. Ramos
G.R. No. L-18077, 29 September 1962
Cesista
TOPIC:
Parole Evidence Rule EXCEPTION (failure to express the
true agreement of the parties)
PRINCIPLE RELATED TO EVIDENCE:
PER only holds true if there is NO allegation that the
agreement does not express the true intent of the parties.
If there is and this claim is put in issue in the pleadings,
the same may be the subject of parole evidence.
FACTS:
On Nov. 24, 1958, 1958 defendant purchased from
plaintiffs 20 parcels of land located in Quezon City and
covered by transfer certificates of title for the amount of
P235,056 of which only the amount of P35,056 was paid
on the date of sale, the balance of P200,000.00 being
payable within 2 years from the date of sale, with interest.
To secure the payment of the balance, defendant executed
a mortgage which was embodied in the same deed of sale
with mortgage.
For breach of certain stipulations, plaintiffs instituted an
action for foreclosure of the real estate mortgage.
Defendant’s arguments (WON): Defendant set up as
affirmative defense that the contract mentioned in the
complaint does NOT express the true agreement of the
parties because –
1. Certain important conditions agreed upon were
omitted therein by the counsel who prepared the
contract (such as the promise assumed by
plaintiffs that they would construct roads in the
lands which were to be subdivided for sale on or
before January, 1959). However, said condition
was not placed in the contract because, according
to plaintiffs' counsel, it was a superfluity,
inasmuch as there is an ordinance in Quezon City
which requires the construction of roads in a
subdivision before lots therein could be sold; and
2. The true purchase price of the sale was NOT
P235,056.00 but only P185,000, the difference
of P50,000.00 being the voluntary contribution of
defendant to the cost of the construction of the
roads which plaintiffs assumed to do.
ISSUES:
1. Is the purchase price of the 20 lots bought by
defendant from plaintiffs the sum of P185,000.00,
as claimed by defendant, or P235,056.00, as
claimed by plaintiffs? P185,000.00
2. In relation to Evidence: Was an oral agreement,
contemporaneous to the execution of the contract
of sale, entered into between the parties
admissible? YES.

RULING:
The action of the plaintiff was premature.
The construction of the roads was a condition
precedent to the enforcement of the terms of DOS
with mortgage (Exhibit A), particularly the
foreclosure of mortgage, due to the subdivision
regulations of QC which requires that the sellers of
lands therein to be converted into subdivision lots
must construct the roads in said subdivision before
the lots could be sold. The requirement must have been
uppermost in the mind of the parties in this case which led
to the execution of the so-called 'Explanation' (Exhibit 3)
wherein it is stated that the sum of P50,000 was a
contribution of the herein defendant for the construction of
the roads which the plaintiffs would undertake in
accordance with the City Ordinance of QC.
Exhibit 3 was executed on the very day when Exhibit A was
also executed. Exhibit 3 also proves that the purchase
price is NOT, as appearing in the deed of sale with
mortgage, Exhibit A, actually P235,000 but only
P185,000.
It is correct to presume that during the sale in question,
the construction of roads in the prospective
subdivision must have been uppermost in the mind
of defendant for her purpose in purchasing the
property was to develop it into a subdivision. That
such requirement was uppermost in the mind of
defendant is proven by the execution by the
plaintiffs of the so called "Explanation" (Exhibit 3)
on the very day the deed of sale was executed. At any
rate, the execution of the document Exhibit 3 clarifies
whatever doubt may have existed with regard to the true
terms of the agreement on the matter.
Plaintiff argued that the trial court erred in allowing the
presentation of parole evidence to prove that a
contemporaneous oral agreement was also reached
between the parties relative to the construction of the
roads for the same is in violation of the rule which provides
that when the terms of an agreement had been reduced to
writing it is to be considered as containing all that has
been agreed upon and that no evidence other than the
terms thereof can be admitted between the parties
(Section 22, Rule 123). This rule, however, only
holds true if there is NO allegation that the
agreement does not express the true intent of the
parties. If there is and this claim is put in issue in
the pleadings (such in the present case) the same
may be the subject of parole evidence.
Since plaintiffs failed to comply with the condition
precedent relative to the construction of the roads in the
subdivision in question, it follows that their action is
premature as found by the trial court.
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Heirs of Ureta v. Heirs of Ureta
G.R. No. 165748, 14 September 2011
Chio
FACTS:
In his lifetime, Alfonso Ureta (Alfonso) begot 14 children.
The children of Policronio (one of Alfonso’s children), are
opposed to the rest of Alfonso’s children and their
descendants. Policronio, the eldest, was the only child of
Alfonso who failed to finish schooling and instead worked
on his father’s lands.
Sometime in October 1969, Alfonso and four of his
children, namely, Policronio, Liberato, Prudencia, and
Francisco, met at the house of Liberato. Francisco, who
was then a municipal judge, suggested that in order to
reduce the inheritance taxes, their father should make it
appear that he had sold some of his lands to his children.
Thus, Alfonso executed four (4) Deeds of Sale in favor of
Policronio, Liberato, Prudencia, and his common- law wife,
Valeriana. The sales were only for tax purposes, so Alfonso
continued to own the lands and their produce.
The Deed of Sale executed in favor of Policronio, covered
six parcels of land, which are the properties in dispute in
this case. Except for one portion of Parcel 5, the rest of the
parcels transferred to Policronio were tenanted by the
Fernandez Family. These tenants never turned over the
produce of the lands to Policronio, but to Alfonso and,
later, to the administrators of Alfonso’s estate. Policronio
died on November 22, 1974.
On April 19, 1989, Alfonso’s heirs executed a Deed of
Extra-Judicial Partition, which included all the lands that
were covered by the four deeds of sale that were
previously executed by Alfonso for taxation purposes.
Conrado, Policronio’s eldest son, representing the Heirs of
Policronio, signed the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition in
behalf of his co-heirs. After their father’s death, the Heirs
of Policronio found tax declarations in his name covering
the six parcels of land. On June 15, 1995, they obtained a
copy of the Deed of Sale executed on October 25, 1969 by
Alfonso in favor of Policronio.
Not long after, the Heirs of Policronio allegedly learned
about the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition involving
Alfonso’s estate when it was published in the issue of the
Aklan Reporter. Believing that the six parcels of land
belonged to their late father, the Heirs of Policronio filed a
Complaint for Declaration of Ownership, Recovery of
Possession, Annulment of Documents, Partition, and
Damages against the Heirs of Alfonso before the RTC.
RTC ruled in favor of the Heirs of Alfonso. The CA ruled
that the Deed of Sale was void. But contrary annulled the
Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition. Without a special power of
attorney, it was held that Conrado lacked the legal capacity
to give the consent of his co-heirs, thus, rendering the
Deed of Extra- Judicial Partition voidable. Thus, the CA
ordered the remand of the case to the RTC for the proper
partition of the estate.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the testimony may be admitted to
determine the validity of the deed of sale?
2. Whether or not the rule on hearsay was violated
when the testimony was given weight since the
witness was an alien to the contract?
RULING:
The objection against the admission of any evidence must
be made at the proper time, as soon as the grounds
therefor become reasonably apparent, and if not so made,
it will be understood to have been waived. In the case of
testimonial evidence, the objection must be made when
the objectionable question is asked or after the answer is
given if the objectionable features become apparent only
by reason of such answer. In this case, the Heirs of
Policronio failed to timely object to the testimony of
Amparo Castillo and they are, thus, deemed to have
waived the benefit of the parol evidence rule.
Granting that the Heirs of Policronio timely objected to the
testimony of Amparo Castillo, their argument would still
fail.
Section 9 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 9. Evidence of written agreements. When the
terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is
considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and
there can be, between the parties and their successors in
interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents
of the written agreement.
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain
or add to the terms of written agreement if he puts in issue
in his pleading:
a. An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in
the written agreement;
b. The failure of the written agreement to express
the true intent and agreement of the parties
thereto;
c. The validity of the written agreement; or
d. The existence of other terms agreed to by the
parties or their successors in interest after the
execution of the written agreement.
The term "agreement" includes wills. Paragraphs (b) and
(c) are applicable in the case at bench. The failure of the
Deed of Sale to express the true intent and agreement of
the parties was clearly put in issue in the Answer of the
Heirs of Alfonso to the Complaint. It was alleged that the
Deed of Sale was only made to lessen the payment of
estate and inheritance taxes and not meant to transfer
ownership. The exception in paragraph (b) is allowed to
enable the court to ascertain the true intent of the parties,
and once the intent is clear, it shall prevail over what the
document appears to be on its face.
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As the true intent of the parties was duly proven in the
present case, it now prevails over what appears on the
Deed of Sale. The validity of the Deed of Sale was also put
in issue in the Answer, and was precisely one of the issues
submitted to the RTC for resolution. The operation of the
parol evidence rule requires the existence of a valid written
agreement. It is, thus, not applicable in a proceeding
where the validity of such agreement is the fact in dispute,
such as when a contract may be void for lack of
consideration. Considering that the Deed of Sale has been
shown to be void for being absolutely simulated and for
lack of consideration, the Heirs of Alfonso are not
precluded from presenting evidence to modify, explain or
add to the terms of the written agreement.
The Heirs of Policronio must be in a state of confusion in
arguing that the Heirs of Alfonso may not question the
Deed of Sale for not being parties or successors-in-interest
therein on the basis that the parol evidence rule may not
be properly invoked in a proceeding or litigation where at
least one of the parties to the suit is not a party or a privy
of a party to the written instrument in question and does
not base a claim on the instrument or assert a right
originating in the instrument or the relation established
thereby. If their argument was to be accepted, then the
Heirs of Policronio would themselves be precluded from
invoking the parol evidence rule to exclude the evidence of
the Heirs of Alfonso.
Indeed, the applicability of the parol evidence rule requires
that the case be between parties and their successors-in-
interest. In this case, both the Heirs of Alfonso and the
Heirs of Policronio are successors-in-interest of the parties
to the Deed of Sale as they claim rights under Alfonso and
Policronio, respectively. The parol evidence rule excluding
evidence aliunde, however, still cannot apply because the
present case falls under two exceptions to the rule, as
discussed above.
Whether or not the rule on hearsay was violated when the
testimony was given weight since the witness was an alien
to the contract?
Neither was the rule on hearsay violated.
It has indeed been held that hearsay evidence whether
objected to or not cannot be given credence for having no
probative value. This principle, however, has been relaxed
in cases where, in addition to the failure to object to the
admissibility of the subject evidence, there were other
pieces of evidence presented or there were other
circumstances prevailing to support the fact in issue.
In the case at bench, there were other prevailing
circumstances which corroborate the testimony of Amparo
Castillo. First, the other Deeds of Sale which were executed
in favor of Liberato, Prudencia, and Valeriana on the same
day as that of Policronios were all presented in evidence.
Second, all the properties subject therein were included in
the Deed of Extra- Judicial Partition of the estate of
Alfonso. Third, Policronio, during his lifetime, never
exercised acts of ownership over the subject properties (as
he never demanded or took possession of them, never
demanded or received the produce thereof, and never paid
real estate taxes thereon). Fourth, Policronio never
informed his children of the sale. As the Heirs of Policronio
failed to controvert the evidence presented, and to timely
object to the testimony of Amparo Castillo, both the RTC
and the CA correctly accorded probative weight to her
testimony.
Canuto v. Mariano
G.R. No. 11346, 21 March 1918
Dela Rosa
PRINCIPLE RELATED TO EVIDENCE:
The rule forbidding the admission of parol or extrinsic
evidence to altar, vary, or contradict a written instrument
does not apply so as to prohibit the establishment by parol
of an agreement between the parties in writing, entered
into subsequent to the time when the written instrument
was executed, notwithstanding such agreement may have
the effect of adding to, changing, modifying, or even
altogether abrogating the contract of the parties as
evidenced by the writing.
FACTS:
Canuto (plaintiff) executed a deed of sale on Dec. 4, 1913
of the parcel of land described in the complaint to Mariano
(defendant), for the sum of P360, reserving the right to
repurchase the land for that amount within one year from
the date of the deed of sale. The redemption period having
elapsed, and the plaintiff having failed to exercise her right
to repurchase within that period, the defendant set up a
claim of absolute ownership to the land, notwithstanding
the insistent demand of the plaintiff that she be permitted
to exercise her reserved right of repurchase in accordance
with an alleged oral agreement for the extension of the
redemption period down to the end of the month of
December.
Canuto, on the second day of December, 1914, while she
was washing clothes, two days before the expiration of the
original redemption period, she asked the defendant, who
passed by, for an extension of time for the repurchase of
the land and that upon her promise to make the
repurchase during the month of December, 1914, the
defendant agreed to extend the redemption set out in the
written contract, to the end of that month; that after the
expiration of the original redemption period, she thought to
make the repurchase in accordance with the agreement as
to the extension of the time therefor; but the defendant
failed to appear at the time and place, which was the
residence of Atty. Mercado, she then went to his house,
but was told that he was not at home; and that since that
time defendant has refused to carry out his oral
agreement, claiming that the redemption period set out in
the original deed of sale expired on the fourth day of
December, 1914, and that she had no right to repurchase
the land after that date. Severino Pascual, who was
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present when the oral agreement to extend the time for
the repurchase of the land was made, corroborated her
testimony in this regard.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the parol evidence on the extension of the
redemption period be admitted? YES.
RULING:
The SC said that they found nothing in the record which
would justify in disturbing the findings of the trial judge
who accepted her testimony as a substantially true account
of all that occurred, and declined to believe the conflicting
testimony of the defendant which he characterized as
vague and incredible. The defendant having extended the
time within which the plaintiff could repurchase the land on
condition that she would find the money and make
repurchase within the extended period, it is clear that he
cannot be permitted to repudiate his promise, it appearing
that the plaintiff stood ready to make the payment within
the extended period, and was only prevented from doing
so by the conduct of the defendant himself.
The court further ruled that the rule forbidding the
admission of parol or extrinsic evidence to alter, vary, or
contradict a written instrument does not apply so as to
prohibit the establishment by parol of an agreement
between the parties to a writing, entered into subsequent
to the time when the written instrument was executed,
notwithstanding such agreement may have the effect of
adding to, changing, modifying, or even altogether
abrogating the contract of the parties as evidenced by the
writing; for the parol evidence does not in any way deny
that the original agreement of the parties was that which
the writing purports to express, but merely goes to show
that the parties have exercised their right to change or
abrogate the same, or to make a new and independent
contract.
It makes no difference how soon after the execution of the
written contract the parol one was made. If it was in fact
subsequent and is otherwise unobjectionable it may be
proved and enforced.

4TH BATCH
Armed Forces of the Phil. vs. Rep. of the Phil,
G.R. No. 188956, 20 March 2013
Diez
PRINCIPLE RELATED TO EVIDENCE:
There is no substantive or procedural rule which requires a
witness for a party to present some form of authorization
to testify as a witness for the party presenting him or her.
All that the Rules require of a witness is that the witness
possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications provided therein.
FACTS:
Petitioner filed an Application for Registration of Title over
three parcels of land located in West Bicutan, Taguig City,
before the RTC of Pasig City. The said application was later
docketed and raffled to Branch 68 of the court a quo.
These three parcels of land constitute a land grant by
virtue of Presidential Proclamation No. 1218, issued by
former President Fidel V. Ramos on May 8, 1998.
The application was filed by Mr. Honorio S. Azcueta (Mr.
Azcueta), the then Executive Vice President and Chief
Operating Officer of the petitioner, who was duly
authorized to do so by the Board of Trustees of the
petitioner, as evidenced by a notarized Secretary’s
Certificate dated August 18, 2003.
After due posting and publication of the requisite notices,
and since no oppositor registered any oppositions after the
petitioner met the jurisdictional requirements, the court a
quo issued an order of general default against the whole
world, and the petitioner was allowed to present evidence
ex-parte.
The petitioner then presented as its witness, Ms. Alma P.
Aban (Ms. Aban), its Vice President and Head of its Asset
Enhancement Office. She testified, inter alia, that: among
her main duties is to ensure that the properties and assets
of petitioner, especially real property, are legally titled and
freed of liens and encumbrances; the subject properties
were acquired by the petitioner through a land grant under
Presidential Proclamation No. 1218; prior to Presidential
Proclamation No. 1218, the Republic of the Philippines was
in open, continuous, exclusive, notorious, and peaceful
possession and occupation of the subject properties in the
concept of an owner to the exclusion of the world since
time immemorial; petitioner, after the Republic of the
Philippines transferred ownership of the subject properties
to it, assumed open, continuous, exclusive, notorious, and
peaceful possession and occupation, and exercised control
over them in the concept of owner, and likewise assumed
the obligations of an owner; petitioner has been paying the
real estate taxes on the subject properties; and the subject
properties are not mortgaged, encumbered, or tenanted.
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Subsequently, petitioner submitted its Formal Offer of
Evidence, following which, the court a quo granted the
application in a Decision dated April 21, 2008.
In response, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed
a Motion for Reconsideration dated May 12, 2008, wherein
it argued that the petitioner failed to prove that it has
personality to own property in its name and the petitioner
failed to show that the witness it presented was duly
authorized to appear for and in its behalf.
On February 17, 2009, the court a quo issued an Order
granting the Motion for Reconsideration of the OSG on the
ground that the petitioner failed to prosecute its case.
Hence, the present case.
ISSUE:
WON the court a quo acted contrary to law and
jurisprudence when it dismissed petitioner’s application for
land registration on the ground that petitioner failed to
prosecute the subject case. YES.
RULING:
Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, provides only three instances wherein the Court
may dismiss a case for failure to prosecute.
An action may be dismissed for failure to prosecute in any
of the following instances: (1) if the plaintiff fails to appear
at the time of trial; or (2) if he fails to prosecute the action
for an unreasonable length of time; or (3) if he fails to
comply with the Rules of Court or any order of the court.
Once a case is dismissed for failure to prosecute, this has
the effect of an adjudication on the merits and is
understood to be with prejudice to the filing of another
action unless otherwise provided in the order of dismissal.
In other words, unless there be a qualification in the order
of dismissal that it is without prejudice, the dismissal
should be regarded as an adjudication on the merits and is
with prejudice.
First, the petitioner did not fail to appear at the time of the
trial. In fact, the Decision of the RTC dated April 21, 2008
ordering the registration of petitioner’s title to the subject
lots shows that the petitioner appeared before the Court
and was represented by counsel. Records would also reveal
that the petitioner was able to present its evidence, and as
a result, the RTC rendered judgment in its favor.
Second, the petitioner did not fail to prosecute the subject
case considering that it appeared during trial, presented
Ms. Aban, who gave competent testimony as regards the
titling of the subject lots, and the court a quo never held
petitioner liable for any delay in prosecuting the subject
case.
Third, a perusal of the records would demonstrate that the
petitioner did not fail to comply with the Rules or any order
of the court a quo, as there is no ruling on the part of the
latter to this effect.
Indeed, there was no basis for the court a quo’s ruling that
the petitioner failed to prosecute the subject case, because
none of the grounds provided in the Rules for dismissing a
case due to failure to prosecute is present.
(Related to Evidence Class) On the alleged lack of authority
of the witness, Ms. Aban, to testify on behalf of the
petitioner, the SC ruled that there is no substantive or
procedural rule which requires a witness for a party to
present some form of authorization to testify as a witness
for the party presenting him or her. No law or
jurisprudence would support the conclusion that such
omission can be considered as a failure to prosecute on the
part of the party presenting such witness. All that the
Rules require of a witness is that the witness possesses all
the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided
therein. Sections 19 and 20 of Rule 130 provide for specific
disqualifications.
Section 19 disqualifies those who are mentally
incapacitated and children whose tender age or immaturity
renders them incapable of being witnesses. Section 20
provides for disqualification based on conflicts of interest or
on relationship. Section 21 provides for disqualifications
based on privileged communications.
Section 15 of Rule 132 may not be a rule on
disqualification of witnesses but it states the grounds when
a witness may be impeached by the party against whom he
was called.
The specific enumeration of disqualified witnesses excludes
the operation of causes of disability other than those
mentioned in the Rules. As a general rule, where there are
express exceptions these comprise the only limitations on
the operation of a statute and no other exception will be
implied. The Rules should not be interpreted to include an
exception not embodied therein.
Hence, Ms. Aban is qualified to testify as a witness for the
petitioner since she possesses the qualifications of being
able to perceive and being able to make her perceptions
known to others. Furthermore, she possesses none of the
disqualifications described above.
The OSG and the court a quo did not question the
Verification/Certification of the application, and neither did
they question the authority of Mr. Azcueta to file the
subject application on behalf of the petitioner. Case records
would reveal that the application was signed and filed by
Mr. Azcueta in his capacity as the Executive Vice President
and Chief Operating Officer of the petitioner, as authorized
by petitioner’s Board of Trustees. The authority of Mr.
Azcueta to file the 2 subject application was established by
a Secretary’s Certificate attached to the said application.
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The asseveration that the subject case was not prosecuted
by a duly authorized representative of the petitioner is thus
unfounded
Uy Chico v. Union Life
29 Phil. 163 (1915)
Guimary
PRINCIPLE RELATED TO EVIDENCE:
WITNESSES; PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS; ATTORNEY
AND CLIENT. — Communications made by a client to his
attorney for the purpose of being communicated to others
are not privileged after they have been so communicated,
and may be proved by the testimony of the attorney. This
rule applies to a compromise agreement perfected by the
attorney with the authority and under the instructions of
his client.
FACTS:
After the death of his father and before the date of the fire,
plaintiff purchased his brother’s interest in the dry goods
business, took over and continued it under his father’s
name, “Uy Layco.” At the time of the fire, "Uy Layco" was
indebted to the creditors of the estate of the plaintiff's
father.
The plaintiff now brings this action, maintaining that the
insurance policies belonged to him and alleges that he is
not bound by the compromise effected by the
administrator of the estate, who compromised with the
insurance company for one- half their face value, or
P6,000.
The defendant insurance company sought to show that it
was the plaintiff's attorney who had surrendered the
policies to the administrator with the understanding that
such a compromise was to be effected and agreed to by
the plaintiff. The defendant proves these allegations by
presenting the plaintiff’s attorney.
However, counsel for the plaintiff formally withdrew the
waiver previously given by the plaintiff and objected to the
testimony of the attorney on the ground that it was
privileged.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the testimony in question is privileged. NO.
RULING:
Testimony is not privileged.
It will be noted that the evidence in question concerned the
dealings of the plaintiff’s attorney with a third person. Of
the very essence of the veil of secrecy which surrounds
communications made between attorney and client, is that
such communications are not intended for the information
of third persons or to be acted upon by them, but for the
purpose of advising the client as to his rights. It is evident
that a communication made by a client to his attorney for
the express purpose of its being communicated to a third
person is essentially inconsistent with the confidential
relation.
When the attorney has faithfully carried out his
instructions be delivering the communication to the
third person for whom it was intended and the latter
acts upon it, it cannot, by any reasoning whatever,
be classified in a legal sense as a privileged
communication between the attorney and his client.
It is plain that such a communication, after reaching
the party for whom it was intended at least, is a
communication between the client and a third
person, and that the attorney simply occupies the
role of intermediary or agent.
It is manifest that the objection to the testimony of the
plaintiff’s attorney as to his authority to compromise was
properly overruled. The testimony was to the effect that
when the attorney delivered the policies to the
administrator, he understood that there was a compromise
to be effected, and that when he informed the plaintiff of
the surrender of the policies for that purpose the plaintiff
made no objection whatever.
The evidence is sufficient to show that the plaintiff
acquiesced in the compromise settlement of the policies.
Having agreed to the compromise, he cannot now disavow
it and maintain an action for the recovery of their face
value.
Regala v. Sandiganbayan
262 SCRA 124 (1996)
Guzman
PRINCIPLE RELATED TO EVIDENCE:
The identity of a client may fall within the ambit of the
privilege when the client's name itself has an independent
significance, such that disclosure would then reveal client
confidences.
FACTS:
The Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG),
raised a complaint before the Sandiganbayan (SB) against
Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. and Teodoro Regala and his
partners in the ACCRA law firm, for the recovery of alleged
ill-gotten wealth, which includes shares of stocks in the
named corporations in PCGG Case No. 33 (Civil Case No.
0033), entitled "Republic of the Philippines versus Eduardo
Cojuangco, et al."
During the course of the proceedings, PCGG filed a "Motion
to Admit Third Amended Complaint" which excluded private
respondent Raul S. Roco from the complaint on his
undertaking that he will reveal the identity of the
principal/s for whom he acted as nominee/stockholder.
In their answer to the Expanded Amended Complaint,
ACCRA lawyers requested that PCGG similarly grant the
same treatment to them as accorded Roco. The PCGG has
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offered to the ACCRA lawyers the same conditions availed
of by Roco but the ACCRA lawyers have refused to disclose
the identities of their clients. ACCRA lawyers filed the
petition for certiorari, invoking that the Honorable
Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion:
In subjecting petitioners ACCRA lawyers who
acted to the strict application of the law of agency
In not considering petitioners ACCRA lawyers and
Mr. Roco as similarly situated and, therefore,
deserving of equal treatment.
In not holding that, under the facts of this case,
the attorney-client privilege prohibits petitioners
ACCRA lawyers from revealing the identity of their
client(s) and other information requested by
PCGG.
In not requiring that the dropping of party-
defendants by the PCGG must be based on
reasonable and just grounds and with due
consideration to equal protection of the law
ISSUE:
Whether or not client’s identity in a case involving and
acquiring companies allegedly sourced from ill-gotten
wealth is privileged and disclosure of such is unethical.
YES.
RULING:
As a matter of public policy, a client's identity should not
be shrouded in mystery Under this premise, the general
rule in our jurisdiction as well as in the United States is
that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to
divulge the name or identity of this client.
The reasons advanced for the general rule are well
established.
First, the court has a right to know that the client whose
privileged information is sought to be protected is flesh and
blood.
Second, the privilege begins to exist only after the
attorney-client relationship has been established. The
attorney-client privilege does not attach until there is a
client.
Third, the privilege generally pertains to the subject matter
of the relationship.
Finally, due process considerations require that the
opposing party should, as a general rule, know his
adversary. "A party suing or sued is entitled to know who
his opponent is." He cannot be obliged to grope in the dark
against unknown forces.
Notwithstanding these considerations, the general rule is
however qualified by some important exceptions.
1. Client identity is privileged where a strong
probability exists that revealing the client's name
would implicate that client in the very activity for
which he sought the lawyer's advice.
U .S. v. Hodge and Zweig, involved the same exception,
i.e. that client identity is privileged in those instances
where a strong probability exists that the disclosure of the
client's identity would implicate the client in the very
criminal activity for which the lawyer's legal advice was
obtained.
2. Where disclosure would open the client to civil
liability; his identity is privileged. For instance, the
peculiar facts and circumstances of Neugass v.
Terminal Cab Corporation, prompted the New York
Supreme Court to allow a lawyer's claim to the
effect that he could not reveal the name of his
client because this would expose the latter to civil
litigation.
3. Where the government's lawyers have no case
against an attorney's client unless, by revealing
the client's name, the said name would furnish the
only link that would form the chain of testimony
necessary to convict an individual of a crime, the
client's name is privileged.
Apart from these principal exceptions, there exist other
situations which could qualify as exceptions to the general
rule.
For example, the content of any client communication to a
lawyer lies within the privilege if it is relevant to the
subject matter of the legal problem on which the client
seeks legal assistance. Moreover, where the nature of the
attorney-client relationship has been previously disclosed
and it is the identity which is intended to be confidential,
the identity of the client has been held to be privileged,
since such revelation would otherwise result in disclosure
of the entire transaction.
Summarizing these exceptions, information relating
to the identity of a client may fall within the ambit of
the privilege when the client's name itself has an
independent significance, such that disclosure would
then reveal client confidences.
The circumstances involving the engagement of lawyers in
the case at bench, therefore, clearly reveal that the instant
case falls under at least two exceptions to the general rule.
First, disclosure of the alleged client's name would lead to
establish said client's connection with the very fact in issue
of the case, which is privileged information, because the
privilege, as stated earlier, protects the subject matter or
the substance (without which there would be not attorney-
client relationship).
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The link between the alleged criminal offense and the legal
advice or legal service sought was duly establishes in the
case at bar, by no less than the PCGG itself.
The key lies in the three specific conditions laid down by
the PCGG which constitutes petitioners' ticket to non-
prosecution should they accede thereto:
a. the disclosure of the identity of its clients;
b. submission of documents substantiating the
lawyer-client relationship; and
c. the submission of the deeds of assignment
petitioners executed in favor of their clients
covering their respective shareholdings.
From these conditions, particularly the third, we can
readily deduce that the clients indeed consulted the
petitioners, in their capacity as lawyers, regarding the
financial and corporate structure, framework and set-up of
the corporations in question. In turn, petitioners gave their
professional advice in the form of, among others, the
aforementioned deeds of assignment covering their client's
shareholdings.
There is no question that the preparation of the aforestated
documents was part and parcel of petitioners' legal service
to their clients. More important, it constituted an integral
part of their duties as lawyers. Petitioners, therefore, have
a legitimate fear that identifying their clients would
implicate them in the very activity for which legal advice
had been sought, i.e., the alleged accumulation of ill-
gotten wealth in the aforementioned corporations.
Furthermore, under the third main exception, revelation of
the client's name would obviously provide the necessary
link for the prosecution to build its case, where none
otherwise exists. It is the link, in the words of Baird, "that
would inevitably form the chain of testimony necessary to
convict the (client) of a . . . crime."
People vs. Sandiganbayan
275 SCRA 505 (1997)
Ibrahim
PRINCIPLE RELATED TO EVIDENCE:
The lawyer client privilege covers past crimes
communicated by the client to the counsel and not future
crimes to be committed by the client. The period to be
considered is the date when the privileged communication
was made by the client to the attorney in relation to either
a crime committed in the past or with respect to a crime
intended to be committed in the future.
Further, In order that a communication between a lawyer
and his client may be privileged, it must be for a lawful
purpose or in furtherance of a lawful purpose or in
furtherance of a lawful end. The existence of an unlawful
purpose prevents the privilege from attaching.
FACTS:
Paredes fraudulently applied for free patent over a parcel
of land. He succeeded and an OCT was issued in his name.
Years after the said grant, the director of lands filed an
action for the cancellation of the OCT in the name of
Paredes as this land is designated as a school cite. RTC
nullified the OCT. Various cases were filed against Paredes
but the important case in relation to this case is when
Tanodbayan haled Paredes for preliminary investigation on
the charge that, by using his former position as Provincial
Attorney to influence and induce the Bureau of Lands
officials to favorably act on his application for free patent,
he had violated Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended. On August 29, 1988, the Tanodbayan, issued a
resolution recommending the criminal prosecution of
respondent Paredes. Notably, through all these actions,
Paredes was represented by Sansaet, the star of this case.
In response to the case initiated by tanodbayan, Atty
Sansaet filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that
Paredes has been prosecuted with the same offense in a
different court and that he has served his sentenced as
evidenced by Copy of the dismissal order, certificate of
arraignment and the recommendation of the Department
of Justice are hereto attached.
On January 23, 1990, one Teofilo Gelacio, a taxpayer, sent
a letter to the Ombudsman seeking the investigation of the
three respondents herein for falsification of public
documents. He claimed that respondent Honrada, in
conspiracy with his herein co-respondents, simulated and
certified as true copies certain documents purporting to be
a notice of arraignment, dated July 1, 1985, and
transcripts of stenographic notes supposedly taken during
the arraignment of Paredes on the perjury charge. These
falsified documents were annexed to respondent Paredes'
motion for reconsideration of the Tanodbayan resolution
for the filing of a graft charge against him, in order to
support his contention that the same would constitute
double jeopardy. Realizing the severe consequence of the
falsification done, atty sansaet made a counter-affidavit. In
a so called Affidavit of Explanations and Rectifications,
respondent Sansaet revealed that Paredes contrived to
have the graft case under preliminary investigation
dismissed on the ground of double jeopardy by making it
appear that the perjury case had been dismissed by the
trial court after he had been arraigned therein.
To evade responsibility for his own participation in the
scheme, he claimed that he did so upon the instigation and
inducement of respondent Paredes. This was intended to
pave the way for him to be proposed as a government
witness in the consolidated cases against Paredes and
Honrada.
A motion therefore was filed by the prosecution pursuant
to their agreement. The Ombudsman rejected the proposal
for the admission of respondent Sansaet as a state witness
based on the fact that Sansaet and Paredes is covered by
privileged communication.
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ISSUE:
Whether or not the projected testimony of respondent
Sansaet, as proposed state witness, is barred by the
attorney-client privilege. NO.
RULING:
Generally, the privilege is not confined to verbal or written
communications made by the client to his attorney but
extends as well to information communicated by the client
to the attorney by other means. However, a distinction
must be made between confidential communications
relating to past crimes already committed, and future
crimes intended to be committed by the client. Corollarily,
it is admitted that the announced intention of a client to
commit a crime is not included within the confidences
which his attorney is bound to respect. For the application
of the attorney client privilege, however, the period to be
considered is the date when the privileged communication
was made by the client to the attorney in relation to either
a crime committed in the past or with respect to a crime
intended to be committed in the future. In other words, if
the client seeks his lawyer's advice with respect to a crime
that the former has theretofore committed, he is given the
protection of a virtual confessional seal which the attorney-
client privilege declares cannot be broken by the attorney
without the client's consent. The same privileged
confidentiality, however, does not attach with regard to a
crime which a client intends to commit thereafter or in the
future and for purposes of which he seeks the lawyer's
advice. Statements and communications regarding the
commission of a crime already committed, made by a party
who committed it, to an attorney, consulted as such, are
privileged communications. Contrarily, the unbroken
stream of judicial dicta is to the effect that communications
between attorney and client having to do with the client's
contemplated criminal acts, or in aid or furtherance
thereof, are not covered by the cloak of privileges
ordinarily existing in reference to communications between
attorney and client.
In the present cases, the testimony sought to be elicited
from Sansaet as state witness are the communications
made to him by physical acts and/or accompanying words
of Paredes at the time he and Honrada, either with the
active or passive participation of Sansaet, were about to
falsify, or in the process of falsifying, the documents which
were later filed in Tanodbayan by Sansaet and culminated
in the criminal charges now pending in respondent
Sandiganbayan. Clearly, therefore, the confidential
communications thus made by Paredes to Sansaet were for
purposes of and in reference to the crime of falsification
which had not yet been committed in the past by Paredes
but which he, in confederacy with his present
corespondents, later committed. Having been made for
purposes of a future offense, those communications are
outside the pale of the attorney-client privilege. It is
evident, therefore, that it was error for respondent
Sandiganbayan to insist that such unlawful
communications intended for an illegal purpose contrived
by conspirators are nonetheless covered by the so-called
mantle of privilege. To prevent a conniving counsel from
revealing the genesis of a crime which was later committed
pursuant to a conspiracy, because of the objection thereto
of his conspiring client, would be one of the worst
travesties in the rules of evidence and practice in the noble
profession of law. The Court is reasonably convinced, and
so holds, that the other requisites for the discharge of
respondent Sansaet as a state witness are present and
should have been favorably appreciated by the
Sandiganbayan.
In order that a communication between a lawyer and his
client may be privileged, it must be for a lawful purpose or
in furtherance of a lawful purpose or in furtherance of a
lawful end. The existence of an unlawful purpose prevents
the privilege from attaching. In fact, it has also been
pointed out to the Court that the "prosecution of the
honorable relation of attorney and client will not be
permitted under the guise of privilege, and every
communication made to an attorney by a client for a
criminal purpose is a conspiracy or attempt at a conspiracy
which is not only lawful to divulge, but which the attorney
under certain circumstances may be bound to disclose at
once in the interest of justice.
U.S. vs. Gordon-Nikkar
C.A. Fla. 1975, 518 F. 2d 972
Japitan
PRINCIPLE RELATED TO EVIDENCE:
Testimonial evidence sourced from privileged
communications (attorney-client communications) may be
admissible when the confidential communication in
question intended to commit a crime.
FACTS:
Ana Gordon-Nikkar, was convicted after a trial by jury on
all three counts of an indictment charging her with
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute
approximately four kilograms of cocaine, and the
substantive charges of possession with intent to distribute
and distribution of the cocaine. On appeal, appellant
contends her conviction should be reversed because the
district court permitted a Government witness, Brenda
Marchand, to give testimony regarding allegedly privileged
conversations between appellant's attorney and his client.
Antecedent Facts: Brenda Marchand was charged as a
codefendant with the crimes for which appellant was
convicted. Marchand subsequently pled guilty on Count I of
the indictment and testified at trial for the Government.
Prior to entering her plea, Marchand had two meetings in
the office of appellant's attorney, Mr. Estrumsa.
On each of these occasions, several of the co defendants
were present. Marchand, however, was not a client of
Estrumsa, and it is unclear whether all the other persons in
these meetings were Estrumsa's clients. Of the two
conversations related by Marchand, the second was the
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subject of thorough cross-examination by Estrumsa. The
second conversation involved Estrumsa's alleged
recommendation that Marchand leave the country and go
to Venezuela. On redirect, the Government inquired, over
defense objection, into the substance of the conversation
during the first meeting. Marchand testified that at this
meeting the participants, at Mr. Estrumsa's suggestion,
agreed to give perjured cover-up testimony at trial to the
effect that none of them had possessed the cocaine, but
instead merely happened to be at a party where the
cocaine was discovered.
ISSUE:
Whether the statements in attorney Estrumsa's office were
protected by the attorney-client privilege. NO.
RULING:
There were at least five persons present at Estrumsa's
office on this occasion; at least one of the persons, Brenda
Marchand, and perhaps others, were not clients of Mr.
Estrumsa. A communication divulged to "strangers" or
outsiders can scarcely be considered a confidential
communication between attorney and client. Therefore,
this communication is not protected by the attorney-client
privilege. But even if it appeared that the communication
in question were otherwise privileged (i.e., that the
communication was considered confidential despite the
presence of a stranger), the testimony was nonetheless
admissible. The conversations in question dealt with plans
to commit perjury so as to hide the criminal activity of
appellant and others. It is beyond dispute that the
attorney-client privilege does not extend to
communications regarding an intended crime. The policy
underlying the attorney-client privilege is to promote the
administration of justice. It would be a perversion of the
privilege to extend it so as to protect communications
designed to frustrate justice by committing other crimes to
conceal past misdeeds.
U.S. vs. McPartlin
595 F. 2d 1321, C.A. Ill., 1979
Javier
PRINCIPLE RELATED TO EVIDENCE:
The privilege applies to communications by a client "to a
lawyer representing another in a matter of common
interest. The joint-interest privilege is not limited to
situations in which the positions of the parties are
compatible in all respects.
FACTS:
The Sanitary District is a municipal corporation with
primary responsibility for disposing of sewage from
Chicago and surrounding areas. It operates a sewage
treatment plant in Stickney, Illinois. Until 1971 the sludge
produced as a by-product was disposed of by pumping it
into nearby lagoons. Early that year, because the lagoons
were rapidly being filled and efforts to clean them had
failed, the District announced plans to have the sludge
transported to Fulton County, Illinois and solicited bids on
the project.
During the week before the bids were to be submitted, Bull
visited Howson, a vice president of Ingram Contractors,
Inc., and told Howson that if Ingram Corporation expected
to secure the contract, it would have to make a "political
contribution". Howson took Bull to meet Benton, vice
president of Ingram Corporation and president of Ingram
Contractors, Inc.
Benton then telephoned Ingram to inform him of the
"political contribution" proposal. Ingram agreed, provided
that the contribution could be added to the cost of the
contract.
The indictment charged that defendant Frederick B.
Ingram, chairman of the board of Ingram Corporation, had
paid defendant Robert F. McPartlin, an Illinois legislator,
defendant Valentine Janicki, a trustee for the Metropolitan
Sanitary District, and others more than $900,000 to secure
for the Ingram Corporation a multi-million dollar sludge-
hauling contract with the District. Defendants Franklin H.
Weber, a businessman, and Edwin T. Bull, president of a
towing company, were alleged to be intermediaries
through whom many of the payments were made. William
J. Benton, vice president of Ingram Corporation, was an
unindicted co-conspirator who played a major role in the
conspiracy and testified as a witness for the prosecution.
Throughout the period covered by the indictment, Benton
kept diaries, or appointment calendars, in which he made
notes concerning meetings and telephone conversations,
naming the persons involved and often recording the
substance of the conversations.
An investigator acting for Frederick Ingram's counsel twice
interviewed McPartlin with the consent of the latter's
counsel for the purpose of determining whether there was
a basis for challenging the truth of some of the diary
entries. At trial, when Ingram offered evidence of these
statements, McPartlin's counsel objected on the ground,
inter alia, of the attorney-client privilege.
ISSUE:
WON McPartlin was entitled to the protection of the
attorney-client privilege. YES.
RULING:
His statements were made in confidence to an attorney for
a co-defendant for a common purpose related to both
defenses. They were made in connection with the project
of attempting to discredit Benton, a project in which
Ingram and McPartlin and their attorneys were jointly
engaged for the benefit of both defendants. Ingram
acknowledges that communications by a client to his own
lawyer remain privileged when the lawyer subsequently
shares them with co-defendants for purposes of a common
defense.
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The common-defense rule, which is not as narrow as
Ingram contends, has been recognized in cases spanning
more than a century. Uninhibited communication among
joint parties and their counsel about matters of common
concern is often important to the protection of their
interests.
Rule 503(b)(3) of the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence,
as approved by the Supreme Court, stated that the
privilege applies to communications by a client "to a lawyer
representing another in a matter of common interest. The
Advisory Committee's Note to proposed Rule 503(b) makes
it clear that the joint-interest privilege is not limited to
situations in which the positions of the parties are
compatible in all respects.
The privilege protects pooling of information for any
defense purpose common to the participating defendants.
Cooperation between defendants in such circumstances is
often not only in their own best interests but serves to
expedite the trial or, as in the case at bar, the trial
preparation.
Krohn v. Court of Appeals
233 SCRA 146 (1994)
Lamusao
PRINCIPLE RELATED TO EVIDENCE:
Requisites in order that the physician-patient privilege may
be successfully invoked: (a) the privilege is claimed in a
civil cases; (b) the person against whom the privilege is
claimed is one duly authorized to practice medicine,
surgery or obstetrics; (c) such person acquired the
information while he was attending to the patient in his
professional capacity; (d) the information was necessary to
enable him to act in that capacity; and, (e) the information
was confidential and, if disclosed, would blacken the
reputation (formerly character) of the patient.
FACTS:
Edgar Krohn, Jr., and Ma. Paz Fernandez were married.
However, their relationship developed into a stormy one.
Ma. Paz underwent psychological testing purportedly in an
effort to ease the martial strain. The effort however proved
futile. They finally separated in fact.
Edgar was able to secure a copy of the confidential
psychiatric report on Ma. Paz prepared and signed by Drs.
Cornelio Banaag, Jr., and Baltazar Reyes.
Presenting the report among others, he obtained a decree
nullifying his church marriage with Ma. Paz on the ground
of "incapacitas assumendi onera conjugalia" due to lack of
due discretion existent at the time of the wedding and
thereafter.
Edgar filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage
with Ma. Paz before the trial court. In his petition, he cited
the Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report which Ma.
Paz merely denied in her Answer as "either unfounded or
irrelevant."
At the hearing, Edgar took the witness stand and tried to
testify on the contents of the Report. This was objected to
on the ground that it violated the rule on privileged
communication between physician and patient.
The trial court issued an Order admitting the Report in
evidence. On appeal, the appellate court dismissed the
petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation
Report should be admitted in evidence. YES.
RULING:
It must be admitted.
Petitioner argues that since Sec. 24, par. (c), Rule 130, of
the Rules of Court prohibits a physician from testifying on
matters which he may have acquired in attending to a
patient in a professional capacity, "WITH MORE REASON
should a third person (like respondent-husband in this
particular instance) be PROHIBITED from testifying on
privileged matters between a physician and patient or from
submitting any medical report, findings or evaluation
prepared by a physician which the latter has acquired as a
result of his confidential and privileged relation with a
patient."
Private respondent Edgar Krohn, Jr., however contends
that "the rules are very explicit: the prohibition applies
only to a physician. Thus . . . . the legal prohibition to
testify is not applicable to the case at bar where the person
sought to be barred from testifying on the privileged
communication is the husband and not the physician of the
petitioner." In fact, according to him, the Rules sanction
his testimony considering that a husband may testify
against his wife in a civil case filed by one against the
other.
Besides, private respondent submits that privileged
communication may be waived by the person entitled
thereto, and this petitioner expressly did when she gave
her unconditional consent to the use of the psychiatric
evaluation report when it was presented to the Tribunal in
declaring their marriage null and void. Private respondent
further argues that petitioner also gave her implied
consent when she failed to specifically object to the
admissibility of the report in her Answer where she merely
described the evaluation report as "either unfounded or
irrelevant." At any rate, failure to interpose a timely
objection at the earliest opportunity to the evidence
presented on privileged matters may be construed as an
implied waiver.
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Petitioner's discourse while exhaustive is however
misplaced. Lim v. Court of Appeals clearly lays down the
requisites in order that the privilege may be successfully
invoked: (a) the privilege is claimed in a civil cases; (b)
the person against whom the privilege is claimed is one
duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics;
(c) such person acquired the information while he was
attending to the patient in his professional capacity; (d)
the information was necessary to enable him to act in that
capacity; and, (e) the information was confidential and, if
disclosed, would blacken the reputation (formerly
character) of the patient."
In the instant case, the person against whom the privilege
is claimed is not one duly authorized to practice medicine,
surgery obstetrics. He is simply the patient's husband who
wishes to testify on a document executed by medical
practitioners. Plainly and clearly, this does not fall within
the claimed prohibition. Neither can his testimony be
considered a circumvention of the prohibition because his
testimony cannot have the force and effect of the
testimony of the physician who examined the patient and
executed the report.
Counsel for petitioner indulged heavily in objecting to the
testimony of private respondent on the ground that it was
privileged. In his Manifestation before the trial court, he
invoked the rule on privileged communications but never
questioned the testimony as hearsay. It was a fatal
mistake. For in failing to object to the testimony on the
ground that it was hearsay, counsel waived his right to
make such objection and, consequently, the evidence
offered may be admitted.
Blue Cross Health v. Olivares
G.R. No. 169737, 12 February 2008
Ledesma
PRINCIPLE RELATED TO EVIDENCE:
Disputable presumptions does not apply if:
a. The evidence is at the disposal of both
b. Suppression was not wilful
c. Evidence is merely corroborative or cumulative
d. The suppression is an exercise of a privilege
FACTS:
Neomi Olivares applied for a health care program with
petitioner Blue Cross Health Care Inc. She paid for the
coverage in full and her application was approved. In the
health care agreement, ailments due to “pre-existing
conditions” were excluded from the coverage.
However, after the member has been continuously covered
for 12 months, the pre-existing provision shall no longer be
applicable except for illnesses specifically excluded by an
Endorsement.
Barely 38 days from the effectivity of her health insurance,
Neomi suffered a stroke and was admitted to The Medical
City, an accredited hospital of petitioner.
She incurred 34,217.20 for her medical bills. When she
requested petitioner to issue a letter of authorization in
order to settle her medical bills, petitioner refused to issue
such and suspended payment pending the submission of a
certification from her attending physician that the stroke
suffered was not caused by a pre-existing condition. She
was constrained to pay for the medical bills herself and
thereafter filed a complaint for collection of sum of money
against petitioner.
The attending physician replied to petitioner’s request and
maintained that he will not be releasing any medical
information regarding her status as the patient invokes
patient-physician confidentiality.
Petitioner argues that respondents prevented the physician
from submitting his report regarding the medical condition
of Neomi. Hence, it contends that the presumption that
evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced
should apply in its favor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the disputable presumption invoked should
be applied in petitioner’s favor. NO.
RULING:
Section 3. Disputable presumptions. The following
presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may
be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
(e) That evidence willfully suppressed would be
adverse if produced.
However, this presumption does not apply if:
a. The evidence is at the disposal of both
d. Suppression was not wilful
e. Merely corroborative or cumulative
f. The suppression is an exercise of a a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum
privilege
Hence, respondent’s refusal to allow the presentation of
the physician’s report was justified as it is a privileged
communication between physician and patient.
Since petitioner had the burden of proving exception to
liability, it should have made its own assessment of
whether respondent had a pre-existing condition when it
failed to obtain the physicians report.
Furthermore, it is in the nature of a non-life insurance and
as it is an established rule in insurance contracts that when
their terms contain limitations on liability, they should be
construed strictly against the insurer. This doctrine is
equally applicable to health care agreements.
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Josielene Chan v. Johnny Chan
G.R. No. 179786, 24 July 2013
Legaspi
PRINCIPLE RELATED TO EVIDENCE:
The physician-patient privileged communication rule
essentially means that a physician who gets information
while professionally attending a patient cannot in a civil
case be examined without the patient's consent as to any
facts which would blacken the latter's reputation. This rule
is intended to encourage the patient to open up to the
physician, relate to him the history of his ailment, and give
him access to his body, enabling the physician to make a
correct diagnosis of that ailment and provide the
appropriate cure. Any fear that a physician could be
compelled in the future to come to court and narrate all
that had transpired between him and the patient might
prompt the latter to clam up, thus putting his own health
at great risk.
FACTS:
Josie Chan filed a declaration of nullity of marriage,
dissolution of the conjugal partnership and award of the
custody of their children. Josie Claimed that Johnny failed
to take care of and support his family and that a
psychiatrist diagnosed him as mentally deficient due to
incessant drinking and excessive use of prohibited drugs.
She convinced him to undergo hospital confinement for
detoxification and rehabilitation.
Johnny claimed that it was Josie who failed in her "wifely"
duties" and that to save their marriage he agreed to
marriage counselling.
During the pre-trial conference, Josie pre-marked the
Philhealth Claim Form that Johnny attached to his answer
as proof that he was forcibly confined at the rehabilitation
unit of a hospital. The form carried a physician's
handwritten note that Johnny suffered from
"methamphetamine and alcohol abuse." Following up on
this point, on August 22, 2006 Josielene filed with the RTC
addressed to Medical City, covering Johnny's medical
records when he was there confined. The request was
accompanied by a motion to "be allowed to submit in
evidence" the records sought by subpoena duces tecum
Johnny opposed the motion, arguing that the medical
records were covered by physician-patient privilege.
RTC and CA: ruled that, if courts were to allow the
production of medical records, then patients would be left
with no assurance that whatever relevant disclosures they
may have made to their physicians would be kept
confidential. The prohibition covers not only testimonies,
but also affidavits, certificates, and pertinent hospital
records. The CA added that, although Johnny can waive
the privilege, he did not do so in this case. He attached the
Philhealth form to his answer for the limited purpose of
showing his alleged forcible confinement.

ISSUE:
Whether it was proper to issue a subpoena duces tecum for
the production and submission in the court of respondent
husband's hospital records in a case for declaration of
nullity of marriage where the one of the issues is the
mental fitness of the husband.
Josie Arguments: (1)Josie claims that the hospital records
subject of this case are not privileged since it is the
"testimonial" evidence of the physician that may be
regarded as privileged. Section 24 (c) of Rule 130 states
that the physician "cannot in a civil case, without the
consent of the patient, be examined" regarding their
professional conversation. The privilege, says Josielene,
does not cover the hospital records, but only the
examination of the physician at the trial. (2) Josie argues
that since Johnny admitted in his answer to the petition
before the RTC that he had been confined in a hospital
against his will and in fact attached to his answer a
Philhealth claim form covering that confinement, he should
be deemed to have waived the privileged character of its
records. Josielene invokes Section 17, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Evidence that provides:
SEC. 17.When part of transaction, writing or
record given in evidence, the remainder
admissible. — When part of an act, declaration,
conversation, writing or record is given in
evidence by one party, the whole of the same
subject may be inquired into by the other, and
when a detached act, declaration, conversation,
writing or record is given in evidence, any other
act, declaration, conversation, writing or record
necessary to its understanding may also be given
in evidence.
RULING:
SEC. 24.Disqualification by reason of privileged
communication. — The following persons cannot testify as
to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:
(c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or
obstetrics cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the
patient, be examined as to any advice or treatment given
by him or any information which he may have acquired in
attending such patient in a professional capacity, which
information was necessary to enable him to act in that
capacity, and which would blacken the reputation of the
patient.
The physician-patient privileged communication rule
essentially means that a physician who gets information
while professionally attending a patient cannot in a civil
case be examined without the patient's consent as to any
facts which would blacken the latter's reputation. This rule
is intended to encourage the patient to open up to the
physician, relate to him the history of his ailment, and give
him access to his body, enabling the physician to make a
correct diagnosis of that ailment and provide the
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appropriate cure. Any fear that a physician could be
compelled in the future to come to court and narrate all
that had transpired between him and the patient might
prompt the latter to clam up, thus putting his own health
at great risk.
The case presents a procedural issue, given that the time
to object to the admission of evidence, such as the hospital
records, would be at the time they are offered. The offer
could be made part of the physician's testimony or as
independent evidence that he had made entries in those
records that concern the patient's health problems.
Section 36, Rule 132, states that objections to evidence
must be made after the offer of such evidence for
admission in court. Thus:
SEC. 36.Objection. — Objection to evidence
offered orally must be made immediately after the
offer is made.
Objection to a question propounded in the course of the
oral examination of a witness shall be made as soon as the
grounds therefor shall become reasonably apparent.
An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to within
three (3) days after notice of the offer unless a different
period is allowed by the court.
In any case, the grounds for the objections must be
specified.
Since the offer of evidence is made at the trial, Josielene's
request for subpoena duces tecum is premature. She will
have to wait for trial to begin before making a request for
the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering Johnny's
hospital records. It is when those records are produced for
examination at the trial, that Johnny may opt to object, not
just to their admission in evidence, but more so to their
disclosure. Section 24 (c), Rule 130 of the Rules of
Evidence quoted above is about non-disclosure of
privileged matters.
It is of course possible to treat Josie’s motion for the
issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering the hospital
records as a motion for production of documents, a
discovery procedure available to a litigant prior to trial.
Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
HEDSCc
SEC. 1.Motion for production or inspection; order. — Upon
motion of any party showing good cause therefor, the
court in which an action is pending may (a) order any
party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or
photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any
designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters,
photographs, objects or tangible things, not privileged,
which constitute or contain evidence material to any
matter involved in the action and which are in his
possession, custody or control; or (b) order any party to
permit entry upon designated land or other property in his
possession or control for the purpose of inspecting,
measuring, surveying, or photographing the property or
any designated relevant object or operation thereon. The
order shall specify the time, place and manner of making
the inspection and taking copies and photographs, and
may prescribe such terms and conditions as are just.
In response to Josie’s argument 1: To allow, however, the
disclosure during discovery procedure of the hospital
records — the results of tests that the physician ordered,
the diagnosis of the patient's illness, and the advice or
treatment he gave him — would be to allow access to
evidence that is inadmissible without the patient's consent.
Physician memorializes all these information in the
patient's records. Disclosing them would be the equivalent
of compelling the physician to testify on privileged matters
he gained while dealing with the patient, without the
latter's prior consent.
In response to Petitioner’s argument 2: But, trial in the
case had not yet begun. Consequently, it cannot be said
that Johnny had already presented the Philhealth claim
form in evidence, the act contemplated above which would
justify Josie into requesting an inquiry into the details of
his hospital confinement. Johnny was not yet bound to
adduce evidence in the case when he filed his answer. Any
request for disclosure of his hospital records would again
be premature.
Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability G.R. No.
180643, 25 March 2008
Lumogdang
PRINCIPLE RELATED TO EVIDENCE:
The balancing of interests — between executive privilege
on one hand and the other competing constitutionally
recognized interests on the other hand — is a function of
the courts. The courts will have to decide the issue based
on the factual circumstances of each case. This is how
conflicts on executive privilege between the Executive and
the Legislature, and between the Executive and the
Judiciary, have been decided by the courts.
FACTS:
Neri, then Director General of NEDA, was invited by the
respondent Senate Committees to attend their joint
investigation on the alleged anomalies in the National
Broadband Network (NBN) Project.
When he testified before the Senate Committees, he
disclosed that then Commission on Elections Chairman
Benjamin Abalos, brokering for ZTE, offered him P200
million in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project.
He further narrated that he informed President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she
instructed him not to accept the bribe.
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However, when probed further on what they discussed
about the NBN Project, the petitioner refused to answer,
invoking “executive privilege.”
Later on, respondent Committees issued a Subpoena Ad
Testificandum to petitioner, requiring him to appear and
testify. However, Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita sent
a letter to the Committees requesting them to dispense
with Neri’s testimony on the ground of executive privilege.
Ermita invoked the privilege on the ground that “the
information sought to be disclosed might impair our
diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s
Republic of China,” and given the confidential nature in
which these information were conveyed to the President,
Neri “cannot provide the Committee any further details of
these conversations, without disclosing the very thing the
privilege is designed to protect.”
Respondents issued a Show Cause Letter to Neri requiring
him to show cause why he should not be cited for
contempt for his failure to attend the scheduled hearing.
As response, Neri replied that his nonappearance was upon
the order of the President, and that his conversation with
her dealt with delicate and sensitive national security and
diplomatic matters relating to the impact of the bribery
scandal involving high government officials and the
possible loss of confidence of foreign investors and lenders
in the Philippines.
Neri stressed that his refusal to answer was anchored on a
valid claim to executive privilege in accordance with the
ruling in the landmark case of Senate vs. Ermita For its
part, the Senate Committees argued that they did not
exceed their authority in issuing the assailed orders
because there is no valid justification for Neri’s claim to
executive privilege.
In addition, they claimed that the refusal to answer the
three questions violates the people’s right to public
information, and that the executive is using the concept of
executive privilege as a means to conceal the criminal act
of bribery in the highest levels of government.
ISSUE:
Whether the communications elicited were covered by
executive privilege. YES.
RULING:
There are two (2) kinds of executive privilege:
1. Presidential Communications Privilege (pertains to
"communications, documents or other materials
that reflect presidential decision-making and
deliberations and that the President believes
should remain confidential. Presidential
communications privilege applies to decision-
making of the President)
2. Deliberative Process Privilege (includes advisory
opinions, recommendations and deliberations
 comprising part of a process by which
governmental decisions and policies are
formulated. This applies to decision-making of
executive officials)
The elements of presidential communications privilege are:
a. The protected communication must relate to a
"quintessential and non-delegable presidential
power”
b. The communication must be authored or "solicited
and received" by a close advisor of the President
or the President himself. The judicial test is that
an advisor must be in "operational proximity" with
the President.
c. The presidential communications privilege remains
a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a
showing of adequate need, such that the
information sought "likely contains important
evidence" and by the unavailability of the
information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.
In the case at bar, Ermita premised his claim of executive
privilege on the ground that the communications elicited
"fall under conversation and correspondence between the
President and public officials" necessary in "her executive
and policy decision-making process" and, that "the
information sought to be disclosed might impair our
diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People's
Republic of China."
Using the above elements, indeed, the communications
elicited are covered by the presidential communications
privilege.
First, the communications relate to a "quintessential and
non-delegable power" of the President, i.e. the power to
enter into an executive agreement with other countries.
This authority of the President to enter into executive
agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has
traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.
Second, the communications are "received" by a close
advisor of the President. Under the "operational proximity"
test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a
member of President Arroyo's cabinet.
Finally, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need
that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the
unavailability of the information elsewhere by an
appropriate investigating authority. The record is bereft of
any categorical explanation from respondent Committees
to show a compelling or critical need for the answers in the
enactment of a law. Instead, the questions veer more
towards the exercise of the legislative oversight function
under Section 22 of Article VI rather than Section 21 of the
same Article.
While the above provisions are closely related and
complementary to each other, they should not be
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considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress.
Section 21 relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid
of legislation. Its aim is to elicit information that may be
used for legislation. On the other hand, Section 22 pertains
to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of
which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress'
oversight function. Simply stated, while both powers allow
Congress or any of its committees to conduct inquiry, their
objectives are different.
This distinction gives birth to another distinction with
regard to the use of compulsory process. Unlike in Section
21, Congress cannot compel the appearance of executive
officials under Section 22.
Respondent Committees argue that a claim of executive
privilege does not guard against a possible disclosure of a
crime or wrongdoing.
However, in the case at bar, the information here is
elicited, not in a criminal proceeding, but in a legislative
inquiry. Furthermore, Ermita categorically claims executive
privilege on the grounds of presidential communications
privilege in relation to her executive and policy decision-
making process and diplomatic secrets.
Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of
petitioner's claim of executive privilege violates the
constitutional provisions on the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern.
Petitioner made himself available to the committee during
the hearing, where he was questioned for eleven (11)
hours and expressly manifested his willingness to answer
more questions from the Senators, with the exception only
of those covered by his claim of executive privilege.
The right to public information, like any other right, is
subject to limitation. The right of Congress or any of its
Committees to obtain information in aid of legislation
cannot be equated with the people's right to public
information. The former cannot claim that every legislative
inquiry is an exercise of the people's right to information.
The distinction between such rights is laid down in Senate
v. Ermita:
There are, it bears noting, clear distinctions between the
right of Congress to information which underlies the power
of inquiry and the right of people to information on matters
of public concern.
The demand of a citizen for the production of documents
pursuant to his right to information does not have the
same obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued
by Congress. Neither does the right to information grant a
citizen the power to exact testimony from government
officials. These powers belong only to Congress, not to an
individual citizen.
Thus, while Congress is composed of representatives
elected by the people, it does not follow, except in a highly
qualified sense, that in every exercise of its power of
inquiry, the people are exercising their right to information.
The members of respondent Committees should not invoke
as justification in their exercise of power a right properly
belonging to the people in general. This is because when
they discharge their power, they do so as public officials
and members of Congress. The right to information must
be balanced with and should give way, in appropriate
cases, to constitutional precepts particularly those
pertaining to delicate interplay of executive-legislative
powers and privileges which is the subject of careful review
by numerous decided cases. Jurisprudence teaches that for
the claim to be properly invoked, there must be a formal
claim of privilege, lodged by the head of the department
which has control over the matter. A formal and proper
claim of executive privilege requires a "precise and certain
reason" for preserving their confidentiality.
The Letter of Executive Secretary Ermita satisfies the
requirement. It serves as the formal claim of privilege.
There, he expressly states that "this Office (referring to the
Office of the President) is constrained to invoke the settled
doctrine of executive privilege as refined in Senate v.
Ermita, and has advised Secretary Neri accordingly." That
is more than enough compliance.
With regard to the existence of "precise and certain
reason," we find the grounds relied upon by Executive
Secretary Ermita specific enough so as not "to leave
respondent Committees in the dark on how the requested
information could be classified as privileged." The case of
Senate v. Ermita only requires that an allegation be made
"whether the information demanded involves military or
diplomatic secrets, closed-door Cabinet meetings, etc." The
particular ground must only be specified. The enumeration
is not even intended to be comprehensive.
Estrada v. Desierto
G.R. No. 146710-15, 3 April 2001
Mabale
FACTS:
In 1998, Joseph Estrada (Erap) was elected President of
the Philippines with Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as his Vice
President (GMA). Erap was charged with corruption,
comprised of Chavit Singson, then the Governor of Ilocos
Sur, accusing him of receiving millions of pesos from
jueteng lords.
While Congress began investigations into the accusations,
key political figures including GMA called upon Erap to
resign and resigned from their cabinet posts themselves.
Ultimately, Erap vacated Malacanang and GMA was sworn
in as President.
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In the instant case, Erap claims that he was merely a
President on leave while GMA claims the presidency and
alleges that Erap resigned.
In deciding the case, the SC relied on the “Final Days of
Joseph Ejercito Estrada”, the diary of then Executive
Secretary Edgardo Angara serialized in the Philippine Daily
Inquirer.
The Angara Diary claims the following:
● That on January 19, 2001 (the time of EDSA Dos)
at 1:20 PM, Erap pulled Angara into his small
office at the presidential residence and exclaimed,
“Ed, seryoso na ito. Kumalas [defected] na si
Angelo Reyes (Chief of Staff, AFP).”)
● That an hour later at 2:30 PM, Erap decided to call
for a snap presidential election and stressed that
he would not be a candidate.
● That at 3:00 PM that same day, due to the
seismic shift of support to GMA’s favor, Erap
listened intently to advice regarding the option of
“dignified exit or resignation.”
● That at 9:30 PM that same day, the advice was
repeated to Erap and the latter expressed no
objection save for the statement that he would
never leave the country.
● That, when Angara briefed Erap regarding
negotiations that were held regarding a transition
of power, Erap said, “"Pagod na pagod na ako.
Ayoko na masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako
sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. I just want to
clear my name, then I will go."
ISSUE:
Is the SC’s reliance on the Angara Diary proper? YES.
RULING:
An adoptive admission is a party’s reaction to a
statement or action by another person when it is
reasonable to treat the party’s reaction as an admission of
something stated or implied by the other person.
In the Angara Diary, the options of Erap started to dwindle
when the armed forces withdrew its support from him as
President and commander-in-chief. Thus, Executive
Secretary Angara had to ask Senate President Pimentel to
advise Erap to consider the option of "dignified exit or
resignation." He did not object to the suggested option but
simply said he could never leave the country. His silence
on this and other related suggestions can be taken as an
admission by him.
Further, admissions by a co-partner or agent are also
admissible as an exception to the res inter alios acta rule.
Executive Secretary Angara as such was an alter ego of the
petitioner. He was the Little President. Indeed, he was
authorized by the petitioner to act for him in the critical
hours and days before he abandoned Malacañang Palace.
According to the Angara Diary, Erap said, “Mula umpisa pa
lang ng kampanya, Ed, ikaw na lang pinakikinggan ko. At
hanggang sa huli, ikaw pa rin." Erap cannot deny that
Secretary Angara headed his team of negotiators that met
with the team of the GMA to discuss the peaceful and
orderly transfer of power.
The Diary shows Erap was always briefed by Secretary
Angara on the progress of their negotiations. Secretary
Angara acted for and in behalf of Erap in the crucial days
before GMA took her oath as President. Consequently, Erap
is bound by the acts and declarations of Secretary Angara.
Finally, the ban on hearsay evidence does not cover
independently relevant statements. These are
statements which are relevant independently of whether
they are true or not. They belong to two (2) classes: (1)
those statements which are the very facts in issue, and (2)
those statements which are circumstantial evidence of the
facts in issue. The second class includes the following:
a. Statement of a person showing his state of mind,
that is, his mental condition, knowledge, belief,
intention, ill will and other emotions;
b. Statements of a person which show his physical
condition, as illness and the like;
c. Statement of a person from which an inference
may be made as to the state of mind of another,
that is, the knowledge, belief, motive, good or bad
faith, etc. of the latter;
d. Statements which may identify the date, place
and person in question; and
e. Statements showing the lack of credibility of a
witness.
The Angara Diary contains statements of the petitioner
which reflect his state of mind and are circumstantial
evidence of his intent to resign. It also contains statements
of Secretary Angara from which we can reasonably deduce
Erap’s intent to resign. They are admissible and they are
not covered by the rule on hearsay.
People v. Godoy
250 SCRA 676 (1995)
Moscoso
PRINCIPLE RELATED TO EVIDENCE:
No implied admission can be drawn from the efforts to
arrive at a settlement outside the court where the accused
did not take part in any of the negotiations.
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Danny Godoy was charged in two
separate informations filed before the Regional Trial Court,
for Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, with rape and
kidnapping with serious illegal detention. During the
arraignment on both indictments, appellant pleaded not
guilty to said charges and a joint trial was conducted by
the trial court.
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According to complainant Mia Taha, at around 7:00 PM as
of January 21, 1994, she went to the boarding house of
her cousin, Merlylyn Casantosan. When she saw that the
house was dark, she decided to pass through the kitchen
door at the back because she knew that there was nobody
inside. As soon as she opened the door, somebody
suddenly grabbed her, poked a knife on her neck, dragged
her by the hand and told her not to shout. She was then
forced to lie down on the floor. The complainant was able
to recognize the assailant by the light coming from the
moon and through his voice, as accused-appellant Danny
Godoy who was her Physics teacher at PNS. When she was
already on the floor, appellant removed her panty with one
hand while holding the knife with the other hand, opened
the zipper of his pants and then inserted his private organ
inside her private parts against her will. She was very
frightened because a knife was continually pointed at her.
She was threatened not to report the incident to anyone or
else she and her family would be killed. Thereafter, when
she arrived at her boarding house, she saw her landlady
but she did not mention anything about the incident.
The following morning, complainant went home to her
parents’ house. She likewise did not tell her parents about
the incident for fear that appellant might make good his
threat. At around 3:00PM of that same day, appellant
arrived at the house of her parents and asked permission
from the latter if complainant could accompany him to
solicit funds because she was a candidate for “Miss PNS
Pulot.” Appellant and complainant then left the house. She
was forced to ride the jeep because appellant threatened
to kill her if she would not board the vehicle. The jeep
proceeded to the sunset garden. Upon arrival, appellant
checked in and brought her to a room where they stayed
for three days. She was continuously guarded and
constantly raped by appellant.
In the early morning of January 25, 1994, appellant
brought her to the house of his friend where she was raped
by him three times, and was detained and locked inside
the room and tightly guarded by appellant. After two days,
they left the place and went to see a certain Naem from
whom appellant sought help. On the same day, she was
released but only after her parents agreed to settle the
case with appellant.
Mia was brought to the District Hospital and was examined
by Dr. Divinagracia. The latter testified that the hymenal
opening was in stellate shape and that there was a
laceration which shows that complainant had participated
in sexual intercourse. The laceration which was downward
at 6 o’clock position determines that where was no force
applied. The doctor found no sign of bruises or injuries.
During the cross- examination, complainant denied that
she wrote the letters and she never loved appellant. Helen
Taha, the mother of complainant, also testified. Later, Fruit
Godoy, the wife of the appellant, went to their house and
offered P50,000 for the settlement of the case. Mia’s father
insisted that they just settle. They also met the mother of
the appellant who gave them P30,000. Mia’s parents
subsequently executed an affidavit of desistance.
The defense presented a different version of what actually
transpired. According to the appellant, he first met Mia
Taha sometime in August 1993. He fell in love with her
because she often told him “Sir, I love you.” What started
as a joke later developed into a serious relationship which
was kept a secret from everybody else notwithstanding the
fact that he was married. Several persons even witnessed
this illicit relationship of Godoy and Taha.
Godoy consulted a certain Naem who is an “Imam.” Naem
suggested that appellant marry complainant in Muslim rites
but appellant refused because he was already married. It
was eventually agreed that Naem would just mediate in
behalf of appellant and make arrangements for a
settlement with Mia's parents. Later that day, Naem went
to see the parents of Mia at the latter’s house.
During his detention, he came to know, through his
mother, that an affidavit of desistance was reportedly
executed by complainants. However, he claims that he
never knew and it was never mentioned to him, not until
the day he testified in court, that his mother paid
P30,000.00 to Mia's father because, although he did not
dissuade them, neither did he request his mother to talk to
complainants in order to settle the case.
After trial, the court convicted Godoy of the crimes of rape
and kidnapping with serious illegal detention and imposed
the capital punishment of death. By reason of the nature of
the penalty imposed, these cases were elevated to the SC
on automatic review.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in concluding that
there was implied admission of guilt on the part of the
accused appellant in view of the offer of compromise. YES.
RULING:
In criminal cases, an offer of compromise is generally
admissible as evidence against the party making it. It has
long been held that in such cases the accused is permitted
to show that the offer was not made under a consciousness
of guilt, but merely to avoid the inconvenience of
imprisonment or for some other reason which would justify
a claim by the accused that the offer to compromise was
not in truth an admission of his guilt or an attempt to avoid
the legal consequences which would ordinarily ensue
therefrom.
The evidence for the defense overwhelmingly proves
appellant’s innocence of the offense charged. It has been
held that where the accused was not present at the time
the offer for monetary consideration was made, such offer
of compromise would not save the day for the prosecution.
No implied admission can be drawn from the efforts to
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arrive at a settlement outside the court where the accused
did not take part in any of the negotiations and the effort
to settle the case was in accordance with the established
tribal customs, that is, Muslim practices and traditions, in
an effort to prevent further deterioration of the relations
between the parties.
The Supreme Court found in the records of the cases
sufficient and substantial evidence which warrant and
demand the acquittal of appellant. The judgment appealed
is hereby reversed and set aside, and the accused-
appellant Danny Godoy is hereby acquitted of the crimes of
rape and kidnapping with serious illegal detention.
The Learning Child vs. Ayala Alabang
G.R. No.134269, 7 July 2010
Orig
PRINCIPLE RELATED TO EVIDENCE:
Under the res inter alios acta rule, the admission of one
cannot prejudice another unless they are person jointly
interested with the party, and is therefore covered under
the following exception to the res inter alios acta rule:
admission by co-partner or agent (Sec. 29).
FACTS:
Ayala Land, Inc. (ALI) sold a parcel of land to the spouses
Yuson. The spouses Yuson sold the same to the spouses
Alfonso. A Deed of Restrictions was annotated in TCT No.
149166 issued to the spouses Alfonso, as had been
required by ALI indicating that “the property shall be used
exclusively for the establishment and maintenance thereon
of a preparatory (nursery and kindergarten) school.” ALI
later turned over the right and power to enforce the
restrictions on the properties to the Ayala Alabang Village
Association (AAVA). The spouses Alfonso opened on the
same lot The Learning Child Center Pre-school (TLC), a
preparatory school which initially consisted of nursery and
kindergarten classes. In 1991, TLC was expanded to
include a grade school program.
AAVA wrote several letters to TLC and the spouses Alfonso,
essentially (1) protesting the TLCs and the spouses
Alfonso’s violation of the Deed of Restrictions, (2)
requesting them to comply with the same, and (3) ordering
them to desist from operating the grade school and from
operating the nursery and kindergarten classes in excess of
the two classrooms allowed by the ordinance.
AAVA filed with the RTC of Makati City an action for
injunction against TLC and the spouses Alfonso, alleging
breach of contract TLC and the spouses Alfonso’s main
argument is that AAVA had allegedly abrogated said
restrictions by its own acts. TLC and the spouses Alfonso
proceeded to enumerate acts allegedly constituting a
setting aside of said restrictions:
 1. AAVA Village Manager Frank Roa admitted before
the RTC that AAVA had previously approved the
proposed construction of a school building with 24
classrooms;
2. AAVA, through its president authorized through a
letter the construction of a new school building
extension;
3. ALI itself requested the reclassification of the
subject property as institutional, as allegedly
proven by the testimony of then Municipal
Planning and Development Officer Engineer; and
4. ALI assented to the reclassification of the subject
property to institutional, as shown by its letter.
ISSUE:
Whether AAVA is estopped from enforcing the Deed of
Restrictions. NO.
RULING:
Estoppel cannot be sustained by mere argument or
doubtful inference; it must be clearly proved in all its
essential elements by clear, convincing and satisfactory
evidence.
Numbers 3 and 4 are acts allegedly performed by ALI.
AAVA claims that these acts cannot be considered in the
case at bar under the res inter alios acta rule, as ALI is not
a party to the case. Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court embodies said rule:
Sec. 28. Admission by third party.
The rights of a party cannot be
prejudiced by an act, declaration, or
omission of another, except as
hereinafter provided.
We have to clarify that ALIs statements, if damaging to
AAVA, would be binding on the latter. The general Ayala
Alabang Village Deed Restrictions, which was attached to
the Deed of Restrictions on the title of the subject
property, expressly state that:
“Compliance with the said restrictions,
reservation, easements and conditions
may be enjoined and/or enforced by
Court action by Ayala Corporation and/or
the Ayala Alabang Village Association,
their respective successors and assigns,
or by any member of the Ayala Alabang
Village Association.”
As such, it appears that Ayala Corporation is jointly
interested with AAVA in an action to enforce the Deed of
Restrictions, and is therefore covered under the following
exception to the res inter alios acta rule: admission by co-
partner or agent (Sec. 29)
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However, the acts of ALI are not at all damaging to the
position of AAVA. The act in number 1 concerns the alleged
assent of ALI to the reclassification of the subject property
as institutional which, as we have already ruled, does not
amount to a nullification of the Deed of Restrictions
because it is not imposed in the Deed of Restrictions but
rather in MMC Ordinance No. 81-01.
As regards the act in number 2, the statement in ALIs July
24, 1991 letter that it believes the expansion of TLC is a
worthy undertaking, it should be pointed out that ALIs
purported assent was merely conditional.
Narra Nickel vs. Redmont Consolidated
G.R. No.195580, 21 April 2014
Piñol
PRINCIPLE RELATED TO EVIDENCE:
A joint venture agreement between and among
corporations may be seen as similar to partnerships since
the elements of partnership are present. Hence, an
admission made by a partner corporation may be admitted
as evidence against its partner corporation under the res
inter alios acta rule.
FACTS:
Respondent Redmont Consolidated Mines Corp., a domestic
corporation, took interest in mining and exploring certain
areas of the province of Palawan. After inquiring with the
DENR, it learned that the areas where it wanted to
undertake exploration and mining activities were already
covered by Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA)
applications of petitioners Narra, Tesoro and McArthur
(through its predecessor Sara Marie Mining, Inc. or SMMI).
Subsequently, Redmont filed before the Panel of
Arbitrators (POA) of the DENR three separate petitions for
the denial of petitioners' applications for MPSA alleging that
at least 60% of the capital stock of McArthur, Tesoro and
Narra are owned and controlled by MBMI Resources, Inc.
which is a 100% Canadian corporation.
Redmont reasoned that since MBMI is a considerable
stockholder of petitioners, it was the driving force behind
petitioners' filing of the MPSAs over the areas covered by
applications since it knows that it can only participate in
mining activities through corporations which are deemed
Filipino citizens. Redmont argued that given that
petitioners' capital stocks were mostly owned by MBMI,
they were likewise disqualified from engaging in mining
activities through MPSAs, which are reserved only for
Filipino citizens.
The POA ruled in favor of Redmont and declared petitioners
as foreign corporations. Naturally, the petitioners filed a
notice of appeal with the Mines Adjudication Board (MAB).
Ultimately, MAB reversed the decision of the POA and
dismissed the petition of Redmont.
Consequently, Redmont filed a petition for review before
the CA assailing the Orders of the MAB. The CA partially
granted the respondent’s petition, reversing the decision of
the MAB and finding petitioners as foreign corporations.
The CA found that there was doubt as to the nationality of
petitioners when it realized that petitioners had a common
major investor, MBMI, a corporation composed of 100%
Canadians. Pursuant to the first sentence of paragraph 7 of
Department of Justice (DOJ) Opinion No. 020, Series of
2005, adopting the 1967 SEC Rules which implemented the
requirement of the Constitution and other laws pertaining
to the exploitation of natural resources, the CA used the
"grandfather rule" to determine the nationality of
petitioners.
The CA looked into their corporate structures and their
corresponding common shareholders. Using the
grandfather rule, the CA discovered that MBMI in effect
owned the majority of the common stocks of the
petitioners.
It considered MBMI's Summary of Significant Accounting
Policies statement regarding the "joint venture"
agreements that it entered into with the "Olympic" and
"Alpha" groups which involves SMMI (predecessor of
McArthur), Tesoro, PLMDC (a corp. from which Narra
acquired its MPSA application) and Narra.
It can be gleaned therefrom that the ownership of the
"layered" corporations boils down to MBMI, Olympic or
corporations under the "Alpha" group wherein MBMI has
joint venture agreements with, practically exercising
majority control over the corporations mentioned. In
effect, whether looking at the capital structure or the
underlying relationships between and among the
corporations, petitioners are NOT Filipino nationals and
must be considered foreign since 60% or more of their
capital stocks or equity interests are owned by MBMI.
Hence, a petition for review was filed before the SC.
Petitioners questioned the CA's use of the exception of the
res inter alios acta or the "admission by co-partner or
agent" rule and "admission by privies" under the Rules of
Court in the instant case, by pointing out that statements
made by MBMI (I think this pertains to MBMI’s Summary of
Significant Accounting Policies statement) should not be
admitted in this case since it is not a party to the case and
that it is not a "partner" of petitioners.
ISSUE:
WON the CA correctly applied the res inter alios acta rule?
RULING:
A partnership is defined as two or more persons who bind
themselves to contribute money, property, or industry to a
common fund with the intention of dividing the profits
among themselves. On the other hand, joint ventures have
been deemed to be "akin" to partnerships since it is
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difficult to distinguish between joint ventures and
partnerships.
The Court noted that the relations of the parties to a joint
venture and the nature of their association are so similar
and closely akin to a partnership that it is ordinarily held
that their rights, duties, and liabilities are to be tested by
rules which are closely analogous to and substantially the
same, if not exactly the same, as those which govern
partnership. Though some claim that partnerships and joint
ventures are totally different animals, there are very few
rules that differentiate one from the other. In fact, in joint
venture agreements, rules and legal incidents governing
partnerships are applied.
Accordingly, culled from the incidents and records of this
case, it can be assumed that the relationships entered
between and among petitioners and MBMI are no simple
"joint venture agreements." As a rule, corporations are
prohibited from entering into partnership agreements;
consequently, corporations enter into joint venture
agreements with other corporations or partnerships for
certain transactions in order to form "pseudo
partnerships." Obviously, as the intricate web of "ventures"
entered into by and among petitioners and MBMI was
executed to circumvent the legal prohibition against
corporations entering into partnerships, then the
relationship created should be deemed as "partnerships,"
and the laws on partnership should be applied. Thus, a
joint venture agreement between and among corporations
may be seen as similar to partnerships since the elements
of partnership are present.
Considering that the relationships found between
petitioners and MBMI are considered to be
partnerships, then the CA is justified in applying Sec.
29, Rule 130 of the Rules by stating that "by entering
into a joint venture, MBMI have a joint interest" with
Narra, Tesoro and McArthur.
City of Manila v. Del Rosario
5 Phil. 227 (1905)
Quevedo
PRINCIPLE RELATED TO EVIDENCE:
RES INTER ALIOS ACTA RULE. Where one derives title to
real property from another, the declaration, act, or
omission of the latter, in relation to the property, is
evidence against the former only when made while the
latter holds the title.
FACTS:
This is an action to recover the possession of the two lots
described in the complaint, located in Calles Clavel and
Barcelona, district of Tondo, at present occupied by the
defendant.
Plaintiff introduced both documentary and oral evidence.
The first witness testified that he did not know of his own
knowledge if the land in question belonged to the city.
The next witness testified that the land included in Calles
Clavel and Barcelona was formerly part of Plaza Divisoria,
which belonged to the Central Government (not the city),
and that he did not know to whom it now belongs.
The third witness, Juan Villegas, testified that the land in
question was formerly included in the Gran Divisoria, and
that all the land included in it belonged to the city. In this
particular his testimony is at variance with that of the
preceding witness. He learned from some of the oldest
residents in that section of the city.
Of the documentary evidence the most important of all is
the petition presented by Lorenzo del Rosario to the
"mayor of the city of Manila", and the letter written by him
to the Municipal Board of Manila.
Lorenzo signed the first document before he acquired from
Cipriano Roco y Vera the ownership of the land referred to
therein, the second document being signed after he had
transferred the land to the defendant Jacinto del Rosario,
who took possession of the same and had it registered, as
the plaintiff admits.
ISSUES:
1. WON Villegas' testimony is hearsay. YES.
2. WON the statements of Lorenzo are not binding
upon the defendant. YES.
RULING:
WON Villegas' testimony is hearsay. YES.
Villegas' testimony was merely hearsay. It consisted of
what he had learned from some of the oldest residents in
that section of the city. His testimony was introduced by
the plaintiff apparently for the purpose of proving that the
city was generally considered the owner of the land,
drawing from this fact the presumption of actual
ownership.
Such testimony, however, does not constitute the
"common reputation" referred to in the Code of Civil
Procedure. "Common reputation," as used in that section,
is equivalent to universal reputation. The testimony of this
witness is not sufficient to establish the presumption
referred to.
WON the statements of Lorenzo are not binding upon the
defendant. YES.
Whatever statements Lorenzo del Rosario might have
made in the documents mentioned, they are not binding
upon the defendant, because, under section 278 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, "where one derives title to real
property from another, the declaration, act, or omission of
the latter, in relation to the property, is evidence against
the former ONLY WHEN MADE WHILE THE LATTER HOLDS
THE TITLE"
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In view of the foregoing, we hold that the defendant had a
perfect right to ask for the dismissal of the case.
Gevero vs. IAC
189 SCRA 201
Quinanola
PRINCIPLE RELATED TO EVIDENCE:
Where one derives title to property from another, the act,
declaration, or omission of the latter, while holding the
title, in relation to the property is evidence against the
former.
FACTS:
This involves a dispute pertaining to a portion of a lot of
the Cagayan Cadastre.
Said lot was acquired by purchase from Luis Lancero in
favor of Del Monte Corp. Lancero acquired the said lot from
Ricardo Gevero per deed of sale executed by Gevero which
was annotated at the back of OCT covering the mother lot
in the names of Teodorica Babangha-½ share and her
children: Maria, Restituto, Elena, Ricardo, Eustaquio and
Ursula Gevero, ½ undivided share of the whole area.
When their mother died, they executed an extra-judicial
settlement and partition the estate; the disputed lot
subject of this petition was awarded to Ricardo.
Del Monte Corp filed an action to quiet title and/or annul
the partition made by the heirs insofar as it prejudices the
land which it acquired a portion of. It proved that before
purchasing Lot 2476-A, it first investigated and checked
the title of Lancero and found the same to be intact in the
office of the RD, with the subdivision plan, technical
description and the deed of sale-- all of which found to be
unquestionable. It claimed to have bought it in good faith
and for value, occupying it since the sale and taking over
Lancero’s possession until May 1969 when defendants
Abadas forcibly entered the property.
RTC: declared Del Monte Corp as the true and absolute
owner of that portion of the lot
Heirs of Gevero appealed to IAC/CA which affirmed the
RTC decision.
ISSUE:
WON the deed of sale executed by Ricardo Gevero to
Lancero is valid. YES.
RULING:
Petitioners claim that the signature of Ricardo in the deed
of sale in favor of Lancero was forged without the former’s
knowledge.
The 1952 deed was duly acknowledged by both parties
before the notary public, yet petitioner did not bother to
rebut the legal presumption of regularity of the notarized
document. Forgery cannot be presumed, it must be
proven. Also, their allegation of absence of consideration
was not substantiated.
As to petitioners’ contention that Lancero had recognized
the fatal defect of the 1952 deed when he signed the
document in 1968 entitled “Settlement to Avoid Litigation”,
it is a basic rule of evidence that the right of a party
cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or
omission of another. This is embodied in the maxim
“res inter alios acta alteri non debet”.
Under Section 31, Rule 130, Rules of Court "where
one derives title to property from another, the act,
declaration, or omission of the latter, while holding
the title, in relation to the property is evidence
against the former." It is however stressed that the
admission of the former owner of a property must
have been made while he was the owner thereof in
order that such admission may be binding upon the
present owner.
Hence, Lancero's declaration or acts of executing the 1968
document have no binding effect on Del Monte Corp, the
ownership of the land having passed to Del Monte Corp in
1964.
U.S. v. Pineda
37 Phil. 457 (1918)
Reserva
PRINCIPLE RELATED TO EVIDENCE:
As a general rule, the evidence of other offenses
committed by a defendant is inadmissible. As one
exception, however, it is permissible to ascertain
defendant’s knowledge and intent and to fix his negligence.
If the defendant has on more than one occasion performed
similar acts, accident in good faith is possibly excluded,
negligence is intensified and fraudulent intent may even be
established. There is no better evidence than the frequency
of accidents.
FACTS:
Santiago Pineda, the defendant, is a registered pharmacist
of long standing and the owner of a drug store located at
Nos. 442, 444, Calle Santo Cristo, city of Manila. One
Feliciano Santos, having some sick horses, presented a
copy of a prescription obtained from Dr. Richardson, and
which on other occasions Santos had given to his horses
with good results, at Pineda’s drug store for filling. The
prescription read — “clorato de potasa — 120 gramos — en
seis papelitos de 20 gramos, para caballo.” Under the
supervision of Pineda, the prescription was prepared and
returned to Santos in the form of six papers marked,
“Botica Pineda — Clorato potasa — 120.00 — en seis
papeles — para caballo — Sto. Cristo 442, 444, Binondo,
Manila.” Santos, under the belief that he had purchased
the potassium chlorate which he had asked for, put two of
the packages in water the doses to two of his sick horses.
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Another package was mixed with water for another horse,
but was not used. The two horses, to which had been given
the preparation, died shortly afterwards. Santos,
thereupon, took the three remaining packages to the
Bureau of Science for examination. Drs. Peña and Darjuan,
of the Bureau of Science, on analysis found that the
packages contained not potassium chlorate but barium
chlorate. At the instance of Santos, the two chemists also
went to the drug store of the defendant and bought
potassium chlorate, which when analyzed was found to be
barium chlorate. (Barium chlorate, it should be noted, is a
poison; potassium chlorate is not.) Dr. Buencamino, a
veterinarian, performed an autopsy on the horses, and
found that death was the result of poisoning.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the testimony of the other witnesses is
admissible in accordance with res inter alios acta. NO.
RULING:
As a general rule, the evidence of other offenses
committed by a defendant is inadmissible. But appellant
has confused this maxim and this rule with certain
exceptions thereto.
The effort is not to convict the accused of a second
offense. Nor is there an attempt to draw the mind away
from the point at issue and thus to prejudice defendant’s
case. The purpose is to ascertain defendant’s knowledge
and intent, and to fix his negligence. If the defendant has
on more than one occasion performed similar acts,
accident in good faith is possibly excluded, negligence is
intensified, and fraudulent intent may even be established.
It has been said that there is no better evidence of
negligence than the frequency of accidents.
On the trial of a criminal case the question relates to the
tendency of certain testimony to throw light upon a
particular fact, or to explain the conduct of a particular
person, there is a certain discretion on the part of the trial
judge which a court of errors will not interfere with, unless
it manifestly appear that the testimony has no legitimate
bearing upon the question at issue, and is calculated to
prejudice the accused.
Whenever the necessity arises for a resort to circumstantial
evidence, either from the nature of the inquiry or the
failure of direct proof, objections to the testimony on the
ground of irrelevancy are not favored.
Evidence is admissible in a criminal action which tends to
show motive, although it tends to prove the commission of
another offense by the defendant.
Under one conception, and it should not be forgotten that
the case we consider are civil in nature, the question of
negligence or ignorance is irrelevant. The druggist is
responsible as an absolute guarantor of what he sells.
 People vs. Irang
64 Phil. 285 (1937)
Roque
PRINCIPLE RELATED TO EVIDENCE:
“While evidence of another crime is generally not
admissible in another prosecution, it is admissible when it
is otherwise relevant, as where it tends to identify the
defendant as the perpetrator of the robbery charged, or
tends to show his presence at the scene or in the vicinity of
the crime at the time charged or when it is evidence of a
circumstance connected with the crime.”
FACTS:
Benjamin Irang appeals the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the complex crime of robbery with
homicide. On November 2, 1935, between 7 and 8pm,
seven individuals with white stripes upon their faces, two
of whom were armed with guns and two with bolos went to
the house of spouses Perfecto Melotonoes and Maximiniana
Vicente.
Perfecto was attacked with bolos and died thereafter. The
wife, who was struck in the face with the butt of a gun,
regained consciousness and saw her husband already
dead. Maximiniana, gave money and jewelry to one of the
assailants, which she remembers to have pockmarks and a
scar on his eyelid. That same night, the house of Juana
dela Cruz was assaulted by malefactors. All of the
assailants had white stripes upon their faces and dela Cruz
noticed one of them had pockmarks and scar on the left
eyelid and was dressed in a maong colored suit.
With the description made by Maximiniana, the police
arrested and presented a group of suspects. Benjamin
Irang was identified by Maximiniana to be the one who
struck her. Irang was also identified by dela Cruz. It was
alleged that the accused made an affidavit in Tagalog
wherein he admitted participation in the robbery after
being coerced by a certain Fidel Estrella. The accused
denied executing the affidavit, and said that the contents
thereof are not true and that he was maltreated by the
soldiers.
Accused raised as his defense alibi, saying that at the time
of the commission of the crime, he was in his
rice field.
ISSUE:
Whether Irang was identified as one of perpetrators? YES.
RULING:
The victim gave a description of one of the assailants, and
on that basis, police presented appellant three groups of
persons. In the third group presented, the victim pointed
at the accused as her assailant. Testimony of Dela Cruz
indirectly corroborates Maximiniana’s testimony that the
man of the same description was the one who went to her
house and demanded delivery of her money and jewelry.
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While evidence of another crime, as a general rule, is not
admissible in a prosecution for robbery, it is admissible
when it is otherwise relevant, as where it tends to identify
defendant as the perpetrator of the robbery charged or
tends to show his presence at the scene of the crime at the
time charged, or when it is evidence of a circumstance
connected with a crime.
The court also found that the aforementioned testimonies
were corroborated by the admission of the accused in his
affidavit, which the Court found to have been made under
oath. The affidavit cannot be considered to have been
made involuntary, therefore, it is admissible against the
person making it. Consequently, the defense of alibi cannot
stand as it was contradicted by the testimony of dela Cruz
and the accused-appellant’s own admission.
J. Letrel: Dissent; Justice Letrel was not convinced that
appellant has been satisfactorily identified. The widow
referred to the appellant as a man with pockmarks,
however a month later, she testified that she recognized
him besides by a scar on his left eyelid. A scar identifies a
man more effectively than mere pockmarks. And J. Letrel
does not know why it took the witness one month to
discover this important descriptive detail. Moreover, the
assailants were in disguise when they committed the
crime. This makes identification difficult, if not impossible
and probably account for the fact that the widow made no
reference to the appellant’s scar in beginning.
Rep. of the Phil vs. Kenrick Dev.
G.R. No.149576, 8 August 2006
Rosal
PRINCIPLE RELATED TO EVIDENCE:
The signature of counsel constitutes an assurance by him
that he has read the pleading; that, to the best of his
knowledge, information and belief, there is a good ground
to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay. Under
the Rules of Court, it is counsel alone, by affixing his
signature, who can certify to these matters.
FACTS:
Kenrick Development Corporation fenced off a huge portion
of land behind the Civil Aviation Training Center of the Air
Transportation Office (ATO) effectively depriving them of
30,288 sqm of land. This was premised on the defendant's
ownership of several TCTs which originated from TCT
17508 registered under the name Alfonso Concepcion. The
ATO went to the Land Registration Authority for verification
of the TCTs. However, the head of the Land Title
Verification Task Force of the LRA reported that the
supposed mother TCT 17508 and the ascendant title was
nonexistent. The land in question forms part of the
Villamor Air Base in Pasay city.
Upon hearing this, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a
complaint for revocation, annulment, and cancellation of
certificates of title on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines.
Respondent filed an answer which was purportedly signed
by Atty. Onforte Garlitos, Jr. as counsel for respondent.
Thereafter, it was found out that said counsel merely
transmitted an unsigned draft to respondent’s president
Mr. Victor Ong. The signature was neither the president’s
nor counsel’s and it could not be determined who placed
the signature on the document.
Because of this, the respondent was declared in default by
the trial court. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s
decision and heeded the argument of respondent wherein
they argued that regardless of the signature’s true owner,
Atty. Garlitos, Jr. still assented to the signing of such a
document that he prepared himself. This fact supposedly
cured the defect of the document and the respondent
should not be held in default.
ISSUE:
WON the respondent’s counsel’s assent to the anonymous
signing of the document cured the defect of respondent’s
answer. NO.
RULING:
Such assent does not in any way cure the defect of the
answer and the respondent must be declared in default.
Respondent argues that it was clear that Atty. Garlitos, Jr.
showed definite signs of approving the signed document
and such should be treated as an adoptive admission.
An adoptive admission is a party’s reaction to a statement
or action by another person when it is reasonable to treat
the party’s reaction as an admission of something stated or
implied by the other person. By adoptive admission, a
third person’s statement becomes the admission of the
party embracing or espousing it. Adoptive admission may
occur when a party:
(a) expressly agrees to or concurs in an oral statement
made by another; (b) hears a statement and later on
essentially repeats it; (c) utters an acceptance or builds
upon the assertion of another; (d) replies by way of
rebuttal to some specific points raised by another but
ignores further points which he or she has heard the other
make or(e) reads and signs a written statement made by
another.
Contrary to respondent’s position, a signed pleading is one
that is signed either by the party himself or his counsel.
Section 3, Rule 7 is clear on this matter. It requires that a
pleading must be signed by the party or counsel
representing him. Therefore, only the signature of either
the party himself or his counsel operates to validly convert
a pleading from one that is unsigned to one that is signed.
Counsel’s authority and duty to sign a pleading are
personal to him. He may not delegate it to just any person.
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The preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal
work involving practice of law which is reserved exclusively
for the members of the legal profession. Counsel may
delegate the signing of a pleading to another lawyer but
cannot do so in favor of who is not (Rule 9.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility).
No doubt, Atty. Garlitos could not have validly given
blanket authority for just anyone to sign the answer. The
trial court correctly ruled that respondent’s answer was
invalid and of no legal effect as it was an unsigned
pleading. Respondent was properly declared in default and
the Republic was rightly allowed to present evidence ex
parte.
Ariate vs. Pp
G.R. No. 173608, 20 November 2008
Sabusay
PRINCIPLE RELATED TO EVIDENCE:
At all events, even if the victim's dying declaration were
admissible in evidence, it must identify the assailant with
certainty; otherwise, it loses its significance.
FACTS:
Petitioners Jesus Geraldo and Amado Ariate were charged
with Homicide before the RTC of Surigao Del Sur. At 3:00
a.m. of July 1, 2002, Arthur Ronquillo’s wife, daughter
Mirasol, and son Arnel, among other persons, were
informed of the shooting of Arthur (the victim). They found
him lying on his side and wounded. He was able to utter to
Mirasol, within the hearing distance of Arnel, that he was
shot by Badjing and Amado. Petitioners who were
suspected to be the "Badjing" and "Amado" responsible for
the shooting of the victim were subjected to paraffin tests
at the (PNP) Crime Laboratory. The paraffin tests resulted
in the negative for both accused.
The victim's son Arnel, in an affidavit made under oath,
gave a statement in a question and answer style, that
herein petitioners Geraldo and Ariate were the ones who
shot his father. In another document also denominated as
"Affidavit”, Mirasol also gave a statement that her father
uttered that herein petitioners shot him. At the witness
stand, Mirasol echoed her father's declaration that
"Badjing" and "Amado" shot him. Arnel substantially
corroborated Mirasol's statement.
Petitioner’s side of the story: Petitioner Ariate, a barangay
tanod of Bunga, said that at 3am, a barangay kagawad
informed him that the victim was shot. He helped brought
the victim to the hospital but victim was pronounced dead
on arrival. The police acting on the statements of the
victim’s children pursued petitioners. Ariate thus submitted
himself to a paraffin test and tested negative for
gunpowder residue/nitrates. Petitioner Geraldo declared
that he slept in his house located also in Barangay Bunga,
Lanuza at 9:30 p.m. of June 30, 2002 and woke up at 4:00
a.m. the following day. That at 6:30 a.m., on seeing many
people in the vicinity of the 45-meter away house of one
Josita Bongabong where the victim's body was found, he
inquired and learned that the victim was shot. Policemen
subsequently went to his house and advised him to take a
paraffin test. He obliged and was tested at the PNP Crime
Laboratory and was found negative for gunpowder
residue/nitrates.
RTC ruled in favor of the prosecution and convicted the
petitioners herein. They relied on the dying declaration of
the victim as recounted by his daughter Mirasol and
corroborated by his son Arnel.
On the nature and weight of the dying declaration of the
victim, the trial court observed:
Even assuming that the declaration is not
admissible as a dying declaration, it is still
admissible as part of the res gestae since it was
made shortly after the startling occurrence and
under the influence thereof, hence, under the
circumstances, the victim evidently had no
opportunity to contrive.
The CA affirmed with modifications.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the identities of the accused-appellants had
been established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. NO.
RULING:
No. The Supreme Court acquitted Petitioners Jesus
Geraldo and Amado Ariate of the charge of Homicide for
failure of the prosecution to establish their guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
In convicting the petitioners, the RTC merely relied on the
testimony of the victim's daughter Mirasol, as corroborated
by her brother Arnel, that the "Badjing" and "Amado"
mentioned by the victim as his assailants are herein
petitioners whom they claimed to know because they live
in the same barangay. The Court of Appeals believed too
the siblings' testimonies, holding that:
It is not necessary that the victim further identify that
"Badjing" was in fact Jesus Geraldo or that "Amado" was
Amado Ariate. There was never an issue as to the identity
of the accused. There was no other person known as
"Badjing" or "Amado" in their neighborhood or in their
barangay. Accused-appellants never presented any proof
that a person in their locality had the same aliases or
names as they. It is not uncommon that even an eight-
year-old child can identify that Jesus Geraldo was known
as "Badjing" and that Amado Ariate was "Amado."
However, it is the prosecution, not petitioners, which had
the burden of proving that petitioners were, at the material
time, the only ones in the barangay who bore such
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nicknames or aliases. This, the prosecution failed to
discharge.
DYING DECLARATION
A dying declaration is admissible as evidence if the
following circumstances are present:
(a) it concerns the cause and the surrounding
circumstances of the declarant's death;
(b) it is made when death appears to be imminent
and the declarant is under a consciousness of
impending death;
(c) the declarant would have been competent to
testify had he or she survived; and
(d) the dying declaration is offered in a case in
which the subject of inquiry involves the
declarant's death.
There is no dispute that the victim's utterance to his
children related to the identities of his assailants. As for
the victim's consciousness of impending death, it is not
necessary to prove that he stated that he was at the brink
of death; it suffices that, judging from the nature and
extent of his injuries, the seriousness of his condition was
so apparent to him that it may safely be inferred that such
ante mortem declaration was made under consciousness of
an impending death. The location of the victim's two
gunshot wounds, his gasping for breath, and his eventual
death before arriving at the hospital meet this
requirement.
It has not been established, however, that the victim would
have been competent to testify had he survived the attack.
There is no showing that he had the opportunity to see his
assailant. Among other things, there is no indication
whether he was shot in front, the post-mortem
examination report having merely stated that the points of
entry of the wounds.
At all events, even if the victim's dying declaration
were admissible in evidence, it must identify the
assailant with certainty; otherwise it loses its
significance.
MOTIVE
When there is doubt on the identity of the malefactors,
motive is essential for their conviction. The Court notes
that in their affidavits supporting the criminal complaint,
the victim's wife and children Mirasol and Arnel proffered
not knowing any possible motive for petitioners to shoot
the victim. At the trial, no evidence of any motive was
presented by the prosecution. Petitioners' defense of denial
and alibi thus assumes importance.
NON-FLIGHT OF PETITIONERS
The victim's wife admitted that Ariate accompanied her
family in bringing the victim to the hospital. While non-
flight does not necessarily indicate innocence, under the
circumstances obtaining in the present case, Ariate's
spontaneous gesture of immediately extending assistance
to the victim after he was advised by the Barangay
Kagawad of the victim's fate raises reasonable doubt as to
his guilt of the crime charged.
People vs. De Joya
203 SCRA 403, 8 November 1991
Salgarino
PRINCIPLE RELATED TO EVIDENCE:
Dying declaration to be admissible must be complete in
itself. To be complete in itself does not mean that the
declarant must recite everything that constitutes the
subject of his statement, but that his statement of any
given fact should be a full expression of all that he
intended to say as conveying his meaning in respect of
such fact. A much higher level of explicitness and specific
details is necessary to justify a conclusion that an accused
had impliedly admitted his guilt of a crime as serious as
robbery with homicide.
FACTS:
Spouses Arnedo Valencia and Herminia Salac-Valencia,
together with their ten (10) year old son Alvin Valencia and
Herminia Valencia's 88-year old mother, Eulalia Diamse,
are residents of Balagtas St., Baliuag, Bulacan. In the
afternoon of January 31, 1978, Herminia Salac-Valencia
left for school to teach. Her mother Eulalia Diamse was
then [sitting] at their sofa watching the television set. Her
Son Alvin likewise left for school at 1:00 o'clock. At 3:00
o'clock in the afternoon, his classes were dismissed and he
proceeded home. At the very same time of the same day,
the spouses Valencia's neighbor by the name of Gloria
Capulong, together with a friend, went out of the former's
house to visit a friend.
When Alvin reached home, he saw his grandmother Eulalia
Diamse lying down prostrate and drenched with her own
blood. He immediately threw his bag and ran towards her
and asked her: "Apo, Apo, what happened?" . . . [Eulalia
Diamse held his hand and after which said: "Si Paqui".
After saying these words, she let go of Alvin's hand and
passed away. Upon seeing her mother, Alvin told her:
"Mommy, Mommy, apo is drenched in her own blood."
When she reached their house, she found her mother lying
prostrate in her own blood.
Consequently, Herminia found out that the two (2) gold
rings worn by her mother were missing. The right earring
of her mother was likewise missing. That same afternoon,
Herminia saw the room of the ground floor ransacked.
Herminia found a beach walk step-in, more or less one
meter from where the victim was lying prostrate. Herminia
was able to recognize the said step-in because of its color
and size, as the other half of the pair she bought for her
husband Arnedo but which she gave to Socorro de Joya,
the wife of herein appellant.
Appellant Pioquinto de Joya was charged and convicted
before RTC guilty beyond reasonable doubt with the crime
of robbery with homicide.
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On appeal, the SC considered the elements taken into
account by the RTC in convicting De Joya. Including the
solicitor’s General brief which pointed to a testimony by the
son-in-law of the victim and brother-in-law of appellant
referring to a supposed attempt to settle the criminal
charges by the appellant.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the dying declaration is admissible. NO.
RULING:
SC acquitted the accused.
It must be noted at once, however, that the words "Si
Paqui" do not constitute by themselves a sensible
sentence. It has been held that a dying declaration to be
admissible must be complete in itself. To be complete in
itself does not mean that the declarant must recite
everything that constituted the subject of his statement,
but that his statement of any given fact should be a full
expression of all that he intended to say as conveying his
meaning in respect of such fact. The doctrine of
completeness has also been expressed in the following
terms in Prof. Wigmore's classic work: "The application of
the doctrine of completeness is peculiar here. The
statement as offered must not be merely a part of the
whole as it was expressed by the declarant; it must be
complete as far as it goes. But it is immaterial how much
of the whole affair of the death is related, provided the
statement includes all that the declarant wished or
intended to include in it.
Thus, if an interruption (by death or by an intruder) cuts
short a statement which thus remains clearly less than that
which the dying person wished to make, the fragmentary
statement is not receivable, because the intended whole is
not there, and the whole might be of a very different effect
from that of the fragment; yet if the dying person finishes
the statement he wishes to make, it is no objection that he
has told only a portion of what he might have been able to
tell."
The reason upon which incomplete declarations are
generally excluded, or if admitted, accorded little or no
weight, is that since the declarant was prevented (by death
or other circumstance) from saying all that he wished to
say, what he did say might have been qualified by the
statements which he was prevented from making. That
incomplete declaration is not therefore entitled to the
presumption of truthfulness which constitutes the basis
upon which dying declarations are received.
It is clear to the Court that the dying declaration of the
deceased victim here was incomplete. In other words, the
deceased was cut off by death before she could convey a
complete or sensible communication to Alvin. The trial
court simply assumed that by uttering the words "Si
Paqui", the deceased had intended to name the person
who had thrust some sharp instrument through and
through her neck just below her ears. Since Eulalia herself
did not say so we cannot speculate what the rest of her
communication might have been had death not interrupted
her. We are unable to regard the dying statement as a
dying declaration naming the appellant as the doer of the
bloody deed.
Parel v. Prudencio
487 SCRA (19 April 2006)
Salvador
PRINCIPLE RELATED TO EVIDENCE:
The declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to
testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact
asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so
far contrary to the declarant's own interest, that a
reasonable man in his position would not have made the
declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be
received in evidence against himself or his successors-in-
interest and against third persons.
FACTS:
Respondent Simeon Prudencio filed a complaint for
recovery of possession and damages against the petitioner
alleging that he is the owner of a two-storey residential
house.
The respondent alleged that he allowed petitioner Danilo
Parel’s parents, Florentino (now deceased) and Susan
Parel, to occupy the second floor while the construction of
the ground floor was on-going to supervise the
construction.
In November 1985, respondent wrote Florentino a notice
for them to vacate the said house as to which petitioner’s
parents heeded when they migrated to the U.S. in 1986.
However, without the respondent's knowledge, the
petitioner and his family unlawfully entered and took
possession of the ground floor of the respondent's house.
The petitioner’s refusal to vacate the house despite
repeated demands prompted respondent to file the instant
action for recovery of possession.
Petitioner, in his Answer, alleged that his parents are the
co-owners of the said residential house since his parents
spent their own resources in improving and constructing
the said house as co-owners and the late Florentino was an
awardee of the land on which the house.
The RTC ruled that the house is owned in common by the
late Florentino Parel and respondent Simeon Prudencio and
as such the Prudencio cannot evict the defendant as heirs
of the deceased Florentino Parel from said property.
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The RTC rejected the affidavit executed by Florentino
declaring the house as owned by the respondent saying
the affidavit cannot be accepted for being hearsay.
The CA reversed the trial court and declared respondent as
the sole owner of the subject house and ordered petitioner
to surrender possession of the ground floor to respondent
immediately.
The CA also found that the affidavit of Florentino,
petitioner’s father, stating that he is not the owner of the
subject house but respondent, is a conclusive proof of
respondent’s sole ownership of the subject house as it is a
declaration made by Florentino against his interest.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner was able to prove by
preponderance of evidence that his father was a co-owner
of the subject two-storey residential house? NO.
RULING:
The Court agreed with the CA that respondent had shown
sufficient evidence to support his complaint for recovery of
possession of the ground floor of the subject house as the
exclusive owner.
The Court ruled that declarations against interest are
received in evidence notwithstanding they are hearsay.
Under Section 38 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the
declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to
testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact
asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so
far contrary to the declarant's own interest, that a
reasonable man in his position would not have made the
declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be
received in evidence against himself or his successors-in-
interest and against third persons.
In this case, the affiant, Florentino, who died in 1989 was
the petitioner's father and had adequate knowledge with
respect to the subject covered by his statement. In his
affidavit, Florentino declared that while he is the occupant
of the residential building, he is not the owner of the same
as it is owned by the respondent who is residing in Quezon
City.
The Court ruled that Florentino would not have made such
declaration unless he believed it to be true, as it is
prejudicial to himself as well as to his children’s interests
as his heirs.
It has also been averred that during Florentino’s lifetime,
from 1973, when he executed said affidavit until 1989, the
year of his death, there is no showing that he had revoked
such affidavit even when a criminal complaint for trespass
to dwelling had been filed by respondent against him
(Florentino) and petitioner.

People v. Alegado
201 SCRA 37 (1991)
Suan
PRINCIPLE RELATED TO EVIDENCE:
Declarations in regard to pedigree, although hearsay, are
admitted on the principle that they are natural expressions
of persons who must know the truth
Pedigree testimony is admitted because it is the best that
the nature of the case admits and because greater evil
might arise from the rejection of such proof than from its
admission
FACTS:
Accused was charged with two counts of statutory rape
filed by the offended party herself. The accused raped the
offended party in 1988.
The accused contends that the actual age of the offended
party was not established with certainty.
The grandfather of the offended party testified that the
latter’s mother left her with her and told her that she was
born in 1976 and that she is at the age to be sent to
school.
This was objected to by the accused’s counsel for being
hearsay.
ISSUE:
Whether the grandfather’s testimony as to the offended
party’s age is hearsay. NO
RULING:
The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the offended
party herself and her maternal grandfather, Cornelio
Villarosa, as to the fact that the victim was born on
September 5, 1976 do not constitute hearsay evidence as
claimed by the accused-appellant but rather fall under the
exceptions to the hearsay rule as provided under Sections
39 and 40 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
The word "pedigree" under Section 39 of the same Rule
includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage,
death, the dates when and the places where these facts
occurred and the names of the relatives.
The said provision contains three requisites for its
admissibility, namely:
(1) that there is controversy in respect to the
pedigree of any of the members of a family;
(2) that the reputation or tradition of the pedigree of
the person concerned existed previous to the
controversy; and
(3) that the witness testifying to the reputation or
tradition regarding the pedigree of the person
must be a member of the family of said person.
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All these preconditions are obtaining in the case at bar
considering that the date of birth of the rape victim is
being put in issue; that the declaration of the victim's
grandfather relating to tradition (sending a child to school
upon reaching the age of seven) existed long before the
rape case was filed; and that the witness testifying to the
said tradition is the maternal grandfather of the rape
victim.
Tison v. CA
276 SCRA 582 (1997)
Tagalog
PRINCIPLES RELATED TO EVIDENCE:
1. The presumption of legitimacy shifts the
burden of persuasion to the party claiming
illegitimacy. Where there is an entire lack of
competent evidence to the contrary, it has been
held that a presumption may stand in lieu of
evidence and support a finding or decision.
2. A declaration about pedigree which is
admissible, is an exception to the hearsay rule,
FACTS
Upon the death of Teodora, her surviving spouse, Martin,
executed an Affidavit of Extrajudicial Settlement
adjudicating unto himself, as sole heir, the land in dispute
(subject property).
Subsequently, Martin sold the subject property to PR
Domingo.
Martin died. Subsequently, Petitioners filed an Action for
Reconveyance claiming that they are entitled to inherit
one-half of the property in question by right of
representation.
During the hearing, Petitioner Tison was presented as lone
witness, with the following documentary evidence offered
to prove petitioners' filiation to their father and their aunt.
Petitioners' evidence consists mainly of the testimony of
Petitioner Tison, the baptismal, death and marriage
certificates, the various certifications from the civil
registrar, a family picture, and several joint affidavits
executed by third persons all of which she identified and
explained in the course and as part of her testimony.
PR Domingo filed a Demurrer to Petitioner’s evidence on
the ground that petitioners failed to prove their legitimate
filiation with the deceased Teodora in accordance with Art.
172 of the Family Code.
The RTC granted the demurrer and dismissed the
complaint of petitioners. This was upheld by the CA.
ISSUE: Whether petitioners met the quantum of proof
required by Article 172 of the Family Code to establish
legitimacy and filiation? YES. Both RTC and CA are
wrong.
RULING
The issue on Petitioner’s legitimacy.
It is not debatable that the documentary evidence adduced
by petitioners, taken separately and independently of each
other, are not per se sufficient proof of legitimacy nor even
of pedigree.
However, the rulings of both lower courts in the case are
basically premised on the erroneous assumption that,
in the first place, the issue of legitimacy may be validly
controverted in an action for reconveyance, and, in the
second place, that herein petitioners have the onus
probandi to prove their legitimacy and, corollarily, their
filiation. We disagree on both counts.
It seems that both RTC and CA have regrettably
overlooked the universally recognized presumption on
legitimacy. There is no presumption of the law more firmly
established and founded on sounder morality and more
convincing reason than the presumption that children
born in wedlock are legitimate. And well settled is the
rule that the issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked
collaterally.
The issue, therefore, as to whether petitioners are the
legitimate children of Hermogenes Dezoller cannot be
properly controverted in the present action for
reconveyance.
Presumption of legitimacy is so strong that it is clear
that its effect is to shift the burden of persuasion to
the party claiming illegitimacy. Where there is an entire
lack of competent evidence to the contrary, it has been
held that a presumption may stand in lieu of evidence
and support a finding or decision. This is based on
the theory that a presumption is prima facie proof of
the fact presumed, and unless the fact thus established
prima facie by the legal presumption of its truth is
disproved, it must stand as proved.
Here, when PR opted not to present countervailing
evidence to overcome the presumption, by merely filing a
demurrer to evidence instead, she in effect impliedly
admitted the truth of such fact.
Petitioner’s filiation with the deceased Teodora
The primary proof to be considered in ascertaining the
relationship between the parties concerned is the
testimony of Petitioner Tison to the effect that
Teodora in her lifetime categorically declared that
the former is Teodora's niece.
Such a statement is considered a declaration about
pedigree which is admissible, as an exception to the
hearsay rule, under Section 39, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, subject to the following conditions:
(1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify;
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(2) that the declarant be related to the person whose
pedigree is the subject of inquiry;
(3) that such relationship be shown by evidence
other than the declaration; and
(4) that the declaration was made ante litem motam,
that is, not only before the commencement of the suit
involving the subject matter of the declaration, but
before any controversy has arisen thereon.
There is no dispute with respect to the first, second and
fourth elements. What remains for analysis is the third
element, that is, whether or not the other documents
offered in evidence sufficiently corroborate the
declaration made by deceased Teodora in her
lifetime regarding the pedigree of petitioner Tison
or, if at all, it is necessary to present evidence other
than such declaration.
The general rule is that where the party claiming seeks
recovery against a relative common to both claimant and
declarant, but not from the declarant himself or the
declarant's estate, the relationship of the declarant to the
common relative may not be proved by the declaration
itself. There must be some independent proof of this fact.
As an exception, the requirement that there be other
proof than the declarations of the declarant as to the
relationship, does not apply where it is sought to reach the
estate of the declarant himself and not merely to establish
a right through his declarations to the property of some
other member of the family.
The present case is one instance where the general
requirement on evidence aliunde may be relaxed.
Petitioners are claiming a right to part of the estate of the
declarant herself. Conformably, the declaration made by
the deceased Teodora that petitioner Tison is her
niece, is admissible and constitutes sufficient proof
of such relationship, notwithstanding the fact that there
was no other preliminary evidence thereof, the reason
being that such declaration is rendered competent by
virtue of the necessity of receiving such evidence to
avoid a failure of justice.
More importantly, there is in the present case an absolute
failure to refute that declaration made by the decedent.
It may thus be safely concluded, on the sole basis of the
decedent's declaration and without need for further
proof thereof, that petitioners are the niece and
nephew of deceased Teodora.
As held in one case, where the subject of the declaration is
the declarant's own relationship to another person, it
seems absurd to require, as a foundation for the admission
of the declaration, proof of the very fact which the
declaration is offered to establish. The preliminary proof
would render the main evidence unnecessary.
Applying the general rule in the present case would
nonetheless produce the same result. For while the
documentary evidence submitted by petitioners do
not strictly conform to the rules on their
admissibility, we are however of the considered
opinion that the same may be admitted by reason of
private respondent's failure to interpose any timely
objection thereto at the time they were being offered
in evidence.
An objection to the admission of evidence on the ground of
incompetency, taken after the testimony has been given, is
too late. The situation is aggravated by the fact that
counsel for private respondent unreservedly cross-
examined petitioners, as the lone witness, on the
documentary evidence that were offered. At no time was
the issue of the supposed inadmissibility thereof, or
the possible basis for objection thereto, ever raised.
Hence, even assuming that these documents are
inadmissible for being hearsay, but on account of herein
private respondent's failure to object thereto, the same
may be admitted and considered as sufficient to prove the
facts therein asserted.
Mendoza v. CA
201 SCRA 675
Tan
PRINCIPLE RELATED TO EVIDENCE:
An illegitimate child is allowed to establish his claimed
filiation by "any other means allowed by the Rules of Court
and special laws." Such evidence may consist of his
baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in
which his name has been entered, the testimonies of
witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule
130 of the Rules of Court.
FACTS:
Teopista Toring Tuñacao, the herein private respondent,
alleged that she was born on August 20, 1930, to Brigida
Toring, who was then single, and defendant Casimiro
Mendoza, married at that time to Emiliana Barrientos. She
averred that Mendoza recognized her as an illegitimate
child by treating her as such and according her the rights
and privileges of a recognized illegitimate child.
Casimiro Mendoza, then already 91 years old, specifically
denied the plaintiff's allegations and set up a counterclaim
for damages and attorney's fees.
Two other witnesses testified for Teopista, namely,
Gaudencio Mendoza and Isaac Mendoza, both relatives of
Casimiro.
Gaudencio said he was a cousin of Casimiro and knew
Brigida Toring because she used to work with him in a
saltbed in Opao. Casimiro himself told him she was his
sweetheart. Later, Gaudencio acted as a go-between for
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their liaison, which eventually resulted in Brigida becoming
pregnant in 1930 and giving birth to Teopista.
Isaac testified that his uncle Casimiro was the father of
Teopista because his father Hipolito, Casimiro's brother,
and his grandmother, Brigida Mendoza, so informed him.
Isaac also declared that Casimiro intended to give certain
properties to Teopista.|||
Vicente, who professed to be Casimiro's only illegitimate
child by Brigida Toring, declared that Teopista's father was
not Casimiro but a carpenter named Ondoy, who later
abandoned her. Vicente said that it was he who sold a lot
to Teopista, and for a low price because she was his half-
sister. It was also he who permitted Lolito to build a house
on Casimiro's lot. This witness stressed that when Casimiro
was hospitalized, Teopista never once visited her alleged
father.
ISSUE:
WON Teopista can establish her status as an illegitimate
daughter of Casimiro by an act or declaration regarding
pedigree. YES.
RULING:
An illegitimate child is allowed to establish his claimed
filiation by "any other means allowed by the Rules of Court
and special laws," according to the Civil Code, or "by
evidence or proof in his favor that the defendant is her
father," according to the Family Code.
Such evidence may consist of his baptismal certificate, a
judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has
been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree,
admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and
other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court.|||
The trial court conceded that "the defendant's parents, as
well as the plaintiff himself, told Gaudencio Mendoza and
Isaac Mendoza, that Teopista was the daughter of the
defendant." It should have probed this matter further in
light of Rule 130, Section 39, of the Rules of Court|||.
To set the record straight, we will stress that it was only
Isaac Mendoza who testified on this question of pedigree,
and he did not cite Casimiro's father. His testimony was
that he was informed by his father Hipolito, who was
Casimiro's brother, and Brigida Mendoza, Casimiro's own
mother, that Teopista was Casimiro's illegitimate
daughter.|||
Such acts or declarations may be received in evidence as
an exception to the hearsay rule because it is the best the
nature of the case admits and because greater evils are
apprehended from the rejection of such proof than from its
admission. |||
The following requisites that have to be complied with
before the act or declaration regarding pedigree may be
admitted in evidence: Cdpr
1. The declarant is dead or unable to testify.
2. The pedigree must be in issue.
3. The declarant must be a relative of the person
whose pedigree is in issue.
4. The declaration must be made before the
controversy arose.
5. The relationship between the declarant and the
person whose pedigree is in question must be
shown by evidence other than such declaration.
All the above requisites are present in the case at bar. The
persons who made the declarations about the pedigree of
Teopista, namely, the mother of Casimiro, Brigida
Mendoza, and his brother, Hipolito, were both dead at the
time of Isaac's testimony.
The declarations referred to the filiation of Teopista and
the paternity of Casimiro, which were the very issues
involved in the complaint for compulsory recognition.
The declarations were made before the complaint was filed
by Teopista or before the controversy arose between her
and Casimiro. Finally, the relationship between the
declarants and Casimiro has been established by evidence
other than such declaration, consisting of the extrajudicial
partition of the estate of Florencio Mendoza, in which
Casimiro was mentioned as one of his heirs.
The said declarations have not been refuted. Casimiro
could have done this by deposition if he was too old and
weak to testify at the trial of the case.
Jison v. CA
286 SCRA 495 (24 February 1998)
Togonon
PRINCIPLE RELATED TO EVIDENCE:
Section 40 consists of two parts - the first part consists of
the testimony of a family member while the second
paragraph relates to family possessions. The scope of the
enumeration contained in the second portion of this
provision, in light of the rule of ejusdem generis, is limited
to objects which are commonly known as family
possessions, or those articles which represent, in effect, a
family's joint statement of its belief as to the pedigree of a
person.
FACTS:
Monina claims to be the illegitimate daughter of Francisco
from the nanny who took care of his child. Francisco
refused to acknowledge her so Monina was constrained to
institute an action for compulsory recognition of her
illegitimate filiation.
During the trial, Monina presented several witnesses
including different members of household staff and
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relatives from both Iloilo and Bacolod and also several
pieces of evidence including photos and the letters of
Francisco’s brothers, sisters and relatives. In these letters,
Francisco’s siblings purportedly declared that Monina is
indeed the illegitimate child of Francisco. These letters
were objected for being hearsay since only the recipient of
the letter testified on the contents of the letter and the
writers of these letters were not presented in court. Monina
argued that the letters can be admitted under Sec. 39: Act
or declaration about Pedigree or Sec 40: Family reputation
or tradition regarding pedigree.
ISSUE:
Are the letters admissible in evidence? NO.
RULING:
The letters cannot be admitted as an exception to hearsay
under Sec 39. Under Sec 39. Act or declaration about
Pedigree, one of the requisites there is that the declarant
must be dead or unable to testify. In this case, there was
no showing that the writers of the letters the brothers and
sisters of Francisco were dead or unable to testify. Neither
was the relationship between the declarants and Monina
shown by evidence other than the documents in question.
Section 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding
pedigree. -- The reputation or tradition existing in a family
previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of
any one of its members, may be received in evidence if the
witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family,
either by consanguinity or affinity.
Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts,
engravings on rings, family portraits and the like, may be
received as evidence of pedigree.
Regarding Sec 40 consists of two parts - the first part
consists of the testimony of a family member while the
second paragraph relates to family possessions.
The first portion of the provision pertains to testimonial
evidence, under which the documents in question may not
be admitted as the authors thereof did not take the witness
stand.
The scope of the enumeration contained in the second
portion of this provision, in light of the rule of ejusdem
generis, is limited to objects, which are commonly known
as family possessions, or those articles, which represent, in
effect, a family’s joint statement of its belief as to the
pedigree of a person. These have been described as
objects openly exhibited and well known to the family, or
those, which, if preserved in a family, may be regarded as
giving a family tradition. Other examples of these objects,
which are regarded as reflective of a family’s reputation or
tradition regarding pedigree, are inscriptions on
tombstones, monuments or coffin plates.
The exhibits as private documents not constituting "family
possessions" as discussed above, may not be admitted on
the basis of Rule 130, Section 40.
Their inadmissibility notwithstanding, the letters, inclusive,
may, in like manner as MONINA's school records, properly
be admitted as part of her testimony to strengthen her
claim that, indeed, relatives of FRANCISCO recognized her
as his daughter.
Ferrer v. de Ynchausti
38 Phil. 905 (1918)
Yang
PRINCIPLE RELATED TO EVIDENCE:
Evidence may be given upon trial of monuments and
inscriptions in public places as evidence of common
reputation; and entries in family Bibles or other family
books or charts; engravings on rings,family portraits and
the like, as evidence of pedigree
FACTS:
Plaintiffs, Rafael and Maria Ferrer claiming to be the only
and legitimate heirs of their deceased mother Rosa
Viademonte prayed to have their mother declared having
the right to succeed to the inheritance left by Isabel
Gonzales
Defendants are the other children of Isabel. In their
answer, the defendant admitted that plaintiffs Rafael and
Maria are the children of Rosa Viademonte and Benigno
Ferrer and that their mother Isabel Gonzalez was married
first to Ramon Martinez de Viademonte, and afterwards to
Jose Joaquin de Inchausti. The other defendants also
alleged in their answer that Ramon and Isabel had a child
also named Ramon but denied that Rosa was a daughter of
that marriage.
Counsel for plaintiffs pretend to establish that Rosa Matilde
Viademonte had been treated and considered as a
daughter by Isabel Gonzalez, and as a sister the children of
the latter.
On Page 9 of the day-book which Ramon Martinez de
Viademonte, Jr., kept during his lifetime, appears a
memorandum which says: On September 1, 1862, seven
o'clock in the evening a children three days old namedRosa
Matilde Robles, according to the baptismal certificate
issued by the acting rector Don Ramon Fernandez of
theCathedral Church of Manila, was delivered to my
mother; this child was baptized by the priest Don Remigio
Rodriguez with the authority of said rector, and according
to the baptismal certificate, it was a child of unknown
parents." This memorandum agrees with the above-
mentioned baptismal certificate of Rosa Matilde Robles.
Notwithstanding the argument of counsel for the appellants
Joaquin de Inchausti stated that one day he was assured
by his half-brother Ramon Martinez Viademonte that Rosa
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Matilde was not his sister, but that she was only a mere
protegee and that her true name was Rosa Matilde Robles,
and that on that occasion the said brother showed him the
certificate of birth of which Exhibit 6 is a copy, which he
took from the parochial church.
ISSUE:
WON defendant’s testimony may be received in evidence
to prove that Rosa is not the daughter or Isabel? YES.
RULING:
In view of the fact that Ramon Martinez Viademonte is now
dead, the testimony of Joaquin Jose de Inchaustireferring
to the said deceased is admissible, for they are members
of the same family. The conclusion is that Rosa Matilde is
the same Rosa Matilde Robels which is mentioned in
Exhibit 6 and because she was born in 1852, she could not
have been the legitimate daughter of Ramon Viademonte
and Isabel Gonzalez whose marriage was dissolved in
18365 by the death of the husband. Moreover, the witness
Pilar Abarca presented by the plaintiffs testified that she
had known Rosa Matilde in the Colegio de Santa Isabel in
1863, she being then 20 years old and Rosa, 9 years. If
the witness Abarca was 73 years old on the date of giving
this testimony in 1916, it follows that Rosa Matilde was
born in 1854 ,and that therefore she could not be a
daughter of Ramon Martinez de Viademonte who died in
1836.
Counsel for plaintiffs objected to the admission in evidence
of the day-book kept by Ramon Martinez Viademonte,Jr.,
during his lifetime, alleging that it has not been proven
that the entries in said book were made at the same time
that those events occurred; that the witness who identified
it did not see Ramon Martinez de Viademonte, Jr., in the
act of making the said entries, and that, even if it were so,
still the writing contained in the book, being a mere
memorandum of an interested party, can not be admitted
at the trial.
The above objection can be met and disposed of by the
provisions of section 298, No. 13 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, which provides that evidence may be given
upon trial of monuments and inscriptions in public places
as evidence of common reputation; and entries in family
Bibles or other family books or charts; engravings on
rings,family portraits and the like, as evidence of pedigree.
The law does not require that the entries in the said
booklet be made at the same time as the occurrence of
those events; hence, the written memorandum in the
same is not subject to the defect attributed to it, The
witness Joaquin Jose de Inchausti declared affirmatively
that the memorandum under consideration has been
written in the handwriting of his brother Ramon Martinez
de Viademonte, whose handwriting he was familiar with,
and the testimony of this witness contains some reference
to a member of the family, now dead, and concerning the
family genealogy of the same.
 In Re Mallari
59 SCRA 45
Abella
PRINCIPLE RELATED TO EVIDENCE:
Common reputation refers to the reputation of an
individual existing not within the same family but within
the same community. This can also be a source of
evidence, ones common reputation within
the community.
FACTS:
After an investigation conducted by this Court's Legal
Officer Investigator, a decision was rendered by this Court
on April 29, 1968, holding that by preponderance of
evidence, it appeared that respondent Mallare's father,
Esteban Mallare, was a Chinese up to his death; and his
mother admittedly being a Chinese, respondent is likewise
a Chinese national. Consequently, respondent Florencio
Mallare was declared excluded from the practice of law; his
admission to the bar was revoked, and he was ordered to
return to this Court, the lawyer's diploma previously issued
to him.
Respondent moved for reconsideration of the decision,
which was denied by the Court in its resolution of January
10, 1969. On February 4, 1969, respondent petitioned the
Court for there opening of the case and for new trial on the
ground, inter alia, of newly discovered evidence, the
introduction of which could alter the decision previously
promulgated.
The evidence proposed to be presented consisted of (1) an
entry in the registry of baptism of the Immaculate
Concepcion Church at Macalelon, Quezon, purporting to
show that Estaben Mallare(respondent's father) is the
natural son of Ana Mallare, a Filipino; and (2) testimonies
of certain persons who had a known Esteban Mallare and
his mother during their lifetime.
The entry in the baptismal registry of the Immaculate
Concepcion Church at Macalelon, Quezon, purporting to
show that Esteban Mallare was the natural child of Ana
Mallare, a Filipina.However, it was ruled that Ana Mallare
(Esteban's mother) cannot be considered a Filipino, there
being no proof that she was one.
With the additional evidence submitted by respondent
pursuant to the authority granted by this Court, the
aforementioned void in the proof of respondent's
citizenship has been duly filled.
The witnesses, all natives of Macalelon, who had personal
knowledge of the person, birth andresidency of both Ana
Mallare and her son Esteban, were one in their declaration
that AnaMallare is a Tagalog who had continuously resided
in the place, and that Esteban, her son, was reputedly born
out of wedlock.
ISSUES:
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1. WON the evidence shows that Mallare is a Filipino
citizen and can be allowed to practice law in the
Philippines. NO.
2. WON the rule on common reputation applies in
the case. YES.
RULING:
WON the evidence shows that Mallare is a Filipino citizen
and can be allowed to practice law in the Philippines. NO.
The entire family, consisting of the father, mother and
their four (4) children (Raymundo was not yet born) were
registered as aliens in 1942 in the then Division of Alien
Statistics, pursuant to the proclamation of the
Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces in
the Philippines and Executive Order No. 25 of the then
Executive Commission.
In addition, the respondent himself was again registered as
an alien in 1950, his application thereto bearing his
thumbprints and stating therein that he is a Chinese; that
he belongs to the yellow race and that he had used these
other names:
“Tan Jua Gae”, “Enciong” and “Jua Gac” (Exh. “N”). He had
been a teacher in the Candon Chinese School (t.s.n., p. 17,
Oct. 3, 1962). His explanation that it was his mother who
registered him as an alien is flimsy; and, as stated
hereinbefore, he did not present his mother as a witness.
The evidence is thus clearly preponderant, if not
overwhelming that the respondent’s father, Esteban
Mallare or “Mallari”, also known as “Esteban Dy”, “Esteban
Dy Mallare” and “Esteban Tan”, was and remained a
Chinese until he died; consequently, the respondent’s
mother, admittedly a Chinese, retained her original
citizenship and their offspring, respondent, Florencio
Mallare, together with his brothers and sisters, are likewise
Chinese nationals, through and through.
WON the rule on common reputation applies in the case.
YES.
Some of the pieces of evidences presented by Mallare was
the Baptismal certificate showing that she was born to a
tagalog woman as well as testimonies of the members of
the same community. All these witnesses testified that the
father of Atty Mallare, Esteban, was a son to a tagalog
speaking woman who was not married – so a single
tagalog speaking woman.
The SC said, under common reputation, the testimonies of
the members of the same community where Esteban lived
during his lifetime is admissible even if hearsay under
that provision.
 Talidano v. Falcon Maritime
G.R. No. 172031, 14 July 2008
Archival
PRINCIPLE RELATED TO EVIDENCE:
To be admissible under the first class of res gestae
(Spontaneous Statements), it is required that: (1) the
principal act be a startling occurrence; (2) the statements
were made before the declarant had the time to contrive or
devise a falsehood; and (3) that the statements must
concern the occurrence in question and its immediate
attending circumstances.
To be admissible under the second kind of res gestae
(Verbal Acts) it is required that: (1) the principal act to
be characterized must be equivocal; (2) the equivocal act
must be material to the issue; (3) the statement must
accompany the equivocal act; and (4) the statements give
a legal significance to the equivocal act.
FACTS:
Petitioner was employed as a second marine officer by
Respondent Falcon. He was assigned to M/V Phoenix
Seven, a vessel based in Korea under a one-year
employment contract.
Petitioner claimed that his Korean chief officer always
discriminated and mistreated the vessel’s Filipino crew.
This prompted him to send a letter-complaint to the
officer-in-charge in London. This was allegedly resented by
his chief officer which eventually caused his dismissal. He
then filed a case for illegal dismissal.
Falcon countered that petitioner had voluntarily
disembarked the vessel after having been warned several
times of dismissal from service for his incompetence,
insubordination, disrespect and insulting attitude toward
his superiors. It cited an incident involving petitioner's
incompetence wherein the vessel invaded a different route
at the Osaka Port in Japan due to the absence of petitioner
who was then supposed to be on watch duty. As proof, it
presented a copy of a fax message, sent to it on the date
of incident, reporting the vessel's deviation from its course
due to petitioner's neglect of duty at the bridge, as well as
a copy of the report of crew discharge issued by the
master of M/V Phoenix Seven two days after the incident.
LA Decision: The Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed petitioner’s
complaint and held that he was validly dismissed for gross
neglect of duties relying on the fax messages presented by
Falcon.
NLRC Decision: NLRC reversed the decision. It held that
the fax messages in support of the alleged misbehavior
and neglect of duty by petitioner have no probative value
and are self-serving. It added that the ship's logbook
should have been submitted in evidence as it is the
repository of all the activities on board the vessel,
especially those affecting the performance or attitude of
the officers and crew members, and, more importantly, the
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procedures preparatory to the discharge of a crew
member. The NLRC also noted that private respondent
failed to comply with due process in terminating
petitioner's employment.
CA Decision: CA reversed the NLRC ruling and upheld the
LA’s decision. It relied on the fax messages issued by the
ship master shortly after petitioner had committed a
serious neglect of his duties. It noted that the said fax
messages constitute the res gestae.
ISSUE:
WON the fax messages were considered res gestae
statements to warrant the dismissal of the petitioner. NO.
RULING:
SC held that the fax messages cannot be deemed part of
the res gestae.
Section 42 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court mentions two
acts which form part of the res gestae, namely:
spontaneous statements and verbal acts. In spontaneous
exclamations, the res gestae is the startling occurrence,
whereas in verbal acts, the res gestae are the statements
accompanying the equivocal act.
To be admissible under the first class of res gestae
(Spontaneous Statements), it is required that:
1. The principal act be a startling occurrence;
2. The statements were made before the declarant
had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood;
and
3. That the statements must concern the occurrence
in question and its immediate attending
circumstances.
Assuming that petitioner's negligence — which allegedly
caused the ship to deviate from its course — is the
startling occurrence, there is no showing that the
statements contained in the fax messages were made
immediately after the alleged incident. In addition, no
dates have been mentioned to determine if these
utterances were made spontaneously or with careful
deliberation. Absent the critical element of spontaneity, the
fax messages cannot be admitted as part of the res gestae
of the first kind.
Neither will the second kind of res gestae (Verbal Acts)
apply. The requisites for its admissibility are:
1. The principal act to be characterized must be
equivocal;
2. The equivocal act must be material to the issue;
3. The statement must accompany the equivocal act;
and
4. The statements give a legal significance to the
equivocal act.
Petitioner's alleged absence from watch duty is simply an
innocuous act or at least proved to be one. Assuming
arguendo that such absence was the equivocal act, it is
nevertheless not accompanied by any statement more so
by the fax statements adverted to as parts of the res
gestae. No date or time has been mentioned to determine
whether the fax messages were made simultaneously with
the purported equivocal act.
Furthermore, the material contents of the fax messages
are unclear. The matter of route encroachment or invasion
is questionable. The ship master, who is the author of the
fax messages, did not witness the incident. He obtained
such information only from the Japanese port authorities.
Verily, the messages can be characterized as double
hearsay.
On the issue of illegal dismissal of the petitioner
Petitioner's supposed absence from watch duty in a single
isolated instance is neither gross nor habitual negligence.
Without question, the alleged lapse did not result in any
untoward incident.
If there was any serious aftermath, the incident should
have been recorded in the ship's logbook and presented by
private respondent to substantiate its claim. Instead,
private respondent belittled the probative value of the
logbook and dismissed it as self-serving.
Private respondent's sole reliance on the fax messages in
dismissing petitioner is clearly insufficient as these
messages were addressed only to itself. No notice was ever
given to petitioner apprising him in writing of the particular
acts showing neglect of duty.
Neither was he informed of his dismissal from employment.
Petitioner was never given an opportunity to present his
side. The failure to comply with the two-notice rule only
aggravated respondent's liability on top of dismissing
petitioner without a valid cause.
Caltex v. Africa
16 SCRA 448 (1966)
Eguia
PRINCIPLE RELATED TO EVIDENCE:
Entries in Official Records; Requisites for
Admissibility:
There are three requisites for admissibility under Sec 35
Rule 123, Rules of Court:
a. that the entry was made by a public officer, or by
another person specially enjoined by law to do so;
b. that it was made by the public officer in the
performance of his duties, or by such other person
in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by
law; and
c. that the public officer or other person had
sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated,
which must have been acquired by him personally
or through official information.
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FACTS:
On March 18, 1948, fire broke out at the Caltex service
station at the corner of Antipolo street and Rizal Avenue,
Manila. It started while gasoline was being hosed from a
tank truck into the underground storage, right at the
opening of the receiving tank where the nozzle of the hose
was inserted. The fire spread to and burned several
neighboring houses, including the personal properties and
effects inside them. Their owners, among them petitioners
here, sued respondents Caltex (Phil.), Inc. and Mateo
Boquiren, the former as the alleged owner of the station
and the latter as its agent in charge of operation.
Negligence on the part of both of them was attributed as
the cause of the fire.
The Manila Police Department and the Fire Department
made reports on the fire incident from different sources
such as the gas station employee, truck driver, Boquiren
and other unidentified persons . Furthermore, a certain
Captain Tinio of the AFP made a report regarding the fire
reproducing the information given by a certain Benito
Morales regarding the history of the gasoline station and
what the chief of the fire department had told him on the
same subject.
The Spouses Africa maintain, however, that the reports in
themselves, that is, without further testimonial evidence
on their contents, fall within the scope of section 35, Rule
123 which provides that "entries in official records made in
the performance of his duty by a public officer of the
Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the
facts therein stated." These reports were ruled out as
“double hearsay” by the CA hence inadmissible.
ISSUES:
1. Whether certain reports on the fire prepared by
the Manila Police and Fire Department and by
Captain Tinio are admissible in evidence; NO.
2. Whether, without proof as to the cause and origin
of the fire, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should
apply so as to presume negligence on the part of
Caltex and Boquiren. YES.
RULING:
Whether certain reports on the fire prepared by the Manila
Police and Fire Department and by Captain Tinio are
admissible in evidence; NO.
There are three requisites for admissibility under the rule
invoked by Spouses Africa:
a. that the entry was made by a public officer, or by
another person specially enjoined by law to do so;
b. that it was made by the public officer in the
performance of his duties, or by such other person
in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by
law; and (c) that the public officer or other person
had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him
stated, which must have been acquired by him
personally or through official information.

To qualify their statements as "official information acquired
by the officers who prepared the reports, the persons who
made the statements not only must have personal
knowledge of the facts stated but must have the duty to
give such statements for record.
The reports in question do not constitute an exception to
the hearsay rule: the
facts stated therein were not acquired by the reporting
officers through official
information, not having been given by the informants
pursuant to any duty to do so.
Whether, without proof as to the cause and origin of the
fire, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should apply so as to
presume negligence on the part of Caltex and Boquiren.
YES.
In presumption of negligence under the doctrine of Res
Ipsa Loquitur, where the thing which caused the injury
complained of is shown to be under the management
defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in the
ordinary course of things does not happen if those who
have its management or control use proper care, it affords
reasonable evidence, in absence of explanation by
defendant, that the accident arose from want of care.
Gasoline is a highly combustible material, in the storage
and sale of which extreme care must be taken. On the
other hand, fire is not considered a fortuitous event, as it
arises almost invariably from some act of man. The
gasoline station, with all its appliances, equipment and
employees, was under the control of appellees. A fire
occurred therein and spread to and burned the neighboring
houses. The persons who knew or could have known how
the fire started were appellees and their employees, but
they gave no explanation thereof whatsoever. It is a fair
and reasonable inference that the incident happened
because of want of care. The fire possibly would not have
spread to the neighboring houses were it not for another
negligent omission on the part of defendants, namely, their
failure to provide a concrete wall high enough to prevent
the flames from leaping over it.
People v. Gabriel
G.R. No. L-107735, 1 February 1996
Carreon
PRINCIPLE RELATED TO EVIDENCE:
The Advance Information Sheet does not constitute an
exception to the hearsay rule, hence, inadmissible.
FACTS:
Around seven o'clock in the evening of 26 November 1989,
within the vicinity of Pier 14 at North Harbor along Marcos
Road, Manila, a fight ensued between Jaime Tonog on one
hand and the accused Ricardo San Gabriel together with
"Ramon Doe" on the other. The ght was eventually broken
up when onlookers pacified the protagonists. Ricardo and
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Ramon then hastened towards Marcos Road but in no time
were back with bladed weapons. They approached Tonog
surreptitiously, surrounded him and simultaneously
stabbed him in the stomach and at the back, after which
the assailants ran towards the highway leaving Tonog
behind on the ground. He was then brought to Mary
Johnston Hospital where he was pronounced dead on
arrival.
The accused contends that the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses are incredible and conflicting.
Moreover, the accused leans heavily on the Advance
Information Sheet 6 prepared by Pat. Steve Casimiro which
did not mention him at all and named only "Ramon Doe" as
the principal suspect.
ISSUES:
1. WON the advance information sheet defeats the
witness testimonies. NO.
2. WON the Advance Information sheet constitutes
as an exception to the hearsay rule. NO.
RULING:
WON the advance information sheet defeats the witness
testimonies. NO.
This cannot defeat the positive and candid testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses. Gonzales and Ochobillo, as
observed by the trial court, testified in a direct and candid
manner. No evil motive is attributed to them as to testify
falsely against the accused.
Entries in official records, as in the case of a police blotter,
are only prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
They are not conclusive.
It is understandable that the testimony during the trial
would be more lengthy and detailed than the matters
stated in the police blotter. Significantly, the Advance
Information Sheet was never formally offered by the
defense during the proceedings in the court below. Hence
any reliance by the accused on the document must fail
since the court cannot consider any evidence which has not
been formally offered
WON the Advance Information sheet constitutes as an
exception to the hearsay rule. NO.
The Advance Information Sheet does not constitute an
exception to the hearsay rule, hence, inadmissible. The
public officer who prepared the document had no sufficient
and personal knowledge of the stabbing incident. Any
information possessed by him was acquired from Camba
(an alleged eye witness) which therefore could not be
categorized as official information because in order to be
classified as such the persons who made the statements
not only must have personal knowledge of the facts stated
but must have the duty to give such statements for the
record. In the case of Camba, he was not legally so obliged
to give such statements.
 Barcelon v. Com. of BIR
G.R. No. 157064, 7 August 2006
Cesista
TOPIC:
Exception to Hearsay (Entries in official record)
PRINCIPLE RELATED TO EVIDENCE:
An entrant must have personal knowledge of the facts
stated by him or such facts were acquired by him from
reports made by persons under a legal duty to submit the
same.
FACTS:
Petitioner Barcelon, Roxas Securities, Inc. is a corporation
engaged in trading securities. It filed its Annual Income
Tax Return for taxable year 1987.
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) issued an
assessment for deficiency income tax in the amount of
P826,698.31 for failure to subject the salaries, bonuses
and allowances to withholding taxes. A Formal Assessment
Notice (FAN) was sent to Barcelon through registered mail
on Feb. 6, 1991. However, Barcelon denies receiving the
same.
On March 17, 1992, Barcelon was served with a Warrant
of Distraint and/or Levy to enforce collection of the
deficiency income tax for the year 1987. Barcelon filed a
formal protest, which was denied by the CIR. The CTA, on
the other hand, ruled in favor of the Barcelon on the
ground of prescription of the assessment. However, the CA
reversed the CTA decision.
ISSUE:
WON CIR’s right to assess Barcelon's alleged deficiency
income tax is barred by prescription. YES.
In relation to Evidence: WON the evidence offered by
CIR—BIR record book and the testimony of its custodian—
qualify as an exception to hearsay (as entries of official
records), and thus, is admissible. NO.
RULING:
Under Section 203 16 of the NIRC, respondent had 3
years from the last day for the filing of the return to send
an assessment notice to petitioner. Receipt thereof by the
taxpayer within the prescriptive period is not necessary.
Here, Barcelon filed its Annual ITR for taxable year 1987
on April 14, 1988, one day before the last day of filing on
April 15. Thus, CIR has until April 15, 1991 within which
to send an assessment notice.
There is a presumption that a mail matter sent by
registered mail was received in the regular course of mail.
However, this is still merely a disputable presumption
subject to controversion, and a direct denial of the
receipt thereof shifts the burden upon the party
favored by the presumption to prove that the mailed
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letter was indeed received by the addressee. In the
present case, Barcelon denies receiving the assessment
notice, and the BIR was unable to present substantial
evidence that such notice was, indeed, mailed or sent
before the BIR's right to assess had prescribed and that
said notice was received by the Barcelon.
The respondent presented the BIR record book where the
name of the taxpayer, the kind of tax assessed, the
registry receipt number and the date of mailing were
noted. The BIR records custodian, Ingrid Versola, also
testified that she made the entries therein. CIR
offered the entry in the BIR record book and the
testimony of its record custodian as entries in official
records in accordance with Sec. 44, Rule 130 of the
ROC.
However, there are 3 requisites for admissibility under
this rule that must be present:
1. that the entry was made by a public officer, OR by
another person specially enjoined by law to do so;
2. that it was made by the public officer in the
performance of his duties, OR by such other
person in the performance of a duty specially
enjoined by law; and
3. that the public officer or other person had
sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated,
which must have been acquired by him
personally or through official information.
In this case, the entries made by Ingrid Versola were
NOT based on her personal knowledge as she did not
attest to the fact that she personally prepared and
mailed the assessment notice. NOR was it stated
how and from whom she obtained the pertinent
information.
Moreover, she did not attest to the fact that she
acquired the reports from persons under a legal duty
to submit the same. Hence, Rule 130, Sec. 44 finds
NO application in the present case. Thus, the
evidence offered by respondent does NOT qualify as
an exception to the rule against hearsay evidence.
Independent evidence, such as the registry receipt of the
assessment notice, or a certification from the Bureau of
Posts, could have easily been obtained. Yet respondent
failed to present such evidence.
The evidence offered by the respondent fails to show that
FAN was released, mailed, or sent before April 15 1991, or
before the lapse of the period of limitation upon
assessment and collection prescribed by Sec. 203 of the
NIRC. Such evidence, therefore, is insufficient to give rise
to the presumption that the assessment notice was
received in the regular course of mail. Consequently, the
right of the government to assess and collect the alleged
deficiency tax is barred by prescription.
 PNOC Shipping v. CA
299 SCRA 402 (1999)
Chio
PRINCIPLE RELATED TO EVIDENCE:
The price quotations are not "commercial lists”. These are
not published in any list, register, periodical or other
compilation on the relevant subject matter. Neither are
these "market reports or quotations" within the purview of
"commercial lists" as these are not "standard handbooks or
periodicals, containing data of everyday professional need
and relied upon in the work of the occupation."
FACTS:
On 21 September 1977, while the fishing boat "M/V MARIA
EFIGENIA" owned by plaintiff (Maria Efigenia Fishing
Corporation) was navigating in the vicinity of Fortune
Island, said fishing boat was hit by the LSCO tanker
"Petroparcel" causing the former to sink. The Board of
Marine Inquiry conducted an investigation of this marine
accident and the Commandant of the Philippine Coast
Guard, Simeon N. Alejandro, rendered a decision finding
the cause of the accident to be the reckless and imprudent
manner in which Edgardo Doruelo navigated the LSCO
"Petroparcel" and declared the latter vessel at fault.
Defendant Luzon Stevedoring Corporation (LUSTEVECO),
executed in favor of PNOC Shipping and Transport
Corporation a Deed of Transfer involving several tankers,
tugboats, barges and pumping stations, among which was
the LSCO Petroparcel. On the same date, defendant PNOC
STC again entered into an Agreement of Transfer with co-
defendant Lusteveco whereby all the business properties
and other assets appertaining to the tanker and bulk oil
departments including the motor tanker LSCO Petroparcel
of defendant Lusteveco were sold to PNOC STC. The
aforesaid agreement stipulates that PNOC-STC assumes,
without qualifications, all obligations arising from and by
virtue of all rights it obtained over the LSCO "Petroparcel".
Another agreement between defendant LUSTEVECO and
PNOC-STC was executed wherein Board of Marine Inquiry
Case No. 332 (involving the sea accident of 21 September
1977) was specifically identified and assumed by the latter.
The decision of Board of Marine Inquiry was affirmed by
the Ministry of National Defense, in its decision dismissing
the appeal of Capt. Edgardo Doruelo and Chief mate
Anthony Estenzo of LSCO "Petroparcel". LSCO
"Petroparcel" is presently owned and operated by PNOC-
STC and likewise Capt. Edgardo Doruelo is still in their
employ.
As a result of the sinking of M/V Maria Efigenia caused by
the reckless and imprudent manner in which LSCO
Petroparcel was navigated by defendant Doruelo, plaintiff
suffered actual damages by the loss of its fishing nets,
boat equipments (sic) and cargoes, which went down with
the ship when it sank the replacement value of which
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should be left to the sound discretion of this Honorable
Court.
The lower court rendered its decision in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendant PNOC Shipping &
Transport Corporation. It cited the evidence consisting of
the testimony of its general manager and sole witness,
Edilberto del Rosario. According to him, at the time the
vessel sank, it was then carrying 1,060 tubs of assorted
fish the value of which was never recovered. Also lost with
the vessel were two cummins engines, radar, pathometer
and compass. Maria Efiegnia Fishing Corporation presented
documentary evidence in the nature of market reports or
quotations, trade journals, trade circulars and price lists.
In this case, actual damages were proven through the sole
testimony of private respondent's general manager and
certain pieces of documentary evidence. Except for price
quotations where the value of the 1,050 bañeras of fish
were pegged at their September 1977 value when the
collision happened, the pieces of documentary evidence
proffered by private respondent with respect to items and
equipment lost show similar items and equipment with
corresponding prices in early 1987 or approximately ten
years after the collision. In objecting to the same pieces of
evidence, petitioner commented that these were not duly
authenticated and that the witness (Del Rosario) did not
have personal knowledge on the contents of the writings
and neither was he an expert on the subjects thereof.
Clearly ignoring petitioner's objections to the exhibits, the
lower court admitted these pieces of evidence and gave
them due weight to arrive at the award of P6,438,048.00
as actual damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the price quotations are admissible in
evidence? NO.
RULING:
The price quotations presented as exhibits partake of the
nature of hearsay evidence considering that the persons
who issued them were not presented as witnesses. Any
evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its
probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of
the witness but on the knowledge of another person who is
not on the witness stand.
Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no
probative value unless the proponent can show that the
evidence falls within the exceptions to the hearsay
evidence rule.
It is true that one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule
pertains to "commercial lists and the like" under Section
45, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. This rule
states:
Commercial lists and the like. - Evidence of
statements of matters of interest to persons
 engaged in an occupation contained in a list,
register, periodical, or other published compilation
is admissible as tending to prove the truth of any
relevant matter so stated if that compilation is
published for use by persons engaged in that
occupation and is generally used and relied upon
by them there.
Under Section 45 of the aforesaid Rule, a
document is a commercial list if: (1) it is a
statement of matters of interest to persons
engaged in an occupation; (2) such statement is
contained in a list, register, periodical or other
published compilation; (3) said compilation is
published for the use of persons engaged in that
occupation, and (4) it is generally used and relied
upon by persons in the same occupation.
Based on the above requisites, the price quotations are not
"commercial lists" for these do not belong to the category
of "other published compilations”. Under the principle of
ejusdem generis, “where general words follow an
enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular
and specific meaning, such general words are not to be
construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as
applying only to persons or things of the same kind or
class as those specifically mentioned."
The evidence mentioned are mere price quotations issued
personally to Del Rosario who requested for them from
dealers of equipment similar to the ones lost at the
collision of the two vessels. These are not published in any
list, register, periodical or other compilation on the
relevant subject matter.
Neither are these "market reports or quotations" within the
purview of "commercial lists" as these are not "standard
handbooks or periodicals, containing data of everyday
professional need and relied upon in the work of the
occupation." These are simply letters responding to the
queries of Del Rosario.
The courts differ as to the weight to be given to hearsay
evidence admitted without objection. Some hold that when
hearsay has been admitted without objection, the same
may be considered as any other properly admitted
testimony. Others maintain that it is entitled to no more
consideration than if it had been excluded.
The failure of the defense counsel to object to the
presentation of incompetent evidence, like hearsay
evidence or evidence that violates the rules of res inter
alios acta, or his failure to ask for the striking out of the
same does not give such evidence any probative value.
But admissibility of evidence should not be equated with
weight of evidence. Hearsay evidence whether objected to
or not has no probative value
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Manliclic vs. Calaunan
512 SCRA 643 (25 January 2007)
Dela Rosa
PRINCIPLE RELATED TO EVIDENCE:
Hearsay evidence alone may be insufficient to establish a
fact in a suit but, when no objection is made thereto, it is,
like any other evidence, to be considered and given the
importance it deserves.
FACTS:
At around 6-7am, respondent Calaunan, together with
Mendoza, was on his way to Manila from Pangasinan on
board his jeep. The Bus was likewise bound for Manila from
Concepcion, Tarlac. The two vehicles collided. Respondent
suffered minor injuries while his driver was unhurt. By
reason of such collision, a criminal case was filed charging
petitioner Manliclic with Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Damage to Property with Physical Injuries. Subsequently,
respondent filed a complaint for damages against
petitioners Manliclic and Philippine Rabbit Bus Line (PRBL).
The criminal case was tried ahead of the civil case. Among
those who testified in the criminal case were respondent
Calaunan, Mendoza and Ramos. When the civil case was
heard, counsel for respondent prayed that the transcripts
of stenographic notes (TSNs) of the testimonies of
respondent Calaunan, Mendoza and Ramos in the criminal
case be received in evidence in the civil case in as much as
these witnesses are not available to testify in the civil case.
Then, the trial court subpoenaed the Clerk of Court of the
RTC-Bulacan, the court where Criminal Case was tried, to
bring the TSNs of the testimonies of respondent Calaunan,
Mendoza and Ramos in said case, together with other
documentary evidence marked therein.
Tuliao testified that his brother-in-law, respondent
Calaunan, left for abroad and has not returned since then.
Rogelio took the stand and said that his brother, Ramos,
left for Amman, Jordan, to work. Rosalia testified that her
husband, Mendoza, left their residence to look for a job but
has not returned home yet.
Counsel for respondent wanted to mark other TSNs and
documents from the said criminal case to be adopted in the
instant case, but since the same were not brought to the
trial court, counsel for petitioners compromised that said
TSNs and documents could be offered by counsel for
respondent as rebuttal evidence.
Respondent further marked, among other documents, as
rebuttal evidence, the TSNs of the testimonies of Ganiban,
Buan and petitioner Manliclic in Criminal Case.
Petitioners argue that the TSNs containing the testimonies
of respondent Calaunan, Mendoza and Ramos should not
be admitted in evidence for failure of respondent to comply
with the requisites of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court.

For Section 47, Rule 130 to apply, the following requisites
must be satisfied: (a) the witness is dead or unable to
testify; (b) his testimony or deposition was given in a
former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative,
between the same parties or those representing the same
interests; (c) the former case involved the same subject as
that in the present case, although on different causes of
action; (d) the issue testified to by the witness in the
former trial is the same issue involved in the present case;
and (e) the adverse party had an opportunity to cross-
examine the witness in the former case.
Admittedly, respondent failed to show the concurrence of
all the requisites set forth by the Rules for a testimony
given in a former case or proceeding to be admissible as
an exception to the hearsay rule. Petitioner PRBLI, not
being a party in the Criminal Case, had no opportunity to
cross-examine the 3 witnesses in said case. The criminal
case was filed exclusively against petitioner Manliclic,
petitioner PRBLI’s employee.
Second, Petitioners contend that the documents in the
criminal case should not have been admitted in the instant
civil case because Section 47 of Rule 130 refers only to
"testimony or deposition.”
Lastly, petitioners contend that the version of petitioner
Manliclic as to how the accident occurred is more credible
than respondent’s version. They anchor their contention on
the fact that petitioner Manliclic was acquitted of the
charge of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to
Property with Physical Injuries.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the TSNs containing the
testimonies of respondent Calaunan, Mendoza and
Ramos in the Criminal Case should be admitted in
evidence in the Civil Case. YES.
1. Whether or not the documents in the criminal
case should be admitted in the instant civil case
because Section 47 of Rule 130 refers only to
"testimony or deposition.” YES.
2. Whether or not Manliclic can still be held liable for
the collision and be found negligent
notwithstanding the declaration of the Court of
Appeals that there was an absence of negligence
on his part? YES.
RULING:
Whether or not the TSNs containing the testimonies of
respondent Calaunan, Mendoza and Ramos in the Criminal
Case should be admitted in evidence in the Civil Case.
YES.
An objection shall be made at the time when an alleged
inadmissible document is offered in evidence; otherwise,
the objection shall be treated as waived, since the right to
object is merely a privilege which the party may waive.
Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that these documents
are inadmissible for being hearsay, but on account of
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failure to object thereto, the same may be admitted and
considered as sufficient to prove the facts therein asserted.
Hearsay evidence alone may be insufficient to establish a
fact in a suit but, when no objection is made thereto, it is,
like any other evidence, to be considered and given the
importance it deserves.
In the case at bar, it is too late for petitioner PRBLI to raise
denial of due process in relation to Section 47, Rule 130 as
a ground for objecting to the admissibility of the TSNs. And
the fact that petitioner PRBLI was not a party in said
criminal case, the testimonies of the 3 witnesses are still
admissible on the ground that petitioner PRBLI failed to
object on their admissibility.
And if petitioner PRBLI argues that the TSNs of the
testimonies of plaintiff’s witnesses in the criminal case
should not be admitted in the instant case, why then did it
offer the TSN of the testimony of Ganiban in the civil case
which was given in the criminal case? It appears that
petitioner PRBLI wants to have its cake and eat it too. To
disallow admission in evidence of the TSNs of the
testimonies of Calaunan, Mendoza and Ramos in the
criminal case and to admit the TSN of the testimony of
Ganiban would be unfair.
Whether or not the documents in the criminal case should
be admitted in the instant civil case because Section 47 of
Rule 130 refers only to "testimony or deposition. YES.
Though said section speaks only of testimony and
deposition, it does not mean that documents from a former
case or proceeding cannot be admitted. Said documents
can be admitted, they being part of the testimonies of
witnesses that have been admitted. Accordingly, they shall
be given the same weight as that to which the testimony
may be entitled.
Whether or not Manliclic can still be held liable for the
collision and be found negligent notwithstanding the
declaration of the Court of Appeals that there was an
absence of negligence on his part? YES.
Petitioner Manliclic was acquitted not on reasonable doubt,
but on the ground that he is not the author of the act
complained of. But the extinction of civil liability referred to
refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of
the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the
same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a
crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the
criminal case that the criminal act charged has not
happened or has not been committed by the accused.
In this civil case, it was petitioner Manliclic’s negligence
that caused the smash up and so there arises the juris
tantum presumption that the employer is negligent,
rebuttable only by proof of observance of the diligence of a
good father of a family. But due to lack of supervision of its
employees, petitioner PRBLI is held solidarily responsible
for the damages caused by petitioner Manliclic’s
negligence.
 People vs Victor Padit
G.R. No. 202978, 01 February 2016
Diez
PRINCIPLE RELATED TO EVIDENCE:
When the offended party is of tender age and immature,
courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what
transpired, considering not only her relative vulnerability
but also the shame to which she would be exposed if the
matter to which she testified is not true. Youth and
immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity.
FACTS:
The victim, AAA, a four-year-old girl, was playing inside
their house while her mother was looking after her younger
brother. After a while, AAA went out of the house to buy
bread. On her way to the store, she was called by accused-
appellant, who is their neighbor and the uncle of her
mother, and whom AAA calls as Lolo Victor. Accused-
appellant brought AAA inside his house and allowed her to
play. He then brought her upstairs, caused her to lie down
and removed her short pants. Accused-appellant also
removed his short pants and proceeded to rub his penis
against AAA's vagina. AAA felt pain but was rendered
helpless and prevented from making any sound as
accused-appellant covered her mouth with his hand.
Thereafter, accused-appellant threatened to hurt AAA with
his knife if she tells anybody about the incident. AAA's
mother was about to serve lunch when she noticed that
AAA was not yet around. She then went out to call for AAA.
While she was in accused-appellant's yard, the latter came
out of his house and told her that AAA is inside watching
him weave baskets. Accused-appellant then went back
inside the house and, after a few minutes, brought AAA
outside.
Back at their house, her mother asked AAA why she did
not respond to her calls. AAA then told her mother about
what accused-appellant did to her. Upon hearing AAA's
account of her sexual molestation, AAA's mother
immediately went to accused-appellant's house to confront
him. Accused appellant, however, denied having molested
AAA. Unable to elicit an admission from accused-appellant,
AAA's mother went back to their house and proceeded to
give AAA a bath. While she was washing AAA's vagina, the
latter cried and asked her not to touch it because it was
very painful. AAA's parents filed a complaint with their
Barangay Chairman and caused AAA to undergo
physical/medical examination wherein it was found that the
child's vulva showed a slight hymenal abrasion.
Subsequently, AAA's mother filed a criminal Complaint with
the Prosecutor's Office of Guiuan, Eastern Samar, charging
accused appellant with the crime of rape.
Accused-appellant: Denied the allegations of the
prosecution contending that he could not have raped AAA
because his wife was with him at the time that the alleged
molestation was committed. Accused-appellant's wife
corroborated his testimony on the witness stand.
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RTC: Found accused-appellant guilty as charged. It gave
full faith and credence to the testimony of the victim as
corroborated, in its material points, by the medical findings
of the physician who examined the victim.
CA: Affirmed with modification (amount of damages only)
the judgment of the RTC. It held that the prosecution was
able to establish the elements of rape through the victim's
testimony and that it found no cogent reason to disturb the
findings of the RTC with respect to the credibility of the
victim.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecution was able to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that the accused-appellant is guilty of
rape.
RULING:
Settled is the rule that testimonies of child-victims are
normally given full weight and credit, since when a girl,
particularly if she is a minor, says that she has been raped,
she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape
has, in fact, been committed.
When the offended party is of tender age and immature,
courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what
transpired, considering not only her relative vulnerability
but also the shame to which she would be exposed if the
matter to which she testified is not true.
Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and
sincerity.
Considering that AAA was only four (4) years old when she
was raped and was only five (5) years old when she took
the witness stand, she could not have invented a
horrible story.
For her to fabricate the facts of rape and to charge the
accused falsely of a crime is certainly beyond her mental
capacity.
The Court does not agree with accused-appellant's
contention that the prosecution failed to prove carnal
knowledge on the ground that AAA explicitly stated in her
testimony that accused-appellant merely rubbed his penis
against her vagina.
AAA, who was then four years old at the time of the
molestation, was not expected to be knowledgeable
about sexual intercourse and every stage thereof.
The fact that she claimed that accused-appellant rubbed
his penis against her vagina did not mean that there was
no penetration. Carnal knowledge is defined as the act of a
man having sexual bodily connections with a woman. This
explains why the slightest penetration of the female
genitalia consummates the rape.
Accused-appellant also contends that the testimony of
AAA's mother that it was accused-appellant who molested
her child is nothing but hearsay, considering that she only
came to know of the alleged molestation when she found
AAA inside accused-appellant's house and after the child
told her about it when they got back home.

The Court did not agree. The term "hearsay" as used in

the law on evidence, signifies evidence which is not
founded upon the personal knowledge of the witness from
whom it is elicited and which consequently does not
depend wholly for its credibility and weight upon the
confidence which the court may have in him; its value, if
any, is measured by the credit to be given to some third
person not sworn as a witness to that fact, and
consequently, not subject to cross-examination. If one
therefore testifies to facts which he learned from a third
person not sworn as a witness to those facts, his testimony
is inadmissible as hearsay evidence.

The reason for the exclusion of hearsay evidence is that

the party against whom the hearsay testimony is
presented is deprived of the right or opportunity to cross-
examine the person to whom the statements are
attributed.

Moreover, the court is without opportunity to test the

credibility of hearsay statements by observing the
demeanor of the person who made them.

In the instant case, the declarant, AAA herself, was sworn

as a witness to the fact testified to by her mother.

Accused-appellant's counsel even cross examined AAA.

Moreover, the trial court had the opportunity to observe
AAA's manner of testifying. Hence, the testimony of AAA's
mother on the incident related to her by her daughter
cannot be disregarded as hearsay evidence.

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