Freedom of Expression

Facts : Sometime before 6 June 2005, the radio station dzMM aired the Garci Tapes where the parties to the conversation discussed "rigging" the
results of the 2004 elections to favor President Arroyo. On 6 June 2005, Presidential spokesperson Ignacio Bunye (Bunye) held a press conference in
Malacañang Palace, where he played before the presidential press corps two compact disc recordings of conversations between a woman and a
man. Bunye identified the woman in both recordings as President Arroyo but claimed that the contents of the second compact disc had been "spliced"
to make it appear that President Arroyo was talking to Garcillano. On 11 June 2005, the NTC issued a press release warning radio and television
stations that airing the Garci Tapes is a "cause for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorizations" issued to them.5
On 14 June 2005, NTC officers met with officers of the broadcasters group, Kapisanan ng mga Broadcasters sa Pilipinas (KBP), to dispel fears of
censorship. The NTC and KBP issued a joint press statement expressing commitment to press freedom

Issue : WON the NTC warning embodied in the press release of 11 June 2005 constitutes an impermissible prior restraint on freedom of expression

Held : When expression may be subject to prior restraint, apply in this jurisdiction to only four categories of expression, namely: pornography, false or
misleading advertisement, advocacy of imminent lawless action, and danger to national security. All other expression is not subject to prior restrain
Expression not subject to prior restraint is protected expression or high-value expression. Any content-based prior restraint on protected expression is
unconstitutional without exception. A protected expression means what it says – it is absolutely protected from censorship Prior restraint on
Chavez v. Gonzales, G.R. expression is content-based if the restraint is aimed at the message or idea of the expression. Courts will subject to strict scrutiny content-based
De
1 No. 168338, February 15, restraint. If the prior restraint is not aimed at the message or idea of the expression, it is content-neutral even if it burdens expression The NTC action
ocampo restraining the airing of the Garci Tapes is a content-based prior restraint because it is directed at the message of the Garci Tapes. The NTC’s claim
2008
that the Garci Tapes might contain "false information and/or willful misrepresentation," and thus should not be publicly aired, is an admission that the
restraint is content-based The public airing of the Garci Tapes is a protected expression because it does not fall under any of the four existing
categories of unprotected expression recognized in this jurisdiction. The airing of the Garci Tapes is essentially a political expression because it
exposes that a presidential candidate had allegedly improper conversations with a COMELEC Commissioner right after the close of voting in the last
presidential elections. The content of the Garci Tapes affects gravely the sanctity of the ballot. Public discussion on the sanctity of the ballot is
indisputably a protected expression that cannot be subject to prior restraint. Public discussion on the credibility of the electoral process is one of the
highest political expressions of any electorate, and thus deserves the utmost protection. If ever there is a hierarchy of protected expressions, political
expression would occupy the highest rank. The rule, which recognizes no exception, is that there can be no content-based prior restraint on protected
expression. On this ground alone, the NTC press release is unconstitutional. Of course, if the courts determine that the subject matter of a
wiretapping, illegal or not, endangers the security of the State, the public airing of the tape becomes unprotected expression that may be subject to
prior restraint. However, there is no claim here by respondents that the subject matter of the Garci Tapes involves national security and publicly airing
the tapes would endanger the security of the State. The alleged violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law is not in itself a ground to impose a prior
restraint on the airing of the Garci Tapes because the Constitution expressly prohibits the enactment of any law, and that includes anti-wiretapping
laws, curtailing freedom of expression. The only exceptions to this rule are the four recognized categories of unprotected expression. However, the
content of the Garci Tapes does not fall under any of these categories of unprotected expression.

2 Erice The Diocese of Bacolod v. FACTS:

COMELEC, G.R. No. On February 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within the compound of San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was
205728, January 21, 2015 approximately 6×10 in size. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view.

Page 1 of 38
The first tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURA RH Law” referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No.
10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the heading “Conscience Vote” and lists candidates
as either “(Anti-RH)/ Team Buhay” or “(Pro-RH)/Team Patay”.

The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption of the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the
law were classified by petitioners as comprising “Team Patay,” while those who voted against it form “Team Buhay”:

TEAM BUHAY                                           TEAM PATAY

Estrada, JV                                             Angara, Juan Edgardo
Honasan, Gregorio                               Casiño, Teddy
Magsaysay, Mitos                                 Cayetano, Alan Peter
Pimentel, Koko                                      Enrile, Jackie
Trillanes, Antonio                                  Escudero, Francis
Villar, Cynthia                                        Hontiveros, Risa
*Party List                                                 Legarda, Loren
Party List Buhay          Gabriela, Akbayan, Bayan Muna, Anak Pawis   Party List Ang Pamilya

Respondent Atty. Mavil V. Majarucon, as Election Officer of Bacolod City, issued a Notice to Remove Campaign Materials addressed to
petitioner Most Rev. Bishop Vicente M. Navarra, otherwise, COMELEC will be constrained to file an election offense against the
petitioners.

ISSUE:
Whether the act of the COMELEC infringes the Freedom of Religion and Freedom of Speech.

HELD:
On Freedom of Religion. As aptly argued by COMELEC, the tarpaulin, on its face, “does not convey any religious doctrine of the
Catholic church.” That the position of the Catholic church appears to coincide with the message of the tarpaulin regarding the RH Law
does not, by itself, bring the expression within the ambit of religious speech. On the contrary, the tarpaulin clearly refers to candidates
classified under “Team Patay” and “Team Buhay” according to their respective votes on the RH Law.
On Freedom of Speech. Embedded in the tarpaulin, are opinions expressed by petitioners. It is a specie of expression protected by our
fundamental law. There are several theories and schools of thought that strengthen the need to protect the basic right to freedom of
expression.
First, this relates to the right of the people to participate in public affairs, including the right to criticize government actions. Speech that
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 promotes dialogue on public affairs, or airs out grievances and political discontent, should thus be protected and encouraged.
Second, free speech should be encouraged under the concept of a market place of ideas.
Third, free speech involves self-expression that enhances human dignity.
Fourth, expression is a marker for group identity.
Fifth, the Bill of Rights, free speech included, is supposed to “protect individuals and minorities against majoritarian abuses perpetrated
through [the] framework [of democratic governance]. ”
Lastly, free speech must be protected under the safety valve theory. In order to avoid this situation and prevent people from resorting to
violence, there is a need for peaceful methods in making passionate dissent. Free speech must, thus, be protected as a peaceful means of
achieving one’s goal, considering the possibility that repression of nonviolent dissent may spill over to violent means just to drive a point.
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the
preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; and such priority “gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not
permitting dubious intrusions.”

3 Gonzale Chavez v. Gonzales, G.R. Facts:

s No. 168338, February 15,
The case originates from events that occurred a year after the 2004 national and local elections. On June 5, 2005, Press Secretary Ignacio Bunye told
2008
reporters that the opposition was planning to destabilize the administration by releasing an audiotape of a mobile phone conversation allegedly
between the President of the Philippines, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, and a high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The
conversation was audiotaped allegedly through wire-tapping. Later, in a Malacañang press briefing, Secretary Bunye produced two versions of the
tape, one supposedly the complete version, and the other, a spliced, "doctored" or altered version, which would suggest that the President had
instructed the COMELEC official to manipulate the election results in the President’s favor. 6 It seems that Secretary Bunye admitted that the voice
was that of President Arroyo, but subsequently made a retraction.

Issue:

Whether or not the acts of respondents are violations of the freedom of expression and the press, and the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern.

Held:

Yes. Not every violation of a law will justify straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press. It is not decisive that the press
statements made by respondents were not reduced in or followed up with formal orders or circulars. It is sufficient that the press statements were
made by respondents while in the exercise of their official functions. Any act done, such as a speech uttered, for and on behalf of the government in
an official capacity is covered by the rule on prior restraint. The concept of an "act" does not limit itself to acts already converted to a formal order
or official circular. Otherwise, the non-formalization of an act into an official order or circular will result in the easy circumvention of the prohibition
on prior restraint. The press statements at bar are acts that should be struck down as they constitute impermissible forms of prior restraints on the

Page 3 of 38
 right to free speech and press.

LEONEN, J.:

Facts:

On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod.
Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6′) by ten feet (10′) in size. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view. The
first tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURA RH Law” referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012. The second tarpaulin contains the
heading “Conscience Vote” and lists  candidates  as either “(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with a   checkmark, or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark.
The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption of the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were
classified by petitioners as comprising “Team Patay,” while those who voted against it form “Team Buhay.” Respondents conceded that the
tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by any candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names of candidates for the
2013 elections, but not of politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law but were not candidates for that election.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the act of the COMELEC infringes the Freedom of Speech
The Diocese of Bacolod v.
4 Jacinto COMELEC, G.R. No. Held:
205728, January 21, 2015
Yes. The Court held that every citizen’s expression with political consequences enjoys a high degree of protection. Moreover, the
respondent’s argument that the tarpaulin is election propaganda, being petitioners’ way of endorsing candidates who voted against the RH Law and
rejecting those who voted for it, holds no water. First, this relates to the right of the people to participate in public affairs, including the right to
criticize government actions. Speech that promotes dialogue on public affairs, or airs out grievances and political discontent, should thus be
protected and encouraged. Second, the Bill of Rights, free speech included, is supposed to “protect individuals and minorities against majoritarian
abuses perpetrated through [the] framework [of democratic governance]. “
Lastly, free speech must be protected under the safety valve theory. In order to avoid this situation and prevent people from resorting to violence,
there is a need for peaceful methods in making passionate dissent. Free speech must, thus, be protected as a peaceful means of achieving one’s
goal, considering the possibility that repression of nonviolent dissent may spill over to violent means just to drive a point.
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation
and vitality of our civil and political institutions; and such priority “gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious
intrusions.

5 Forneste In the Matter of the FACTS:

Declaratory Relief Re
RA 4880 of 1967, prohibiting the too early nomination of candidates and limiting the period of election campaign or partisan political activity was

Page 4 of 38
Constitutionality of RA challenged on constitutional grounds. More precisely, the basic liberties of free speech and free press, freedom of assembly and freedom of
4880, G.R. No. L-27833, association are invoked to nullify the act. Petitioner Cabigao was, at the time of the filing the petition, an incumbent councilor in the 4th District of
April 18, 1969 Manila and the Nacionalista Party official candidate for Vice-Mayor of Manila to which he was subsequently elected on November 11, 1967; petitioner
Gonzales, on the other hand, is a private individual, a registered voter in the City of Manila and a political leader of his co-petitioner. There was the
further allegation that the nomination of a candidate and the fixing of period of election campaign are matters of political expediency and
convenience which only political parties can regulate or curtail by and among themselves through self-restraint or mutual understanding or
agreement and that the regulation and limitation of these political matters invoking the police power, in the absence of clear and present danger to
the state, would render the constitutional rights of petitioners meaningless and without effect. Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada was asked to appear as
amicus curiae, and elucidated that Act No. 4880 could indeed be looked upon as a limitation on the preferred rights of speech and press, of assembly
and of association. He did justify its enactment however under the clear and present danger doctrine, there being the substantive evil of elections,
whether for national or local officials, being debased and degraded by unrestricted campaigning, excess of partisanship and undue concentration in
politics with the loss not only of efficiency in government but of lives as well. Respondents contend that the act was based on the police power of the
state.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or Not RA 4880 unconstitutional.

RULING/DISCUSSION/S:

Republic Act No. 4880 cannot be declared unconstitutional.

Free speech and free press may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public interest without censorship or
punishment. There is to be then no previous restraint on the communication of views or subsequent liability whether in libel suits, prosecution for
sedition, or action for damages, or contempt proceedings unless there be a clear and present danger of substantive evil that Congress has a right to
prevent.

Freedom of expression is not an absolute. It would be too much to insist that at all times and under all circumstances it should remain unfettered and
unrestrained. There are other societal values that press for recognition.

In Cabansag v. Fernandez; there are two tests that may supply an acceptable criterion for permissible restriction. Thus: "These are the 'clear and
present danger' rule and the 'dangerous tendency' rule.

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  The first, as interpreted in a number of cases, means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance must be extremely serious and
the degree of imminence extremely high' before the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the 'substantive evil'
sought to be prevented." It has the advantage of establishing according to the above decision "a definite rule in constitutional law. It provides
the criterion as to what words may be public established."

 The second is "dangerous tendency" rule, explained as "If the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right to
prevent, then such words are punishable. It is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be
advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated
to incite persons to acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to
bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body seeks to prevent.

Justice Branders explained that the danger of substantive evil is present when the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before there is
opportunity for full discussion. If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of
education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence. The apprehended evil must be "relatively serious."

On the other hand, Justice Black would go further. He would require that the substantive evil be "extremely serious." Only thus may there be a
realization of the ideal envisioned by Cardozo: "There shall be no compromise of the freedom to think one's thoughts and speak them, except at
those extreme borders where thought merges into action." It received its original formulation from Holmes. Thus: "The question in every case is
whether the words used in such circumstances and of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive
evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree."

This test then as a limitation on freedom of expression is justified by the danger or evil a substantive character that the state has a right to prevent.
Unlike the dangerous tendency doctrine, the danger must not only be clear but also present. The term clear seems to point to a causal connection
with the danger of the substantially evil arising from the utterance questioned. Present refers to the time element. It used to be identified with
imminent and immediate danger. The danger must not only be probable but very likely inevitable.

In considering whether it is violative of any of the freedom of expression, the legislative declaration cannot be ignored, that its enactment was in
response to a serious substantive evil affecting the electoral process, not merely in danger of happening, but to the actual existence of a grave and
substantive evil of excessive partisanship, dishonesty and corruption as well as violence that of late has invariably marred election campaigns and
partisan political activities in this country.

Page 6 of 38
6 Amon Guingguing v. Court of Facts:
Appeals, G.R. No. 128959, Cirser Torralba is a radio broadcaster of DYLA and DYFX based in Cebu City, filed a libel complaint against Guingguing and
September 30, 2005 Lim. Lim published a paid article at Sunday Post and published the records and pictures of estafa cases filed against Torralba, that
according to the latter placed him in public contempt and ridicule and was designed to degrade his person and destroy him as a
broadcaster.

Lim, in defense said that Torralba makes scurrilous attacks against him and his family over his programs, he opted for paid
advertisements to answer the attacks.

The lower court concluded that the publication complained of was indeed libelous. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s
decision finding of guilt.

Issue:

Whether or not finding of guilt against Guingguin constitutes an infringement of his constitutional right o freedom of speech
and of the press.

Held:

No. Libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act,
omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or
to blacken the memory of one who is dead.

Two major propositions in the prosecution of defamatory remarks were stablished: first, that libel against a public person is a
greater offense than one directed against an ordinary man, and second, that it is immaterial that the libel be true. The Supreme Court
has accepted the proposition that the actual malice standard governs the prosecution of criminal libel cases concerning public figures.

As it has been established that complainant was a public figure, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to prove actual malice
on the part of Lim and Guingguing when the latter published the article subject matter of the complaint. It should thus be proceed,
that if the statements made against the public figure are essentially true, then no conviction for libel can be had.

From the foregoing, it is clear that there was nothing untruthful about what was published in the Sunday Post . The criminal
cases listed in the advertisement as pending against the complainant had indeed been filed.

Page 7 of 38
 To this end, the publication of the subject advertisement by Guingguing and Lim cannot be deemed by this court to have been
done with actual malice. Aside from the fact that the information contained in said publication was true, the intention to let the public
know the character of their radio commentator can at best be subsumed under the mantle of having been done with good motives and
justifiable ends.

The Petition is granted and the decision of CA and RTC is reversed and set aside. Guingguin is acquitted.

Facts
The case arises out of consolidated petitions to the Supreme Court of the Philippines on the constitutionality of several provisions of
the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, Act No. 10175.

The Petitioners argued that even though the Act is the government’s platform in combating illegal cyberspace activities, 21 separate
sections of the Act violate their constitutional rights, particularly the right to freedom of expression and access to inforamtion. 

In February 2013, the Supreme Court extended the duration of a temporary restraining order against the government to halt enforcement
of the Act until the adjudication of the issues.

Disini v. Executive
7 Lacas Secretary, G.R. No. ISSUE Whether or not Section 4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act on cyberlibel affected the requirement of “actual malice” as
203335, February 11, 2014 opposed to “presumed malice” as basis for conviction of libel.

RULING The prosecution bears the burden of proving the presence of actual malice in instances where such element is required to
establish guilt. The defense of absence of actual malice, even when the statement turns out to be false, is available where the offended
party is a public official or a public figure, as in the cases of Vasquez (a barangay official) and Borjal (the Executive Director, First
National Conference on Land Transportation). Since the penal code and implicitly, the cybercrime law, mainly target libel against
private persons, the Court recognizes that these laws imply a stricter standard of “malice” to convict the author of a defamatory
statement where the offended party is a public figure. Society’s interest and the maintenance of good government demand a full
discussion of public affairs

8 De Soriano v. Laguardia, G.R. Facts: Ang Dating Daan host Eliseo S. Soriano uttered the following statements in his TV program against Michael Sandoval (Iglesia ni Cristo’s minister and regular
ocampo Nos. 164785 and 165636, host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan):
April 29, 2009

Page 8 of 38
Lehitimong anak ng demonyo[!] Sinungaling [!]

Gago ka talaga[,] Michael[!] [M]asahol ka pa sa putang babae[,] o di ba[?] [‘]Yung putang babae[,] ang gumagana lang doon[,] [‘]yung ibaba, dito kay Michael[,] ang
gumagana ang itaas, o di ba? O, masahol pa sa putang babae, yan. Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito.

As a result, The MTRCB initially slapped Soriano’s Ang Dating Daan, which was earlier given a “G” rating for general viewership, with a 20-day preventive
suspension after a preliminary conference. Later, in a decision, it found him liable for his utterances, and was imposed a three-month suspension from his TV
program Ang Dating Daan. Soriano challenged the order of the MTRCB.

Issue: whether or not he can invoke:

(A) THAT THE [IRR] IS INVALID INSOFAR AS IT PROVIDES FOR THE ISSUANCE OF PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION ORDERS;

(B) THE LACK OF DUE HEARING IN THE CASE AT BENCH;

(C) THE VIOLATION OF EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE LAW;

(D) THE VIOLATION OF FREEDOM OF RELIGION; AND

(E) THE VIOLATION OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION.

HELD:

Page 9 of 38
 The preventive suspension was valid, because it sanctioned the program because it violated the mtrcb rules. There was no violation of due process, because he
was heard several times before the judicial

hearing. There was no violation of equal protection because he violated the rules, because his show was general patronage and the state invoked its right as as
parens patriae.

The SC ruled that “Soriano’s statement can be treated as obscene, at least with respect to the average child,” and thus his utterances cannot be considered as
protected speech. Citing decisions from the US Supreme Court, the High Court said that the analysis should be “context based” and found the utterances to be
obscene after considering the use of television broadcasting as a medium, the time of the show, and the “G” rating of the show, which are all factors that made the
utterances susceptible to children viewers. The Court emphasized on how the uttered words could be easily understood by a child literally rather than in the
context that they were used.”

The SC also said “that the suspension is not a prior restraint, but rather a “form of permissible administrative sanction or subsequent punishment.” In affirming the
power of the MTRCB to issue an order of suspension, the majority said that “it is a sanction that the MTRCB may validly impose under its charter without running
afoul of the free speech clause.” The Court said that the suspension “is not a prior restraint on the right of petitioner to continue with the broadcast of Ang Dating
Daan as a permit was already issued to him by MTRCB,” rather, it was a sanction for “the indecent contents of his utterances in a “G” rated TV program.”

9 Erice Newsounds Broadcasting Facts:

Network, Inc. v. Dy, G.R.
Nos. 170270 & 179411,
April 2, 2009 Petitioners operate and run Bombo Radyo DZNC Cauayan (DZNC), an AM radio broadcast station, and Star FM DWIT Cauayan, an FM radio
broadcast station, in Cauayan Citry, Isabela. Back in 1996, Newsounds commenced relocation of its broadcasting station, management office, and
transmitters on propery located in Minante 2, Cauayan City, Isabela.

On July 1996, the Housing & Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and Office of the Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator (OMPDC)
affirmed and certified that the commercial structure to be constructed conformed to local zoning regulations, noting as well that the location is
classified as a “commercial area”. The radio station was able to fully operate smoothly thereafter.

In 2002 however, when petitioners applied for a renewal of mayor’s permit, City Zoning Administratior-Designate Bagnos Maximo refused to issue
zoning clearance on the grounds that petitioners were not able to submit conversion papers showing that the agricultural land was converted to
commercial land. Petitioners asked the court to compel the issuance of mayor’s permit but the court denied the action. In the meantime, the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Region II office issued to petitioners a formal recognition of conversion of the property from agricultural to
commercial.

In 2003, petitioners again filed their application for renewal of mayor’s permit, attaching the DAR Order. Respondent Felicisimo Meer, acting City
Page 10 of 38
Administrator of Cauayan City denied the same, claiming that it was void on the grounds that they did not have record of the DAR Order.

The deadline lapsed on Febuary 15, 2004, and respondents Meer and Racma Fernandez-Garcia, City Legal Officer of Cauayan City, closed the radio
station. Due to the prvosion of Omnibus Election Code which prohibits the closure of radio station during the pendency of election period, COMELEC
issued an order allowing the petitioners to operate before Febuary 17, 2004, but was barred again by respondent Mayor Ceasar Dy on the grounds
that the radio station had no permit. Nonetheless, COMELEC allowed them to run again until June 10, 2004 after elections.

Petitioners filed the case to the RTC and CA for the issuance of mayor’s permit but both courts denied the petition.

A municipal or city mayor is likewise authorized under the LGC to issue licenses and permits, and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of
the conditions upon which said licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance. In case of Cauayan City, the authority to require a
mayor’s permit was enacted through Ordinance No. 92-004, enacted in 1993. However, nothing in the ordinance requires an application for a
mayor’s permit to submit “either an approved land conversion papers from DAR, showing that its property was converted from prime agricultural
land or an approved resolution from the Sangguniang Bayan or Sangguniang Panglungsod authorizing the reclassification of property from
agricultural to commercial land.

In 1996, the HLURB issued a zoning decision that classified the property as commercial. Petitioners are also armed with several certifications stating
that the property is indeed a commercial area. Also, petitioners paid real property taxes based on the classification of property as commercial
without objections raised by the respondents.

Petitioners argued that this consistent recognition by the local government of Cauayan of the commercial character of the property constitutes
estoppels against respondents from denying the fact before the courts. The lower courts had ruled that “the government of Cauayan City is not
bound by estoppels, but petitioners classified that this concept is understood to only refer to acts and mistakes of its official especially to those
which are irregular.

Issue:

Whether the lower court is correct in contending that the government of Cauayan City is not bound by estoppels on the grounds that the state is
immune against suits.

Held:

No. While it is true that the state cannot be put in estoppels by mistake or error of its officials or agents, there is an exception.

Estoppels against the public are little favored. They should not be invoked except in rare and unusual circumstances, and may not be invoked where
they would operate to defeat the effective operation of a policy adopted to protect the public. They must be applied with circumspection and
should be applied only in those special cases where the interests of justice clearly require it. Nevertheless, the government must not be allowed to
deal dishonorably or capriciously with its citizens, and must not play an ignoble part or do a shabby thing; and subject to limitations . . ., the doctrine
of equitable estoppel may be invoked against public authorities as well as against private individuals

Page 11 of 38
 Thus, when there is no convincing evidence to prove irregularity or negligence on the part of the government official whose acts are being disowned
other than the bare assertion on the part of the State, the Supreme Court have declined to apply State immunity from estoppel. Herein, there is
absolutely no evidence other than the bare assertions of the respondents that the Cauayan City government had previously erred when it certified
that the property had been zoned for commercial use. The absence of any evidence other than bare assertions that the 1996 to 2001 certifications
were incorrect lead to the ineluctable conclusion that respondents are estopped from asserting that the previous recognition of the property as
commercial was wrong.

Respondents were further estopped from disclaiming the previous consistent recognition by the Cauayan City government that the property was
commercially zoned unless they had evidence, which they had none, that the local officials who issued such certifications acted irregularly in doing
so. It is thus evident that respondents had no valid cause at all to even require petitioners to secure “approved land conversion papers from the DAR
showing that the property was converted from prime agricultural land to commercial land.”

Respondents closure of petitioner’s radio stations is clearly tainted with ill motvies. Petitioners have been aggressive in exposing the widespread
election irregularities in Isabela that appear to have favored respondent Dy and his political dynasty. Such statement manifests and confirms that
respondent’s denial of the renewal applications on the ground that property is commercial and merely a pretext, and their real agenda is to remove
petitioners from Cauayan City and suppress the latter’s voice. This is a blatant violation of constitutional right to press freedom.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. The assailed decisions of the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan City, Branch 24, are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The instant petition for mandamus is hereby GRANTED and respondents are directed to immediately issue
petitioners’ zoning clearances and mayor’s permits for 2004 to petitioners.

1 Gonzale Romualdez v. Facts:

0 s Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
The People of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), filed on July 12, 1989 an information before the
152259, July 29, 2004
anti-graft court charging the accused with violation of Section 5, Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. The Information reads:'That on or about and
during the period from July 16, 1975 to July 29, 1975, in Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, said petitioner,
brother-in-law of Ferdinand E. Marcos, former President of the Philippines, and therefore, related to the latter by affinity within the third civil
degree, did then and there willfully and unlawfully, and with evident bad faith, for the purpose of promoting his self-interested and/or that of
others, intervene directly or indirectly, in a contract between the National Shipyard and Steel Corporation (NASSCO), a government-owned and
controlled corporation and the Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Company (BASECO), a private corporation, the majority stocks of which is owned
by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, whereby the NASSCO sold, transferred and conveyed to the BASECO its ownership and all its titles and
interests over all equipment and facilities including structures, buildings, shops, quarters, houses, plants and expendable and semi-expendable
assets, located at the Engineer Island known as the Engineer Island Shops including some of its equipment and machineries from Jose Panganiban,
Camarines Norte needed by BASECO in its shipbuilding and ship repair program for the amount of P5,000,000.00.

Issue:

(1) Whether Section 5 of Republic Act 3019 is unconstitutional; (2) whether the Information is vague; (3) whether there was a valid preliminary
Page 12 of 38
investigation; (4) whether the criminal action or liability has been extinguished by prescription; and (5) whether petitioner is immune from criminal
prosecution under then Section 17 of Article VII of the 1973 Constitution.

Held:

1. No. Overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines have special application only to free-speech cases. They are not appropriate for testing the
validity of penal statutes. A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible 'chilling
effect' upon protected speech. The theory is that when statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as
a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is
deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own
conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity.' The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to
go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because
of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes. Every statute is presumed valid. On the party challenging its validity weighs heavily the
onerous task of rebutting this presumption.32 Any reasonable doubt about the validity of the law should be resolved in favor of its constitutionality.

2. No. In the instant case, a cursory reading of the Information shows that the elements of a violation of Section 5 of RA 3019 have been stated
sufficiently. Likewise, the allegations describe the offense committed by petitioner with such particularity as to enable him to prepare an intelligent
defense. Details of the acts he committed are evidentiary matters that need not be alleged in the Information.

3. None. The failure to conduct a valid preliminary investigation would not warrant the quashal of an information. If the information has already
been filed, the proper procedure is for the Sandiganbayan to hold the trial in abeyance while the preliminary investigation is being conducted or
completed.

4. Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same not be known at the time,
from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The prescription shall be interrupted
when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting
jeopardy.

5. No. Section 17 of Article VII of the 1973 Constitution, as amended, is not applicable to petitioner because the immunity amendment became
effective only in 1981 while the alleged crime happened in 1975. Executive immunity applied only during the incumbency of a President. It could not
be used to shield a non-sitting President from prosecution for alleged criminal acts done while sitting in office. The reasoning of petitioner must
therefore fail, since he derives his immunity from one who is no longer sitting as President. Verily, the felonious acts of public officials and their
close relatives "are not acts of the State, and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands on the same footing as any other
Page 13 of 38

Spouses Romualdez v.
1 COMELEC, G.R. No.
Jacinto
1 167011, December 11,
2008
trespasser. Petitioner utterly fails to show that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in issuing the assailed Resolutions.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Facts:
Garay and Apostol filed a complaint against Sps. Romualdez for violation of the OEC and RA 8189 or Voter’s Registration Act of 1996 for making false
information as to their residence in their applications as new voters in Burauen, Leyte. The Complaint-Affidavit contained a prayer that a preliminary investigation
be conducted by the COMELEC, and if the evidence so warrants, the corresponding Information against petitioners be filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for
the prosecution of the same. Sps. Romualdez contend that they intend to reside in Burauen, Leyte since 1989. On May 2000, they took actual residence in Burauen
by leasing for 5 years the house of Renomeron. The Complaint-Affidavit contained a prayer that a preliminary investigation be conducted by the COMELEC, and if
the evidence so warrants, the corresponding Information against petitioners be filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for the prosecution of the same.
Issue:
Whether or not due process was violated.
Held:
No. First, the Complaint-Affidavit filed by private respondent with the COMELEC is couched in a language which embraces the allegations necessary to
support the charge for violation of Section 10(g) and (j), in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189. Petitioners cannot be said to have been denied due
process on the claim that the election offenses charged against them by private respondent are entirely different from those for which they stand to be accused of
before the RTC, as charged by the COMELEC. In the first place, there appears to be no incongruity between the charges as contained in the Complaint-Affidavit and
the Informations filed before the RTC. Evidently, the Informations directed to be filed by the COMELEC against petitioners, and which were, in fact, filed with the
RTC, were based on the same set of facts as originally alleged in the private respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit. In Lacson, we underscored the elementary rule that
the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the Complaint or Information, and not by the evidence presented by the parties at the trial.
Petitioners’ reliance on Lacson, however, does not support their claim of lack of due process because, as we have said , the charges contained in private
respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit and the charges as directed by the COMELEC to be filed are based on the same set of facts. Petitioners cannot claim that they
were not able to refute or submit documentary evidence against the charges that the COMELEC filed with the RTC. Petitioners were afforded due process because
they were granted the opportunity to refute the allegations in private respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit. On 2 April 2001, in opposition to the Complaint-Affidavit,
petitioners filed a Joint Counter-Affidavit with Motion to Dismiss with the Law Department of the COMELEC. They similarly filed a Memorandum before the said
body. Finding that due process was not dispensed with under the circumstances in the case at bar, we agree with the stance of the Office of the Solicitor General
that petitioners were reasonably apprised of the nature and description of the charges against them. It likewise bears stressing that preliminary investigations
were conducted whereby petitioners were informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted against them. They were given the opportunity to adduce
controverting evidence for their defense. In all these stages, petitioners actively participated.
Page 14 of 38
1 Forneste Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, FACTS:
2 G.R. No. 148560,
Petitioner Joseph Estrada, prosecuted under An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder, wishes to impress upon the Court that the assailed
November 19, 2001 law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. His contentions are
mainly based on the effects of the said law that it suffers from the vice of vagueness; it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal
prosecutions; and it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code saying that it violates the
fundamental rights of the accused.

The focal point of the case is the alleged “vagueness” of the law in the terms it uses. Particularly, this terms are: combination, series and
unwarranted. Because of this, the petitioner uses the facial challenge on the validity of the mentioned law.

ISSUE/S:

W/ON the Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague and overbroad.

RULING:

RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL.

DISCUSSION/S:

The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law." The overbreadth
doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that "a governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby
invade the area of protected freedoms."

A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech.
The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the
statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on
overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute
drawn with narrow specificity." The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility

Page 15 of 38
 that the protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad
statutes.

This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial
challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of
criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.

The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal
statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the
limited context of the First Amendment." In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, the Court ruled that "claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases
involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words" and, again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been
curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct." For this reason, it has been held that "a
facial challenge to a legislative act is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of
circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid." As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face
only if it is vague in all its possible applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness
of the law as applied to the conduct of others."

In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech
cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute.
With respect to such statute, the established rule is that "one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute
on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional."
As has been pointed out, "vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation,
while statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular defendant." Consequently, there is no
basis for petitioner's claim that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety.

White Light Corporation v.

1
Amon City of Manila, G.R. No.
3
122846, January 20, 2009

1 Lacas Social Weather Stations v. Facts : Petitioner, Social Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS), is a private non-stock, non-profit social research institution conducting surveys in
4 COMELEC, G.R. No. various fields, including economics, politics, demography, and social development, and thereafter processing, analyzing, and publicly
147571, May 5, 2001 reporting the results thereof. On the other hand, petitioner Kamahalan Publishing Corporation publishes the Manila Standard, a
newspaper of general circulation, which features news- worthy items of information including election surveys Petitioners brought this
action for prohibition to enjoin the Commission on Elections from enforcing §5.4 of RA. No.9006 (Fair Election Act), which provides:

Page 16 of 38
 Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published fifteen (15) days before an election and surveys affecting local candidates
shall not be published seven (7) days be- fore an election. Petitioner SWS states that it wishes to conduct an election survey throughout
the period of the elections both at the national and local levels and release to the media the results of such survey as well as publish them
directly. Petitioner Kamahalan Publishing Corporation, on the other hand, states that it intends to publish election survey results up to the
last day of the elections on May 14,2001

Issue : WON §5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of speech, expression, and the press.

HELD : What test should then be employed to determine the constitutional validity of §5.4? The United States Supreme Court, through
Chief Justice Warren, held in United States v. O 'Brien: [A] Government regulation is sufficiently justified [1] if it is within the
constitutional power of the Government; [2] if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; [3] if the governmental
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and [4] if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms [of
speech, expression and press] is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. This is so far the most influential test for
distinguishing content-based from content neutral regulations and is said to have "become canonical in the review of such laws." is
noteworthy that the O 'Brien test has been applied by this Court in at least two cases First. Sec. 5.4 fails to meet criterion [3] of the O
'Brien test because the causal connection of expression to the asserted governmental interest makes such interest "not related to the
suppression of free expression." By prohibiting the publication of election survey results because of the possibility that such publication
might undermine the integrity of the election, §5.4 actually suppresses a whole class of expression, while allowing the expression of
opinion concerning the same subject matter by newspaper columnists, radio and TV commentators, armchair theorists, and other opinion
takers Even if the governmental interest sought to be promoted is unrelated to the suppression of speech and the resulting restriction of
free expression is only incidental, §5.4 nonetheless fails to meet criterion [4] of the O'Brien test, namely, that the restriction be not greater
than is necessary to further the governmental interest. As already stated, §5.4 aims at the prevention of last-minute pressure on voters, the
creation of bandwagon effect, "junking" of weak or "losing" candidates, and resort to the form of election cheating called "dagdag-
bawas." Praiseworthy as these aims of the regulation might be, they cannot be attained at the sacrifice of the fundamental right of
expression, when such aim can be more narrowly pursued by punishing unlawful acts, rather than speechbecause of apprehension that
such speech creates the danger of such evils To summarize then, we hold that §5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the
freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is only for a
limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression of freedom of
expression.

1 De Reno v. American Civil Facts: There are two provisions that were issued that sought to protect the youth from the internet and the uncensored speech that was readily available to them.
5 ocampo Liberties Union, 521 US These are:
844
The first, 47 U. S. C. § 223(a) (1994 ed., Supp. II), prohibits the knowing transmission of obscene or indecent messages to any recipient under 18 years of age. It
Page 17 of 38
provides in pertinent part:

"(a) Whoever—

"(1) in interstate or foreign communications—

.....

"(B) by means of a telecommunications device knowingly—

"(i) makes, creates, or solicits, and

"(ii) initiates the transmission of, "any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication which is obscene or indecent, knowing that the
recipient of the communication is under 18 years of age, regardless of whether the maker of such communication placed the call or initiated the communication;

.....

"(2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under his control to be used for any activity prohibited by paragraph (1) with the intent that it be used for
such activity, "shall be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not more than two years, or both."

The second provision, § 223(d), prohibits the knowing sending or displaying of patently offensive messages in a manner that is available to a person under 18 years
of age. It provides:

860*860 "(d) Whoever—

"(1) in interstate or foreign communications knowingly—

"(A) uses an interactive computer service to send to a specific person or persons under 18 years of age, or

"(B) uses any interactive computer service to display in a manner available to a person under 18 years of age, "any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image,
or other communication that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory
Page 18 of 38
 activities or organs, regardless of whether the user of such service placed the call or initiated the communication; or

"(2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under such person's control to be used for an activity prohibited by paragraph (1) with the intent that it be
used for such activity, "shall be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not more than two years, or both."

The breadth of these prohibitions is qualified by two affirmative defenses. See § 223(e)(5).[26] One covers those who take "good faith, reasonable, effective, and
appropriate actions" to restrict access by minors to the prohibited communications. § 223(e)(5)(A). The other covers those who 861*861 restrict access to covered
material by requiring certain designated forms of age proof, such as a verified credit card or an adult identification number or code. § 223(e)(5)(B).

Issue: the constitutionality of two statutory provisions enacted to protect minors from "indecent" and "patently offensive" communications on the Internet.
Notwithstanding the legitimacy and importance of the congressional goal of protecting children from harmful materials, we agree with the three-judge District
Court that the statute abridges "the freedom of speech" protected by the First Amendmen

Ruling:

The first provision is held invalid because it was very broad, an the audience they congress should have regulated should be narrower.

The second provision is valid: Thus, the constitutionality of the CDA as a zoning law hinges on the extent to which it substantially interferes with the First
Amendment rights of adults. Because the rights 897*897 of adults are infringed only by the "display" provision and by the "indecency transmission" and "specific
person" provisions as applied to communications involving more than one adult, I would invalidate the CDA only to that extent. Insofar as the "indecency
transmission" and "specific person" provisions prohibit the use of indecent speech in communications between an adult and one or more minors, however, they
can and should be sustained. The Court reaches a contrary conclusion, and from that holding I respectfully dissent.

Facts: Mr. Near published a newspaper in Minnesota called the Saturday Press, which reported certain questionable conduct by the local police and
officials, and hinted at a perceived favoritism. An article claimed that the police were turning their heads to the criminal actions of a Jewish
gangster. Minnesota enacted a statute that made the publication of malicious, scandalous and defamatory matters in the print media a public
nuisance.
1 Near v. Minnesota, 283 US
Erice
6 697
Issue(s): Whether a state law authorizing proceedings to restrain the publication of print media operates within the bounds of the liberty of press
protected by the 1st and 14th

Holding: No. The law infringes upon the liberty of the press, guaranteed through the 14th and unconstitutionally restrains publication.

1 Gonzale Grosjean v. American Facts:

7 s Press Co., 297 US 233
Fast-forward to the 1930s, when the colorful if dictatorial Huey “Kingfish” Long was governor of Louisiana. Long’s political machine controlled the
legislature, but not some newspapers. In fact, 12 of the 13 largest newspapers in Louisiana—all newspapers having a circulation of more than
Page 19 of 38
 20,000 a week—were editorially opposed to Governor Long. The Long-controlled legislature passed a statute to put a special 2 percent license tax
on all periodicals having a circulation of more than 20,000 copies per week. The nine newspaper publishers who produced the larger-circulation
newspapers targeted by the tax sued, claiming that the special tax violated the First Amendment rights of the newspapers.

Issue:

Can a discriminatory tax hitting political foes of a government official withstand First Amendment scrutiny.

Decision: (9-0) A unanimous Supreme Court of the United States

Reasons: (Justice George Sutherland, for the Court, with apparent drafting help from the younger, far more liberal, Justice Benjamin Nathan
Cardozo.)

The Court’s opinion quoted from the legendary 19th Century American constitutional scholar, Judge Thomas Cooley. The Court quoted Cooley: “The
evils to be prevented were not the censorship of the press merely, but any action of the government by means of which it might prevent such free
and general discussion of public matters as seems absolutely essential to prepare the people for an intelligent exercise of their rights as citizens.”

Grosjean v. American Press Co. remains the leading case awarding the media constitutional protection from discriminatory taxation. And that is
important, for as the Court said in Grosjean, “A free press stands as one of the great interpreters between the government and the people. To allow
it to be fettered is to fetter ourselves.”

1 Jacinto New York Times v. United Facts:

8 States, 403 US 713
The Petitioner published excerpts from top-secret Defense Department documents that chronicled some of the decision-making that
occurred during the Vietnam War. The documents were referred to as the Pentagon Papers. The Respondent, the United States (Respondent),
sought to enjoin further publications on the grounds that national security was jeopardized. The Respondent immediately sought an injunction from
further publications citing the compromise of national security as justification for the restraint. The District Court in the New York Times case and the
District Court and the Court of Appeals in the Washington Post case held that the Government had not met the requisite burden justifying such a
prior restraint.

Issue:

Whether or not the United States met the heavy burden of showing justification for the enforcement of such a restraint on the New York Times
and Washington Post to enjoin them from publishing contents of a classified study?

Held:

Page 20 of 38

1 Forneste Iglesia ni Cristo v. Court of FACTS;
9 Appeals, G.R. No. 119673,
July 26, 1996
No. Judgments of the lower courts affirmed. The order of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is reversed and remanded with directions
to enter a judgment affirming the District Court. The government failed to show sufficient justification for this restraint on expression by the press.
The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) held that the Government failed to meet the requisite burden of proof needed to justify a
prior restraint of expression when attempting to enjoin the New York Times and Washington Post from publishing contents of a classified study. Any
system of prior restraints on expression comes to the Supreme Court bearing a heavy presumption against its invalidity. The Government “thus
creates a heavy burden of showing justification for the enforcement of such a restraint.”
Several pre-taped episodes of the TV program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo” of the religious group Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) were rated “X” – i.e., not for public
viewing – by the respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television (now MTRCB). These TV programs allegedly “offend[ed] and
constitute[d] an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law” because of petitioner INC’s controversial biblical interpretations
and its “attacks” against contrary religious beliefs.
Petitioner INC went to court to question the actions of respondent Board. The RTC ordered the respondent Board to grant petitioner INC the
necessary permit for its TV programs. But on appeal by the respondent Board, the CA reversed the RTC. Dissatisfied with the CA decision, petitioner
INC appealed to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE/S: W/ON the respondent gravely abused its discretion when it prohibited the airing of petitioner's religious program for the reason that they
constitute an attack against other religions and that they are indecent, contrary to law and good customs.
RULING:
The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the action of the respondent MTRCB x-rating petitioner's TV Program Series.
DISCUSSION/S:
Deeply ensconced in our fundamental law is its hostility against all prior restraints on speech, including religious speech. Hence, any act that restrains
speech is hobbled by the presumption of invalidity and should be greeted with furrowed brows. It is the burden of the respondent Board to overthrow
this presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its act of censorship will be struck down. It failed in the case at bar.
In x-rating the TV program of the petitioner, the respondents failed to apply the clear and present danger rule. In American Bible Society v. City of
Manila, this Court held: "The constitutional guaranty of free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries with it the right to
Page 21 of 38
 disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such right can be justified like other restraints on freedom of expression on the ground that there
is a clear and present danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent." In Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, we
further ruled that ". . . it is only where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the
community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger."

It is suggested that we re-examine the application of clear and present danger rule to the case at bar. In the United States, it is true that the clear
and present danger test has undergone permutations. It was Mr. Justice Holmes who formulated the test in Schenck v. US, as follows: ". . . the
question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger
that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." Admittedly, the test was originally designed to determine the
latitude which should be given to speech that espouses anti-government action. Bannered by Justices Holmes and Brandeis, the test attained its full
flowering in the decade of the forties, when its umbrella was used to protect speech other than subversive speech. Thus, for instance, the test was
applied to annul a total ban on labor picketing. The use of the test took a downswing in the 1950's when the US Supreme Court decided Dennis v.
United States involving communist conspiracy. In Dennis, the components of the test were altered as the High Court adopted Judge Learned Hand's
formulation that ". . . in each case [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free
speech as is necessary to avoid the danger." The imminence requirement of the test was thus diminished and to that extent, the protection of the
rule was weakened. In 1969, however, the strength of the test was reinstated in Brandenburg v. Ohio, when the High Court restored in the test the
imminence requirement, and even added an intent requirement which according to a noted commentator ensured that only speech directed at
inciting lawlessness could be punished. Presently in the United States, the clear and present danger test is not applied to protect low value speeches
such as obscene speech, commercial speech and defamation. Be that as it may, the test is still applied to four types of speech: speech that advocates
dangerous ideas, speech that provokes a hostile audience reaction, out of court contempt and release of information that endangers a fair trial.
Hence, even following the drift of American jurisprudence, there is reason to apply the clear and present danger test to the case at bar which
concerns speech that attacks other religions and could readily provoke hostile audience reaction. It cannot be doubted that religious truths disturb
and disturb tenribly.

It is also opined that it is inappropriate to apply the clear and present danger test to the case at bar because the issue involves the content of speech
and not the time, place or manner of speech. Allegedly, unless the speech is first allowed, its impact cannot be measured, and the causal connection
between the speech and the evil apprehended cannot be established. The contention overlooks the fact that the case at bar involves videotapes that
are pre-taped and hence, their speech content is known and not an X quantity. Given the specific content of the speech, it is not unreasonable to
assume that the respondent Board, with its expertise, can determine whether its sulphur will bring about the substantive evil feared by the law.

2 Amon Primicias v. Fugoso, G.R. Facts:

0 No. L-1800, January 27, Primicias, campaign manager of Coalasced Minority Parties, applied for a permit for the holding of a peaceful public meeting at
1948 Plaza Miranda for the purpose of petitioning the government for redress to grievances. Mayor Fugoso refused to issue permit for the
reason that here is a reasonable ground to believe, basing upon previous utterances and upon the fact that passions, especially on the
part of the losing groups, remains bitter and high, that similar speeches will be delivered tending to undermine the faith and
confidence of the people in their government, and in the duly constituted authorities, which might threaten the breaches of the peace

Page 22 of 38
 and disruption of public order.

Mayor Fugoso based his refusal to the revised ordinances of 1927 prohibiting as an offense against public peace, and penalizes
as a misdemeanor,

"any act, in any public place, meeting, or procession, tending to disturb the peace or excite a riot; or collect with other persons in a
body or crowd for any unlawful purpose; or disturb or disquiet any congregation engaged in any lawful assembly." Included in the said
Ordinance is Sec. 1119, Free Use of Public Place.

Issue: Whether or not the freedom of speech was violated.

Held:

Yes. Dealing with the ordinance, specifically, Sec. 1119, it provides for two constructions: (1) the Mayor of the City of Manila is
vested with unregulated discretion to grant or refuse, to grant permit for the holding of a lawful assembly or meeting, parade, or
procession in the streets and other public places of the City of Manila; (2) The right of the Mayor is subject to reasonable discretion to
determine or specify the streets or public places to be used with the view to prevent confusion by overlapping, to secure convenient use
of the streets and public places by others, and to provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the risk of disorder. The court
favored the second construction, that it does not confer upon the Mayor the power to refuse to grant the permit, but only the
discretion, in issuing the permit, to determine or specify the streets or public places where the parade or procession may pass or the
meeting may be held.

The contention of Mayor Fugoso is untenable. As stated in the portion of the decision in Hague vs. Committee on Industrial
Organization, supra, "It does not make comfort and convenience in the use of streets or parks the standard of official action. It enables
the Director of Safety to refuse the permit on his mere opinion that such refusal will prevent riots, disturbances or disorderly
assemblage. It can thus, as the record discloses, be made the instrument of arbitrary suppression of free expression of views on
national affairs, for the prohibition of all speaking will undoubtedly 'prevent' such eventualities." To this we may add the following,
which we make our own, said by Mr. Justice Brandeis in his concurring opinion in Whitney vs. California, 71 U. S. (Law. ed.), 1105-
1107: "Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly. Men feared witches and burned women. It
is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech there must be
reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the
danger apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious one.
The petition for mandamus is granted and Mayor Fugosos is ordered to issue the corresponding permit, as requested.

2 Lacas Mutuc v. COMELEC, G.R. FACTS:

1 No. L-32717, November
26, 1970
Petitioner Mutuc was a candidate for delegate to the Constitutional Convention. He filed a special civil action against the respondent
COMELEC when the latter informed him through a telegram that his certificate of candidacy was given due course but he was prohibited
from using jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound systems and loud speakers. The petitioner accorded the order to be violative of
his constitutional right to freedom of speech. COMELEC justified its prohibition on the premise that the Constitutional Convention act
provided that it is unlawful for the candidates “to purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets
Page 23 of 38
 such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches,
cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign origin.” COMELEC contended that the jingle or the recorded or taped voice of the
singer used by petitioner was a tangible propaganda material and was, under the above statute, subject to confiscation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the usage of the jingle by the petitioner form part of the prohibition invoked by the COMELEC.

HELD:
The Court held that “the general words following any enumeration being applicable only to things of the same kind or class as those
specifically referred to”. The COMELEC’s contention that a candidate’s jingle form part of the prohibition, categorized under the phrase
“and the like”, could not merit the court’s approval by principle of Ejusdem Generis. It is quite apparent that what was contemplated in
the Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate
responsible for its distribution.

Furthermore, the COMELEC failed to observe construction of the statute which should be in consonance to the express terms of the
constitution. The intent of the COMELEC for the prohibition may be laudable but it should not be sought at the cost of the candidate’s
constitutional righ

FACTS: Public respondent promulgated a resolution prohibiting the posting of decals and stickers on “mobile” places, public or private, and limit their location or
publication to the authorized posting areas that COMELEC fixes. Petitioner senatorial candidate assails said resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals
and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving vehicles, wherein it is his last medium to inform the electorate that he is a senatorial candidate, due to the
ban on radio, tv and print political advertisements.
Adiong v. COMELEC, G.R.
2 De
No. 103956, March 31, ISSUE: WON a resolution prohibiting posting of decals and stickers is constitutional.
2 ocampo
1992
HELD:  No. The prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on “mobile”places whether public or private except in the authorized areas designated by the
COMELEC becomes censorship which is unconstitutional. There is no public interest substantial enough to warrant the prohibition.

Page 24 of 38
 Concerned Boholanos for
2 Law and Order v. Calibo,
Erice
3 A.M. No. RTJ-01-1621,
September 27, 2007

Tulfo v. People, G.R. No.

2 Gonzale
161032, September 16,
4 s
2008

2 US v. Bustos, 37 Phil 731

Jacinto
5 (1918)

2 Forneste Borjal v. CA, G.R. No. FACTS:

6 126466, January 14, 1999
A civil action for damages based on libel was filed before the court against Borjal and Soliven for writing and publishing articles that are allegedly
derogatory and offensive against Francisco Wenceslao, attacking among others the solicitation letters he send to support a conference to be launch
concerning resolving matters on transportation crisis that is tainted with anomalous activities. Wenceslao however was never named in any of the
Page 25 of 38
articles nor was the conference he was organizing. The lower court ordered petitioners to indemnify the private respondent for damages which was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. A petition for review was filed before the SC contending that private respondent was not sufficiently identified to be
the subject of the published articles.

ISSUE/S:

W/ON the disputed articles constitute privileged communications as to exempt the author from liability.

RULING:

The Decision of the Court of Appeals and its Resolution denying reconsideration are, REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the complaint for damages
against petitioners is DISMISSED.

DISCUSSION/S:

A privileged communication may be either absolutely privileged or qualifiedly privileged. Absolutely privileged communications are those which are not
actionable even if the author has acted in bad faith. An example is found in Sec. 11, Art.VI, of the 1987 Constitution which exempts a member of
Congress from liability for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any Committee thereof. Upon the other hand, qualifiedly privileged
communications containing defamatory imputations are not actionable unless found to have been made without good intention justifiable motive. To
this genre belong "private communications" and "fair and true report without any comments or remarks."

Indisputably, petitioner Borjal's questioned writings are not within the exceptions of Art. 354 of The Revised Penal Code for, as correctly observed by
the appellate court, they are neither private communications nor fair and true report without any comments or remarks. However this does not
necessarily mean that they are not privileged. To be sure, the enumeration under Art. 354 is not an exclusive list of qualifiedly privileged
communications since fair commentaries on matters of public interest are likewise privileged. The rule on privileged communications had its genesis
not in the nation's penal code but in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution guaranteeing freedom of speech and of the press. As early as 1918, in
United States v. Cañete, this Court ruled that publications which are privileged for reasons of public policy are protected by the constitutional
guaranty of freedom of speech. This constitutional right cannot be abolished by the mere failure of the legislature to give it express recognition in the
statute punishing libels.

The concept of privileged communications is implicit in the freedom of the press. As held in Elizalde v. Gutierrez and reiterated in Santos v. Court of
Appeals —

To be more specific, no culpability could be imputed to petitioners for the alleged offending publication without doing violence to the concept of

Page 26 of 38
 privileged communications implicit in the freedom of the press. As was so well put by Justice Malcolm in Bustos: "Public policy, the welfare of society,
and the orderly administration of government have demanded protection of public opinion. The inevitable and incontestable result has been the
development and adoption of the doctrine of privilege."

The doctrine formulated in these two (2) cases resonates the rule that privileged communications must, sui generis, be protective of public opinion.
This closely adheres to the democratic theory of free speech as essential to collective self-determination and eschews the strictly libertarian view that
it is protective solely of self-expression which, in the words of Yale Sterling Professor Owen Fiss, makes its appeal to the individualistic ethos that so
dominates our popular and political culture. It is therefore clear that the restrictive interpretation vested by the Court of Appeals on the penal
provision exempting from liability only private communications and fair and true report without comments or remarks defeats, rather than promotes,
the objective of the rule on privileged communications, sadly contriving as it does, to suppress the healthy effloresence of public debate and opinion
as shining linchpins of truly democratic societies.

To reiterate, fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. The doctrine
of fair comment means that while in general every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent
until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against
a public person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable,
it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on
established facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the facts.

There is no denying that the questioned articles dealt with matters of public interest.

New York Times v.

2
Amon Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
7
(1964)

2 Lacas Cabansag v. Fernandez, FACTS:

8 G.R. No. L-8974, October
18, 1957
Apolonio Cabansag filed a complaint seeking the ejectment of Germiniana Fernandez from a parcel of land. He later wrote a letter to the
Presidential Complaints and Action Commission (PCAC) regarding the delay in the disposition of his case before the CFI Pangasinan.
The judge ordered Cabansag and his lawyers to show cause why he should not be held liable for contempt for sending such letter which
tended to degrade the court in the eyes of the President (Magsaysay) and the people. After due hearing, the court rendered a decision
finding Cabansag and his lawyers guilty of contempt and sentencing them to pay a fine.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not Cabansag’s letter created a sufficient danger to a fair administration of justice?

Page 27 of 38
RULING:
NO. The letter was sent to the Office of the President asking for help because of the precarious predicament of Cabansag. While the
course of action he had taken may not be a wise one for it would have been proper had he addressed his letter to the Secretary of Justice
or to the Supreme Court, such act alone would not be contemptuous. To be so the danger must cause a serious imminent threat to the
administration of justice. Nor can we infer that such act has “a dangerous tendency” to belittle the court or undermine the administration
of justice for the writer merely exercised his constitutional right to petition the government for redress of a legitimate grievance.
Petition is GRANTED and appealed decision is REVERSED.
Facts: During the period July 8-10, 1987, Union of Filipro Employees, and Kimberly Independent Labor Union for Solidarity, Activism
and Nationalism-Olalia, intensified the intermittent pickets they had been conducting since 17 June 1981 in front of the Padre Faura gate
of the Supreme Court building. They set up pickets' quarters on the pavement in front of the Supreme Court building, at times obstructing
access to and egress from the Court's premises and offices of justices, officials and employees. They constructed provisional shelters
along the sidewalks, set up a kitchen and littered the place with food containers and trash in utter disregard of proper hygiene and
sanitation. They waved their red streamers and placards with slogans, and took turns haranguing the court all day long with the use of
loudspeakers. These acts were done even after their leaders had been received by Justices Pedro L. Yap and Marcelo B. Fernan as
Chairmen of the Divisions where their cases are pending, and Atty. Jose C. Espinas, counsel of the Union of Filipro Employees, had been
called in order that the pickets might be informed that the demonstration must cease immediately for the same constitutes direct contempt
of court and that the Court would not entertain their petitions for as long as the pickets were maintained. Thus, on 10 July 1987, the Court
en banc issued a resolution giving the said unions the opportunity to withdraw graciously and requiring Messrs. Tony Avelino, Lito
Payabyab, Eugene San Pedro, Dante Escasura, Emil Sayao and Nelson Centeno, union leaders of Union of Filipro Employees in the
Nestle case and their counsel of record, Atty. Jose C. Espinas; and Messrs. Ernesto Facundo, Fausto Gapuz, Jr. Constitutional Law II,
2005 ( 27 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) and Antonio Gonzales, union leaders of Kimberly Independent Labor Union for Solidarity,
Activism and Nationalism-Olalia in the Kimberly case to appear before the Court on 14 July 1987 at 10:30 a.m. and then and there to
show cause why they should not be held in contempt of court. Atty. Jose C. Espinas was further required to show cause why he should
not be administratively dealt with. On the appointed date and time, the individuals appeared before the Court, represented by Atty. Jose
C. Espinas, in the absence of Atty. Potenciano Flores, who was still recuperating from an operation. Atty. Espinas, for himself and in
behalf of the union leaders concerned, apologized to the Court for the acts, together with an assurance that they will not be repeated. He
likewise manifested to the Court that he had explained to the picketers why their actions were wrong and that the cited persons were
willing to suffer such penalty as may be warranted under the circumstances. He, however, prayed for the Court's leniency considering that
the picket was actually spearheaded by the leaders of the "Pagkakaisa ng Manggagawa sa Timog Katagalogan" (PAMANTIK), an
unregistered loose alliance of about 75 unions in the Southern Tagalog area, and not by either the Union of Filipro Employees or the
Kimberly Independent Labor Union. To confirm for the record that the person cited for contempt fully understood the reason for the
citation and that they will abide by their promise that said incident will not be repeated, the Court required the respondents to submit a
written manifestation to this effect, which respondents complied with on 17 July 1987.

Issue: Whether the respondents should be cited for contempt for their continued picketing at the Supreme Court’s premises.

Page 28 of 38
 Held: The right of petition is conceded to be an inherent right of the citizen under all free governments. However, such right, natural and
inherent though it may be, has never been invoked to shatter the standards of propriety entertained for the conduct of courts. For "it is a
traditional conviction of civilized society everywhere that courts and juries, in the decision of issues of fact and law should be immune
from every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence produced in court; and that the determination of such facts
should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies." Moreover, "parties have a constitutional right to have their causes tried fairly in
court by an impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by publication or public clamor. Every citizen has a profound personal interest in the
enforcement of the fundamental right to have justice administered by the courts, under the protection and forms of law free from outside
coercion or interference." The acts of the respondents are therefore not only an affront to the dignity of the Court, but equally a violation
of the right of the adverse parties and the citizenry at large. Still, the individuals cited, who are non-lawyers, are not knowledgeable in the
intricacies of substantive and adjective laws. They are not aware that even as the rights of free speech and of assembly are protected by
the Constitution, any attempt to pressure or influence courts of justice through the exercise of either right amounts to an abuse thereof, is
no longer within the ambit of constitutional protection, nor did they realize that any such efforts to influence the course of justice
constitutes contempt of court. The duty and responsibility of advising them, therefore, rest primarily and heavily upon the shoulders of
their counsel of record. Atty. Jose C. Espinas, when his attention was called by this Court, did his best to demonstrate to the pickets the
untenability of their acts and posture. The incident should therefore serve as a reminder to all members of the legal profession that it is
their duty as officers of the court to properly apprise their clients on matters of decorum and proper attitude toward courts of justice, and
to labor leaders of the importance of a continuing educational program for their members.

2 De Marantan v. Diokno, G.R. FACTS:

9 ocampo No. 205956, February 12,
2014
P/Supt. Hansel M. Marantan is the respondent in G.R. No. 199462, a Criminal Case, where Marantan and his co-accused are charged with homicide. Respondent
Monique Cu-Unjieng La’O is one of the petitioners in the said case, while respondent Atty. Jose Manuel Diokno is her counsel. The case involves an incident where
the son of La’O and his company were shot and killed by police officers at Ortigas Center allegedly for carnapping. La’O, together with other petitioners filed that
the resolution for homicide be withdrawn; and that charges for murder be filed.

On January 2013, a shooting incident occurred in Atimonan, Quezon, where Marantan was the ground commander in a police-military team, which resulted in the
death of thirteen men (Atimonan incident). The said encounter, according to Marantan, elicited much negative publicity, that respondents took advantage of the
incident. After a few consecutive days, La’O, her counsel, Atty. Diokno, and one Ernesto Manzano, organized and conducted a media press conference where they
allegedly made malicious, intemperate and unreasonable comments on the conduct of the Court in handling G.R. No. 199462, branding Marantan and his co-
accused guilty of murder in the Ortigas incident.

Marantan submits that the respondents violated the sub judice rule, making them liable for indirect contempt. The respondents answered that there was no
violation of the sub judice rule as their statements were legitimate expressions and did not actually impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice in a
concrete way; that no criminal intent was shown as the utterances being a fair comment of a matter of public interest and concern; and that the petition is
Page 29 of 38
 intended to stifle legitimate speech.

ISSUE:

Whether the sub judice rule restricting comments and disclosures pertaining to the judicial proceedings infringe on freedom of speech.

HELD:

The “clear and present danger” rule means that the evil consequence of the comment must be “extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high”
before an utterance can be punished. There must exist a clear and present danger that the utterance will harm the administration of justice. Freedom of speech
should not be impaired through the exercise of the power of contempt of court unless there is no doubt that the utterances in question make a serious and
imminent threat to the administration of justice. It must constitute an imminent, not merely a likely, threat.

In the case, the comments are merely a reiteration of the respondents position in G.R. No. 199462, which precisely calls the Court to upgrade the charges from
homicide to murder. The Court detects no malice on the face of the said statements. The mere restatement of their argument in their petition cannot actually, or
does not even tend to, influence the Court.

“A public utterance or publication is not to be denied the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and press merely because it concerns a judicial
proceeding still pending in the court is, upon the theory that in such a case, it must necessarily tend to obstruct the orderly and fair administration of justice.” The
respondents’ comments does not pose a serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice. No criminal intent to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice can be inferred from their comments.

Petition is DISMISSED.

3 Erice Bayan v. Ermita, G.R. No. Facts: Rallies of September 20, October 4, 5 and 6, 2005 is at issue. BAYAN’s rally was violently dispersed. 26 petitioners were injured, arrested and
0 169838 detained when a peaceful mass action they was preempted and violently dispersed by the police. KMU asserts that the right to peaceful assembly,
are affected by Batas Pambansa No. 880 and the policy of “Calibrated Preemptive Response” (CPR) being followed to implement it. KMU, et al.,
claim that on October 4, 2005, a rally KMU co-sponsored was to be conducted at the Mendiola bridge but police blocked them along C.M. Recto and
Lepanto Streets and forcibly dispersed them, causing injuries to several of their members. They further allege that on October 6, 2005, a multi-
sectoral rally which KMU also co-sponsored was scheduled to proceed along España Avenue in front of the UST and going towards Mendiola bridge.

Page 30 of 38
Police officers blocked them along Morayta Street and prevented them from proceeding further. They were then forcibly dispersed, causing injuries
on one of them. Three other rallyists were arrested.
All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880 The Public Assembly Act of 1985, some of them in toto and others only Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and
14(a), as well as the policy of CPR. They seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies under the “no permit, no rally” policy and the CPR policy announced
on Sept. 21, 2005.
Petitioners Bayan, et al., contend that BP 880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and
other human rights treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory.

They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present
danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a public assembly
form part of the message for which the expression is sought.
Petitioners Jess del Prado, et al., in turn, argue that B.P. No. 880 is unconstitutional as it is a curtailment of the right to peacefully assemble and
petition for redress of grievances because it puts a condition for the valid exercise of that right. It also characterizes public assemblies without a
permit as illegal and penalizes them and allows their dispersal. Thus, its provisions are not mere regulations but are actually prohibitions. Regarding
the CPR policy, it is void for being an ultra vires act that alters the standard of maximum tolerance set forth in B.P. No. 880, aside from being void for
being vague and for lack of publication.
KMU, et al., argue that the Constitution sets no limits on the right to assembly and therefore B.P. No. 880 cannot put the prior requirement of
securing a permit. And even assuming that the legislature can set limits to this right, the limits provided are unreasonable: First, allowing the Mayor
to deny the permit on clear and convincing evidence of a clear and present danger is too comprehensive. Second, the five-day requirement to apply
for a permit is too long as certain events require instant public assembly, otherwise interest on the issue would possibly wane.As to the CPR policy,
they argue that it is preemptive, that the government takes action even before the rallyists can perform their act, and that no law, ordinance or
executive order supports the policy. Furthermore, it contravenes the maximum tolerance policy of B.P. No. 880 and violates the Constitution as it
causes a chilling effect on the exercise by the people of the right to peaceably assemble.
Respondents argued that petitioners have no standing. BP 880 entails traffic re-routing to prevent grave public inconvenience and serious or undue
interference in the free flow of commerce and trade. It is content-neutral regulation of the time, place and manner of holding public assemblies.
According to Atienza RA. 7160 gives the Mayor power to deny a permit independently of B.P. No. 880. and that the permit is for the use of a public
place and not for the exercise of rights; and that B.P. No. 880 is not a content-based regulation because it covers all rallies.
Issue: Whether or Not BP 880 and the CPR Policy unconstitutional
Held: No question as to standing. Their right as citizens to engage in peaceful assembly and exercise the right of petition, as guaranteed by the
Constitution, is directly affected by B.P. No. 880. B.P. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time,
place and manner of the assemblies. It refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places. The reference to “lawful cause” does not
make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be “peaceable” and entitled to protection.

Page 31 of 38
 Maximum tolerance1 is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the content of the expressions in the rally. There is,
likewise, no prior restraint, since the content of the speech is not relevant to the regulation.
The so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our legal firmament and must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds
freedom. It merely confuses our people and is used by some police agents to justify abuses. Insofar as it would purport to differ from or be in lieu of
maximum tolerance, this was declared null and void.
The Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments, are DIRECTED to take all necessary steps for the immediate compliance with Section 15 of
Batas Pambansa No. 880 through the establishment or designation of at least one suitable freedom park or plaza in every city and municipality of
the country. After thirty (30) days from the finality of this Decision, subject to the giving of advance notices, no prior permit shall be required to
exercise the right to peaceably assemble and petition in the public parks or plazas of a city or municipality that has not yet complied with Section 15
of the law.

Ayer Production PTY, Ltd.

3 Gonzale
v. Capulong, G.R. No.
1 s
82380, April 29, 1988

American Communications
3
Jacinto Association v. Douds, 229
2
US 282

3 Forneste Re: Letter of the UP Law FACTS:

3 Faculty entitled Restoring
Allegations of plagiarism were hurled by Atty. Harry L. Roque, Jr. and Atty. Romel R. Bagares against Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo for his ponencia
Integrity: A Statement by in the case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary.
the Faculty of the
University of the
Philippines College of Law Members of the faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law published a statement on the allegations of plagiarism and
on the Allegations of misrepresentation relative to the Court’s decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary. Essentially, the faculty of the UP College of Law, headed by its
Plagiarism and dean, Atty. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, calls for the resignation of Justice Del Castillo in the face of allegations of plagiarism in his work.
Misrepresentation in the
Supreme Court, A.M. No.
10-10-4-SC, June 7, 2011 Notably, while the statement was meant to reflect the educators’ opinion on the allegations of plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo, they treated
such allegation not only as an established fact, but a truth. In particular, they expressed dissatisfaction over Justice Del Castillo’s explanation on how
he cited the primary sources of the quoted portions and yet arrived at a contrary conclusion to those of the authors of the articles supposedly
plagiarized.

Page 32 of 38
 ISSUE/S:

Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan,
3
Amon G.R. Nos. 79690-707, April
4
27, 1988

Nestle Phils. v. Sanchez,

3
Lacas G.R. No. 75209,
5
September 30, 1987

Facts of the case

Miller, after conducting a mass mailing campaign to advertise the sale of "adult" material, was convicted of violating a California statute prohibiting the distribution
of obscene material. Some unwilling recipients of Miller's brochures complained to the police, initiating the legal proceedings.

Issue: Is the sale and distribution of obscene materials by mail protected under the First Amendment's freedom of speech guarantee?

Held: 5–4 DECISION FOR MARVIN MILLER

3 De Miller v. California, 413
MAJORITY OPINION BY WARREN E. BURGER
6 ocampo U.S. 15 (1973)
Obscene materials are not protected by the First Amendment, but the definition of "obscene material" is lessened.

Rationale

In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that obscene materials did not enjoy First Amendment protection. The Court modified the test for obscenity established in Roth
v. United States and Memoirs v. Massachusetts, holding that "[t]he basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether 'the average person, applying
contemporary community standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest. . . (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value." The Court rejected the "utterly without redeeming social value" test of the Memoirs decision.

3 Erice Fernando v. Court of J. Quisimbing

7 Appeals, G.R. No. 159751,
December 6, 2006

Page 33 of 38
Facts:

Acting on reports of sale and distribution of pornographic materials, officers of the Philippine National Police CIDG conducted police surveillance on
the store bearing the name of Gaudencio E. Fernando Music Fair (Music Fair).

On May 5, 1999, Judge Perfecto Laguio of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 19, issued Search Warrant No. 99-1216 for violation of Article
201 of the Revised Penal Code against petitioner Gaudencio E. Fernando and a certain Warren Tingchuy.

The warrant ordered the search of the store for copies of New Rave, Hustler, IOU magazine, and VHS tapes.

On the same day, police officers of the PNP-CIDG NCR served the warrant on Rudy Estorninos, who, according to the prosecution, introduced
himself as the store attendant of Music Fair. The police searched the premises and confiscated twenty-five (25) VHS tapes and ten (10) different
magazines, which they deemed pornographic.

All appellants pled not guilty to the offenses charged. They waived their right to present evidence. The RTC acquitted Tingchuy for lack of evidence
to prove his guilt, but convicted herein petitioners Fernando and Estorninos.

The CA affirmed the decision. The petitioners sought for review in the SC on certiorari and assailed the CA decision.

They assigned the following errors:

I. Respondent court erred in convicting petitioner Fernando even if he was not present at the time of the raid

II. Respondent erred in convicting petitioner Estorninos who was not doing anything illegal at the time of the raid.

Petitioners contend that the prosecution failed to prove that at the time of the search, they were selling pornographic materials. Fernando
contends that since he was not charged as the owner of an establishment selling obscene materials, the prosecution must prove that he was
present during the raid and that he was selling the said materials. Estorninos, on the other hand, insists that he was not an attendant in Music Fair,
nor did he introduce himself so.

The Solicitor General counters that owners of establishments selling obscene publications are expressly held liable under Article 201, and petitioner
Fernando’s ownership was sufficiently proven. As the owner, according to the Solicitor General, Fernando was naturally a seller of the prohibited
materials and liable under the Information.

Issue: Whether the appellate court erred in affirming the petitioners’ conviction.

Held: No. Petition dismissed.

Page 34 of 38
Ratio:

As obscenity is an unprotected speech which the State has the right to regulate, the State in pursuing its mandate to protect, as parens patriae, the
public from obscene, immoral and indecent materials must justify the regulation or limitation.

One such regulation is Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code. To be held liable, the prosecution must prove that (a) the materials, publication,
picture or literature are obscene; and (b) the offender sold, exhibited, published or gave away such materials. Necessarily, that the confiscated
materials are obscene must be proved.

People v. Kottinger-.obscenity as something which is offensive to chastity, decency or delicacy. The test to determine the existence of obscenity is,
whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into
whose hands a publication or other article charged as being obscene may fall.

Also, “that which shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as an indecency.” The disclaimer was whether a picture is obscene or indecent
must depend upon the circumstances of the case, and that ultimately, the question is to be decided by the judgment of the aggregate sense of the
community reached by it.

Go Pin- If such pictures, sculptures and paintings are shown in art exhibits and art galleries for the cause of art, to be viewed and appreciated by
people interested in art, there would be no offense committed. However, the pictures here in question were used not exactly for art’s sake but
rather for commercial purposes. In other words, the supposed artistic qualities of said pictures were being commercialized so that the cause of art
was of secondary or minor importance. Gain and profit would appear to have been the main, if not the exclusive consideration in their exhibition;
and it would not be surprising if the persons who went to see those pictures and paid entrance fees for the privilege of doing so, were not exactly
artists and persons interested in art and who generally go to art exhibitions and galleries to satisfy and improve their artistic tastes, but rather
people desirous of satisfying their morbid curiosity and taste, and lust, and for love [of] excitement, including the youth who because of their
immaturity are not in a position to resist and shield themselves from the ill and perverting effects of these pictures

Padan- An actual exhibition of the sexual act, preceded by acts of lasciviousness, can have no redeeming feature. In it, there is no room for art. One
can see nothing in it but clear and unmitigated obscenity, indecency, and an offense to public morals, inspiring and causing as it does, nothing but
lust and lewdness, and exerting a corrupting influence specially on the youth of the land.

Katigbak- the Court measures obscenity in terms of the “dominant theme” of the material taken as a “whole” rather than in isolated passages.

Pita v. Court of Appeals, concerning alleged pornographic publications, the Court recognized that Kottinger failed to afford a conclusive definition of
obscenity, and that both Go Pin and Padan y Alova raised more questions than answers such as, whether the absence or presence of artists and
persons interested in art and who generally go to art exhibitions and galleries to satisfy and improve their artistic tastes, determine what art is; or
that if they find inspiration in the exhibitions, whether such exhibitions cease to be obscene. Go Pin and Padan y Alova gave too much latitude for

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 judicial arbitrament, which has permitted ad lib of ideas and “two-cents worths” among judges as to what is obscene or what is art.

The Court in Pita also emphasized the difficulty of the question and pointed out how hazy jurisprudence is on obscenity and how jurisprudence
actually failed to settle questions on the matter. Significantly, the dynamism of human civilization does not help at all. It is evident that individual
tastes develop, adapt to wide-ranging influences, and keep in step with the rapid advance of civilization. It seems futile at this point to formulate a
perfect definition of obscenity that shall apply in all cases.

There is no perfect definition of “obscenity” but the latest word is that of Miller v. California which established basic guidelines, to wit: (a) whether
to the average person, applying contemporary standards would find the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work,
taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.

But, it would be a serious misreading of Miller to conclude that the trier of facts has the unbridled discretion in determining what is “patently
offensive. No one will be subject to prosecution for the sale or exposure of obscene materials unless these materials depict or describe patently
offensive “hard core” sexual conduct. Ie offensive descriptions of sex acts.

What remains clear is that obscenity is an issue proper for judicial determination and should be treated on a case to case basis and on the judge’s
sound discretion.

In this case, the trial court found the confiscated materials obscene and the Court of Appeals affirmed such findings. Findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals affirming that of the trial court are accorded great respect, even by this Court, unless such findings are patently unsupported by the
evidence on record or the judgment itself is based on misapprehension of facts.

Did petitioners participate in the distribution and exhibition of obscene materials? We emphasize that mere possession of obscene materials,
without intention to sell, exhibit, or give them away, is not punishable under Article 201, considering the purpose of the law is to prohibit the
dissemination of obscene materials to the public. The offense in any of the forms under Article 201 is committed only when there is publicity. The
mayor’s permit shows that Fernando was the owner of the store.

Petitioner Estorninos is likewise liable as the store attendant actively engaged in selling and exhibiting the obscene materials. Prosecution witness
Police Inspector Tababan, who led the PNP-CIDG NCR that conducted the search, identified him as the store attendant upon whom the search
warrant was served.

People v. Kottinger, G.R.

3 Gonzale
No. L-20569, October 29,
8 s
1923

3 Jacinto Gonzales v. Kalaw

9 Katigbak, G.R. No. L-

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 69500, July 22, 1985

4 Forneste Espuelas v. People, G.R. FACTS:

0 No. L-2990, December 17,
Oscar Espuelas had his picture taken, making it to appear as if he were hanging lifeless at the end of a piece of a rope suspended form the limb of
1951 the tree, when in truth and in fact, he was merely standing on a barrel. After securing copies of his photograph, Espuelas sent copies of same to
several newspapers and weeklies of general circulation, not only in the Province of Bohol but also throughout the Philippines and abroad, for their
publication with a suicide note or letter, wherein he made to appear that it was written by a fictitious suicide. Alberto Reveniera and addressed to the
latter's supposed wife translation of which letter or note stating his dismay in the administration of President Roxas pointing out the situation in
Central Luzon, the Leyte, directing his wife to write to President Truman and Churchill and tell them that the government of the Philippines is infested
with many Hitlers and Mussolinis.

ISSUE:/S

W/ON the accused is liable of seditious libel under Art. 142 of the RPC.

RULING:

The accused is guilty as charged.

DISCUSSION/S:

In disposing of the appeal, careful thought had to be given to the fundamental right to freedom of speech. Yet the freedom of speech secured by the
Constitution "does not confer an absolute right to speak or publish without responsibility whatever one may choose." It is not "unbridled license that
gives immunity for every possible use of language and prevents the punishment of those who abuse this freedom." So statutes against sedition have
guaranty, although they should not be interpreted so as to agitate for institutional changes.

Not to be restrained is the privilege of any citizen to criticize his government officials and to submit his criticism to the "free trade of ideas" and to
plead for its acceptance in "the competition of the market." However, let such criticism be specific and therefore constructive, reasoned or tempered,
and not a contemptuous condemnation of the entire government set-up. Such wholesale attack is nothing less than an invitation to disloyalty to the
government. In the article now under examination one will find no particular objectionable actuation of the government. It is called dirty, it is called a
dictatorship, it is called shameful, but no particular omissions or commissions are set forth. Instead the article drip with male-violence and hate
towards the constituted authorities. It tries to arouse animosity towards all public servants headed by President Roxas whose pictures this appellant

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 would burn and would teach the younger generation to destroy.

Analyzed for meaning and weighed in its consequences the article cannot fail to impress thinking persons that it seeks to sow the seeds of sedition
and strife. The infuriating language is not a sincere effort to persuade, what with the writer's simulated suicide and false claim to martyrdom and
what with is failure to particularize. When the use irritating language centers not on persuading the readers but on creating disturbances, the
rationable of free speech cannot apply and the speaker or writer is removed from the protection of the constitutional guaranty.

If it be argued that the article does not discredit the entire governmental structure but only President Roxas and his men, the reply is that article 142
punishes not only all libels against the Government but also "libels against any of the duly constituted authorities thereof." The "Roxas people" in the
Government obviously refer of least to the President, his Cabinet and the majority of legislators to whom the adjectives dirty, Hitlers and Mussolinis
were naturally directed. On this score alone the conviction could be upheld.

People v. Nabong, G.R. No.

4
Amon L-36426, November 3,
1
1932

Facts: Petitioners, students in private respondent Mabini Colleges, Inc. in Daet, Camarines Norte, were not allowed to re-enroll by the
school for the academic year 1988-1989 for leading or participating in student mass actions against the school in the preceding semester.

Issue: Whether or not students were denied of due process?

4 Magana v. Danes, G.R. No. Held: Petition granted. Undisputed is the fact that the refusal to readmit or re-enroll petitioners was decided upon and implemented by
Lacas
2 89317, May 20, 1990 school authorities as a reaction to student mass actions directed against the school. While the highest regard must be afforded the exercise
of the rights to free speech and assembly, this should not be taken to mean that school authorities are virtually powerless to discipline
students. The penalty imposed must be proportionate to the offense committed. It would appear from the pleadings that the decision to
refuse them re-enrolment because of failing grades was a mere afterthought. These should not be taken to mean that no disciplinary action
could have been taken against petitioners for breach of discipline if the facts had so warranted.

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