#1 Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization vs.
Philippine Blooming through their suffrage but also in the administration of public affairs as well as in
Mills Co., Inc.
No. L-31195. June 5, 1973.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION, NICANOR
TOLENTINO,FLORENCIO PADRIGANO,RUFINO, ROXAS,MARIANO DE
LEON,ASENCION PACIENTE,BONIFACIO VACUNA,BENJAMIN PAGCU and RODULFO
MUNSOD, petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC.and COURT OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.
Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization vs. Philippine Blooming Mills Co.,
Inc.
Political and Constitutional Law; Basic concepts and principles underlying a
democracy.—In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement of the dignity and
worth of the human personality is the central core as well as the cardinal article of
faith of our civilization. The inviolable character of man as an individual must be
"protected to the largest possible extent in his thoughts and in his beliefs as the
citadel of his person."
Same; Purpose of Bill of Rights.—The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals
of liberty, equality and security "against the assaults of opportunism, the
expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of small encroachments, and the scorn
and derision of those who have no patience with general principles." The purpose
of the Bill of Rights is to "withdraw subjects from the vicissitudes of political
controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials, and to
establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts..."
Same; Same.—The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the right to
petition are included among the immunities reserved by the sovereign people, in
the rhetorical aphorism of Justice Holmes, to protect the ideas that we abhor or
hate more than the ideas we cherish; or as Socrates insinuated, not only to protect
the minority who want to talk, but also to benefit the majority who refuse to listen.
And as Justice Douglas cogently stresses it, the liberties of one are the liberties of
all; and the liberties of one are not safe unless the liberties of all are protected.
Same; Same.—The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not
only civil rights but also political rights essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to
his happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment. Thru these freedoms the
citizens can participate not merely in the periodic establishment of the government
1
the discipline of abusive public officers. The citizen is accorded these rights so that
he can appeal to the appropriate governmental officers or agencies for redress and
protection as well as for the imposition of the lawful sanctions on erring public
officers and employees.
Same; Same; Human rights supreme to property rights.—While the Bill of Rights
also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights is
recognized. Because these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as
supremely precious in our society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter their
exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions," they "need
breathing space to survive," permitting government regulation only "with narrow
specificity." Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human
rights are imprescriptible. If human rights are extinguished by the passage of time,
then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to limit the power of government and
ceases to be an efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials, of majorities, of
the influential and powerful, and of oligarchs—political, economic or otherwise.
Same; Same; Same; Freedom of assembly and expression occupy a preferred
position.—In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of
assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and
vitality of our civil and political institutions; and such "priority gives these liberties
the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions."
Same; Same; Same; Why human civil liberties more superior than property rights
disclosed.—The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is underscored
by the fact that a mere reasonable or rational relation between the means
employed by the law and its object or purpose—that the law is neither arbitrary nor
discriminatory nor oppressive—would suffice to validate a law which restricts or
impairs property rights. On the other hand, a constitutional or valid infringement of
human rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely, existence of a grave and
immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. So
it has been stressed in the main opinion of Mr. Justice Fernando in Gonzales vs.
Comelec and reiterated by the writer of the opinion in Imbong vs. Ferrer. It should
be noted that Mr. Justice Barredo in Gonzales vs. Comelec, like Justices Douglas,
Black and Goldberg in N.Y. Times Co. vs. Sullivan, believes that the freedoms of
speech and of the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress
of grievances are absolute when directed against public officials or "when exercised
in relation to our right to choose the men and women by whom we shall be
governed," even as Mr. Justice Castro relies on the balancing-of-interest test. Chief
Justice Vinson is partial to the improbable danger rule formulated by Chief Judge
Learned Hand, viz.—whether the gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability,
justifies such invasion of free expression as is necessary to avoid the danger.
Same; Same; Same; Labor Law; Workers who joined a demonstration against police
abuses did not violate CBA "no-strike no-lockout" provision.—Tested against the
foregoing principles, the conclusion of the Court of Industrial Relations that the
petitioners by their "concerted act and the occurrence of a temporary stoppage of
Work," are guilty of bargaining in bad faith and hence violated the collective
bargaining agreement cannot be sustained. The demonstration held by petitioners
on March 4, 1969 before Malacanang was against alleged abuses of some Pasig
policemen, not against their employer, herein private respondent firm. Said
demonstration was purely and completely an exercise of their freedom of
expression in general and of their right of assembly and of petition for redress of
grievances in particular before appropriate governmental agency, the Chief
Executive, against the police officers of the municipality of Pasig.
Same; Same; Same; Same; It is the duty of employer to protect employees against
police abuses.—As a matter of fact, it was the duty of herein respondent firm to
protect herein petitioner Union and its members from the harassment of local
police officers. It was to the interest of herein respondent firm to rally to the
defense of, and to take up the cudgels for, its employees, so that they can report to
work free from harassment, vexation or peril and as a consequence perform more
efficiently their respective tasks to enhance its productivity as well as profits.
Same; Same; Same; Demonstration against police abuses not a violation of
collective bargaining agreement.—As heretofore stated, the primacy of human
rights—freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of
grievances—over property rights has been sustained. Emphatic reiteration of this
basic tenet as a coveted boon—at once the shield and armor of the dignity and
worth of the human personality, the all-consuming ideal of our enlightened
civilization—becomes Our Duty, if freedom and social justice have any meaning at
all for him who toils so that capital can produce economic goods that can generate
happiness for all. To regard the demonstration against police officers, not against
the employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation
of the collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal from
employment of the demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the compass of the
collective bargaining agreement, is "a potent means of inhibiting speech" and
therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees
of free expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition.
2
Same; Demonstration against police abuses could not have been enjoined by any
court.—The mass demonstration staged by the employees on March 4, 1969 could
not have been legally enjoined by any court, for such an injunction would be
trenching upon the freedom of expression of the workers, even if it legally appears
to be an illegal picketing or strike.
Same; Labor Law; All employees of a firm and not merely those belonging to a
particular shift may join demonstration.—The respondent firm claims that there
was no need for all its employees to participate in the demonstration and that they
suggested to the Union that only the first and regular shift from 6 a.m. to 2 p.m.
should report for work in order that loss or damage to the firm will be averted. This
stand failed to appreciate the sine qua non of an effective demonstration especially
by a labor union, namely, the complete unity of the Union members as well as their
total presence at the demonstration site in order to generate the maximum
persuasive force that will gain for them not only public sympathy for the validity of
their cause but also immediate action on the part of the corresponding government
agencies with jurisdiction over the issues they raised against the local police.
Circulation is one of the aspects of freedom of expression. If demonstrators are
reduced by one-third, then by that much the circulation of the issues raised by the
demonstration is diminished. ... At any rate, the Union notified the company two
days in advance of their projected demonstration and the company could have
made arrangements to counteract or prevent whatever losses it might sustain by
reason of the absence of its workers for one day, especially in this case when the
Union requested it to excuse only the day shift employees who will join the
demonstration. ... There was a lack of human understanding or compassion on the
part of the firm in rejecting the request... And to regard as a ground for dismissal
the mass demonstration held against the Pasig police, not against the company, is
gross vindictiveness on the part of the employer, which is as unchristian as it is
unconstitutional.
Same; Same; Employer who refuses its employees to join demonstration against
police abuse guilty of unfair labor practice.—Because the refusal on the part of the
respondent firm to permit all its employees and workers to join the mass
demonstration against alleged police abuses and the subsequent separation of the
eight petitioners from the service constituted an unconstitutional restraint on their
freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom of petition for redress of
grievances, the respondent firm committed an unfair labor practice defined in
Section 4(a-1) in relation to Section 3 of R.A. No. 875, otherwise known as the
Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of R.A. 875 guarantees to the employees the right "to also authorized by Section 20 of C.A. 103, the CIR charter, which enjoins the Court
engage in concerted activities for xxx mutual of Industrial Relations to "act according to justice and equity and substantial merits
of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms."
Same; When a court acts against the Constitution, its judgments and orders become
null and void.—Having violated the basic human rights of the laborers, the Court of The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Industrial Relations ousted itself of jurisdiction and the questioned orders it issued
     L.S. Osorio & P. B. Castillon and J. C. Espinas & Associates for petitioners.
in the instant case are a nullity.
     Demetrio B. Salem & Associates for private respondent.
Same; CIR rules against late filing of a motion for reconsideration cannot prevail
over basic constitutional rights.—Does the mere fact that the motion for
reconsideration was filed two days late defeat the rights of the petitioning
employees for their reinstatement? The answer should be obvious in the light of MAKASIAR, J.:
the aforecited cases. To accord supremacy to the foregoing rules of the Court of
The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (hereinafter
Industrial Relations over basic human rights sheltered by the Constitution, is not
referred to as PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union composed of the employees of
only incompatible with the basic tenet of constitutional government that the
the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners Nicanor
Constitution is superior to any statute or subordinate rules and regulations, but also
Tolentino, Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente,
does violence to natural reason and logic. The dominance and superiority of the
Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and members
constitutional right over the aforesaid court procedural rule of necessity should be
of the petitioner Union.
affirmed.
Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass
Same.—It is thus seen that a procedural rule of Congress or of the Supreme Court
demonstration at Malacañang on March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged abuses
gives way to a constitutional right. In the instant case, the procedural rule of the
of the Pasig police, to be participated in by the workers in the first shift (from 6 A.M.
Court of Industrial Relations, a creature of Congress, must likewise yield to the
to 2 P.M.) as well as those in the regular second and third shifts (from 7 A.M. to 4
constitutional rights invoked by herein petitioners even before the institution of the
P.M. and from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M., respectively); and that they informed the
unfair labor practice charged against them and in their defense to the said charge.
respondent Company of their proposed demonstration.
In the case at bar, enforcement of the basic human freedoms sheltered no less by
the organic law, is a most compelling reason to deny application of a CIR rule which The quest ioned order dated September 15, 1969, of Associate Judge Joaquin M.
impinges on such human rights. Salvador of the respondent Court reproduced the following stipulation of facts of
the parties—
Same; Civil Procedure; Court may suspend its own rules.—It is an accepted principle
that the Supreme Court has inherent power to "suspend its own rules or to except a "3.That on March 2, 1969 complainant company learned of the projected mass
particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice requires." Mr. demonstration at Malacanang in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig Police
Justice Barredo in his concurring opinion in Estrada vs. Sto. Domingo reiterated this Department to be participated by the first shift (6:00 AM - 2:00 PM) workers as well
principle and added that "Under this authority, this Court is enabled to cope with all as those working in the regular shifts (7:00 A.M. to 4:00 PM and 8:00 AM to 5:00
situations without concerning itself about procedural niceties that do not square PM) in the morning of March 4, 1969;
with the need to do justice..." If we can disregard our own rules when justice
requires it, obedience to the Constitution renders more imperative the suspension "4. That a meeting was called by the Company on March 3, 1969 at about 11:00
of a CIR rule that classes with the human rights sanctioned and shielded with A.M. at the Company's canteen, and those present were: for the Company: (1) Mr.
resolute concern by the specific guarantees outlined in the organic law. Arthus L. Ang, (2) Atty. Cesareo S. de Leon, Jr., (3) and all department and section
heads. For the
Same; Same; Suspension of CIR rules authorized by C.A. 103.—The suspension of
the application of Section 15 of the CIR rules with reference to the case at bar, is PBMEO: (1) Florencio Padrigano, (2) Rufino Roxas, (3) Mariano de Leon, (4)
Asencion Paciente, (5) Bonifacio Vacuna and (6) Benjamin Pagcu.
3
"5.That the Company asked the union panel to confirm or deny said projected mass
demonstration at Malacañang on March 4, 1969. PBMEO, thru Benjamin Pagcu who
acted as spokesman of the union panel, confirmed the planned demonstration and
stated that the demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled because it has already
been agreed upon in the meeting. Pagcu explained further that the demonstration
has nothing to do with the Company because the union has no quarrel or dispute
with Management;
"6.That Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company personnel manager,
informed PBMEO that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union
guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized, however, that any demonstration
for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the Company.
For which reason, the Company, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, warned the PBMEO
representatives that workers who belong to the first and regular shifts, who without
previous leave of absence approved by the Company, particularly the officers
present who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for
work the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because such
failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an
illegal strike;
"7.That at about 5:00 P.M. on March 3, 1969, another meeting was convoked.
Company represented by Atty. C.S. de Leon, Jr. The Union panel was composed of:
Nicanor Tolentino, Rodolfo Munsod, Benjamin Pagcu and Florencio Padrigano. In
this afternoon meeting of March 3, 1969, Company reiterated and appealed to the
PBMEO representatives that while all workers may join the Malacanang
demonstration, the workers for the first and regular shift of March 4, 1969 should
be excused from joining the demonstration and should report for work; and thus
utilize the workers in the 2nd and 3rd shifts in order not to violate the provisions of
the CBA, particularly Article XXIV: 'NO LOCKOUT - NO STRIKE'. All those who will not
follow this warning of the Company shall be dismissed; De Leon reiterated the
Company's warning that the officers shall be primarily liable being the organizers of
the mass demonstration. The union panel countered that it was rather too late to
change their plans inasmuch as the Malacanang demonstration will be held the
following morning; and
"8.That a certain Mr. Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of PBMEO sent a cablegram to the
Company which was received 9.50 A.M., March 4, 1969, the contents of which are
as follows: 'REITERATING REQUEST EXCUSE DAY SHIFT EMPLOYEES JOINING
DEMONSTRATION MARCH 4, 1969.' " (Pars. 3-8, Annex "F", pp. 42-43, rec)
.
4
Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400 proceeded with
the demonstration despite the pleas of the respondent Company that the first shift
workers should not be required to participate in the demonstration and that the
workers in the second and third shifts should be utilized for the demonstration from
6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on March 4, 1969, respondent Company filed on March 4, 1969,
with the respondent Court, a charge against petitioners and other employees who
composed the first shift, charging them with a "violation of Section 4(a)-6 in relation
to Sections 13 and 14, as well as Section 15, all of Republic Act No. 875, and of the
CBA providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout.' " (Annex "A", pp. 19-20, rec). The
charge was accompanied by the joint affidavit of Arthur L. Ang and Cesareo de
Leon, Jr. (Annex "B", pp. 21-24, rec). Thereafter, a corresponding complaint was
filed, dated April 18, 1969, by Acting Chief Prosecutor Antonio T. Tirona and Acting
Prosecutor Linda P. Ilagan (Annex "C", pp. 25-30, rec.).
In their answer, dated May 9, 1969, herein petitioners claim that they did not
violate the existing CBA because they gave the respondent Company prior notice of
the mass demonstration on March 4, 1969; that the said mass demonstration was a
valid exercise of their constitutional freedom of speech against the alleged abuses
of some Pasig policemen; and that their mass demonstration was not a declaration
of strike because it was not directed against the respondent firm (Annex "D", pp.
31-34, rec.).
After considering the aforementioned stipulation of facts submitted by the parties,
Judge Joaquin M. Salvador, in an order dated September 15, 1969, found herein
petitioner PBMEO guilty of bargaining in bad faith and herein petitioners Florencio
Padrigano, Rufino Roxas Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna,
Benjamin Pagcu, Nicanor
Tolentino and Rodulfo Munsod as directly responsible for perpetrating the said
unfair labor practice and were, as a consequence, considered to have lost their
status as employees of the respondent Company (Annex "F", pp. 42-56, rec.).
Herein petitioners claim that they received on September 23, 1969, the aforesaid
order (p. 11, rec.); and that they filed on September 29, 1969, because September
28, 1969 fell on Sunday (p. 59, rec.), a motion for reconsideration of said order
dated September 15, 1969, on the ground that it is contrary to law and the
evidence, as well as asked for ten (10) days within which to file their arguments
pursuant to Sections 15, 16 and 17 of the Rules of the CIR, as amended (Annex "G",
pp. 57-60, rec.).
In its opposition dated October 7, 1969, filed on October 11, 1969 (p. 63, rec.),
respondent Company averred that herein petitioners received on September 22,
1969, the order dated September 17 (should be September 15), 1969; that under
Section 15 of the amended Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations, herein
petitioners had five (5) days from September 22, 1969 or until September 27, 1969,
within which to file their motion for reconsideration; and that because their motion
for reconsideration was two (2) days late, it should be accordingly dismissed,
invoking Bien vs. Castillo,1 which held among others, that a motion for extension of
the five-day period for the filing of a motion for reconsideration should be filed
before the said five-day period elapses (Annex "M", pp. 61-64, rec.).
Subsequently, herein petitioners filed on October 14, 1969 their written arguments
dated October 11, 1969, in support of their motion for reconsideration (Annex "I",
pp. 65-73, rec.).
In a resolution dated October 9, 1969, the respondent Court en banc dismissed the
motion for reconsideration of herein petitioners for being pro forma as it was filed
beyond the reglementary period prescribed by its Rules (Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.),
which herein petitioners received on October 28, 1969 (pp. 12 & 76, rec.).
At the bottom of the notice of the order dated October 9, 1969, which was released
on October 24, 1969 and addressed to the counsels of the parties (pp. 75-76, rec.),
appear the requirements of Sections 15, 16 and 17, as amended, of the Rules of the
Court of Industrial Relations, that a motion for reconsideration shall be filed within
five (5) days from receipt of its decision or order and that an appeal from the
decision, resolution or order of the C.I.R., sitting en banc, shall be perfected within
ten (10) days from receipt thereof (p. 76, rec.).
On October 31, 1969, herein petitioners filed with the respondent court a petition
for relief from the order dated October 9, 1969, on the ground that their failure to
file their motion for reconsideration on time was due to excusable negligence and
honest mistake committed by the president of the petitioner Union and of the
office clerk of their counsel, attaching thereto the affidavits of the said president
and clerk (Annexes "K", "K-1" and "K-2", rec.).
Without waiting for any resolution on their petition for relief from the order dated
October 9, 1969, herein petitioners filed on November 3, 1969, with the Supreme
Court, a notice of appeal (Annex "L", pp. 88-89, rec.).
I
There is need of briefly restating basic concepts and principles which underlie the
issues posed by the case at bar.
5
(1)In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement of the dignity and worth of
the human personality is the central core as well as the cardinal article of faith of
our civilization. The inviolable character of man as an individual must be "protected
to the largest possible extent in his thoughts and in his beliefs as the citadel of his
person."2
(2)The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty, equality and
security "against the assaults of opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour,
the erosion of government through their suffrage but also in the administration of
public affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive public officers. The citizen is
accorded these rights so that he can appeal to the appropriate governmental
officers or agencies for redress and protection as well as for the imposition of the
lawful sanctions on erring public officers and employees.
(5)While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights
over property rights is recognized.8 Because these freedoms are "delicate and
vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society" and the "threat of
sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of
sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive," permitting government
regulation only "with narrow specificity."9
Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are
imprescriptible. If human rights are extinguished by the passage of time, then the
Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to limit the power of government and ceases to be
an efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the influential
and powerful, and of oligarchs—political, economic or otherwise.
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly
occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of
our civil and political institutions;10 and such priority "gives these liberties the
sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions."11
The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is underscored by the fact
that a mere reasonable or rational relation between the means employed by the
law and its object or purpose—that the law is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory
nor oppressive—would suffice to validate a law which restricts or impairs property
rights.12 On the other hand, a constitutional or valid infringement of human rights
requires a more stringent criterion, namely existence of a grave and immediate
danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. So it has been
stressed in the main opinion of Mr. Justice Fernando in Gonzales vs. Comelec and
reiterated by the writer of the opinion in Imbong vs. Ferrer.13 It should be added
that Mr. Justice Barredo in Gonzales vs. Comelec, supra, like Justices Douglas, Black
and Goldberg in N.Y. Times Co. vs. Sullivan,14 believes that the freedoms of speech
and of the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of
grievances are absolute when directed against public officials or "when exercised in
relation to our right to choose the men and women by whom we shall be
governed,"15 even as Mr. Justice Castro relies on the balancing-of-interests test.16
Chief Justice Vinson is partial to the improbable danger rule formulated by Chief
Judge Learned Hand, viz.—whether the gravity of the evil, discounted by its
improbability, justifies such invasion of free expression as is necessary to avoid the
danger.17
II
The respondent Court of Industrial Relations, after opining that the mass
demonstration was not a declaration of strike, concluded that by their "concerted
act and the occurrence of a temporary stoppage of work," herein petitioners are
guilty of bargaining in bad faith and hence violated the collective bargaining
agreement with private respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc. Set against
and tested by the foregoing principles governing a democratic society, such a
conclusion cannot be sustained. The demonstration held by petitioners on March 4,
1969 before Malacañang was against alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen, not
against their employer, herein private respondent firm, said demonstration was
purely and completely an exercise of their freedom of expression in general and of
their right of assembly and of petition for redress of grievances in particular before
the appropriate governmental agency, the Chief Executive, against the police
officers of the municipality of Pasig. They exercised their civil and political rights for
their mutual aid and protection from what they believe were police excesses. As a
matter of fact, it was the duty of herein private respondent firm to protect herein
petitioner Union and its members from the harassment of local police officers. It
was to the interest of herein private respondent firm to rally to the defense of, and
to take up the cudgels for, its employees, so that they can report to work free from
harassment, vexation or peril and as a consequence perform more efficiently their
respective tasks to enhance its productivity as well as profits. Herein respondent
employer did not even offer to intercede for its employees with the local police.
Was it securing peace for itself at the expense of its workers? Was it also
intimidated by the local police or did it encourage the local police to terrorize or vex
its workers? Its failure to defend its own employees all the more weakened the
position of its laborers vis-a-vis the alleged oppressive police, who might have been
all the more emboldened thereby to subject its lowly employees to further
indignities.
6
In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression as well as their right of
assembly and of petition against alleged persecution of local officialdom, the
employees and laborers of herein private respondent firm were fighting for their
very survival, utilizing only the weapons afforded them by the Constitution—the
untrammelled enjoyment of their basic human rights. The pretension of their
employer that it would suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of its
employees from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea for
the preservation merely of their property rights. Such apprehended loss or damage
would not spell the difference between the life and death of the firm or its owners
or its management. The employees' pathetic situation was a stark reality—abused,
harassed and persecuted as they believed they were by the peace officers of the
municipality. As above intimated, the condition in which the employees found
themselves vis-a-vis the local police of Pasig, was a matter that vitally affected their
right to individual existence as well as that of their families. Material loss can be
repaired or adequately compensated. The debasement of the human being—
broken in morale and brutalized in spirit—can never be fully evaluated in monetary
terms. The wounds fester and the scars remain to humiliate him to his dying day,
even as he cries in anguish for retribution, denial of which is like rubbing salt on
bruised tissues.
As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights—freedom of expression, of
peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances—over property rights
has been sustained.18 Emphatic reiteration of this basic tenet as a coveted boon—
at once the shield and armor of the dignity and worth of the human personality, the
all-consuming ideal of our enlightened civilization—becomes Our duty, if freedom
and social justice have any meaning at all for him who toils so that capital can
produce economic goods that can generate happiness for all. To regard the
demonstration against police officers, not against the employer, as evidence of bad
faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargaining
agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment of the demonstrating
employees, stretches unduly the compass of the collective bargaining agreement, is
"a potent means of inhibiting speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as well as
mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free expression, of peaceful
assembly and of petition.19
The collective bargaining agreement which fixes the working shifts of the
employees, according to the respondent Court of Industrial Relations, in effect
imposes on the workers the "duty x x x to observe regular working hours." The
strained construction of the Court of Industrial Relations that such stipulated
working shifts deny the workers the right to stage a mass demonstration against
police abuses during working hours, constitutes a virtual tyranny over the mind and
life of the workers and deserves severe condemnation. Renunciation of the
freedom should not be predicated on such a slender ground.
The mass demonstration staged by the employees on March 4, 1969 could not have
been legally enjoined by any court, for such an injunction would be trenching upon
the freedom of expression of the workers, even if it legally appears to be an illegal
picketing or strike.20 The respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the case at bar
concedes that the mass demonstration was not a declaration of a strike "as the
same is not rooted in any industrial dispute although there is a concerted act and
the occurrence of a temporary stoppage of work." (Annex "F", p. 45, rec.).
The respondent firm claims that there was no need for all its employees to
participate in the demonstration and that they suggested to the Union that only the
first and regular shift from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. should report for work in order that loss
or damage to the firm will be averted. This stand failed to appreciate the sine qua
non of an effective demonstration especially by a labor union, namely the complete
unity of the Union members as well as their total presence at the demonstration
site in order to generate the maximum sympathy for the validity of their cause but
also immediate action on the part of the corresponding government agencies with
jurisdiction over the issues they raised against the local police. Circulation is one of
the aspects of freedom of expression.21 If demonstrators are reduced by one-third,
then by that much the circulation of the issues raised by the demonstration is
diminished. The more the participants, the more persons can be apprised of the
purpose of the rally. Moreover, the absence of one-third of their members will be
regarded as a substantial indication of disunity in their ranks which will enervate
their position and abet continued alleged police persecution. At any rate, the Union
notified the company two days in advance of their projected demonstration and the
company could have made arrangements to counteract or prevent whatever losses
it might sustain by reason of the absence of its workers for one day, especially in
this case when the Union requested it to excuse only the day-shift employees who
will join the demonstration on March 4, 1969 which request the Union reiterated in
their telegram received by the company at 9:50 in the morning of March 4, 1969,
the day of the mass demonstration (pp. 42-43, rec.). There was a lack of human
understanding or compassion on the part of the firm in rejecting the request of the
Union for excuse from work for the day shifts in order to carry out its mass
demonstration. And to regard as a ground for dismissal the mass demonstration
held against the Pasig police, not against the company, is gross vindictiveness on
the part of the employer, which is as unchristian as it is unconstitutional.
III
7
The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice. Because the
refusal on the part of the respondent firm to permit all its employees and workers
to join the mass demonstration against alleged police abuses and the subsequent
separation of the eight (8) petitioners from the service constituted an
unconstitutional restraint on their freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and
freedom to petition for redress of grievances, the respondent firm committed an
unfair labor practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to Section 3 of Republic Act
No. 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of Republic Act No.
875 guarantees to the employees the right "to engage in concerted activities for x x
x mutual aid or protection"; while Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice
for an employer "to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of
their rights guaranteed in Section Three."
We repeat that the obvious purpose of the mass demonstration staged by the
workers of the respondent firm on March 4, 1969, was for their mutual aid and
protection against alleged police abuses, denial of which was interference with or
restraint on the right of the employees to engage in such a common action to better
shield themselves against such alleged police indignities. The insistence on the part
of the respondent firm that the workers for the morning and regular shifts should
not participate in the mass demonstration, under pain of dismissal, was as
heretofore stated, "a potent means of inhibiting speech."22
Such a concerted action for their mutual help and protection, deserves at least
equal protection as the concerted action of employees in giving publicity to a letter
complaint charging a bank president with immorality, nepotism, favoritism and
discrimination in the appointment and promotion of bank employees.23 We further
ruled in the Republic Savings Bank case, supra, that for the employees to come
within the protective mantle of Section 3 in relation to Section 4(a-1) of Republic
Act No. 875, "it is not necessary that union activity be involved or that collective
bargaining be contemplated," as long as the concerted activity is for the
furtherance of their interests.24
As stated clearly in the stipulation of facts embodied in the questioned order of
respondent Court dated September 15, 1969, the company, "while expressly
acknowledging, that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the Union
guaranteed by the Constitution," nonetheless emphasized that "any demonstration
for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the company"
and "warned the PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to the first and
regular shifts, who without previous leave of absence approved by the Company,
particularly the officers present who are the organizers of the demonstration, who
shall fail to report for work the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be
dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore,
would be amounting to an illegal strike (;)" (p. III, petitioner's brief). Such threat of
dismissal tended to coerce the employees from joining the mass demonstration.
However, the issues that the employees raised against the local police, were more
important to them because they had the courage to proceed with the
demonstration, despite such threat of dismissal. The most that could happen to
them was to lose a day's wage by reason of their absence from work on the day of
the demonstration. One day's pay means much to a laborer, more especially if he
has a family to support. Yet, they were willing to forego their one-day salary hoping
that their demonstration would bring about the desired relief from police abuses.
But management was adamant in refusing to recognize the superior legitimacy of
their right of free speech, free assembly and the right to petition for redress.
Because the respondent company ostensibly did not find it necessary to demand
from the workers proof of the truth of the alleged abuses inflicted on them by the
local police, it thereby concedes that the evidence of such abuses should properly
be submitted to the corresponding authorities having jurisdiction over their
complaint and to whom such complaint may be referred by the President of the
Philippines for proper investigation and action with a view to disciplining the local
police officers involved.
On the other hand, while the respondent Court of Industrial Relations found that
the demonstration "paralyzed to a large extent the operations of the complainant
company," the respondent Court of Industrial Relations did not make any finding as
to the fact of loss actually sustained by the firm. This significant circumstance can
only mean that the firm did not sustain any loss or damage. It did not present
evidence as to whether it lost expected profits for failure to comply with purchase
orders on that day; or that penalties were exacted from it by customers whose
orders could not be filled that day of the demonstration; or that purchase orders
were cancelled by the customers by reason of its failure to deliver the materials
ordered; or that its own equipment or materials or products were damaged due to
absence of its workers on March 4, 1969. On the contrary, the company saved a
sizable amount in the form of wages for its hundreds of workers, cost of fuel, water
and electric consumption that day. Such savings could have amply compensated for
unrealized profits or damages it might have sustained by reason of the absence of
its workers for only one day.
IV
Apart from violating the constitutional guarantees of free speech and assembly as
well as the right to petition for redress of grievances of the employees, the
dismissal of the eight (8) leaders of the workers for proceeding with the
8
demonstration and consequently being absent from work, constitutes a denial of
social justice likewise assured by the fundamental law to these lowly employees.
Section 5 of Article II of the Constitution imposes upon the State "the promotion of
social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all of the people,"
which guarantee is emphasized by the other directive in Section 6 of Article XIV of
the Constitution that "the State shall afford protection to labor x x x". Respondent
Court of Industrial Relations as an agency of the State is under obligation at all
times to give meaning and substance to these constitutional guarantees in favor of
the working man; for otherwise these constitutional safeguards would be merely a
lot of "meaningless constitutional patter." Under the Industrial Peace Act, the Court
of Industrial Relations is enjoined to effect the policy of the law "to eliminate the
causes of industrial unrest by encouraging and protecting the exercise by
employees of their right to self-organization for the purpose of collective bargaining
and for the promotion of their moral, social and economic well-being." It is most
unfortunate in the case at bar that respondent Court of Industrial Relations, the
very governmental agency designed therefor, failed to implement this policy and
failed to keep faith with its avowed mission—its raison d'etre—as ordained and
directed by the Constitution.
V
It has been likewise established that a violation of a constitutional right divests the
court of jurisdiction; and as a consequence its judgment is null and void and confers
no rights. Relief from a criminal conviction secured at the sacrifice of constitutional
liberties, may be obtained through habeas corpus proceedings even long after the
finality of the judgment. Thus, habeas corpus is the remedy to obtain the release of
an individual, who is convicted by final judgment through a forced confession,
which violated his constitutional right against self-incrimination;25 or who is denied
the right to present evidence in his defense as a deprivation of his liberty without
due process of law,26 even after the accused has already served sentence for
twenty-two years.27
Both the respondents Court of Industrial Relations and private firm trenched upon
these constitutional immunities of petitioners. Both failed to accord preference to
such rights and aggravated the inhumanity to which the aggrieved workers claimed
they had been subjected by the municipal police. Having violated these basic
human rights of the laborers, the Court of Industrial Relations ousted itself of
jurisdiction and the questioned orders it issued in the instant case are a nullity.
Recognition and protection of such freedoms are imperative on all public offices
including the courts28 as well as private citizens and corporations, the exercise and
enjoyment of which must not be nullified by a mere procedural rule promulgated by
the Court of Industrial Relations exercising a purely delegated legislative power,
when even a law enacted by Congress must yield to the untrammelled enjoyment
of these human rights. There is no time limit to the exercise of these freedoms. The
right to enjoy them is not exhausted by the delivery of one speech, the printing of
one article or the staging of one demonstration. It is a continuing immunity, to be
invoked and exercised when exigent and expedient whenever there are errors to be
rectified, abuses to be denounced, inhumanities to be condemned. Otherwise,
these guarantees in the Bill of Rights would be vitiated by a rule on procedure
prescribing the period for appeal. The battle then would be reduced to a race for
time. And in such a contest between an employer and its laborer, the latter
eventually loses because he cannot employ the best and dedicated counsel who can
defend his interest with the required diligence and zeal, bereft as he is of the
financial resources with which to pay for competent legal services.28-a
VI
The Court of Industrial Relations rule prescribes that a motion for reconsideration of
its order or writ should be filed within five (5) days from notice thereof and that the
arguments in support of said motion shall be filed within ten (10) days from the
date of filing of such motion for reconsideration (Sec. 16). As above intimated, these
rules of procedure were promulgated by the Court of Industrial Relations pursuant
to a legislative delegation.29
The motion for reconsideration was filed on September 29, 1969, or seven (7) days
from notice on September 22, 1969 of the order dated September 15, 1969 or two
(2) days late.
Petitioners claim that they could have filed it on September 28, 1969, but it was a
Sunday.
Does the mere fact that the motion for reconsideration was filed two (2) days late
defeat the rights of the petitioning employees? Or more directly and concretely,
does the inadvertent omission to comply with a mere Court of Industrial Relations
procedural rule governing the period for filing a motion for reconsideration or
appeal in labor cases, promulgated pursuant to a legislative delegation, prevail over
constitutional rights? The answer should be obvious in the light of the aforecited
cases. To accord supremacy to the foregoing rules of the Court of Industrial
Relations over basic human rights sheltered by the Constitution, is not only
incompatible with the basic tenet of constitutional government that the
Constitution is superior to any statute or subordinate rules and regulations, but also
does violence to natural reason and logic. The dominance and superiority of the
constitutional right over the aforesaid Court of Industrial Relations procedural rule
9
of necessity should be affirmed. Such a Court of Industrial Relations rule as applied
in this case does not implement or reinforce or strengthen the constitutional rights
affected, but instead constrict the same to the point of nullifying the enjoyment
thereof by the petitioning employees. Said Court of Industrial Relations rule,
promulgated as it was pursuant to a mere legislative delegation, is unreasonable
and therefore is beyond the authority granted by the Constitution and the law. A
period of five (5) days within which to file a motion for reconsideration is too short,
especially for the aggrieved workers, who usually do not have the ready funds to
meet the necessary expenses therefor. In case of the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court, a period of fifteen (15) days has been fixed for the filing of the
motion for re hearing or reconsideration (Sec. 10, Rule 51; Sec. 1, Rule 52; Sec. 1,
Rule 56, Revised Rules of Court). The delay in the filing of the motion for
reconsideration could have been only one day if September 28, 1969 was not a
Sunday. This fact accentuates the unreasonableness of the Court of Industrial
Relations rule insofar as circumstances of the instant case are concerned.
It should be stressed here that the motion for reconsideration dated September 27,
1969, is based on the ground that the order sought to be reconsidered "is not in
accordance with law, evidence and facts adduced during the hearing," and likewise
prays for an extension of ten (10) days within which to file arguments pursuant to
Sections 15, 16 and 17 of the Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations (Annex "G",
pp. 57-60, rec.); although the arguments were actually filed by the herein
petitioners on October 14, 1969 (Annex "I", pp. 70-73, rec.), long after the 10-day
period required for the filing of such supporting arguments counted from the filing
of the motion for reconsideration. Herein petitioners received only on October 28,
1969 the resolution dated October 9, 1969 dismissing the motion for
reconsideration for being pro forma since it was filed beyond the reglementary
period (Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.)
It is true that We ruled in several cases that where a motion to reconsider is filed
out of time, or where the arguments in support of such motion are filed beyond the
10 day reglementary period provided for by the Court of Industrial Relations rules,
the order or decision subject of reconsideration becomes final and
unappealable.29-a But in all these cases, the constitutional rights of free expression,
free assembly and petition were not involved.
It is a procedural rule that generally all causes of action and defenses presently
available must be specifically raised in the complaint or answer; so that any cause of
action or defense not raised in such pleadings, is deemed waived.
However, a constitutional issue can be raised any time, even for the first time on
appeal, if it appears that the determination of the constitutional issue is necessary
to a decision of the case, the very lis mota of the case without the resolution of
which no final and complete determination of the dispute can be made.30 It is thus
seen that a procedural rule of Congress or of the Supreme Court gives way to a
constitutional right. In the instant case, the procedural rule of the Court of
Industrial Relations, a creature of Congress, must likewise yield to the constitutional
rights invoked by herein petitioners even before the institution of the unfair labor
practice charged against them and in their defense to the said charge.
In the case at bar, enforcement of the basic human freedoms sheltered no less by
the organic law, is a most compelling reason to deny application of a Court of
Industrial Relations rule which impinges on such human rights.30-a
It is an accepted principle that the Supreme Court has the inherent power to
"suspend its own rules or to except a particular case from its operation, whenever
the purposes of justice require."30-b Mr. Justice Barredo in his concurring opinion
in Estrada vs. Sto. Domingo30-c reiterated this principle and added that
"Under this authority, this Court is enabled to cope with all situations without
concerning itself about procedural niceties that do not square with the need to do
justice, in any case, without further loss of time, provided that the right of the
parties to a full day in court is not substantially impaired. Thus, this Court may treat
an appeal as a certiorari and vice-versa. In other words, when all the material facts
are spread in the records before Us, and all the parties have been duly heard, it
matters little that the error of the court a quo is of judgment or of jurisdiction, We
can then and there render the appropriate judgment. It is within the contemplation
of this doctrine that as it is perfectly legal and within the power of this Court to
strike down in an appeal acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or committed with
grave abuse of discretion, it cannot be beyond the ambit of its authority, in
appropriate cases, to reverse in a certain proceeding any error of judgment of a
court a quo which cannot be exactly categorized as a flaw of jurisdiction. If there
can be any doubt, which I do not entertain, on whether or not the errors this Court
has found in the decision of the Court of Appeals are short of being jurisdictional
nullities or excesses, this Court would still be on firm legal grounds should it choose
to reverse said decision here and now even if such errors can be considered as mere
mistakes of judgment or only as faults in the exercise of jurisdiction, so as to avoid
the unnecessary return of this case to the lower courts for the sole purpose of
pursuing the ordinary course of an appeal." (Italics supplied.)30-d
Insistence on the application of the questioned Court of Industrial Relations rule in
this particular case at bar would be an unreasoning adherence to "procedural
niceties," which denies justice to the herein laborers, whose basic human freedoms,
including the right to survive, must be accorded supremacy over the property rights
10
of their employer firm, which has been given a full hearing on this case, especially
when, as in the case at bar, no actual material damage has been demonstrated as
having been inflicted on its property rights.
If We can disregard our own rules when justice requires it, obedience to the
Constitution renders more imperative the suspension of a Court of Industrial
Relations rule that clashes with the human rights sanctioned and shielded with
resolute concern by the specific guarantees outlined in the organic law. It should be
stressed that the application in the instant case of Section 15 of the Court of
Industrial Relations rules relied upon by herein respondent firm, is unreasonable
and therefore such application becomes unconstitutional as it subverts the human
rights of petitioning labor union and workers in the light of the peculiar facts and
circumstances revealed by the record.
The suspension of the application of Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations
rules with reference to the case at bar, is also authorized by Section 20 of
Commonwealth Act No. 103, the C.I.R. charter, which enjoins the Court of Industrial
Relations to "act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case,
without regard to technicalities or legal forms x x."
On several occasions, We emphasized this doctrine which was re-stated by Mr.
Justice Barredo, speaking for the Court, in the 1970 case of Kapisanan, etc. vs.
Hamilton, etc., et al.,30-e thus:
"As to the point that the evidence being offered by the petitioners in the motion for
new trial is not 'newly discovered,' as such term is understood in the rules of
procedure for the ordinary courts, We hold that such criterion is not binding upon
the Court of Industrial Relations. Under Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No. 103,
'The Court of Industrial Relations shall adopt its rules or procedure and shall have
such other powers as generally pertain to a court of justice: Provided, however,
That in the hearing, investigation and determination of any question or controversy
and in exercising any duties and power under this Act, the Court shall act according
to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to
technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal
evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and
equitable.' By this provision, the industrial court is disengaged from the rigidity of
the technicalities applicable to ordinary courts. Said court is not even restricted to
the specific relief demanded by the parties but may issue such orders as may be
deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or dispelling
any doubts that may give rise to future disputes. (Ang Tibay v. C.I.R., G.R., No.
46496, Feb. 17, 1940; Manila Trading & Supply Co. v. Phil. Labor, 71 Phil. 124.) For
these reasons, We believe that this provision is ample enough to have enabled the
respondent court to consider whether or not its previous ruling that petitioners
constitute a minority was founded on fact, without regard to the technical meaning
of newly discovered evidence.x x x x (Alonso v. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315; Chua Kiong v.
Whitaker, 46 Phil. 578)." (italics supplied.)
To apply Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules with "pedantic rigor" in
the instant case is to rule in effect that the poor workers, who can ill-afford an alert
and competent lawyer, can no longer seek the sanctuary of the human freedoms
secured to them by the fundamental law, simply because their counsel—
erroneously believing that he received a copy of the decision on September 23,
1969, instead of September 22, 1969—filed his motion for reconsideration on
September 29, 1969, which practically is only one day late, considering that
September 28, 1969 was a Sunday.
Many a time, this Court deviated from procedural technicalities when they ceased
to be instruments of justice, for the attainment of which such rules have been
devised. Summarizing the jurisprudence on this score, Mr. Justice Fernando,
speaking for a unanimous Court in Palma vs. Oreta,30-f stated:
"As was so aptly expressed by Justice Moreland in Alonso v. Villamor (16 Phil. 315
[1910]. The Villamor decision was cited with approval in Register of Deeds v. Phil.
Nat. Bank, 84 Phil. 600 [1949]; Potenciano v. Court of Appeals, 104 Phil. 156 [1958]
and Uy v. Uy, L-14243, June 30, 1961, 2 SCRA 675.), decided as far back as 1910,
'technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its
great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts.' (Ibid.,
p, 322.) To that norm, this Court has remained committed. The late Justice Recto in
Blanco v. Bernabe, (63 Phil. 124 [1936]) was of a similar mind. For him the
interpretation of procedural rule should never 'sacrifice the ends of justice.' While
'procedural laws are no other than technicalities' to view them in their entirety,
'they were adopted not as ends in themselves for the compliance with which courts
have been organized and function, but as means conducive to the realization of the
administration of the law and of justice. (Ibid., p. 128). We have remained
steadfastly opposed, in the highly rhetorical language of Justice Felix, to 'a sacrifice
of substantial rights of a litigant in the altar of sophisticated technicalities with
impairment of the sacred principles of justice.' (Potenciano v. Court of Appeals, 104
Phil. 156, 161 [1958]). As succinctly put by Justice Makalintal, they 'should give way
to the realities of the situation.' (Urbayan v. Caltex, L-15379, Aug. 31, 1962, 5 SCRA
1016, 1019). In the latest decision in point, promulgated in 1968, (Udan v. Amon, L-
24288, 1968, 23 SCRA 837 citing McEntee v. Manotok, L-14968, Oct. 27, 1961, 3
SCRA 272.) Justice Zaldivar was partial to an earlier formulation of Justice Labrador
11
that rules of procedure 'are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense'; but
are intended 'to help secure substantial justice.' (Ibid., p. 843).xx"30-g
Even if the questioned Court of Industrial Relations orders and rule were to be given
effect, the dismissal or termination of the employment of the petitioning eight (8)
leaders of the Union is harsh for a one-day absence from work. The respondent
Court itself recognized the severity of such a sanction when it did not include the
dismissal of the other 393 employees who are members of the same Union and
who participated in the demonstration against the Pasig police. As a matter of fact,
upon the intercession of the Secretary of Labor, the Union members who are not
officers, were not dismissed, and only the Union itself and its thirteen (13) officers
were specifically named as respondents in the unfair labor practice charge filed
against them by the firm (pp. 16-20, respondent's Brief; Annexes "A", "B" and "C",
pp. 20-30, rec.). Counsel for respondent firm insinuates that not all the 400 or so
employees participated in the demonstration, for which reason only the Union and
its thirteen (13) officers were specifically named in the unfair labor practice charge
(p. 20, respondent's brief). If that were so, then many, if not all, of the morning and
regular shifts reported for work on March 4, 1969 and that, as a consequence, the
firm continued in operation that day and did not sustain any damage.
The appropriate penalty—if it deserves any penalty at all—should have been simply
to charge said one-day absence against their vacation or sick leave. But to dismiss
the eight (8) leaders of the petitioner Union is a most cruel penalty, since as
aforestated the Union leaders depend on their wages for their daily sustenance as
well as that of their respective families aside from the fact that it is a lethal blow to
unionism, while at the same time strengthening the oppressive hand of the petty
tyrants in the localities who consciously seek to destroy our system of government,
but from men of goodwill—good men who allow their proper concerns to blind
them to the fact that what they propose to accomplish involves an impairment of
liberty.
"x x The Motives of these men are often commendable. What we must remember,
however, is that preservation of liberties does not depend on motives. A
suppression of liberty has the same effect whether the suppressor be a reformer or
an outlaw. The only protection against misguided zeal is constant alertness of the
infractions of the guarantees of liberty contained in our Constitution. Each
surrender of liberty to the demands of the moment makes easier another, larger
surrender. The battle over the Bill of Rights is a never ending one.
"x x The liberties of any person are the liberties of all of us.
"x x In short, the Liberties of none are safe unless the liberties of all are protected.
"x x But even if we should sense no danger to our own liberties, even if we feel
secure because we belong to a group that is important and respected, we must
recognize that our Bill of Rights is a code of fair play for the less fortunate that we in
all honor and good conscience must be observe.31
The case at bar is worse.
Management has shown not only lack of good-will or good intention, but a
complete lack of sympathetic understanding of the plight of its laborers who claim
that they are being subjected to indignities by the local police. It was more
expedient for the firm to conserve its income or profits than to assist its employees
in their fight for their freedoms and security against alleged petty tyrannies of local
police officers. This is sheer opportunism. Such opportunism and expediency
resorted to by the respondent company assaulted the immunities and welfare of its
employees. It was pure and simple selfishness, if not greed.
Of happy relevance is the 1967 case of Republic Savings Bank vs. C.I.R.,32 where the
petitioner Bank dismissed eight (8) employees for having written and published "a
patently libelous letter x x x to the Bank president demanding his resignation on the
grounds of immorality, nepotism in the appointment and favoritism as well as
discrimination in the promotion of bank employees." Therein, thru Mr. Justice
Castro, We ruled:
"It will avail the Bank none to gloat over this admission of the respondents.
Assuming that the latter acted in their individual capacities when they wrote the
letter-charge they were nonetheless protected for they were engaged in concerted
activity, in the exercise of their right of self organization that includes concerted
activity for mutual aid and protection, (Section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act x x x).
This is the view of some members of this Court. For, as has been aptly stated, the
joining in protests or demands, even by a small group of employees, if in
furtherance of their interests as such, is a concerted activity protected by the
Industrial Peace Act. It is not necessary that union activity be involved or that
collective bargaining be contemplated. (Annot., 6 A.L.R. 2d 416 [1949]).
XX      XX     XX     XX     XX
"Instead of stifling criticism, the Bank should have allowed the respondents to air
their grievances.
xx     xx     xx     xx     xx
"The Bank defends its action by invoking its right to discipline for what it calls the
respondents' libel in giving undue publicity to their letter-charge. To be sure, the
12
right of self-organization of employees is not unlimited (Republic Aviation Corp. vs.
NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 [1945]), as the right of the employer to discharge for cause
(Philippine Education Co. v. Union of Phil. Educ. Employees, L-13773, April 29, 1960)
is undenied. The Industrial Peace Act does not touch the normal exercise of the
right of the employer to select his employees or to discharge them. It is directed
solely against the abuse of that right by interfering with the countervailing right of
self organization (Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 [1941]).
XX     XX
"In the final sum and substance, this Court is in unanimity that the Bank's conduct,
identified as an interference with the employees' right of self-organization, or as a
retaliatory action, and/or as a refusal to bargain collectively, constituted an unfair
labor practice within the meaning and intendment of section 4(a) of the Industrial
Peace Act." (Italics supplied.)33
If free expression was accorded recognition and protection to fortify labor unionism
in the Republic Savings case, supra, where the complaint assailed the morality and
integrity of the bank president no less, such recognition and protection for free
speech, free assembly and right to petition are rendered all the more justifiable and
more imperative in the case at bar, where the mass demonstration was not against
the company nor any of its officers.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
(1)setting aside as null and void the orders of the respondent Court of Industrial
Relations dated September 15 and October 9, 1969; and
(2)directing the reinstatement of the herein eight (8) petitioners, with full back pay
from the date of their separation from the service until reinstated, minus one day's
pay and whatever earnings they might have realized from other sources during
their separation from the service.
With costs against private respondent Philippine Blooming Company, Inc.
BARREDO, J.: Dissenting—
I bow in respectful and sincere admiration, but my sense of duty compels me to
dissent.
The background of this case may be found principally in the stipulation of facts
upon which the decision under review is based. It is as follows:
"1.That complainant Philippine Blooming Mills, Company, Inc., is a corporation
existing and operating under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines with
corporate address at 666 Muelle de Binondo, Manila, which is the employer of
respondent;
"2.That Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization, PBMEO for short, is a
legitimate labor organization, and the respondents herein are either officers of
respondent PBMEO or members thereof;
"3.That on March 2, 1969 complainant company learned of the projected mass
demonstration at Malacañang in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig Police
Department to be participated by the first shift (6:00 AM - 2:00 PM) workers as well
as those working in the regular shifts (7:00 A.M. to 4:00 PM and 8:00 AM to 5:00
PM) in the morning of March 4, 1969;
"4.That a meeting was called by the Company on March 3, 1969 at about 11:00
A.M. at the Company's canteen, and those present were: for the Company: (1) Mr.
Arthur L. Ang, (2) Atty. Cesareo S. de Leon, Jr. (3) and all department and section
heads. For the PBMEO: (1) Florencio Padrigano, (2) Rufino Roxas, (3) Mariano de
Leon, (4) Asencion Paciente, (5) Bonifacio Vacuna and (6) Benjamin Pagcu.
"5.That the Company asked the union panel to confirm or deny said projected mass
demonstration at Malacañang on March 4, 1969. PBMEO, thru Benjamin Pagcu who
acted as the spokesman of the union panel, confirmed the planned demonstration
and stated that the demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled because it has
already been agreed upon in the meeting. Pagcu explained further that the
demonstration has nothing to do with the Company because the union has no
quarrel or dispute with Management;
"6.That Management, thru Atty. C. S. de Leon, Company personnel manager,
informed PBMEO that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union
guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized, however, that any demonstration
for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the Company.
For which reason, the Company, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, warned the PBMEO
representatives that workers who belong to the first and regular shifts, who without
previous leave of absence approved by the Company, particularly the officers
present who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for
work the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because such
failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an
illegal strike;
"7.That at about 5:00 P.M. on March 3, 1969, another meeting was convoked.
Company represented by Atty. C. S. de Leon, Jr. The Union panel was composed of:
Nicanor Tolentino, Rodulfo Munsod, Benjamin Pagcu and Florencio Padrigano. In
this afternoon meeting of March 3, 1969, Company reiterated and appealed to the
13
PBMEO representatives that while all workers may join the Malacañang
demonstration, the workers for the first and regular shift of March 4, 1969 should
be excused from joining the demonstration and should report for work; and thus
utilize the workers in the 2nd and 3rd shifts in order not to violate the provisions of
the CBA, particularly Article XXIV: "NO LOCKOUT - NO STRIKE". All those who will
not follow this warning of the Company shall be dismissed; De Leon reiterated the
Company's warning that the officers shall be primarily liable being the organizers of
the mass demonstration. The union panel countered that it was rather too late to
change their plans inasmuch as the Malacañang demonstration will be held the
following morning; and
"8.That a certain Mr. Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of PBMEO sent a cablegram to the
Company which was received 9:50 A.M., March 4, 1969, the contents of which are
as follows: 'REITERATING REQUEST EXCUSE DAY SHIFT EMPLOYEES JOINING
DEMONSTRATION MARCH 4, 1969.' "
Additionally, the trial court found that "the projected demonstration did in fact
occur and in the process paralyzed to a large extent the operations of the
complainant company".(p. 5, Annex F).
Upon these facts the Prosecution Division of the Court of Industrial Relations filed
with said court a complaint for Unfair Labor Practice against petitioners charging
that:
"3.That on March 4, 1969, respondents (petitioners herein) particularly those in the
first shift, in violation of the existing collective bargaining agreement and without
filing the necessary notice as provided for by law, failed to report for work,
amounting to a declaration of strike;
"4.That the above acts are in violation of Section 4(a) sub-paragraph 6, in relation to
Sections 13, 14 and 15 of Republic Act No. 875, and of the collective bargaining
agreement." (Pars. 3 and 4, Annex C.)
After due hearing, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive part of which reads:
"IN VIEW HEREOF, the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Employees
Organization is found guilty of bargaining in bad faith and is hereby ordered to
cease and desist from further committing the same and its representatives namely:
respondent Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion
Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu, Nicanor Tolentino and Rodulfo
Munsod who are directly responsible for perpetrating this unfair labor practice act,
are hereby considered to have lost their status as employees of the Philippine
Blooming Mills, Inc." (p. 8, Annex F.)
Although it is alleged in the petition herein that petitioners were notified of this
decision on September 23, 1969, there seems to be no serious question that they
were actually served therewith on September 22, 1969. In fact, petitioners admitted
this date of notice in paragraph 2 of their Petition for Relief dated October 30, 1969
and filed with the industrial court on the following day. (See Annex K.)
It is not controverted that it was only on September 29, 1969, or seven (7) days
after they were notified of the court's decision, that petitioners filed their motion
for reconsideration with the industrial court; as it is also not disputed that they filed
their "Arguments in Support of the Respondents' Motion for Reconsideration" only
on October 14, 1969. (See Annex I.) In other words, petitioners' motion for
reconsideration was filed two (2) days after the lapse of the five (5) day period
provided for the filing thereof in the rules of the Court of Industrial Relations,
whereas the "Arguments" were filed five (5) days after the expiration of the period
therefor also specified in the same rules.
Accordingly, the first issue that confronts the Court is the one raised by respondent
private firm, namely, that in view of the failure of petitioners to file not only their
motion for reconsideration but also their arguments in support thereof within the
periods respectively fixed in the rules therefor, the Court of Industrial Relations
acted correctly and within the law in rendering and issuing its impugned order of
October 9, 1969 dismissing petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
Respondent's contention presents no problem. Squarely applicable to the facts
hereof is the decision of this Court in Elizalde & Co. Inc. vs. Court of Industrial
Relations1 wherein it was ruled that:
"August 6, 1963. Petitioner received a copy of the decision of the then Associate
Judge Arsenio I. Martinez, the dispositive part of which was set forth earlier in this
opinion.
"August 12, 1963. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. No arguments were
advanced in support thereof.
"August 21, 1963. Petitioner moved for additional time to file its arguments in
support of its motion to reconsider.
"August 27, 1963. Petitioner filed its arguments in support of its aforesaid motion
seeking reconsideration.
"September 16, 1963. CIR en banc resolved to dismiss the motion for
reconsideration. Ground therefor was that the arguments were 'filed out of time'.
14
"October 3, 1963. Petitioner filed its notice of appeal and at the same time lodged
the present petition with this Court.
"Upon respondent Perlado's return and petitioner's brief (respondents did not file
their brief), the case is now before us for resolution.
"1.That the judgment appealed from is a final judgment—not merely an
interlocutory order—there is no doubt. The fact that there is need for computation
of respondent Perlado's overtime pay would not render the decision incomplete.
This in effect is the holding of the Court in Pan American World Airways System
(Philippines) vs. Pan American Employees Association, which runs thus: 'It is next
contended that in ordering the Chief of the Examining Division or his representative
to compute the compensation due, the Industrial Court unduly delegated its judicial
functions and thereby rendered an incomplete decision. We do not believe so.
Computation of the overtime pay involves a mechanical function, at most. And the
report would still have to be submitted to the Industrial Court for its approval, by
the very terms of the order itself. That there was no specification of the amount of
overtime pay in the decision did not make it incomplete, since this matter would
necessarily be made clear enough in the implementation of the decision (see
Malate Taxicab & Garage, Inc. vs. CIR, et al., L-8718, May 11, 1956).'
"2.But has that judgment reached the stage of finality in the sense that it can no
longer be disturbed?
"CIR Rules of Procedure, as amended, and the jurisprudence of this Court both
answer the question in the affirmative.
"Section 15 of the CIR Rules requires that one who seeks to reconsider the
judgment of the trial judge must do so within five (5) days from the date on which
he received notice of the decision, subject of the motion. Next follows Section 16
which says that the motion must be submitted with arguments supporting the
same. But if said arguments could not be submitted simultaneously with the
motion, the same section commands that 'the movant shall file the same within ten
(10) days from the date of the filing of his motion for reconsideration'. Section 17 of
the same rules admonishes a movant that '(f)ailure to observe the above-specified
periods shall be sufficient cause for dismissal of the motion for reconsideration or
striking out of the answer and/or the supporting arguments, as the case may be'.
"Not that the foregoing rules stand alone. Jurisprudence has since stabilized the
enforceability thereof. Thus, in Bien vs. Castillo, (97 Phil. 956) we ruled that where a
pro forma motion for reconsideration was filed out of time its denial is in order
pursuant to CIR rules, regardless of whether the arguments in support of said
motion were or were not filed on time. Pangasinan Employees Laborers & Tenants
Association (PELTA) vs. Martinez, (L-13846, May 20, 1960) pronounced that where a
motion to reconsider is filed out of time, the order or decision subject of
reconsideration becomes final. And so also, where the arguments in support of the
motion for reconsideration are filed beyond the ten-day reglementary period, the
pro forma motion for reconsideration although seasonably filed must nevertheless
be denied. This in essence is our ruling in Local 7, Press & Printing Free Workers
(FFW) vs. Tabigne. The teaching in Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc. vs. Court of Industrial
Relations, is that where the motion for reconsideration is denied upon the ground
that the arguments in support thereof were filed out of time, the order or decision
subject of the motion becomes 'final and unappealable'.
"We find no difficulty in applying the foregoing rules and pronouncements of this
Court in the case before us. On August 6, petitioner received a copy of the
judgment of Judge Arsenio I. Martinez aforesaid. Petitioner's motion to reconsider
—without arguments in support thereof—of August 12 was filed on time. For,
August 11, the end of the five-day reglementary period to file a motion for
reconsideration, was a Sunday. But, actually, the written arguments in support of
the said motion were submitted to the court on August 27. The period from August
12 to August 27, is a space of fifteen (15) days. Surely enough, said arguments were
filed out of time—five (5) days late. And the judgment had become final.
"3. There is, of course, petitioner's motion of August 21, 1963 seeking extension of
time within which to present its arguments in support of its motion. Counsel in his
petition before this Court pleads that the foregoing motion was grounded on the
'extremely busy and difficult schedule of counsel' which would not enable him to do
so within the stated ten-day reglementary period. The arguments were only filed on
August 27—five (5) days late, as aforesaid.
"The foregoing circumstances will not avail petitioner any. It is to be noted that the
motion for expansion of time was filed only on August 21, that is, one day before
the due date which is August 22. It was petitioner's duty to see to it that the court
act on this motion forthwith or at least inquire as to the fate thereof not later than
the 22nd of August. It did not. It merely filed its arguments on the 27th.
"To be underscored at this point is that 'obviously to speed up the disposition of
cases', CIR 'has a standing rule against the extension of the ten-day period for filing
supporting arguments'. That no-extension policy should have placed petitioner on
guard. It should not have simply folded its arms, sit by supinely, and relied on the
court's generosity. To compound petitioner's neglect, it filed the arguments only on
August 27, 1953, knowing full well that by that time the reglementary period had
expired.
15
"Petitioner cannot complain against CIR's ruling of September 16, 1963 dismissing
the motion for reconsideration on the ground that the supporting arguments were
filed out of time. That ruling in effect denied the motion for extension.
"We rule that CIR's judgment has become final and unappealable. We may not
review the same."
Notwithstanding this unequivocal and unmistakable precedent, which has not been
in any way modified, much less revoked or reversed by this Court, the main opinion
has chosen not only to go into the merits of petitioners' pose that the respondent
court erred in holding them guilty of bargaining in bad faith but also to ultimately
uphold petitioners' claim for reinstatement on constitutional grounds.
Precisely because the conclusions of the main opinion are predicated on an
exposition of the constitutional guarantees of freedoms of speech and peaceful
assembly for redress of grievances, so scholarly and masterful that it is bound to
overwhelm Us unless We note carefully the real issues in this case, I am
constrained, over and above my sincere admiration for the eloquence and zeal of
Mr. Justice Makasiar's brilliant dissertation, to dutifully state that as presented by
petitioners themselves and in the light of its attendant circumstances, this case
does not call for the resolution of any constitutional issue. Admittedly, the
invocation of any constitutional guarantee, particularly when it directly affects
individual freedoms enshrined in the bill of rights, deserves the closest attention of
this Court. It is my understanding of constitutional law and judicial practices related
thereto, however, that even the most valuable of our constitutional rights may be
protected by the courts only when their jurisdiction over the subject matter is
unquestionably established and the applicable rules of procedure consistent with
substantive and procedural due process are observed. No doubt no constitutional
right can be sacrificed in the altar of procedural technicalities, very often fittingly
downgraded as niceties, but as far as I know, this principle is applied to annul or set
aside final judgments only in cases wherein there is a possible denial of due process.
I have not come across any instance, and none is mentioned or cited in the well-
documented main opinion, wherein a final and executory judgment has been
invalidated and set aside upon the ground that the same has the effect of
sanctioning the violation of a constitutional right, unless such violation amounts to a
denial of due process.
Without support from any provision of the constitution or any law or from any
judicial precedent or reason of principle, the main opinion nudely and unqualifiedly
asserts, as if it were universally established and accepted as an absolute rule, that
"a violation of a constitutional right divests the court of jurisdiction; and as a
consequence its judgment is null and void and confers no rights". Chavez vs. Court
of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663, which is mentioned almost in passing, does uphold the
proposition that "relief from a criminal conviction secured at the sacrifice of
constitutional liberties, may be obtained through habeas corpus proceedings even
after the finality of the judgment". And, of course, Chavez is correct; as is also Abriol
vs. Homeres,2 which, in principle, served as its precedent, for the very simple
reason that in both of those cases, the accused were denied due process. In Chavez,
the accused was compelled to testify against himself as a witness for the
prosecution; in Abriol, the accused was denied his request to be allowed to present
evidence to establish his defense after his demurrer to the People's evidence was
denied.
As may be seen, however, the constitutional issues involved in those cases are a far
cry from the one now before Us. Here, petitioners do not claim they were denied
due process. Nor do they pretend that in denying their motion for reconsideration,
"the respondent Court of Industrial Relations and private firm trenched upon any of
their constitutional immunities . . .,"contrary to the statement to such effect in the
main opinion. Indeed, neither in the petition herein nor in any of the other pleading
of petitioners can any direct or indirect assertion be found assailing the impugned
decision of the respondent court as being null and void because it sanctioned a
denial of a valued constitutional liberty.
In their petition, petitioners state the issue for Our resolution as follows:
"Petitioners herein humbly submit that the issue to be resolved is whether or not
the respondent Court en banc under the facts and circumstances, should consider
the Motion for Reconsideration filed by your petitioners.
"Petitioners, therefore, in filing this petition for a writ of certiorari, humbly beg this
Honorable Court to treat this petition under Rule 43 and 65 of the Rules of Court."
"The basic issue therefore is the application by the Court en banc of the strict and
narrow technical rules of procedure without taking into account justice, equity and
substantial merits of the case."
On the other hand, the complete argument submitted by petitioners on this point in
their brief runs thus:
"III
ISSUES
"1. Does the refusal to heed a warning in the exercise of a fundamental right to
peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances
constitute bargaining in bad faith? and,
16
"Do the facts found by the court below justify the declaration and conclusion that
the union was guilty of bargaining in bad faith meriting the dismissal of the persons
allegedly responsible therefor?
"2. Was there grave abuse of discretion when the respondent court refused to act
one way or another on the petition for relief from the resolution of October 9,
1969?
IV
ARGUMENT
The respondent Court erred in finding the petitioner union guilty of bargaining in
bad faith and consequently dismissing the persons allegedly responsible therefor,
because such conclusion is contrary to the evidence on record; that the dismissal of
leaders was discriminatory.
"As a result of exercising the constitutional rights of freedom to assemble and
petition the duly constituted authorities for redress of their grievances, the
petitioners were charged and then condemned of bargaining in bad faith.
"The findings that petitioners were guilty of bargaining in bad faith were not borne
out by the records. It was not even alleged nor proven by evidence. What has been
alleged and which the respondent company tried to prove was that the
demonstration amounted to a strike and hence, a violation of the provisions of the
'no-lockout—no strike' clause of the collective bargaining agreement. However, this
allegation and proof submitted by the respondent company were practically
resolved when the respondent court in the same decision stated categorically:
'The company alleges that the walkout because of the demonstration is tantamount
to a declaration of a strike. We do not think so, as the same is not rooted in any
industrial dispute although there is a concerted act and the occurrence of a
temporary stoppage of work.' (Italics supplied, p. 4, 5th paragraph, Decision.)
"The respondent court's findings that the petitioner union bargained in bad faith is
not tenable because:
"First, it has not been alleged nor proven by the respondent company;
"Second, before the demonstration, the petitioner union and the respondent
company convened twice in a meeting to thresh out the matter of demonstration.
Petitioners requested that the employees and workers be excused but the
respondent company instead of granting the request or even settling the matter so
that the hours of
work will not be disrupted, immediately threatened the employees of mass
dismissal;
"Third, the refusal of the petitioner union to grant the request of the company that
the first shift shall be excluded in the demonstration is not tantamount to
bargaining in bad faith because the company knew that the officers of the union
belonged to the first shift, and that the union cannot go and lead the demonstration
without their officers. It must be stated that the company intends to prohibit its
officers to lead and join the demonstration because most of them belonged to the
first shift; and
"Fourth, the findings of the respondent court that the demonstration if allowed will
practically give the union the right to change the working conditions agreed in the
CBA is a conclusion of facts, opinionated and not borne by any evidence on record.
The demonstration did not practically change the terms or conditions of
employment because it was only for one (1) day and the company knew about it
before it went through. We can even say that it was the company who bargained in
bad faith, when upon representation of the Bureau of Labor not to dismiss the
employees demonstrating, the company tacitly approved the same and yet while
the demonstration was in progress, the company filed a ULP Charge and
consequently dismissed those who participated.
"Records of the case show that more or less 400 members of the union participated
in the demonstration and yet, the respondent court selected the eight officers to be
dismissed from the union thus losing their status as employees of the respondent
company. The respondent court should have taken into account that the company's
action in allowing the return of more or less three hundred ninety two (392)
employees/members of the union is an act of condonation and the dismissal of the
eight (8) officers is an act of discrimination (Phil. Air Lines Inc., vs. Phil. Air Lines
Employees Association, G.R. No. L-8197, Oct. 31, 1958). Seemingly, from the
opinion stated in the decision by the court, while there is a collective bargaining
agreement, the union cannot go on demonstration or go on strike because it will
change the terms and conditions of employment agreed in the CBA. It follows that
the CBA is over and above the constitutional rights of a man to demonstrate and
the statutory rights of a union to strike as provided for in Republic Act 875. This
17
creates a bad precedent because it will appear that the rights of the union is solely
dependent upon the CBA.
"One of the cardinal primary rights which must be respected in
proceedings before the Court of Industrial Relations is that 'the decision must be
rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the
record and disclosed to the parties affected.' (Interstate Commerce Commission vs.
L & N R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law ed. 431.) Only by confining the
administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be
protected in their rights to know and meet the case against them. (Ang Tibay vs.
CIR, G.R. No. L-45496, February 27, 1940.)
"The petitioners respectfully and humbly submit that there is no scintilla of
evidence to support the findings of the respondent court that the petitioner union
bargained in bad faith. Corollary therefore, the dismissal of the individual
petitioners is without basis either in fact or in law."
Additionally, in their reply they also argued that:
"1)That respondent court's finding that petitioners have been guilty of bargaining in
bad faith and consequently lost their status as employees of the respondent
company did not meet the meaning and comprehension of 'substantial merits of
the case.' Bargaining in bad faith has not been alleged in the complaint (Annex "C",
Petition) nor proven during the hearing of the case. The important and substantial
merit of the case is whether under the facts and circumstances alleged in
respondent company's pleadings, the demonstration done by the petitioners
amounted to on 'illegal strike' and therefore in violation of the 'no strike—no lock
out' clause of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. Petitioners respectfully reiterate
and humbly submit, that the respondent court had altogether opined and decided
that such demonstration does not amount to a strike. Hence, with that findings,
petitioners should have been absolved of the charges against them. Nevertheless,
the same respondent court disregarding, its own findings, went out of bounds by
declaring the petitioners as having 'bargained in faith.' The stand of the respondent
court is fallacious, as it follows the principle in logic as 'non-siquitor';
"2)That again respondents wanted to impress that the freedom to assemble
peaceably to air grievances against the duly constituted authorities as guaranteed in
our Constitution is subject to the limitation of the agreement in the Collective
Bargaining Agreement. The fundamental rights of the petitioners to free speech and
assembly is paramount to the provision in the Collective Bargaining Agreement and
such attempt to override the constitutional provision
would be null and void. These fundamental rights of the petitioners were not taken
into consideration in the deliberation of the case by the respondent court;"
Thus, it is clear from the foregoing contentions that petitioners are not raising any
issue of due process. They do not posit that the decision of the industrial court is
null and void on that constitutional ground. True it is that they fault the respondent
court for having priced the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement herein
involved over and above their constitutional right to peaceably assemble and
petition for redress of their grievances against the abuses of the Pasig police, but in
no sense at all do they allege or contend that such action affects its jurisdiction in a
manner that renders the proceedings a nullity. In other words, petitioners
themselves consider the alleged flaw in the court's action as a mere error of
judgment rather than that of jurisdiction which the main opinion projects. For this
Court to roundly and indignantly condemn private respondent now for the grievous
violation of the fundamental law the main opinion sees in its refusal to allow all its
workers to join the demonstration in question, when that specific issue has not
been duly presented to Us and properly argued, is to my mind unfair and unjust, for
the simple reason that the manner this case was brought to Us does not afford it
the opportunity to be heard in regard to such supposed constitutional
transgression.
To be sure, petitioners do maintain, that respondent court committed an error of
jurisdiction by finding petitioners guilty of bargaining in bad faith when the charge
against them alleged in the complaint was for having conducted a mass
demonstration, which "amounted to a strike", in violation of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement, but definitely, this jurisdictional question has no
constitutional color. Indeed, We can even assume for the sake of argument, that
the trial judge did err in not giving preferential importance to the fundamental
freedoms invoked by the petitioners over the management and proprietary
attributes claimed by the respondent private firm—still, We cannot rightly hold that
such disregard of petitioners' priceless liberties divested His Honor of jurisdiction in
the premises. The unbending doctrine of this Court is that "decisions, erroneous or
not, become final after the period fixed by law; litigations would be endless; no
questions would be finally settled; and titles to property would become precarious
if the losing party were allowed to reopen them at any time in the future".3
I only have to add to this that the fact that the error is in the interpretation,
construction or application of a constitutional precept, not constituting a denial of
due process, should not make any difference. Juridically, a party cannot be less
injured by an overlooked or erroneously sanctioned violation of an ordinary statute
than by a misconstrued or misapplied constitutional injunction affecting his
18
individual freedoms. In both instances, there is injustice which should be intolerable
were it not for the more paramount considerations that inform the principle of
immutability of final judgments. I dare say this must be the reason why, as I have
already noted, the main opinion does not cite any constitutional provision, law or
rule or any judicial doctrine or principle supporting its basic holding that
infringement of constitutional guarantees, other than denial of due process, divests
courts of jurisdiction to render valid judgments.
In this connection, it must be recalled that the teaching of Philippine Association of
Colleges and Universities vs. Secretary of Education,4 following Santiago vs. Far
Eastern Broadcasting,5 is that "it is one of our (the Supreme Court's) decisional
practices that unless a constitutional point is specifically raised, insisted upon and
adequately argued, the court will not consider it". In the case at bar, the petitioners
have not raised, they are not insisting upon, much less have they adequately argued
the constitutional issues so extendedly and ably discussed in the main opinion.
Indeed, it does not seem wise and sound for the Supreme Court to hold that the
erroneous resolution by a court of a constitutional issue not amounting to a denial
of due process renders its judgment or decision null and void, and, therefore,
subject to attack even after said judgment or decision has become final and
executory. I have actually tried to bring myself into agreement with the views of the
distinguished and learned writer of the main opinion, if only to avoid dissenting
from his well prepared thesis, but its obvious incongruity with settled jurisprudence
always comes to the fore to stifle my effort.
As a matter of fact, for a moment, it appeared to me as if I could go along with
petitioners under the authority of our constitutionally irreducible appellate
jurisdiction under Section 2(5) of Article VII of the 1935 Constitution of the
Philippines6 (reenacted practically ipssisimis verbis in Section 5(2) (e) of the 1973
Constitution), only to realize upon further reflection that the very power granted to
Us to review decisions of lower courts involving questions of law (and these include
constitutional issues not affecting the validity of statutes, treaty, executive
agreement, etc.) is not unqualified but has to be exercised only in the manner
provided in the law or the Rules of Court. In other words, before We can exercise
appellate jurisdiction over constitutional issues, no matter how important they may
be, there must first be a showing of compliance with the applicable procedural law
or rules, among them, those governing appeals from the Court of Industrial
Relations involved herein. Consequently, if by law or rule, a judgment of the
industrial court is already final and executory, this Court would be devoid of power
and authority to review, much less alter or modify the same, absent any denial of
due process or fatal defect of jurisdiction. It must be borne in mind that the
situation confronting Us now is not merely whether or not We should pass upon a
question or issue not specifically raised by the party concerned, which, to be sure,
could be enough reason to dissuade Us from taking pains in resolving the same;
rather, the real problem here is whether or not We have jurisdiction to entertain it.
And, in this regard, as already stated earlier, no less than Justice Conrado Sanchez,
the writer of Chavez, supra., which is being relied upon by the main
opinion, already laid down the precedent in Elizalde vs. Court, supra, which for its
four-square applicability to the facts of this case, We have no choice but to follow,
that is, that in view of the failure of the petitioners to file not only their motion for
reconsideration but even their argument supporting the same within the prescribed
period, "the judgment (against them) has become final, beyond recall".
Indeed, when I consider that courts would be useless if the finality and
enforceability of their judgments are made contingent on the correctness thereof
from the constitutional standpoint, and that in truth, whether or not they are
correct is something that is always dependent upon combined opinion of the
members of the Supreme Court, which in turn is naturally as changeable as the
members themselves are changed, I cannot conceive of anything more pernicious
and destructive to a trustful administration of justice than the idea that, even
without any showing of denial of due process or want of jurisdiction of the court, a
final and executory judgment of such court may still be set aside or reopened in
instances other than those expressly allowed by Rule 38 and that of extrinsic fraud
under Article 1146(1) of the Civil Code.7 And just to emphasize the policy of the law
of respecting judgments once they have become final, even as this Court has ruled
that final decisions are mute in the presence of fraud which the law abhors,8 it is
only when the fraud is extrinsic and not intrinsic that final and executory judgments
may be set aside,9 and this only when the remedy is sought within the prescriptive
period.10
Apropos here is the following passage in Li Kim Tho vs. Go Sin Kaw, 82 Phil. 776:
"Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to
an effective and efficient administration of
10 Quion v. Claridad, 74 Phil. 100. justice that once a judgment has become final,
the winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the
verdict. Courts must therefore guard against any scheme calculated to bring about
that result. Constituted as they are to put an end to controversies, courts should
frown upon any attempt to prolong them."
19
Likewise the stern admonition of Justice George Malcolm in Dy Cay v. Crossfield, 38
Phil. 521, thus:
"x x x. Public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional errors,
judgments of courts should become final at some definite date fixed by law. The
very object for which courts were instituted was to put an end to controversies. To
fulfill this purpose and to do so speedily, certain time limits, more or less arbitrary,
have to be set up to spur on the slothful. 'If a vacillating, irresolute judge were
allowed to thus keep causes ever within his power, to determine and redetermine
them term after term, to bandy his judgments about from one party to the other,
and to change his conclusions as freely and as capriciously as a chamelon may
change its hues, then litigation might become more intolerable than the wrongs it is
intended to redress.' (See Arnedo vs. Llorente and Liongson (1911), 18 Phil., 257.)."
My disagreement with the dissenters in Republic vs. Judge de los Angeles, L-26112,
October 4, 1971, 41 SCRA 422, was not as to the unalterability and invulnerability of
final judgments but rather on the correct interpretation of the contents of the
judgment in question therein. Relevantly to this case at bar, I said then:
"The point of res adjudicata discussed in the dissents has not escaped my attention.
Neither am I overlooking the point of the Chief Justice regarding the dangerous and
inimical implications of a ruling that would authorize the revision, amendment or
alteration of a final and executory judgment. I want to emphasize that my position
in this opinion does not detract a whit from the soundness, authority and binding
force of existing doctrines enjoining any such modifications. The public policy of
maintaining faith and respect in judicial decisions, which inform said doctrines, is
admittedly of the highest order. I am not advocating any departure from them. Nor
am I trying to put forth for execution a decision that I believe should have been
rather than what it is. All I am doing is to view not the judgment of Judge Tengco
but the decision of this Court in G.R. No.
L-20950, as it is and not as I believe it should have been, and, by this opinion, I
would like to guide the court a quo as to what, in my honest view, is the true and
correct meaning and implications of the decision of this Court, not that of Judge
Tengco's."
The main opinion calls attention to many instances, precisely involving cases in the
industrial court, wherein this Court refused to be constrained by technical rules of
procedure in its determination to accord substantial justice to the parties. I still
believe in those decisions, some of which were penned by me. I am certain,
however, that in none of those precedents did this Court disturb a judgment
already final and executory. It is too obvious to require extended elucidation or
even reference to any precedent or authority that the principle of immutability of
final judgments is not a mere technicality, and if it may be considered to be in a
sense a procedural rule, it is one that is founded on public policy and cannot,
therefore, yield to the ordinary plea that it must give priority to substantial justice.
Apparently bent on looking for a constitutional point of due process to hold on, the
main opinion goes far as to maintain that the long existing and constantly applied
rule governing the filing of motions for reconsideration in the Court of Industrial
Relations, "as applied in this case does not implement or reinforce or strengthen
the constitutional rights affected, but instead constricts the same to the point of
nullifying the enjoyment thereof by the petitioning employees. Said Court of
Industrial Relations Rule, promulgated as it was pursuant to a mere legislative
delegation, is unreasonable and therefore is beyond the authority granted by the
Constitution and the law. A period of five (5) days within which to file a motion for
reconsideration is too short, especially for the aggrieved workers, who usually do
not have the ready funds to meet the necessary expenses therefor. In case of the
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, a period of fifteen (15) days has been
fixed for the filing of the motion for re-hearing or reconsideration (Sec. 10, Rule 51;
Sec. 1, Rule 52; Sec. 1, Rule 56, Revised Rules of Court). The delay in the filing of the
motion for reconsideration could have been only one day if September 28, 1969
was not a Sunday. This fact accentuates the unreasonableness of the Court of
Industrial Relations Rule insofar as circumstances of the instant case are
concerned."
I am afraid the zeal and passion of these arguments do not justify the conclusion
suggested. Viewed objectively, it can readily be seen that there can hardly be any
factual or logical basis for such a critical view of the rule in question. Said rule
provides:
"MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION
"Sec. 15. The movant shall file the motion, in six copies, within five (5) days from the
date on which he receives notice of the order or decision, object of the motion for
reconsideration, the same to be verified under oath with respect to the correctness
of the allegations of fact, and serving a copy thereof, personally or by registered
mail, on the adverse party. The latter may file an answer, in six (6) copies, duly
verified under oath.
"Sec. 16. Both the motion and the answer shall be submitted with arguments
supporting the same. If the arguments can not be submitted simultaneously with
said motions, upon notice to the Court, the movant shall file same within ten (10)
days from the date of the filing of his motion for reconsideration. The adverse party
20
shall also file his answer within ten (10) days from the receipt by him of a copy of
the arguments submitted by the movant.
"Sec. 17. After an answer to the motion is registered, or after ten (10) days from the
receipt of the arguments in support of said motion having been filed, the motion
shall be deemed submitted for resolution of the Court in banc, unless it is
considered necessary to hear oral arguments, in which case the Court shall issue the
corresponding order or notice to that effect.
"Failure to observe the above-specified periods shall be sufficient cause for
dismissal of the motion for reconsideration or striking out of the answer and/or the
supporting arguments, as the case may be. (As amended April 20, 1951, Court of
Industrial Relations.)."
As implemented and enforced in actual practice, this rule, as everyone acquainted
with proceedings in the industrial court well knows, precisely permits the party
aggrieved by a judgment to file no more than a pro-forma motion for
reconsideration without any argument or lengthy discussion and with barely a brief
statement of the fundamental ground or grounds therefor, without prejudice to
supplementing the same by making the necessary exposition, with citations of laws
and authorities, in the written arguments to be filed ten (10) days later. In truth,
such a pro-forma motion has the effect of just advising the court and the other
party that the movant does not agree with the judgment due to fundamental
defects stated in brief and general terms. Evidently, the purpose of this
requirement is to apprise everyone concerned within the shortest possible time
that a reconsideration is to be sought, and thereby enable the parties concerned to
make whatever adjustments may be warranted by the situation, in the meanwhile
that the litigation is prolonged. It must be borne in mind that cases in the industrial
court may involve or affect the operation of vital industries in which labor-
management problems might require day-to-day solutions and it is to the best
interests of justice and all concerned that the attitude of each party at every
important juncture of the case be known to the other so that other avenues for
earlier settlement may, if possible, be explored.
There can be no reason at all to complain that the time fixed by the rule is short or
inadequate. In fact, the motion filed by petitioners was no more than the following:
"MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
"COME NOW movant respondents, through counsel, to this Honorable Court most
respectfully moves for the RECONSIDERATION of the Order of this Honorable Court
dated September 17, 1969 on the ground that the same is not in accordance with
law, evidence and facts adduced during the hearing of the above-entitled case.
"Movant-respondents most respectfully move for leave to file their respective
arguments within ten (10) days pursuant to Sections 15, 16 & 17 as amended of the
Rules of Court.
"WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that this Motion for Reconsideration be
admitted.
"Manila, September 27, 1969."
To say that five (5) days is an unreasonable period for the filing of such a motion is
to me simply incomprehensible. What is worse in this case is that petitioners have
not even taken the trouble of giving an explanation of their inability to comply with
the rule. Not only that, petitioners were also late five (5) days in filing their written
arguments in support of their motion, and, the only excuse offered for such delay is
that both the President of the Union and the office clerk who took charge of the
matter forgot to do what they were instructed to do by counsel, which, according to
this Court, as I shall explain anon, "is the most hackneyed and habitual subterfuge
employed by litigants who fail to observe the procedural requirements prescribed
by the Rules of Court". (Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Arca, infra). And yet, very
indignantly, the main opinion would want the Court to overlook such nonchalance
and indifference.
In this connection, I might add that in my considered opinion, the rules fixing
periods for the finality of judgments are in a sense more substantive than
procedural in their real nature, for in their operation they have the effect of either
creating or terminating rights pursuant to the terms of the particular judgment
concerned. And the fact that the court that rendered such final judgment is
deprived of jurisdiction or authority to alter or modify the same enhances such
substantive character. Moreover, because they have the effect of terminating rights
and the enforcement thereof, it may be said that said rules partake of the nature
also of rules of prescription, which again are substantive. Now, the twin predicates
of prescription are inaction or abandonment and the passage of time or a
prescribed period. On the other hand, procrastination or failure to act on time is
unquestionably a form of abandonment, particularly when it is not or cannot be
sufficiently explained. The most valuable right of a party may be lost by
prescription, and he has no reason to complain because public policy demands that
rights must be asserted in time, as otherwise they can be deemed waived.
I see no justification whatsoever for not applying these self-evident principles to the
case of petitioners. Hence, I feel disinclined to adopt the suggestion that the Court
suspend, for the purposes of this case the rules aforequoted of the Court of
Industrial Relations. Besides, I have grave doubts as to whether we can suspend
21
rules of other courts, particularly one that is not under our supervisory jurisdiction,
being an administrative agency under the Executive Department. Withal, if, in order
to hasten the administration of substantial justice, this Court did exercise in some
instances its reserve power to amend its rules, I am positively certain, it has never
done it for the purpose of reviving a case in which the judgment has already
become final and executory.
Before closing, it may be mentioned here, that as averred in their petition, in a
belated effort to salvage their cause, petitioners filed in the industrial court on
October 31, 1969 a petition for relief alleging that their failure to file their
"Arguments in Support of their Motion for Reconsideration" within the
reglementary period or five (5), if not seven (7), days late "was due to excusable
negligence and honest mistake committed by the President of the respondent
Union and of the office clerk of the counsel for respondents as shown and attested
in their respective affidavits", (See Annexes K, K-1, and K-2) which in brief, consisted
allegedly of the said President's having forgotten his appointment with his lawyer
"despite previous instructions" and of the said office employee having also
coincidentally forgotten "to do the work as instructed (sic) to (him) by Atty. Osorio"
because he "was too busy with clerical jobs". No sympathy at all can be evoked by
these allegations, for, under probably more justifying circumstances, this Court
ruled out a similar explanation in a previous case this wise:
"We find merit in PAL's petition. The excuse offered by respondent Santos as reason
for his fail ure to perfect in due time his appeal from the judgment of the Municipal
Court, that counsel's clerk forgot to hand him the court notice, is the most
hackneyed and habitual subterfuge employed by litigants who fail to observe the
procedural requirements prescribed by the Rules of Court. The uncritical
acceptance of this kind of commonplace excuses, in the face of the Supreme Court's
repeated rulings that they are neither credible nor constitutive of excusable
negligence (Gaerlan vs. Bernal, L 4039, 29 January 1952; Mercado vs. Judge
Domingo, L-19457, 17 December 1966) is certainly such whimsical exercise of
judgment as to be a grave abuse of discretion." (Philippine Air Lines, Inc. vs. Arca, 19
SCRA 300.)
For the reason, therefore, that the judgment of the industrial court sought to be
reviewed in the present case has already become final and executory, nay, not
without the fault of the petitioners, hence, no matter how erroneous from the
constitutional viewpoint it may be, it is already beyond recall, I vote to dismiss this
case, without pronouncement as to costs.
SEPARATE OPINION
TEEHANKEE,J., concurring:
For having carried out a mass demonstration at Malacañang on March 4, 1969 in
protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police department, upon two days' prior
notice to respondent employer company, as against the latter's insistence that the
first shift1 should not participate but instead report for work, under pain of
dismissal, the industrial court ordered the dismissal from employment of the eight
individual petitioners as union officers and organizers of the mass demonstration.
Respondent court's order finding petitioner union guilty on respondent's complaint
of bargaining in bad faith and unfair labor practice for having so carried out the
mass demonstration, notwithstanding that it concededly was not a declaration of
strike nor directed in any manner against respondent employer, and ordering the
dismissal of the union officers, manifestly constituted grave abuse of discretion in
fact and in law.
There could not be, in fact, bargaining in bad faith nor unfair labor practice since
respondent firm conceded that "the demonstration is an inalienable right of the
union guaranteed by the Constitution" and the union up to the day of the
demonstration pleaded by cablegram to the company to excuse the first shift and
allow it to join the demonstration in accordance with their previous requests.
1 The first shift comprised the workers from 6 A. M. to 2 P.M. Respondent company
had no objection to the two regular shifts workers (7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and 8 A.M. to 5
P.M.) being excused from work for the mass demonstration.
Neither could there be, in law, a willful violation of the collective bargaining
agreement's "no-strike" clause as would warrant the union leaders' dismissal, since
as found by respondent court itself the mass demonstration was not a declaration
of a strike, there being no industrial dispute between the protagonists, but merely
"the occurrence of a temporary stoppage of work" to enable the workers to
exercise their constitutional rights of free expression, peaceable assembly and
petition for redress of grievance against alleged police excesses.
Respondent court's en banc resolution dismissing petitioners' motion for
reconsideration for having been filed two days late, after expiration of the
reglementary five-day period fixed by its rules, due to the negligence of petitioners'
counsel and/or the union president should likewise be set aside as a manifest act of
grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners' petition for relief from the normal adverse
consequences of the late filing of their motion for reconsideration due to such
negligence—which was not acted upon by respondent court—should have been
granted, considering the monstrous injustice that would otherwise be caused the
petitioners through their summary dismissal from employment, simply because
22
they sought in good faith to exercise basic human rights guaranteed them by the
Constitution. It should be noted further that no proof of actual loss from the oneday
stoppage of work was shown by respondent company, providing basis to the main
opinion's premise that its insistence on dismissal of the union leaders for having
included the first shift workers in the mass demonstration against its wishes was
but an act of arbitrary vindictiveness.
Only thus could the basic constitutional rights of the individual petitioners and the
constitutional injunction to afford protection to labor be given true substance and
meaning. No person may be deprived of such basic rights without due process—
which is but "responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates
of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided . . . Due
process is thus hostile to any official action marred by lack of reasonableness.
Correctly it has been identified as freedom from arbitrariness."2
Accordingly, I vote for the setting aside of the appealed orders of the respondent
court and concur in the judgment for petitioners as set forth in the main opinion.
Judgment set aside and directing the re-instatement of the herein eight (8)
petitioners.
Notes.—The rule is that the law forms part of, and is read into, every contract,
unless clearly excluded therefrom in those cases where such exclusion is allowed
(Liberation Steamship Co., Inc. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, L-25389, June 27,
1968, 23 SCRA 1105; National Development Company vs. Unlicensed Crew
Members of Three Doña Vessels (PMIU), L-25390, June 27, 1968, 23 SCRA 1105).
It has also been held that as a matter of principle the provisions of the Industrial
Peace Act granting freedom to employees to organize themselves and select their
representatives for entering into bargaining agreements, should be subordinated to
the constitutional provision protecting the sanctity of contracts. (Victorias Milling
Co., Inc. vs. Victorias Manapla Workers Organization PAFLU, L-18467, Sept. 30,
1963, 9 SCRA 154).
Due Process
#2 Buck vs. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927)
FACTS:
The Racial Integrity Act of 1924 (Sterilization Act) was approved on March,
20, 1924 for the sterilization of those people who are mentally defective under the
care of institutions supported by the Commonwealth, by which if these people who
are mentally defective will be discharged now, would just become a menace to the
society, but if incapable of procreation, might be discharged with safety and
become self – supporting with the benefit to themselves and to the society.
The sterilization may be conducted through vasectomy in males and
salpingectomy in females. It was believe to promote the health and welfare of the
society for eugenicists believes that mental illness and retardation, epilepsy,
alcoholism, and certain criminal behavior were genetically inherited and was feared
to be weakening the gene pool of the general population.
Carrie Buck is a feebleminded white woman who was an inmate to Virginia
State Colony for Epileptics and Feebleminded. She is the daughter of a
feebleminded mother in the same institution, and a mother of an illegitimate
feebleminded child as a result of rape.
The Board of Directors of the State Colony ordered the authorization for
Buck’s sterilization, by which Buck and her guardian contended that the due process
clause guarantees all adults the right to procreate which was being violated. They
also made the argument that the Equal Protection Clause in the 14th
Amendment was being violated since not all similarly situated people were being
treated the same. The sterilization law was only for the "feeble-minded" at certain
state institutions and made no mention of other state institutions or those who
were not in an institution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent by authorizing the petitioner’s sterilization
denied her right to due process and equal protection of laws?
RULING:
No. It was held by the Court, that Buck, her mother, and her daughter were
“feebleminded” and that it was the state’s interest to have her sterilized.
The judgment finds the facts that have been recited that Carrie Buck is a
probable potential parent of socially inadequate offspring, likewise afflicted, that
she maybe sexually sterilized without detriment to her general health, and that her
welfare and that of society will be promoted by her sterilization.
Notice of the petition and of the time and place of hearing in the
institution is served to the inmate, and also upon his guardian and the board see to
it that the inmate attends his hearing if desired by him or his guardian.
In support of Justice Holmes’ argument that the interest of the states in a
"pure" gene pool outweighed the interest of individuals in their bodily integrity, he
23
expressed that “It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute
degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can
prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind.” And that "Three
generations of imbeciles are enough.”
The ruling legitimized Virginia's sterilization procedures until they were repealed in
1974.
#3 G.R. No. 135962             March 27, 2000
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., respondent.
PUNO, J.:
Not infrequently, the government is tempted to take legal shortcuts solve urgent
problems of the people. But even when government is armed with the best of
intention, we cannot allow it to run roughshod over the rule of law. Again, we let
the hammer fall and fall hard on the illegal attempt of the MMDA to open for public
use a private road in a private subdivision. While we hold that the general welfare
should be promoted, we stress that it should not be achieved at the expense of the
rule of law.
Petitioner MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of basic services
in Metro Manila. Respondent Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. (BAVA) is a non-stock,
non-profit corporation whose members are homeowners in Bel-Air Village, a private
subdivision in Makati City. Respondent BAVA is the registered owner of Neptune
Street, a road inside Bel-Air Village.
On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner, through its Chairman,
a notice dated December 22, 1995 requesting respondent to open Neptune Street
to public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996. The notice reads:
SUBJECT: NOTICE of the Opening of Neptune Street to Traffic.
Dear President Lindo,
Please be informed that pursuant to the mandate of the MMDA law or
Republic Act No. 7924 which requires the Authority to rationalize the use
of roads and/or thoroughfares for the safe and convenient movement of
 persons, Neptune Street shall be opened to vehicular traffic effective
January 2, 1996.
In view whereof, the undersigned requests you to voluntarily open the
points of entry and exit on said street.
Thank you for your cooperation and whatever assistance that may be
extended by your association to the MMDA personnel who will be
directing traffic in the area.
Finally, we are furnishing you with a copy of the handwritten instruction of
the President on the matter.
Very truly yours,
PROSPERO I. ORETA
Chairman 1
On the same day, respondent was apprised that the perimeter wall
separating the subdivision from the adjacent Kalayaan Avenue would be
demolished.
On January 2, 1996, respondent instituted against petitioner before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 136, Makati City, Civil Case No. 96-001 for injunction.
Respondent prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction enjoining the opening of Neptune Street and prohibiting the
demolition of the perimeter wall. The trial court issued a temporary restraining
order the following day.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the challenged Order dated January
23, 1995, in Civil Case No. 96-001, is SET ASIDE and the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction issued on February 13, 1996 is hereby made permanent.
For want of sustainable substantiation, the Motion to Cite Roberto L. del
Rosario in contempt is denied. 5
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 6
The Motion for Reconsideration of the decision was denied on September 28, 1998.
Hence, this recourse.
Petitioner MMDA raises the following questions:
I
HAS THE METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (MMDA)
THE MANDATE TO OPEN NEPTUNE STREET TO PUBLIC TRAFFIC PURSUANT
TO ITS REGULATORY AND POLICE POWERS?
II
IS THE PASSAGE OF AN ORDINANCE A CONDITION PRECEDENT BEFORE THE
MMDA MAY ORDER THE OPENING OF SUBDIVISION ROADS TO PUBLIC
TRAFFIC?
III

On January 23, 1996, after due hearing, the trial court denied issuance of a IS RESPONDENT BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC. ESTOPPED FROM
preliminary injunction. 2 Respondent questioned the denial before the Court of DENYING OR ASSAILING THE AUTHORITY OF THE MMDA TO OPEN THE
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 39549. The appellate court conducted an ocular SUBJECT STREET?
inspection of Neptune Street 3 and on February 13, 1996, it issued a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining the implementation of the MMDA's proposed
IV
action. 4
WAS RESPONDENT DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS DESPITE THE SEVERAL
On January 28, 1997, the appellate court rendered a Decision on the merits of the
MEETINGS HELD BETWEEN MMDA AND THE AFFECTED EEL-AIR RESIDENTS
case finding that the MMDA has no authority to order the opening of Neptune
AND BAVA OFFICERS?
Street, a private subdivision road and cause the demolition of its perimeter walls. It
held that the authority is lodged in the City Council of Makati by ordinance. The
V
decision disposed of as follows:
24
 HAS RESPONDENT COME TO COURT WITH UNCLEAN HANDS? 7
Neptune Street is owned by respondent BAVA. It is a private road inside Bel-Air
Village, a private residential subdivision in the heart of the financial and commercial
district of Makati City. It runs parallel to Kalayaan Avenue, a national road open to
the general public. Dividing the two (2) streets is a concrete perimeter wall
approximately fifteen (15) feet high. The western end of Neptune Street intersects
Nicanor Garcia, formerly Reposo Street, a subdivision road open to public vehicular
traffic, while its eastern end intersects Makati Avenue, a national road. Both ends of
Neptune Street are guarded by iron gates.
Petitioner MMDA claims that it has the authority to open Neptune Street to public
traffic because it is an agent of the state endowed with police power in the delivery
of basic services in Metro Manila. One of these basic services is traffic management
which involves the regulation of the use of thoroughfares to insure the safety,
convenience and welfare of the general public. It is alleged that the police power of
MMDA was affirmed by this Court in the consolidated cases of Sangalang
v.  Intermediate Appellate Court. 8 From the premise that it has police power, it is
now urged that there is no need for the City of Makati to enact an ordinance
opening Neptune street to the public. 9
Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined as the
power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish
all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with
penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for
the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the
same. 10 The power is plenary and its scope is vast and pervasive, reaching and
justifying measures for public health, public safety, public morals, and the general
welfare. 11
It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the National
Legislature. 12 It cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not
possessing legislative power. 13 The National Legislature, however, may
delegate  this power to the President and administrative boards as well as the
lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government units. 14 Once
delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on
them by the national lawmaking body. 15
A local government  is a "political subdivision of a nation or state which is
constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs." 16 The Local
Government Code of 1991 defines a local government unit as a "body politic and
corporate." 17 — one endowed with powers as a political subdivision of the National
Government and as a corporate entity representing the inhabitants of its
25
territory. 18 Local government units are the provinces, cities, municipalities and
barangays. 19 They are also the territorial and political subdivisions of the state. 20
Our Congress delegated police power to the local government units in the Local
Government Code of 1991. This delegation is found in Section 16 of the same Code,
known as the general welfare clause, viz:
Sec. 16. General Welfare. — Every local government unit shall exercise the
powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as
powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective
governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general
welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government
units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and
enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the
people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of
appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities,
improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice,
promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and
order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants. 21
Local government units exercise police power through their respective legislative
bodies. The legislative body of the provincial government is the sangguniang
panlalawigan, that of the city government is the sangguniang panlungsod, that of
the municipal government is the sangguniang bayan, and that of the barangay is
the sangguniang barangay. The Local Government Code of 1991 empowers
the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod and sangguniang
bayan to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the
general welfare of the [province, city or municipality, as the case may be], and its
inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of the Code and in the proper exercise of the
corporate powers of the [province, city municipality] provided under the Code . . .
" 22 The same Code gives the sangguniang barangay  the power to "enact ordinances
as may be necessary to discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law or
ordinance and to promote the general welfare of the inhabitants thereon." 23
Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local government
units  — i.e., twelve (12) cities and five (5) municipalities, namely, the cities of
Caloocan, Manila, Mandaluyong, Makati, Pasay, Pasig, Quezon, Muntinlupa, Las
Pinas, Marikina, Paranaque and Valenzuela, and the municipalities of Malabon,
Navotas, Pateros, San Juan and Taguig. With the passage of Republic Act (R. A.)
No. 7924  24 in 1995, Metropolitan Manila was declared as a  "special development
and administrative region" and the Administration of  "metro-wide" basic services
affecting the region placed under "a development authority" referred to as the
MMDA. 25
"Metro-wide services" are those "services which have metro-wide impact and
transcend local political boundaries or entail huge expenditures such that it would
not be viable for said services to be provided by the individual local government
units comprising Metro Manila." 26 There are seven (7) basic metro-wide services
and the scope of these services cover the following: (1) development planning; (2)
transport and traffic management; (3) solid waste disposal and management; (4)
flood control and sewerage management; (5) urban renewal, zoning and land use
planning, and shelter services; (6) health and sanitation, urban protection and
pollution control; and (7) public safety. The basic service of transport and traffic
management includes the following:
(b) Transport and traffic management which include the
formulation, coordination, and monitoring of
policies, standards,  programs and projects to rationalize the existing
transport operations, infrastructure requirements, the use of
thoroughfares, and promotion of safe and convenient movement of
persons and goods;  provision for the mass transport system and the
institution of a system to regulate road users; administration and
implementation of all traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering
services and traffic education programs, including the institution of a single
ticketing system in Metropolitan Manila;" 27
In the delivery of the seven (7) basic services, the MMDA has the following powers
and functions:
Sec. 5. Functions and powers of the Metro Manila Development Authority.
— The MMDA shall:
(a) Formulate, coordinate and regulate the implementation of medium and
long-term plans and programs for the delivery of metro-wide services, land
use and physical development within Metropolitan Manila, consistent with
national development objectives and priorities;
(b) Prepare, coordinate and regulate the implementation of medium-term
investment programs for metro-wide services which shall indicate sources
and uses of funds for priority programs and projects, and which shall
include the packaging of projects and presentation to funding institutions;
(c) Undertake and manage on its own metro-wide programs and projects
for the delivery of specific services under its jurisdiction, subject to the
approval of the Council. For this purpose, MMDA can create appropriate
project management offices;
26
(d) Coordinate and monitor the implementation of such plans, programs
and projects in Metro Manila; identify bottlenecks and adopt solutions to
problems of implementation;
(e) The MMDA shall set the policies concerning traffic in Metro Manila, and
shall coordinate and regulate the implementation of all programs and
projects concerning traffic management, specifically pertaining to
enforcement, engineering and education. Upon request, it shall be
extended assistance and cooperation, including but not limited
to, assignment of personnel, by all other government agencies and offices
concerned;
(f) Install and administer a single ticketing system, fix, impose and collect
fines and penalties for all kinds of violations of traffic rules and
regulations, whether moving or non-moving in nature, and confiscate and
suspend or revoke drivers' licenses in the enforcement of such traffic laws
and regulations, the provisions of RA 4136 and PD 1605 to the contrary
notwithstanding. For this purpose, the Authority shall impose all traffic
laws and regulations in Metro Manila, through its traffic operation
center, and may deputize members of the PNP, traffic enforcers of local
government units, duly licensed security guards, or members of non-
governmental organizations to whom may be delegated certain
authority, subject to such conditions and requirements as the Authority
may impose; and
(g) Perform other related functions required to achieve the objectives of
the MMDA, including the undertaking of delivery of basic services to the
local government units, when deemed necessary subject to prior
coordination with and consent of the local government unit concerned.
The implementation of the MMDA's plans, programs and projects is undertaken by
the local government units, national government agencies, accredited people's
organizations, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector as well as by
the MMDA itself. For this purpose, the MMDA has the power to enter into
contracts, memoranda of agreement and other arrangements with these bodies for
the delivery of the required services Metro Manila. 28
The governing board of the MMDA is the Metro Manila Council. The Council is
composed of the mayors of the component 12 cities and 5 municipalities, the
president of the Metro Manila Vice-Mayors' League and the president of the Metro
Manila Councilors' League. 29 The Council is headed by Chairman who is appointed
by the President and vested with the rank of cabinet member. As the policy-making
body of the MMDA, the Metro Manila Council approves metro-wide plans,
programs and projects, and issues the necessary rules and regulations for the
implementation of said plans; it approves the annual budget of the MMDA and
promulgate the rules and regulations for the delivery of basic services, collection of
service and regulatory fees, fines and penalties. These functions are particularly
enumerated as follows:
Sec. 6. Functions of the Metro Manila Council. —
(a) The Council shall be the policy-making body of the MMDA;
(b) It shall approve metro-wide plans, programs and projects and issue
rules and regulations deemed necessary by the MMDA to carry out the
purposes of this Act;
(c) It may increase the rate of allowances and per diems of the members of
the Council to be effective during the term of the succeeding Council. It
shall fix the compensation of the officers and personnel of the MMDA, and
approve the annual budget thereof for submission to the Department of
Budget and Management (DBM);
(d) It shall promulgate rules and regulations and set policies and standards
for metro-wide application governing the delivery of basic services,
prescribe and collect service and regulatory fees, and impose and collect
fines and penalties.
Clearly, the scope of the MMDA's function is limited to the delivery of the seven (7)
basic services. One of these is transport and traffic management which includes the
formulation and monitoring of policies, standards and projects to rationalize the
existing transport operations, infrastructure requirements, the use of thoroughfares
and promotion of the safe movement of persons and goods. It also covers the mass
transport system and the institution of a system of road regulation, the
administration of all traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and
traffic education programs, including the institution of a single ticketing system in
Metro Manila for traffic violations. Under the service, the MMDA is expressly
authorized "to set the policies concerning traffic" and "coordinate and regulate the
implementation of all traffic management programs." In addition, the MMDA may
"install and administer a single ticketing system," fix, impose and collect fines and
penalties for all traffic violations.
It will be noted that the powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts:
formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management,
monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and administration.  There is
27
no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone
legislative power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any
legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units, there
is no provision in R.A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to "enact
ordinances, approve resolutions appropriate funds for the general welfare" of the
inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself,
"development authority." 30 It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down
policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, people's
organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the
efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All
its functions are administrative in nature and these are actually summed up in the
charter itself, viz:
Sec. 2. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority. — . . . .
The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and coordinative functions,
and in the process exercise regulatory and supervisory authority  over the
delivery of metro-wide services within Metro Manila, without diminution
of the autonomy of the local government units concerning purely local
matters. 31
Petitioner cannot seek refuge in the cases of Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate
Court  32 where we upheld a zoning ordinance issued by the Metro Manila
Commission (MMC), the predecessor of the MMDA, as an exercise of police power.
The first Sangalang decision was on the merits of the petition, 33 while the second
decision denied reconsideration of the first case and in addition discussed the case
of Yabut v. Court of Appeals. 34
Sangalang v. IAC  involved five (5) consolidated petitions filed by respondent BAVA
and three residents of Bel-Air Village against other residents of the Village and the
Ayala Corporation, formerly the Makati Development Corporation, as the developer
of the subdivision. The petitioners sought to enforce certain restrictive easements
in the deeds of sale over their respective lots in the subdivision. These were the
prohibition on the setting up of commercial and advertising signs on the lots, and
the condition that the lots be used only for residential purposes. Petitioners alleged
that respondents, who were residents along Jupiter Street of the subdivision,
converted their residences into commercial establishments in violation of the "deed
restrictions," and that respondent Ayala Corporation ushered in the full
commercialization" of Jupiter Street by tearing down the perimeter wall that
separated the commercial from the residential section of the village. 35
The petitions were dismissed based on Ordinance No. 81 of the Municipal Council
of Makati and Ordinance No. 81-01 of the Metro Manila Commission (MMC).
Municipal Ordinance No. 81 classified Bel-Air Village as a Class A Residential Zone,
with its boundary in the south extending to the center line of Jupiter Street. The
Municipal Ordinance was adopted by the MMC under the Comprehensive Zoning
Ordinance for the National Capital Region and promulgated as MMC Ordinance No.
81-01. Bel-Air Village was indicated therein as bounded by Jupiter Street and the
block adjacent thereto was classified as a High Intensity Commercial Zone. 36
We ruled that since both Ordinances recognized Jupiter Street as the boundary
between Bel-Air Village and the commercial district, Jupiter Street was not for the
exclusive benefit of Bel-Air residents. We also held that the perimeter wall on said
street was constructed not to separate the residential from the commercial blocks
but simply for security reasons, hence, in tearing down said wall, Ayala Corporation
did not violate the "deed restrictions" in the deeds of sale.
We upheld the ordinances, specifically MMC Ordinance No. 81-01, as a legitimate
exercise of police power. 37 The power of the MMC and the Makati Municipal
Council to enact zoning ordinances for the general welfare prevailed over the "deed
restrictions".
In the second Sangalang/Yabut decision, we held that the opening of Jupiter Street
was warranted by the demands of the common good in terms of "traffic
decongestion and public convenience." Jupiter was opened by the Municipal Mayor
to alleviate traffic congestion along the public streets adjacent to the Village. 38 The
same reason was given for the opening to public vehicular traffic of Orbit Street, a
road inside the same village. The destruction of the gate in Orbit Street was also
made under the police power of the municipal government. The gate, like the
perimeter wall along Jupiter, was a public nuisance because it hindered and
impaired the use of property, hence, its summary abatement by the mayor was
proper and legal. 39
Contrary to petitioner's claim, the two Sangalang cases do not apply to the case at
bar. Firstly, both involved zoning ordinances passed by the municipal council of
Makati and the MMC. In the instant case, the basis for the proposed opening of
Neptune Street is contained in the notice of December 22, 1995 sent by petitioner
to respondent BAVA, through its president. The notice does not cite any ordinance
or law, either by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City or by the MMDA, as
the legal basis for the proposed opening of Neptune Street. Petitioner MMDA
simply relied on its authority under its charter "to rationalize the use of roads
and/or thoroughfares for the safe and convenient movement of persons."
Rationalizing the use of roads and thoroughfares is one of the acts that fall within
the scope of transport and traffic management. By no stretch of the imagination,
however, can this be interpreted as an express or implied grant of ordinance-
making power, much less police power.
28
Secondly, the MMDA is not the same entity as the MMC in Sangalang. Although the
MMC is the forerunner of the present MMDA, an examination of Presidential
Decree (P. D.) No. 824, the charter of the MMC, shows that the latter possessed
greater powers which were not bestowed on the present MMDA.
Metropolitan Manila was first created in 1975 by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 824.
It comprised the Greater Manila Area composed of the contiguous four (4) cities of
Manila, Quezon, Pasay and Caloocan, and the thirteen (13) municipalities of Makati,
Mandaluyong, San Juan, Las Pinas, Malabon, Navotas, Pasig, Pateros, Paranaque,
Marikina, Muntinlupa and Taguig in the province of Rizal, and Valenzuela in the
province of Bulacan. 40 Metropolitan Manila was created as a response to the
finding that the rapid growth of population and the increase of social and economic
requirements in these areas demand a call for simultaneous and unified
development; that the public services rendered by the respective local governments
could be administered more efficiently and economically if integrated under a
system of central planning; and this coordination, "especially in the maintenance of
peace and order and the eradication of social and economic ills that fanned the
flames of rebellion and discontent [were] part of reform measures under Martial
Law essential to the safety and security of the State." 41
Metropolitan Manila was established as a "public corporation" with the following
powers:
Sec. 1. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila. — There is hereby created
a  public corporation, to be known as the Metropolitan Manila, vested with
powers and attributes of a corporation including the power to make
contracts, sue and be sued, acquire, purchase,  expropriate, hold, transfer
and dispose of property and such other powers as are necessary to carry
out its purposes. The Corporation shall be administered by a Commission
created under this Decree. 42
The administration of Metropolitan Manila was placed under the Metro Manila
Commission (MMC) vested with the following powers:
Sec. 4. Powers and Functions of the Commission. — The Commission shall have the
following powers and functions:
1. To act as a central government to establish and administer programs
and provide services common to the area;
2. To levy and collect taxes and special assessments, borrow and expend
money and issue bonds, revenue certificates, and other obligations of
indebtedness. Existing tax measures should, however, continue to be
operative until otherwise modified or repealed by the Commission;
3. To charge and collect fees for the use of public service facilities;
4. To appropriate money for the operation of the metropolitan
government and review appropriations for the city and municipal units
within its jurisdiction with authority to disapprove the same if found to be
not in accordance with the established policies of the Commission, without
prejudice to any contractual obligation of the local government units
involved existing at the time of approval of this Decree;
5. To review, amend, revise or repeal all ordinances, resolutions and acts of
cities and municipalities within Metropolitan Manila;
6. To enact or approve ordinances, resolutions and to fix penalties for any
violation thereof which shall not exceed a fine of P10,000.00 or
imprisonment of six years or both such fine and imprisonment for a single
offense;
7. To perform general administrative, executive and policy-making
functions;
8. To establish a fire control operation center, which shall direct the fire
services of the city and municipal governments in the metropolitan area;
9. To establish a garbage disposal operation center, which shall direct
garbage collection and disposal in the metropolitan area;
10. To establish and operate a transport and traffic center, which shall
direct traffic activities;
11. To coordinate and monitor governmental and private activities
pertaining to essential services such as transportation, flood control and
drainage, water supply and sewerage, social, health and environmental
services, housing, park development, and others;
12. To insure and monitor the undertaking of a comprehensive social,
economic and physical planning and development of the area;
13. To study the feasibility of increasing barangay participation in the
affairs of their respective local governments and to propose to the
29
President of the Philippines definite programs and policies for
implementation;
14. To submit within thirty (30) days after the close of each fiscal year an
annual report to the President of the Philippines and to submit a periodic
report whenever deemed necessary; and
15. To perform such other tasks as may be assigned or directed by the
President of the Philippines.
The MMC was the  "central government" of Metro Manila for the purpose of
establishing and administering programs providing services common to the area. As
a "central government" it had the power to levy and collect taxes and special
assessments, the power to charge and collect fees; the power to appropriate
money for its operation, and at the same time, review appropriations for the city
and municipal units within its jurisdiction. It was bestowed the power to enact or
approve ordinances, resolutions and fix penalties for violation of such ordinances
and resolutions. It also had the power to review, amend, revise or repeal all
ordinances, resolutions and acts of any of the four (4) cities and thirteen (13)
municipalities comprising Metro Manila.
P.D. No. 824 further provided:
Sec. 9. Until otherwise provided, the governments of the four cities and
thirteen municipalities in the Metropolitan Manila shall continue to exist in
their present form except as may be inconsistent with this Decree. The
members of the existing city and municipal councils in Metropolitan Manila
shall, upon promulgation of this Decree, and until December 31, 1975,
become members of the Sangguniang Bayan which is hereby created for
every city and municipality of Metropolitan Manila.
In addition, the Sangguniang Bayan shall be composed of as many
barangay captains as may be determined and chosen by the Commission,
and such number of representatives from other sectors of the society as
may be appointed by the President upon recommendation of the
Commission.
x x x           x x x          x x x
The Sangguniang Bayan may recommend to the Commission ordinances,
resolutions or such measures as it may adopt; Provided, that no such
ordinance, resolution or measure shall become effective, until after its
 approval by the Commission; and Provided further, that the power to
impose taxes and other levies, the power to appropriate money and the
power to pass ordinances or resolutions with penal sanctions shall be
vested exclusively in the Commission.
The creation of the MMC also carried with it the creation of the Sangguniang Bayan.
This was composed of the members of the component city and municipal councils,
barangay captains chosen by the MMC and sectoral representatives appointed by
the President. The Sangguniang Bayan  had the power to recommend to the MMC
the adoption of ordinances, resolutions or measures. It was the MMC itself,
however, that possessed legislative powers. All ordinances, resolutions and
measures recommended by the Sangguniang Bayan  were subject to the MMC's
approval. Moreover, the power to impose taxes and other levies, the power to
appropriate money, and the power to pass ordinances or resolutions with penal
sanctions were vested exclusively in the MMC.
Thus, Metropolitan Manila had a "central government," i.e., the MMC which fully
possessed legislative police powers. Whatever legislative powers the component
cities and municipalities had were all subject to review and approval by the MMC.
After President Corazon Aquino assumed power, there was a clamor to restore the
autonomy of the local government units in Metro Manila. Hence, Sections 1 and 2
of Article X of the 1987 Constitution provided:
Sec. 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the
Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays. There
shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as
herein provided.
Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.
The Constitution, however, recognized the necessity of creating metropolitan
regions not only in the existing National Capital Region but also in potential
equivalents in the Visayas and Mindanao. 43 Section 11 of the same Article X thus
provided:
Sec. 11. The Congress may, by law, create special metropolitan political
subdivisions, subject to a plebiscite as set forth in Section 10 hereof. The
component cities and municipalities shall retain their basic autonomy and
shall be entitled to their own local executives and legislative assemblies.
The jurisdiction of the metropolitan authority that will thereby be created
shall be limited to basic services requiring coordination.
30
Constitution itself expressly provides that Congress may, by law, create "special
metropolitan political subdivisions" which shall be subject to approval by a majority
of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected; the jurisdiction
of this subdivision shall be limited to basic services requiring coordination; and the
cities and municipalities comprising this subdivision shall retain their basic services
requiring coordination; and the cities and municipalities comprising this subdivision
shall retain their basic autonomy and their own local executive and legislative
assemblies. 44 Pending enactment of this law, the Transitory Provisions of the
Constitution gave the President of the Philippines the power to constitute the
Metropolitan Authority, viz:
Sec. 8. Until otherwise provided by Congress, the President may constitute
the Metropolitan Authority to be composed of the heads of all local
government units comprising the Metropolitan Manila area. 45
In 1990, President Aquino issued Executive Order (E. O.) No. 392 and constituted
the Metropolitan Manila Authority (MMA). The powers and functions of the MMC
were devolved to the MMA. 46 It ought to be stressed, however, that not all powers
and functions of the MMC were passed to the MMA. The MMA's power was limited
to the "delivery of basic urban services requiring coordination in Metropolitan
Manila." 47 The MMA's governing body, the Metropolitan Manila Council, although
composed of the mayors of the component cities and municipalities, was merely
given power of: (1) formulation of policies on the delivery of basic services requiring
coordination and consolidation; and (2) promulgation resolutions and other
issuances, approval of a code of basic services and the exercise of its rule-making
power. 48
Under the 1987 Constitution, the local government units became primarily
responsible for the governance of their respective political subdivisions. The MMA's
jurisdiction was limited  to addressing common problems involving basic services
that transcended local boundaries. It did not have legislative power. Its power was
merely to provide the local government units technical assistance in the
preparation of local development plans. Any semblance of legislative power it had
was confined to a "review [of] legislation proposed by the local legislative
assemblies to ensure consistency among local governments and with the
comprehensive development plan of Metro Manila," and to "advise the local
governments accordingly." 49
When R.A. No. 7924 took effect, Metropolitan Manila became a "special
development and administrative region" and the MMDA a "special development
authority" whose functions were "without prejudice to the autonomy of the
affected local government units." The character of the MMDA was clearly defined in
the legislative debates enacting its charter.
R.A. No. 7924 originated as House Bill No. 14170/11116 and was introduced by
several legislators led by Dante Tinga, Roilo Golez and Feliciano Belmonte. It was
presented to the House of Representatives by the Committee on Local
Governments chaired by Congressman Ciriaco R. Alfelor. The bill was a product of
Committee consultations with the local government units in the National Capital
Region (NCR), with former Chairmen of the MMC and MMA, 50 and career officials of
said agencies. When the bill was first taken up by the Committee on Local
Governments, the following debate took place:
THE CHAIRMAN [Hon. Ciriaco Alfelor]: Okay, Let me explain. This has been
debated a long time ago, you know. It's a special . . . we can create a
special metropolitan political subdivision.
Actually, there are only six (6) political subdivisions provided for in the
Constitution: barangay, municipality, city, province, and we have the
Autonomous Region of Mindanao and we have the Cordillera. So we have
6. Now. . . . .
HON. [Elias] LOPEZ: May I interrupt, Mr. Chairman. In the case of the
Autonomous Region, that is also specifically mandated by the Constitution.
THE CHAIRMAN: That's correct. But it is considered to be a political
subdivision. What is the meaning of a political subdivision? Meaning to say,
that it has its own government, it has its own political personality, it has
the power to tax, and all governmental powers: police power and
everything. All right. Authority is different; because it does not have its
own government. It is only a council, it is an organization of political
subdivision, powers, "no, which is not imbued with any political power.
If you go over Section 6, where the powers and functions of the Metro
Manila Development Authority, it is purely coordinative. And it provides
here that the council is policy-making. All right.
Under the Constitution is a Metropolitan Authority with coordinative
power. Meaning to say, it coordinates all of the different basic services
which have to be delivered to the constituency. All right.
There is now a problem. Each local government unit is given its respective .
. . as a political subdivision. Kalookan has its powers, as provided for and
protected and guaranteed by the Constitution. All right, the exercise.
However, in the exercise of that power, it might be deleterious and
disadvantageous to other local government units. So, we are forming an
31
authority where all of these will be members and then set up a policy in
order that the basic services can be effectively coordinated. All right.
Of course, we cannot deny that the MMDA has to survive. We have to
provide some funds, resources. But it does not possess any political power.
We do not elect the Governor. We do not have the power to tax. As a
matter of fact, I was trying to intimate to the author that it must have the
power to sue and be sued because it coordinates. All right. It coordinates
practically all these basic services so that the flow and the distribution of
the basic services will be continuous. Like traffic, we cannot deny that. It's
before our eyes. Sewerage, flood control, water system, peace and order,
we cannot deny these. It's right on our face. We have to look for a solution.
What would be the right solution? All right, we envision that there should
be a coordinating agency and it is called an authority. All right, if you do
not want to call it an authority, it's alright. We may call it a council or
maybe a management agency.
x x x           x x x          x x x 51
Clearly, the MMDA is not a political unit of government. The power delegated to
the MMDA is that given to the Metro Manila Council to promulgate administrative
rules and regulations in the implementation of the MMDA's functions. There is no
grant of authority to enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of
the inhabitants of the metropolis. This was explicitly stated in the last Committee
deliberations prior to the bill's presentation to Congress. Thus:
THE CHAIRMAN: Yeah, but we have to go over the suggested revision. I
think this was already approved before, but it was reconsidered in view of
the proposals, set-up, to make the MMDA stronger. Okay, so if there is no
objection to paragraph "f". . . And then next is paragraph "b," under
Section 6. "It shall approve metro-wide plans, programs and projects and
issue ordinances or resolutions deemed necessary by the MMDA to carry
out the purposes of this Act." Do you have the powers? Does the
MMDA... because that takes the form of a local government unit, a
political subdivision.
HON. [Feliciano] BELMONTE: Yes, I believe so, your Honor. When we say
that it has the policies, it's very clear that those policies must be followed.
Otherwise, what's the use of empowering it to come out with policies.
Now, the policies may be in the form of a resolution or it may be in the
form of a ordinance. The term "ordinance" in this case really gives it more
teeth, your honor. Otherwise, we are going to see a situation where you
have the power to adopt the policy but you cannot really make it stick as in
 the case now, and I think here is Chairman Bunye. I think he will agree that
that is the case now. You've got the power to set a policy, the body wants
to follow your policy, then we say let's call it an ordinance and see if they
will not follow it.
THE CHAIRMAN: That's very nice. I like that. However, there is a
constitutional impediment.1âwphi1 You are making this MMDA a political
subdivision. The creation of the MMDA would be subject to a plebiscite.
That is what I'm trying to avoid. I've been trying to avoid this kind of
predicament. Under the Constitution it states: if it is a political subdivision,
once it is created it has to be subject to a plebiscite. I'm trying to make this
as administrative. That's why we place the Chairman as a cabinet rank.
HON. BELMONTE: All right, Mr. Chairman, okay, what you are saying there
is . . . . .
THE CHAIRMAN: In setting up ordinances, it is a political exercise, Believe
me.
HON. [Elias] LOPEZ: Mr. Chairman, it can be changed into issuances of rules
and regulations. That would be . . . it shall also be enforced.
HON. BELMONTE: Okay, I will . . . .
HON. LOPEZ: And you can also say that violation of such rule, you impose a
sanction. But you know, ordinance has a different legal connotation.
HON. BELMONTE: All right, I defer to that opinion, your Honor.
THE CHAIRMAN: So instead of ordinances, say rules and regulations.
HON. BELMONTE: Or resolutions. Actually, they are actually considering
resolutions now.
THE CHAIRMAN: Rules and resolutions.
HON. BELMONTE: Rules, regulations and resolutions. 52
The draft of H. B. No. 14170/11116 was presented by the Committee to the House
of Representatives. The explanatory note to the bill stated that the proposed
MMDA is a "development authority" which is a "national agency, not a political
government unit." 53 The explanatory note was adopted as the sponsorship speech
32
of the Committee on Local Governments. No interpellations or debates were made
on the floor and no amendments introduced. The bill was approved on second
reading on the same day it was presented. 54
When the bill was forwarded to the Senate, several amendments were
made.1âwphi1 These amendments, however, did not affect the nature of the
MMDA as originally conceived in the House of Representatives. 55
It is thus beyond doubt that the MMDA is not a local government unit or a public
corporation endowed with legislative power. It is not even a "special metropolitan
political subdivision" as contemplated in Section 11, Article X of the Constitution.
The creation of a "special metropolitan political subdivision" requires the approval
by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected." 56 R. A. No. 7924 was not submitted to the inhabitants of Metro Manila in
a plebiscite. The Chairman of the MMDA is not an official elected by the people, but
appointed by the President with the rank and privileges of a cabinet member. In
fact, part of his function is to perform such other duties as may be assigned to him
by the President, 57 whereas in local government units, the President merely
exercises supervisory authority. This emphasizes the administrative character of the
MMDA.
Clearly then, the MMC under P.D. No. 824 is not the same entity as the MMDA
under R.A. No. 7924. Unlike the MMC, the MMDA has no power to enact
ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the local government units,
acting through their respective legislative councils, that possess legislative power
and police power. In the case at bar, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did
not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street,
hence, its proposed opening by petitioner MMDA is illegal and the respondent
Court of Appeals did not err in so ruling. We desist from ruling on the other issues
as they are unnecessary.
We stress that this decision does not make light of the MMDA's noble efforts to
solve the chaotic traffic condition in Metro Manila. Everyday, traffic jams and traffic
bottlenecks plague the metropolis. Even our once sprawling boulevards and
avenues are now crammed with cars while city streets are clogged with motorists
and pedestrians. Traffic has become a social malaise affecting our people's
productivity and the efficient delivery of goods and services in the country. The
MMDA was created to put some order in the metropolitan transportation system
but unfortunately the powers granted by its charter are limited. Its good intentions
cannot justify the opening for public use of a private street in a private subdivision
without any legal warrant. The promotion of the general welfare is not antithetical
to the preservation of the rule of law.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied. The Decision and Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 39549 are affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
4. Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
No. L-74457. March 20,1987.*
RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION
COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and THE
REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO CITY,
respondents.
Constitutional Law; Jurisdiction; Lower courts have authority to resolve the issue of
constitutionality of legislative measures.—This Court has declared that while lower
courts should observe a becoming modesty in examining constitutional questions,
they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever warranted,
subject only to review by the highest tribunal. We have jurisdiction under the
Constitution to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as
the law or rules of court may provide," final judgments and orders of lower courts
in, among others, all cases involving the constitutionality of certain measures. This
simply means that the resolution of such cases may be made in the first instance by
these lower courts.
Same; Due Process; Judgments must be based on the sporting idea of fair play.—
The closed mind has no place in the open society. It is part of the sporting idea of
fair play to hear "the other side" before an opinion is formed or a decision is made
by those who sit in judgment. Obviously, one side is only one-half of the question;
the other half must also be considered if an impartial verdict is to be reached based
on an informed appreciation of the issues in contention. It is indispensable that the
two sides complement each other, as unto the bow the arrow, in leading to the
correct ruling after examination of the problem not from one or the other
perspective only but in its totality. A judgment based on less that this full appraisal,
on the pretext that a hearing is unnecessary or useless, is tainted with the vice of
bias or intolerance or ignorance, or worst of all, in repressive regimes, the insolence
of power.
Same; Same; The ban on slaughter of carabaos is directly related to public welfare.
—In the light of the tests mentioned above, we hold with the Toribio Case that the
33
carabao, as the poor man's tractor, so to speak, has a direct relevance to the public
welfare and so is a lawful subject of Executive Order No. 626. The method chosen in
the basic measure is also reasonably necessary for the purpose sought to be
achieved and not unduly oppressive upon individuals, again following the above-
cited doctrine. There is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of these animals
except where they are at least seven years old if male and eleven years old if female
upon issuance of the necessary permit, the executive order will be conserving those
still fit for farm work or breeding and preventing their improvident depletion.
Same; Same; The ban on the transportation of carabaos from one province to
another (E.O. 626-A), their confiscation and disposal without a prior court hearing is
violative of due process for lack of reasonable connection between the means
employed and the purpose to be achieved and for being confiscatory.—But while
conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the original
executive order, we cannot say with equal certainty that it complies with the
second requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method. We note that to
strengthen the original measure, Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute
ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement, providing that "no
carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef
shall be transported from one province to another." The object of the prohibition
escapes us. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the
purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing.
Same; Same; Same.—Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end
were to be assumed, we would still have to reckon with the sanction that the
measure applies for violation of the prohibition. The penalty is outright confiscation
of the carabao or carabeef being transported, to be meted out by the executive
authorities, usually the police only. In the Toribio Case, the statute was sustained
because the penalty prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the
court after trial and conviction of the accused. Under the challenged measure,
significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the property being transported is
immediately impounded by the police and declared, by the measure itself, as
forfeited to the government.
Same; Same; Same.—We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of
the disposition of the confiscated property as prescribed in the questioned
executive order. It is there authorized that the seized property shall "be distributed
to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the
National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to
deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit,
in the case of carabaos." (Emphasis supplied.) The phrase "may see fit" is an
extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with
perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches
in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the
limitations that the said officers must observe when they make their distribution.
There is none. Their options are apparently boundless.
Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria
shall they be chosen? Only the officers named can supply the answer, they and they
alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion.
Definitely, there is here a "roving commission," a wide and sweeping authority that
is not "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, a clearly
profligate and therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.
Same; Same; Same.—To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an
invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the
carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is
unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property conf
iscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned
and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to
adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial
functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is,
finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the of ficers mentioned
therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties
arbitrarily taken.
authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only after trial and conviction of
the accused.
Same; Same; Damages; A police officer who confiscated carabaos being transported
in violation of E.O. 626-A is not liable for damages even if said Executive Order were
later declared unconstitutional.—We agree with the respondent court, however,
that the police station commander who confiscated the petitioner's carabaos is not
liable in damages for enforcing the executive order in accordance with its mandate.
The law was at that time presumptively valid, and it was his obligation, as a member
of the police, to enforce it. It would have been impertinent of him, being a mere
subordinate of the President, to declare the executive order unconstitutional and,
on his own responsibility alone, refuse to execute it. Even the trial court, in fact, and
the Court of Appeals itself did not feel they had the competence, for all their
superior authority, to question the order we now annul.
PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner.

Same; Same; Omission of right to a prior hearing can be justified only where a
CRUZ, J..
problem needs immediate and urgent correction.—It has already been remarked
that there are occasions when notice and hearing may be validly dispensed with
The essence of due process is distilled in the immortal cry of Themistocles to
notwithstanding the usual requirement for these minimum guarantees of due
Alcibiades: "Strike—but hear me first!' " It is this cry that the petitioner in effect
process. It is also conceded that summary action may be validly taken in
repeats here as he challenges the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A
administrative proceedings as procedural due process is not necessarily judicial
only. In the exceptional cases accepted, however, there is a justification for the
omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the problem The said executive order reads in full as follows:
sought to be corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it. In the case before
us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the petitioner's "WHEREAS, the President has given orders prohibiting the interprovincial
peremptory treatment. The properties involved were not even inimical per se as to movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos not complying with the
require their instant destruction. There certainly was no reason why the offense requirements of Executive Order No. 626 particularly with respect to age;
prohibited by the executive order should not have been proved first in a court of
justice, with the accused being accorded all the rights safeguarded to him under the "WHEREAS, it has been observed that despite such orders the violators still manage
Constitution. Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v. Angeles, Executive Order to circumvent the prohibition against interprovincial movement of carabaos by
No. 626-A is penal in nature, the violation thereof should have been pronounced transporting carabeef instead; and
not by the police only but by a court of justice, which alone would have had the

34
"WHEREAS, in order to achieve the purposes and objectives of Executive Order No.
626 and the prohibition against interprovincial movement of carabaos, it is
necessary to strengthen the said Executive Order and provide for the disposition of
the carabaos and carabeef subject of the violation;
"NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by
virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby promulgate the
following:
"SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such that henceforth, no
carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall
be transported from one province to another. The carabao or carabeef transported
in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and
forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other
similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission
may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as
the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos.
"SECTION 2. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.
"Done in the City of Manila, this 25th day of October, in the year of Our Lord,
nineteen hundred and eighty.
(SGD.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
President     
Republic of the Philippines"     
The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo
on January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander
of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the above measure.1 The petitioner sued
for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon
his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering the merits of the
case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no
longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined
to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raised by the petitioner,
for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity.2
The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court,**3 which
upheld the trial court,*** and he has now come bef ore us in this petition for
review on certiorari.
35
The thrust of his petition is that the executive order is unconstitutional insofar as it
authorizes outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported
across provincial boundaries. His claim is that the penalty is invalid because it is
imposed without according the owner a right to be heard before a competent and
impartial court as guaranteed by due process. He complains that the measure
should not have been presumed, and so sustained, as constitutional. There is also a
challenge to the improper exercise of the legislative power by the former President
under Amendment No, 6 of the 1973 Constitution.4
While also involving the same executive order, the case of Pesigan v. Angeles5 is not
applicable here. The question raised there was the necessity of the previous
publication of the measure in the Official Gazette before it could be considered
enforceable. We imposed the requirement then on the basis of due process of law.
In doing so, however, this Court did not, as contended by the Solicitor General,
impliedly affirm the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A. That is an
entirely different matter.
This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming
modesty in examining constitutional questions, they are nonetheless not prevented
from resolving the same whenever warranted, subject only to review by the highest
tribunal.6 We have jurisdiction under the Constitution to "review, revise, reverse,
modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may provide,"
final judgments and orders of lower courts in, among others, all cases involving the
constitutionality of certain measures.7
** Justices Coquia, Bartolome and Ejercito.
*** Judge Bethel Katalbas-Moscardon.
This simply means that the resolution of such cases may be made in the first
instance by these lower courts.
And while it is true that laws are presumed to be constitutional, that presumption is
not by any means conclusive and in fact may be rebutted. Indeed, if there be a clear
showing of their invalidity, and of the need to declare them so, then "will be the
time to make the hammer fall, and heavily,"8 to recall Justice Laurel's trenchant
warning. Stated otherwise, courts should not follow the path of least resistance by
simply presuming the constitutionality of a law when it is questioned. On the
contrary, they should probe the issue more deeply, to relieve the abscess,
paraphrasing another distinguished jurist, 9 and so heal the wound or excise the
affliction.
Judicial power authorizes this; and when the exercise is demanded, there should be
no shirking of the task for fear of retaliation, or loss of favor, or popular censure, or
any other similar inhibition unworthy of the bench, especially this Court.
The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really
presidential decree, promulgating a new rule instead of merely implementing an
existing law. It was issued by President Marcos not for the purpose of taking care
that the laws were faithfully executed but in the exercise of his legislative authority
under Amendment No. 6. It was provided thereunder that whenever in his
judgment there existed a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof or
whenever the legislature failed or was unable to act adequately on any matter that
in his judgment required immediate action, he could, in order to meet the exigency,
issue decrees, orders or letters of instruction that were to have the force and effect
of law. As there is no showing of any exigency to justify the exercise of that
extraordinary power then, the petitioner has reason, indeed, to question the
validity of the executive order. Nevertheless, since the determination of the
grounds was supposed to have been made by the President "in his judgment," a
phrase that will lead to protracted discussion not really necessary at this time, we
reserve resolution of this matter until a more appropriate occasion. For the nonce,
we confine ourselves to the more fundamental question of due process.
It is part of the art of constitution-making that the provisions of the charter be cast
in precise and unmistakable language to avoid controversies that might arise on
their correct interpretation. That is the ideal. In the case of the due process clause,
however, this rule was deliberately not followed and the wording was purposely
kept ambiguous. In fact, a proposal to delineate it more clearly was submitted in the
Constitutional Convention of 1934, but it was rejected by Delegate Jose P. Laurel,
Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights, who forcefully argued against it.
He was sustained by the body.10
The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also
conveniently resilient. This was felt necessary because due process is not, like some
provisions of the fundamental law, an "iron rule" laying down an implacable and
immutable command for all seasons and all persons. Flexibility must be the best
virtue of the guaranty. The very elasticity of the due process clause was meant to
make it adapt easily to every situation, enlarging or constricting its protection as the
changing times and circumstances may require.
Aware of this, the courts have also hesitated to adopt their own specific description
of due process lest they confine themselves in a legal straitjacket that will deprive
them of the elbow room they may need to vary the meaning of the clause
whenever indicated. Instead, they have preferred to leave the import of the
protection open-ended, as it were, to be "gradually ascertained by the process of
36
inclusion and exclusion in the course of the decision of cases as they arise."11 Thus,
Justice Felix Frankfurter of the U.S. Supreme Court, for example, would go no
farther than to define due process—and in so doing sums it all up—as nothing more
and nothing less than "the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play."12
When the barons of England extracted from their sovereign liege the reluctant
promise that that Crown would thenceforth not proceed against the life, liberty or
property of any of its subjects except by the lawful judgment of his peers or the law
of the land, they thereby won for themselves and their progeny that splendid
guaranty of fairness that is now the hallmark of the free society. The solemn vow
that King John made at Runnymede in 1215 has since then resounded through the
ages, as a ringing reminder to all rulers, benevolent or base, that every person,
when confronted by the stern visage of the law, is entitled to have his say in a fair
and open hearing of his cause.
The closed mind has no place in the open society. It is part of the sporting idea of
fair play to hear "the other side" before an opinion is formed or a decision is made
by those who sit in judgment. Obviously, one side is only one-half of the question;
the other half must also be considered if an impartial verdict is to be reached based
on an informed appreciation of the issues in contention. It is indispensable that the
two sides complement each other, as unto the bow the arrow, in leading to the
correct ruling af ter examination of the problem not f rom one or the other
perspective only but in its totality. A judgment based on less that this full appraisal,
on the pretext that a hearing is unnecessary or useless, is tainted with the vice of
bias or intolerance or ignorance, or worst of all, in repressive regimes, the insolence
of power.
The minimum .requirements of due process are notice and hearing13 which,
generally speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a
safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on our judicial
system that the jurisprudence of this country is rich with ap-
plications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of law and the ancient
rudiments of fair play. We have consistently declared that every person, faced by
the awesome power of the State, is entitled to "the law of the land," which Daniel
Webster described almost two hundred years ago in the famous Dartmouth College
Case,14 as "the law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry
and renders judgment only after trial." It has to be so if the rights of every person
are to be secured beyond the reach of officials who, out of mistaken zeal or plain
arrogance, would degrade the due process clause into a worn and empty
catchword.
This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case for, to be
sure, there are a number of admitted exceptions. The conclusive presumption, for
example, bars the admission of contrary evidence as long as such presumption is
based on human experience or there is a rational connection between the fact
proved and the fact ultimately presumed therefrom. 15 There are instances when
the need for expeditious action will justify omission of these requisites, as in the
summary abatement of a nuisance per se, like a mad dog on the loose, which may
be killed on sight because of the immediate danger it poses to the safety and lives
of the people. Pornographic materials, contaminated meat and narcotic drugs are
inherently pernicious and may be summarily destroyed. The passport of a person
sought for a criminal offense may be cancelled without hearing, to compel his
return to the country he has fled.16 Filthy restaurants may be summarily padlocked
in the interest of the public health and bawdy houses to protect the public
morals.17 In such instances, previous judicial hearing may be omitted without
violation of due process in view of the nature of the property involved or the
urgency of the need to protect the general welfare from a clear and present danger.
The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power
which both restraints and is restrained by due process. The police power is simply
defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for the
promotion of the general welfare.18 By reason of its function, it extends to all the
great public needs and is described as the most pervasive, the least limitable and
the most demanding of the three inherent powers of the State, far outpacing
taxation and eminent domain. The individual, as a member of society, is hemmed in
by the police power, which affects him even before he is born and follows him still
after he is dead—from the womb to beyond the tomb—in practically everything he
does or owns. Its reach is virtually limitless. It is a ubiquitous and often unwelcome
intrusion. Even so, as long as the activity or the property has some relevance to the
public welfare, its regulation under the police power is not only proper but
necessary. And the justification is found in the venerable Latin maxims, Salus populi
est suprema lex and Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which call for the
subordination of individual interests to the benefit of the greater number.
It is this power that is now invoked by the government to justify Executive Order
No. 626-A, amending the basic rule in Executive Order No. 626, prohibiting the
slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. The original measure was
issued for the reason, as expressed in one of its Whereases, that "present
conditions demand that the carabaos and the buff aloes be conserved f or the
benefit of the small farmers who rely on them for energy needs." We affirm at the
outset the need for such a measure. In the face of the worsening energy crisis and
the increased dependence of our farms on these traditional beasts of burden, the
37
government would have been remiss, indeed, if it had not taken steps to protect
and preserve them.
A similar prohibition was challenged in United States v. Toribio,19 where a law
regulating the registration, branding and slaughter of large cattle was claimed to be
a deprivation of property without due process of law. The defendant had been
convicted thereunder for having slaughtered his own carabao without the required
permit, and he appealed to the Supreme Court. The conviction was affirmed. The
law was sustained as a valid police measure to prevent the indiscriminate killing of
carabaos, which were then badly needed by farmers. An epidemic had stricken
many of these animals and the reduction of their number had resulted in an acute
decline in agricultural output, which in turn had caused an incipient famine.
Furthermore, because of the scarcity of the animals and the consequent increase in
their price, cattle-rustling had spread alarmingly, necessitating more effective
measures for the registration and branding of these animals. The Court held that
the questioned statute was a valid exercise of the police power and declared in part
as f ollows:
"To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must
appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those
of a particular class, require such interference; and second, that the means are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. x x x      x x x.
"From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of the provisions
of the statute under consideration was required by 'the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class' and that the prohibition
of the slaughter of carabaos for human consumption, so long as these animals are
fit for agricultural work or draft purposes was a 'reasonably necessary' limitation on
private ownership, to protect the community from the loss of the services of such
animals by their slaughter by improvident owners, tempted either by greed of
momentary gain, or by a desire to enjoy the luxury of animal food, even when by so
doing the productive power of the community may be measurably and dangerously
affected."
In the light of the tests mentioned above, we hold with the Toribio Case that the
carabao, as the poor man's tractor, so to speak, has a direct relevance to the public
welfare and so is a lawful subject of Executive Order No. 626. The method chosen in
the basic measure is also reasonably necessary for the purpose sought to be
achieved and not unduly oppressive upon individuals, again following the above-
cited doctrine. There is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of these animals
except where they are at least seven years old if male and eleven years old if female
upon issuance of the necessary permit, the executive order will be conserving those
still fit for farm work or breeding and preventing their improvident depletion.
But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as
the original executive order, we cannot say with equal certainty that it complies
with the second requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method. We note that to
strengthen the original measure, Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute
ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement, providing that "no
carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef
shall be transported from one province to another." The object of the prohibition
escapes us. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the
purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing.
We do not see how the prohibition of the interprovincial transport of carabaos can
prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed
anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously,
retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any
more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there.
As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says
executive order, it could be easily circumvented by simply killing the animal.
Perhaps so. However, if the movement of the live animals for the purpose of
preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should follow that there is no
reason either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant, dead meat.
E ven if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed,
we would still have to reckon with the sanction that the measure applies for
violation of the prohibition. The penalty is outright confiscation of the carabao or
carabeef being transported, to be meted out by the executive authorities, usually
the police only. In the Toribio Case, the statute was sustained because the penalty
prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial and
conviction of the accused. Under the challenged measure, significantly, no such trial
is prescribed, and the property being transported is immediately impounded by the
police and declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited to the government.
In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station
commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for
recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00, which was ordered
confiscated upon his failure to produce the carabaos when ordered by the trial
court. The executive order defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and
immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. The measure
struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be
heard, thus denying him the centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play.
38
It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing may
be validly dispensed with notwithstanding the usual requirement for these
minimum guarantees of due process. It is also conceded that summary action may
be validly taken in administrative proceedings as procedural due process is not
necessarily judicial only.20 In the exceptional cases accepted, however, there is a
justification for the omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the
immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and the urgency of the need to
correct it.
In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the
petitioner's peremptory treatment. The properties involved were not even inimical
per se as to require their instant destruction. There certainly was no reason why the
offense prohibited by the executive order should not have been proved first in a
court of justice, with the accused being accorded all the rights safeguarded to him
under the Constitution. Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v. Angeles,21
Executive Order No. 626-A is penal in nature, the violation thereof should have
been pronounced not by the police only but by a court of justice, which alone would
have had the authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only after trial and
conviction of the accused.
We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the
confiscated property as prescribed in the questioned executive order. It is there
authorized that the seized property shall "be distributed to charitable institutions
and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection
Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through
dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos."
(Emphasis supplied.) The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and
dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities for
partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual
standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said
officers must observe when they make their distribution. There is none. Their
options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their
generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers named can
supply the answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and
in their own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a "roving commission," a
wide and sweeping authority that is not "canalized within banks that keep it from
overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation of
legislative powers.
To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the
police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not
reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive.
Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the
right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The SO ORDERED.
conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of
the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates      Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Gancayco, Padilla,
against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.
delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted
unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these      Melencio-Herrera and Feliciano, JJ., on leave.
reasons, we hereby declare Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.
Decision reversed.
We agree with the respondent court, however, that the police station commander
who confiscated the petitioner's carabaos is not liable in damages for enforcing the
Note.—Judicial review exists precisely to test the validity of executive or legislative
executive order in accordance with its mandate. The law was at that time
acts in an appropriate legal proceedings; there is always the possibility of their
presumptively valid, and it was his obligation, as a member of the police, to enforce
being declared inoperative and void. Realism compels the acceptance of the though
it. It would have been impertinent of him, being a mere subordinate of the
that there would be a time-lag between the initiation of such presidential or
President, to declare the executive order unconstitutional and, on his own
congressional exercise of power and the final declaration of nullity. In the
responsibility alone, refuse to execute it. Even the trial court, in fact, and the Court
meanwhile, it would be productive of confusion, perhaps at times even of chaos, if
of Appeals itself did not feel they had the competence, for all their superior
the parties affected were left free to speculate as to its fate being one of doom, this
authority, to question the order we now annul.
leading them free to disobey in the meanwhile. Since, however, the orderly
processes of government, not to mention common sense, requires that the
The Court notes that if the petitioner had not seen fit to assert and protect his presumption of validity be accorded an act of Congress or an order of the President.
rights as he saw them, this case would never have reached us and the taking of his It would be less than fair, and it may productive of injustice, if no notice of its
property under the challenged measure would have become a fait accompli despite assistance as a fact be paid to it, even if thereafter, it is stricken down as contrary,
its invalidity. We commend him for his spirit. Without the present challenge, the in the case of Presidential act, either to the Constitution or a controlling statute.
matter would have ended in that pump boat in Masbate and another violation of (Municipality of Malabang vs. Benito, 27 SCRA 533.)
the Constitution, for all its obviousness, would have been perpetrated, allowed
without protest, and soon forgotten in the limbo of relinquished rights.

——o0o——

The strength of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees but in the courage of
the people to invoke them whenever they are ignored or violated. Rights are but
weapons on the wall if, like expensive tapestry, all they do is embellish and impress.
5. G.R. No. 177056. September 18, 2009.*
Rights, as weapons, must be a promise of protection. They become truly
meaningful, and fulfill the role assigned to them in the free society, if they are kept
bright and sharp with use by those who are not afraid to assert them. THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, petitioner, vs. AYALA LAND,
INCORPORATED, ROBINSON’S LAND CORPORATION, SHANGRI-LA PLAZA
CORPORATION and SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC., respondents.
WHEREFORE, Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional. Except
as affirmed above, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The
supersedeas bond is cancelled and the amount thereof is ordered restored to the Statutory Construction; Statutory construction has it that if a statute is clear and
petitioner. No costs. unequivocal, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without any attempt at
interpretation.—Statutory construction has it that if a statute is clear and
unequivocal, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without any attempt at
interpretation. Since Section 803 of the National Building Code and Rule XIX of its

39
IRR do not mention parking fees, then simply, said provisions do not regulate the
collection of the same. The RTC and the
Court of Appeals correctly applied Article 1158 of the New Civil Code, which states:
Art. 1158. Obligations derived from law are not presumed. Only those expressly
determined in this Code or in special laws are demandable, and shall be regulated
by the precepts of the law which establishes them; and as to what has not been
foreseen, by the provisions of this Book.
National Building Code; The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) cannot rely on
Section 102 of the National Building Code to expand the coverage of Section 803 of
the same Code and Rule XIX of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR), so as
to include the regulation of parking fees.—The OSG cannot rely on Section 102 of
the National Building Code to expand the coverage of Section 803 of the same Code
and Rule XIX of the IRR, so as to include the regulation of parking fees. The OSG
limits its citation to the first part of Section 102 of the National Building Code
declaring the policy of the State “to safeguard life, health, property, and public
welfare, consistent with the principles of sound environmental management and
control”; but totally ignores the second part of said provision, which reads, “and to
this end, make it the purpose of this Code to provide for all buildings and structures,
a framework of minimum standards and requirements to regulate and control their
location, site, design, quality of materials, construction, use, occupancy, and
maintenance.” While the first part of Section 102 of the National Building Code lays
down the State policy, it is the second part thereof that explains how said policy
shall be carried out in the Code. Section 102 of the National Building Code is not an
all-encompassing grant of regulatory power to the DPWH Secretary and local
building officials in the name of life, health, property, and public welfare. On the
contrary, it limits the regulatory power of said officials to ensuring that the
minimum standards and requirements for all buildings and structures, as set forth
in the National Building Code, are complied with.
Administrative Agencies; The rule-making power of administrative agencies must be
confined to details for regulating the mode or proceedings to carry into effect the
law as it has been enacted and it cannot be extended to amend or expand the
statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute.—The
OSG cannot claim that in addition to fixing the minimum requirements for parking
spaces for buildings, Rule XIX of the IRR also mandates that such parking spaces be
provided by building owners free of
Rule XIX is not covered by the enabling law, then it cannot be added to or included
in the implementing rules. The rule-making power of administrative agencies must
be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceedings to carry into effect
the law as it has been enacted, and it cannot be extended to amend or expand the
40
statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute.
Administrative regulations must always be in harmony with the provisions of the
law because any resulting discrepancy between the two will always be resolved in
favor of the basic law.
National Building Code; Whether allowing or prohibiting the collection of such
parking fees, the action of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH)
Secretary and local building officials must pass the test of classic reasonableness
and propriety of the measures or means in the promotion of the ends sought to be
accomplished.—It is not sufficient for the OSG to claim that “the power to regulate
and control the use, occupancy, and maintenance of buildings and structures carries
with it the power to impose fees and, conversely, to control, partially or, as in this
case, absolutely, the imposition of such fees.” Firstly, the fees within the power of
regulatory agencies to impose are regulatory fees. It has been settled law in this
jurisdiction that this broad and all-compassing governmental competence to restrict
rights of liberty and property carries with it the undeniable power to collect a
regulatory fee. It looks to the enactment of specific measures that govern the
relations not only as between individuals but also as between private parties and
the political society. True, if the regulatory agencies have the power to impose
regulatory fees, then conversely, they also have the power to remove the same.
Even so, it is worthy to note that the present case does not involve the imposition
by the DPWH Secretary and local building officials of regulatory fees upon
respondents; but the collection by respondents of parking fees from persons who
use the mall parking facilities. Secondly, assuming arguendo that the DPWH
Secretary and local building officials do have regulatory powers over the collection
of parking fees for the use of privately owned parking facilities, they cannot allow or
prohibit such collection arbitrarily or whimsically. Whether allowing or prohibiting
the collection of such parking fees, the action of the DPWH Secretary and local
building officials must pass the test of classic reasonableness and propriety of the
measures or means in the promotion of the ends sought to be
     Same; The National Building Code regulates buildings, by setting the minimum
specifications and requirements for the same.—The Court is unconvinced. The
National Building Code regulates buildings, by setting the minimum specifications
and requirements for the same. It does not concern itself with traffic congestion in
areas surrounding the building. It is already a stretch to say that the National
Building Code and its IRR also intend to solve the problem of traffic congestion
around the buildings so as to ensure that the said buildings shall have adequate
lighting and ventilation. Moreover, the Court cannot simply assume, as the OSG has
apparently done, that the traffic congestion in areas around the malls is due to the
fact that respondents charge for their parking facilities, thus, forcing vehicle owners
to just park in the streets. The Court notes that despite the fees charged by
respondents, vehicle owners still use the mall parking facilities, which are even fully
occupied on some days. Vehicle owners may be parking in the streets only because
there are not enough parking spaces in the malls, and not because they are
deterred by the parking fees charged by respondents. Free parking spaces at the
malls may even have the opposite effect from what the OSG envisioned: more
people may be encouraged by the free parking to bring their own vehicles, instead
of taking public transport, to the malls; as a result, the parking facilities would
become full sooner, leaving more vehicles without parking spaces in the malls and
parked in the streets instead, causing even more traffic congestion.
Police Power; The Court finds, however, that in totally prohibiting respondents from
collecting parking fees from the public for the use of the mall parking facilities, the
State would be acting beyond the bounds of police power.—Without using the term
outright, the OSG is actually invoking police power to justify the regulation by the
State, through the DPWH Secretary and local building officials, of privately owned
parking facilities, including the collection by the owners/operators of such facilities
of parking fees from the public for the use thereof. The Court finds, however, that
in totally prohibiting respondents from collecting parking fees from the public for
the use of the mall parking facilities, the State would be acting beyond the bounds
of police power.
Same; Police power does not involve the taking or confiscation of property, with the
exception of a few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in
order to destroy it for the purpose of
protecting peace and order and of promoting the general welfare; for instance, the
confiscation of an illegally possessed article, such as opium and firearms.—Police
power is the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating
the use of liberty and property. It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate the
use and enjoyment of the property of the owner. The power to regulate, however,
does not include the power to prohibit. A fortiori, the power to regulate does not
include the power to confiscate. Police power does not involve the taking or
confiscation of property, with the exception of a few cases where there is a
necessity to confiscate private property in order to destroy it for the purpose of
protecting peace and order and of promoting the general welfare; for instance, the
confiscation of an illegally possessed article, such as opium and firearms.
Taking; A police regulation that unreasonably restricts the right to use business
property for business purposes amounts to taking of private property, and the
41
owner may recover therefor.—The power of eminent domain results in the taking
or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no
cogent reason appears why the said power may not be availed of only to impose a
burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and
possession. It is a settled rule that neither acquisition of title nor total destruction of
value is essential to taking. It is usually in cases where title remains with the private
owner that inquiry should be made to determine whether the impairment of a
property is merely regulated or amounts to a compensable taking. A regulation that
deprives any person of the profitable use of his property constitutes a taking and
entitles him to compensation, unless the invasion of rights is so slight as to permit
the regulation to be justified under the police power. Similarly, a police regulation
that unreasonably restricts the right to use business property for business purposes
amounts to a taking of private property, and the owner may recover therefor.
Same; Although in the present case, title to and/or possession of the parking
facilities remain/s with respondents, the prohibition against their collection of
parking fees from the public, for the use of said facilities, is already tantamount to a
taking or confiscation of their properties.—Although in the present case, title to
and/or possession of the parking facilities remain/s with respondents, the pro-
hibition against their collection of parking fees from the public, for the use of said
facilities, is already tantamount to a taking or confiscation of their properties. The
State is not only requiring that respondents devote a portion of the latter’s
properties for use as parking spaces, but is also mandating that they give the public
access to said parking spaces for free. Such is already an excessive intrusion into the
property rights of respondents. Not only are they being deprived of the right to use
a portion of their properties as they wish, they are further prohibited from profiting
from its use or even just recovering therefrom the expenses for the maintenance
and operation of the required parking facilities.
Same; Expropriation; The total prohibition against the collection by respondents of
parking fees from persons who use the mall parking facilities has no basis in the
National Building Code or its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR).—The total
prohibition against the collection by respondents of parking fees from persons who
use the mall parking facilities has no basis in the National Building Code or its IRR.
The State also cannot impose the same prohibition by generally invoking police
power, since said prohibition amounts to a taking of respondents’ property without
payment of just compensation.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  The Solicitor General for petitioner.
  Migallos & Luna Law Offices for respondent Shangri-la Plaza Corporation.
  Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako for respondent Ayala Land, Inc.
  Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De Los Angeles for respondent
Robinsons Land Corporation.
  Tan, Acut & Lopez for respondent SM Prime Holdings, Inc.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari,1 under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court, filed by petitioner Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
seeking the reversal and setting aside of the Decision2 dated 25 January 2007 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76298, which affirmed in toto the Joint
Decision3 dated 29 May 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City,
Branch 138, in Civil Cases No. 00-1208 and No. 00-1210; and (2) the Resolution4
dated 14 March 2007 of the appellate court in the same case which denied the
Motion for Reconsideration of the OSG. The RTC adjudged that respondents Ayala
Land, Incorporated (Ayala Land), Robinsons Land Corporation (Robinsons), Shangri-
la Plaza Corporation (Shangri-la), and SM Prime Holdings, Inc. (SM Prime) could not
be obliged to provide free parking spaces in their malls to their patrons and the
general public.
42
Respondents Ayala Land, Robinsons, and Shangri-la maintain and operate shopping
malls in various locations in Metro Manila. Respondent SM Prime constructs,
operates, and leases out commercial buildings and other structures, among which,
are SM City, Manila; SM Centerpoint, Sta. Mesa, Manila; SM City, North Avenue,
Quezon City; and SM Southmall, Las Piñas.
The shopping malls operated or leased out by respondents have parking facilities
for all kinds of motor vehicles, either by way of parking spaces inside the mall
buildings or in separate buildings and/or adjacent lots that are solely devoted for
use as parking spaces. Respondents Ayala Land, Robinsons,
and SM Prime spent for the construction of their own parking facilities. Respondent
Shangri-la is renting its parking facilities, consisting of land and building specifically
used as parking spaces, which were constructed for the lessor’s account.
Respondents expend for the maintenance and administration of their respective
parking facilities. They provide security personnel to protect the vehicles parked in
their parking facilities and maintain order within the area. In turn, they collect the
following parking fees from the persons making use of their parking facilities,
regardless of whether said persons are mall patrons or not:
Respondent Parking Fees
Ayala Land On weekdays, P25.00 for the first four hours and P10.00 for every
succeeding hour; on weekends, flat rate of P25.00 per day
Robinsons P20.00 for the first three hours and P10.00 for every succeeding
hour
Shangri-la Flat rate of P30.00 per day
SM Prime P10.00 to P20.00 (depending on whether the parking space is
outdoors or indoors) for the first three hours and 59 minutes, and P10.00 for every
succeeding hour or fraction thereof
The parking tickets or cards issued by respondents to vehicle owners contain the
stipulation that respondents shall not be responsible for any loss or damage to the
vehicles parked in respondents’ parking facilities.
In 1999, the Senate Committees on Trade and Commerce and on Justice and Human
Rights conducted a joint investigation for the following purposes: (1) to inquire into
the legality of the prevalent practice of shopping malls of charging parking fees ; (2)
assuming arguendo that the collection of parking fees was legally authorized, to find
out the basis and reasonableness of the parking rates charged by shopping malls;
and (3) to determine the legality of the policy of shopping malls of denying liability
in cases of theft, robbery, or carnapping, by invoking the waiver clause at the back
of the parking tickets. Said Senate Committees invited the top executives of
respondents, who operate the major malls in the country; the officials from the
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH), Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA), and other local
government officials; and the Philippine Motorists Association (PMA) as
representative of the consumers’ group.
After three public hearings held on 30 September, 3 November, and 1 December
1999, the afore-mentioned Senate Committees jointly issued Senate Committee
Report No. 2255 on 2 May 2000, in which they concluded:
“In view of the foregoing, the Committees find that the collection of parking fees by
shopping malls is contrary to the National Building Code and is therefor [sic] illegal.
While it is true that the Code merely requires malls to provide parking spaces,
without specifying whether it is free or not, both Committees believe that the
reasonable and logical interpretation of the Code is that the parking spaces are for
free. This interpretation is not only reasonable and logical but finds support in the
actual practice in other countries like the United States of America where parking
spaces owned and operated by mall owners are free of charge.
Figuratively speaking, the Code has “expropriated” the land for parking—something
similar to the subdivision law which require developers to devote so much of the
land area for parks.
Moreover, Article II of R.A. No. 9734 (Consumer Act of the Philippines) provides that
“it is the policy of the State to protect the interest of the consumers, promote the
general welfare and establish standards of conduct for business and industry.”
Obviously, a contrary interpretation (i.e., justifying the collection of parking fees)
would be going against the declared policy of R.A. 7394.
Section 201 of the National Building Code gives the responsibility for the
administration and enforcement of the provisions of the Code, including the
imposition of penalties for administrative violations thereof to the Secretary of
Public Works. This set up, however, is not being carried out in reality.
43
In the position paper submitted by the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority
(MMDA), its chairman, Jejomar C. Binay, accurately pointed out that the Secretary
of the DPWH is responsible for the implementation/enforcement of the National
Building Code. After the enactment of the Local Government Code of 1991, the
local government units (LGU’s) were tasked to discharge the regulatory powers of
the DPWH. Hence, in the local level, the Building Officials enforce all rules/
regulations formulated by the DPWH relative to all building plans, specifications and
designs including parking space requirements. There is, however, no single national
department or agency directly tasked to supervise the enforcement of the
provisions of the Code on parking, notwithstanding the national character of the
law.”6
Senate Committee Report No. 225, thus, contained the following
recommendations:
“In light of the foregoing, the Committees on Trade and Commerce and Justice and
Human Rights hereby recommend the following:
1. The Office of the Solicitor General should institute the necessary action to
enjoin the collection of parking fees as well as to enforce the penal sanction
provisions of the National Building Code. The Office of the Solicitor General should
likewise study how refund can be exacted from mall owners who continue to collect
parking fees.
2. The Department of Trade and Industry pursuant to the provisions of R.A. No.
7394, otherwise known as the Consumer Act of the Philippines should enforce the
provisions of the Code relative to parking. Towards this end, the DTI should
formulate the necessary implementing rules and regulations on parking in shopping
malls, with prior consultations with the local government units where these are
located. Furthermore, the DTI, in coordination with the DPWH, should be
empowered to regulate and supervise the construction and maintenance of parking
establishments.
3. Finally, Congress should amend and update the National Building Code to
expressly prohibit shopping malls from collecting parking fees by at the same time,
prohibit them from invoking the waiver of liability.”7
Respondent SM Prime thereafter received information that, pursuant to Senate
Committee Report No. 225, the DPWH Secretary and the local building officials of
Manila, Quezon City, and Las Piñas intended to institute, through the OSG, an action
to enjoin respondent SM Prime and similar establishments from collecting parking
fees, and to impose upon said establishments penal sanctions under Presidential
Decree No. 1096, otherwise known as the National Building Code of the Philippines
(National Building Code), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR). With
the threatened action against it, respondent SM Prime filed, on 3 October 2000, a
Petition for Declaratory Relief8 under Rule 63 of the Revised Rules of Court, against
the DPWH Secretary and local building officials of Manila, Quezon City, and Las
Piñas. Said Petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 00-1208 and assigned to the RTC
of Makati City, Branch 138, presided over by Judge Sixto Marella, Jr. (Judge
Marella). In its Petition, respondent SM Prime prayed for judgment:
“a) Declaring Rule XIX of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the National
Building Code as ultra vires, hence, unconstitutional and void;
b) Declaring [herein respondent SM Prime]’s clear legal right to lease parking
spaces appurtenant to its department stores, malls, shopping centers and other
commercial establishments; and
c) Declaring the National Building Code of the Philippines Implementing Rules and
Regulations as ineffective, not having been published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation, as prescribed by Section
211 of Presidential Decree No. 1096.
[Respondent SM Prime] further prays for such other reliefs as may be deemed just
and equitable under the premises.”9
The very next day, 4 October 2000, the OSG filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief
and Injunction (with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction)10 against respondents. This Petition was docketed as Civil
Case No. 00-1210 and raffled to the RTC of Makati, Branch 135, presided over by
Judge Francisco B. Ibay (Judge Ibay). Petitioner prayed that the RTC:
“1. After summary hearing, a temporary restraining order and a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued restraining respondents from collecting parking
fees from their customers; and
2. After hearing, judgment be rendered declaring that the practice of respondents
in charging parking fees is violative of the National Building Code and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations and is therefore invalid, and making
permanent any injunctive writ issued in this case.
Other reliefs just and equitable under the premises are likewise prayed for.”11
44
On 23 October 2000, Judge Ibay of the RTC of Makati City, Branch 135, issued an
Order consolidating Civil Case No. 00-1210 with Civil Case No. 00-1208 pending
before Judge Marella of RTC of Makati, Branch 138.
As a result of the pre-trial conference held on the morning of 8 August 2001, the
RTC issued a Pre-Trial Order12 of even date which limited the issues to be resolved
in Civil Cases No. 00-1208 and No. 00-1210 to the following:
“1. Capacity of the plaintiff [OSG] in Civil Case No. 00-1210 to institute the present
proceedings and relative thereto whether the controversy in the collection of
parking fees by mall owners is a matter of public welfare.
2. Whether declaratory relief is proper.
3. Whether respondent Ayala Land, Robinsons, Shangri-La and SM Prime are
obligated to provide parking spaces in their malls for the use of their patrons or the
public in general, free of charge.
4. Entitlement of the parties of [sic] award of damages.”13
On 29 May 2002, the RTC rendered its Joint Decision in Civil Cases No. 00-1208 and
No. 00-1210.
The RTC resolved the first two issues affirmatively. It ruled that the OSG can initiate
Civil Case No. 00-1210 under Presidential Decree No. 478 and the Administrative
Code of 1987.14 It also found that all the requisites for an action for declaratory
relief were present, to wit:
“The requisites for an action for declaratory relief are: (a) there is a justiciable
controversy; (b) the controversy is between persons whose interests are adverse;
(c) the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (d) the
issue involved is ripe for judicial determination.
SM, the petitioner in Civil Case No. 001-1208 [sic] is a mall operator who stands to
be affected directly by the position taken by the government officials sued namely
the Secretary of Public Highways and the Building Officials of the local government
units where it operates shopping malls. The OSG on the other hand acts on a matter
of public interest and has taken a position adverse to that of the mall owners whom
it sued. The construction of new and bigger malls has been announced, a matter
which the Court can take judicial notice and the unsettled issue of whether mall
operators should provide parking facilities, free of charge needs to be resolved.”15
As to the third and most contentious issue, the RTC pronounced that:
“The Building Code, which is the enabling law and the Implementing Rules and
Regulations do not impose that parking spaces shall be provided by the mall owners
free of charge. Absent such directive[,] Ayala Land, Robinsons, Shangri-la and SM
[Prime] are under no obligation to provide them for free. Article 1158 of the Civil
Code is clear:
malls because without parking spaces, going to their malls will be inconvenient.
These are[,] however[,] business considerations which mall operators will have to
decide for themselves. They are not sufficient to justify a legal conclusion, as the
OSG would like the Court to adopt that it is the obligation of the mall owners to
provide parking spaces for free.”16
The RTC then held that there was no sufficient evidence to justify any award for
damages.

The RTC finally decreed in its 29 May 2002 Joint Decision in Civil Cases No. 00-1208
and No. 00-1210 that:
“Obligations derived from law are not presumed. Only those expressly determined
in this Code or in special laws are demandable and shall be regulated by the
precepts of the law which establishes them; and as to what has not been foreseen,
by the provisions of this Book (1090).[“] “FOR THE REASONS GIVEN, the Court declares that Ayala Land[,] Inc., Robinsons
Land Corporation, Shangri-la Plaza Corporation and SM Prime Holdings[,] Inc. are
xxxx not obligated to provide parking spaces in their malls for the use of their patrons or
public in general, free of charge.
The provision on ratios of parking slots to several variables, like shopping floor area
or customer area found in Rule XIX of the Implementing Rules and Regulations
cannot be construed as a directive to provide free parking spaces, because the
enabling law, the Building Code does not so provide. x x x. All counterclaims in Civil Case No. 00-1210 are dismissed.

To compel Ayala Land, Robinsons, Shangri-La and SM [Prime] to provide parking No pronouncement as to costs.”17
spaces for free can be considered as an unlawful taking of property right without
just compensation.

CA-G.R. CV No. 76298 involved the separate appeals of the OSG18 and respondent
SM Prime19 filed with the Court of Appeals. The sole assignment of error of the
Parking spaces in shopping malls are privately owned and for their use, the mall OSG in its Appellant’s Brief was:
operators collect fees. The legal relationship could be either lease or deposit. In
either case[,] the mall owners have the right to collect money which translates into
income. Should parking spaces be made free, this right of mall owners shall be
gone. This, without just compensation. Further, loss of effective control over their
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE NATIONAL BUILDING CODE DID
property will ensue which is frowned upon by law.
NOT INTEND MALL PARKING SPACES TO BE FREE OF CHARGE[;]20

     The presence of parking spaces can be viewed in another light. They can be
looked at as necessary facilities to entice the public to increase patronage of their
45
while the four errors assigned by respondent SM Prime in its Appellant’s Brief were:
I the Court of Appeals.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DECLARE RULE XIX OF THE IMPLEMENTING
RULES AS HAVING BEEN ENACTED ULTRA VIRES, HENCE, UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND
VOID.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DECLARE THE IMPLEMENTING RULES
INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT HAVING BEEN PUBLISHED AS REQUIRED BY LAW.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DISMISS THE OSG’S PETITION FOR
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND INJUNCTION FOR FAILURE TO EXHAUST
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DECLARE THAT THE OSG HAS NO LEGAL
CAPACITY TO SUE AND/OR THAT IT IS NOT A REAL PARTY-IN-INTEREST IN THE
INSTANT CASE.21
46
Respondent Robinsons filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal of the OSG on the ground
that the lone issue raised therein involved a pure question of law, not reviewable by
The Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 76298 on 25
January 2007. The appellate court agreed with respondent Robinsons that the
appeal of the OSG should suffer the fate of dismissal, since “the issue on whether or
not the National Building Code and its implementing rules require shopping mall
operators to provide parking facilities to the public for free” was evidently a
question of law. Even so, since CA-G.R. CV No. 76298 also included the appeal of
respondent SM Prime, which raised issues worthy of consideration, and in order to
satisfy the demands of substantial justice, the Court of Appeals proceeded to rule
on the merits of the case.
In its Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the capacity of the OSG to initiate Civil
Case No. 00-1210 before the RTC as the legal representative of the government,22
and as the one deputized by the Senate of the Republic of the Philippines through
Senate Committee Report No. 225.
The Court of Appeals rejected the contention of respondent SM Prime that the OSG
failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The appellate court explained that an
administrative review is not a condition precedent to judicial relief where the
question in dispute is purely a legal one, and nothing of an administrative nature is
to be or can be done.
22 Citing Section 35, Chapter XII, Title III, Book IV of Executive Order No. 292,
otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, which provide:
 SECTION 35. Powers and Functions.—The Office of the Solicitor General shall
represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and
its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring
the services of a lawyer. When authorized by the President or head of the office
concerned, it shall also represent government-owned or controlled corporations.
The Office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the Government
and, as such, shall discharge duties requiring the services of a lawyer. It shall have
the following specific powers and functions:
 x x x x

 (3)  Appear in any court in any action involving the validity of any treaty, law,
executive order or proclamation, rule or regulation when in his judgment his
intervention is necessary or when requested by the Court.
In its Resolution issued on 14 March 2007, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion
for Reconsideration of the OSG, finding that the grounds relied upon by the latter
had already been carefully considered, evaluated, and passed upon by the appellate
court, and there was no strong and cogent reason to modify much less reverse the
assailed judgment.

The OSG now comes before this Court, via the instant Petition for Review, with a
single assignment of error:
 x x x x
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RULING OF THE
LOWER COURT THAT RESPONDENTS ARE NOT OBLIGED TO PROVIDE FREE PARKING
SPACES TO THEIR CUSTOMERS OR THE PUBLIC.24
 (11)  Act and represent the Republic and/or the people before any court, tribunal,
body or commission in any matter, action or proceeding which, in his opinion,
affects the welfare of the people as the ends of justice may require; x x x.
The OSG argues that respondents are mandated to provide free parking by Section
The Court of Appeals likewise refused to rule on the validity of the IRR of the 803 of the National Building Code and Rule XIX of the IRR.
National Building Code, as such issue was not among those the parties had agreed
to be resolved by the RTC during the pre-trial conference for Civil Cases No. 00-1208
and No. 00-1210. Issues cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Furthermore,
the appellate court found that the controversy could be settled on other grounds, According to Section 803 of the National Building Code:
without touching on the issue of the validity of the IRR. It referred to the settled
rule that courts should refrain from passing upon the constitutionality of a law or
implementing rules, because of the principle that bars judicial inquiry into a
constitutional question, unless the resolution thereof is indispensable to the “SECTION 803. Percentage of Site Occupancy
determination of the case.

Lastly, the Court of Appeals declared that Section 803 of the National Building Code
and Rule XIX of the IRR were clear and needed no further construction. Said
(a) Maximum site occupancy shall be governed by the use, type of construction,
provisions were only intended to control the occupancy or congestion of areas and
and height of the building and the use, area, nature, and location of the site; and
structures. In the absence of any express and clear provision of law, respondents
subject to the provisions of the local zoning requirements and in accordance with
could not be obliged and expected to provide parking slots free of charge.
the rules and regulations promulgated by the Secretary.”

The fallo of the 25 January 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:

In connection therewith, Rule XIX of the old IRR,25 provides:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeals are DENIED. Accordingly,

appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.”23

47
RULE XIX—PARKING AND LOADING SPACE REQUIREMENTS Office of the Solicitor General vs. Ayala Land, Incorporated

“Pursuant to Section 803 of the National Building Code (PD 1096) providing for
maximum site occupancy, the following provisions on parking and loading space
requirements shall be observed:
1. The parking space ratings listed below are minimum off-street requirements for
specific uses/occupancies for buildings/structures:
1.1 The size of an average automobile parking slot shall be computed as 2.4
meters by 5.00 meters for perpendicular or diagonal parking, 2.00 meters by 6.00
meters for parallel parking. A truck or bus parking/loading slot shall be computed at
a minimum of 3.60 meters by 12.00 meters. The parking slot shall be drawn to scale
and the total number of which shall be indicated on the plans and specified
whether or not parking accommodations, are attendant-managed. (See Section 2
for computation of parking requirements).

xxxx
_______________

1.7 Neighborhood shopping center—1 slot/100 sq. m. of shopping floor area

24 Id., at p. 33.

The OSG avers that the aforequoted provisions should be read together with
25 A Revised IRR took effect on 30 April 2005. Rule XIX of the old IRR was Section 102 of the National Building Code, which declares:
reproduced in Table VII.4 (Minimum Required Off-Street (Off-RROW)-cum-On-Site
Parking Slot, Parking Area and Loading/Unloading Space Requirements by Allowed
Use or Occupancy) of the Revised IRR.
“SECTION 102. Declaration of Policy

636
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to safeguard life, health, property,
and public welfare, consistent with the principles of sound environmental
management and control; and to this end, make it the purpose of this Code to
636 provide for all buildings and structures, a framework of minimum standards and
requirements to regulate and control their location, site, design, quality of
materials, construction, use, occupancy, and maintenance.”

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

48
The requirement of free-of-charge parking, the OSG argues, greatly contributes to
the aim of safeguarding “life, health, property, and public welfare, consistent with
the principles of sound environmental management and control.” Adequate parking
spaces would contribute greatly to alleviating traffic congestion when
complemented by quick and easy access thereto because of free-charge parking.
Moreover, the power to regulate and control the use, occupancy, and maintenance
of buildings and structures carries with it the power to impose fees and, conversely,
to control—partially or, as in this case, absolutely—the imposition of such fees.
The Court finds no merit in the present Petition.
The explicit directive of the afore-quoted statutory and regulatory provisions,
garnered from a plain reading thereof, is that respondents, as operators/lessors of
neighborhood shopping centers, should provide parking and loading spaces, in
accordance with the minimum ratio of one slot per 100 square meters of shopping
floor area. There is nothing therein pertaining to the collection (or non-collection)
of parking fees by respondents. In fact, the term “parking fees” cannot even be
found at all in the entire National Building Code and its IRR.
Statutory construction has it that if a statute is clear and unequivocal, it must be
given its literal meaning and applied without any attempt at interpretation.26 Since
Section 803 of the National Building Code and Rule XIX of its IRR do not mention
parking fees, then simply, said provisions do not regulate the collection of the same.
The RTC and the Court of Appeals correctly applied Article 1158 of the New Civil
Code, which states:
“Art. 1158. Obligations derived from law are not presumed. Only those expressly
determined in this Code or in special laws are demandable, and shall be regulated
by the precepts of the law which establishes them; and as to what has not been
foreseen, by the provisions of this Book.” (Emphasis ours.)
Hence, in order to bring the matter of parking fees within the ambit of the National
Building Code and its IRR, the OSG had to resort to specious and feeble
argumentation, in which the Court cannot concur.
49
The OSG cannot rely on Section 102 of the National Building Code to expand the
coverage of Section 803 of the same Code and Rule XIX of the IRR, so as to include
the regulation of parking fees. The OSG limits its citation to the first part of
_______________
Section 102 of the National Building Code declaring the policy of the State “to
safeguard life, health, property, and public welfare, consistent with the principles of
sound environmental management and control”; but totally ignores the second part
of said provision, which reads, “and to this end, make it the purpose of this Code to
provide for all buildings and structures, a framework of minimum standards and
requirements to regulate and control their location, site, design, quality of
materials, construction, use, occupancy, and maintenance.” While the first part of
Section 102 of the National Building Code lays down the State policy, it is the
second part thereof that explains how said policy shall be carried out in the Code.
Section 102 of the National Building Code is not an all-encompassing grant of
regulatory power to the DPWH Secretary and local building officials in the name of
life, health, property, and public welfare. On the contrary, it limits the regulatory
power of said officials to ensuring that the minimum standards and requirements
for all buildings and structures, as set forth in the National Building Code, are
complied with.
Consequently, the OSG cannot claim that in addition to fixing the minimum
requirements for parking spaces for buildings, Rule XIX of the IRR also mandates
that such parking spaces be provided by building owners free of charge. If Rule XIX
is not covered by the enabling law, then it cannot be added to or included in the
implementing rules. The rule-making power of administrative agencies must be
confined to details for regulating the mode or proceedings to carry into effect the
law as it has been enacted, and it cannot be extended to amend or expand the
statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute.
Administrative regulations must always be in harmony with the provisions of the
law because any resulting discrepancy between the two will always be resolved in
favor of the basic law.27
From the RTC all the way to this Court, the OSG repeatedly referred to Republic v.
Gonzales28 and City of Ozamis v. Lumapas29 to support its position that the State
has the power to regulate parking spaces to promote the health, safety, and
welfare of the public; and it is by virtue of said power that respondents may be
required to provide free parking facilities. The OSG, though, failed to consider the
substantial differences in the factual and legal backgrounds of these two cases from
those of the Petition at bar.
In Republic, the Municipality of Malabon sought to eject the occupants of two
parcels of land of the public domain to give way to a road-widening project. It was
in this context that the Court pronounced:
“Indiscriminate parking along F. Sevilla Boulevard and other main thoroughfares
was prevalent; this, of course, caused the build up of traffic in the surrounding area
to the great discomfort and inconvenience of the public who use the streets. Traffic
congestion constitutes a threat to the health, welfare, safety and convenience of
the people and it can only be substantially relieved by widening streets and
providing adequate parking areas.”
The Court, in City of Ozamis, declared that the City had been clothed with full
power to control and regulate its streets for the purpose of promoting public
health, safety and welfare. The City can regulate the time, place, and manner of
parking in the streets and public places; and charge minimal fees for the street
parking to cover the expenses for supervision, inspection and control, to ensure the
smooth flow of traffic in the environs of the public market, and for the safety and
convenience of the public.
Republic and City of Ozamis involved parking in the local streets; in contrast, the
present case deals with privately owned parking facilities available for use by the
general public. In Republic and City of Ozamis, the concerned local governments
regulated parking pursuant to their power to control and regulate their streets; in
the instant case, the DPWH Secretary and local building officials regulate parking
pursuant to their authority to ensure compliance with the minimum standards and
requirements under the National Building Code and its IRR. With the difference in
subject matters and the bases for the regulatory powers being invoked, Republic
and City of Ozamis do not constitute precedents for this case.
50
Indeed, Republic and City of Ozamis both contain pronouncements that weaken the
position of the OSG in the case at bar. In Republic, the Court, instead of placing the
burden on private persons to provide parking facilities to the general public,
mentioned the trend in other jurisdictions wherein the municipal governments
themselves took the initiative to make more parking spaces available so as to
alleviate the traffic problems, thus:
“Under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, parking in designated areas along
public streets or highways is allowed which clearly indicates that provision for
parking spaces serves a useful purpose. In other jurisdictions where traffic is at least
as voluminous as here, the provision by municipal governments of parking space is
not limited to parking along public streets or highways. There has been a marked
trend to build off-street parking facilities with the view to removing parked cars
from the streets. While the provision of off-street parking facilities or carparks has
been commonly undertaken by private enterprise, municipal governments have
been constrained to put up carparks in response to public necessity where private
enterprise had failed to keep up with the growing public demand. American courts
have upheld the right of municipal governments to construct off-street parking
facilities as clearly redounding to the public benefit.”30
In City of Ozamis, the Court authorized the collection by the City of minimal fees for
the parking of vehicles along the streets: so why then should the Court now
preclude respondents from collecting from the public a fee for the use of the mall
parking facilities? Undoubtedly, respondents also incur expenses in the
maintenance and operation of the mall parking facilities, such as electric
consumption, compensation for parking attendants and security, and upkeep of the
physical structures.
It is not sufficient for the OSG to claim that “the power to regulate and control the
use, occupancy, and maintenance of buildings and structures carries with it the
power to impose fees and, conversely, to control, partially or, as in this case,
absolutely, the imposition of such fees.” Firstly, the fees within the power of
regulatory agencies to impose are regulatory fees. It has been settled law in this
jurisdiction that this broad and all-compassing governmental competence to restrict
rights of liberty and property carries with it the undeniable power to collect a
regulatory fee. It looks to the enactment of specific measures that govern the
relations not only as between individuals but also as between private parties and
the political society.31 True, if the regulatory agencies have the power to impose
regulatory fees, then conversely, they also have the power to remove the same.
Even so, it is worthy to note that the present case does not involve the imposition
by the DPWH Secretary and local building officials of regulatory fees upon
respondents; but the collection by respondents of parking fees from persons who
use the mall parking facilities. Secondly, assuming arguendo that the DPWH
Secretary and local building officials do have regulatory powers over the collection
of parking fees for the use of privately owned parking facilities, they cannot allow or
prohibit such collection arbitrarily or whimsically. Whether allowing or prohibiting
the collection of such parking fees, the
action of the DPWH Secretary and local building officials must pass the test of
classic reasonableness and propriety of the measures or means in the promotion of
the ends sought to be accomplished.32
Keeping in mind the aforementioned test of reasonableness and propriety of
measures or means, the Court notes that Section 803 of the National Building Code
falls under Chapter 8 on Light and Ventilation. Evidently, the Code deems it
necessary to regulate site occupancy to ensure that there is proper lighting and
ventilation in every building. Pursuant thereto, Rule XIX of the IRR requires that a
building, depending on its specific use and/or floor area, should provide a minimum
number of parking spaces. The Court, however, fails to see the connection between
regulating site occupancy to ensure proper light and ventilation in every building
vis-à-vis regulating the collection by building owners of fees for the use of their
parking spaces. Contrary to the averment of the OSG, the former does not
necessarily include or imply the latter. It totally escapes this Court how lighting and
ventilation conditions at the malls could be affected by the fact that parking
facilities thereat are free or paid for.
The OSG attempts to provide the missing link by arguing that:
“Under Section 803 of the National Building Code, complimentary parking spaces
are required to enhance light and ventilation, that is, to avoid traffic congestion in
areas surrounding the building, which certainly affects the ventilation within the
building itself, which otherwise, the annexed parking spaces would have served.
51
Free-of-charge parking avoids traffic congestion by ensuring quick and easy access
of legitimate shoppers to off-street parking spaces annexed to the malls, and
thereby removing the vehicles of these legitimate shoppers off the busy streets
near the commercial establishments.”33
The Court is unconvinced. The National Building Code regulates buildings, by setting
the minimum specifications and requirements for the same. It does not concern
itself with traffic congestion in areas surrounding the building. It is already a stretch
to say that the National Building Code and its IRR also intend to solve the problem
of traffic congestion around the buildings so as to ensure that the said buildings
shall have adequate lighting and ventilation. Moreover, the Court cannot simply
assume, as the OSG has apparently done, that the traffic congestion in areas around
the malls is due to the fact that respondents charge for their parking facilities, thus,
forcing vehicle owners to just park in the streets. The Court notes that despite the
fees charged by respondents, vehicle owners still use the mall parking facilities,
which are even fully occupied on some days. Vehicle owners may be parking in the
streets only because there are not enough parking spaces in the malls, and not
because they are deterred by the parking fees charged by respondents. Free
parking spaces at the malls may even have the opposite effect from what the OSG
envisioned: more people may be encouraged by the free parking to bring their own
vehicles, instead of taking public transport, to the malls; as a result, the parking
facilities would become full sooner, leaving more vehicles without parking spaces in
the malls and parked in the streets instead, causing even more traffic congestion.
Without using the term outright, the OSG is actually invoking police power to justify
the regulation by the State, through the DPWH Secretary and local building officials,
of privately owned parking facilities, including the collection by the
owners/operators of such facilities of parking fees from the public for the use
thereof. The Court finds, however, that in totally prohibiting respondents from
collecting parking fees from the public for the use of the mall parking facilities, the
State would be acting beyond the bounds of police power.
Police power is the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and
regulating the use of liberty and property. It is usually exerted in order to merely
regulate the use and enjoyment of the property of the owner. The power to
regulate, however, does not include the power to prohibit. A fortiori, the power to
regulate does not include the power to confiscate. Police power does not involve
the taking or confiscation of property, with the exception of a few cases where
there is a necessity to confiscate private property in order to destroy it for the
purpose of protecting peace and order and of promoting the general welfare; for
instance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed article, such as opium and
firearms.34
When there is a taking or confiscation of private property for public use, the State is
no longer exercising police power, but another of its inherent powers, namely,
eminent domain. Eminent domain enables the State to forcibly acquire private
lands intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner.35
Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or
appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no
cogent reason appears why the said power may not be availed of only to impose a
burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and
possession.36 It is a settled rule that neither acquisition of title nor total destruction
of value is essential to taking. It is usually in cases where title remains with the
private owner that inquiry should be made to determine whether the impairment
of a property is merely regulated or amounts to a compensable taking. A regulation
that deprives any person of the profitable use of his property constitutes a taking
and entitles him to compensation, unless the invasion of rights is so slight as to
permit the regulation to be justified under the police power. Similarly, a police
regulation that unreasonably restricts the right to use business property for
business purposes amounts to a taking of private property, and the owner may
recover therefor.37
Although in the present case, title to and/or possession of the parking facilities
remain/s with respondents, the prohibition against their collection of parking fees
from the public, for the use of said facilities, is already tantamount to a taking or
confiscation of their properties. The State is not only requiring that respondents
devote a portion of the latter’s properties for use as parking spaces, but is also
mandating that they give the public access to said parking spaces for free. Such is
already an excessive intrusion into the property rights of respondents. Not only are
they being deprived of the right to use a portion of their properties as they wish,
they are further prohibited from profiting from its use or even just recovering
therefrom the expenses for the maintenance and operation of the required parking
facilities.
52
The ruling of this Court in City Government of Quezon City v. Judge Ericta38 is
edifying. Therein, the City Government of Quezon City passed an ordinance obliging
private cemeteries within its jurisdiction to set aside at least six percent of their
total area for charity, that is, for burial grounds of deceased paupers. According to
the Court, the ordinance in question was null and void, for it authorized the taking
of private property without just compensation:
“There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent
of the total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased
paupers and the promotion of’ health, morals, good order, safety, or the general
welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a
certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the
municipal corporation. Instead of’ building or maintaining a public cemetery for this
purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeeries.
‘The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not
covered by Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City
which empowers the city council to prohibit the burial of the dead within the center
of population of the city and to provide for their burial in a proper place subject to
the provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries. When the
Local Government Code, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 provides in Section 177(q) that a
sangguniang panlungsod may “provide for the burial of the dead in such place and
in such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance” it simply authorizes the city to
provide its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private properties to
construct public cemeteries. This has been the law, and practise in the past. It
continues to the present. Expropriation, however, requires payment of just
compensation. The questioned ordinance is different from laws and regulations
requiring owners of subdivisions to set aside certain areas for streets, parks,
playgrounds, and other public facilities from the land they sell to buyers of
subdivision lots. The necessities of public safety, health, and convenience are very
clear from said requirements which are intended to insure the development of
communities with salubrious and wholesome environments. The beneficiaries of
the regulation, in turn, are made to pay by the subdivision developer when
individual lots are sold to homeowners.”
In conclusion, the total prohibition against the collection by respondents of parking
fees from persons who use the mall parking facilities has no basis in the National
Building Code or its IRR. The State also cannot impose the same prohibition by
generally invoking police power, since said prohibition amounts to a taking of
respondents’ property without payment of just compensation.
Given the foregoing, the Court finds no more need to address the issue persistently
raised by respondent SM Prime concerning the unconstitutionality of Rule XIX of the
IRR. In addition, the said issue was not among those that the parties, during the pre-
trial conference for Civil Cases No. 12-08 and No. 00-1210, agreed to submit for
resolution of the RTC. It is likewise axiomatic that the constitutionality of a law, a
regulation, an ordinance or an act will not be resolved by courts if the controversy
can be, as in this case it has been, settled on other grounds.39
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby DENIED. The
Decision dated 25 January 2007 and Resolution dated 14 March 2007 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76298, affirming in toto the Joint Decision dated 29
May 2002 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 138, in Civil Cases No.
00-1208 and No. 00-1210 are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Velasco, Jr., Nachura and Peralta, JJ., concur.
Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.
Note.—While the Constitution protects property rights, petitioners must accept the
realities of business and the State, in the exercise of police power can intervene in
the operations of a business which may result in an impairment of property rights in
the process. (Carlos Superdrug Corp., vs. Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD), 526 SCRA 130 [2007])
——o0o——   Office of the Solicitor General vs. Ayala Land, Incorporated, 600 SCRA
617, G.R. No. 177056 September 18, 2009
[No. 14355. October 31, 1919.]
53
#6
THE CITY OF MANILA, plaintiff and appellant, vs. CHINESE COMMUNITY OF
MANILA ET AL., defendants and appellees.
1.EMINENT DOMAIN ; EXPROPRIATION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY, RIGHT OF COURTS
TO INQUIRE INTO NECESSITY OF.—When a municipal corporation attempts to
expropriate private property and an objection is made thereto by the owner, the
courts have ample authority, in this jurisdiction, to make inquiry, and to hear proof
upon an -issue properly presented, concerning the question whether or not the
purpose of the appropriation is, in fact, for some public use. The right of
expropriation is not inherent power in a municipal corporation and before it can
exercise the right some law must exist conferring the power upon it. A municipal
corporation in this jurisdiction cannot expropriate public property. The land to be
expropriated must be private, and the purpose of the expropriation must be public.
If the court, upon trial, finds that neither of said condition exists, or
that either one of them fails, the right to expropriate does not exist. If the property
is taken in' the ostensible behalf of a public improvement which it can never by any
possibility serve, it is being taken for a use not public, and the owner's
constitutional rights call for protection by the courts.
2.ID. ; ID.—Upon the other hand, the Legislature may directly determine the
necessity for appropriating private property for a particular improvement for public
use, and it may select the exact location of the improvement. In such a case, it is
well settled that the utility of the proposed improvement, the existence of the
public necessity for its construction, the expediency of constructing it, the
suitableness of the location selected, and the consequent necessity of taking the
lands selected, are all questions exclusively for the legislature to determine, and the
courts have no power to interfere or to substitute their own views for those of the
representatives of the people.
3.ID.; ID.—But when the law does not designate the property to be taken, nor how
much may be taken, then the necessity of taking private property is a question for
the courts.
4.ID. ; ID.—There is a wide distinction between a legislative declaration that a
municipality is given authority to exercise the right of eminent domain and a
decision by the municipality that there exists a necessity for the exercise of that
right in a particular case.
5.ID. ; ID.—Whether or not it was wise, advisable, or necessary to confer upon a 12.ID.; ID.—The city of Manila is not authorized to expropriate public property.
municipality the power to exercise the right of eminent domain, is a question with
which the courts are not concerned. But whenever that right or authority is Per MALCOLM, J., concurring:
exercised for the purpose of depriving citizens of their property, the courts are
authorized, in this jurisdiction, to make inquiry and to hear proof upon the necessity
in a particular case, and not the general authority.
13.EMINENT DOMAIN; POWER OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.
6.ID.; ID.—In the absence of some constitutional or statutory provision to the —The Government of the Philippine Islands is authorized by the Philippine Bill to
contrary, the necessity and expediency of exercising the right of eminent domain acquire real estate for public use by the exercise of the right of eminent domain.
are questions essentially political and not judicial in their character.
14.ID.; ID.; CITY OF MANILA.—The city of Manila is authorized by the Philippine
7.ID. ; ID.—The taking of private property for any use which is not required by the Legislature to condemn private property for public use.
necessities or convenience of the inhabitants of a state, is an unreasonable exercise
of the right of eminent domain
15.ID.; ID.; ID.; PRIVATE PROPERTY; PUBLIC USE.—The Legislature has the power to
authorize the taking of land already applied to one public use and devote it to
8.ID. ; ID.—That government can scarcely be deemed free where the rights of another.
property are left solely dependent on the legislative body without restraint. The
fundamental maxims of free government seem to require that the rights of
16.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—When the power to take land already applied to one public
personal liberty and private property should be held sacred. At least no court of
use and devote it to another is granted to municipal or private corporations in
justice would be warranted in assuming that the power to
express words, no question can arise.

violate and disregard them lurks in any general grant of legislative authority or
17.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—Land already devoted to a public use cannot be taken by
ought to be implied from any general expression of the people. The people ought
the public for another use which is inconsistent with the first without special
not to be presumed to part with rights so vital to their security and well-being
authority from the Legislature or authority granted by necessary and reasonable
without a very strong and direct expression of such intention.
implication.

9.ID. ; ID.—The exercise of the right of eminent domain is necessarily in derogation

18.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—Land applied to one use should not be taken for another
of private rights, and the rule in that case is that the authority must be strictly
except in cases of necessity.
construed. No species of property is held by individuals with greater tenacity and
none is guarded by the constitution and laws more sedulously, than the right to the
19.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CEMETERIES; CLASSES.—Cemeteries are of two classes:
freehold of inhabitants. When the legislature interferes with that right, the plain
public and private.
meaning of the law should not be enlarged by doubtful interpretation.

20.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PUBLIC CEMETERY.—A public cemetery is one used
10.ID.; ID.—The very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a
by the general community, or neighborhood, or church.
genuine necessity, and that necessity must be of a public character. The
ascertainment of the necessity must precede, and not follow, the taking of the
property. The general power to exercise the right of eminent domain must not be 21.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PRIVATE CEMETERY.—A private cemetery is one
confused with the right to exercise it in a particular case. used only by a family, or a small portion of a community.

11.ID. ; CEMETERIES, EXPROPRIATION OF.—Where a cemetery is open to the public, 22.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CHINESE CEMETERY, CITY OF MANILA.—The Chinese
it is a public use and no part of the ground can be taken for other public uses under Cemetery in the city of Manila is a public cemetery.
a general authority.

54
23.ID. ; ID. ; ID.; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID.—Cemeteries, while still devoted to pious
uses, are sacred, and it cannot be supposed that the Legislature has intended that
they should be violated in the absence of special provisions on the subject
authorizing such invasion.
24.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—Held: That since the city of Manila is only
permitted to condemn private property for public use and since the Chinese
Cemetery in the city of Manila is a public cemetery already devoted to a public use,
the city of Manila cannot condemn a portion of the cemetery for a public street.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila. Del Rosario, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
City Fiscal Diaz for appellant.
Crossfield & O'Brien, Williams, Ferrier & Sycip, Delgado & Delgado, Filemon Sotto,
and Ramon Salinas for appellees.
JOHNSON, J.:
The important question presented by this appeal is: In expropriation proceedings by
the city of Manila, may the courts inquire into, and hear proof upon, the necessity
of the expropriation ?
That question arose in the following manner:
On the 11th day of December, 1916, the city of Manila presented a petition in the
Court of First Instance of said city, praying that certain lands, therein particularly
described, be expropriated for the purpose of constructinga public improvement.
The petitioner, in the second paragraph of the petition, alleged:
55
"That for the purpose of constructing a public improvement, namely, the extension
of Rizal Avenue, Manila, it is necessary for the plaintiff to acquire ownership in fee
simple of certain parcels of land situated in the district of Binondo of said city within
Block 83 of said district, and within the jurisdiction of this court."
The defendant, the Comunidad de Chinos de Manila [Chinese Community of
Manila], answering the petition of the plaintiff, alleged that it was a corporation
organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippine Islands,
having for its purpose the benefit and general welfare of the Chinese Community of
the City of Manila; that it was the owner of parcels one and two of the land
described in paragraph 2 of the complaint; that it denied that it was either
necessary or expedient that the ,said parcels be expropriated f or street purposes;
that existing street and roads furnished ample means of communication for the
public in the district covered by such proposed expropriation; that if the
construction of the street or road should be considered a public necessity, other
routes were available, which would fully satisfy the plaintiff's purposes, at much less
expense and without disturbing the resting places of the dead; that it had a Torrens
title for the lands in question; that the lands in question had been used by the
defendant for cemetery purposes; that a great number of Chinese were buried in
said cemetery; that if said expropriation be carried into effect, it would disturb the
resting places of the dead, would require the expenditure of a large sum of money
in the transfer or removal of the bodies to some other place or site and in the
purchase of such new sites, would involve the destruction of existing monuments
and the erection of new monuments in their stead, and would create irreparable
loss and injury to the defendant and to all those persons owning and interested in
the graves and monuments which would have to be destroyed; that the plaintiff
was without right or authority to expropriate said cemetery or any part or portion
thereof for street purposes; and that the expropriation, in fact, was not necessary
as a public improvement.
The defendant Ildefonso Tambunting, answering the petition, denied each and
every allegation of the complaint, and alleged that said expropriation was not a
public improvement; that it was not necessary for the plaintiff to acquire the
parcels of land in question; that a portion of the lands in question was used as a
cemetery in which were the graves of his ancestors; that monuments and
tombstones of great value were found thereon; that the land had become quasi-
public property of a benevolent association, dedicated and used for the burial of
the dead and that many dead were buried there; that if the plaintiff deemed it
necessary to extend Rizal Avenue, he had offered and still offers to grant a right of
way for the said extension over other land, without cost to the plaintiff, in order
that the sepulchres, chapels and graves of his ancestors may not be disturbed; that
the land so offered, free of charge, would answer every public necessity on the part
of the plaintiff.
The defendant Feliza Concepcion de Delgado, with her husband, Jose Maria
Delgado, and each of the other defendants, answering separately, presented
substantially the same defense as that presented by the Comunidad de Chinos de
Manila and Ildefonso Tambunting above referred to.
The foregoing parts of the defense presented by the defendants have been inserted
in order to show the general character of the defenses presented by each of the
defendants. The plaintiff alleged that the expropriation was necessary. The
defendants each alleged (a) that no necessity existed for said expropriation and (b)
that the land in question was a cemetery, which had been used as such for many
years, and was covered with sepulchres and monuments, and that the same should
not be converted into a street for public purposes.
Upon the issue thus presented by the petition and the various answers, the
Honorable Simplicio del Rosario, judge, in a very elucidated opinion, with very clear
and explicit reasons, supported by abundance of authorities, decided that there was
no necessity for the expropriation of the particular strip of land in question, and
absolved each and all of the defendants from all liability under the complaint,
without any finding as to costs.
From that judgment the plaintiff appealed and presented the above question as its
principal ground of appeal. The theory of the plaintiff is, that once it has established
the fact, under the law, that it has authority to expropriate land, it may expropriate
any land it may desire; that the only function of the court in such proceedings is to
ascertain the value of the land in question; that neither the court nor the owners of
the land can inquire into the advisible purpose of the expropriation or ask any
questions concerning the necessities therefor; that the courts are mere appraisers
of the land involved in expropriation proceedings, and, when the value of the land is
fixed by the method adopted by the law, to render a judgment in favor of the
defendant for its value.
That the city of Manila has authority to expropriate private lands for public
purposes, is not denied. Section 2429 of Act No. 2711 (Charter of the city of Manila)
provides that "the city (Manila) * * * may condemn private property for public use."
The Charter of the city of Manila contains no procedure by which the said authority
may be carried into effect. We are driven, therefore, to the procedure marked out
by Act No. 190 to ascertain how the said authority may be exercised. From an
examination of Act No. 190, in its section 241, we find how the right of eminent
domain may be exercised. Said section 241 provides that, "The Government of the
56
Philippine Islands, or of any province or department thereof, or of any municipality,
and any person, or public or private corporation having, by law, the right to
condemn private property for public use, shall exercise that right in the manner
hereinafter prescribed."
Section 242 provides that a complaint in expropriation proceeding shall be
presented; that the complaint shall state with certainty the right of condemnation,
with a description of the property sought to be condemned together with the
interest of each defendant separately.
Section 243 provides that if the court shall find upon trial that the right to
expropriate the land in question exists, it shall then appoint commissioners.
Sections 244, 245 and 246 provide the method of procedure and duty of the
commissioners. Section 248 provides for an appeal from the judgment of the Court
of First Instance to the Supreme Court. Said section 248 gives the Supreme Court
authority to inquire into the right of expropriation on the part of the plaintiff. If the
Supreme Court on appeal shall determine that no right of expropriation existed, it
shall remand the cause to the Court of First Instance with a mandate that the
defendant be replaced in the possession of the property and that he recover
whatever damages he may have sustained by reason of the possession of the
plaintiff.
It is contended on the part of the plaintiff that the phrase in said section, "and if the
court shall find that the right to expropriate exists," means simply that, if the court
finds that there is some law authorizing the plaintiff to expropriate, then the courts
have no other function than to authorize the expropriation and to proceed to
ascertain the value of the land involved; that the necessity for the expropriation is a
legislative and not a judicial question.
Upon the question whether expropriation is a legislative function exclusively, and
that the courts cannot intervene except for the purpose of determining the value of
the land in question, there is much legal literature. Much has been written upon
both sides of that question. A careful examination of the discussions pro and con
will disclose the fact that the decisions depend largely upon particular constitutional
or statutory provisions. It cannot be denied, if the legislature under proper
authority should grant the expropriation of a certain or particular parcel of land for
some specified public purpose, that the courts would be without jurisdiction to
inquire into the purpose of that legislation.
If, upon the other hand, however, the Legislature should grant general authority to
a municipal corporation to expropriate private land for public purposes, we think
the courts have ample authority in this jurisdiction, under the provisions above
quoted, to make inquiry and to hear proof, upon an issue properly presented,
concerning whether or not the lands were private and whether the purpose was, in
fact, public. In other words, have not the courts in this jurisdiction the right,
inasmuch as the questions relating to expropriation must be referred to them (sec.
241, Act No. 190) for final decision, to ask whether or not the law has been
complied with? Suppose, in a particular case, it should be denied that the property
is not private property but public, may not the courts hear proof upon that
question? Or, suppose the defense is, that the purpose of the expropriation is not
public but private, or that there exists no public purpose at all, may not the courts
make inquiry and hear proof upon that question?
The city of Manila is given authority to expropriate private lands for public
purposes. Can it be possible that said authority confers the right to determine for
itself that the land is private and that the purpose is public, and that the people of
the city of Manila who pay the taxes for its support, especially those who are
directly affected, may not question one or the other, or both, of these questions ?
Can it be successfully contended that the phrase used in Act No. 190, "and if the
court upon trial shall find that such right exists," means simply that the court shall
examine the statutes simply for the purpose of ascertaining whether a law exists
authorizing the petitioner to exercise the right of eminent domain? Or, when the
case arrives in the
Supreme Court, can it be possible that the phrase, "if the Supreme Court shall
determine that no right of expropriation exists," that that simply means that the
Supreme Court shall also examine the enactments of the legislature f or the
purpose of determining whether or not a law exists permitting the plaintiff to
expropriate?
We are of the opinion that the power of the court is not limited to that question.
The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal corporation, and
before it can exercise the right some law must exist conferring the power upon it.
When the courts come to determine the question, they must not only find (a) that a
law or authority exists for the exercise of the right of eminent domain, but (b) also
that the right or authority is being exercised in accordance with the law. In the
present case there are two conditions imposed upon the authority conceded to the
City of Manila: First, the land must be private; and, second, the purpose must be
public. If the court, upon trial, finds that neither of these conditions exists or that
either one of them fails, certainly it cannot be contended that the right is being
exercised in accordance with law.
57
Whether the purpose for. the exercise of the right of eminent domain is public, is a
question of fact. Whether the land is public or private is also a question of fact; and,
in our opinion, when the legislature conferred upon the courts of the Philippine
Islands the right to ascertain upon trial whether the right exists for the exercise of
eminent domain, it intended that the courts should inquire into, and hear proof
upon, those questions. Is it possible that the owner of valuable land in this
jurisdiction is compelled to stand mute while his land is being expropriated for a use
not public, with the right simply to beg the city of Manila to pay him the value of his
land? Does the law in this jurisdiction permit municipalities to expropriate lands,
without question, simply for the purpose of satisfying the aesthetic sense of those
who happen for the time being to be in authority? Expropriation of lands usually
calls for public expense. The taxpayers are called upon to pay the costs.
Cannot the owners of land question the public use or the public necessity?
As was said above, there is a wide divergence of opinion upon the authority of the
court to question the necessity or advisability of the exercise of the right of eminent
domain. The divergence is usually found to depend upon particular statutory or
constitutional provisions.
It has been contended—and many cases are cited in support of that contention,
and section 158 of volume 10 of Ruling Case Law is cited as conclusive—that the
necessity for taking property under the right of eminent domain is not a judicial
question. But those who cited said section evidently overlooked the section
immediately following (sec. 159), which adds: "But it is obvious that if the property
is taken in the ostensible behalf of a public improvement which it can never by any
possibility serve, it is being taken for a use not public, and the owner's
constitutional rights call for protection by the courts. While many courts have used
sweeping expression in the decisions in which they have disclaimed the power of
supervising the selection of the sites of public improvements, it may be safely said
that the courts of the various states would feel bound to interfere to prevent an
abuse of the discretion delegated by the legislature, by an attempted appropriation
of land in utter disregard of the possible necessity of its use, or when the alleged
purpose was a cloak to some sinister scheme." Norwich City vs. Johnson, 86 Conn.,
151; Bell vs. Mattoon Waterworks, etc. Co., 245 111., 544; Wheeling, etc. R. R. Co.
vs. Toledo Ry. etc. Co., 72 Ohio St., 368; State vs. Stewart, 74 Wis., 620.)
Said section 158 .(10 R. C. L., 183) which is cited as conclusive authority in support
of the contention of the appellant, says:
"The legislature, in providing for the exercise of the power of eminent domain, may
directly determine the necessity for appropriating private property for a particular
improvement for public use, and 'it may select the exact location of the
improvement. In such a case, it is well settled that
the present case, merely conferred general authority to take land for public use
when a necessity exists therefor. We believe that it can be confidently asserted
that, under such statute, the allegation of the necessity for the appropriation is an
issuable allegation which it is competent for the courts to decide. (Lynch vs. Forbes,
161 Mass., 302 [42 Am. St. Rep 402, 407].)
361

the utility of the proposed improvement, the extent of the public necessity for its
construction, the expediency of constructing it, the suitableness of the location
selected and the consequent necessity of taking the land selected for its site, are all VOL. 40, OCTOBER 31, 1919.
questions exclusively for the legislature to determine, and the courts have no power
to interfere, or to substitute their own views for those of the representatives of the
people."
361

Practically every case cited in support of the above doctrine has been examined,
and we are justified in making the statement that in each case the legislature
City of Manila vs. Chinese Community of Manila.
directly determined the necessity for the exercise of the right of eminent domain in
the particular case. It is not denied that if the necessity for the exercise of the right
of eminent domain is presented to the legislative department of the government
and that department decides that there exists a necessity for the exercise of the
right in a particular case, that then and in that case, the courts will not go behind There is a wide distinction between a legislative declaration that a municipality is
the action of the legislature and make inquiry concerning the necessity. But, in the given authority to exercise the right of eminent domain, and a decision by the
case of Wheeling, etc. R. R. Co. vs. Toledo, Ry., etc. Co. (72 Ohio St., 368 [106 Am. municipality that there exists a necessity for the exercise of that right in a particular
St. Rep., 622, 628]), which is cited in support of the doctrine laid down in section case. The first is a declaration simply that there exist, reasons why the right should
158 above quoted, the court said: be conf erred upon municipal corporation, while the second is the application of the
right to a particular case. Certainly, the legislative declaration relating to the
advisability of granting the power cannot be converted into a declaration that a
necessity exists for its exercise in a particular case, and especially so when, perhaps,
the land in question was not within the territorial jurisdiction of the municipality at
"But when the statute does not designate the property to be taken nor how much
the time the legislative authority was granted.
may be taken, then the necessity of taking particular property is a question for the
courts. Where the application to condemn or appropriate is made directly to the
court, the question (of necessity) should be raised and decided in limine."

Whether it was wise, advisable, or necessary to confer upon a municipality the

power to exercise the right of eminent domain, is a question with which the courts
are not concerned. But when that right or authority is exercised for the purpose of
The legislative department of the government very rarely undertakes to designate
depriving citizens of their property, the courts are authorized, in this jurisdiction, to
the precise property which should be taken f or public use. It has generally, like in
58
make inquiry and to hear proof upon the necessity in the particular case, and not
the general authority.
Volume 15 of the Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure (Cyc.), page 629, is cited as a
further conclusive authority upon the question that the necessity for the exercise of
the right of eminent domain is a legislative and not a judicial question. Cyclopedia,
at the page stated, says:
"In the absence of some constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary, the
necessity and expediency of exercising the right of eminent domain are questions
essentially political and not judicial in their character. The determination of those
questions (the necessity and the expediency) belongs to the sovereign power; the
legislative department is final and conclusive, and the courts have no power to
review it (the necessity and the expediency) * * * It (the legislature) may designate
the particular property to be condemned, and its determination in this respect
cannot be reviewed by the courts."
362
362
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
City of Manila, vs. Chinese Community of Manila.
The volume of Cyclopedia, above referred to, cites many cases in support of the
doctrine quoted. While time has not permitted an examination of all of said
59
citations, many of them have been examined, and it can be confidently asserted
that said cases which are cited in support of the assertion that, "the necessity and
expediency of exercising the right of eminent domain are questions essentially
political and not judicial," show clearly and invariably that in each case the
legislature itself usually, by a special law, designated the particular case in which
the right of eminent domain might be exercised by the particular municipal
corporation or entity within the state. (Eastern R. Co. vs. Boston, etc., R. Co., 11
Mass., 125 [15 Am. Rep., 13]; Brooklyn Park Com'rs. vs. Armstrong, 45 N. Y., 234 [6
Am. Rep., 70] ; Hairston vs. Danville, etc. Ry. Co., 208 U. S. 598; Cincinnati vs.
Louisville, etc. Ry. Co., 223 U. S. 390; U. S. vs. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co.,
229 U. S., 53; U. S. vs. Gettysburg, etc. Co., 160 U. S., 668; Traction Co. vs. Mining
Co., 196 U. S., 239; Sears vs. City of Akron, 246 U. S., 351 [erroneously cited as 242
U. S.].)
In the case of Traction Co. vs. Mining Co. (196 U. S., 239), the Supreme Court of the
United States said: "It is erroneous to suppose that the legislature is beyond the
control of the courts in exercising the power of eminent domain, either as to the
nature of the use or the necessity to the use of any particular property. For if the
use be not public or no necessity for the taking exists, the legislature cannot
authorize the taking of private property against the will of the.owner,
notwithstanding compensation may be required" "
In the case of School Board of Carolina vs. Saldaña (14 Porto Rico, 339, 356), we find
the Supreme Court of Porto Rico, speaking through Justice MacLeary, quoting
approvingly the following, upon the question which we are discussing': "It is well
settled that although the legislature must necessarily determine in the first instance
whether the use for which they (municipalities, etc.) attempt to
exercise the power is a public one or not, their (municipalities, etc.) determination
is not final, but is subject to correction by the courts, who may undoubtedly declare
the statute unconstitutional, if it shall clearly appear that the use for which it is
proposed to authorize the taking of private property is in reality not public but
private." Many cases are cited in support of that doctrine.
Later, in the same decision, we find the Supreme Court of Porto Rico says: "At any
rate, the rule is quite well settled that in the cases under consideration the
determination of the necessity of taking a particular piece or a certain amount of
land rests ultimately with the courts." (Spring Valley etc. Co. vs. San Mateo, etc. Co.,
64 Cal., 123.)
In the case of Board of Water Com'rs., etc. vs. Johnson (86 Conn.? 571 [41 L. R. A.,
N. S., 1024]), the Supreme Court of Connecticut approvingly quoted the following
doctrine from Lewis on Eminent Domain (3d ed.), section 599: "In all such cases the
necessity of public utility of the proposed work or improvement is a judicial
question. In all such cases, where the authority is to take property necessary for the
purpose, the necessity of taking particular property for a particular purpose is a
judicial one, upon which the owner is entitled to be heard," Riley vs. Charleston,
etc. Co., 71 S. C., 457, 489 [110 Am. St. Rep., 579]; Henderson vs. Lexington 132 Ky.,
390, 403.)
The taking of private property for any use which is not required by the necessities
or convenience of the inhabitants of the state, is an unreasonable exercise of the
right of eminent domain, and beyond the power of the legislature to delegate.
(Bennett vs. Marion, 106 lowa, 628, 633; Wilson vs. Pittsburg, etc. Co., 222 Pa. St.,
541, 545; Greasy, etc. Co. vs. Ely, etc. Co., 132 Ky., 692, 697.)
In the case of New Central Coal Co. vs. George's, etc. Co. (37 Md., 537, 564), the
Supreme Court of the State of Maryland, discussing the question before us, said:
"To justify the exercise of this extreme power .(eminent domain) where the
legislature has left it to depend upon the
necessity that may be found to exist, in order to accomplish the purposes of the
incorporation, as in this case, the party claiming the right to the exercise of the
power should be required to show at least a reasonable degree of necessity for its
exercise. Any rule less strict than this, with the large and almost indiscriminate
delegation of the right to corporations, would likely lead to oppression and the
sacrifice of private right to corporate power."
60
In the case of Dewey vs. Chicago, etc. Co. (184 141., 426, 433), "the court said: "Its
right to condemn property is not a general power of condemnation, but is limited to
cases where a necessity for resort to private property is shown to exist. Such
necessity must appear upon the face of the petition to condemn. If the necessity is
denied the burden is upon the company (municipality) to establish it." (Highland,
etc. Co. vs. Strickley, 116 Fed., 852, 856; Kiney vs. Citizens' Water & Light Co., 173
Ind., 252, 257; Bell vs. Mattoon Waterworks, etc. Co., 245 111., 544 [137 Am. St.
Rep., 338].)
It is true that many decisions may be found asserting that what is a public use is a
legislative question, and many other decisions declaring -with equal emphasis that
it is a judicial question. But, as long as there is a constitutional or statutory provision
denying the right to take land for any use other than a public use, it occurs to us
that the question whether any particular use is a public one or not is ultimately, at
least, a judicial question. The legislature may, it is true, in effect declare certain uses
to be public, and, under the operation of the well-known rule that a statute will not
be declared to be unconstitutional except in a case free, or comparatively free, from
doubt, the courts will certainly sustain the action of the legislature, unless it
appears that the particular use is clearly not of a public nature. The decisions must
be understood with this limitation; for, certainly, no court of last resort will be
willing to declare that any and every purpose which the legislature might happen to
designate as a public use
shall be conclusively held to be so, irrespective of the purpose in question and of its
manifestly private character. Blackstone in his Commentaries on the English Law
remarks that, so great is the regard of the law for private property that it will not
authorize the least violation of it, even for the public good, unless there exists a
very great necessity therefor.
In the case of Wilkinson vs. Leland (2 Pet. [U. S.], 657), the Supreme Court of the
United States said: "That government can scarcely be deemed f ree where the
rights of property are left solely dependent on the legislative body, without
restraint. The fundamental maxims of free government seem to require that the
rights of personal liberty and private property should be held sacred. At least no
court of justice in this country would be warranted in assuming that the power to
violate and disregard them—a power so repugnant to the common principles of
justice and civil liberty—lurked in any general grant of legislative authority, or ought
to be implied from any general expression of the people. The people ought not to
be presumed to part with rights so vital to their security and well-being without
very strong and direct expression of such intention." (Lewis on Eminent Domain,
sec. 603; Lecoul vs. Police Jury, 20 La. Ann., 308; Jefferson vs. Jazem, 7 La. Ann.,
182.)
Blackstone, in his Commentaries on the English Law, said that the right to own and
possess land—a place to live separate and apart from others—to retain it as a home
for the f amily in a way not to be molested by others—is one of the most sacred
rights that men are heirs to. That right has been written into the organic law of
every civilized nation. The Acts of Congress of July 1, 1902, and of August 29,1916,
which provide that "no law shall be enacted in the Philippine Islands which shall
deprive any person of his property without due process of law," are but a
restatement of the time-honored protection of the absolute right of the individual
to his property. Neither did said Acts of Congress add anything to the law already
existing in the Philippine Islands. The Spaniard fully recognized the prin-
ciple and adequately protected the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands against the
encroachment upon the private property of the individual. Article 349 of the Civil
Code provides that: "No one may be deprived of his property unless it be by
competent authority, for some purpose of proven public utility, and after payment
of the proper compensation. Unless this requisite (proven public utility and
payment) has been complied with, it shall be the duty of the courts to protect the
owner of such property in its possession or to restore its possession to him, as the
case may be."
The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State, or by its
authorized agents, is necessarily in derogation of private rights, and the rule in that
case is that the authority must be strictly construed. No species of property is held
by individuals with greater tenacity, and none is guarded by the constitution and
laws more sedulously, than the right to the freehold of inhabitants. When the
legislature interferes with that right, and, for greater public purposes, appropriates
the land of an individual without his consent, the plain meaning of the law should
not be enlarged by doubtly interpretation. (Bensley vs. Mountainlake Water Co., 13
Cal., 306 and cases cited [73 Am. Dec., 576].)
The statutory power of taking property from the owner without his consent is one
of the most delicate exercise of governmental authority. It is to be watched with
61
jealous scrutiny. Important as the power may be to the government, the inviolable
sanctity which all free constitutions attach to the right of property of the citizens,
constrains the strict observance of the substantial provisions of the law which are
prescribed as modes of the exercise of the power, and to protect it from abuse. Not
only must the authority of municipal corporations to take property be expressly
conferred and the use for which it is taken specified, but the power, with all
constitutional limitation and directions for its exercise, must be strictly pursued.
(Dillon on Municipal Corporations [5th Ed.], sec. 1040, and cases cited; Tenorio vs.
Manila Railroad Co., 22 Phil., 411.)
It can scarcely be contended that a municipality would be permitted to take
property for some public use unless some public necessity existed therefor. The
right to take private property for public use originates in the necessity, and the
taking must be limited by such necessity. The appellant contends that inasmuch as
the legislature has given it general authority to take private property f or public use,
that the legislature has, therefore, settled the question of the necessity in every
case and that the courts are closed to the owners of the property upon that
question. Can it be imagined, when the legislature adopted section 2429 of Act No.
2711, that it thereby declared that it was necessary to appropriate the property of
Juan de la Cruz, whose property, perhaps, was- not within the city limits at the time
the law was adopted? The legislature, then, not having declared the necessity, can
it be contemplated that it intended that a municipality should be the sole judge of
the necessity in every case, and that the courts, in the face of the provision that "if
upon trial they shall find that a right exists," cannot in that trial inquire into and
hear proof upon the necessity for the appropriation in a particular case?
The Charter of the city of Manila authorizes the taking of private property for public
use. Suppose the owner of the property denies and successfully proves that the
taking of his property serves no public use: Would the courts not be justified in
inquiring into that question and in finally denying the petition if no public purpose
was proved ? Can it be denied that the courts have a right to inquire into that
question ? If the courts can ask questions and decide, upon an issue properly
presented, whether the use is public or not, is not that tantamount to permitting
the courts to inquire into the necessity of the appropriation? If there is no public
use, then there is no necessity, and if there is no necessity, it is difficult to
understand how a public use can necessarily exist. If the courts can inquire into the
question whether a public use exists or not, then it seems that it must follow that
they can examine into the question of the necessity.
The very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity,
and that necessity must be of a public character. The ascertainment of the necessity
must precede or accompany, and not follow, the taking of the land. (Morrison vs.
Indianapolis, etc. Ky. Co., 166 Ind., 511; Stearns vs. Barre, 73 Vt, 281; Wheeling, etc.
R. R. Co. vs. Toledo, Ry. etc. Co., 72 Ohio St., 368.)
The general power to exercise the right of eminent domain must not be confused
with the right to exercise it in a particular case. The power of the legislature to
confer, upon municipal corporations and other entities within the State, general
authority to exercise the right of eminent domain cannot be questioned by the
courts, but that general authority of municipalities or entities must not be confused
with the right to exercise it in particular instances.. The moment the municipal
corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it must comply
with the conditions accompanying the authority. 'The necessity for conferring the
authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of eminent domain is
admittedly within the power of the legislature. But whether or not the municipal
corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under the conditions
imposed by the general authority, is a question which the courts have the right to
inquire into.
The conflict in the authorities upon the question whether the necessity for the
exercise of the right of eminent domain is purely legislative and not judicial, arises
generally in the wisdom and propriety of the legislature in authorizing the exercise
of the right of eminent domain instead of in the question of the right to exercise it
in a particular case. (Creston Waterworks Co. vs. McGrath, 89 lowa, 502.)
By the weight of authorities, the courts have the power of restricting the exercise of
eminent domain to the actual reasonable necessities of the case and for the
purposes designated by the law. (Fairchild vs. City of St. Paul. 48 Minn., 540.)
And, moreover, the record does not show conclusively that the plaintiff has
definitely decided that their exists a necessity for the appropriation of the particular
land described in the complaint. Exhibits 4, 5, 7, and E clearly indicate that the
municipal board believed at one time that other land might be used for the
proposed improvement, thereby avoiding the necessity of disturbing the quiet
resting place of the dead.
62
Aside from insisting that there exists no necessity for the alleged improvement, the
defendants further contend that the street in question should not be opened
through the cemetery. One of the defendants alleges that said cemetery is 'public
property. If that allegations is true, then, of course, the city of Manila cannot
appropriate it for public use. The city of Manila can only expropriate private
property.
It is a well known fact that cemeteries may be public or private. The former is a
cemetery used by the general community, or neighborhood, or church, while the
latter is used only by a family, or a small portion of the community or
neighborhood. (11 C. J., 50.)
Where a cemetery is open to the public, it is a public use and no part of the ground
can be taken for other public uses under a general authority. And this immunity
extends to the unimproved and unoccupied parts which are held in good faith for
future use. (Lewis on Eminent Domain, sec. 434, and cases cited.)
The cemetery in question seems to have been established under governmental
authority. The Spanish Governor-Gen-eral, in an order creating the same, used the
following language:
"The cemetery and general hospital for indigent Chinese having been founded and
maintained by the spontaneous and fraternal contribution of their protector,
merchants and industrials, benefactors of mankind, in consideration of their
services to the Government of the Islands its internal administration, government
and regime must necessarily be adjusted to the taste and traditional practices of
those born and educated in China in order that the sentiments which animated the
founders may be perpetually effectuated."
It is alleged, and not denied, that the cemetery in question may be used by the
general community of Chinese, which fact, in the general acceptation of the
definition of a public cemetery, would make the cemetery in question public
property. If that is true, then, of course, the petition of the plaintiff must be denied,
for the reason that the city of Manila has no authority or right under the law to
expropriate public property.
But, whether or not the cemetery is public or private property, its appropriation for
the uses of a public street, especially during the lifetime of those specially
interested in its maintenance as a cemetery, should be a question of great concern,
and its appropriation should not be made for such purposes until it is fully
established that the greatest necessity exists therefor.
While we do not contend that the dead must not give place to the living, and while
it is a matter of public knowledge that in the process of time sepulchres may
become the seat of cities and cemeteries traversed by streets and daily trod by the
feet of millions of men, yet, nevertheless such sacrifices and such uses of the places
of the dead should not be made unless and until it is fully established that there
exists an eminent necessity therefor. While cemeteries and sepulchres and the
places of the burial of the dead are still within the memory and command of the
active care of the living; while they are still devoted to pious uses and sacred
regard, it is difficult to believe that even the legislature would adopt a law expressly
providing that such places, under such circumstances, should be violated.
In such an appropriation, what, we may ask, would be the measure of damages at
law, for the wounded sensibilities of the living, in having the graves of kindred and
loved ones blotted out and desecrated by a common highway or street for public
travel? The impossibility of measuring the damage and inadequacy of a remedy at
law is too apparent
to admit of argument, To disturb the mortal remains of those endeared to us in life
sometimes becomes the sad duty of the living; but, except in cases of necessity, or f
or laudable purposes, the sanctity of the grave, the last resting place of our f
friends, should be maintained, and the preventative aid of the courts should be
invoked for that object. (Railroad Company vs. Cemetery Co., 116 Tenn., 400;
Evergreen Cemetery Association vs. The City of New Haven, 43 Conn., 234;
Anderson vs. Acheson, 132 lowa, 744; Beatty vs. Kurtz, 2 Peters, 566.)
63
In the present case, even granting that a necessity exists for the opening of the
street in question, the record contains no proof of the necessity of opening the
same through the cemetery. The record shows that adjoining and adjacent lands
have been offered to the city free of charge, which will answer every purpose of the
plaintiff. For all of the foregoing, we are fully persuaded that the judgment of the
lower court should be and is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So
ordered.
Arellano, C. J., Torres, Araullo and Avanceña, JJ., concur.
MALCOLM, J., concurring:
The Government of the Philippine Islands is authorized by the Philippine Bill to
acquire real estate for public use by the exercise of the right of eminent domain.
(Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, sec 63.) A portion of this power has been delegated
by the Philippine Legislature to the city of Manila, which is permitted to "condemn
private property for public use." (Administrative Code of 1917, sec. 2429.) The Code
of Civil Procedure, in prescribing how the right of eminent domain may be
exercised, also limits the condemnation to "private property for public use." (Sec.
241.) As under the facts actually presented, there can be no question that a public
street constitutes a public use, the only remaining question is whether or not the
Chinese Cemetery and the other property here sought to be taken by the exercise
'of the right of eminent domain is "private property."
372
As narrowing our inquiry still further, let it be noted that cemeteries are of two
classes, public and private. A public cemetery is one used by the general
community, or neighborhood, or church; while a private cemetery is one used only
by a family, or a small portion of a community. (Lay vs. State, 12 Ind. App., 362;
Cemetery Association vs. Meninger [1875], 14 Kan., 312.) Our specific question,
then, is, whether the Chinese Cemetery in the city of Manila is a public, or a private
graveyard. If it be found to be the former, it is not subject to condemnation by the
city of Manila; if it be found to be the latter, it is subject to condemnation.

The Chinese Cemetery of Manila was established during the Spanish administration
in the Philippines by public spirited Chinese. The order of the Governor-General
giving governmental recognition to the cemetery reads as follows: "The cemetery
and general hospital for indigent Chinese having been f ounded and maintained by
the spontaneous and f fraternal contribution of their protectors, merchants and
industrials, benefactors of mankind, in consideration of their services to the
Government of the Islands, its internal administration, government and regime,
must necessarily be adjusted to the taste and traditional practices of those born
and educated in China in order that the sentiments which animated the founders
may be perpetually effectuated." Sometimes after the inauguration of the new
regime in the Philippines, a corporation was organized to control the cemetery, and
a Torrens title for the lands in question was obtained.
From the time of its creation until the present the cemetery has been used by the
Chinese community for the burial of their dead. It is said that not less than four
hundred graves, many of them with handsome monuments, would be destroyed by
the proposed street. This desecration is attempted as to the last resting places of
the dead of a people who, because of their peculiar and ingrained ancestral
worship, retain more than the usual reverence for the departed. These f acts lead
us straight to the conclusion that
the Chinese Cemetery is not used by a family or a small portion of a community but
by a particular race long existing in the country and of considerable numbers. The
case, then, is one of where the city of Manila, under a general authority permitting
it to condemn private property for public use, is attempting to convert a property
already dedicated to a public use to an entirely different public use; and this, not
directly pursuant to legislative authority, but primarily through the sole advice of
the consulting architect.
Two well considered decisions coming from the American state courts on almost
identical facts are worthy of our consideration. The first is the case of The Evergreen
Cemetery Association vs. The City of New Haven ([1875], 43 Conn., 234), oft cited by
other courts. Here the City of New Haven, Connecticut, under the general power
conferred upon it to lay out, construct, and maintain all necessary highways within
its limits, proceeded to widen and straighten one of its streets, and in so doing took
a small piece of' land belonging to the Evergreen Cemetery Association. This
64
association was incorporated under the general statute. The city had no special
power to take any part of the cemetery for such purposes. It was found that the
land taken was needed for the purposes of the cemetery and was not needed for
the purpose of widening and straightening the avenue. The court said that it is
unquestionable that the Legislature has the power to authorize the taking of land
already applied to one public use and devote it to another. When the power is
granted to municipal or private corporations in express words, no question can
arise. But, it was added, "The same land cannot properly be used for burial lots and
for a public highway at the same time. * * * Land therefore applied to one use
should not be taken.for the other except in cases of necessity. * * * There is no
difficulty in effecting the desired improvement by taking land on the other side of
the street. * * * The idea of running a public street, regardless of graves,
monuments, and the feelings of the living, through one of our public cemeteries,
would be shocking to the moral sense of the community, and would not
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
City of Manila vs. Chinese Community of Manila.
be tolerated except upon the direst necessity." It was then held that land already
devoted to a public use cannot be taken by the public for another use which is
inconsistent with the first, without special authority from the Legislature, or
authority granted by necessary and reasonable implication.
The second decision is that of Memphis State Line Railroad Company vs. Forest Hill
Cemetery Co. ([1906], 116 Tenn., 400.) Here the purpose of the proceeding was to
condemn a right of way for the railway company through the Forest Hill Cemetery.
The railroad proposed to run through the southeast corner of the cemetery where
no bodies were interred. The cemetery had been in use for about eight years, and
during this period thirteen hundred bodies had been buried therein. The cemetery
was under the control of a corporation which, by its character, held itself out as
being willing to sell lots to any one who applies therefor and pays the price
demanded, except to members of the Negro race.
It was found that there were two other routes along which the railroad might be
located without touching the cemetery, while the present line might be pursued
without interfering with Forest Hill Cemetery by making a curve around it. In the
court below the railroad Was granted the right of condemnation through the
cemetery and damages were assessed. On appeal, the certiorari applied for was
granted, and the supersedeas awarded. The court, in effect, found that the land of
the Cemetery Company was devoted to a public purpose, and that under the
general language of the Tennessee statute of eminent domain it could not be taken
for another public purpose. The court said that in process of time the sepulchres of
the dead "are made the seats of cities, and are traversed by streets, and daily
trodden by the feet of man. This is inevitable in the course of ages. But while these
places are yet within the memory and under the active care of the living, while they
are still devoted to pious uses, they are sacred, and we cannot suppose that the
legislature intended that they should be violated, in the absence of special
provisions upon the subject
authorizing such invasion, and indicating a method for the disinterment, removal,
and reinterment of the bodies buried, and directing how the expense thereof shall
be borne." Two members of the court, delivering a separate concurring opinion,
concluded with this significant and eloquent sentence: "The wheels of commerce
must stop at the grave."
For the f oregoing reasons, and f or others which are stated in the principal
decision, I am of the opinion that the judgment of the lower court should be
affirmed.
STREET, J., dissenting:
It may be admitted that, upon the evidence before us, the projected condemnation
of the Chinese Cemetery is unnecessary and perhaps ill-considered. Nevertheless I
concur with Justice Moir in the view that the authorities of the city of Manila are
the proper judges of the propriety of the condemnation and that this Court should
have nothing to do with the question of the necessity of the taking.
MOIR, J., dissenting:
65
I dissent from the majority opinion in this case, which has not yet been written, and
because of the importance of the question involved, present my dissent for the
record.
This is an action by the city of Manila for the expropriation of land for an extension
of Rizal Avenue north. The petition for condemnation was opposed by the
"Comunidad de Chinos de Manila" and Ildefonso Tambunting and various others
who obtained permission of the trial court to intervene in the case.
All of the defendants allege in their 'opposition that the proposed extension of Rizal
Avenue cuts through a part of the Chinese Cemetery, North of Manila, and
necessitates the destruction of many monuments and the removal of many graves.
The Court of First Instance of Manila, Honorable S. del Rosario, judge, after hearing
the parties, decided that there was no need for constructing the street as and
where proposed by the city, and dismissed the petition.
1.The court erred in deciding that the determination of the necessity and
convenience of the expropriation of the lands of the defendants lies with the court
and not with the Municipal Board of the city of Manila.
2.The court erred in permitting the presentation of proofs over the objection and
exception of the plaintiff tending to demonstrate the lack of necessity of the
projected street and the need of the lands in question.
3.The court erred in declaring that the plaintiff had no right to expropriate the lands
in question.
4.The court erred in dismissing the complaint.
The right of the plaintiff to expropriate property for public use cannot be denied.
The "right of eminent domain is inherent in all sovereignties and therefore would
exist without any constitutional recognition * * *. The right of eminent domain
antedates constitutions * * *.' The right can only be denied or restricted by
fundamental law and is right inherent in society." (15 Cyc., pp. 557-8.)

This general right was recognized in the Philippine Code of Civil Procedure effective
October 1st, 1901, which prescribed the manner of exercising the right. (Section
241 et seq.)
It was further recognized in the Organic Act of July 1st, 1902, which provides in
section 74 "that the Government of the Philippine Islands may grant franchises * * *
including the authority to exercise the right of eminent domain f or the construction
and operation of works of public utility and service, and may authorize said works
to be constructed and maintained over and across the public property of the United
States including * * * reservations." This provision is repeated in the Jones Law of
August, 1916.
'The legislature of the Islands conferred the right on the city of Manila. (Section
2429, Administrative Code of 1917; section 2402, Administrative Code of 1916.)
Clearly having the right of expropriation, the city of Manila. selected the line of its
street and asked the court
by proper order to place the plaintiff in possession of the land described in the
complaint, and to appoint Commissioners to inspect the property, appraise the
value, and assess the damages. Instead of doing so, the court entered upon the
question of the right of the city to take the property and the necessity for the
taking.
The court says:
"The controversy relates to whether or not the Chinese Cemetery, where a great
majority of this race is buried and other persons belonging to other nationalities
have been formerly inhumed, is private or public; whether or not said cemetery, in
case it is public, would be susceptible to expropriation for the purpose of public
improvements proposed by the city of Manila; whether or not the latter is justified
of the necessity and expediency of similar expropriation before its right to the same
would be upheld by the courts of justice; and whether or not the appreciation of
66
said necessity pertains to the legislative or the judicial department before which the
expropriation proceedings have been brought.
"Relative to the first point, it is not necessary for the court to pass upon its
consideration, in view of the conclusion it has arrived at the appreciation of the
other points connected with each other.
"From the testimony of two reputable engineers produced by some of the
defendants, it appears that the land chosen by the plaintiff for the extension of Rizal
Avenue to the municipality of Caloocan is not the best or the less expensive,
although upon it there may be constructed a straight road, without curves or
winding; but that in order to construct said road upon said land, the city of Manila
would have to remove and transfer to other places about four hundred graves and
monuments, make some grubbings, undergo some leveling and build some bridges
—the works thereon, together with the construction of the road and the value of
the lands expropriated, would mean an expenditure which will not be less than
P180,000.
"Beside that considerable amount, the road would have a declivity of 3 per cent
which, in order to cover a distance of one kilometer, would require an energy
equivalent to that which would be expended in covering a distance of two and one-
half kilometers upon a level road.
"On the other hand, if the road would be constructed with the deviation proposed
by Ildefonso Tambunting, one of the defendants, who even offered to donate
gratuitously to the city of Manila part of the land upon which said road will have to
be constructed, the plaintiff entity would be able to save more than hundreds of
thousands of pesos, which can be invested in other improvements of greater
pressure and necessity for the benefit of the taxpayers; and it will not have to
employ more time and incur greater expenditures in the removal and transfer of
the remains buried in the land of the Chinese Community and of Sr. Tambunting,
although with the insignificant disadvantage that the road would be a little longer
by a still more insignificant extension of 426 meters and 55 centimeters, less than
one-half kilometer, according to the plan included in the records; but it would offer
a better panorama to those who would use it, and who would not have to traverse
in their necessary or pleasure-making trips or walks any cemetery which, on
account of its nature, always deserves the respect of the travellers. It should be
observed that the proposed straight road over the cemetery, which the city of
Manila is proposing to expropriate, does not lead to any commercial, industrial, or
agricultural center, and if with said road it is endeavored to benefit some
community or created interest, the same object may be obtained by the proposed
deviation, of the road by the defendants. The road traced by the plaintiffs has the
disadvantage that the lands on both sides thereof would not serve for residential
purposes, for the reason that no one has the pleasure to construct buildings upon
cemeteries, unless it be in very overcrowded cities, so exhausted of land that every
inch thereof represents a dwelling house."
And it is against this ruling, that it lies with the court to determine the necessity of
the proposed street and not with the municipal board, that the appellant directs its
first assignment of error.
It is a right of the city government to determine whether or not it will construct
streets and where, and the court's sole duty was to see that the value of the
property was paid the owners after proper legal proceedings ascertaining the value.
The law gives the city the right to take private property for public use. It is assumed
it is unnecessary to argue that a public -road is a public use.
But it is argued that plaintiff must show that it is necessary to take this land for a
public improvement. The law does not so read, and it is believed that the great
weight of authority, including the United States Supreme Court, is against the
contention.
"The question of necessity is distinct from the question of public use, and the
former question is exclusively for the legislature, except that if the constitution or
statute authorizes the taking of property only in cases of necessity, then the
necessity becomes a judicial question." (McQuillen Municipal Corporations, Vol. IV,
pp. 3090-3091.)
"In the absence of some constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary, the
necessity and expediency of exercising the right of eminent domain are questions
essentially political and not judicial in their character. The determination of those
questions belongs to the sovereign power; the legislative determination is final and
conclusive, and the courts have no power to review it. It rests with the legislature
not only to determine when the power of eminent domain may be exercised, but
also the character, quality, method, and extent of such exercise. And this power is
67
unqualified, other than by the necessity of providing that compensation shall be
made. Nevertheless, under the express provisions of the constitution of some states
the question of necessity is made a judicial one, to be determined by the courts and
not by the legislature.
"While the legislature may itself exercise the right of determining the necessity for
the exercise of the power of eminent domain, it may, unless prohibited by the
constitution, delegate this power to public officers or to private corporations
established to carry on enterprises in which the public are interested, and their
determination that a necessity for the exercise of the power exists is conclusive.
There is no restraint upon the power except that requiring compensation to be
made. And when the power has been so delegated it is a subject of legislative
discretion to determine what prudential regulations shall be established to secure a
discreet and judicious exercise of the authority. It has been held that in the absence
of any statutory provision submitting the matter to a court or jury the decision of
the question of necessity lies with the body of individuals to whom the state has
delegated the authority to take, and the legislature may by express provision confer
this power on a corporation to whom the power of eminent domain is delegated
unless prohibited by the constitution. It is of course competent for the legislature to
declare that the question shall be a judicial one, in which case the court and not the
corporation determines the question of necessity." (15 Cyc., pp. 629-632.)
To the same effect is Lewis on Eminent Domain (3d Edition, section 597).
I quote from the notes to Vol. 5, Encyclopedia of United States Supreme Court
Reports, p. 762, as follows:
"Neither can it be said that there is any fundamental right secured by the
constitution of the United States to have the questions of compensation and
necessity both passed upon by one and the same jury. In many states the question
of necessity is never submitted to the jury which passes upon the question of
compensation. It is either settled affirmatively by the legislature, or left to the
judgment of the corporation invested with the right to take property by
condemnation. The question of necessity is not one of a judicial character, but
rather one for determination by the lawmaking branch of the government. (Boom
Co.
"Speaking generally, it is for the state primarily and exclusively, to declare for what
local public purposes private property, within its limits, may be taken upon
compensation to the owner, as well as to prescribe a mode in which it may be
condemned and taken. (Madisonville Tract. Co. vs. St. Bernard Min. Co., 196 U. S.,
239, 252 [49 L. ed., 462].)
"Courts have no power to control the legislative authority in the exercise of their
right to determine when it is necessary or expedient to condemn a specific piece of
property for public purposes. (Adirondack R. Co. vs. New York States, 176 U. S., 335
[44 L. ed., 492].)"
10 R. C. L. (p. 183), states the law as follows:
"158. Necessity for taking ordinarily not judicial question.—The legislature, in
providing for the exercise of the power of eminent domain, may directly determine
the necessity for appropriating private property for a particular improvement or
public use, and it may select the exact location of the improvement. In such a case,
it is well settled that the utility of the proposed improvement, the extent of the
public necessity for its construction, the expediency of constructing it, the
suitableness of the location selected and the consequent necessity of taking the
land selected f or its site, are all questions exclusively for the legislature to
determine, and the courts have no power to interfere, or to substitute their own
views for these of the representatives of the people. Similarly, when the legislature
has delegated the power of eminent domain to municipal or public service
corporation or other tribunals or bodies, and has given them discretion as to when
the power is to be called into exercise and to what extent, the court will not inquire
into the necessity or propriety of the taking."
The United States Supreme Court recently said:
"The uses to which this land are to be put are undeniablypublic uses. When that is
the case the propriety or expediency of the appropriation cannot be called in
question by any other authority." (Cincinnati vs. S. & N. R. R. Co., 223 U. S., 390,
quoting U. S. vs. Jones, 109 U. S., 519.)
And in Sears vs. City of Akron (246 U. S., 242), decided March 4th, 1918, it said:
68
"Plaintiff contends that the ordinance is void because the general statute which
authorized the appropriation violates both Article 1, paragraph 10, of the Federal
Constitution, and the Fourteenth Amendment, in that it authorizes the municipality
to determine the necessity for the taking of private property without the owners
having an opportunity to be heard as to such necessity; that in fact no necessity
existed for any taking which would interfere with the company's project; since the
city might have taken water from the Little Cuyahoga or the Tuscarawas rivers; and
furthermore, that it has taken ten times as much water as it can legitimately use. It
is well settled that while the question whether the purpose of a taking is a public
one is judicial (Hairston vs. Danville & W. R. Co., 208 U. S. 598 [52 L. ed., 637; 28
Sup. Ct. Rep., 331; 13 Ann. Cas., 1008]), the necessity and the proper extent of a
taking is a legislative question. (Shoemaker vs. United States, 147 U. S., 282, 298 [57
L. ed., 170, 184; 13 Sup. Ct. Rep., 361] ; United States vs. Gettysburg Electric R. Co.,
160 U. S. 668, 685 [40 L. ed., 576, 582; 16 Sup. Ct. Rep., 427] ; United States vs.
ChandlerDunbar Water Power Co., 229 U. S., 53, 65 [57 L. ed., 1063, 1076; 33 Sup.
Ct. Rep., 667].)"
I think the case should be decided in accordance with foregoing citations, but one
other point has been argued so extensively that it ought to be considered.
It is contended for the defense that this Chinese Cemetery is a public cemetery and
that it cannot therefore be taken for public use. In its answer the "Comunidad de
Chinos de Manila" says it is "a corporation organized and existing under and by
virtue of the laws of the Philippine Islands," and that it owns the land which plaintiff
seeks to acquire. The facts that it is a private corporation owning land would seem
of necessity to make the land it owns private land. The fact that it belongs to the
Chinese community deprives it of any public character.
But admitting that it is a public cemetery, although limited in its use to the Chinese
Community of the- city of Manila, can it not be taken for public use? Must we let
the reverence we feel for the dead and the sanctity of their final resting-place
obstruct the progress of the living? It will be instructive to enquire what other
jurisdictions have held on that point.
On the Application of Board of Street Openings of New York City to acquire St.
Johns Cemetery (133 N. Y., 329) the court of appeal said:
"* * * The board instituted this proceeding under the act to acquire for park
purposes the title to land below One Hundred and Fifty-fifth street known as St.
John's cemetery which belonged to a religious corporation in the city of New York,
commonly called Trinity Church. It was established as a cemetery as early as 1801,
and used for that purpose until 1839, during which time about ten thousand human
bodies had been buried therein. In 1839 an ordinance was passed by the city of
New York forbidding interments south of Eighty-sixth street, and since that time no
interments have been made in the cemetery, but Trinity Church has preserved and
kept it in order and prevented any disturbance thereof.
"It is contended on behalf of Trinity Church that under the general authority given
by the statute of 1887, this land which had been devoted to cemetery purposes
could not be taken for a park. The authority conferred upon the board by the act is
broad and general. It is authorized to take for park purposes any land south of One
Hundred and Fifty-fifth street. * * *
"The fact that lands have previously been devoted to cemetery purposes does not
place them beyond the reach of the power of eminent domain. That is an absolute
transcendent power belonging to the sovereign which can be exercised for the
public welfare whenever the sovereign authority shall determine that a necessity
for its exercise exists. By its existence the homes and the dwellings of the living, and
the resting-places of the dead may be alike condemned.
"It seems always to have been recognized in the laws of this state, that under the
general laws streets and highways could be laid out through cemeteries, in the
absence of special limitation or prohibition. * * *"
In Re Opening of Twenty-second Street (102 Penn. State Reports, 108) the Supreme
Court of the State said:
"This was an action for the opening of a street through a cemetery in the City of
Philadelphia. It was contended for the United American Mechanics and United
Daughters of America Cemetery Association that by an act of the legislature of the
State approved March 20th, 1849, they were forever exempt from the taking of any
their property for streets, roads or alleys and this Act was formally accepted by the
Cemetery Company on April 9th, 1849, and there was, therefore, a contract
between the Cemetery Company and the State of Pennsylvania, which would be
violated by the taking of any part of their property for street purposes. It was
further contended that there were 11,000 persons buried in the cemetery.
69
"The court held that property and contracts of all kinds must yield to the demand of
the sovereign and that under the power of eminent domain all properties could be
taken, and that if there was a contract between the State of Pennsylvania and the
Cemetery Association, the contract itself could be taken for public use, and ordered
the opening- of the street through the cemetery."
In Vol. 5, Encyclopedia of United States Supreme Court Reports (p. 759), it is said:
"Although it has been held, that where a state has delegated, the power of eminent
domain to a person or corporation, and where by its exercise lands have been
subject to a public use, they cannot be applied to another public use without
specific authority expressed or implied to that effect,
yet, the general rule seems to be that the f act that property is already devoted to a
public use, does not exempt it from being appropriated under the right of eminent
domain, but it may be so taken for a use which is clearly superior or paramount to
the one to which it is already devoted." (Citing many United States Supreme Court
decisions.)
A few cases have been cited where the courts refused to allow the opening of
streets through cemeteries, but in my opinion they are not as well considered as
the cases and authorities relied upon herein.
The holding of this court in this case reverses well settled principles of law of long
standing and almost universal acceptance.
The other assignments of error need not be considered as they are involved in the
foregoing.
The decision should be reversed and the record returned to the Court of First
Instance with instructions to proceed with the case in accordance with this decision.
Judgment affirmed. City of Manila vs. Chinese Community of Manila., 40 Phil. 349,
No. 14355 October 31, 1919
#7
G.R. No. L-12172             August 29, 1958
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JUAN F. FAJARDO, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Assistant Solicitor General Esmeraldo Umali and Higinio V. Catalan for appellee.
Prila, Pardalis and Pejo for appellants.
REYES, J. B. L., J.:
Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur convicting
defendants-appellants Juan F. Fajardo and Pedro Babilonia of a violation of
Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1950, of the Municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, for
having constructed without a permit from the municipal mayor a building that
destroys the view of the public plaza.
It appears that on August 15, 1950, during the incumbency of defendant-appellant
Juan F. Fajardo as mayor of the municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, the municipal
council passed the ordinance in question providing as follows:
SECTION 1. Any person or persons who will construct or repair a building
should, before constructing or repairing, obtain a written permit from the
Municipal Mayor.
SEC. 2. A fee of not less than P2.00 should be charged for each building
permit and P1.00 for each repair permit issued.
SEC. 3. PENALTY — Any violation of the provisions of the above, this
ordinance, shall make the violation liable to pay a fine of not less than P25
nor more than P50 or imprisonment of not less than 12 days nor more
than 24 days or both, at the discretion of the court. If said building
destroys the view of the Public Plaza or occupies any public property, it
shall be removed at the expense of the owner of the building or house.
SEC. 4. EFFECTIVITY — This ordinance shall take effect on its approval.
(Orig. Recs., P. 3)
Four years later, after the term of appellant Fajardo as mayor had expired, he and
his son in-law, appellant Babilonia, filed a written request with the incumbent
municipal mayor for a permit to construct a building adjacent to their gasoline
station on a parcel of land registered in Fajardo's name, located along the national
highway and separated from the public plaza by a creek (Exh. D). On January 16,
1954, the request was denied, for the reason among others that the proposed
70
building would destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza (Exh. E). On January
18, 1954, defendants reiterated their request for a building permit (Exh. 3), but
again the request was turned down by the mayor. Whereupon, appellants
proceeded with the construction of the building without a permit, because they
needed a place of residence very badly, their former house having been destroyed
by a typhoon and hitherto they had been living on leased property.
On February 26, 1954, appellants were charged before and convicted by the justice
of the peace court of Baao, Camarines Sur, for violation of the ordinance in
question. Defendants appealed to the Court of First Instance, which affirmed the
conviction, and sentenced appellants to pay a fine of P35 each and the costs, as well
as to demolish the building in question because it destroys the view of the public
plaza of Baao, in that "it hinders the view of travelers from the National Highway to
the said public plaza." From this decision, the accused appealed to the Court of
Appeals, but the latter forwarded the records to us because the appeal attacks the
constitutionality of the ordinance in question.
We find that the appealed conviction can not stand.
A first objection to the validity of the ordinance in question is that under it the
mayor has absolute discretion to issue or deny a permit. The ordinance fails to state
any policy, or to set up any standard to guide or limit the mayor's action. No
purpose to be attained by requiring the permit is expressed; no conditions for its
grant or refusal are enumerated. It is not merely a case of deficient standards;
standards are entirely lacking. The ordinance thus confers upon the mayor arbitrary
and unrestricted power to grant or deny the issuance of building permits, and it is a
settled rule that such an undefined and unlimited delegation of power to allow or
prevent an activity, per se lawful, is invalid (People vs. Vera, 65 Phil., 56;
Primicias vs. Fugoso, 80 Phil., 71; Schloss Poster Adv. Co. vs. Rock Hill, 2 SE (2d) 392)
The ordinance in question in no way controls or guides the discretion
vested thereby in the respondents. It prescribes no uniform rule upon
which the special permission of the city is to be granted. Thus the city is
clothed with the uncontrolled power to capriciously grant the privilege to
some and deny it others; to refuse the application of one landowner or
lessee and to grant that of another, when for all material purposes, the
two applying for precisely the same privileges under the same
circumstances. The danger of such an ordinance is that it makes possible
arbitrary discriminations and abuses in its execution, depending upon no
conditions or qualifications whatever, other than the unregulated arbitrary
will of the city authorities as the touchstone by which its validity is to be
tested. Fundamental rights under our government do not depend for their
existence upon such a slender and uncertain thread. Ordinances which
 thus invest a city council with a discretion which is purely arbitrary, and
which may be exercised in the interest of a favored few, are unreasonable
and invalid. The ordinance should have established a rule by which its
impartial enforcement could be secured. All of the authorities cited above
sustain this conclusion.
As was said in City of Richmond vs. Dudley, 129 Ind. 112,28 N. E. 312, 314
13 L. R. A. 587, 28 Am. St. Rep. 180: "It seems from the foregoing
authorities to be well established that municipal ordinances placing
restrictions upon lawful conduct or the lawful use of property must, in
order to be valid, specify the rules and conditions to be observed in such
conduct or business; and must admit of the exercise of the privilege of all
citizens alike who will comply with such rules and conditions; and must not
admit of the exercise, or of an opportunity for the exercise, of any arbitrary
discrimination by the municipal authorities between citizens who will so
comply. (Schloss Poster Adv. Co., Inc. vs. City of Rock Hill, et al., 2 SE (2d),
pp. 394-395).
It is contended, on the other hand, that the mayor can refuse a permit solely in case
that the proposed building "destroys the view of the public plaza or occupies any
public property" (as stated in its section 3); and in fact, the refusal of the Mayor of
Baao to issue a building permit to the appellant was predicated on the ground that
the proposed building would "destroy the view of the public plaza" by preventing its
being seen from the public highway. Even thus interpreted, the ordinance is
unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive appellants
of the right to use their own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police
power, and amounts to a taking of appellants property without just compensation.
We do not overlook that the modern tendency is to regard the beautification of
neighborhoods as conducive to the comfort and happiness of residents. But while
property may be regulated in the interest of the general welfare, and in its pursuit,
the State may prohibit structures offensive to the sight (Churchill and Tait vs.
Rafferty, 32 Phil. 580), the State may not, under the guise of police power,
permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property and practically
confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of the
community. As the case now stands, every structure that may be erected on
appellants' land, regardless of its own beauty, stands condemned under the
ordinance in question, because it would interfere with the view of the public plaza
from the highway. The appellants would, in effect, be constrained to let their land
remain idle and unused for the obvious purpose for which it is best suited, being
urban in character. To legally achieve that result, the municipality must give
appellants just compensation and an opportunity to be heard.
71
An ordinance which permanently so restricts the use of property that it
can not be used for any reasonable purpose goes, it is plain, beyond
regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property. The only
substantial difference, in such case, between restriction and actual taking,
is that the restriction leaves the owner subject to the burden of payment
of taxation, while outright confiscation would relieve him of that burden.
(Arverne Bay Constr. Co. vs. Thatcher (N.Y.) 117 ALR. 1110, 1116).
A regulation which substantially deprives an owner of all beneficial use of
his property is confiscation and is a deprivation within the meaning of the
14th Amendment. (Sundlum vs. Zoning Bd., 145 Atl. 451; also Eaton vs.
Sweeny, 177 NE 412; Taylor vs. Jacksonville, 133 So. 114).
Zoning which admittedly limits property to a use which can not reasonably
be made of it cannot be said to set aside such property to a use but
constitutes the taking of such property without just compensation. Use of
property is an element of ownership therein. Regardless of the opinion of
zealots that property may properly, by zoning, be utterly destroyed
without compensation, such principle finds no support in the genius of our
government nor in the principles of justice as we known them. Such a
doctrine shocks the sense of justice. If it be of public benefit that property
remain open and unused, then certainly the public, and not the private
individuals, should bear the cost of reasonable compensation for such
property under the rules of law governing the condemnation of private
property for public use. (Tews vs. Woolhiser (1933) 352 I11. 212, 185 N.E.
827) (Emphasis supplied.)
The validity of the ordinance in question was justified by the court below under
section 2243, par. (c), of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended. This section
provides:
SEC. 2243. Certain legislative powers of discretionary character. — The
municipal council shall have authority to exercise the following
discretionary powers:
xxx     xxx     xxx
(c) To establish fire limits in populous centers, prescribe the kinds of
buildings that may be constructed or repaired within them, and issue
permits for the creation or repair thereof, charging a fee which shall be
determined by the municipal council and which shall not be less than two
pesos for each building permit and one peso for each repair permit issued.
 The fees collected under the provisions of this subsection shall accrue to
the municipal school fund.
Under the provisions of the section above quoted, however, the power of the
municipal council to require the issuance of building permits rests upon its first
establishing fire limits in populous parts of the town and prescribing the kinds of
buildings that may be constructed or repaired within them. As there is absolutely no
showing in this case that the municipal council had either established fire limits
within the municipality or set standards for the kind or kinds of buildings to be
constructed or repaired within them before it passed the ordinance in question, it is
clear that said ordinance was not conceived and promulgated under the express
authority of sec. 2243 (c) aforequoted.
We rule that the regulation in question, Municipal Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1950,
of the Municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, was beyond the authority of said
municipality to enact, and is therefore null and void. Hence, the conviction of herein
appellants is reversed, and said accused are acquitted, with costs de oficio. So
ordered.
#8
G.R. No. L-20620 August 15, 1974
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
CARMEN M. VDA. DE CASTELLVI, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant.
C.A. Mendoza & A. V. Raquiza and Alberto Cacnio & Associates for defendant-
appellees.
ZALDIVAR, J.:p
Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in its Civil Case
No. 1623, an expropriation proceeding.
Plaintiff-appellant, the Republic of the Philippines, (hereinafter referred to as the
Republic) filed, on June 26, 1959, a complaint for eminent domain against
defendant-appellee, Carmen M. Vda. de Castellvi, judicial administratrix of the
72
estate of the late Alfonso de Castellvi (hereinafter referred to as Castellvi), over a
parcel of land situated in the barrio of San Jose, Floridablanca, Pampanga, described
as follows:
A parcel of land, Lot No. 199-B Bureau of Lands Plan Swo 23666.
Bounded on the NE by Maria Nieves Toledo-Gozun; on the SE by
national road; on the SW by AFP reservation, and on the NW by
AFP reservation. Containing an area of 759,299 square meters,
more or less, and registered in the name of Alfonso Castellvi
under TCT No. 13631 of the Register of Pampanga ...;
and against defendant-appellee Maria Nieves Toledo Gozun (hereinafter referred to
as Toledo-Gozun over two parcels of land described as follows:
A parcel of land (Portion Lot Blk-1, Bureau of Lands Plan Psd,
26254. Bounded on the NE by Lot 3, on the SE by Lot 3; on the SW
by Lot 1-B, Blk. 2 (equivalent to Lot 199-B Swo 23666; on the NW
by AFP military reservation. Containing an area of 450,273 square
meters, more or less and registered in the name of Maria Nieves
Toledo-Gozun under TCT No. 8708 of the Register of Deeds of
Pampanga. ..., and
A parcel of land (Portion of lot 3, Blk-1, Bureau of Lands Plan Psd
26254. Bounded on the NE by Lot No. 3, on the SE by school lot
and national road, on the SW by Lot 1-B Blk 2 (equivalent to Lot
199-B Swo 23666), on the NW by Lot 1-B, Blk-1. Containing an
area of 88,772 square meters, more or less, and registered in the
name of Maria Nieves Toledo Gozun under TCT No. 8708 of the
Register of Deeds of Pampanga, ....
In its complaint, the Republic alleged, among other things, that the fair market
value of the above-mentioned lands, according to the Committee on Appraisal for
the Province of Pampanga, was not more than P2,000 per hectare, or a total market
value of P259,669.10; and prayed, that the provisional value of the lands be fixed at
P259.669.10, that the court authorizes plaintiff to take immediate possession of the
lands upon deposit of that amount with the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga; that
the court appoints three commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just
compensation for the property sought to be expropriated, and that the court issues
thereafter a final order of condemnation.
On June 29, 1959 the trial court issued an order fixing the provisional value of the
lands at P259,669.10.
In her "motion to dismiss" filed on July 14, 1959, Castellvi alleged, among other
things, that the land under her administration, being a residential land, had a fair
market value of P15.00 per square meter, so it had a total market value of
P11,389,485.00; that the Republic, through the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
particularly the Philippine Air Force, had been, despite repeated demands, illegally
occupying her property since July 1, 1956, thereby preventing her from using and
disposing of it, thus causing her damages by way of unrealized profits. This
defendant prayed that the complaint be dismissed, or that the Republic be ordered
to pay her P15.00 per square meter, or a total of P11,389,485.00, plus interest
thereon at 6% per annum from July 1, 1956; that the Republic be ordered to pay her
P5,000,000.00 as unrealized profits, and the costs of the suit.
By order of the trial court, dated August, 1959, Amparo C. Diaz, Dolores G. viuda de
Gil, Paloma Castellvi, Carmen Castellvi, Rafael Castellvi, Luis Castellvi, Natividad
Castellvi de Raquiza, Jose Castellvi and Consuelo Castellvi were allowed to intervene
as parties defendants. Subsequently, Joaquin V. Gozun, Jr., husband of defendant
Nieves Toledo Gozun, was also allowed by the court to intervene as a party
defendant.
After the Republic had deposited with the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga the
amount of P259,669.10, the trial court ordered that the Republic be placed in
possession of the lands. The Republic was actually placed in possession of the lands
on August 10,
1959.1
In her "motion to dismiss", dated October 22, 1959, Toledo-Gozun alleged, among
other things, that her two parcels of land were residential lands, in fact a portion
with an area of 343,303 square meters had already been subdivided into different
lots for sale to the general public, and the remaining portion had already been set
aside for expansion sites of the already completed subdivisions; that the fair market
value of said lands was P15.00 per square meter, so they had a total market value
of P8,085,675.00; and she prayed that the complaint be dismissed, or that she be
paid the amount of P8,085,675.00, plus interest thereon at the rate of 6% per
annum from October 13, 1959, and attorney's fees in the amount of P50,000.00.
Intervenors Jose Castellvi and Consuelo Castellvi in their answer, filed on February
11, 1960, and also intervenor Joaquin Gozun, Jr., husband of defendant Maria
Nieves Toledo-Gozun, in his motion to dismiss, dated May 27, 1960, all alleged that
the value of the lands sought to be expropriated was at the rate of P15.00 per
square meter.
On November 4, 1959, the trial court authorized the Provincial Treasurer of
Pampanga to pay defendant Toledo-Gozun the sum of P107,609.00 as provisional
73
value of her lands.2 On May 16, 1960 the trial Court authorized the Provincial
Treasurer of Pampanga to pay defendant Castellvi the amount of P151,859.80 as
provisional value of the land under her administration, and ordered said defendant
to deposit the amount with the Philippine National Bank under the supervision of
the Deputy Clerk of Court. In another order of May 16, 1960 the trial Court entered
an order of condemnation.3
The trial Court appointed three commissioners: Atty. Amadeo Yuzon, Clerk of Court,
as commissioner for the court; Atty. Felicisimo G. Pamandanan, counsel of the
Philippine National Bank Branch at Floridablanca, for the plaintiff; and Atty.
Leonardo F. Lansangan, Filipino legal counsel at Clark Air Base, for the defendants.
The Commissioners, after having qualified themselves, proceeded to the
performance of their duties.
On March 15,1961 the Commissioners submitted their report and recommendation,
wherein, after having determined that the lands sought to be expropriated were
residential lands, they recommended unanimously that the lowest price that should
be paid was P10.00 per square meter, for both the lands of Castellvi and Toledo-
Gozun; that an additional P5,000.00 be paid to Toledo-Gozun for improvements
found on her land; that legal interest on the compensation, computed from August
10, 1959, be paid after deducting the amounts already paid to the owners, and that
no consequential damages be awarded. 4 The Commissioners' report was objected
to by all the parties in the case — by defendants Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun, who
insisted that the fair market value of their lands should be fixed at P15.00 per
square meter; and by the Republic, which insisted that the price to be paid for the
lands should be fixed at P0.20 per square meter.5
After the parties-defendants and intervenors had filed their respective memoranda,
and the Republic, after several extensions of time, had adopted as its memorandum
its objections to the report of the Commissioners, the trial court, on May 26, 1961,
rendered its decision6 the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, taking into account all the foregoing circumstances,
and that the lands are titled, ... the rising trend of land values ...,
and the lowered purchasing power of the Philippine peso, the
court finds that the unanimous recommendation of the
commissioners of ten (P10.00) pesos per square meter for the
three lots of the defendants subject of this action is fair and just.
xxx xxx xxx
 The plaintiff will pay 6% interest per annum on the total value of
the lands of defendant Toledo-Gozun since (sic) the amount
deposited as provisional value from August 10, 1959 until full
payment is made to said defendant or deposit therefor is made in
court.
In respect to the defendant Castellvi, interest at 6% per annum
will also be paid by the plaintiff to defendant Castellvi from July 1,
1956 when plaintiff commenced its illegal possession of the
Castellvi land when the instant action had not yet been
commenced to July 10, 1959 when the provisional value thereof
was actually deposited in court, on the total value of the said
(Castellvi) land as herein adjudged. The same rate of interest shall
be paid from July 11, 1959 on the total value of the land herein
adjudged minus the amount deposited as provisional value, or
P151,859.80, such interest to run until full payment is made to
said defendant or deposit therefor is made in court. All the
intervenors having failed to produce evidence in support of their
respective interventions, said interventions are ordered
dismissed.
The costs shall be charged to the plaintiff.
On June 21, 1961 the Republic filed a motion for a new trial and/or reconsideration,
upon the grounds of newly-discovered evidence, that the decision was not
supported by the evidence, and that the decision was against the law, against which
motion defendants Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun filed their respective oppositions.
On July 8, 1961 when the motion of the Republic for new trial and/or
reconsideration was called for hearing, the Republic filed a supplemental motion for
new trial upon the ground of additional newly-discovered evidence. This motion for
new trial and/or reconsideration was denied by the court on July 12, 1961.
On July 17, 1961 the Republic gave notice of its intention to appeal from the
decision of May 26, 1961 and the order of July 12, 1961. Defendant Castellvi also
filed, on July 17, 1961, her notice of appeal from the decision of the trial court.
The Republic filed various ex-parte motions for extension of time within which to
file its record on appeal. The Republic's record on appeal was finally submitted on
December 6, 1961.
Defendants Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun filed not only a joint opposition to the
approval of the Republic's record on appeal, but also a joint memorandum in
74
support of their opposition. The Republic also filed a memorandum in support of its
prayer for the approval of its record on appeal. On December 27, 1961 the trial
court issued an order declaring both the record on appeal filed by the Republic, and
the record on appeal filed by defendant Castellvi as having been filed out of time,
thereby dismissing both appeals.
On January 11, 1962 the Republic filed a "motion to strike out the order of
December 27, 1961 and for reconsideration", and subsequently an amended record
on appeal, against which motion the defendants Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun filed
their opposition. On July 26, 1962 the trial court issued an order, stating that "in the
interest of expediency, the questions raised may be properly and finally determined
by the Supreme Court," and at the same time it ordered the Solicitor General to
submit a record on appeal containing copies of orders and pleadings specified
therein. In an order dated November 19, 1962, the trial court approved the
Republic's record on appeal as amended.
Defendant Castellvi did not insist on her appeal. Defendant Toledo-Gozun did not
appeal.
The motion to dismiss the Republic's appeal was reiterated by appellees Castellvi
and Toledo-Gozun before this Court, but this Court denied the motion.
In her motion of August 11, 1964, appellee Castellvi sought to increase the
provisional value of her land. The Republic, in its comment on Castellvi's motion,
opposed the same. This Court denied Castellvi's motion in a resolution dated
October 2,1964.
The motion of appellees, Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun, dated October 6, 1969,
praying that they be authorized to mortgage the lands subject of expropriation, was
denied by this Court or October 14, 1969.
On February 14, 1972, Attys. Alberto Cacnio, and Associates, counsel for the estate
of the late Don Alfonso de Castellvi in the expropriation proceedings, filed a notice
of attorney's lien, stating that as per agreement with the administrator of the estate
of Don Alfonso de Castellvi they shall receive by way of attorney's fees, "the sum
equivalent to ten per centum of whatever the court may finally decide as the
expropriated price of the property subject matter of the case."
---------
Before this Court, the Republic contends that the lower court erred:
 1. In finding the price of P10 per square meter of the lands subject
of the instant proceedings as just compensation;
2. In holding that the "taking" of the properties under
expropriation commenced with the filing of this action;
3. In ordering plaintiff-appellant to pay 6% interest on the
adjudged value of the Castellvi property to start from July of 1956;
4. In denying plaintiff-appellant's motion for new trial based on
newly discovered evidence.
In its brief, the Republic discusses the second error assigned as the first issue to be
considered. We shall follow the sequence of the Republic's discussion.
1. In support of the assigned error that the lower court erred in holding that the
"taking" of the properties under expropriation commenced with the filing of the
complaint in this case, the Republic argues that the "taking" should be reckoned
from the year 1947 when by virtue of a special lease agreement between the
Republic and appellee Castellvi, the former was granted the "right and privilege" to
buy the property should the lessor wish to terminate the lease, and that in the
event of such sale, it was stipulated that the fair market value should be as of the
time of occupancy; and that the permanent improvements amounting to more that
half a million pesos constructed during a period of twelve years on the land, subject
of expropriation, were indicative of an agreed pattern of permanency and stability
of occupancy by the Philippine Air Force in the interest of national Security. 7
Appellee Castellvi, on the other hand, maintains that the "taking" of property under
the power of eminent domain requires two essential elements, to wit: (1) entrance
and occupation by condemn or upon the private property for more than a
momentary or limited period, and (2) devoting it to a public use in such a way as to
oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. This
appellee argues that in the instant case the first element is wanting, for the contract
of lease relied upon provides for a lease from year to year; that the second element
is also wanting, because the Republic was paying the lessor Castellvi a monthly
rental of P445.58; and that the contract of lease does not grant the Republic the
"right and privilege" to buy the premises "at the value at the time of occupancy." 8
Appellee Toledo-Gozun did not comment on the Republic's argument in support of
the second error assigned, because as far as she was concerned the Republic had
not taken possession of her lands prior to August 10, 1959. 9
75
In order to better comprehend the issues raised in the appeal, in so far as the
Castellvi property is concerned, it should be noted that the Castellvi property had
been occupied by the Philippine Air Force since 1947 under a contract of lease,
typified by the contract marked Exh. 4-Castellvi, the pertinent portions of which
read:
CONTRACT OF LEASE
This AGREEMENT OF LEASE MADE AND ENTERED into by and
between INTESTATE ESTATE OF ALFONSO DE CASTELLVI,
represented by CARMEN M. DE CASTELLVI, Judicial
Administratrix ... hereinafter called the LESSOR and THE REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by MAJ. GEN. CALIXTO DUQUE,
Chief of Staff of the ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
hereinafter called the LESSEE,
WITNESSETH:
1. For and in consideration of the rentals hereinafter reserved and
the mutual terms, covenants and conditions of the parties, the
LESSOR has, and by these presents does, lease and let unto the
LESSEE the following described land together with the
improvements thereon and appurtenances thereof, viz:
Un Terreno, Lote No. 27 del Plano de subdivision Psu 34752, parte
de la hacienda de Campauit, situado en el Barrio de San Jose,
Municipio de Floridablanca Pampanga. ... midiendo una extension
superficial de cuatro milliones once mil cuatro cientos trienta y
cinco (4,001,435) [sic] metros cuadrados, mas o menos.
Out of the above described property, 75.93 hectares thereof are
actually occupied and covered by this contract. .
Above lot is more particularly described in TCT No. 1016, province
of
Pampanga ...
of which premises, the LESSOR warrants that he/she/they/is/are the registered
owner(s) and with full authority to execute a contract of this nature.
2. The term of this lease shall be for the period beginning July 1,
1952 the date the premises were occupied by the PHILIPPINE AIR
FORCE, AFP until June 30, 1953, subject to renewal for another
year at the option of the LESSEE or unless sooner terminated by
the LESSEE as hereinafter provided.
3. The LESSOR hereby warrants that the LESSEE shall have quiet,
peaceful and undisturbed possession of the demised premises
throughout the full term or period of this lease and the LESSOR
undertakes without cost to the LESSEE to eject all trespassers, but
should the LESSOR fail to do so, the LESSEE at its option may
proceed to do so at the expense of the LESSOR. The LESSOR
further agrees that should he/she/they sell or encumber all or any
part of the herein described premises during the period of this
lease, any conveyance will be conditioned on the right of the
LESSEE hereunder.
4. The LESSEE shall pay to the LESSOR as monthly rentals under
this lease the sum of FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY-FIVE PESOS & 58/100
(P455.58) ...
5. The LESSEE may, at any time prior to the termination of this
lease, use the property for any purpose or purposes and, at its
own costs and expense make alteration, install facilities and
fixtures and errect additions ... which facilities or fixtures ... so
placed in, upon or attached to the said premises shall be and
remain property of the LESSEE and may be removed therefrom by
the LESSEE prior to the termination of this lease. The LESSEE shall
surrender possession of the premises upon the expiration or
termination of this lease and if so required by the LESSOR, shall
return the premises in substantially the same condition as that
existing at the time same were first occupied by the AFP,
reasonable and ordinary wear and tear and damages by the
elements or by circumstances over which the LESSEE has no
control excepted: PROVIDED, that if the LESSOR so requires the
return of the premises in such condition, the LESSOR shall give
written notice thereof to the LESSEE at least twenty (20) days
before the termination of the lease and provided, further, that
should the LESSOR give notice within the time specified above,
the LESSEE shall have the right and privilege to compensate the
LESSOR at the fair value or the equivalent, in lieu of performance
of its obligation, if any, to restore the premises. Fair value is to be
determined as the value at the time of occupancy less fair wear
and tear and depreciation during the period of this lease.
76
6. The LESSEE may terminate this lease at any time during the
term hereof by giving written notice to the LESSOR at least thirty
(30) days in advance ...
7. The LESSEE should not be responsible, except under special
legislation for any damages to the premises by reason of combat
operations, acts of GOD, the elements or other acts and deeds not
due to the negligence on the part of the LESSEE.
8. This LEASE AGREEMENT supersedes and voids any and all
agreements and undertakings, oral or written, previously entered
into between the parties covering the property herein leased, the
same having been merged herein. This AGREEMENT may not be
modified or altered except by instrument in writing only duly
signed by the parties. 10
It was stipulated by the parties, that "the foregoing contract of lease (Exh. 4,
Castellvi) is 'similar in terms and conditions, including the date', with the annual
contracts entered into from year to year between defendant Castellvi and the
Republic of the Philippines (p. 17, t.s.n., Vol. III)". 11 It is undisputed, therefore, that
the Republic occupied Castellvi's land from July 1, 1947, by virtue of the above-
mentioned contract, on a year to year basis (from July 1 of each year to June 30 of
the succeeding year) under the terms and conditions therein stated.
Before the expiration of the contract of lease on June 30, 1956 the Republic sought
to renew the same but Castellvi refused. When the AFP refused to vacate the leased
premises after the termination of the contract, on July 11, 1956, Castellvi wrote to
the Chief of Staff, AFP, informing the latter that the heirs of the property had
decided not to continue leasing the property in question because they had decided
to subdivide the land for sale to the general public, demanding that the property be
vacated within 30 days from receipt of the letter, and that the premises be returned
in substantially the same condition as before occupancy (Exh. 5 — Castellvi). A
follow-up letter was sent on January 12, 1957, demanding the delivery and return of
the property within one month from said date (Exh. 6 Castellvi). On January 30,
1957, Lieutenant General Alfonso Arellano, Chief of Staff, answered the letter of
Castellvi, saying that it was difficult for the army to vacate the premises in view of
the permanent installations and other facilities worth almost P500,000.00 that were
erected and already established on the property, and that, there being no other
recourse, the acquisition of the property by means of expropriation proceedings
would be recommended to the President (Exhibit "7" — Castellvi).
Defendant Castellvi then brought suit in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, in
Civil Case No. 1458, to eject the Philippine Air Force from the land. While this
ejectment case was pending, the Republic instituted these expropriation
proceedings, and, as stated earlier in this opinion, the Republic was placed in
possession of the lands on August 10, 1959, On November 21, 1959, the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga, dismissed Civil Case No. 1458, upon petition of the
parties, in an order which, in part, reads as follows:
1. Plaintiff has agreed, as a matter of fact has already signed an
agreement with defendants, whereby she has agreed to receive
the rent of the lands, subject matter of the instant case from June
30, 1966 up to 1959 when the Philippine Air Force was placed in
possession by virtue of an order of the Court upon depositing the
provisional amount as fixed by the Provincial Appraisal Committee
with the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga;
2. That because of the above-cited agreement wherein the
administratrix decided to get the rent corresponding to the rent
from 1956 up to 1959 and considering that this action is one of
illegal detainer and/or to recover the possession of said land by
virtue of non-payment of rents, the instant case now has become
moot and academic and/or by virtue of the agreement signed by
plaintiff, she has waived her cause of action in the above-entitled
case. 12
The Republic urges that the "taking " of Castellvi's property should be deemed as of
the year 1947 by virtue of afore-quoted lease agreement. In American
Jurisprudence, Vol. 26, 2nd edition, Section 157, on the subject of "Eminent
Domain, we read the definition of "taking" (in eminent domain) as follows:
Taking' under the power of eminent domain may be defined
generally as entering upon private property for more than a
momentary period, and, under the warrant or color of legal
authority, devoting it to a public use, or otherwise informally
appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way as
substantially to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial
enjoyment thereof. 13
Pursuant to the aforecited authority, a number of circumstances must be present in
the "taking" of property for purposes of eminent domain.
First, the expropriator must enter a private property. This circumstance is present in
the instant case, when by virtue of the lease agreement the Republic, through the
AFP, took possession of the property of Castellvi.
77
Second, the entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary
period. "Momentary" means, "lasting but a moment; of but a moment's duration"
(The Oxford English Dictionary, Volume VI, page 596); "lasting a very short time;
transitory; having a very brief life; operative or recurring at every moment"
(Webster's Third International Dictionary, 1963 edition.) The word "momentary"
when applied to possession or occupancy of (real) property should be construed to
mean "a limited period" — not indefinite or permanent. The aforecited lease
contract was for a period of one year, renewable from year to year. The entry on
the property, under the lease, is temporary, and considered transitory. The fact that
the Republic, through the AFP, constructed some installations of a permanent
nature does not alter the fact that the entry into the land was transitory, or
intended to last a year, although renewable from year to year by consent of 'The
owner of the land. By express provision of the lease agreement the Republic, as
lessee, undertook to return the premises  in substantially the same condition as at
the time the property was first occupied by the AFP. It is claimed that the intention
of the lessee was to occupy the land permanently, as may be inferred from the
construction of permanent improvements. But this "intention" cannot prevail over
the clear and express terms of the lease contract. Intent is to be deduced from the
language employed by the parties, and the terms 'of the contract, when
unambiguous, as in the instant case, are conclusive in the absence of averment and
proof of mistake or fraud — the question being not what the intention was, but
what is expressed in the language used. (City of Manila v. Rizal Park Co., Inc., 53
Phil. 515, 525); Magdalena Estate, Inc. v. Myrick, 71 Phil. 344, 348). Moreover, in
order to judge the intention of the contracting parties, their contemporaneous and
subsequent acts shall be principally considered (Art. 1371, Civil Code). If the
intention of the lessee (Republic) in 1947 was really to occupy permanently
Castellvi's property, why was the contract of lease entered into on year to year
basis? Why was the lease agreement renewed from year to year? Why did not the
Republic expropriate this land of Castellvi in 1949 when, according to the Republic
itself, it expropriated the other parcels of land that it occupied at the same time as
the Castellvi land, for the purpose of converting them into a jet air base?  14 It might
really have been the intention of the Republic to expropriate the lands in question
at some future time, but certainly mere notice - much less an implied notice — of
such intention on the part of the Republic to expropriate the lands in the future did
not, and could not, bind the landowner, nor bind the land itself. The expropriation
must be actually commenced in court (Republic vs. Baylosis, et al., 96 Phil. 461,
484).
Third, the entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal
authority. This circumstance in the "taking" may be considered as present in the
instant case, because the Republic entered the Castellvi property as lessee.
Fourth, the property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally
appropriated or injuriously affected. It may be conceded that the circumstance of
the property being devoted to public use is present because the property was used
by the air force of the AFP.
Fifth, the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust
the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. In the
instant case, the entry of the Republic into the property and its utilization of the
same for public use did not oust Castellvi and deprive her of all beneficial
enjoyment of the property. Castellvi remained as owner, and was continuously
recognized as owner by the Republic, as shown by the renewal of the lease contract
from year to year, and by the provision in the lease contract whereby the Republic
undertook to return the property to Castellvi when the lease was terminated.
Neither was Castellvi deprived of all the beneficial enjoyment of the property,
because the Republic was bound to pay, and had been paying, Castellvi the agreed
monthly rentals until the time when it filed the complaint for eminent domain on
June 26, 1959.
It is clear, therefore, that the "taking" of Catellvi's property for purposes of eminent
domain cannot be considered to have taken place in 1947 when the Republic
commenced to occupy the property as lessee thereof. We find merit in the
contention of Castellvi that two essential elements in the "taking" of property under
the power of eminent domain, namely: (1) that the entrance and occupation by the
condemnor must be for a permanent, or indefinite period, and (2) that in devoting
the property to public use the owner was ousted from the property and deprived of
its beneficial use, were not present when the Republic entered and occupied the
Castellvi property in 1947.
Untenable also is the Republic's contention that although the contract between the
parties was one of lease on a year to year basis, it was "in reality a more or less
permanent right to occupy the premises under the guise of lease with the 'right and
privilege' to buy the property should the lessor wish to terminate the lease," and
"the right to buy the property is merged as an integral part of the lease
relationship ... so much so that the fair market value has been agreed upon, not, as
of the time of purchase, but as of the time of occupancy" 15 We cannot accept the
Republic's contention that a lease on a year to year basis can give rise to a
permanent right to occupy, since by express legal provision a lease made for a
determinate time, as was the lease of Castellvi's land in the instant case, ceases
upon the day fixed, without need of a demand (Article 1669, Civil Code). Neither
can it be said that the right of eminent domain may be exercised by simply leasing
the premises to be expropriated (Rule 67, Section 1, Rules of Court). Nor can it be
accepted that the Republic would enter into a contract of lease where its real
intention was to buy, or why the Republic should enter into a simulated contract of
78
lease ("under the guise of lease", as expressed by counsel for the Republic) when all
the time the Republic had the right of eminent domain, and could expropriate
Castellvi's land if it wanted to without resorting to any guise whatsoever. Neither
can we see how a right to buy could be merged in a contract of lease in the absence
of any agreement between the parties to that effect. To sustain the contention of
the Republic is to sanction a practice whereby in order to secure a low price for a
land which the government intends to expropriate (or would eventually
expropriate) it would first negotiate with the owner of the land to lease the land
(for say ten or twenty years) then expropriate the same when the lease is about to
terminate, then claim that the "taking" of the property for the purposes of the
expropriation be reckoned as of the date when the Government started to occupy
the property under the lease, and then assert that the value of the property being
expropriated be reckoned as of the start of the lease, in spite of the fact that the
value of the property, for many good reasons, had in the meantime increased
during the period of the lease. This would be sanctioning what obviously is a
deceptive scheme, which would have the effect of depriving the owner of the
property of its true and fair market value at the time when the expropriation
proceedings were actually instituted in court. The Republic's claim that it had the
"right and privilege" to buy the property at the value that it had at the time when it
first occupied the property as lessee nowhere appears in the lease contract. What
was agreed expressly in paragraph No. 5 of the lease agreement was that, should
the lessor require the lessee to return the premises in the same condition as at the
time the same was first occupied by the AFP, the lessee would have the "right and
privilege" (or option) of paying the lessor what it would fairly cost to put the
premises in the same condition as it was at the commencement of the lease, in lieu
of the lessee's performance of the undertaking to put the land in said condition. The
"fair value" at the time of occupancy, mentioned in the lease agreement, does not
refer to the value of the property if bought by the lessee, but refers to the cost of
restoring the property in the same condition as of the time when the lessee took
possession of the property. Such fair value cannot refer to the purchase price, for
purchase was never intended by the parties to the lease contract. It is a rule in the
interpretation of contracts that "However general the terms of a contract may be,
they shall not be understood to comprehend things that are distinct and cases that
are different from those upon which the parties intended to agree" (Art. 1372, Civil
Code).
We hold, therefore, that the "taking" of the Castellvi property should not be
reckoned as of the year 1947 when the Republic first occupied the same pursuant
to the contract of lease, and that the just compensation to be paid for the Castellvi
property should not be determined on the basis of the value of the property as of
that year. The lower court did not commit an error when it held that the "taking" of
the property under expropriation commenced with the filing of the complaint in
this case.
Under Section 4 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, 16 the "just compensation" is to be
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. This Court has ruled that
when the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the
commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the
filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. (Republic vs. Philippine
National Bank, L-14158, April 12, 1961, 1 SCRA 957, 961-962). In the instant case, it
is undisputed that the Republic was placed in possession of the Castellvi property,
by authority of the court, on August 10, 1959. The "taking" of the Castellvi property
for the purposes of determining the just compensation to be paid must, therefore,
be reckoned as of June 26, 1959 when the complaint for eminent domain was filed.
Regarding the two parcels of land of Toledo-Gozun, also sought to be expropriated,
which had never been under lease to the Republic, the Republic was placed in
possession of said lands, also by authority of the court, on August 10, 1959, The
taking of those lands, therefore, must also be reckoned as of June 26, 1959, the
date of the filing of the complaint for eminent domain.
2. Regarding the first assigned error — discussed as the second issue — the
Republic maintains that, even assuming that the value of the expropriated lands is
to be determined as of June 26, 1959, the price of P10.00 per square meter fixed by
the lower court "is not only exhorbitant but also unconscionable, and almost
fantastic". On the other hand, both Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun maintain that their
lands are residential lands with a fair market value of not less than P15.00 per
square meter.
The lower court found, and declared, that the lands of Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun
are residential lands. The finding of the lower court is in consonance with the
unanimous opinion of the three commissioners who, in their report to the court,
declared that the lands are residential lands.
The Republic assails the finding that the lands are residential, contending that the
plans of the appellees to convert the lands into subdivision for residential purposes
were only on paper, there being no overt acts on the part of the appellees which
indicated that the subdivision project had been commenced, so that any
compensation to be awarded on the basis of the plans would be speculative. The
Republic's contention is not well taken. We find evidence showing that the lands in
question had ceased to be devoted to the production of agricultural crops, that they
had become adaptable for residential purposes, and that the appellees had actually
taken steps to convert their lands into residential subdivisions even before the
Republic filed the complaint for eminent domain. In the case of City of  Manila vs.
Corrales  (32 Phil. 82, 98) this Court laid down basic guidelines in determining the
value of the property expropriated for public purposes. This Court said:
79
In determining the value of land appropriated for public
purposes, the same consideration are to be regarded as in a sale
of property between private parties. The inquiry, in such cases,
must be what is the property worth in the market, viewed not
merely with reference to the uses to which it is at the time
applied, but with reference to the uses to which it is plainly
adapted, that is to say, What is it worth from its availability for
valuable uses?
So many and varied are the circumstances to be taken into
account in determining the value of property condemned for
public purposes, that it is practically impossible to formulate a
rule to govern its appraisement in all cases. Exceptional
circumstances will modify the most carefully guarded rule, but, as
a general thing, we should say that the compensation of the
owner is to be estimated by reference to the use for which the
property is suitable, having regard to the existing business or
wants of the community, or such as may be reasonably expected
in the immediate future. (Miss. and Rum River Boom Co. vs.
Patterson, 98 U.S., 403).
In expropriation proceedings, therefore, the owner of the land has the right to its
value for the use for which it would bring the most in the market. 17 The owner may
thus show every advantage that his property possesses, present and prospective, in
order that the price it could be sold for in the market may be satisfactorily
determined. 18 The owner may also show that the property is suitable for division
into village or town lots. 19
The trial court, therefore, correctly considered, among other circumstances, the
proposed subdivision plans of the lands sought to be expropriated in finding that
those lands are residential lots. This finding of the lower court is supported not only
by the unanimous opinion of the commissioners, as embodied in their report, but
also by the Provincial Appraisal Committee of the province of Pampanga composed
of the Provincial Treasurer, the Provincial Auditor and the District Engineer. In the
minutes of the meeting of the Provincial Appraisal Committee, held on May 14,
1959 (Exh. 13-Castellvi) We read in its Resolution No. 10 the following:
3. Since 1957 the land has been classified as residential in view of
its proximity to the air base and due to the fact that it was not
being devoted to agriculture. In fact, there is a plan to convert it
into a subdivision for residential purposes. The taxes due on the
property have been paid based on its classification as residential
land;
The evidence shows that Castellvi broached the idea of subdividing her land into
residential lots as early as July 11, 1956 in her letter to the Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines. (Exh. 5-Castellvi) As a matter of fact, the layout of
the subdivision plan was tentatively approved by the National Planning Commission
on September 7, 1956. (Exh. 8-Castellvi). The land of Castellvi had not been devoted
to agriculture since 1947 when it was leased to the Philippine Army. In 1957 said
land was classified as residential, and taxes based on its classification as residential
had been paid since then (Exh. 13-Castellvi). The location of the Castellvi land
justifies its suitability for a residential subdivision. As found by the trial court, "It is
at the left side of the entrance of the Basa Air Base and bounded on two sides by
roads (Exh. 13-Castellvi), paragraphs 1 and 2, Exh. 12-Castellvi), the poblacion, (of
Floridablanca) the municipal building, and the Pampanga Sugar Mills are closed by.
The barrio schoolhouse and chapel are also near (T.S.N. November 23,1960, p.
68)." 20
The lands of Toledo-Gozun (Lot 1-B and Lot 3) are practically of the same condition
as the land of Castellvi. The lands of Toledo-Gozun adjoin the land of Castellvi. They
are also contiguous to the Basa Air Base, and are along the road. These lands are
near the barrio schoolhouse, the barrio chapel, the Pampanga Sugar Mills, and the
poblacion of Floridablanca (Exhs. 1, 3 and 4-Toledo-Gozun). As a matter of fact,
regarding lot 1-B it had already been surveyed and subdivided, and its conversion
into a residential subdivision was tentatively approved by the National Planning
Commission on July 8, 1959 (Exhs. 5 and 6 Toledo-Gozun). As early as June, 1958, no
less than 32 man connected with the Philippine Air Force among them
commissioned officers, non-commission officers, and enlisted men had requested
Mr. and Mrs. Joaquin D. Gozun to open a subdivision on their lands in question
(Exhs. 8, 8-A to 8-ZZ-Toledo-Gozun). 21
We agree with the findings, and the conclusions, of the lower court that the lands
that are the subject of expropriation in the present case, as of August 10, 1959
when the same were taken possession of by the Republic, were residential lands
and were adaptable for use as residential subdivisions. Indeed, the owners of these
lands have the right to their value for the use for which they would bring the most
in the market at the time the same were taken from them. The most important
issue to be resolved in the present case relates to the question of what is the just
compensation that should be paid to the appellees.
The Republic asserts that the fair market value of the lands of the appellees is P.20
per square meter. The Republic cites the case of Republic vs. Narciso, et al., L-6594,
which this Court decided on May 18, 1956. The Narciso case involved lands that
belonged to Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun, and to one Donata Montemayor, which
were expropriated by the Republic in 1949 and which are now the site of the Basa
Air Base. In the Narciso case this Court fixed the fair market value at P.20 per square
80
meter. The lands that are sought to be expropriated in the present case being
contiguous to the lands involved in the Narciso case, it is the stand of the Republic
that the price that should be fixed for the lands now in question should also be at
P.20 per square meter.
We can not sustain the stand of the Republic. We find that the price of P.20 per
square meter, as fixed by this Court in the Narciso case, was based on the allegation
of the defendants (owners) in their answer to the complaint for eminent domain in
that case that the price of their lands was P2,000.00 per hectare and that was the
price that they asked the court to pay them. This Court said, then, that the owners
of the land could not be given more than what they had asked, notwithstanding the
recommendation of the majority of the Commission on Appraisal — which was
adopted by the trial court — that the fair market value of the lands was P3,000.00
per hectare. We also find that the price of P.20 per square meter in the Narciso case
was considered the fair market value of the lands as of the year 1949 when the
expropriation proceedings were instituted, and at that time the lands were
classified as sugar lands, and assessed for taxation purposes at around P400.00 per
hectare, or P.04 per square meter. 22 While the lands involved in the present case,
like the lands involved in the Narciso case, might have a fair market value of P.20
per square meter in 1949, it can not be denied that ten years later, in 1959, when
the present proceedings were instituted, the value of those lands had increased
considerably. The evidence shows that since 1949 those lands were no longer
cultivated as sugar lands, and in 1959 those lands were already classified, and
assessed for taxation purposes, as residential lands. In 1959 the land of Castellvi
was assessed at P1.00 per square meter. 23
The Republic also points out that the Provincial Appraisal Committee of Pampanga,
in its resolution No. 5 of February 15, 1957 (Exhibit D), recommended the sum of
P.20 per square meter as the fair valuation of the Castellvi property. We find that
this resolution was made by the Republic the basis in asking the court to fix the
provisional value of the lands sought to be expropriated at P259,669.10, which was
approved by the court. 24 It must be considered, however, that the amount fixed as
the provisional value of the lands that are being expropriated does not necessarily
represent the true and correct value of the land. The value is only "provisional" or
"tentative", to serve as the basis for the immediate occupancy of the property being
expropriated by the condemnor. The records show that this resolution No. 5 was
repealed by the same Provincial Committee on Appraisal in its resolution No. 10 of
May 14, 1959 (Exhibit 13-Castellvi). In that resolution No. 10, the appraisal
committee stated that "The Committee has observed that the value of the land in
this locality has increased since 1957 ...", and recommended the price of P1.50 per
square meter. It follows, therefore, that, contrary to the stand of the Republic, that
resolution No. 5 of the Provincial Appraisal Committee can not be made the basis
for fixing the fair market value of the lands of Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun.
The Republic further relied on the certification of the Acting Assistant Provincial
Assessor of Pampanga, dated February 8, 1961 (Exhibit K), to the effect that in 1950
the lands of Toledo-Gozun were classified partly as sugar land and partly as urban
land, and that the sugar land was assessed at P.40 per square meter, while part of
the urban land was assessed at P.40 per square meter and part at P.20 per square
meter; and that in 1956 the Castellvi land was classified as sugar land and was
assessed at P450.00 per hectare, or P.045 per square meter. We can not also
consider this certification of the Acting Assistant Provincial Assessor as a basis for
fixing the fair market value of the lands of Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun because, as
the evidence shows, the lands in question, in 1957, were already classified and
assessed for taxation purposes as residential lands. The certification of the assessor
refers to the year 1950 as far as the lands of Toledo-Gozun are concerned, and to
the year 1956 as far as the land of Castellvi is concerned. Moreover, this Court has
held that the valuation fixed for the purposes of the assessment of the land for
taxation purposes can not bind the landowner where the latter did not intervene in
fixing it. 25
On the other hand, the Commissioners, appointed by the court to appraise the
lands that were being expropriated, recommended to the court that the price of
P10.00 per square meter would be the fair market value of the lands. The
commissioners made their recommendation on the basis of their observation after
several ocular inspections of the lands, of their own personal knowledge of land
values in the province of Pampanga, of the testimonies of the owners of the land,
and other witnesses, and of documentary evidence presented by the appellees.
Both Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun testified that the fair market value of their
respective land was at P15.00 per square meter. The documentary evidence
considered by the commissioners consisted of deeds of sale of residential lands in
the town of San Fernando and in Angeles City, in the province of Pampanga, which
were sold at prices ranging from P8.00 to P20.00 per square meter (Exhibits 15, 16,
17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23-Castellvi). The commissioners also considered the decision
in Civil Case No. 1531 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, entitled Republic
vs. Sabina Tablante, which was expropriation case filed on January 13, 1959,
involving a parcel of land adjacent to the Clark Air Base in Angeles City, where the
court fixed the price at P18.00 per square meter (Exhibit 14-Castellvi). In their
report, the commissioners, among other things, said:
... This expropriation case is specially pointed out, because the
circumstances and factors involved therein are similar in many
respects to the defendants' lands in this case. The land in Civil
Case No. 1531 of this Court and the lands in the present case (Civil
Case No. 1623) are both near the air bases, the Clark Air Base and
the Basa Air Base respectively. There is a national road fronting
them and are situated in a first-class municipality. As added
81
advantage it may be said that the Basa Air Base land is very near
the sugar mill at Del Carmen, Floridablanca, Pampanga, owned by
the Pampanga Sugar Mills. Also just stone's throw away from the
same lands is a beautiful vacation spot at Palacol, a sitio of the
town of Floridablanca, which counts with a natural swimming pool
for vacationists on weekends. These advantages are not found in
the case of the Clark Air Base. The defendants' lands are nearer to
the poblacion of Floridablanca then Clark Air Base is nearer (sic) to
the poblacion of Angeles, Pampanga.
The deeds of absolute sale, according to the undersigned
commissioners, as well as the land in Civil Case No. 1531 are
competent evidence, because they were executed during the year
1959 and before August 10 of the same year. More specifically so
the land at Clark Air Base which coincidentally is the subject
matter in the complaint in said Civil Case No. 1531, it having been
filed on January 13, 1959 and the taking of the land involved
therein was ordered by the Court of First Instance of Pampanga
on January 15, 1959, several months before the lands in this case
were taken by the plaintiffs ....
From the above and considering further that the lowest as well as
the highest price per square meter obtainable in the market of
Pampanga relative to subdivision lots within its jurisdiction in the
year 1959 is very well known by the Commissioners, the
Commission finds that the lowest price that can be awarded to
the lands in question is P10.00 per square meter. 26
The lower court did not altogether accept the findings of the Commissioners based
on the documentary evidence, but it considered the documentary evidence as basis
for comparison in determining land values. The lower court arrived at the
conclusion that "the unanimous recommendation of the commissioners of ten
(P10.00) pesos per square meter for the three lots of the defendants subject of this
action is fair and just". 27 In arriving at its conclusion, the lower court took into
consideration, among other circumstances, that the lands are titled, that there is a
rising trend of land values, and the lowered purchasing power of the Philippine
peso.
In the case of Manila Railroad Co. vs. Caligsihan, 40 Phil. 326, 328, this Court said:
A court of first instance or, on appeal, the Supreme Court, may
change or modify the report of the commissioners by increasing
or reducing the amount of the award if the facts of the case so
 justify. While great weight is attached to the report of the
commissioners, yet a court may substitute therefor its estimate of
the value of the property as gathered from the record in certain
cases, as, where the commissioners have applied illegal principles
to the evidence submitted to them, or where they have
disregarded a clear preponderance of evidence, or where the
amount allowed is either palpably inadequate or excessive. 28
The report of the commissioners of appraisal in condemnation proceedings are not
binding, but merely advisory in character, as far as the court is concerned. 29 In our
analysis of the report of the commissioners, We find points that merit serious
consideration in the determination of the just compensation that should be paid to
Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun for their lands. It should be noted that the
commissioners had made ocular inspections of the lands and had considered the
nature and similarities of said lands in relation to the lands in other places in the
province of Pampanga, like San Fernando and Angeles City. We cannot disregard
the observations of the commissioners regarding the circumstances that make the
lands in question suited for residential purposes — their location near the Basa Air
Base, just like the lands in Angeles City that are near the Clark Air Base, and the
facilities that obtain because of their nearness to the big sugar central of the
Pampanga Sugar mills, and to the flourishing first class town of Floridablanca. It is
true that the lands in question are not in the territory of San Fernando and Angeles
City, but, considering the facilities of modern communications, the town of
Floridablanca may be considered practically adjacent to San Fernando and Angeles
City. It is not out of place, therefore, to compare the land values in Floridablanca to
the land values in San Fernando and Angeles City, and form an idea of the value of
the lands in Floridablanca with reference to the land values in those two other
communities.
The important factor in expropriation proceeding is that the owner is awarded the
just compensation for his property. We have carefully studied the record, and the
evidence, in this case, and after considering the circumstances attending the lands
in question We have arrived at the conclusion that the price of P10.00 per square
meter, as recommended by the commissioners and adopted by the lower court, is
quite high. It is Our considered view that the price of P5.00 per square meter would
be a fair valuation of the lands in question and would constitute a just
compensation to the owners thereof. In arriving at this conclusion We have
particularly taken into consideration the resolution of the Provincial Committee on
Appraisal of the province of Pampanga informing, among others, that in the year
1959 the land of Castellvi could be sold for from P3.00 to P4.00 per square meter,
while the land of Toledo-Gozun could be sold for from P2.50 to P3.00 per square
meter. The Court has weighed all the circumstances relating to this expropriations
proceedings, and in fixing the price of the lands that are being expropriated the
82
Court arrived at a happy medium between the price as recommended by the
commissioners and approved by the court, and the price advocated by the Republic.
This Court has also taken judicial notice of the fact that the value of the Philippine
peso has considerably gone down since the year 1959. 30 Considering that the lands
of Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun are adjoining each other, and are of the same nature,
the Court has deemed it proper to fix the same price for all these lands.
3. The third issue raised by the Republic relates to the payment of
interest. The Republic maintains that the lower court erred when
it ordered the Republic to pay Castellvi interest at the rate of 6%
per annum on the total amount adjudged as the value of the land
of Castellvi, from July 1, 1956 to July 10, 1959. We find merit in
this assignment of error.
In ordering the Republic to pay 6% interest on the total value of the land of Castellvi
from July 1, 1956 to July 10, 1959, the lower court held that the Republic had
illegally possessed the land of Castellvi from July 1, 1956, after its lease of the land
had expired on June 30, 1956, until August 10, 1959 when the Republic was placed
in possession of the land pursuant to the writ of possession issued by the court.
What really happened was that the Republic continued to occupy the land of
Castellvi after the expiration of its lease on June 30, 1956, so much so that Castellvi
filed an ejectment case against the Republic in the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga. 31 However, while that ejectment case was pending, the Republic filed
the complaint for eminent domain in the present case and was placed in possession
of the land on August 10, 1959, and because of the institution of the expropriation
proceedings the ejectment case was later dismissed. In the order dismissing the
ejectment case, the Court of First Instance of Pampanga said:
Plaintiff has agreed, as a matter of fact has already signed an
agreement with defendants, whereby she had agreed to receive
the rent of the lands, subject matter of the instant case from June
30, 1956 up to 1959 when the Philippine Air Force was placed in
possession by virtue of an order of the Court upon depositing the
provisional amount as fixed by the Provincial Appraisal Committee
with the Provincial Treasurer of
Pampanga; ...
If Castellvi had agreed to receive the rentals from June 30, 1956 to August 10, 1959,
she should be considered as having allowed her land to be leased to the Republic
until August 10, 1959, and she could not at the same time be entitled to the
payment of interest during the same period on the amount awarded her as the just
compensation of her land. The Republic, therefore, should pay Castellvi interest at
the rate of 6% per annum on the value of her land, minus the provisional value that
was deposited, only from July 10, 1959 when it deposited in court the provisional
value of the land.
4. The fourth error assigned by the Republic relates to the denial by the lower court
of its motion for a new trial based on nearly discovered evidence. We do not find
merit in this assignment of error.
After the lower court had decided this case on May 26, 1961, the Republic filed a
motion for a new trial, supplemented by another motion, both based upon the
ground of newly discovered evidence. The alleged newly discovered evidence in the
motion filed on June 21, 1961 was a deed of absolute sale-executed on January 25,
1961, showing that a certain Serafin Francisco had sold to Pablo L. Narciso a parcel
of sugar land having an area of 100,000 square meters with a sugar quota of 100
piculs, covered by P.A. No. 1701, situated in Barrio Fortuna, Floridablanca, for
P14,000, or P.14 per square meter.
In the supplemental motion, the alleged newly discovered evidence were: (1) a
deed of sale of some 35,000 square meters of land situated at Floridablanca for
P7,500.00 (or about P.21 per square meter) executed in July, 1959, by the spouses
Evelyn D. Laird and Cornelio G. Laird in favor of spouses Bienvenido S. Aguas and
Josefina Q. Aguas; and (2) a deed of absolute sale of a parcel of land having an area
of 4,120,101 square meters, including the sugar quota covered by Plantation Audit
No. 161 1345, situated at Floridablanca, Pampanga, for P860.00 per hectare (a little
less than P.09 per square meter) executed on October 22, 1957 by Jesus Toledo y
Mendoza in favor of the Land Tenure Administration.
We find that the lower court acted correctly when it denied the motions for a new
trial.
To warrant the granting of a new trial based on the ground of newly discovered
evidence, it must appear that the evidence was discovered after the trial; that even
with the exercise of due diligence, the evidence could not have been discovered
and produced at the trial; and that the evidence is of such a nature as to alter the
result of the case if admitted. 32 The lower court correctly ruled that these requisites
were not complied with.
The lower court, in a well-reasoned order, found that the sales made by Serafin
Francisco to Pablo Narciso and that made by Jesus Toledo to the Land Tenure
Administration were immaterial and irrelevant, because those sales covered
sugarlands with sugar quotas, while the lands sought to be expropriated in the
instant case are residential lands. The lower court also concluded that the land sold
by the spouses Laird to the spouses Aguas was a sugar land.
83
We agree with the trial court. In eminent domain proceedings, in order that
evidence as to the sale price of other lands may be admitted in evidence to prove
the fair market value of the land sought to be expropriated, the lands must, among
other things, be shown to be similar.
But even assuming, gratia argumenti, that the lands mentioned in those deeds of
sale were residential, the evidence would still not warrant the grant of a new trial,
for said evidence could have been discovered and produced at the trial, and they
cannot be considered newly discovered evidence as contemplated in Section 1(b) of
Rule 37 of the Rules of Court. Regarding this point, the trial court said:
The Court will now show that there was no reasonable diligence
employed.
The land described in the deed of sale executed by Serafin
Francisco, copy of which is attached to the original motion, is
covered by a Certificate of Title issued by the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Pampanga. There is no question in the mind
of the court but this document passed through the Office of the
Register of Deeds for the purpose of transferring the title or
annotating the sale on the certificate of title. It is true that Fiscal
Lagman went to the Office of the Register of Deeds to check
conveyances which may be presented in the evidence in this case
as it is now sought to be done by virtue of the motions at bar,
Fiscal Lagman, one of the lawyers of the plaintiff, did not exercise
reasonable diligence as required by the rules. The assertion that
he only went to the office of the Register of Deeds 'now and then'
to check the records in that office only shows the half-hazard [sic]
manner by which the plaintiff looked for evidence to be presented
during the hearing before the Commissioners, if it is at all true
that Fiscal Lagman did what he is supposed to have done
according to Solicitor Padua. It would have been the easiest
matter for plaintiff to move for the issuance of a subpoena duces
tecum directing the Register of Deeds of Pampanga to come to
testify and to bring with him all documents found in his office
pertaining to sales of land in Floridablanca adjacent to or near the
lands in question executed or recorded from 1958 to the present.
Even this elementary precaution was not done by plaintiff's
numerous attorneys.
The same can be said of the deeds of sale attached to the
supplementary motion. They refer to lands covered by certificate
of title issued by the Register of Deeds of Pampanga. For the same
reason they could have been easily discovered if reasonable The granting or denial of a motion for new trial is, as a general rule, discretionary
diligence has been exerted by the numerous lawyers of the with the trial court, whose judgment should not be disturbed unless there is a clear
plaintiff in this case. It is noteworthy that all these deeds of sale showing of abuse of discretion. 34 We do not see any abuse of discretion on the part
could be found in several government offices, namely, in the of the lower court when it denied the motions for a new trial.
Office of the Register of Deeds of Pampanga, the Office of the
Provincial Assessor of Pampanga, the Office of the Clerk of Court WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is modified, as follows:
as a part of notarial reports of notaries public that acknowledged
these documents, or in the archives of the National Library. In (a) the lands of appellees Carmen Vda. de Castellvi and Maria
respect to Annex 'B' of the supplementary motion copy of the Nieves Toledo-Gozun, as described in the complaint, are declared
document could also be found in the Office of the Land Tenure expropriated for public use;
Administration, another government entity. Any lawyer with a
modicum of ability handling this expropriation case would have
(b) the fair market value of the lands of the appellees is fixed at
right away though [sic] of digging up documents diligently
P5.00 per square meter;
showing conveyances of lands near or around the parcels of land
sought to be expropriated in this case in the offices that would
(c) the Republic must pay appellee Castellvi the sum of
have naturally come to his mind such as the offices mentioned
P3,796,495.00 as just compensation for her one parcel of land
above, and had counsel for the movant really exercised the
that has an area of 759,299 square meters, minus the sum of
reasonable diligence required by the Rule' undoubtedly they
P151,859.80 that she withdrew out of the amount that was
would have been able to find these documents and/or caused the
deposited in court as the provisional value of the land, with
issuance of subpoena duces tecum. ...
interest at the rate of 6% per annum from July 10, 1959 until the
day full payment is made or deposited in court;
It is also recalled that during the hearing before the Court of the
Report and Recommendation of the Commissioners and objection
(d) the Republic must pay appellee Toledo-Gozun the sum of
thereto, Solicitor Padua made the observation:
P2,695,225.00 as the just compensation for her two parcels of
land that have a total area of 539,045 square meters, minus the
I understand, Your Honor, that there was a sale that took place in
sum of P107,809.00 that she withdrew out of the amount that
this place of land recently where the land was sold for P0.20
was deposited in court as the provisional value of her lands, with
which is contiguous to this land.
interest at the rate of 6%, per annum from July 10, 1959 until the
day full payment is made or deposited in court; (e) the attorney's
The Court gave him permission to submit said document subject lien of Atty. Alberto Cacnio is enforced; and
to the approval of the Court. ... This was before the decision was
rendered, and later promulgated on May 26, 1961 or more than
(f) the costs should be paid by appellant Republic of the
one month  after Solicitor Padua made the above observation. He
Philippines, as provided in Section 12, Rule 67, and in Section 13,
could have, therefore, checked up the alleged sale and moved for
Rule 141, of the Rules of Court.
a reopening to adduce further evidence. He did not do so. He
forgot to present the evidence at a more propitious time. Now, he
IT IS SO ORDERED.
seeks to introduce said evidence under the guise of newly-
discovered evidence. Unfortunately the Court cannot classify it as
newly-discovered evidence, because tinder the circumstances, the #9
correct qualification that can be given is 'forgotten evidence'.
Forgotten however, is not newly-discovered G.R. No. L-10405           December 29, 1960
evidence. 33

84
WENCESLAO PASCUAL, in his official capacity as Provincial Governor of
Rizal, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS, ET AL., respondents-
appellees.
Asst. Fiscal Noli M. Cortes and Jose P. Santos for appellant.
Office of the Asst. Solicitor General Jose G. Bautista and Solicitor A. A. Torres for
appellee.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Appeal, by petitioner Wenceslao Pascual, from a decision of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, dismissing the above entitled case and dissolving the writ of
preliminary injunction therein issued, without costs.
On August 31, 1954, petitioner Wenceslao Pascual, as Provincial Governor of Rizal,
instituted this action for declaratory relief, with injunction, upon the ground that
Republic Act No. 920, entitled "An Act Appropriating Funds for Public Works",
approved on June 20, 1953, contained, in section 1-C (a) thereof, an item (43[h]) of
P85,000.00 "for the construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and
improvement" of Pasig feeder road terminals (Gen. Roxas — Gen. Araneta — Gen.
Lucban — Gen. Capinpin — Gen. Segundo — Gen. Delgado — Gen. Malvar — Gen.
Lim)"; that, at the time of the passage and approval of said Act, the aforementioned
feeder roads were "nothing but projected and planned subdivision roads, not yet
constructed, . . . within the Antonio Subdivision . . . situated at . . . Pasig, Rizal"
(according to the tracings attached to the petition as Annexes A and B, near Shaw
Boulevard, not far away from the intersection between the latter and Highway 54),
which projected feeder roads "do not connect any government property or any
important premises to the main highway"; that the aforementioned Antonio
Subdivision (as well as the lands on which said feeder roads were to be construed)
were private properties of respondent Jose C. Zulueta, who, at the time of the
passage and approval of said Act, was a member of the Senate of the Philippines;
that on May, 1953, respondent Zulueta, addressed a letter to the Municipal Council
of Pasig, Rizal, offering to donate said projected feeder roads to the municipality of
Pasig, Rizal; that, on June 13, 1953, the offer was accepted by the council, subject to
the condition "that the donor would submit a plan of the said roads and agree to
change the names of two of them"; that no deed of donation in favor of the
municipality of Pasig was, however, executed; that on July 10, 1953, respondent
85
Zulueta wrote another letter to said council, calling attention to the approval of
Republic Act. No. 920, and the sum of P85,000.00 appropriated therein for the
construction of the projected feeder roads in question; that the municipal council of
Pasig endorsed said letter of respondent Zulueta to the District Engineer of Rizal,
who, up to the present "has not made any endorsement thereon" that inasmuch as
the projected feeder roads in question were private property at the time of the
passage and approval of Republic Act No. 920, the appropriation of P85,000.00
therein made, for the construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and
improvement of said projected feeder roads, was illegal and, therefore, void ab
initio"; that said appropriation of P85,000.00 was made by Congress because its
members were made to believe that the projected feeder roads in question were
"public roads and not private streets of a private subdivision"'; that, "in order to
give a semblance of legality, when there is absolutely none, to the aforementioned
appropriation", respondents Zulueta executed on December 12, 1953, while he was
a member of the Senate of the Philippines, an alleged deed of donation — copy of
which is annexed to the petition — of the four (4) parcels of land constituting said
projected feeder roads, in favor of the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines; that said alleged deed of donation was, on the same date, accepted by
the then Executive Secretary; that being subject to an onerous condition, said
donation partook of the nature of a contract; that, such, said donation violated the
provision of our fundamental law prohibiting members of Congress from being
directly or indirectly financially interested in any contract with the Government,
and, hence, is unconstitutional, as well as null and void ab initio, for the
construction of the projected feeder roads in question with public funds would
greatly enhance or increase the value of the aforementioned subdivision of
respondent Zulueta, "aside from relieving him from the burden of constructing his
subdivision streets or roads at his own expense"; that the construction of said
projected feeder roads was then being undertaken by the Bureau of Public
Highways; and that, unless restrained by the court, the respondents would continue
to execute, comply with, follow and implement the aforementioned illegal provision
of law, "to the irreparable damage, detriment and prejudice not only to the
petitioner but to the Filipino nation."
Petitioner prayed, therefore, that the contested item of Republic Act No. 920 be
declared null and void; that the alleged deed of donation of the feeder roads in
question be "declared unconstitutional and, therefor, illegal"; that a writ of
injunction be issued enjoining the Secretary of Public Works and Communications,
the Director of the Bureau of Public Works and Highways and Jose C. Zulueta from
ordering or allowing the continuance of the above-mentioned feeder roads project,
and from making and securing any new and further releases on the aforementioned
item of Republic Act No. 920, and the disbursing officers of the Department of
Public Works and Highways from making any further payments out of said funds
provided for in Republic Act No. 920; and that pending final hearing on the merits, a
writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining the aforementioned parties
respondent from making and securing any new and further releases on the
aforesaid item of Republic Act No. 920 and from making any further payments out
of said illegally appropriated funds.
Respondents moved to dismiss the petition upon the ground that petitioner had
"no legal capacity to sue", and that the petition did "not state a cause of action". In
support to this motion, respondent Zulueta alleged that the Provincial Fiscal of
Rizal, not its provincial governor, should represent the Province of Rizal, pursuant to
section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code; that said respondent is " not
aware of any law which makes illegal the appropriation of public funds for the
improvements of . . . private property"; and that, the constitutional provision
invoked by petitioner is inapplicable to the donation in question, the same being a
pure act of liberality, not a contract. The other respondents, in turn, maintained
that petitioner could not assail the appropriation in question because "there is no
actual bona fide case . . . in which the validity of Republic Act No. 920 is necessarily
involved" and petitioner "has not shown that he has a personal and substantial
interest" in said Act "and that its enforcement has caused or will cause him a direct
injury."
Acting upon said motions to dismiss, the lower court rendered the aforementioned
decision, dated October 29, 1953, holding that, since public interest is involved in
this case, the Provincial Governor of Rizal and the provincial fiscal thereof who
represents him therein, "have the requisite personalities" to question the
constitutionality of the disputed item of Republic Act No. 920; that "the legislature
is without power appropriate public revenues for anything but a public purpose",
that the instructions and improvement of the feeder roads in question, if such roads
where private property, would not be a public purpose; that, being subject to the
following condition:
The within donation is hereby made upon the condition that the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines will use the parcels of land
hereby donated for street purposes only and for no other purposes
whatsoever; it being expressly understood that should the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines violate the condition hereby imposed upon
it, the title to the land hereby donated shall, upon such violation, ipso facto
revert to the DONOR, JOSE C. ZULUETA. (Emphasis supplied.)
which is onerous, the donation in question is a contract; that said donation or
contract is "absolutely forbidden by the Constitution" and consequently "illegal", for
Article 1409 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, declares in existence and void from
the very beginning contracts "whose cause, objector purpose is contrary to law,
morals . . . or public policy"; that the legality of said donation may not be contested,
86
however, by petitioner herein, because his "interest are not directly affected"
thereby; and that, accordingly, the appropriation in question "should be upheld"
and the case dismissed.
At the outset, it should be noted that we are concerned with a decision granting the
aforementioned motions to dismiss, which as much, are deemed to have admitted
hypothetically the allegations of fact made in the petition of appellant herein.
According to said petition, respondent Zulueta is the owner of several parcels of
residential land situated in Pasig, Rizal, and known as the Antonio Subdivision,
certain portions of which had been reserved for the projected feeder roads
aforementioned, which, admittedly, were private property of said respondent when
Republic Act No. 920, appropriating P85,000.00 for the "construction,
reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement" of said roads, was passed by
Congress, as well as when it was approved by the President on June 20, 1953. The
petition further alleges that the construction of said roads, to be undertaken with
the aforementioned appropriation of P85,000.00, would have the effect of relieving
respondent Zulueta of the burden of constructing his subdivision streets or roads at
his own expenses, 1and would "greatly enhance or increase the value of the
subdivision" of said respondent. The lower court held that under these
circumstances, the appropriation in question was "clearly for a private, not a public
purpose."
Respondents do not deny the accuracy of this conclusion, which is self-
evident. 2However, respondent Zulueta contended, in his motion to dismiss that:
A law passed by Congress and approved by the President can never be
illegal because Congress is the source of all laws . . . Aside from the fact
that movant is not aware of any law which makes illegal the appropriation
of public funds for the improvement of what we, in the meantime, may
assume as private property . . . (Record on Appeal, p. 33.)
The first proposition must be rejected most emphatically, it being inconsistent with
the nature of the Government established under the Constitution of the Republic of
the Philippines and the system of checks and balances underlying our political
structure. Moreover, it is refuted by the decisions of this Court invalidating
legislative enactments deemed violative of the Constitution or organic laws. 3
As regards the legal feasibility of appropriating public funds for a public purpose,
the principle according to Ruling Case Law, is this:
It is a general rule that the legislature is without power to appropriate
public revenue for anything but a public purpose. . . . It is the essential
 character of the direct object of the expenditure which must determine its
validity as justifying a tax, and not the magnitude of the interest to be
affected nor the degree to which the general advantage of the community,
and thus the public welfare, may be ultimately benefited by their
promotion. Incidental  to the public or to the state, which results from the
promotion of private interest and the prosperity of private enterprises or
business, does not justify their aid by the use public money. (25 R.L.C. pp.
398-400; Emphasis supplied.)
The rule is set forth in Corpus Juris Secundum in the following language:
In accordance with the rule that the taxing power must be exercised for
public purposes only, discussed supra sec. 14, money raised by taxation can
be expended only for public purposes and not for the advantage of private
individuals. (85 C.J.S. pp. 645-646; emphasis supplied.)
Explaining the reason underlying said rule, Corpus Juris Secundum states:
Generally, under the express or implied provisions of the
constitution, public funds may be used only for public purpose. The right of
the legislature to appropriate funds is correlative with its right to tax, and,
under constitutional provisions against taxation except for public purposes
and prohibiting the collection of a tax for one purpose and the devotion
thereof to another purpose, no appropriation of state funds can be made
for other than for a public purpose.
x x x           x x x          x x x
The test of the constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of public
funds is whether the statute is designed to promote the public interest, as
opposed to the furtherance of the advantage of individuals, although each
advantage to individuals might incidentally serve the public. (81 C.J.S. pp.
1147; emphasis supplied.)
Needless to say, this Court is fully in accord with the foregoing views which, apart
from being patently sound, are a necessary corollary to our democratic system of
government, which, as such, exists primarily for the promotion of the general
welfare. Besides, reflecting as they do, the established jurisprudence in the United
States, after whose constitutional system ours has been patterned, said views and
jurisprudence are, likewise, part and parcel of our own constitutional
law.lawphil.net
87
This notwithstanding, the lower court felt constrained to uphold the appropriation
in question, upon the ground that petitioner may not contest the legality of the
donation above referred to because the same does not affect him directly. This
conclusion is, presumably, based upon the following premises, namely: (1) that, if
valid, said donation cured the constitutional infirmity of the aforementioned
appropriation; (2) that the latter may not be annulled without a previous
declaration of unconstitutionality of the said donation; and (3) that the rule set
forth in Article 1421 of the Civil Code is absolute, and admits of no exception. We
do not agree with these premises.
The validity of a statute depends upon the powers of Congress at the time of its
passage or approval, not upon events occurring, or acts performed, subsequently
thereto, unless the latter consists of an amendment of the organic law, removing,
with retrospective operation, the constitutional limitation infringed by said statute.
Referring to the P85,000.00 appropriation for the projected feeder roads in
question, the legality thereof depended upon whether said roads were public or
private property when the bill, which, latter on, became Republic Act 920, was
passed by Congress, or, when said bill was approved by the President and the
disbursement of said sum became effective, or on June 20, 1953 (see section 13 of
said Act). Inasmuch as the land on which the projected feeder roads were to be
constructed belonged then to respondent Zulueta, the result is that said
appropriation sought a private purpose, and hence, was null and void. 4 The
donation to the Government, over five (5) months after the approval and effectivity
of said Act, made, according to the petition, for the purpose of giving a "semblance
of legality", or legalizing, the appropriation in question, did not cure its
aforementioned basic defect. Consequently, a judicial nullification of said donation
need not precede the declaration of unconstitutionality of said appropriation.
Again, Article 1421 of our Civil Code, like many other statutory enactments, is
subject to exceptions. For instance, the creditors of a party to an illegal contract
may, under the conditions set forth in Article 1177 of said Code, exercise the rights
and actions of the latter, except only those which are inherent in his person,
including therefore, his right to the annulment of said contract, even though such
creditors are not affected by the same, except indirectly, in the manner indicated in
said legal provision.
Again, it is well-stated that the validity of a statute may be contested only by one
who will sustain a direct injury in consequence of its enforcement. Yet, there are
many decisions nullifying, at the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the
disbursement of public funds, 5upon the theory that "the expenditure of public
funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of administering
an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds," which may be
enjoined at the request of a taxpayer. 6Although there are some decisions to the
contrary, 7the prevailing view in the United States is stated in the American
Jurisprudence as follows:
In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the
requisite standing to attack the constitutionality of a statute, the general
rule is that not only persons individually affected, but also taxpayers, have
sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of moneys raised by
taxation and may therefore question the constitutionality of statutes
requiring expenditure of public moneys. (11 Am. Jur. 761; emphasis
supplied.)
However, this view was not favored by the Supreme Court of the U.S. in
Frothingham vs. Mellon (262 U.S. 447), insofar as federal  laws are concerned, upon
the ground that the relationship of a taxpayer of the U.S. to its Federal Government
is different from that of a taxpayer of a municipal corporation to its government.
Indeed, under the composite system of government existing in the U.S., the states
of the Union are integral part of the Federation from an international viewpoint,
but, each state enjoys internally a substantial measure of sovereignty, subject to
the limitations imposed by the Federal Constitution. In fact, the same was made by
representatives of each state of the Union, not of the people of the U.S., except
insofar as the former represented the people of the respective States, and the
people of each State has, independently of that of the others, ratified said
Constitution. In other words, the Federal Constitution and the Federal statutes have
become binding upon the people of the U.S. in consequence of an act of, and, in
this sense, through the respective states of the Union of which they are citizens.
The peculiar nature of the relation between said people and the Federal
Government of the U.S. is reflected in the election of its President, who is chosen
directly, not  by the people of the U.S., but by electors chosen by each State, in such
manner as the legislature thereof may direct (Article II, section 2, of the Federal
Constitution).lawphi1.net
The relation between the people of the Philippines and its taxpayers, on the other
hand, and the Republic of the Philippines, on the other, is not identical to that
obtaining between the people and taxpayers of the U.S. and its Federal
Government. It is closer, from a domestic viewpoint, to that existing between the
people and taxpayers of each state and the government thereof, except that the
authority of the Republic of the Philippines over the people of the Philippines
is more fully direct  than that of the states of the Union, insofar as
the simple and unitary  type of our national government is not subject to limitations
analogous to those imposed by the Federal Constitution upon the states of the
Union, and those imposed upon the Federal Government in the interest of the
Union. For this reason, the rule recognizing the right of taxpayers to assail the
constitutionality of a legislation appropriating local or state public funds — which
88
has been upheld by the Federal Supreme Court (Crampton vs. Zabriskie, 101 U.S.
601) — has greater application in the Philippines than that adopted with respect to
acts of Congress of the United States appropriating federal funds.
Indeed, in the Province of Tayabas vs. Perez (56 Phil., 257), involving the
expropriation of a land by the Province of Tayabas, two (2) taxpayers thereof were
allowed to intervene for the purpose of contesting the price being paid to the
owner thereof, as unduly exorbitant. It is true that in Custodio vs. President of the
Senate (42 Off. Gaz., 1243), a taxpayer and employee of the Government was not
permitted to question the constitutionality of an appropriation for backpay of
members of Congress. However, in Rodriguez vs. Treasurer of the Philippines and
Barredo vs. Commission on Elections (84 Phil., 368; 45 Off. Gaz., 4411), we
entertained the action of taxpayers impugning the validity of certain appropriations
of public funds, and invalidated the same. Moreover, the reason that impelled this
Court to take such position in said two (2) cases — the importance of the issues
therein raised — is present in the case at bar. Again, like the petitioners in the
Rodriguez and Barredo cases, petitioner herein is not merely a taxpayer. The
Province of Rizal, which he represents officially as its Provincial Governor, is our
most populated political subdivision, 8and, the taxpayers therein bear a substantial
portion of the burden of taxation, in the Philippines.
Hence, it is our considered opinion that the circumstances surrounding this case
sufficiently justify petitioners action in contesting the appropriation and donation in
question; that this action should not have been dismissed by the lower court; and
that the writ of preliminary injunction should have been maintained.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, and the records are
remanded to the lower court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
decision, with the costs of this instance against respondent Jose C. Zulueta. It is so
ordered.
#10
G.R. No. L-19201             June 16, 1965
REV. FR. CASIMIRO LLADOC, petitioner,
vs.
The COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and The COURT of TAX
APPEALS, respondents.
Hilado and Hilado for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
PAREDES, J.:
Sometime in 1957, the M.B. Estate, Inc., of Bacolod City, donated P10,000.00 in
cash to Rev. Fr. Crispin Ruiz, then parish priest of Victorias, Negros Occidental, and
predecessor of herein petitioner, for the construction of a new Catholic Church in
the locality. The total amount was actually spent for the purpose intended.
On March 3, 1958, the donor M.B. Estate, Inc., filed the donor's gift tax return.
Under date of April 29, 1960, the respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue
issued an assessment for donee's gift tax against the Catholic Parish of Victorias,
Negros Occidental, of which petitioner was the priest. The tax amounted to
P1,370.00 including surcharges, interests of 1% monthly from May 15, 1958 to June
15, 1960, and the compromise for the late filing of the return.
Petitioner lodged a protest to the assessment and requested the withdrawal
thereof. The protest and the motion for reconsideration presented to the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue were denied. The petitioner appealed to the
Court of Tax Appeals on November 2, 1960. In the petition for review, the Rev. Fr.
Casimiro Lladoc claimed, among others, that at the time of the donation, he was
not the parish priest in Victorias; that there is no legal entity or juridical person
known as the "Catholic Parish Priest of Victorias," and, therefore, he should not be
liable for the donee's gift tax. It was also asserted that the assessment of the gift
tax, even against the Roman Catholic Church, would not be valid, for such would be
a clear violation of the provisions of the Constitution.
After hearing, the CTA rendered judgment, the pertinent portions of which are
quoted below:
... . Parish priests of the Roman Catholic Church under canon laws are
similarly situated as its Archbishops and Bishops with respect to the
properties of the church within their parish. They are the guardians,
superintendents or administrators of these properties, with the right of
succession and may sue and be sued.
xxx     xxx     xxx
The petitioner impugns the, fairness of the assessment with the argument
that he should not be held liable for gift taxes on donation which he did
not receive personally since he was not yet the parish priest of Victorias in
the year 1957 when said donation was given. It is intimated that if
someone has to pay at all, it should be petitioner's predecessor, the Rev.
Fr. Crispin Ruiz, who received the donation in behalf of the Catholic parish
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of Victorias or the Roman Catholic Church. Following petitioner's line of
thinking, we should be equally unfair to hold that the assessment now in
question should have been addressed to, and collected from, the Rev. Fr.
Crispin Ruiz to be paid from income derived from his present parish where
ever it may be. It does not seem right to indirectly burden the present
parishioners of Rev. Fr. Ruiz for donee's gift tax on a donation to which
they were not benefited.
xxx     xxx     xxx
We saw no legal basis then as we see none now, to include within the
Constitutional exemption, taxes which partake of the nature of an excise
upon the use made of the properties or upon the exercise of the privilege
of receiving the properties. (Phipps vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
91 F [2d] 627; 1938, 302 U.S. 742.)
It is a cardinal rule in taxation that exemptions from payment thereof are
highly disfavored by law, and the party claiming exemption must justify his
claim by a clear, positive, or express grant of such privilege by law.
(Collector vs. Manila Jockey Club, G.R. No. L-8755, March 23, 1956; 53 O.G.
3762.)
The phrase "exempt from taxation" as employed in Section 22(3), Article VI
of the Constitution of the Philippines, should not be interpreted to mean
exemption from all kinds of taxes. Statutes exempting charitable and
religious property from taxation should be construed fairly though strictly
and in such manner as to give effect to the main intent of the lawmakers.
(Roman Catholic Church vs. Hastrings 5 Phil. 701.)
xxx     xxx     xxx
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the decision of the
respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue appealed from, is hereby
affirmed except with regard to the imposition of the compromise penalty
in the amount of P20.00 (Collector of Internal Revenue v. U.S.T., G.R. No. L-
11274, Nov. 28, 1958); ..., and the petitioner, the Rev. Fr. Casimiro Lladoc is
hereby ordered to pay to the respondent the amount of P900.00 as
donee's gift tax, plus the surcharge of five  per centum (5%) as ad
valorem penalty under Section 119 (c) of the Tax Code, and one  per
centum (1%) monthly interest from May 15, 1958 to the date of actual
payment. The surcharge of 25% provided in Section 120 for failure to file a
 return may not be imposed as the failure to file a return was not due to the jurisdiction and orders of this Court and that it was presenting, by reference,
willful neglect.( ... ) No costs. the brief of petitioner Rev. Fr. Casimiro Lladoc as its own and for all purposes.

The above judgment is now before us on appeal, petitioner assigning two (2) errors In view here of and considering that as heretofore stated, the assessment at bar
allegedly committed by the Tax Court, all of which converge on the singular issue of had been properly made and the imposition of the tax is not a violation of the
whether or not petitioner should be liable for the assessed donee's gift tax on the constitutional provision exempting churches, parsonages or convents, etc. (Art VI,
P10,000.00 donated for the construction of the Victorias Parish Church. sec. 22 [3], Constitution), the Head of the Diocese, to which the parish Victorias
Pertains, is liable for the payment thereof.
Section 22 (3), Art. VI of the Constitution of the Philippines, exempts from taxation
cemeteries, churches and parsonages or convents, appurtenant thereto, and The decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby affirmed insofar as tax liability
all lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for religious purposes. The is concerned; it is modified, in the sense that petitioner herein is not personally
exemption is only from the payment of taxes assessed on such properties liable for the said gift tax, and that the Head of the Diocese, herein substitute
enumerated, as property taxes, as contra distinguished from excise taxes. In the petitioner, should pay, as he is presently ordered to pay, the said gift tax, without
present case, what the Collector assessed was a donee's gift tax; the assessment special, pronouncement as to costs.
was not on the properties themselves. It did not rest upon general ownership; it
was an excise upon the use made of the properties, upon the exercise of the
privilege of receiving the properties (Phipps vs. Com. of Int. Rec. 91 F 2d 627).
Manifestly, gift tax is not within the exempting provisions of the section just
mentioned. A gift tax is not a property tax, but an excise tax imposed on the
transfer of property by way of gift inter vivos, the imposition of which on property
used exclusively for religious purposes, does not constitute an impairment of the
Constitution. As well observed by the learned respondent Court, the phrase
"exempt from taxation," as employed in the Constitution (supra) should not be
interpreted to mean exemption from all kinds of taxes. And there being no clear,
positive or express grant of such privilege by law, in favor of petitioner, the
exemption herein must be denied.

The next issue which readily presents itself, in view of petitioner's thesis, and Our
finding that a tax liability exists, is, who should be called upon to pay the gift tax?
Petitioner postulates that he should not be liable, because at the time of the
donation he was not the priest of Victorias. We note the merit of the above claim,
and in order to put things in their proper light, this Court, in its Resolution of March
15, 1965, ordered the parties to show cause why the Head of the Diocese to which
the parish of Victorias pertains, should not be substituted in lieu of petitioner Rev.
Fr. Casimiro Lladoc it appearing that the Head of such Diocese is the real party in
interest. The Solicitor General, in representation of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, interposed no objection to such a substitution. Counsel for the petitioner
did not also offer objection thereto.

On April 30, 1965, in a resolution, We ordered the Head of the Diocese to present
whatever legal issues and/or defenses he might wish to raise, to which resolution
counsel for petitioner, who also appeared as counsel for the Head of the Diocese,
the Roman Catholic Bishop of Bacolod, manifested that it was submitting itself to
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