STUDYING MULTICULTURAL DISCOURSES

Series editors: Shi-xu (Zhejiang University, China); Doreen Wu (The Hong Kong
Shi-xu is Qiushi Distinguished Professor and Polytechnic of Hong Kong) Discourse as Cultural Str uggle challenges the

Discourse as Cultural Struggle

Director of the Institute of Discourse and
Cultural Studies, Zhejiang University, China.
He was previously Reader at the University of
Ulster, UK. A leading scholar in discourse
studies, Shi-xu is the author of A Cultural
Approach to Discourse, Cultural Representations:
Analyzing the Discourse about the Other, and the
lead editor of Read the Cultural Other: Forms of
Otherness in the Discourses of Hong Kong’s
Decolonisation. He is also the founding editor
of the Journal of Multicultural Discourses.
Discourse as Cultural Struggle
cultural imbalance in current research
The aim of the series is to provide a framework for original work on multicultural
discourse analysis. All volumes set out to introduce research traditions in language traditions, and argues for a culturalist
and communication outside the mainstream. Aiming at an international readership, perspective in facilitating better intercultural
the series covers a wide range of topics including public and professional discourse,
exchange amidst accelerated processes of
media studies, and intercultural communication.
globalization. It is the first engagement with
discourses in non-mainstream cultures.
Covering a wide range of issues in public,
professional, media and intercultural
communication, the twelve original essays here
tackle culturally pressing issues by aligning
viewpoints from various geo-political contexts.

“Here is a book that takes diversity seriously and lifts it to the level of an epistemic This is a thought-provoking book for scholars
paradigm. What we know is culturally constituted and discursively articulated; this and researchers of language and
relativism is converted into an absolutism due to historical power relations, and we
communication studies who seek innovative
find ourselves a curious situation in which anything that suggests diversity at
fundamental levels of thought becomes a serious theoretical problem. This book
addresses this absurdity, and in the context of globalization, the exercise is to be
welcomed.” Jan Blommaert, University of London
“This volume opens up new and innovative perspectives for all interested in discourse
analysis, cross-cultural communication, and social change. It links and relates
approaches which originate more in the ‘West’ with those stemming from the ‘East’.
Thus, a challenging debate is finally made possible which ultimately could and should
lead to more collaborative research and, even more importantly, to better and mutual
understanding.” Ruth Wodak, Lancaster University
“This fine volume enters the large field of Discourse Studies by insisting that cultural
knowledge of discourses is essential, and thus necessary for our understanding of how

Edited by Shi-xu
discourse shapes human communities and relations among them. It is a rich collection
of conceptual and case studies, a fine addition to our literatures, and worthy of our
careful study.” Donal Carbaugh, University of Massachusetts at Amherst

Linguistics/Discourse Studies
ISBN 962-209-812-6

HONG
KONG
9 789622 098121 UNIVERSITY
PRESS
Discourse as
Cultural Struggle
 STUDYING MULTICULTURAL DISCOURSES

Series editors:
Shi-xu (Zhejiang University)
Doreen Wu (The Hong Kong Polytechnic University)

International advisory board:

Antonia Candela, National Polytechnical Institute, Mexico
N. Paredes-Canilao, National University of the Philippines
Norman Fairclough, Lancaster University
Catherine Kerbat-Orecchioni, Institut Universitaire de France
Walkyria Monte Mor, University of Sao Paulo
Anne Pauwels, University of Western Australia
Daniel So, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University
Tu Weiming, Harvard University
Ginette Verstraete, Free University, Amsterdam
Wang Ning, Tsinghua University
Zhou Qingsheng, Chinese Academy of Social Science

The aim of this series is to provide a framework for original work on

multicultural discourse analysis. All volumes set out to introduce research
traditions in language and communication outside the mainstream. Directed
at an international readership, the series covers a wide range of topics such as
public and professional discourse, media, communication, and intercultural
communication.
Discourse as
Cultural Struggle

Edited by Shi-xu
Hong Kong University Press
14/F Hing Wai Centre
7 Tin Wan Praya Road
Aberdeen
Hong Kong

© Hong Kong University Press 2007

Hardback ISBN 978-962-209-811-4

Paperback ISBN 978-962-209-812-1

All rights reserved. No portion of this publication may be reproduced or

transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including
photocopy, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without
permission in writing from the publisher.

Secure On-line Ordering

http:// www.hkupress.org

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Printed and bound by United League Graphic & Printing Co. Ltd., in Hong Kong, China
Contents

Foreword vii

Contributors xi

Part I: Cultural Issues in Theory and Methodology 1

1. Discourse Studies and Cultural Politics: An Introduction 3

Shi-xu

2. Discourse and Cultural Transformation 17

Robert Maier

3. Agendas for Multicultural Discourse Research 29

Aydan Gülerce

Part II: Cultural Struggles in Discourse

4. Discursive Transition in Central and Eastern Europe 49

Norman Fairclough

5. Cultural Value Change in Mainland China’s Commercial Discourse 73

Jieyun Wendy Feng and Dor een Wu

6. A Chinese Christmas Story 91

Gary Sigley

7. Western Representations of the Other 105

Qing Cao
vi Contents

8. Western Politeness Theory and non-Western Context 123

Jung-ran Park

9. Discourse, Cultural Imperialism, Black Culture and Language 143

Research in the United States
Garrett Albert Duncan

10. The Discourse of Chinese Medicine and Westernization 155

Zongjie Wu and Qingxia Lü

11. Intercultural Communication and Conflict Resolution: 177

Towards an Iranian Approach
Reza Najafbagy

12. Teaching Intercultural Communication in a Chinese Perspective 187

Shen Zhaohua
Foreword

Shi-xu’s edited volume, Discourse as Cultural Struggle, is a significant contribution

to discourse studies. Many of the essays gathered in this volume address
important issues that advance our thinking on discourse, power, and imperatives
of culture. Shi-xu has a good and clear understanding of where discourse studies
are currently at, and it is his intention to move beyond this place, to open up
newer pathways of inquiry.
The concept of discourse is pivotal to the entire endeavor of this book. This
concept has had an interesting intellectual biography. It first emerged as a vital
formulation in linguistics, where research focused on how stretches of language
regarded in their total textual, cultural, and social contexts came to assume
meaning and unity for their respective users. Linguists, interested in discourse
analysis, chose to call attention to such features as cohesion, substation, ellipsis,
conjunction, information structures, and rhetorical patterns. Linguists bent on
discourse analysis differentiated themselves from sentence linguists, who focused
on isolated and decontextualized sentences; discourse-oriented linguists, in
contrast, were interested in exploring how language achieved meaning in special
locations and contexts.
The second discipline that exerted a profound influence on foregrounding
the concept of discourse is narratology. Narratologists sought to focus on
narration and the linguistic environment of a text in contradiction to the
sequential arrangement of events. In the hands of theorists such as Tvezan
Todorov, Seymor Chatman, and Hayden White, this notion of discourse received
insightful inflection.
The third discipline that invested the concept of discourse with great
measure of new meaning is post-structuralism. Michel Foucault, in particular,
made it a central concept in his analyses, and many of the chapters in this book
display the influence of Foucault. For Michel Foucault, discourses are cohesive
and self-referential statements that seek to generate descriptions of reality by
viii Foreword

producing knowledge, regarding objects, concepts, and practices. In addition,

discourses are responsible for coming up with rules regarding what can be said
about those objects, concepts, and practices. Foucault’s concept of discourse
has had a profound impact on the work of subsequent humanists and on the
social sciences.
While recognizing the pioneering influence of Foucault in reinvigorating
the concept of discourse, it seems to me that there are two central deficiencies
in his formulation. First, he overemphasizes the point that “discourse is not the
majestically unfolding of a thinking, knowing, speaking subject, but, on the
contrary, a totality in which the disappearance of the subject and his
discontinuity with himself may be determined”(1972, 55). In other words,
Foucault seems to demonstrate the notion that discourse is not the articulation
of a speaker, but rather the speaker is an element in the system of discursive
practices. For him, the more significant question is from where does a given
discourse emanate rather than the question of who is the author of a given text.
This has had the unfortunate consequence of devaluing agency. Shi-xu is deeply
aware of this flaw in Foucault’s formulation and is keen to rectify it. Second,
Foucault, in his theorizations of discourse, does not pay adequate attention to
issues of semiotics. We live in a world saturated with signs, images disseminated
by mass media. Jean Baudrillard employs the term “hyper-reality” to characterize
this phenomenon. If we are to attain a deeper understanding of the nature and
significance of discourse, we need to pay closer attention to the field of media
semiotics. Shi-xu is fully cognizant of this desideratum.
In exploring the ways in which discourse functions in modern society, we
need to engage the concept of globalization. It needs to be stressed that we are
living at a moment in history when the local and the global are co-implicated
in complex and unanticipated ways (Wilson and Dissanayake 1996). How does
research in Asia conceptualize and respond to this phenomenon? As Mike
Featherstone rightly points out, “rather than the emergence of a unified global
culture there is a strong tendency for the process of globalization to provide a
stage for global difference not only to open up a world showcase of cultures in
which the examples of the distant exotic are brought directly into the home,
but to provide a field for more discordant clashing of cultures” (1995, 13). In
this context, the cultural fashioning of discourse, as Shi-xu rightly demonstrates,
takes on the dimensions of a significant phenomenon.
In examining the notion of discourse as a cultural struggle, Shi-xu has
foregrounded a notion of culture that goes way beyond the Geertzian idea of
culture being webs of significance that human beings spin around themselves.
In the modern world, cultural meanings are not monological, stable, and unitary
but plural, volatile and fragmented. Institutional structures, economic forces,
materialities, and symbolic construct all enter competitively into the process of
cultural construction. How certain groups appropriate cultural values and
meanings as a way of gaining legitimacy for their actions is a complex and
 Foreword ix

problematic phenomenon. Walter Benjamin once remarked that there is no

document of civilization that is at the same time a document of barbarism. What
this observation calls attention to is the effects of violence and social domination
that are endemic to constructions of culture. Cultural meanings are generated
by human groups contending with each other in a terrain characterized by
domination and inequities. Culture cannot rise above or remain untouched by
the material forces and the relations of production in any given society. This is,
of course, not to suggest that culture is a mere reflection of the economic system,
as some vulgar Marxists would have us believe. What this points to is the complex
interaction that takes place among materialities, relations of production, and
symbolic meanings, which have to be examined very carefully. The generation
of cultural meanings is always already implicated in the political and economic
behaviors and social relations of domination. Shi-xu is fully aware of the complex
minefield that culture is. Hence, his notion of discourse as a cultural struggle
takes on an added significance of meaning.
All in all, Shi-xu’s Discourse as a Cultural Str uggle is a book that productively
extends the range of discussion on discourse, culture, and power. It is indeed a
welcome addition to the literature on discourse studies.

Wimal Dissanayake
University of Hawaii
Honolulu

References

Featherstone, M. (1995) Undoing Cultures: Globalization, Postmodernism and Identity.

London: Sage.
Foucault, M. (1972) The Archeology of Knowledge. New York: Pantheon.
Wilson, R. and Dissanayake, W. (1996) Global/Local; Cultural Pr oduction and the
Transnational Imaginary. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996.
Contributors

Qing Cao is a senior lecturer at Liverpool John Moores University, UK. His
current research interests focus on mutual perceptions and representations
between China and the West. His recent publications have appeared in the
Journal of International Communication, Journalism Studies, East Asia, and Concentric.
Garrett Albert Duncan is an associate professor in the College of Arts and
Sciences at Washington University in St. Louis. He holds appointments in
education, African and Afro-American studies, and American cultural studies.
His current project is concerned with questions of race, citizenship, and
democracy in the United States, in the contexts of post-industrialism and
globalization. He addresses these questions in his forthcoming book School to
Prison: Education and the Celling of Black Y outh in Postindustr ial America.
Norman Fairclough is formerly a professor of language in social life at Lancaster
University in the United Kingdom, and is now an emeritus professor. His
publications on Critical Discourse Analysis include Language and Power (1989/
2001), Discourse and Social Change (1992), Media Discourse (1995), Critical Discourse
Analysis (1995), Discourse in Late Moder nity (1999, with Lilie Chouliaraki), New
Labour, New Language? (2000), and Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social
Research (2003). He is currently working on “transition” in Central and Eastern
Europe.
Jieyun Wendy Feng (MA Zhongshan University of Guangzhou, PRC) currently
is a PhD student in the Department of Chinese and Bilingual Studies,
Polytechnic University of Hong Kong and her PhD project focuses on advertising
discourses and social changes in mainland China. Her main research interests
include discourse studies in contemporary China, media discourses and
sociolinguistics. Her publications include a review paper in Discourse & Society
(forthcoming), “Reflections on Cultural Values in Mainland China: A Content
xii Contributors

Analysis of Web Advertisements in 2004” (2004), “Retrospect and Prospect of

Media Language Studies in China and Abroad” (2004), and “Discourses,
Language Functions and Language Teaching” (2000).
Aydan Gülerce is a full professor of psychology at Bogazici University, Istanbul,
Turkey. She received her doctoral degree in clinical psychology from Denver
University and City University of New York as a Fulbright scholar, and has been
a visiting researcher to several European and American institutions. Following
her graduate work on the conceptual and metatheoretical synthesis of
psychoanalysis and family systems thinking, she has further developed
transformational epistemology, psychological theory, and practice. Her early
academic research consists of a nationwide qualitative and empirical study of
families, public contructions of mental health, everyday theories of child
development, and the status of women in Turkish society. Her more recent
publications are in the areas of general epistemology, cultural/critical analysis
of psychological discourses, intersubjectivity, and sociocultural/psychological
transformations.
Qingxia Lu was a research assistant at the School of International Studies,
Zhejiang University, and is currently a lecturer at Zhejiang University of Finance
and Economics. Her primary area of interest is critical discourse studies in cross-
cultural communication.
Robert Maier is a professor of argumentation and social dynamics at the Social
Faculty of the University of Utrecht. His research interests center on cultural
development and migration, discourse studies, and comparative studies of
welfare capitalism. He has published and edited books on argumentation,
sociogenesis, citizenship and identity, and on multicultural schools.
Reza Najafbagy received his PhD from Utrecht University, the Netherlands, in
comparative management. He was an associate professor of cross-cultural
management at Rotterdam School of Management, and a visiting professor at
the University of Texas at Dallas, USA. Currently, he is a professor of change
management at Islamic Azad University, Iran, and is director of the Master of
Executive Management program.
Jung-ran Park is currently an assistant professor at the College of Information
Science and Technology at Drexel University (USA). She received her PhD in
linguistics and an MLIS from the University of Hawaii in 2003 and 2000,
respectively. She has taught Korean linguistics in South Korea and pragmatics
at Indiana State University. Her primary areas of research interest are discourse,
pragmatics, and Korean. Her current research involves information organization
and retrieval from a linguistic perspective, focusing on multilingual and
multicultural contexts. A long-term research goal is to further interdisciplinary
study on multicultural discourse and communication in a digital environment.
 Contributors xiii

Shen Zhaohua has an M.A. from Australian National University. She is an

associate professor at the School of Foreign Languages, Ningbo University. Her
current research centers on data-based schema theoretical research on ESL/
EFL reading comprehension and language in education, including the
relationship between language and culture in the context of EFL teaching in
China. She has presented papers at international conferences and published
in international scholarly journals. Her current projects include the schema
theory on reform of college English teaching of reading in China, and the
extended research on schema theoretical views in EFL reading comprehension.
Shi-xu has a Ph.D. from the University of Amsterdam. He has been a research
fellow at the University of Amsterdam, lecturer at the National University of
Singapore, and reader at the University of Ulster, UK. His books in English
include Cultural Repr esentations: A Cultural Appr oach to Discourse and Read the
Cultural Other (lead editor). He is the founding editor-in-chief of the Journal of
Multicultural Discourses and serves on the international editorial boards of
Discourse and Society , Cultur e and Psychology , and Journal of Language and Social
Psychology. He is a recipient of the New-Century Outstanding Researcher Fund
from the Ministry of Education, China, for 2005–07. Currently, he is Qiushi
Distinguished Professor and director of the Institute of Discourse and Cultural
Studies, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou.
Gary Sigley is a lecturer in Asian Studies at the University of Western Australia.
His research interests center on governmentality in contemporary China. He
has recently published an article on Chinese authoritarian governmentality and
population planning under the title “Liberal Despotism: Population planning,
government and subjectivity in contemporary China” in Alternatives: Global, Local,
Political. His book on the discourse of population in modern China, Governing
Chinese Bodies: Reproduction and Citizenship from Plan to Market, is forthcoming. A
new research project examining the emerging governmental role of social work
in the context of Shanghai is also under way.
Doreen Wu (Wu Dongying) is an associate professor in the Department of
Chinese and Bilingual Studies, the Hong Kong Polytechnic University. While
her works include media communication, contrastive rhetoric, and contact
linguistics, her primary research interests are in media discourses in the Greater
China region. Among her publications are: “Retrospect and Prospect of
Approaches to Media Language Studies in China and Abroad,” “Personage
Description in Hong Kong versus Mainland Chinese Entertainment News
Discourse,” “Dialect or Register Variation? Case Studies of Variation between
Hong Kong and Inland China News Reporting,” “Orality in Hong Kong Print
Media,” “Generic Change in Hong Kong Print Advertisements,” and “The
Language of Advertising between Hong Kong and Inland China.”
xiv Contributors

Zongjie Wu obtained his PhD from the Department of Linguistics and English
Language, Lancaster University, and is currently a professor at the School of
International Studies, Zhejiang University. His main areas of interest include
critical discourse studies in Chinese cultural contexts, philosophy of educational
linguistics, and curriculum discourse. He has recently published and edited three
books on discourse, culture, and curriculum studies.
PART I

Cultural Issues in Theory and Methodology

1
Discourse Studies and Cultural Politics:
An Introduction
Shi-xu

In mainstream (critical) discourse analysis/studies, discourse is usually

understood as a linguistic, meaningful activity that is different in kind from,
though causally related to, context, the elements of which range from the
person, the mind, the medium, the situation, to society and culture. Moreover,
theory of discourse and approaches to it, which are largely of Western origin
and orientation anyway, are presented as more or less universally applicable,
implicitly or explicitly. So it may be observed that what practitioners mainly do
is description or analysis of “discourse” or text or talk, and, to a much lesser
extent, explanation in functional relationship between form/structure and
meaning/function, or text/talk and context. And, they would use the same kind
of theoretical perspective and the same mode of research, irrespective of the
different cultural backgrounds involved. Implicit in such disciplinary practice,
it should be noted, too, is the notion that the researched discourse is treated
as detachable from the researcher and, further, that the basic nature and
structure of discourse are the same across human cultures.
The authors of this volume do not subscribe to this standard, Western,
dominant paradigm. Instead, we try to steer a new, thoroughly culturalist
direction in discourse research. That is, we go beyond the a-culturalist and binary
tradition and explore human discourses, including their contexts, as dialectic
wholes. The central thesis that we want to establish in and through this book is
that human discourses in the contemporary world, lay and professional alike,
are sites of cultural contest. That is, they are saturated with power and history and
therefore diversified, dynamic, and competing. Because of this, new, locally
grounded and globally minded perspectives and techniques must be
reconstructed in order to make proper sense of culturally different, “other”
discourses, especially those of hitherto neglected, marginalized, repressed, non-
Western/Third-/Fourth-World groups and communities, on the one hand, and
on the other hand, to help promote new discourses of cultural cohesion and
4 Shi-xu

progress. For this reason, we entitle the present volume Discourse as Cultural
Struggle.
In the remainder of this introductory chapter, I first consider the larger
cultural-intellectual context and the practical international situation that will,
it is hoped, show the deeper and broader significance of the present endeavor.
Then, I go on to outline a general theoretical and methodological framework
that will prepare the way for the various kinds of culturalist discourse studies to
follow. This consists mainly of a culturalist reconceptualization of discourse and
relevant philosophical and procedural principles. At the end of the chapter, I
briefly introduce the contents of each chapter contained in the volume.

Disciplinary and everyday discourse in contemporary culture

What I pointed to above regarding the notion of discourse is only part of a much
larger, cultural-intellectual context that has been behind the present project:
the lived but ignored fact that international scholarship on discourse, and for
that matter, language and communication, has been a mainly West-dominated
enterprise and, consequently, culturally univocal and monological in nature
rather than pluralistic and reflexive (Ashcroft et al. 1989; CCCS 1982; Césaire
1972; Dissanayake 1988; Fanon 1986; Foucault 1972, 1980; Hall 1999; Kincaid
1987; Wa Thiong’o 1986; Said 1978). Often, practitioners appear to be pursuing
“integration,” “standardization,” and “universality” of theories, methods, and
research questions. However, if we examined the origins, the contents, the
rhetoric, and the institutional basis of their discourse, then it would become
clear that such pursuits are inalienably connected with the cultural interests of
knowledge and information control and ultimately cultural power and
domination, and that the achievement of such interests is enabled largely
through the political economy of metropolitan academic institutions,
international publishing and marketing, digital media, and global travels.
This oft-obscured, neo-colonialist discourse of knowledge and scholarship,
I should like to stress, is not restricted to just particular locales, say North
America or Europe. It would be equally erroneous to conceive of the discourse
as reducible to singular individuals or institutions. What I am referring to here
is a historically evolved, continued, and dominant pattern of speaking that is
being circulated transnationally, or simply, globally. This implies that, just as
there are critical discourses from within the West opposing its culturally
repressive discourse, there are also within the non-Western world voices
complicit with that dominant discourse, conscious or inadvertent. It is precisely
this globalized dominant discourse, across the borders of nations, race, and
ethnicities, that characterizes the expansionist nature of the discourse.
And yet we cannot wholly understand the repressive nature of this scholarly
discourse unless and until we also see, on the other end of the power continuum,
 Discourse Studies and Cultural Politics: An Introduction 5

the virtual “aphasic” state of the scholarly communities in the non-Western,

Third, and Fourth Worlds. The professional groups in these subordinate,
postcolonial or otherwise disadvantaged places have few or even no resources
to reconstruct their own cultural-intellectual heritages, maintain their own
identity, or make their voices heard. Effectively, the dominant, the complicit,
and the silenced groups consciously or inadvertently produce and reproduce a
coordinated, systematic, and global discourse of academic hegemony.
This unhappy state of the international discourse scholarship has broader
consequences on the development of human knowledge and, ultimately, on the
survival of human cultures. For, when such a culturally unbalanced
communication system, as is manifested in the powerful cultural symbolic
practices of (text)books, journals, conferences, research projects, classroom
teaching, and so on, keep producing and reproducing culturally singular and
perhaps circular forms of understanding, pre-emptying the cultural diversity of
knowledge (seeking) and invalidating the relevance of dialogue and critique
between culturally different intellectual traditions thereby, genuine intellectual
growth and innovation become difficult, if not impossible. By continuing to
repress culturally different communities and their discourses, such exclusive
discourse may beget resistant forms of discourses from the marginalized groups,
causing academic tension and rift. But more seriously perhaps, such mainstream
academic institutions will not make any better but actually worsen the existing
antagonisms between human cultures and civilizations in the everyday world,
since they are doing anything but preserving and encouraging cultural diversity
and equality in their field of expertise. This leads to my next concern.
The changed and changing everyday context of our professional work
constitutes another, no less significant, motivating factor for the present
collection. That is, as a result of the accelerated globalization in communication,
finance and trade, international politics, and so on, the world’s divergent
communities and populations are becoming more and more interconnected
and to some extent interpenetrated and hybridized. The discourses from the
non-Western, Third, and Fourth World countries must not be ignored any longer
or still seen from traditional, culturally singular perspectives. Culturally more
pluralistic visions and broader scopes need to be adopted. At the same time,
the world’s groupings, such as the North and South, the (American) West and
the Rest, East and West, the centers and margins, and so on and so forth, and
hence their voices, are getting, not any more harmonious but even more in
discord. Amid this neo/postcolonial disorder, as should also be noted,
marginalized and silenced cultural communities aspire to reassert their voices
and identities and engage in genuinely intercultural dialogue and critique. The
speech of Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez at the UN World Summit in 2005
and the protests during the WTO meeting in Hong Kong in 2005 are only more
dramatic manifestations in recent times.
6 Shi-xu

Such paradoxical cultural dilemmas call for concerted, reflexive, and

systematic efforts on the discourse researchers. We should and are able to help
transform the situation, beyond existing descriptive, explanatory, interpretative,
or critical modes of research. For one thing, the global alienation and
antagonism are not merely some immovable facts for discourse analysts or critics
to analyze or criticize; the reality of discourse and the discourse of reality can
themselves be changed. For another, researchers and the researched are
intermeshed, and the former should and can take the initiative to proactively
and creatively participate in changing the latter. How the discursive
transformation can become possible and effectively done is one of the central
questions that the contributors to this book try to answer.

Discourse as cultural struggle

The central point that the present volume attempts to make is that human
discourses, involving different communities of speakers and different historical
backgrounds, are neither uniform in form or function nor equal in status and
relationship to merit the current dominant trend of universalization of (critical)
discourse analysis/studies in the international academic and educational
communication system. Rather, they are culturally differentiated, mutually
competing, as well as interpenetrated (Asante 1998; Batibo 2005; Canagarajah
2002; Chen and Starosta 2003; Cronin 2003; Duszak 1997; Giroux 2005; Hall
and du Gay 1996; hooks 1991; James 1993; Lauf 2005; McDermott 1994; Miike
2004; Pennycook 1998; Phillipson 1992; Said 1993; Shiva 1993; Tu and Tucker
1998; Van Dijk 1993). In this section, I try to tease out the whys and wherefores
(see also Shi-xu 2005).
First, the notion and the term “discourse” are not universally recognized
and applicable. Just as different cultures may have variable conceptions of
language and communication and their relations, so they will have a similar
situation regarding “discourse.” Although the Western form of speaking about
discourse is dominant, there is nothing to suggest that it is the singular,
comprehensive one that exists. In the Chinese language, for example, there is
a rich collection of categories and concepts to do with discourse: shuofa, kanfa,
guandian, lundian, tanhua, biaoshu, huayu . None of them has an exact
correspondence with “discourse,” though each may in one way or another reflect
the meaning of discourse (huayu is merely a recent professional convention for
the direct translation of “discourse”). My point here is not that we must not
use the term and concept when studying non-Western language and
communication but that, at the meta-discourse, scholarly level, the notion of
discourse is a contested one and that local cultural realities and peculiarities
need to be taken into account in any adequate understanding. This point is
particularly clear if and when one can think and speak from the perspective of
 Discourse Studies and Cultural Politics: An Introduction 7

those who suffer from the domination of “universal,” “general,” “integrated,”

or indeed “inter/multidisciplinary” discourses.
Second, there can be a diversity of discourses with different or even mutually
exclusive contents by different groups and communities in contemporary
culture. For some, discourses about the world market, leisure, tourism,
individuality, fashion, art, health care, higher education, and the media are part
of their lives on the one side. For others, it is the discourses of hunger,
homelessness, unemployment, poverty, AIDS, and illiteracy that are constituents
of daily existence on the other side. That is, certain discourses are restricted to
particular communities but unknown or denied to others. It may be added at
this point that many discourses of the local, native, social, ethnic, gendered
concerns, issues and voices, especially of the Third and Fourth Worlds as well
as women, homosexuals, ethnic minorities, working or unemployed classes, for
instance, have yet to be rediscovered and understood.
Thirdly, about the “same” or similar topic, there can be different,
incompatible, and even opposing discourses. Competing discourses over Iraq,
Palestine, democracy, justice, globalization, the UN reform, human cloning,
abortion, and so on, are some of the outstanding examples. Similarly, human
discourses embody divergent patterns of interaction; some discourses may be
more individualistic, instrumental, analytical, Eurocentric, and low-context
whereas others may be more other-relational, harmony-oriented, intuitive,
holistic, and high-context. Only, the voices of certain groups, communities, and
institutions tend to be louder than those of others; certain ways of talking are
exalted as standard and others as deviant. The very act of proclaiming some
discourse to be the norm, dismissing alternative ones or undermining them,
already indicates the presence of the cultural diversity and struggle of human
discourses. Over the sovereignty return of Hong Kong to China, for instance, it
is paradoxically not the voices of native Hong Kong or China that get more
represented in the international communication system than those of the
Western world, but rather the other way around (Shi-xu et al. 2005).
Fourthly, there is a historical dimension to the cultural diversity and struggle
of human discourses. Human groups and communities do not speak the same
across history: their discourses evolve and often become discontinued through
time (Foucault 1972). More fundamentally, human communities and their
discourses have the intrinsic critical consciousness to re-emerge from history
and create historically better or preferred versions of reality and ways of acting.
Therefore, it is possible for members of cultures to reflexively and actively
reorient and transform their own discourses. Thus, if our present and past
discourses have been characterized by cultural prejudice, division, and
domination, and the peoples from the non-Western, non-white, Third Worlds
silenced, repressed, and alienated, then it should be a worthwhile goal for
discourse professionals to help rediscover, reconstruct, foster, and promote new
discourses of cultural diversity, tolerance, harmony, and prosperity.
8 Shi-xu

All the contributors to this book proceed from this general starting point
and set out to explore the particularities, complexities, intricacies, dynamic, and
reflexivity of the cultural discourses they choose to study. Concerned with the
inequality and hence struggle in cultural discourses, we are committed to a
cultural politics that strives to change that power imbalance between East and
West, North and South, and ultimately to facilitate global cultural solidarity and
prosperity through a variety of discourse research strategies. Thus we set
ourselves a set of particular research aims and actions: (1) undermining existing
discourses of domination and exclusion, (2) helping reclaim identities and
experiences of the already disadvantaged and marginalized, (3) identifying and
advocating positive discourses of harmony, and (3) creating new discourses of
cultural solidarity and prosperity.
Now, if there are culturally divergent concepts and views of language and
communication, and if local and global perspectives can be usefully combined
to reveal new things or to see the “same” thing in a new light, then discourse
research should explore, recover, and reconstruct such cultural-intellectual
heritages for possible bricolage and synergy. Further, if the hierarchy of human
discourses is not natural but cultural, and if there exist also other, alternative
discourses at the bottom or periphery, then discourse research must not take
the discourses at the center or at the top as the sole object worth studying.
Discourse research must treat seriously repressed and marginalized discourses
in their own right and, in particular, make explicit, highlight, and undermine
the cultural power relations and practices. In addition, it must help reclaim,
valorize, and empower the repressed non-Western, Third/Fourth World
discourses, in order to maintain and enhance cultural coexistence. In addition,
if contemporary discourses are not autochthonous and monolithic but
hybridized, diversified, and possessed of the critical consciousness to change,
then discourse studies must help advocate new and culturally helpful discourses.
Then, questions arise as what sorts of research strategies may be needed to those
objectives, to which we must now turn.

Culturalist strategies in discourse research

In this section, I would like to suggest a set of research strategies or principles

that may be instrumental to the study of discourse and cultural struggle. These
pertain to the entire system of discourse research and of social science more
broadly: epistemology, theory, method, data selection, question, analysis, and
conclusion.
First, we should draw upon culturally different ways of knowing. This
requires that we try to know about not just one cultural system of knowing but
especially both Western and Eastern forms of knowing, since the Western
tradition has been dominating. Or else at the very least, we should adopt the
 Discourse Studies and Cultural Politics: An Introduction 9

attitude of respecting and acknowledging the possibility of culturally alternative

ways of knowing. The Asian and Chinese perspective, for instance, emphasizes
the indivisiveness of oneness of the cosmos and hence the holistic way of seeing
things, different from the Western dualism (e.g., self and other, person and
society, language and context, analyst and text). This alternative epistemology
can be helpful for reconstructing a harmony-minded model of communication
in the human cultural world and for making sense of the otherwise mechanically
divided text and context, discourse and society, the person and culture, the
researcher and the researched.
Second, we should ground our theory in particular cultural and historical
context. Discourse, as dialectic wholes of texts and historical and cultural
contexts, is time/space-bound and, as such, saturated with particular power
relations. In the contemporary culture of globalization or more precisely global
capitalism, discourse is also locally dynamic and diversified in connection with
the global milieu. All this means that we should always stand on guard against
universalizing tendencies but attempt to render possible dialogue between
different cultural perspectives. Chinese communication is governed by the norm
of harmonious relations; it bodies the Chinese synthetic way of thinking. A high-
context language, Chinese is far more implicit and much less form-dependent
than European languages. Moreover, Chinese discourse is embedded in the
modern history of Western colonialism and imperialism. Consequently,
understanding Chinese discourse solely on the Western dualistic, binary, and
individualist model of discourse will obviously lead to distortion.
Thirdly, from the same argument of the historicity and cultural specificity
of human discourses, it follows that we must not confine ourselves to pre-
determined, perennial, or popular research agenda but should commit ourselves
to cultural concerns of the moment, for example, the discourses of cultural
domination or resistance of different populations and regions which we earlier
identified the central and urgent time of our contemporary culture. Thus we
can pay more attention to the cultural power inequality and struggle in human
discourses and give voice to culturally marginalized discourses in and through
our discourse research. Indeed, if Western and non-Western discourses are not
a matter of center and periphery but different ways of constructing and acting
upon the world — or different “language games” offering different worlds of
experience — then Western discourse must not be taken as the sole object worth
studying. Non-Western discourse, which has hitherto been marginalized and
subordinated, must also be treated seriously. More importantly, if the relation
between these language games — e.g. Eastern and Western discourses — is not
symmetrical but saturated with power, then discourse research and the study of
non-Western discourse in particular must help make explicit, highlight, and
undermine the cultural power relations and practices; it must help reclaim,
valorize, and empower the repressed non-Western discourse. In addition, if non-
Western discourse is not autochthonous and monolithic, but hybridized,
10 Shi-xu

diversified, and possessed of creative agency, then discourse studies must explore
the complexity, new identities, and the possibility of cultural relation-building
and transformation.
Fourthly, we must not rely on any predetermined, fixed and “universal”
method (including techniques, procedures, and standards of assessment) but
make eclectic, varied, and creative use of methods that are appropriate to the
issues, objectives, and cultural and historical context at hand. Thus, mindful of
the diversity of potentially useful methods from different cultural traditions,
attentive to the local specifics and always conscious of the intended cultural-
political objectives, we should try to make use of as many varied techniques as
possible and practical. In particular, I should like to suggest that we adopt some
particular strategic methods to deal with the data and questions mentioned in
the preceding paragraph, such as the following. We can attempt to expose the
marginality and marginalization of the discourses of certain cultural
communities. We can try to rediscover those ways of speaking that enhance or
foster cultural coexistence and progress. We can try to formulate or re-articulate
new forms of speech that are conducive to the same cultural political purpose.
We can also advocate the discussion and negotiation for culturally shared norms
and procedures of communication (e.g., tolerance of and respect for
difference), in order to ensure equality of intercultural communication.
Finally, since discourse is saturated with culture and cultural contestation
in particular, we should refrain from reproducing dominant and repressive
language as far as possible and try instead to use a culturally pluralistic, inclusive,
critical, and egalitarian form of academic discourse. Specifically, we should reach
our understandings in dialogue and consultation with the people whom we do
research on, and we should keep our accounts and conclusions open to cultural
dialogue, reinterpretation, and critique. In addition, we should formulate our
research products in ways that will be acceptable to as many colleagues and
students in the field as possible.

About this book

This book is composed of two parts. Part I discusses cultural and political issues
involved in discourse theory and method, or the meta-discourse and its
implications for transformation of discourse scholarship. Following the present
chapter, in Chapter 2, Robert Maier considers the new cultural context of
contemporary discourse (language and communication) and discusses new ways
of engaging in cultural discourses. He observes that discourse is receiving
increasing attention in the social sciences because it is a crucial medium and
component in the various forms of power and identity in the contemporary
multicultural world. After the phase of Western countries imposing universalistic
norms and values on the rest of the world, we are now in a new era when the
 Discourse Studies and Cultural Politics: An Introduction 11

right to be different is being affirmed by many cultural groups and communities

in the world. Therefore, the author asks and tries to answer the question: How
will it be possible to avoid a renewed imposition of some abstract universalistic
norms and values while at the same time respecting cultural differences in a
satisfactory way?
In Chapter 3, Aydan Gülerce argues that, as discourse analysis has been
widely and rapidly spreading among many disciplines and international
communities, it may be necessary to reflect on the deeper philosophical,
theoretical, and practical issues involved. A major potential problem here,
Gülerce suggests, might be the reproduction of many unchallenged
presumptions and intellectual habits of the Western modernist paradigm. This
may be even of relevance to those discourse analysts who are themselves aware
of the hegemonic universalist tendencies and make conscious efforts towards
multiculturalism. Accordingly, the author draws attention to and critically
examines some of the interrelated issues and calls for a new, multidisciplinary,
and multidiscursive understanding of human discourses, differences and
solidarity.
Part II presents a diversity of empirical studies of intricate cultural power
practices and processes of struggle, resistance, change, and cooperation in non-
Western as well as Western discourses. The first four chapters deal with discourses
in public life. In Chapter 4, Norman Fairclough looks at discourse in processes
of social change in Central and Eastern Europe. Here, he applies the trans-
disciplinary framework, incorporating Critical Discourse Analysis, to “transition”
in Central and Eastern Europe and focuses on the particular case of the re-
contextualization in Romania of the European Union’s strategy to develop a
“knowledge-based economy” and “information society.” The analysis involves a
Romanian government policy text, and the cultural implications from this
exercise for meta-theory, theory, and method are discussed.
In Chapter 5, Feng Jieyun and Doreen Wu study the cultural values and
change in mainland China on the basis of empirical research of Web
advertisements. They examine the characteristics and the use of value appeals
in the Web advertisements of mainland China and register how the cultural
trends of mainland China are reflected in the Web advertisements. Via
examination of 119 flash ads collected from the top nine websites of China in
2004, Feng and Wu show that the majority of Web ads in China are for IT-related
products and services, and that utilitarian values rather than symbolic ones are
in a predominant position. More significantly, they point out that the dominant
value appeals in the Web ads are Western values rather than Eastern values,
indicating a trend of progressive westernization in the young people in China.
In Chapter 6, Gary Sigley places the increasingly popular Christmas
celebration in the broader context of China’s unfolding social transformation
in a way that highlights the interconnectivity of political, economic, and cultural
discourses. Sigley treats the celebration of Christmas as a foreign festival here,
12 Shi-xu

as an allegory for the celebration of China’s integration with the global economy
and of the emergence of a so-called “consumer democracy.” On the other side,
the author argues that this celebratory discourse of consumption is only one
side of the Chinese Christmas story, the other side of the equation being related
to those subjects who are not in a position to become “consumer-citizens.” In
conclusion, the author notes that any examination of the discourse of Christmas
and cultural nationalism in China must take into account what is excluded just
as much as what is included.
Qing Cao, in Chapter 7, examines Western representations of China with
special reference to the mass media, and highlights the cultural power processes
in the Western discourse of the Other. Combining an assessment of the
theoretical and conceptual frameworks with an examination of the practice of
reporting on China, Cao delineates broad patterns of Western images of China
in the last two decades of the twentieth century and contextualizes them in the
political and historical conditions. His chapter concludes that Sino-Western
relations are a key factor in determining dominant discourses of China. Further,
it suggests that the portrayal of China as a Western symbolic management of
the “other” constitutes part of its sociopolitical processes in which its own values,
assumptions, and cultural identities are confirmed and reproduced.
The next three chapters look at cultural power struggle at the theoretical,
scholarly, or professional level. Jung-ran Park, in Chapter 8, examines the
cultural issues and controversies involved in the theoretical frameworks of
linguistic politeness. Utilizing naturally occurring contemporary Korean
discourse, she critically examines the theoretical accounts of non-Western
sociocultural phenomena and the concept of face, and argues how and why
linguistic politeness can and should ultimately be seen as a sociocultural
phenomenon, as indicated by its principal definitional characteristic as a so-
called strategic device for reducing social friction by smoothing social
interactions and for avoiding conflict during social encounters. As such,
politeness is encoded within linguistic systems through the filtering of given
social and cultural attributes. The cultural case of politeness, maintains Park, is
merely a sign of all other sociocultural signs.
In Chapter 9, Garrett Albert Duncan offers a critical account of black
language research discourse and cultural imperialism in the United States. The
1996 Oakland (California, USA) Unified School District resolution that affirmed
the role of black culture and language in the education of Afro-American
students touched off a brief but highly contentious international debate on
school policy. This chapter critically examines the discourses that underlie
research on black language in the United States that contribute to its contested
meanings in the public sphere. The analysis here has implications not only for
understanding conceptual, theoretical, and methodological issues related to
black language but also for ethics and the pedagogical policies implied by
different formulations, and the economic and social consequences that result
from them.
 Discourse Studies and Cultural Politics: An Introduction 13

In Chapter 10, Zongjie Wu and Qingxia Lü presents a critical analysis of

the cultural struggle within traditional Chinese medical discourse. The authors
engage texts collected from Chinese clinical practice, medicine research, media
and related interviews, combined with ethnographic descriptions of a medical
case, and reveal how the generic structure and the epistemological essence of
the Chinese traditional practice are undermined by technologization of the
language. Pressed for a persuasive discourse of justification and explanation,
Chinese doctors strive for a scientification of their medicine tradition, but
consequently, their language, which renders the form of life plausible for seeking
a harmonious relationship between humans and nature, becomes gradually
silenced and removed, posing a threat to the cultural integrity in general and
the Chinese medicine heritage in particular.
The final two chapters move on to the question of conflict resolution and
harmony between cultures in discourse and communication. In Chapter 11, Reza
Najafbagy focuses on the Iranian perspective and argues that the establishment
of realistic, proper, and effective communication based on mutual cultural
understanding and goodwill would settle many national and international
disputes. Najafbagy notes that the question becomes more acute, sensitive, and
perhaps more complicated if a dispute arises among individuals or government
representatives from the less and more developed nations. Further, he draws
attention to the unprecedented economic, social, and political crises that cannot
be resolved by traditional means. Therefore, the author goes on to developing
new concepts of appropriate cross-cultural understanding and administrative
systems, through the case of administrative reform in Iran, in ways that may lead
to cultural reciprocity, transformation, and cooperation.
In Chapter 12, Shen Zhaohua interrogates the current educational
discourse on intercultural communication and argues for a more culturally
oriented approach. Taking issue with the Chinese case on communication with
English-speaking Westerners, she argues that successful intercultural
communication involves not only a person’s linguistic competence but also his
or her cultural competence. Here, she first shows why concentration on learning
the linguistic structure without attention to history, culture, and hence power
is one of the central problems with teaching English in the Chinese tertiary
setting. Then, the author attempts to answer the question of how teaching and
training in tertiary education can be transformed and mobilized to enhance
students’ overall intercultural communication competence.
Let me end this introduction with an announcement. In conjunction with
this book are a number of associated global academic endeavors: Journal of
Multicultural Discourses (edited by Shi-xu), a tri-annual International Conference
on Multicultural Discourses (www.shixu.com/institute-conference), and the
International Association for Multicultural Discourses (www.shixu.com/institute-
association). Herewith we invite scholars and students the world over to join in
our efforts in turning social science in general and discourse studies in particular
into multiculturalist scholarship.
14 Shi-xu

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2
Discourse and Cultural Transformation
Robert Maier

Introduction

Discourse is currently increasing in importance in the more global and

multicultural world of today. Discourse is not only a representation of reality
and of oneself; it is also a weapon and an action for influencing other players.
Therefore, discourse is intimately related to power and identity. All the actors,
be they nations, regions, international organizations, or cultural groups, use
discourse to present themselves, to defend their interests, and to advance plans
of action with or against other actors. However, the ongoing transformations
of the world cannot be reduced to discourse. There are many non-discursive
events and processes, such as biological and physiological changes, and the
reorganization of space and physical and military power. All these non-discursive
events and processes can be depicted and interpreted in one form or another
in discourses, but this constitutes another event or process, namely, a process
of construction of meaning.
Therefore, it comes as no surprise that the academic discipline of discourse
studies occupies a central position. This academic discipline can, in fact, be
found under a great number of different denominations, including
communication studies, cultural studies, and media studies, or as a subdiscipline
of political studies, legal studies, management and organization studies, and so
on. Discourse experts can be found working as advisors to all the important
actors in the world, and there is a growing number of organizations whose
exclusive function is to elaborate and evaluate discourses for their clients, such
as governments, or to diffuse certain discourses.
The aim of this chapter is to analyze how discourses intervene in cultural
transformations. The world of today is characterized by many inequalities of
different types, such as economic or military inequalities. However, there is also
a definite awareness of cultural diversity, and it is no longer the case that the
18 Robert Maier

powerful actors can impose their discourses without resistance, or, in other
words, their values and visions of the world on the other actors with less power.
This chapter aims to reflect on a satisfactory way to integrate a “weak”
universalistic outlook with a deep respect for cultural differences, and highlight
the role of discourse in such a process. I will start with a brief note on normative
conditions for executing such a task. I then go on to analyze the current
problems of cultural transformation in our multicultural world. Finally, I
examine the connections between discourse and power.

Brief normative considerations

Studying how discourse intervenes in cultural transformations in the present

world presupposes a conceptual framework that facilitates, on the one hand, a
comparison of various cultures in a non-discriminatory way, and which, on the
other hand, takes into account the unequal power constellations. I will come
back to this last point in a later section. How can the diversity of cultures be
conceptualized? There are, in fact, quite a few candidates; for example, human
rights, the value of democracy, the principles of freedom and equality, and the
value of human dignity. These are quite respectable candidates. However, one
should not assume that these principles, values, or norms are universally shared
in their concrete application and in their reciprocal relations. For example, it
is well known that there is tension between freedom and equality, which is
resolved in many different ways in various parts of the world. As these concepts
have been mainly elaborated in the West, and as the affirmation of cultural
identities has been realized in a context of Western domination, one has to be
very careful not to consider the particular Western applications of these — in
principle — respectable norms, values, and principles as being universally valid.
However, one cannot avoid relativism without some weak universalistic
principles. Relativism recognizes differences, and values these differences, but
sees communication and understanding between different cultural groups as
impossible. The only remaining possibility is to live according to one’s own
cultural ethnocentrism. This is evidently not a satisfactory solution because, in
that case, cultures are conceived of as being closed entities, and worldwide there
is a free market of power constellations that cannot be understood or influenced.
A minimum requirement is to posit a limited possibility of communication
between different cultures, in order to avoid relativism. This possibility has been
affirmed and justified in a satisfactory way (Fay 1996). But more is needed.
I suggest introducing a normative standard that has been elaborated in
many contexts, and in particular during the period of the Enlightenment. It is
the principle of autonomy, or, in other words the right of all individuals, groups,
and social entities, to self-determination and self-government. This right need
only to be defined in an abstract way, because it is evident that various cultural
 Discourse and Cultural Transformation 19

groups will work it out in different ways. Indeed, what an individual or a group
wants to be, how to define an outlook on the world, and how to govern actions
will depend on the situation (with its geographical, political, and economic
characteristics) and on the interactions in which the individual or the group is
involved. Affirming the right of autonomy as universal means, in the first place,
having a minimum of respect for the attempts of cultural groups to affirm
discursively what they want to be and how they want to handle their affairs. In
short, this means not excluding cultural groups from a discussion in which the
consequences and the meaning of the self-affirmation can be examined by the
actors concerned. This is different from the abstract principle of discursive ethics
(Habermas 1986), because here I have situated the attempt to affirm one’s
autonomy. Moreover, any attempt to affirm one’s autonomy discursively will take
place within constellations of power. These dynamic constellations of power can
constrain this right, but even limited attempts to affirm characteristics of self-
determination and self-government, and the discussions and conflicts that may
follow, can and will alter the power constellations. In the first place, such
attempts will aid a clearer understanding of the concrete network of effective
forms of power at hand. Eventually, some of these power relations can be
neutralized during a phase of debate and discussion, and possibly some of the
power relations can be shifted by the establishment of new forms of self-
determination and self-government by particular groups and collectives.
To summarize, this rather “weak” universal standard of autonomy for
individuals, groups, and collectives is sufficient for the present purpose of
analyzing how discourse intervenes in cultural transformations and how it can
contribute to a satisfactory solution, taking these normative considerations into
account.

Cultural differences: Rigidities and the problem of coordination

Enlightenment thinking and the constitution of nation-states have put forward

universalistic models of emancipation, such as human rights, liberty, equality,
and solidarity. However, as a result of the growing recognition that international
political, economic, and cultural inequality is not disappearing (or is, according
to many, on the increase), it has become rather evident that a quest for
autonomy and equality of all cultures and of a people organized as a nation
entails a rejection of the universal thinking and value system. Human rights have
been rejected, and nations or regions such as China, India, Africa, and the
Arabic Islamic countries present themselves as different from the Western
models. A more basic right, the right to be different, emerges, and it seems to
be a characteristic of the late twentieth and the early twenty-first centuries.
Even a simple version of Enlightenment thinking entails the right to
national independence and cultural diversity. Over the past 200 years, this right
20 Robert Maier

to be different has been applied in a very problematic way. The dominant

colonial and imperialist nations have either attempted to assimilate other
cultures or have attributed an inferior status to these cultures. This practice was
clearly at variance with the elementary statements of the Enlightenment. Indeed,
no culture, nor any national social entity or region, forms a homogeneous bloc.
Enlightenment thinking will therefore always also formulate the right for
subcultures, for groups, and for regions to be different. The recognition of this
simple consequence was only possible through struggles for national
independence and autonomy, and it has been accompanied by a series of
debates on the ethnocentrism of Western powers (see, for example, Said 1979).
This recognition has far-reaching consequences for multicultural societies
all over the world. After identifying all kinds of differences and after formulating
the right to be different, the problem now is how to avoid total relativism and
a violent and chaotic explosion of constituted entities, such as nation-states. In
other words, after a strong universalistic period based on European or more
general, Western models, one can, at present, recognize a period in which the
radical affirmation of differences is at the forefront.
This shift can be identified in scientific studies and in policy measures. On
the one hand, many universalistic references (such as human rights, equal
participation, etc.) are used. But on the other hand, more and more
differentiations are made in research (for example, distinguishing cultural
backgrounds, styles of socialization, domains of activity, fields of integration, etc.)
and in policy measures.
However, there is certainly no easy way to abandon forms of cultural
domination. An example from Europe illustrates this point well. Europe is at
present a Western economic power bloc that attempts to resolve conflicts
through complicated negotiation and without the use of military force.
Compared with the present-day US, Europe is not generally considered to be
an actor that imposes a strong universalistic outlook on the world. However,
there are definite tendencies at work even in Europe that stimulate racism in a
direct and indirect way, and therefore, these tendencies severely restrict a
satisfactory form of cultural transformation.
Europe does indeed stimulate racist manifestations, both directly and
indirectly, in two interconnected ways. Firstly, Europe has introduced a new
category of residents, the so-called “third-country residents” as a side effect of
the introduction of a European form of identity and citizenship. Third-country
residents are legal residents who originate from countries outside the European
Union. This legal and social type of categorization entails direct effects of
discrimination, and therefore stimulates racism. Secondly, Europe has, in recent
years, transformed immigrants — or to be more precise, certain categories of
immigrants — into a problematic category that must be controlled and regulated
in a very strict way because of all the difficulties this category of people
supposedly causes in the various European countries. The elaboration of such
 Discourse and Cultural Transformation 21

a category of potentially dangerous and disconcerting people stimulates racist

manifestations, at least indirectly.
Over the past three decades, supporters of European integration have
defended the promotion of a European consciousness and the creation of a
European identity as a crucial policy goal. When, in the early nineties, the Single
Market had actually come into effect, the promotion of a European identity
regained momentum. Several strategies have been used to stimulate and foster
a European identity. Efforts have been made to stress and to construct
discursively a common culturally defined European identity in a similar way to
that in which national identities have been constructed. This goal was pursued
through the use of historical myths referring to a common Christian heritage,
to a common political and legal history going back to the Romans, and to the
tradition of humanism. Moreover, ideologies (Europe as a peaceful and
democratic project with modernizing and civilizing aspirations), the
performance of secular rituals (European elections), and the use of common
Euro-symbolism (flag, anthem, passport format, etc.) were used to promote a
common cultural identity. In addition, a broad scheme of cooperation programs
in different European states was introduced on the levels of education, research,
and the arts. One can summarize these efforts by stating that Europe appears
as the source and as the bearer of what is generally called “Western culture.”
Moreover, a new kind of supra-national legal status was introduced in the
Treaty of Maastricht and in the Treaty of Amsterdam — so-called European
citizenship. Citizens of one of the Member States of the EU have acquired the
right to free movement in the other countries of the EU, and several other rights
(see Jacobs and Maier 1998, for a detailed analysis of the new European identity
and citizenship). Legal residents in one of the Member States who originally
came from outside the EU are referred to as “third-country residents,” and they
have, in many respects, much more limited rights, for example, when it comes
to free movement or settlement in other European countries, compared with
European citizens (see Staples 1999, for details).
In short, the traditional differentiation between nationals and non-nationals
has been shifting towards new divisions between nationals, European co-citizens,
and foreigners, an important distinction between foreigners coming originally
from a country with Western culture on the one hand, and “real” foreigners on
the other hand. Legally, there are only three categories: nationals, European
co-citizens, and “third-country residents,” but this categorization is elaborated
further by using the dimension of “Western culture” for a further subdivision.
According to Fuchs, Gerhard, and Roller (1995), in countries such as Belgium,
Denmark, France, Germany, Britain, and the Netherlands, the “real” foreigner
is most often thought of as being Turkish, Arabic, Asian, or African, although
in reality most non-nationals have an European nationality. In addition, these
non-European foreigners are disliked more than are European foreigners. Even
if the identification with the European project remains problematic for many
22 Robert Maier

European citizens, the boundaries between “them” and “us” are drawn more
and more between natives and immigrants from other European countries, and
immigrants from outside Europe and especially from “non-white-countries” or
“non-Western countries.”
This differentiation among different groups of non-nationals is not merely
a populist phenomenon or a purely accidental consequence of the official policy
efforts to create a European identity and citizenship. The realization of a
European identity and citizenship was stimulated primarily by the aim to include
European nationals in a common economic, cultural, and political project. But
if, in practice, this inclusion entails the internal exclusion of foreign residents
of non-European origin, then it is evident that such a project has discriminatory
effects. Indeed, introducing the status of “third-country-resident” as a product
of the creation of a European citizenship has clear racist qualities when
combined with the qualification of “non-Western-culture” as a by-product of the
strengthening of European identity characterized by Western culture. That this
combination has become, to a significant extent, a social-psychological and
political reality in European countries can be seen from the results of the
Eurobarometer Opinion Poll of 1997 on racism and xenophobia. Some of the
results of this survey (European average) nine percent declare themselves to
be very racist, and twenty-four percent to be quite racist.
The case of Europe clearly demonstrates that discourse plays an important
role in the construction of new cultural entities. Moreover, this example points
to the persistent tendency to re-establish cultural categorization and valuations
that may stimulate racism.
Is it possible to avoid such a problematic reshuffling of cultural groups, and
under what conditions? Is it possible to formulate a theoretical framework of
human autonomy and self-government for all individuals and groups, combining
a weak universalistic perspective with a perspective affirming the right to be
different? Only such a combination can offer a theoretical framework for a new
satisfactory politics of diversity.
One can currently observe two tendencies. The first tendency is either to
impose or to reject the universalistic frameworks. They are rejected because they
are either too simplistic or one-sided in their particular applications (such as
national constitutions, and freedom), or they are understood as defending
particular interests. The second tendency is the radical defense of the right of
cultural groups to be different (and who does not belong to some cultural
group?). The various fundamentalisms and the so-called identity politics (Meyer
2002) belong here. Or, this radical affirmation is rejected because of its
disruptive and destabilizing character.
If the basic universalistic aims are autonomy and self-government for all
(individuals, groups, and collectivities), the road to achieving these aims will
be a long one, and it will not necessarily be the same for everyone. The starting
positions are so radically different to begin with, and they will influence the path
 Discourse and Cultural Transformation 23

to be taken. This does not necessarily exclude convergences but certainly also
does entail divergences. For this reason, Taylor (1999), for example, puts forward
the concept of cultural forms of modernization, which might be different for
India, China, or Africa. At the same time, Taylor rejects the dominant a-cultural
concepts of modernization.
For European countries, for example, these considerations entail, on the
one hand, being very critical when it comes to imposing as “natural” the classic
universalistic criteria to ethnic minorities, and on the other hand, paying much
more attention to the differences encountered. In particular, there are
differences that are considered “rightful” by the individuals and groups
concerned. Concretely, this implies engaging in a dialogue not only with those
who more or less accept the classic universalistic criteria but also with those who
put forward their radical differences. By the way, this statement does not mean
accepting just about any affirmation of differences, nor that violent action should
not be prevented; but it does mean that suitable discourses have to be elaborated
in order for the radical other to be addressed.

Discourse and power

The significance of important inequalities in the present world has been

mentioned several times, as has how power relations can constrain and limit
the possibilities of cultural transformation. In this part, I therefore analyze in
some detail how discourse and power are connected with each other. This
question is often rather neglected by discourse studies.
Power does not exist in isolation; a field theory of power is called for. Power
can be defined as an action on an action; in other words, by the ways in which
actions can be influenced by other actions: for example, by restraining an action,
by accelerating the action, by making the action change direction, or by
combining initially separate actions. There are various concrete forms of power,
such as power through the exercise of physical force, power as sanction, power
as status, power as charisma, or argumentative power. With the exception of
power as the exclusive use of physical or military force, discourse intervenes in
all the other forms of power. Even in the case of the use of military force, the
actors concerned will use discourse either prior to the use of military force, for
example in negotiations, or afterwards, if one actor has not been completely
eliminated. Argumentation takes place in and through discourses, and status
power is prepared by discourse, for example a nomination or election in which
discourse is involved. The various forms of sanction, whether political, juridical,
economic, or emotional, are embedded in discourses, such as speeches,
judgments, contracts, or racist stories.
As power does not exist in isolation, I suggest using the concept of
constellations of power. A constellation of power is a network of a variety of
24 Robert Maier

different forms of power, and constitutes a dynamic context of interactions. The

forms of power can be independent of individuals (such as wealth) or be specific
human competencies, such as the ability to formulate argumentative discourses.
The constellations of power form the context of interactions between individuals,
groups, and global actors with specific psychological, social, and cultural profiles
(Maier 1996). The constellation of power can be conceived of as a system with
some structural properties; but, as power is always a cause of action and
transformation, the constellations of power can never be completely stable, so
they will, by necessity, have to be conceived of as sets of processes.
There is no common measure for the various forms of power, as in the case
of economy, in which value, expressed as monetary value, serves as a general
equivalent, however problematic it may be. In other words, the various forms
of power are not comparable with each other in a simple way. The main reason
for this complexity can be found in the nature of the different forms of power.
These forms of power, taken two by two, both exclude each other and attract
and stimulate each other. One example should be sufficient here to illustrate
this form of dialectic relationship between the forms of power. Let us examine
status power and argumentative power. These two forms of power are mutually
exclusive, because somebody with status power does not really need to use
argument and vice versa. But, if a holder of status power is not able to formulate
subtle arguments, the basis of status power might be progressively eroded, and
an excellent arguer might not only be dependent on this functional capacity
but might also look for a stable position; in other words, for status power.
From this field theory of power, one can establish a certain number of
general relations (see Maier 1995, for more details), one of which is particularly
relevant for the present discussion. One general relation states that preservation
of power will necessarily lead to attempts to increase power, as pure preservation
uses power and therefore diminishes power by entailing costs. However,
increasing power is far from being a simple affair. Indeed, an increase of power
means: (1) greater independence of the sources of power, (2) an extension of
the domains of power where power is exercised, (3) an increase in the intensity
of power in each domain, (4) a multiplication of the objects of power, and (5)
a reduction of the costs of power. But it is impossible to achieve all these points
at the same time. For example, an extension of the domains of power and a
reduction of the costs of power cannot be achieved simultaneously. Therefore,
power necessarily involves conflict and instability. As I show later, the affirmation
of cultural differences affects the power relations and cannot lead naturally to
a stable power balance, taking into account the previous remarks.
The effective and/or potential exercise of power is a general characteristic
of interactions between actors and is the case in negotiations, which I choose
as an example. Typical moves in negotiations are threats and promises, and they
can only be understood by referring to power. Threats and promises are
evidently discursive moves. A threat, for example, is to point to a future action
 Discourse and Cultural Transformation 25

that will affect the actions of another actor in a negative way. The action may
take a variety of forms, such as constraining the range of movements; or by a
territorial arrangement that limits access to goods which are necessary for certain
activities, such as water; or by refusing the usual recognitions, such as the
withdrawal of love, attention, or respect. Threats, in principle, use the forms of
power of physical force and of sanction. But in order to be used effectively, some
form of status power will generally be necessary for executing the action. In
addition to these forms of power, promises use argumentative power; for
example, when promising to assist another party in difficult negotiations.
The execution of a threat or a promise will affect the power base and will
involve costs. And the consequence will be that the means of power used will
have to be replaced with one or other source of power if the party executing
the action wants to prevent its position of power from being diminished. Threats
and promises will only be effective if they are considered to be more or less
realistic. In other words, the second actor should be convinced that the first
actor can: (a) execute the menacing action, and (b) that his or her action will
indeed have an effect on his or her own actions. In short, the probability and
the effectiveness of the action will be considered, in order to evaluate the
seriousness of the threat. Empty threats and promises lack at least one of these
two characteristics.
It is now easy to show that the potential or effective use of power will
transform the social, cultural, and (in the case of individuals) the psychological
identity of the actors. Identity can be defined as dynamic, with social, cultural,
and eventually psychological aspects, involving self-identification and
categorizations, with the help of discourses. My thesis is that, during the process
of interaction between actors, in a situation of conflict, the (potential) power
play will, in general, reproduce and transform the social, cultural, and
psychological aspects of identity.
Let me take negotiation once more as an example, elaborated in more
detail in Maier (2001). During negotiations, the parties involved (as individuals
or as representatives of organizations or states) will at least specify their
reciprocal appraisal as actors using (potential) power. In other words, the parties
will categorize each other by elaborating discourses, and at the same time change
their own self-identification in reaction to the categorizations imposed by the
other party. Moreover, in situations in which some effective use of power occurs,
the necessity to replace the means of power from one source or another will
entail a somewhat detailed self-analysis. This self-analysis does not presuppose
self-awareness, but it at least involves an internal transformation (of the
individual, the group, or the community), because the initial arrangement of
the parts has to be altered in order to secure the replacement of the means of
power already used. For an individual, for example, this may involve training
or looking for new areas of activity; and for groups and communities, it can be
achieved by raising new taxes, by buying arms, or by trying to find new partners
26 Robert Maier

with their own means of power. This self-analysis and transformation will have
consequences for self-identification and, by repercussion, influence the
categorizations of the other parties.
In the case of lengthy conflicts with phases of escalation and possibly with
phases of fight and debate, the transformations of the social, cultural, and
psychological identities of the parties involved can be very pronounced. This is
understandable, because all the participants will have to pass through many steps
of internal reorganization in order to secure sources of power and in order to
ensure that their power bases do not shrink in any obvious way. These processes
will evidently have notable effects on the social, cultural, and, eventually, on the
psychological aspects of their identity, and on the processes of self-identification
and categorization involving discourses.
To summarize, discourse is a crucial ingredient of power constellations. As
the transformations of identity, and of cultural identity in particular, can only
be understood through the working of power constellations, we can conclude
that, the ongoing inequalities in the present world notwithstanding, there has
been a significant shift within the power constellations because the cultural
identities of many groups and regions have been successfully affirmed. What is
the meaning of these new claims affirmed discursively to be different from the
dominant actor?

Conclusion

Working out (1) a formulation for a suitable normative framework, and (2) a
combination of a weak, universalistic outlook with a recognition of differences
is not only a practical and political problem; it is also a theoretical endeavor.
Such a work can only be realized in combination with empirical research, but
it has also to take account of the power constellations in the world with all their
economic, military, and cultural aspects. Two examples should be sufficient to
illustrate this point.
At present, after 9/11 and other terrorist activities in several (also
European) countries, there is a strong movement to affirm and to impose once
again, and in a non-critical way, a universalistic Western framework (“democracy,”
“freedom and liberty,” etc.). In such a way, many specific attempts at recognizing,
both practically and locally, all kinds of cultural differences are either stopped
altogether, or these attempts tend to be marginalized. At the same time, the
non-critical imposition of a universalistic Western framework stimulates the
emergence of strong reactions (and I am not considering the terrorist movement
at the moment), with the elaboration of an alternative framework, based on the
valuation of specific and regional habits (of a cultural or religious nature) against
the universalistic framework and by rejecting in a more or less elaborated way
Western values. This tendency is referred to by Buruma and Margalit (2004) as
 Discourse and Cultural Transformation 27

“occidentalism.” In practice and in theory, both tendencies threaten the

elaboration of a framework that facilitates combining a weak universalistic
outlook with a deep respect for cultural differences. Therefore, the task of
discourse scholars is to analyze concrete manifestations of these two tendencies
and to point out the limitations and dangers of these projects.
Secondly, one can imagine several solutions to the problem of how to
combine a weak universalistic outlook (with necessarily some structural features
concerning, for example, the possibility, however difficult it might be, of
intercultural communication) with a deep recognition of differences. But
solutions to this problem will continue to remain completely abstract, as long
as they do not take into account the present power constellations in the world
with their various interrelated dimensions, such as economic, social, and cultural
dimensions. This does not mean that a solution has to take the present power
constellations for granted. These constellations are not stable; they can be
influenced to some extent by discourse, because discourse is an ingredient of
almost all forms of power.
In short, working out solutions is partly situated in the arena of academia
and public debate. These arenas are part of the existing power constellations
but should not be overestimated. Indeed, economic and military inequalities
severely constrain the range of possible solutions, but it is an illusion to suppose
that an elimination of these inequalities is a realistic option in the short run.
At best, one can understand the present-day dynamic of cultural conflicts in
particular, and one can try to influence the conflicts surrounding these
inequalities by limiting fights and by stimulating negotiation and dialogue. For
nation-states and supra-national entities, Carens (2000) and Benhabib (2004),
for example, have worked out “situational ethics” of recognition of differences.
This approach is similar to the perspective suggested here. However, they do
not take the power constellations into account. Held (1995) attempts to work
out a global framework of democratic regulation. However, it should be clear
that much remains to be done.

References

Benhabib, S. (2004) The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents and Citizens. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Buruma, I. and Margalit, A. (2004) Occidentalism. London: Penguin Books.
Carens, J.H. (2000) Culture, Citizenship and Community: A Contextual Exploration
of Justice as Evenhandedness . Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fay, B. (1996) Contemporary Philosophy of Social Science . Oxford: Blackwell
Publishers.
Fuchs, D., Gerhards, J., and Roller, E. (1995) Nationalism versus Eurocentrism?
The Construction of Collective Identities in Western Europe. In M.
28 Robert Maier

Martiniello (ed.) Migration, Citizenship and Ethno-National Identities in the

European Union. Aldershot: Avebury.
Habermas, J. (1986) Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns . 2 vol. Frankfurt:
Suhrkamp Verlag.
Held, D. (1995) Democracy and the Global Or der: Fr om the Moder n State to
Cosmopolitan Governance. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Jacobs, D. and Maier, R. (1998) European Identity: Construct, Fact and Fiction.
In M. Gastelaars, and A. de Ruijter (eds.) A United Eur ope: The Quest for a
Multifaceted Identity, 13–33. Maastricht: Shaker Publishing.
Racism and Xenophobia in Europe. Eurobarometer Opinion Poll no. 47.1.
Maier, R. (1995) Argument and Community. Communication and Cognition, 28
(4): 367–86.
Maier, R. (1996) Forms of Identity and Argumentation. Journal for the Theor y of
Social Behaviour, 26(1): 35–50.
Maier, R. (2001) Negotiation and identity. In E. Weigand and M. Dascal (eds.)
Negotiation and Power in Dialogic Interactions , 225–37. Amsterdam: John
Benjamins.
Meyer, T. (2002) Identitätspolitik. Vom Missbrauch kultureller Unterschiede. Frankfurt:
Suhrkamp Verlag.
Said, E.W. (1979) Orientalism. New York: Vintage Books.
Staples, H. (1999) The Legal Status of Thir d Countr y Nationals Resident in the
European Union. The Hague: Kluwer Law International.
Taylor, C. (1999) Two Theories of Modernity. Public Culture, 11 (1): 153–74.
3
Agendas for Multicultural Discourse Research
Aydan Gülerce

It may be useful, right at the outset, to point at the deliberate choice of the
words in the title of this chapter and what they are expected to signify. Let us
attend to each word briefly, in order to spell out the multiple goals and the
ultimate aim of the chapter, set the scene for the discussion and engage in the
main argument itself that they co-constitute.

Alternative to what?

Despite the variability of the definitions of the concept of “discourse,” there

can be no disagreement on the notion of “cultural struggle,” in any reading/
writing, that the term always has a symbiotic reference. In this volume, Discourse
as Cultural Str uggle, that implicit referant is the hegemonistic Anglo-American
First World, and research traditions outside the dominant cultures are especially
invited to this dialogue. Both the intellectual discursive world and the culture
of scientism, however, have no actual geographical or disciplinary borders. They
have been so pervasively disseminated already in our academic world, let alone
the very fact that many texts, including this one, need to be in the English
language. If there is any one particular discourse to exit from, or a knowledge
position to step outside of, so to speak, that ought to be the hegemonic discourse
of Western modernism. In order to confront the universalizing and
impoverishing tendencies of our times, and to genuinely move towards
possibilities for world peace and equality, I find an action in this direction as a
first crucial step. Since it is on this evaluation that I base the current discussion,
let us make the answer to the subheading explicit: alternative to the knowledge/
practice of universalist and absolutist modernism.
The very same self-centric discourse of modernism, however, defines only
two possible doors to exit from itself: premodernism and postmodernism. One
30 Aydan Gülerce

may postulate that there is no other alternative than, on the one hand,
fundamentalism as in the Dark Ages of the pre-Enlightenment, and on the other,
further disintegration and nihilism. Again, it is the very same Cartesian
dichotomic thinking and its habitual either/or reasoning that create a paradox
for today’s intellectuals. Both possibilities absolutely suggest further regression,
definitely not progress, by the normative epigenetic discourse of modernism.
Yet, it is possible, of course, not to “enter” at all into this paradoxical “Catch-
22” or “damn if you do, damn if you don’t” situation in the first place. That is
not only a possibility for the future generation of scholars but also for the current
scholarship that might be already caught up in it. It would be much easier,
indeed, especially for those who belong to both intellectual worlds of the West
and the Rest, to find an appropriate forum in the readership in the present
volume.
Having altered Russell’s (1903) theory of logical types, Bateson (1956) had
developed the double-bind theory (or known as the communication theory of
schizophrenia) together with his colleagues, in which the “exit” from such
paradoxical situations comes through meta-communication; that is,
communication about communication. I would therefore suggest that we first
interpret the current intellectual entrapment which is associated with the
postmodern condition (Lyotard) and its critique as a communication about
modernism. The reason is that, as much as this proposed knowledge/practice
(e.g, Gülerce 1991; 1997) joins the postmodernist critique in most places with
its transformational epistemology, transdisciplinary ontology, transcultural
aesthetics, translational praxis, and transcendental ethics, its reading of
(post)modernity has not been a (post)modernist one. Hence, the descriptive
comment about our narrative continues: it is alternative to foundationalist,
essentialist, and equally binary postmodernism.
Indeed, modernism leaves postmodernism as a philosophy of thought
outside, and talks about it from the exterior without necessarily understanding
its language. What defines postmodernism, and always in a counter-dependent,
comparative, or reactive fashion to itself, is nothing but the Cartesian
dichotomic, foundationalist, and essentialist mentality of Western modernism.
Thus, its self-referential and self-centric grammar helps only with the continuous
reproduction of the modernist discourse. The language of postmodernism is
not only linguistic, semiotic, semantic, and interpretive but also, though not yet,
transcendental. Thus, postmodernism can read and understand the
reductionistic language of modernism and contains modernism within itself as
a “special condition,” so to speak, yet it is “speechless” before modernism.
Since this is no place for silence, a few more words may be in order here
on an alternative interpretation of postmodernism. In a broader sense of the
term, “modern” refers to the present time and place. In fact, etymologically it
comes from the root-word modo, which means “just now” in Latin. In Turkey,
for instance, one particular social discourse prefers cagdas, whereas another one
 Agendas for Multicultural Discourse Research 31

uses muasir for “modern,” perhaps more correctly, as both mean “contemporary”
in the Turkish (the first being in “new,” and the latter being in “old”) language.
However, the imported word modern itself has much wider currency. In any case,
“modern,” thanks to the hegemonic discourse of modernism, has signified “the
fashionable–but unavailable,” “not yet–but later,” “so near–but far,” and “the
most advanced–but there,” for so long. Indeed, in most “developing societies,”
“there” still points at the (absolute) West in the essentializing campos of
modernism, regardless of the (relative) geographical locations in the world map.
Thus, the modern condition, for these societies, does not indicate their own
situatedness in historical time but the socioeconomical conditions of those north-
western societies that they desire to obtain. In this case, they feel the need to
catch up, and to be able to live in the same ideological time, with the modern
world. However, as the attempts to be “up-to-date” are made by filling the gap
with whatever is “outdated” for the already “developed,” the lack of modernity
is impossible to be filled. Hence, it is inevitable, by definition of the modernist
epistemological discourse of development and progress, that the Utopian project
of modernity remain “unfinished” in Habermas’s terms.
It is indeed this very linear, hierarchical, and causal deterministic view of
ontogenesis/sociogenesis of modernist discourse that defines postmodernity as
the condition to follow modernity. However, this sequential relationship should
not be sought between modernism as the philosophy of thought and
postmodernism. As a matter of fact, it is highly possible for the “underdeveloped”
not to overcome or to move beyond modernist mentality, even when the “later”
arrives as a “historical time,” just as it is absolutely possible to appreciate and
join in postmodernist sentiments in the “imaginary time” of “now.” This is
especially meaningful because the synchronic exposure to all — traditional
(premodern), modern, and postmodern — historical conditions is expected,
or, is inevitable particularly in the less developed Third World.
The dominant view defines modernism as the intellectual culture of the
historical condition of modernity, and postmodernism as the intellectual culture
of the historical condition of postmodernity (Sarup 1993). This seems to be a
source of the problem for at least two reasons: (1) Even if one defines the
modern as whatever is “just here-and-now,” one still does not see that it has no
longer an essentialist, absolute, and normative value. Otherwise, we do not object
to the idea, of course, that rapidly changing historical conditions and
technologies in the societies that have been industrialized and digitalized before
the rest have strongly influenced their culture and philosophy. From the point
of view of the postmodernist culture/thought/philosophy, the universalist,
Eurocentric, and hegemonic discourse of modernism itself is a local and
historically situated intelligibility. (2) Speaking of the historicity of modernity
and modernism, one can say that the “developed” West’s (pre)modern culture
of yesterday has more in common in the imaginary realm of meaning with
today’s (post)modern culture of the “underdeveloped” rest and vice versa. In
32 Aydan Gülerce

other words, the imaginary has no social, cultural, and historical boundaries to
an extent which an African or an Ottoman individual of the nineteenth century
may meet with a European or an American individual of the twenty-first century.
Furthermore, and critically speaking, that is a counter-productive presumption
for all worlds (because it reduces to, or imprisons, the liberatory thinking and
the creative imaginary within the realms of the symbolic or the material). It is
more with the second concern that I now turn to the next term in the chapter
title.

Why “narrative”? Why not “discourse”?

Modernism depends entirely on the logic of order in Western rationality.

Western rationality in a modern society means further differentiation,
stratification, and structuration through various boundaries and units such as
individualization and institutionalization. Corollarily, the familiar (the self, the
nearby, and the “here-and-now”) is seen within the order, while the unknown
and unwanted (the other, the far, and the distant past-and-future) is left outside
the order. Anything resistant is a “disorder” by definition. In other words, in
the Western modern society, the order is obtained by continuous redefinitions
and reproductions of the order, together with what maintains (inside the self,
the same) and what disturbs it (outside the self, the different) with a logic of
dichotomic polarizations.
Indeed, the notion of “totality” that Lyotard defines, and the “totalized
system” which Derrida discusses, are prerequisites of stability and order in a
modern society. This is an ideology that can be maintained only through
modernist discourses. Since the terms “discourse” and “narrative” have many
different connotations even within the discourse analytical circles, I must state
what they mean in this text, although my use of the term “discourse” is closer
to the late Foucaultian sense, and “narrative” to the way Barthes defined it.
Discourse, then, by definition, is a closed and deterministic symbolic system with
quite a firm intrastructure. It is organized around a single logic of a scientific,
ideological, or any other belief or thought. Indeed, it is constraining, deviation-
correcting, order-producing, disciplining, and is reactive to some other
alternative (discourse) to itself. Discourse assigns a top-down regulatory role not
only to its (re)producer, but also to its analyst or (de)coder. Even if the “subject”
manages not to become a mystified “object,” she or he remains interpellated in
this extremely passive position and cannot exit the discourse as an “actively
obedient reader/doer,” or, still finds two other ways: either through “false-
conscious and false-knowledge” or through “over-conscious and over-
identification.” However, none of these (acting-in, and acting-out) activities suffices
for the “re-active subject” to become a “pro-active actor” in a society (though
the notion of a pro-active actor may of itself be a mythological projection).
 Agendas for Multicultural Discourse Research 33

Discourse, then, regulates the symbolic domain in order to maintain social

order, and is highly sensitive to the grammar of its (natural) language. It
symbolically mediates between the domains of the historical material Real and
of the collective cultural Imaginary; hence, the interest of Foucault in the truth
regimes via discourse analysis because “historical truth” (Spence 1982) is not
directly accessible and is always coated with “symbolic truth.” Symbolic truth,
in contrast, cannot be constructed through discourse alone and needs to be
cultivated within the Imaginary through “narrative truth.”
A narrative, then, is not interested in disciplining but aims at flexible
coherence. In accordance with its domain of cultural (collective or singular)
imaginary, it is an open and deviation-amplifying meaning-making system. The
connection between the signifier and the signified of a semiotic sign (de Saussure
1974) is an arbitrary (Barthes 1968) process (Kristeva 1986). A narrative
proactively appropriates from many and even contradictory discourses, let alone
being reactive to any single discourse. Since it also uses the nondiscursive
imaginary as well as the symbolic, it is not only resistant to linguistic and semiotic
reductions and discursive regimes but also to historical time and forgetting.
Similarly, narrative truth is able to visit many meaning generators, “central” or
“peripheral,” as it transcends all the geographical/cultural and scientific/
disciplinary boundaries, and fosters creativity. Hence, it is for these very reasons
among so many others that I prefer the term and the liberatory philosophy
behind the concept of narrative towards a coherent meaning and understanding,
by appropriating and connecting multiple discourses.
Although the story I am about to describe here involves some historical
events concerning the foundations of the Turkish nation-state, its main interest
is not in the historiography. Instead, this alternative narrative is an invitation to
novel and multiple ways of thinking, not only at the meta-theoretical level of
epistemology, ontology, ethics, aesthetics, and pragmatics of modernism as
suggested earlier but also at the level of the theory. We must therefore pay a
very quick visit to some premises of modernist theories of modernization in
general, and to their various interrelated concepts like the sovereign, nation-
state/individual, emancipation/subjectivication, globalization, and localization
in particular, if we are to conceptualize them somewhat differently.
Although alternative experiences of non-Western societies have led to the
“cultural theory of modernity” (e.g., Taylor 1991), and despite various
developing discourses of recognition rights and multiculturalism (e.g., Gellner,
Rorty, Taylor), it is hard to feel content with the revisions of the sociopolitical
theory. Let us here limit the challenge from the transformational narrative
perspective to three issues that I elaborate in the upcoming sections: the first
one concerns itself with a relational/historical understanding of “positionality.”
The second is more to do with the imaginary meaning-making processes involved
in the process of individuation/societilization as modern national emancipation.
The third is about the so-called paradigmatic shift.
34 Aydan Gülerce

Subjectivication: Transformation of an object into a subject

Every “subject” historically is first an object in relation to some other “subject”

(which actually also is an object) prior to becoming a subject itself. In fact, the
notion of “otherization,” as in the poststructural, orientalist, and postcolonialist
discourses, is nothing but a process of objectivication of the other object, while
it necessarily serves in the larger process of subjectivication of the self. The
(self)object as the precursor of the (self)subject, fixes and essentializes the
(other)object. This non-self, like any unpredictable and unknown (internal/
external) condition, signals anxiety and threatens the (internal/external)
stability and order, mentioned earlier.
Thanks to the universalist, absolutist, essentialist, and the static-world a
priories of Western modern social science, however, in many cases the concept
of the “other” has been used arbitrarily and excessively. If we do not see
theoretical constructs as innocent abstract concepts, but the instruments at times
leading to undesired effects in social practice, then we must underline several
interrelated and more relevant points to the current argument that these habits
tend to overlook.
First, not every “other” (object/subject) means and serves the same function
to the “self” (object/subject), as it is a historical and conditional (contingent)
concept. Thus, the “other” is a positional concept in relation to the self’s position
in the process of “subjectivication.” The lack of appreciation of this very basic
point in the hegemonic and totalizing discourse, and in its various critical realist
and social constructionist critiques, produces and essentializes new self-identity
categories and their “other’s” every other day, in additon to reproducing already
existing and more common ones. Second, the historicity of this turn-taking
process requires some intergenerationality, the historical time correspondent
of which is defined by the unit of analysis. Third, be it the object/subject in
question, the nation-state that modernism defines as the governing unit of
modernity, or the individual-citizen as its smallest governable unit, both object/
subjects are not noun-phenomena but dynamic processes of mutual negotiations.
From here, we must still look further beyond the apparent distinction between
the static and dynamic understandings in the process of subjectivication:
collective or personal, each subjectivication is not an adventure in isolation;
rather, it is a mutually dependent coexistance which evolves through continuous
negotiations with the other(s). Hence, it is not a predetermined unfolding
process that can be observed when the right maturational time comes, nor does
it move teleologically towards an absolute end-value such as further democracy,
equality, and freedom. The process has multiple directions as in the “maze” of
Deleuze (1989), with its multiple entrances and exits. Which ones of these
trajectories count for progression or regression is also a relative and contingent
judgment. It is historically, contextually, and hermeneutically dependent. Thus
each process is singular. Fourth, the singularity of the process also stems from
 Agendas for Multicultural Discourse Research 35

the fact that not every “self” (object/subject) deals with the “other” (object/
subject) in a similar way in all possible historical conditions and from within all
(object/subject) positions. For instance, repression of the “other” to the
collective unconscious, conscious suppression, and omitting in the discourse,
ignorance, rejection, denial, displacement, destruction, idealization, devaluation,
fixation, identification, and over-identification, and so on and so forth are some
possibilities that are contingent on various historic, symbolic, and imaginary
conditions. Thus the individual reflects and internalizes external conditions and,
in rejecting the “other,” maintains its own bondage. Hence the dynamics of this
relational process of subjectivication are not necessarily polarized. The self’s
position is not always symmetrical, or the asymmetry in question is not
oppositional to the other(s). Furthermore, the negotiations do not take place
between two parties or “intensities” only as it is frequently assumed, but at least
among three and many. In the next section, I further develop this theorizing
narrative by employing a pair of conceptual castings: Splitting and projective
identification.

Splitting and projective identification in the context of

sociohistorical relations

Both terms, splitting and projective identification, have been exponentially used in
sociopolitical theory over the last decade, calling for some conceptual
clarification. As a matter of fact, these (twin) concepts, which were initially
described by Freud and developed by Klein as primary defense mechanisms,
are in need of further transformations themselves in order to be more useful
in a critical sociopolitical analysis (Gülerce 2004).
Let us first begin with a re-examination of the presumption that
subjectivication/societalization in the modern sense necessitates the
development of a nation-state’s societal identity as an autonomus totality. That
is nothing but an imaginary, ideological, and utopian ideal. In actuality, the
interactional negotiation process that we briefly discussed earlier begins and
continues entirely with partial images and discourses. In other words, these
collective images (Castoriadis 1987) and social representations (Moscovici 1984) are
not at all homogeneous and holistic but partial and separate from one another
in any society and for its cultivating culture. Culture in practice is not
homogeneous, or even heterogeneous, but a relationship of pre-emptively
strategic pluralities (Wolf 1982). For instance, the devaluating and stereotypical
descriptions of the East in the ahistorical, pre-emptive, and essentialistic
orientalist discourse as silent, passive, female, etc. is nothing but an illustration
of a textual/discursive selectivity. However, value meanings and the imaginary
that have been attributed to the East in the Western world show significant
variability in history (Ahmad 1992).
36 Aydan Gülerce

The difference between the partial meanings, however, is not a negation

always, as Hegelian dialectics totalizes. It is rather more in line with the notions
of difference (Derrida 1982) and intensities (Deleuze 1989). Nevertheless, for
the sake of easy communication only, we can cluster these partial imaginary and
symbolic materials under various degrees between the two extreme values of
the desired and undesired. Since our conceptualization also requires the
inclusion of positionality, we need to consider at least four types of imaginary
meaning intensities and their symbolic discourses that co-construct each other
in social practice. In a 2 X 2 analysis of “desirability by positionality,” two of the
attributes are about the “self,” and the remaining two are about the “other,”
whereas still two of these are “desired” by the self,” and the other two are
“undesired.”
The object/subject in constitution does not yet have a (memory or affective)
capacity to register and retain different values together. Be they towards the self
or the other(s), desired or undesired, these meaning potentials are recognized
and recorded in isolation even as they are experienced. Thus the process is
called splitting. The cyclical process through which these split images are
projected onto the other object, and then are identified with it, is called projective
identification. The imaginary meanings are brought to the (national/
international) collective conscious and maintained in memory as long as they
couple up with symbolic discourses, social representations, and practices.
In contrast, the nation-state society as a modernist utopia is expected to be
approached and actualized as the subjectivication/modernization increases and
is completed. From a psychodynamic point of view, that means an increased
tolerance for the contradiction between the desired and the undesired
attributes, and the coexistence of opposing discourses. Together with the
completion of the process of subjectivication and the possibility of the developed
subject, the number of discourses and images are reduced to two: one holistic
sense of self, one holistic sense of the other, so that the subject now can hold
both conflicting values about the same (self- or other-) subject together, that is,
“ambivalence,” without experiencing a “crisis” and a threat to its well-being. For
this psychologically self-sufficient society and automous nation-state, the self or
the other is no longer either all desired, or all undesired but is both (partially)
desired and (partially) undesired. Put more openly, and from the point of view
of the modernist theory of development, this both/and state (actually, “stage”)
is a much more advanced state than the either/or state, and its ambiguity
challenges the dogma of classical logic’s excluded middle, on which much
merely oppositional historical analysis rests. The achievement of the later state
does not exclude any practices of the earlier state, particularly at times of distress,
and is obviously seen as a sign of “regression.” The current discourse of “good
Muslim, bad Muslim” (Mamdani 2004) of the US government is a typical
example of this.
 Agendas for Multicultural Discourse Research 37

As international dynamic relations in history clearly provide the empirical

evidence, a reliable and stable enough relational history of one societal “subject”
with other societal (internal/external) “subjects” has never been possible. Nor
have been the subjectivication (national societalization) and socioeconomic
development (modernization) process and a stable sense of subjectivity (a
collective sense of autonomous nation-state) that modernist utopia has
envisaged. Thus, our conceptual narrative may have some validity for all modern
societal histories, as it is contingent on the local discourses and practices. It can
be redefined by taking into consideration the subjective historical conditions
of possibility and the dynamics of its (internal/external) self/other relations.
As a matter of fact, this is precisely the message that I intend to deliver here,
through the illustrative case of the modern Turkish Republic.

Emancipation: Separation through localization/convergence through

globalization

In our transformational/historical analysis, modernity is both a Eurocentric and

a Western egocentric project that has been carried over from the Middle Ages
(Weber 1958) and a contagious, hence relational historical conditon in the
world-system in which Europe is the center (Wallerstein 1974). The first one
carries more racist and colonialist tones that understand modernization as a
process of assimilation, whereas the latter accentuates the conquestive and
imperialist motives in which modernization is a dissemination from the center
to a periphery. Nevertheless, from both perspectives, modernity is a hierarchical,
predetermined, unidimensional, unidirectional, flat, and linear deterministic
progress. This is mirrored in Western conceptions of Time as an “arrow,” for
instance, and its application in causally deterministic models of understanding.
It is also expected that the further the societies and their individuals are
modernized and subjectivized, the more similar they become (Fukuyama 1989).
This is how the Enlightenment values were to be spread and internalized all
around the globe. Although not al-Qaeda or Huntington (1993), most
modernists today seem surprised before the observations that as globalization
increases, so does localization. Robertson (1992) rightfully pointed at the
bifocality of the globalization dynamics: while the universal became
particularized, the particular became universalized in the process. In our
theorizing, the process of societalization/subjectivication is nothing but a
dialectical process of separation/individuation that is best defined by the object-
relations school of psychoanalysis. Let us appropriate it then within the context
of Turkey.
38 Aydan Gülerce

Societal individuation narrative of the Turkish Republic

Processes in the development of the political thought, modernization, and

Westernization during the periods of the Ottoman Empire and Turkish Republic
have been studied in detail from historical, economical, social, and political
·
points of view (e.g., Tekeli and Ilkin 2003a, 2003b, 2003c; Kocaba o lu 2002).
The process of turning the multi-religious, premodern society of the vast
Ottoman Empire into the nation-state of modern Turkish society has been
narrated in four distinct phases (Tekeli 2002). At first, the societal problems
stemming from European modernity were not recognized as external influences.
Then, during the reigns of Sultan Selim II and Sultan Mahmut II, the
connections between internal problems and modernity were realized. Various
reforms, including the institutionalization of individual ownership and rights,
the differentiation of public and private spaces, and the replacement of military
personnel with bureaucratic public administrators were made. During this
second phase, European societies were not merely examined from a distance;
many students were also sent abroad (mostly to France), and modern
educational institutions were established at home. Under the influence of
Western knowledge, law, and art, the internalization of modernism as the
guiding political orientation became visible. In the third phase, corresponding
to the ruling periods of Abdulmecit, Abdulaziz, and Abdulhamit II, the “internal”
political opposition to the Ottoman Empire developed as an underground
movement in Anatolia and in Europe. The final phase is the period of the
fragmentation of the Empire, World War I, and the establishment of the
Republic. Together with the change of legitimate power from the Sultan to
democratic public preferences, modernization became a radical national project
of the young Turkish Republic. Prior to World War I, the expectation was that
modernization would prevent the fragmentation of the Ottoman Empire.
However, from the 1920s on, the modernization project centered on the
economic development of the new nation-state until World War II.
Embedded in this brief political historical narrative of a social
transformation are some radical discontinuities, as well as some continuous but
repressed collective discourses. Hence, in order to highlight those, I offer
another summary of the emancipation adventure of Turkish society, a
psychopolitical narrative about the same historical period, with the same social
events and actors.
It is clear that the late Ottoman and Turkish societies “voluntarily adopted”
modernization/Westernization. They were not colonized but imperialized. The
Tanzimat (re-ordering) and Young Turks periods can be seen as the flirting and
insemination phases of European modernity that is followed by the political birth
of the modern Turkish state. Although the separation/individuation of the self
apparently is frequently seen as being from one particular other, in our
theorizing it always requires at least one more other to begin with, and many
 Agendas for Multicultural Discourse Research 39

others. Thus, both the modern Western world and the traditional Islamic world
serve as the “parental-others” in the collective imaginary from which modern
Turkey (still) tries to individuate. Furthermore, the Western world represents
the “Name-of-the-Father” (Lacan 1977; Gülerce 2004), and traditional Islam
signifies a world that has “no-Name-for-the-Mother” (Gülerce 2005) for the
“male” child.
By the end of the nineteenth century, projected meanings between the
modernized West and traditional Ottoman-Islam were mutually negative, due
to the essentializing and hegemonic attributions concerning the dichotomic
categories like Judeo-Christian/Muslim, Orient/Occident, masculine/feminine,
master/slave, industrial/feudal agricultural, and so on. While the modern
“father” represses and omits the conservative “mother,” it is seen by the
“illegitimate partner” as the wild capitalism and imperialism that destroys the
“body,” the “mother-land.”
Within the trialectics of separation/individuation through intergenerational
projective identification, the self-object of the newborn (Turkish) society is in
imaginary communication with its two other-objects. While the Western
modernity as the imaginary paternal other-object projects the message of “Be
(civilized) like me!” through the symbolic discourse of modernism, the self-
object projects the message of “I want to be (modern) like you!” through the
symbolic discourse of Turkish Westernism in return. In contrast, the symbolic
discourse of the traditional Islam as the imaginary maternal other-object carries
the message of “Don’t deny your essence; don’t change!”. The Turkish state’s
national discourse of secularism responds: “If I remain as (conservative as) you
are, then I cannot become (‘developed’) like my ‘father’.”
To summarize and emphasize, these messages reflect what is repressed in
the collective imaginary of the society and form the four split discourses about
the partial self-objects and other-objects: (1) The liberal discourse couples up
with the Occidentalist imaginary as the internal ally of Orientalism and forms
the “desired (Western) other.” (2) The nationalistic discourse of secularizm
appropriates the modernist imaginary and forms the “desired (modern) self.”
(3) The leftist discourse voices the anti-imperialist imaginary and forms the
“undesired (imperialist) other.” (4) The traditional Orientalist imaginary lives
through the discourse of political Islam and forms the “undesired (premodern)
self.”
Individuation means a holistic and coherent sense of self that this utopic
possibility necessarily depends on: through the syntheses of the self part-images,
and the other part-images and their corresponding partial discourses. Indeed,
any emancipatory discourse of Ataturkism in the context of Turkey following
the “war of independence” has been signifying such an ideal over the decades,
and covers, or has overlaps with, all partial discourses as a meta-discourse. This is
precisely why all four partial social discourses find themselves in (though
partially) the discourse of Ataturkism, and attempt to monopolize it at critical
40 Aydan Gülerce

historical times with populist political concerns. At the same time, they cannot
tolerate the coexistence of other conflictual discourses. Therefore, an indication
of the actualization of subjectivication/individuation of Turkish or any modern
society would be its democratization, defined as the negotiated coherence of
the diverse discourses of the self and the other. These, in Benedict Anderson’s
terms, are “imagined communities,” in which the self and the other, mediated
through the trends of globalization, construct a “bricolage of understanding”
(Levi-Strauss 1967) that contrasts wholly with the geographically bound self/
other of premodernity.
If we were to elaborate subjectivication/modernization narratives of societies
like India, China, Japan, South America or Africa, of course, these positive and
negative partial imaginaries and their collective discourses would be different
for each. Hence they are predicted to have served different functions for new
generations in the subjectivication and individuation/autonomization of nation-
states. Keeping this in mind, we may continue with our conceptual narrative in
the case of the Turkish modernization/Westernization experience to make
further, generalizable points. What has been projected onto Western modernity
(as the external other) by “the underdeveloped” world in the process of
becoming a modern nation-state society is very much interwined with the mutual
dynamics of indigenous (as the internalized other) and local identity (as the
idealized other) discourses, which in turn are realized as cultural processes
within a social matrix.
The post-war trauma (or the “birth trauma”), for a young nation suggests
a revolutionary break from the traditional discourse of the past and creates a
“temporary loss in the collective memory.” It becomes more painful to recall
various social events that took place during that part of the history. This is also
because the confrontation with these events in the collective conscious means
to face and accept continuity and undifferentiation with the imaginary maternal
other that national discourse represses and denies, as discussed earlier. The
nightmare of symbiosis evoked by the idea that the maternal imaginary will never
allow separation is kept in the collective unconscious. However, the novel
fantastic developmental bond of modernity that is established with the idealized
imaginary paternal other (to replace the cut “umbilical cord”) is found equally
frustrating. Since the amount, pace, and the nurturing/developmental quality
of modernization transmitting through this channel of nurturance is so low, the
supposition that this so-called parental (Eurocentric/colonial/imperial) other
will never be able to fulfill the hunger for modernity, and instead will destroy
the self. It is also kept in the collective unconscious. So, this young societal
object/subject which tries to modernize has serious anxieties evoked by such
fantasies of further disintegration, disappearance and chaos. The point here I
wish to emphasize is that this paranoid conspiracy of annihilation anxiety does
not have one source, as is frequently reproduced in literature, but two: the
dividing/disintegrating Modern West and the swallowing/suffocating
 Agendas for Multicultural Discourse Research 41

premodern Islamic tradition (or “rest”). It is not a unidirectional but a

bidirectional position, facing both “progression” and “regression.” Thus, the
object/subject positionality and self-identity of the non-Western, post-imperial,
postcolonial nation-states give a picture of “the go-between” as a borderline
historical condition. A full discussion of this argument would exceed the limits of
this chapter. However, it is notable that Turner (1975) has referred to such
borderline historical or cultural states as “communitas,” regarding them as sites
of regeneration within pre-exisiting and rigid social structures.
Nonetheless, what may concern us here is that the majority of sociopolitical
analyses interpellated by various modernist discourses views such a (borderline)
condition as societal pathology, distorted modernization, underdevelopment,
lack of cultural identity, passivity, dual character, tampon status, and so on, all
of which indicate some value judgment of negativity, pessimism, and
insufficiency. They strongly suggest to “leave” this conditon of “lack” (i.e.,
identitylessness) by being on the one side of the “border” that is seen to be
dividing the common Cartesian dichotomies. This pressure thus becomes the
chronic source of a continual sense of self-dissatisfaction and failure while, in
effect, there is no actual side of the border that can be transferred to and
occupied; yet this “inbetweenness” (as Turner argues) is also a very legitimate
type of sociohistorical position.
However, and through our transmodernist lenses, there is no value in the
essentialist, dualist, hierarchical categories in the symbolic domain of
sociohistorical discourses and the imaginary domain of world cultures.
Therefore, the very sign of “border” may signify not an imaginary line, tampon,
razor’s edge, and so on, but the enormous space that still seems uncaptured,
undefined and free-floating at the skirts of the rigid, narrow, and reductionistic
scope of modernity. This inbetweenness is not necessarily a phase/stage in the
unilinear and hierarchical process of modernization/subjectivication/
emancipation/societalization, but a historically situated, meaningful contextual,
and multi-perspectival subject position. In short, then, it is dynamic and has
more possibilities than all other (so-called premodern, modern, postmodern)
types and positions. It provides, in Bourdieu’s (1993) words, the possibility for
a new “habitus.”1 The metaphor of the go-betweenness, however, refers more
to the continuous negotiations in between the “internal partial discourses” than
to the “external partial discourses.” As a matter of fact, without their mediation,
the object/subject cannot be subjectified but only ages.

Moral of the story and further possibilities

Today, as the globe goes global, while eighty-six percent of the entire population
lives in the “underdeveloped” societies and shares only twenty percent of the
total production, the total assets of only the 200 richest US citizens exceed that
42 Aydan Gülerce

of entire nation of China (Rapley 2004). The discrepancy of social-economic

conditions between the rich and the poor further grows every second in all
societies. Various expressions of violence including waste dumping, corruption,
and torture increase in every corner. This immoral and unjust picture cannot
be “understood”, let alone “corrected,” through political economical analyses
and practice alone. However, even though universalist, Eurocentric, and male-
minded modernist thought has expanded around the globe with its distinct
language and technology, and through the actual cultural contacts, it is
eventually realized that convergence and homogeneity are not fully attainable,
even within the same cultural, national, or any other identity groups.
Nevertheless, it has failed to revise its own philosophy, to reconstruct its own
language, and to redefine itself, by making any attempt towards learning those
of the “unknown”, the “barbarian,” and the “savage” before this observation.
Quite contrarily, it reproduced its own peripheral and undesired Other, in order
to sustain the symbiotically dependent definition of its central and desired Self.
Not even its own early modern humanist philosophy, scientific thought and
discourse were able to prevent the violations of some self-defined moral criteria
and virtues while dealing with rich human diversity, and hence the occurance
of oppression and violence towards “others” than itself. Thus, while “progressing”
technologically and “growing” economically, it “regressed” further — in moral
development and by its own definition — to uncivilized action.
Then, it cannot be the late-modern world that is to liberate the alternative-
modern world in the alterity, and definitely not its reading of the so-called
postmodern global condition. Also, the modern societal/individual subject is
not lost in postmodernism; it has never been actualized in the first place in
modernism, so that it cannot be truly self-reflexive. Perhaps, what is needed most
is an ability to tolerate the critique from a nonessentialized other or periphery.
This requires transmodern, transcultural, transnational reflections, as distinct from
liberatory modernist, multiculturalist and postmodernist positions.
It is only from such a broader historical perspective that we can keep in
mind that today’s devalued (peripheral) other by the Western world was
yesterday’s idealized (central) other, as in the case of the Muslim world, India
and China. Similarly, the original modernity is defined as having Spain in the
center of the global system of Amerindia and its colony in Flanders at the
periphery, which later becomes the center of the second (commonly known as
the hegemonic European) modernity (Dussell 1995). However, no matter how
broad our historical analysis may become, a commitment to a linear, or even a
hierarchical and value-laden normative model of development cannot assure
more humane humanity in the globe. Thanks to a deep-seated “Aryan model”
of modernity, the globe does not go global with increasing international trade,
and globalization is understood as “the compression of the world and the
intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole” (Robertson 1992, 8).
The confrontation of their world views means that globalization involves
 Agendas for Multicultural Discourse Research 43

comparative interaction of different forms of life. As the interactions between

the world do not take place as cultural contact in Batesonian sense, however,
the globe goes “virtual,” not quite “global.” Live CNN reports from different
corners of the globe, for instance, do not necessarily lead in the Western world
to the realization of actual human problems that the majority of the world’s
population struggles with, but most of the times desensitize and normalize those
via cyber means. Thus, postmodern technologies of connection do not connect
the diverse, but the like-minded, creating new imaginary culture communities
and global stratification.
For these very reasons, a transmodernist and postculturalist interpretation of
the current global condition that I advocate here may be more useful for globally
constructive reflections. Thus, it is time for some redefinitions through
replacements of various subject positions. By that, I do not mean to suggest
counter-reactive essentialistically local (nationalist, ethnicist, culturalist) discourses
with the very same regressive modernist mentality, nor some role reversal such
as shifting positions of the “master” and the “slave” in the imaginary, as the
language of violence is only good for reproducing more violence.
It would be a necessary task for the multiculturalistic discourse scholarship
to adopt a postculturalist position, then, in order to develop an empathetic
understanding of plural subject positions of the self/other. It is equally important
to address the deep-seated and disguised antagonism that has been fed and
regenerated like a bloodbath in the collective “imaginaries” over a thousand
years, towards a genuine and peaceful global consciousness. It is only through
some broad historical, psychopolitical, and (psycho)dynamic conceptualizations
such as the present narrative, I think, that we may practice global democracy
and a more humane world within our human constraints and limitations.

Note

1. “Habitus” is that part of a self-object so essential that it is impossible to

imagine its existence without that element.

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PART II

Cultural Struggles in Discourse

4
Discursive Transition in Central and Eastern Europe
Norman Fairclough

This chapter is an initial contribution to an area of research I am currently

embarking on: the role of discourse in processes of “transition” (i.e., from
socialism to capitalism and Western forms of democratic government) in central
and eastern Europe (henceforth CEE). My particular focus here is on attempts
in CEE, and specifically Romania, to construct a “knowledge-based economy”
(KBE) and “information society” (IS). I begin with a brief sketch of the version
of Critical Discourse Analysis (henceforth CDA), which I am currently working
with. I then discuss discourse as an element in processes of “transition,” and
the construction of “objects of research” from research topics such as
“transition,” KBE, and IS. The final part of the chapter looks in particular at
the recontextualization of discourses of the KBE and IS, especially the later, in
Romania. I shall analyze a specific Romanian government policy text, the
“National Strategy for the promotion of the New Economy and the
implementation of the Information Society” (2002).

Critical Discourse Analysis

I have chosen some of the main features of the version of CDA I now work with
(Fairclough 2003, 2000a, 2000b; Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999; Fairclough,
Jessop, and Sayer 2004), listing them for the sake of brevity:
1. Discourse is an element of all social processes, events and practices, though
they are not simply discourse (Fairclough 1992).
2. The relationship between abstract social structures and concrete social
events is mediated by social practices, relatively stabilized forms of social
activity (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999).
3. Each of these levels has a linguistic/semiotic element: languages (social
structures), orders of discourse (social practices), texts broadly understood
(social events) (Fairclough, Jessop, and Sayer 2004).
50 Norman Fairclough

4. Social practices and events are constituted as articulations of dialectically

related elements including discourse. These are different (and they cannot,
for instance, all be reduced to discourse, as some versions of discourse
theory claim) but not discrete: discourse internalizes and is internalized in
other elements (Harvey 1996; Fairclough 2003). For instance, in researching
any social organization, one is faced with its partly discursive character,
including its constitution as an operationalization (putting into practice,
“translating” into its non-discursive as well as discursive facets) of particular
discourses. But this does not mean that the organization is nothing but
discourse, or that it can be researched exclusively through discourse analysis
— which would be highly reductive.
5. Discourse figures in three main ways in social practices: discourses (ways
of representing, e.g., political discourses), genres (ways of [inter] acting,
e.g., lecturing, interviewing), styles (ways of being — identities, e.g., styles
of management) (Fairclough 2000a, 2000b).
6. Social practices are articulated into networks that constitute social fields,
institutions, and organizations. Orders of discourse are more exactly the
linguistic/semiotic facet of such networks (Chouliaraki and Fairclough
1999).
7. An order of discourse is a social structuring of linguistic/semiotic difference,
which is constituted as a relatively stable articulation of discourses, genres,
and styles (Fairclough 2003). For instance, the political order of discourse,
associated with the political field as an articulation of social practices, is
constituted in a particular time and place as an articulation of (conservative,
liberal, social-democratic, etc.) discourses; of genres such as political debate,
speech, and interview; and of styles, including different styles of political
leadership.
8. Social change includes change in social structures, social practices, and
social events.
9. Change in social practices affects how elements are articulated together in
practices; how practices are articulated together in networks; and how
discourses, genres, and styles are articulated together in orders of discourse
(Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999). Thus the relatively recent development
of “mediatized politics” is a re-articulation of the relationship between the
fields of politics and media; their reconstitution as a network, which includes
a transformation of the political order of discourse; its genres (e.g., the
forms of political interview), discourses (e.g., the translation of political
discourses into popularized, more “conversational,” forms), and styles
(political leaders adopt to a degree the “show business” styles of
entertainers).
10. Social change in countries, organizations, etc. is often initiated with new
discourses. This operates through a dissemination across structural and
scalar boundaries which “recontextualizes” new discourses. These may be
 Discursive Transition in Central and Eastern Europe 51

enacted as new ways of (inter)acting including genres, inculcated as new

ways of being including styles, as well as materialized in, for example, new
ways of structuring space. Thus liberal and neo-liberal discourses have been
recontextualized in “transitional” countries in CEE, and to varying degrees
enacted in new ways of (inter)acting (e.g., in government, including
government addressing and interacting with citizens as consumers),
inculcated in new ways of being (e.g., people adopting the lifestyles and
identities of consumers), and materialized in such new constructions of
space as the “shopping mall.”
11. “May” is important: there are discursive as well as non-discursive conditions
of possibility for discourses having constitutive effects on other elements
of the social — the fact that discourses “construe” the world in particular
ways does not necessarily mean that they (re-)construct it in those ways
(Fairclough, Jessop, and Sayer 2004). Social fields, institutions, and
organizations are “intransitive” realities that have properties that make them
more or less amenable or resistant to particular directions of change.
12. CDA claims that analysis of social processes and change is productively
carried down into detailed textual analysis. More detailed (including
linguistic) analysis of texts is connected to broader social analysis by way of
interdiscursive analysis of shifting articulations of genres, discourses, styles
in texts (Fairclough 2003).
13. As a form of critical social science, CDA analyzes social life in its discursive
aspects from a normative perspective, i.e., on the basis of a commitment to
a set of values of social justice, social equality, democracy — though there
are differences in how such values are understood and interpreted.

Discourse as an element of processes of “transition”

The importance of language and discourse in processes of “transition” in CEE

and elsewhere is quite widely recognized in social research (for instance, in
Miroiu 1999, and in the conception of influential neo-liberal models of transition
as “discourses” in, e.g., Bourdieu and Wacquant 2001). But social research has
so far produced only a limited understanding of how discourse figures in
processes of “transition.” This is partly a theoretical problem: the theories of
discourse which tend to be drawn upon are relatively underdeveloped and do
not constitute an adequate basis for providing full and nuanced accounts of how
discourse interacts with other non-discursive facets of processes of “transition.”
It is also a problem of data and analytical method: acknowledgement of the
importance of discourse in general and abstract statements about discourse in
“transition” or more generally in social change have not generally been
translated into detailed analysis texts or talk, so there is little concrete knowledge
of how they figure in the unfolding of events or change and continuity of
52 Norman Fairclough

practices in specific types of situation, organization, locality, etc. Having said

that, forms of textual analysis have already been used in Romanian research on
“transition,” e.g., on media (e.g., Miroiu 1999; Beciu 2000; Coman 2003), but
CDA’s particular mix of interdiscursive and linguistic analysis is, I think, a more
powerful analytical resource for addressing these issues than those I have seen
used (Preoteasa 2002 is one case of CDA being used). I see CDA as a resource
for producing richer understanding and analysis of the relationship between
discourse and other non-discursive facets of social processes and social change,
and of the effects of discourse on wider processes of social change, through a
“transdisciplinary” dialogue with other theories and disciplines. Transdisciplinary
research is a form of interdisciplinary research that sees “internal” development
of a theory or discipline (of their theoretical categories and concepts and
methods of research) as emerging out of dialogue with others (Fairclough 2003).

Theorizing “transition”

I shall approach the IS and KBE as topics of research by way of recent

developments in political economy (Pickles and Smith 1998; Jessop 2002; Stark
and Bruszt 1998; Ray and Sayer 1999; Sayer 1995). In particular, I follow Jessop
(2002) in viewing them as strategies for achieving and stabilizing a new “fix”
between a regime of capital accumulation and a regime of political regulation
in the aftermath of the demise of the “fix” commonly referred to as “Fordism.”
This formulation derives from “regulation theory,” which has a political-
economic rather than a narrowly and purely economic perspective on economic
change, arguing that an economic order (“regime of capital accumulation”) is
dependent upon a political order (a “mode of regulation”) that can produce
and sustain the preconditions for its durable operation. The more general claim
is that there are non-economic (including, as we shall see, social and cultural
as well as political) preconditions for the establishment and reproduction of
economies. The dominant international political-economic order since the
demise of Fordism has been widely identified as “post-Fordist,” which is indicative
of the uncertainty of what follows, or should follow, Fordism. The significance
of the KBE (this is Jessop’s focus, though the same could be said for the IS,
and for the frequent conjunction of the two which is characteristic of the
material I shall look at) is that it seems to be emerging as a strategy for change
that can effectively be operationalized in real change.
They are strategies but, like any strategy, also discourses, particular ways of
representing, or rather imagining (because they are certainly as much predictive
as descriptive) a new political-economic order. And they are discourses of a
particular kind, what we might call “nodal” discourses, in the sense that they
are discourses which subsume and articulate in a particular way a great many
other discourses: technical discourses (e.g., discourses of ICT — information
 Discursive Transition in Central and Eastern Europe 53

and communications technology), the discourse of “intellectual property,”

discourses of governance and government (e.g., “e-government”), discourses of
“social exclusion” and “social inclusion,” and so forth. As discourses, they
constitute selective representations, “simplifications” (Jessop 2002),
“condensations” (Harvey 1996) of highly complex economic, political, social,
and cultural realities, which include certain aspects of these realities and exclude
others, highlight certain aspects and background others. Not any discourse
would work as a strategic nodal discourse for imagining and potentially
operationalizing, actualizing, a new political-economic fix. A discourse can only
work in so far as it achieves a high level of adequacy with respect to the realities
it selectively represents, simplifies, condenses — in so far as it is capable (as
these seem capable) of being used to represent/imagine realities at different
levels of abstraction, in different areas of social life (economy, government,
education, health, regional and social disparities, etc.), on different scales
(international, macro-regional [e.g., EU], national, local). It is only if it is a
plausible imaginary that it will attract investments of time and money to prepare
for the imaginary future it projects, material factors which are crucial to making
imaginaries into realities (Cameron and Palan 2004). In this sense, the KBE and
the IS have a partially discursive and partially material character. They are
discourses, but not just discourses; they are discourses that are materially
grounded and materially promoted. The theoretical framework we need to
conceptualize this needs to be not just a political economy (rather than a narrow
economics) but what Jessop calls a “cultural political economy,” a political
economy which, among other things, incorporates a theory of discourse and of
the dialectics of discourse, of how discursive construals of the world can come
to construct and reconstruct the world, without losing sight of the material reality
of the world, or the conditions which the material reality of the world sets (as I
have briefly indicated) on the discursive (re)construction of the world.
This strategic perspective provides a basis for formulating objects of research
for this aspect of “transition” as a topic of research, and the “cultural” orientation
of the approach to political economy means that objects of research can be
formulated to include or highlight questions of semiosis. Objects of research
might include the emergence and constitution, hegemony, dissemination and
recontextualization and operationalization of the strategies of the “KBE” and
the “IS.” These objects of research might be formulated specifically as objects
for CDA research projects in the following ways:
• The emergence of the discourses of the “KBE” and the “IS” as nodal
discourses in association with the emergence of strategies, their constitution
through the articulation of relationships between other discourses,
including discourses “available” within existing or prior nodal discourses.1
• Relations of contestation between discourses within the framework of
relations of contestation between strategies, and the emerging hegemony
of these nodal discourses.2
54 Norman Fairclough

• The dissemination of the discourses of “KBE” and the “IS” across structures
(e.g., between economic markets, governments, public and social services
such as education and health) and scales (between “global” or international,
macro-regional [e.g., EU or NAFTA], national, and local scales of social life),
their recontextualization in new social fields, institutions, organizations,
countries, localities.
• The shift of these nodal discourses from “construals” to “constructions”
(Sayer 2000), from being just representations and imaginaries to having
transformative effects on social reality, being operationalized — enacted as
new ways of (inter)acting, inculcated in new ways of being (identities),
materialized in new instruments and techniques of production or ways of
organizing space.

These different research objects call for different methods in data selection,
collection, and analysis. Researching the emergence and constitution of these
discourses requires a genealogical approach which locates these discourses
within the field of prior discourses and entails collection of historical series of
texts and selection of key texts within these series, analysis of the constitution
of these discourses through articulation of elements within the field of prior
discourses, and specification of the relations of articulation between the diverse
discourses which are drawn together within these nodal discourses. Researching
the emergent hegemony of these discourses entails locating these discourses in
their relations of contestation with other potentially nodal discourses, which
involves, for instance, focusing on dialogical relations between and within texts
in key institutions such as the OECD (Godin 2003). Researching dissemination
and recontextualization entails comparing texts in different social fields and at
different social scales (e.g., in different societies or localities), and analyzing,
for instance, how, when these discourses are recontextualized, they are
articulated with discourses that already exist within these new contexts.
Researching operationalization calls for ethnographical methods in the
collection of data, in that it is only by accessing insider perspectives in particular
localities, companies, and so on, that one can assess how discourses are
materialized, enacted, and inculcated. I shall be discussing only aspects of (the
dissemination and) recontextualization of these nodal discourses.
The predominant form of critique associated with CDA and critical social
research more generally has been ideology critique. But we can distinguish three
forms of critique that are relevant to CDA: ideological, rhetorical, and strategic
critique. Whereas ideological critique focuses on the effects of semiosis on social
relations of power, and rhetorical critique on persuasion (including
“manipulation”) in individual texts or talk, what we might call “strategic critique”
focuses on how semiosis figures within the strategies pursued by groups of social
agents to change societies in particular directions. The research objects I have
distinguished (emergence, hegemony, recontextualization, and
 Discursive Transition in Central and Eastern Europe 55

operationalization) can be seen as objects associated with strategic critique. One

might see strategic critique as assuming a certain primacy in periods of major
social change and restructuring, such as the one we are going through now.
This is not to suggest at all that ideological and rhetoric critique cease to be
relevant; it is more a matter of their relative salience within the critical analysis.
The Pickles and Smith (1998) collection on the political economy of
“transition” adopts a regulation approach in combination with theories of
governance and elements of cultural theory. One concern is with “re-scaling,”
which alludes to the category of “scales,” different levels of social process,
organization, structure and strategy: “global,” international, and macro-regional
(e.g., the EU and candidate countries), national, micro-regional, and local. One
aspect of transition is “re-scaling,” the emergence of new scales, and the
reorganization of relations between scales (Jessop 2002). The issue of
“globalization” is significant here, as is what has been referred to as
“glocalization” (Robertson 1992), a re-scaling which sets up new relations
between the local and the global in ways that can to some degree bypass the
national. Ethnographic and other studies of crisis and change in specific
localities (Burawoy 2000; Burawoy and Verdery 1999; An st soaie 2003) have
shown how “global” resources are marshaled by local strategists in struggles over,
for instance, environmental issues, or attempts to reposition economically
depressed cities within global urban networks (Gille 2000; Pickles 1998). These
“global” resources include discourses — for instance the discourses of
internationally organized environmental groups.
On the basis of this literature, one can say the following about “transition”:
1. There is not one form of capitalism but many forms. The market is only
one regulatory mechanism within contemporary forms of capitalism, which
combines in various ways with others, hierarchies (states), and networks
(Pickles and Smith 1998; Jessop 2002; Stark and Bruszt 1998; Sayer 1995).
2. The particular trajectories of “transition” vary in different countries but also
within different countries, depending on legacies, including how the process
of extrication from communism took place. The forms of capitalism that
develop are consequently also variable (Przeworski 1992; Pickles and Smith
1998; Daianu 2000).
3. Transition entails a mixture of old and new, rather than a simple
replacement of the old by the new (Stark and Bruszt 1998; Verdery 2000).
4. Research on transition in a particular country should be sensitive to (a)
variation both between and within social fields — economy, government,
politics, media etc. — and (b) hybridity (including mixtures of old and new)
in particular fields, institutions, practices, etc.
5. Transition has semiotic as well as non-semiotic elements. Consequently,
variation and hybridity will be in part semiotic variation and hybridity (see,
for instance, Miroiu 1999 on variation and hybridity in post-1989 Romanian
political discourses) — in the way social life is represented, narrated,
56 Norman Fairclough

imagined (therefore in discourses), in semiotic aspects of forms of action

and interaction (therefore in genres), in semiotic aspects of the identities
of social actors (therefore in styles).

Recontextualization of the “knowledge-based economy” and

“information society” in Romanian policy texts

The dissemination and recontextualization of the strategies and discourses of

the “KBE” and “IS” in CEE is closely connected to the process of EU
enlargement. The Lisbon Council of the EU in 2000 adopted these strategies
as part of the “e-Europe” initiative. The EU’s “strategic goal” is to “become the
most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable
of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social
cohesion.” The “e-Europe 2002 Action Plan” was agreed at Feira in 2000, and
the candidate countries for EU membership in CEE were associated with the
EU’s strategic goal in adopting the “e-Europe+ Action Plan” in 2001, one reason
for which was said to be avoiding a “digital divide” within the EU. According to
the Romanian government’s “National Strategy for the promotion of the New
Economy and the implementation of the Information Society” (2002), it was
made clear at a conference of ministers of the candidate countries and
representatives of the EU in Warsaw (May 2000) that “the e-Europe initiative
will become a basic element of the process of integration.”
The “e-Europe+ Action Plan” agreed by the candidate countries was
explicitly modeled upon the EU’s “e-Europe 2002 Action Plan,” and much of
the Romanian government’s “National Strategy” document is modeled upon
them. The document is partly an “action plan,” but it is also partly a strategy
document comparable to an extent with the Lisbon Summit Declaration. The
nodal discourse in the Lisbon Declaration is the “KBE,” whereas the nodal
discourse in the Romanian document is the “IS” (the discourse of “the new
economy” could be seen as a secondary nodal discourse). There seems to be
no clear and stable relation between the two nodal discourses within the
“eEurope” and “eEurope+” projects overall; they are articulated together in
different ways in different policy documents. In the Romanian position paper
on the KBE for the World Bank’s “Knowledge Economy Forum for EU Accession
Countries,” held in Paris at precisely the same time as the publication of the
Romanian “National Strategy” document (February 2002), the nodal discourse
is “the KBE,” even though it refers to virtually the same set of strategies and
policies. In the Lisbon Declaration, the “IS” is one element of one of three
“strategies” for achieving the “strategic goal” of becoming “the most competitive
and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world” (see section 5 of the
Lisbon Declaration, Text 1, in the Appendix). Although the “KBE” is not an
entity or imaginary or strategic goal in the Romanian “National Strategy,” the
 Discursive Transition in Central and Eastern Europe 57

“new economy” is defined partly in recognizably “KBE” terms as the

“intensification of incorporation of knowledge in new products and services”
(“intensificarea înglob rii cunoa terii în noile produse i servicii”).
As these comments imply, what is significant with respect to
recontextualization is both the presence or absence of particular discourses in
particular texts, and the relations in which diverse discourses are articulated,
“textured,” together. One can identify differences between texts in this regard,
by analyzing the relationship between discourses and features of genre, in the
sense that genres can be seen as “framing” devices for organising relationships
between discourses (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999). Relevant features of
genre include the rhetorical structure and argumentative structure of the text
(Fairclough 2003). I shall focus my analytical comments upon these issues. One
can see how this selection of focuses for analysis depends upon the particular
object of research (recontextualization), though there are many other analytical
issues (such as the presentation of processes and of agency) that are germane
to recontextualization.
In the opening section of the Lisbon Declaration (“A strategic goal for the
next decade,” paragraphs 1–7, Text 1, Appendix), predominant features of the
rhetorical structure are arguments from problems to solutions and from ends
to means. The two paragraphs of the first subsection (“The new challenge”)
are both arguments from problem to solution, from what “is” happening to what
“must” be done in response (from the “challenge,” the changes that are
happening, to the necessary responses, what the Union “must” do, “needs” to
do, what is “urgent” for it to do, what these changes “require”). The second
section (“The Union’s strengths and weaknesses”) is also a version of a problem-
to-solution argument, arguing for the proposed solution as a response to
“weaknesses” which is timely in the light of “strengths.” Both paragraphs 5 and
6 in the third section (“The way forward”) are arguments from ends (“strategic
goals”) to means (“strategy”), and paragraph 7 is an argument from ends
(“strategy”) to means of governance for achieving them.
This rhetorical structure constitutes a frame within which diverse discourses
are articulated together in a particular way, within which relations are textured
(textually constituted) between these discourses. I am particularly concerned
here with the placing of expressions that are associated with different discourses
in relations of “equivalence”3 through listing and other forms of paratactic
connection (Fairclough 2003). One can see this as a process of (re-)classifying,
texturing relations between expressions as co-members of a class (even if, as is
generally the case, the class itself is not named — what van Leeuwen 1996 calls
“association”). In paragraph 5, for instance, the formulation of the “strategic
goal” sets up a relation of equivalence between “sustainable economic growth,”
“more and better jobs,” and “greater social cohesion” (more precisely: there is
a comitative structure which sets up a relation of equivalence between the first
and the other two phrases, and a coordinate structure which sets up a relation
58 Norman Fairclough

of equivalence between these two), all as attributes of the “KBE.” Each of these
equivalent phrases represents a substantive EU policy area associated with an
elaborated discourse (the discourses of growth, (un)employment, social and
regional cohesion), and the relations of equivalence among them are linguistic
realizations of interdiscursive hybridity (the “mixing” of discourses).
The formulation of the “overall strategy,” which is the means to achieving
the “strategic goal,” again sets up relations of equivalence, among the three listed
elements of the strategy (“preparing …,” “modernizing …,” “sustaining ….”),
and within them between “better policies for the information society and R&D”
(and within this, between “IS” and “R&D”), “stepping up the process of structural
reform for competitiveness and innovation” (and within this, between
“competitiveness” and “innovation”) and “completing the internal market”;
among “modernizing the European social model,” “investing in people,” and
“combating social exclusion”; and so forth. Again, diverse policy areas and
associated discourses (e.g., the “IS,” “competitiveness,” “social exclusion”) are
articulated together in particular relations within the nodal discourse of the
“KBE.”
A significant overall feature of the articulation of discourses in the
document is that, in the formulation of problems, the strategic goal, and the
strategies for achieving it, discourses which represent the economy (“sustainable
economic growth” in the strategic goal) are articulated with discourses which
represent social problems and policies (“more and better jobs” and “social
cohesion” in the strategic goal).
One notable difference between the Lisbon Declaration and the Romanian
“National Strategy” document is that there is no section in the latter with a
comparable rhetorical structure, articulating arguments from problems to
solutions with arguments from ends to means. In more general terms, the
Romanian document is not based upon arguments from the specific problems
facing Romania to strategic goals for dealing with them (and strategies for
achieving these). This is on the face of it a surprising absence in a national
strategy document, though, as I argue later, not actually at all surprising given
Romania’s international position. This does not mean that problems are not
identified in the document, or that goals and strategies and policies are not
specified. They are, but what is significant is the relations that are textured
between them. For instance, the relationship between strategic goals and
problems is largely reversed: rather than goals and strategies being legitimized
in their adequacy and timeliness in responding to a diagnosis of the problems
facing the country, the problems are construed as weaknesses and difficulties
with respect to achieving the strategic goal, taken as given, of the “IS.” This is
indicated by the wider rhetorical structure of the document: the strategic goal
is formulated (as I show below) in Chapters 1 and 2, on the basis of claims about
the general benefits (not specific benefits to Romania) of the “IS” and Romania’s
international commitments (especially to “eEurope+”), and specific Romanian
 Discursive Transition in Central and Eastern Europe 59

problems (of poverty, emigration of skilled labor, etc.) are identified only in
Chapter 3 within an assessment of the country’s current position in respect of
the “IS.”
Arguments for the “IS” as the strategic goal are largely implicit. The Lisbon
Declaration is “based upon” arguments from problems to solutions in the
material sense that the document begins from these arguments. The Romanian
document, by contrast, begins with a general chapter about the “IS” and the
“new economy,” which does not directly refer to Romania at all and only
indirectly alludes to Romania in the final few paragraphs. In rhetorical structure,
the chapter is an extended description of the “IS,” followed by prescriptions
about what must be done to construct such a society. The first, descriptive,
section construes the “IS” as actually existing rather than as a strategic goal,
representing it in an idealized (and to some degree utopian) way, which
construes in universal terms what are commonly claimed to be its potential
effects and benefits as if they were actual effects and benefits. Here, for instance,
is a translation of the second paragraph:
The information society represents a new stage of human civilization,
a new and qualitatively superior way of life, which implies the intensive
use of information in all spheres of human activity and existence, with
major economic and social consequences. The information society
allows widespread access to information for its members, a new way of
working and learning, greater possibilities for economic globalization,
and increasing social cohesion.

It is only in the ninth of its thirteen paragraphs that a strategic perspective on

“constructing the new model of society” (“Construirea noului model de societate
...”) appears. The following paragraphs specify the role of government, business,
the academic community, and civil society in this process. By this stage, one can
assume that Romania in particular is being alluded to without being explicitly
named — this is implicit in the claim that “national development priorities for
the medium-long term” and “objectives of adhesion to Euro-atlantic structures”
(often formulated in this way in Romanian policy contexts) need to be taken
into account. The “IS” as a strategic goal is covertly established on the basis of
idealized claims about the “IS” as a universal reality.
The second chapter is a review of tendencies and policies internationally
and within the EU, including a summary of the “e-Europe” and “eEurope+”
initiatives. Romania is a participant in “eEurope+.” The “IS” as a “development
objective” is claimed to be “an essential condition for participation in the single
European market.” It is implied, without being explicitly stated, that this applies
to Romania, and that the “information society” is therefore its “development
objective” (strategic goal). The third chapter is a STEEP (social, technological,
economic, and political factors) analysis of the current situation with respect
to the “IS” internationally and in Romania, which includes a review of problems
60 Norman Fairclough

and possibilities and policies in Romania — it is here, as I said earlier, that

specifically Romanian problems are introduced.
Thus the “IS” is implicitly established as Romania’s strategic goal on
essentially extraneous grounds: the universal benefits it brings as an existing
reality, and the commitment to this strategic goal as a part of commitment to
the “e-Europe+” initiative.
It is only in Chapter 4 (“Strategic Directions and Options”) that “strategic
choices” for Romania are explicitly addressed. I shall comment on the rhetorical
and argumentative structure of the first section (entitled “Global objectives,”
see Texts 2 and 3 in the Appendix) and how it frames the articulation of
discourses. The rhetorical structure of the section is characterized by arguments
from general factual claims about economic changes and their societal
consequences in the “IS,” to possibilities, policies and strategies (for, by
implication, particular countries). Although these arguments are formulated in
general terms without specific reference to Romania (Romania is referred to
explicitly only in the last sentence), they can be taken as referring implicitly to
Romania — the list of four policies includes what appear to be specifically
Romanian policies (especially the fourth, which is very similar to policies
advocated explicitly for economic applications of ICT in Romania in the next
section of the chapter). The first sentence makes a general factual claim about
the consequences of large-scale use of ICTs (“profound implications for socio-
economic life, fundamental transformations in the way of producing goods and
services and in human behavior”). The second sentence is a conditional
formulation of the possibilities opened up: greater use of information
technologies “can ensure the socio-economic progress characteristic of
information societies,” as long as “objectives and orientations of a strategic
nature are adopted through policies appropriate to the actual societies in which
we live.” Four policies are then listed (“consolidation of democracy and the rule
of law,” “development of a market economy and progressive movement towards
the new economy,” “improving the quality of life,” and, through policies to
achieve this, “integration into Euro-Atlantic structures and the Global
Information Society”, “consolidation and development of a national economic
framework which ensures the production of goods and services which are
competitive on internal and external markets”). The first three elements of this
list are structured as arguments from end to means. In the following two
paragraphs, there are two sentences making general factual claims about the
“IS,” which frame a more specific claim (sentence 3) about the development
of knowledge as “a critical, determining, factor in economic growth and
standards of living,” which by implication makes it possible (sentence 4) for the
“digital divide” to become, with “appropriate strategies,” the “digital
opportunity.” The pattern of argument from factual economic claim to strategic
possibilities is repeated in the following two paragraphs. The final sentence is a
recommendation, “given the example of the countries referred to above and
 Discursive Transition in Central and Eastern Europe 61

presented in the appendix” (Ireland, Israel, Finland) that Romania “should

make a fundamental choice to develop a branch of the economy which produces
the goods and services demanded by the information society, based on ICT.”
The rhetorical structure of the first section of the Lisbon Declaration set
up a relationship among diagnosed problems, a strategic goal for solving them,
and strategies for achieving it (with means for achieving these strategic ends).
Here, by contrast, the strategic goal is taken for granted rather than established
on the basis of diagnosis of problems (there is no such diagnosis), and the focus
is on possibilities arising from general claims about economic and social change
and the strategies for realizing them. Thus, at the one point in the document
where “strategic options” specifically for Romania are addressed, there is no
attempt to establish strategic goals adapted to Romania’s particular problems,
and the only strategic choice recommended, in the last sentence (the only one
that explicitly refers to Romania), relates specifically and narrowly to economic
applications of ICT. The rest of the chapter is taken up with an elaboration of
this.
I noted above that, in the Lisbon Declaration, discourses that represent the
economy are articulated with discourses that represent social problems and
policies. In the Romanian document, there is something resembling this
articulation in the list of four policies, but it is significantly different. First, this
articulation is only within strategies to achieve the assumed strategic goal of the
“IS,” whereas in the Lisbon Declaration the articulation of economic and social
discourses is present in the formulation of problems, strategic goal, and
strategies for achieving it. Second, and connectedly, it is only social policies that
are represented, not social problems. Third, the social policies represented relate
to political issues and “the quality of life,” but not, for instance, to standards of
living (or the key problem of poverty), employment (or the problem of
unemployment), or the major divisions between urban and rural areas and
populations.4 That is, major social problems which one might see as demanding
social policies (including those focused upon in the Lisbon Declaration,
(un)employment, social and regional cohesion) are not represented.
I shall make a few comments on the articulation of discourses within the
listed policies. In the first, a relation of equivalence is textured between
“democracy” and “(the institutions of) the state of right,”5 which one can see
as significant in the recontextualization of the discourse of “e-government” (as
a constituent discourse of both the nodal discourses): the aim of establishing
the “state of right” was one of the key ways in which Romanian society after
1989 differentiated and distanced itself from the Ceausescu era. However, the
equivalence relations within the formulation of the means for achieving the
policy (between “the participation of citizens in public life,” “the facilitation of
non-discriminatory access to public information,” “improvement of the quality
of public services,” modernization of public administration”) constitute an
articulation of discourses that one might find in the “e-government” policies of
62 Norman Fairclough

EU members. In the third, the policy of “improving the quality of life” is

represented as a means to “integration into Euro-Atlantic structures and the
Global Information Society.” This is again significant with respect to
recontextualization. “Integration into Euro-Atlantic structures,” subsuming
integration into the EU, is often formulated as a Romanian policy objective
which has been interpreted as merging in a confused way EU membership and
NATO membership (Repere 2004). Policies for improving the quality of life are
a means to this end in that they are among the conditions Romania must meet
(in the acquis communitaires and the “e-Europe” initiative) for joining the EU.
If we look at the arguments and explanations given in the document as a
whole for Romania’s adoption of the “IS” as a strategic goal, it may clarify what
problems it is covertly construed as a solution to. ICT is “considered an
important engine for boosting the national economy and promoting national
interests.” Romania has adhered to the objectives of the “e-Europe” program,
“considering them a beneficial framework for the urgent process of integration
in the EU.” If Romania is not rapidly integrated into “Euro-Atlantic structures”
(the strategy of the “IS” is represented as a precondition for this), “the economic
gap between our country and developed countries will grow.” What is noteworthy
is that factors to do with the economy, “national interests,” and EU integration
are included, but — in contrast with the Lisbon Declaration — social factors
(unemployment, poverty, social exclusion, social and regional cohesion) are not.
These are the cases of Romania being specifically and explicitly referred to.
There is a much larger number of others, in which arguments for the “IS” are
given in general terms, without reference to particular countries, which can be
seen as implicitly applying to Romania. Apart from the first chapter, these are
mainly economic arguments (e.g., “developing countries can obtain certain
economic advantages from rapidly capitalizing on the opportunities offered by
ICT and especially electronic commerce”). In the first chapter, there are a
number of general claims about the “IS” which might be taken as implicit
arguments in favor of adopting it as a strategic goal, and these do include
solutions to social problems (see the paragraph quoted earlier). But these
arguments do not of course address Romania’s particular and in some ways quite
specific social problems (e.g., approximately forty percent of the workforce is
still employed in agriculture).
In Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999), we argued that recontextualization
is a colonization-appropriation dialectic. There is both a process of an “external”
discourse colonizing the recontextualizing practices (country, field, organization
etc.), and a process of the “external” discourse being appropriated within the
recontextualizing practices. In principle, one can claim that there is no
colonization without appropriation — recontextualization is always an active
process on the part of “internal” social agents of inserting an “external” element
into a new context, working it into a new set of relations with its existing
elements, and in so doing transforming it. This is often manifested in the
 Discursive Transition in Central and Eastern Europe 63

interdiscursive hybridity of texts, the mixing of “external” with “internal”

discursive elements. Moreover, in strategic terms one could argue that strategic
relations between “external” and “internal” social agents will always be inflected
by strategic relations between “internal” social agents.
However, it is necessary to add two provisos to this theoretical account. First,
the degree to which recontextualization becomes an active process of
appropriation entailing potentially substantive transformation of
recontextualized elements (which includes the possibilities of them being
strategically used by some “internal” agents in their struggles with others, being
contained or marginalized or contested, etc.) depends upon the state of the
relations between “external” and “internal” agents and of relations between
“internal” agents. Recontextualizing contexts may manifest degrees of passivity.
Second, however active the process of appropriation, one cannot assume that
it will be equally active in all practices within the recontextualizing context (e.g.,
a nation-state such as Romania).
In general terms, the room for autonomous agency and initiative in
contemporary Romania with respect to the main lines of economic and social
policy and activity is rather limited. Romania is strongly committed to integration
into the European Union and “Euro-Atlantic structures” and to maintaining
good relations with and the support and assistance of the EU, the US, EU states,
international agencies (UNO, World Bank, IMF, and so forth), and these come
with conditions attached which leave Romania with little room for maneuver. I
have shown in the analysis of the “National Strategy” document that, rather than
being explicitly legitimized as solutions to Romania’s particular problems,
strategic goals are implicitly legitimized through idealized claims about the “IS”
construed as a universal reality, and by reference to Romania’s international
commitments. Any state is faced with the problem of legitimizing its goals,
strategies, and policies, and these can perhaps be seen as the legitimizing
strategies adopted by the Romanian government (though such a conclusion
would require more extensive analysis of policy documents and other
government material). Given its international position, one might argue that
Romania does not have the option of formulating goals, strategies, and policies
on the basis of an analysis of its specific problems and needs. Though Boia
(1999), in distinguishing “defensive” and “offensive” Romanian responses to
integration with “the West” over the course of modern Romanian history,
suggests that it is a characteristic of the “offensive” (integrationist) responses
to proceed with scant regard for the consequences in the already profound social
divisions and inequalities in the country.

Conclusion
Miroiu (1999) describes the “mental cramp” she experienced in discussing
Romanian problems with Western academics, and her realization that Romanian
64 Norman Fairclough

realities could not be grasped in their conceptual frameworks. I think this is in

part an issue of methodology. Bourdieu’s approach to constructing the “object
of research” implies a progressive articulation or rapprochement of topics of
research with theories and methods in the course of defining and refining the
“object of research,” rather than immediately approaching the topic of research
armed with ready-made theories and methods. What is implied is that theories
and methods appropriate to the object of research and particular to this object
of research should be progressively constructed out of existing resources of
theory and method, which can quite legitimately include theories and methods
hitherto used only “elsewhere,” be that in different parts of the world, different
areas of research, or different disciplines.
We also need to draw distinctions, with respect to theory, among different
types of theory. Metatheories (such as “critical realism” as a philosophy of
science) and general theories (such as the theory of discourse I have sketched
here, or regulation theory) generally travel better than “local theories” (e.g.,
theories focused upon particular social fields in particular sorts of society, such
as theories of education, media, or social welfare in social democratic societies).
This is not to say that research in particular sorts of society may not lead to
specific critiques of metatheories or general theories. There are, for instance,
apparently general theories whose covert particularity is revealed by working
with them in new contexts — recently influential economic theories are a case
in point. And even with general theories, one needs to carefully distinguish what
is general about them from particularities that attach to them because of the
specific research topics they have been used to address and the specific localities
of such research. This is certainly true for CDA: the categories of “order and
discourse,” “discourses,” “genres,” styles,” “interdiscursivity” are among those
which belong to the general theory, whereas categories such as “marketization”
or “conversationalization” which have figured quite prominently in CDA
research do not, nor does the use of Systemic Functional Grammar for linguistic
analysis of texts. If “conversationalization” proved to be a useless category for
discourse analytical research in Romania, it would not be a problem for the
theory; if “interdiscursivity” did, it would.
CDA’s transdisciplinary way of working makes it difficult sometimes to
separate general from particular. For instance, I would say that
“recontextualization,” a category which originated in Bernstein’s sociology of
pedagogy (Bernstein 1990; Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999) has become a
general category of CDA because it has been fully reinterpreted in discourse-
analytical terms and built into the relational structure of the categories of the
theory, whereas “conversationalization” has not. Moreover the transdisciplinary
way of working and the associated methodology I have pointed to entails that,
in the course of progressively arriving at one’s “object of research,” one is also
seeking to find a coherent synthesis between CDA as a general theory and other
theories which bear upon one’s topic — let us say theories of media and
 Discursive Transition in Central and Eastern Europe 65

mediation, theories of politics, theories of identity, theories of learning — so

that caution is always needed about non-reflexively “importing” inappropriate
or misleading particularities.
Finally, let me note the limited nature of what I have done in this chapter,
and point to directions in which this research will be developed.
1. I have looked at recontextualization only with respect to policy texts. One
would also need material from within particular institutions (e.g.,
educational), businesses, localities, political parties, etc. to arrive at a fuller
assessment. Such an extension of the data might also provide evidence of
a more active appropriation of these discourses, hybrid relations between
these and other discourses, and strategic differences in their
recontextualization, than I have been able to show in this chapter.
2. A commonplace in commentaries on transition is that they are, in the much-
used expression of the nineteenth century Romanian literary critic
Maiorescu, “form without content”— as modernization and westernization
in Romania have always been, many would add. The language of
modernization is readily “imitated” from the West, but without much change
in social realities. Such claims make it particularly important to go beyond
public policy documents in looking at recontextualization, and especially
to research the operationalization of discourses such as the “IS” and the
“knowledge economy,” not only by looking, for instance, at how imaginaries
for “e-government” are being operationalized in, for instance, the setting
up of a government Web portal (www.guvernare.ro) but also through
ethnographic research in localities, companies etc. which can give insights
into the relationship among discourses, rhetoric, and reality.

Notes

1. Godin (2004) lists some seventy-five terms for societal transformation

between 1950 and 1984 alone, including “post-industrial society,”
“neocapitalism,” and “management society.”
2. The stance of key states (notably the US, European states, Japan) and
international institutions and agencies (the World Bank, the IMF, etc.)
towards strategies and discourses is one important factor in the outcome
of struggles for hegemony. Godin (2004) traces the displacement of
“national systems of innovation” (NSIs) by “knowledge-based economy” as
the favored strategy of the OECD in the 1990s.
3. In Fairclough 2003, I suggest analysis of the texturing of relations of
“equivalence” and “difference” as the operationalization in textual analysis
of the view of the political (which one can extend more generally to social
action) in Laclau and Mouffe (1985) as constituted through the
simultaneous operation of the “logics” of “equivalence” and “difference.” I
66 Norman Fairclough

see this as a case of textual analysis being enriched through transdisciplinary

dialogue.
4. The discourse of “social exclusion,” which is widely used in the EU, is not
widely used in Romania. The discourse of “poverty,” which was, for instance,
displaced by the discourse of “social exclusion” in the UK in the language
of New Labour (Fairclough 2000), is, by contrast, widely used, though it
appears only once in this document — the issue of poverty is not otherwise
referred to.
5. I use the term “state of right” as equivalent to the German term
“Rechtsstaat.”

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68 Norman Fairclough

Appendix

Text 1: Extract from the Lisbon Declaration: (“A STRATEGIC GOAL FOR THE
NEXT DECADE”)

The new challenge. 1. The European Union is confronted with a quantum shift
resulting from globalisation and the challenges of a new knowledge-driven
economy. These changes are affecting every aspect of people’s lives and require
a radical transformation of the European economy. The Union must shape these
changes in a manner consistent with its values and concepts of society and also
with a view to the forthcoming enlargement.
2. The rapid and accelerating pace of change means it is urgent for the
Union to act now to harness the full benefits of the opportunities presented.
Hence the need for the Union to set a clear strategic goal and agree a
challenging programme for building knowledge infrastructures, enhancing
innovation and economic reform, and modernising social welfare and education
systems.
The Union’s strengths and weaknesses. 3. The Union is experiencing its
best macro-economic outlook for a generation. As a result of stability-oriented
monetary policy supported by sound fiscal policies in a context of wage
moderation, inflation and interest rates are low, public sector deficits have been
reduced remarkably and the EU’s balance of payments is healthy. The euro has
been successfully introduced and is delivering the expected benefits for the
European economy. The internal market is largely complete and is yielding
tangible benefits for consumers and businesses alike. The forthcoming
enlargement will create new opportunities for growth and employment. The
Union possesses a generally well-educated workforce as well as social protection
systems able to provide, beyond their intrinsic value, the stable framework
required for managing the structural changes involved in moving towards a
knowledge-based society. Growth and job creation have resumed.
4. These strengths should not distract our attention from a number of
weaknesses. More than 15 million Europeans are still out of work. The
employment rate is too low and is characterised by insufficient participation in
the labour market by women and older workers. Long-term structural
unemployment and marked regional unemployment imbalances remain
endemic in parts of the Union. The services sector is underdeveloped,
particularly in the areas of telecommunications and the Internet. There is a
widening skills gap, especially in information technology where increasing
numbers of jobs remain unfilled. With the current improved economic situation,
the time is right to undertake both economic and social reforms as part of a
positive strategy which combines competitiveness and social cohesion.
The way forward. 5. The Union has today set itself a new strategic goal for
the next decade: to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy
 Discursive Transition in Central and Eastern Europe 69

in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater
social cohesion. Achieving this goal requires an overall strategy aimed at:
• preparing the transition to a knowledge-based economy and society by
better policies for the information society and R&D, as well as by
stepping up the process of structural reform for competitiveness and
innovation and by completing the internal market;
• modernising the European social model, investing in people and
combating social exclusion;
• sustaining the healthy economic outlook and favourable growth
prospects by applying an appropriate macro-economic policy mix.
6. This strategy is designed to enable the Union to regain the conditions
for full employment, and to strengthen regional cohesion in the European
Union. The European Council needs to set a goal for full employment in Europe
in an emerging new society which is more adapted to the personal choices of
women and men. If the measures set out below are implemented against a sound
macro-economic background, an average economic growth rate of around 3%
should be a realistic prospect for the coming years.
7. Implementing this strategy will be achieved by improving the existing
processes, introducing a new open method of coordination at all levels, coupled with
a stronger guiding and coordinating role for the European Council to ensure
more coherent strategic direction and effective monitoring of progress. A
meeting of the European Council to be held every Spring will define the relevant
mandates and ensure that they are followed up.

Text 2: Chapter 4, section 1, of the Romanian “Strategia Na ional Pentru

Promovarea Noii Economii i Implementarea Societa ii Informa ionale”

Obiective globale

Utilizarea larg a tehnologiilor informa ionale i de comunica ii (TIC) conduce

la implica ii profunde în via a social-economic , la transform ri fundamentale
în modul de a realiza produsele i serviciile i în comportamentul uman.
Valorificarea superioar a acestor tehnologii poate asigura progresul economic-
social ce caracterizeaz societatea informa ional , cu condi ia îndeplinirii unor
obiective i orient ri de natur strategic prin politici adecvate st rii societ ii în
care tr im:
1. Consolidarea democra iei i a institu iilor statului de drept prin
participarea cet enilor la via a politic i facilitarea accesului nediscriminatoriu
la informa ia public , îmbun t irea calit ii serviciilor publice i modernizarea
administra iei publice (e-government, e-administration);
70 Norman Fairclough

2. Dezvoltarea economiei de pia i trecerea progresiv la noua economie,

cre terea competitivit ii agen ilor economici i crearea de noi locuri de munc
în sectoare de înalt tehnologie prin dezvoltarea comer ului electronic, tele-
lucrului, a unor noi metode de management al afacerilor, de management
financiar i al resurselor umane, integrarea capabilit ilor TIC în noi produse i
servicii, dezvoltarea sectorului TIC.
3. Cre terea calit ii vie ii prin utilizarea noilor tehnologii în domenii
precum: protec ia social , asisten a medical , educa ie, protec ia mediului i
monitorizarea dezastrelor, siguran a transporturilor etc.. i, pe aceast cale,
integrarea în structurile euro-atlantice i în Societatea Informa ional Global .
4. Consolidarea i dezvoltarea unei ramuri a economiei na ionale care s
asigure realizarea de produse i servicii competitive pe pia a intern i extern ,
cerute de evolu ia lumii contemporane. O ramur a economiei bazat pe
produse i servicii care valorific TIC pe piata intern i, mai ales, la export, ar
permite ocuparea resursei umane în activit i caracterizate de eficien maxim ,
comparativ cu alte ramuri, prin faptul c produsele i serviciile specifice SI contin
o cot ridicat a valorii ad ugate, asociat cu consumuri minime de resurse
materiale i de energie. O asemenea op iune corespunde previziunilor privind
evolu ia societ ii umane în secolul 21, fiind sus inut de experien a ultimilor
zece ani a unor ri de dimensiuni mici, cum sunt Irlanda, Finlanda sau Israelul.
(vezi Anexa nr. 3).
în ultimii ani au intervenit schimb ri importante în evolutia societ ii, cu
un impact major asupra modului în care gândim, muncim, interac ion m,
petrecem timpul liber i în mod special, asupra modului în care realiz m
produsele i serviciile. Schimb rile majore care au produs acest impact i care
vor marca evolu ia societ ii în perspectiva noului mileniu sunt legate în principal
de globalizarea competi iei i a pie ei i de progresele ob inute în domeniul TIC.
În acest context ce defineste Societatea Informa ional , asist m la impunerea
cunoa terii ca un factor critic, determinant, al cre terii economice i al
standardului de viat . De la o diviziune a lumii în raport cu accesul la cunoa tere
i la utilizarea noilor tehnologii din domeniu (“global digital divide”) se poate
ajunge prin strategii adecvate, elaborate la nivel na ional i global, la noi
oportunit i oferite dezvolt rii societ ii la nivel planetar (“global digital
opportunity,” The Okinawa Summit of the G7/G8,” iulie 2000).
Globalizarea i noile TIC impun realizarea produselor i serviciilor la nivelul
standardelor existente pe pia a extern /global , în special pe pia a intern a UE,
în care aceste standarde sunt la nivelul cel mai ridicat.
Realizarea produselor i serviciilor inovative la acest nivel nu se poate asigura
decât prin men inerea i dezvoltarea unei capacit i de cercetare-dezvoltare-
inovare sus inuta i de un transfer tehnologic activ c tre produc torii de bunuri
i servicii. Con tientizarea acestei st ri impune elaborarea unei strategii a
dezvolt rii economiei na ionale i a unor sectoare viabile ale acesteia care s fac
fa competi iei pe pia a intern i extern , mai ales a UE.
 Discursive Transition in Central and Eastern Europe 71

Având exemplul rilor amintite mai sus i prezentate în anexe (Irlanda,

Israel, Finlanda), România trebuie s fac o op iune fundamental pentru
dezvoltarea unei ramuri a economiei care s realizeze produse i servicii cerute
de societatea informa ional , bazat pe tehnologiile informa iei i comunica iilor.

Text 3: English translation Text 2

Overall objectives

The widespread use of ICT produces profound implications for socio-economic

life, and fundamental transformations in the way of producing goods and
services and in human behaviour. Capitalizing more on these technologies can
ensure the socio-economic progress characteristic of information societies as
long as objectives and orientations of a strategic nature are adopted through
policies appropriate to the actual societies in which we live:
1. Consolidation of democracy and the institutions of the state of right
through the participation of citizens in political life and the facilitation of non-
discriminatory access to public information, the improvement of the quality of
public services and the modernization of public administration (e-government,
e-administration);
2. Development of a market economy and progressive movement towards
the new economy, growth in the competitiveness of economic agents and the
creation of new jobs in the high-technology sector through developing electronic
commerce, tele-work, and new methods of business management, financial
management and management of human resources, incorporation of ICT
capacities in new goods and services, development of the ICT sector.
3. Improving the quality of life by using new technologies in areas such as:
social welfare, health, education, protection of the environment and monitoring
of disasters, transport security etc., and thereby integration into Euro-Atlantic
structures and the Global Information Society.
4. Consolidation and development of a national economic framework which
ensures the production of goods and services which are competitive on internal
and external markets, as the evolution of the modern world demands. A branch
of the economy based on goods and services which capitalize on ICT for the
internal market and especially for export would permit a maximally efficient
use of human resources, compared with other branches, because specifically
information society goods and services contain expanded added value associated
with minimal use of material resources and energy. Such an option corresponds
to forecasts about the development of human society in the twenty-first century,
and is confirmed by the experience of several small countries over the last ten
years, such as Ireland, Finland and Israel (see Annex nr 3).
72 Norman Fairclough

Important changes in the development of society have taken place in recent

years, which have had a major impact on the way we think, work, interact, spend
our free time and, especially, on the way we produce goods and services. The
major changes which have produced these effects and which will shape the
development of society in the new millennium are linked especially to the
globalization of competition and the market and progress in the field of ICT.
In this context of the Information Society we are witnessing the
implementation of knowledge as a critical, determining, factor in economic
growth and the standard of living. From the division of the world on the basis
of access to knowledge and use of new technologies in the field (“global digital
divide”), we can, with appropriate strategies developed at national and global
levels, move towards new opportunities for social development at a planetary
level (“global digital opportunity,” The Okinawa Summit of the G7/G8, July
2000).
Globalization and new ICT mean producing goods and services to the
standard of external/global markets, especially the internal market of the EU,
where standards are the highest.
The production of innovative goods and services at this level can only be
achieved through maintaining and developing a capacity for sustained research-
development-innovation and for active technology transfer between producers
of goods and services. Making people aware of this entails developing a strategy
for development of the national economy and for viable sectors within it, which
can compete on internal and external markets, especially the EU.
Given the example of the countries referred to above and presented in the
appendix (Ireland, Israel, Finland), Romania should make a fundamental choice
to develop a branch of the economy which produces the goods and services
demanded by the information society, based on ICT.
5
Cultural Value Change in Mainland China’s
Commercial Discourse
Jieyun Wendy Feng and Doreen Wu

Introduction

Globalization and consumerism in China

In his book Sociology of the Global System , Sklair (1991) argued that the culture-
ideology of consumerism is the key for the successful transition of Third-World
countries to capitalist modernization. And he defined consumerism according
to Wells (1972) as the increase in consumption of the material culture of the
developed countries.
Over the last two decades, China has undergone significant internal changes
along with the external globalization movement. After Mao’s death in 1976,
Deng Xiaoping adopted an “open door” policy to improve Chinese people’s
living standard, and he initiated the change from a planned economy to a
market economy and modernization, though the government also attempted
to advocate a “socialist market economy” and “modernization without
Westernization” (Wang and Chang 1996). In China’s change from a centrally
planned economy to market economy, consumerism is one of the very active
driving forces, as the disposable income of many Chinese people has increased
by a great margin. While eighty percent of the Chinese population in 1978
earned less than ¥1 per day (World Bank 1998), the annual average disposable
income for urban residents in 2004 reached ¥9,422, and the annual average
net income for rural residents amounted to ¥2,936 (for details, please refer to
http://finance.sina.com.cn).
In promoting consumerism and stimulating people’s buying behaviors,
advertising has a very important role to play. In the early 1980s, the
advertisements in mainland China focused on “production materials” aimed at
serving the interests of state-owned work units, and few of them targeted
individual consumers. This was the period called “high accumulation for the
74 Jieyun Wendy Feng and Doreen Wu

nation, low consumption for the individuals” (Huang 1997, 357). However, when
it came to the 1990s and early 2000s, the majority of the advertisements
appearing in various media aimed at increasing individual consumption, ranging
from health-care products to luxurious villas.

Socio-cultural communication and the growth of Internet advertising

Leiss, Kline, and Jhally (1990, 5) pointed out that “advertising is not just a
business expenditure undertaken in the hope of moving some merchandise off
the store shelves, but is rather an integral part of modern culture. Its creation
appropriate and transforms a vast range of symbols and ideas.” Examining the
discursive practice of advertising provides some indication of the current
dynamics in a particular society.
Regarding the design and construction of advertisements, past researchers
have mainly focused on those using the traditional media, i.e., the content
dimension of the ads in the newspaper, magazine, radio, and/or TV media, as
these traditional media have been the dominant and useful communication
outlets for producing commercials and promoting consumerism. But now a new
medium — Web/Internet advertising — has emerged and begun to compete
with these conventional means of communication.
Although Web advertising is not yet the most dominant mass medium in
China, it has been growing at an unprecedented rate. The Internet was first
introduced to China in 1994, and by the end of 2003, there were 79,500,000
Internet users, 308,900,000 online computers, and more than 595,550 websites
in China, according to the thirteenth release report on China’s Internet
development from CNNIC (China Internet Network Information Center) on
January 15, 2004. Correspondingly, Internet advertising has been developing
very fast through these years. The first Web ad in China appeared in the
homepage of the sohu website in July 1997, and in 2003, the total income of
Internet advertising in mainland China reached ¥300,000,000,000. Apparently,
in China’s move towards consumerism, it is of great theoretical significance to
undertake empirical research on the discursive practice of Web ads.
Therefore, this chapter attempts to examine the discursive practice of Web
advertising in China, investigating how consumerism is promoted and how
linguistic-cultural dynamics are reflected and constructed through Web
advertisements. Three broad research concerns guide the investigation of this
chapter:
(1) What is the main target group of Chinese Web advertising?
(2) What are the main value appeals used in the Chinese Web ads that reflect
and construct the values and preferences of its target audience?
(3) What are the main characteristics of the language use in Chinese Web ads
that reflect and construct the linguistic practice and preferences of its target
audience?
 Cultural Value Change in Mainland China’s Commercial Discourse 75

Literature review

In the past few years, there has been a distinct increase in the study of Chinese
Web advertising. These studies explored the newly emerged medium from a
macro perspective. For example, studies on the status quo and future
development of Chinese Web advertising have been conducted and documented
(e.g., Song 1999), and inherent features unique to the new medium such as
interactivity and multimedia dimensions have been much discussed (e.g., Xu
2002). In addition, there are explorations concerning how the government and
its administrative department should effectively monitor the operation of the
industry and how the legal issues concerned should be addressed (e.g., Zhou
2001). Brief discussions can also be found about the culture embodied in Web
advertising and about the differences between Web advertising and newspaper
advertising (Xu et al. 2000; Zhang et al. 2002).
Despite the dramatic growth of the research about Internet as an advertising
medium in China, there are few empirical studies (e.g., Feng 2004) on the
content dimensions of Chinese Web advertisements, and few studies have
attempted a more micro perspective investigating the discourse structuring in
Chinese Web advertising.
Review of the literature also shows that studies of Chinese ads in the
traditional media have focused primarily on value appeals — one important
dimension in the content construction of the ads. It has been found that, while
Chinese advertising in the 1980s and in the early 1990s tended to emphasize
product information and utilitarian appeals (Ramaprasad et al. 1995; Tse et al.
1989), most of the studies in the 1990s reported that utilitarian values conveyed
in ads were decreasing, and symbolic values such as hedonism and self-fulfillment
were increasing. Along with the increase of symbolic values, it has been
discovered that ads in the 1990s with Western values increased in frequency
(Cheng 1997; McIntyre and Wei 1998).
Needless to say, value appeals constitute an important dimension in
examining the content construction of ads, and they are powerful forces in
shaping consumers’ motivations, lifestyles, and product choices (Tse et al. 1989).
Nevertheless, systematic studies of language use — another important aspect
of ad construction — are largely left unexplored in Chinese media studies. As
a matter of fact, value appeals and language use are two important dimensions
that constitute an ad for a product or service, and both should be taken into
account (Ha 1998). Based on this argument, in order to depict a fuller picture
of how advertising strategies are created in promoting consumerism, a trans-
disciplinary approach is needed, and in this case a combination of linguistic
analysis and value appeal analysis in mass communication research. The present
research, therefore, attempts to fill in the research gaps by incorporating
linguistic analysis with value appeal analysis in examining the discursive practice
of Chinese Web advertising, investigating how consumerism is promoted and
76 Jieyun Wendy Feng and Doreen Wu

how cultural-linguistic dynamics are reflected and constituted via such discursive
practice.

Hypotheses

A review of the previous studies provides a good basis for formulating our
hypotheses. It is argued in the present study that an investigation of the main
target audience of Web advertising becomes essential before looking into the
dimensions of language use and value appeals. According to CNNIC’s thirteenth
release report on China’s Internet development, among regular Internet users
in China, 18.8 percent are aged below 18, 34.1 percent aged between 18 and
24, 17.2 percent aged between 25 and 30, and 12.1 percent aged between 31
and 35. In total, 63.4 percent of the Chinese Internet users are aged between
18 and 35 (for details, see Figure 5.1).

40.00%

35.00%
34.10%
30.00%

25.00%
18.80%
20.00% 17.20%
15.00% 12.10%
10.00% 7.60%
6.40%
5.00% 3.00%
0.80%
0.00%
aged below aged aged aged aged aged aged aged
18 18–24 25–30 31–35 36–40 41–50 51–60 above 60

Figure 5.1 Age distribution of the Internet users in China (from CNNIC)

It is indicated from Figure 5.1 that Web advertising in mainland China

primarily targets the younger generation. It is therefore proposed that
advertising strategies including value appeals and language use should typically
reflect the youth culture, and understanding the main characteristics and
preferences of young Chinese people thereby becomes crucial for Web
advertisers who always keep their target consumers in mind.
One prominent feature of the younger generation in mainland China is
their extensive exposure to the Western lifestyle since China began to implement
reform and open-door policies in 1979. Many studies reveal that young Chinese
show a stronger preference for Western culture than the older generation. Wei
(1997) suggested that the modern and Generation X segments viewed
 Cultural Value Change in Mainland China’s Commercial Discourse 77

advertising positively, spent freely, and favored a Western lifestyle. Wei and Pan
(1999) reported three stable consumerist value orientations in the 1990s:
conspicuous consumption, aspiration for self-actualization, and worshipping
Western lifestyles. Those who were younger, better educated, and financially
better off were the most likely bearers of these values. Wang (1997) indicated
that foreign ads were perceived as better than domestic ads by some young
Chinese consumers at a Shanghai vocational school. What underlay these young
Chinese consumers’ overwhelming preference for foreign ads seemed to be their
curiosity about and yearning for the exotic and affluent Western “Other.” Zhang
and Harwood (2002) also suggested that their respondents, Chinese college
students, expressed their preference for viewing the TV programs from the US.
Based on previous studies on the younger generation’s strong preference
for Western culture, the first hypothesis (H1) is generated as:
H1: Western value appeals occur more frequently in Chinese Web
ads than Eastern values.

Closely associated with H1 regarding the preference of Western values, it

is postulated that Chinese Web ads should be characterized by English mixing.
It has been found (e.g., Bhatia 1992; Lee, 2000) that the use of English connotes
westernization and modernization in Third-World countries. In other words, if
young people are pro-Western in value appeals, it is very likely that they also
enjoy English mixing while reading Chinese Web ads. Furthermore, these young
people, unlike the older generation, have obtained a certain knowledge of the
English language, as most of them have received some years of education. It is
revealed in Figure 5.2 that 86.5 percent of Internet users received senior high
school education or above. In the school years of these people, English language
is a compulsory course and, moreover, for university/college students, it has
become a requirement to passing the national College English Test Band 4,
which means much to their future job hunting.

35.00%
29.30%
30.00% 27.40% 27.10%
25.00%
20.00%
15.00% 13.50%

10.00%
5.00% 2.20%
0.50%
0.00%
below senior junior BA MA PhD
senior high college degree degree degree
high school
school

Figure 5.2 Educational levels of the Internet users in China (from CNNIC)
78 Jieyun Wendy Feng and Doreen Wu

For the reasons above, the second hypothesis is formulated as:

H2: English mixing is easily found in Chinese Web ads.

Although it has been reported that there is an increase of symbolic values

in Chinese ads over the past two decades, previous research (e.g., Cheng 1997;
McIntyre et al. 1998) suggested that utilitarian value appeals (e.g., “quality”,
“technology”, “informative”) remained predominant in the 1990s. This reveals
that China is still a low-income country and utilitarian appeals still have much
selling power. Furthermore, as the main target consumers of Web advertising
are young Chinese — aged in their twenties or early thirties and either are still
in school or have just started to work after graduation — their consumption
power for luxury commodities is limited, and utilitarian values have much appeal
to them (Han 2004; Zhong 2004). Therefore, the third hypothesis is postulated
as follows:
H3: Utilitarian values occur more frequently in Chinese Web ads
than symbolic values.

Another important feature of youth in mainland China is their reluctance

to follow long-standing traditions, as the past two decades have witnessed
tremendous socio-cultural changes. What many young Chinese have in mind is
to pursue lives that their parents and grandparents never dreamed of. Longing
to establish their own lives and develop distinctive identities are important
characteristics of contemporary Chinese youth. And according to Wu (2000)
and Wu et al. (2004), the means for young people to construct a distinctive
identity can be manifested in their use of unconventional language. Hence, the
fourth hypothesis is presented as:
H4: Unconventional language use is easily found in Chinese
Web ads.

Research methodology
Sampling

Samples for this study are based on the release report provided by CNNIC, which
serves as the national Internet Information center. CNNIC was established on
June 3, 1997, and affiliated with the Ministry of Information Industry and
Chinese Academy of Science. Starting in 1998, CNNIC releases reports on
Chinese Internet development every January and July, and its authority has been
widely recognized (for details about CNNIC, please refer to www.cnnic.com.cn).
On July 27, 2000, it listed the ranking of Chinese commercial websites, in a
report entitled The Most Influential Commer cial Websites in China. The top ten
websites and their scores are as follows:
 Cultural Value Change in Mainland China’s Commercial Discourse 79

1. http://www.sina.com.cn 79532
2. http://www.sohu.com 63987
3. http://www.163.com 60352
4. http://www.263.net 45006
5. http://cn.yahoo.com 38005
6. http://www.163.net 28047
7. http://www.21cn.com 25949
8. http://www.china.com 21612
9. http://www.chinaren.com 20006
10. http://www.yesky.com 17092

It is worth noting that, due to the sensitivity of ranking commercial websites,

CNNIC ceased to score these websites after July 27, 2000, and the present
research is based on the latest ranking that could be obtained. What is more,
unlike the first nine integrated websites, yesky.com, the tenth, is a specialty
website confined to promoting IT products and technologies. It is therefore
excluded from our sampling, since a specialty website is too limited in product
categories and may not be a good representative of Chinese integrated websites.
Finally, data collected from the top nine Chinese websites were examined for
the present study.
The unit of analysis was all the flash ads (also called animated ads) from
the homepages of the top nine commercial websites during February 23–26,
2004 (for details of the collection of the ads, see Table 5.1). Flash ads were
chosen as sampling data because they easily attract the attention of the audience
and manifest the salient features of Chinese Web ads. The period February 23–
26 2004 was selected randomly, since there were no intervening festivals involved
and the Web ads displayed their normal practices.

Table 5.1
Collection of 119 flash ads from the top nine Chinese websites

Name of website Number of flash ads (T= 119) Date of collection

sina.com 14 Feb 23, 2004
sohu.com 15 Feb 23, 2004
163.com 14 Feb 23, 2004
263.net 14 Feb 25, 2004
cn.yahoo.com 25 Feb 25, 2004
163.net 13 Feb 25, 2004
21cn.com 10 Feb 25, 2004
china.com 8 Feb 25, 2004
chinaren.com 6 Feb 26, 2004
80 Jieyun Wendy Feng and Doreen Wu

Coding scheme for value appeals

The categorization of value appeals was mainly based on McIntyre and Wei
(1998). Two more cultural values were incorporated into the scheme for the
present study: “use of Western symbols” and “use of Eastern symbols.” In our
final coding scheme, for the purpose of hypothesis testing (H1 and H3) of
value appeals, Western values were defined as comprising the values of
“competition,” “individualism,” “modernity,” “sex appeal,” and “use of
Western symbols.” Eastern values were defined as comprising the values of
“collectivism,” “family,” “respect for the elderly,” “tradition,” and “use of
Eastern symbols.” In addition, “utilitarian values” were defined as involving
the values of “convenience,” “economy,” “effectiveness,” “information,”
“quality,” and “technology.” Symbolic values were defined as involving the
values of “enjoyment,” “modernity,” “beauty,” “youth,” and “social status.”
The operational definitions of these cultural values are provided in Table
5.2.

Table 5.2
Operational definitions of the identified values in Chinese Web ads

Utilitarian Values
Convenience: Product is suggested to be handy and easy to use.
Economy: Inexpensive, affordable, and cost-saving nature of product is emphasized.
Effectiveness: Product is suggested to be powerful and capable of achieving certain ends.
Information Only: Only information about the product or service is provided. No socio-
cultural values are manifested.
Quality: The excellence and durability of product are emphasized. For example,
product is claimed to be a winner of a medal or of a certificate awarded
by a government department for its high quality, or is demonstrated and
shown to have excellent performance.
Technology: Advanced and sophisticated technical skills to engineer and manufacture
a particular product are emphasized.

Symbolic values
Beauty: It is suggested that the use of a product will enhance the beauty,
attractiveness, or elegance of an individual.
Enjoyment: Product will make the user wild with joy. Typical examples include the fun
that beer or soda drinkers demonstrated in some commercials.
Modernity: Being new, contemporary, up-to-date, and ahead of the times is
emphasized.
Social status: The use of a product is claimed to elevate the position or rank of the user
in the eyes of others. The feeling of prestige, trendsetting, and pride in
the use of a product is conveyed. The promotion of a company manager’s
status or fame by quoting him or her or showing the manager’s picture in
a commercial is included in this category.
 Cultural Value Change in Mainland China’s Commercial Discourse 81

Youth: The worship of the younger generation is shown through the depiction
of younger actors/models. The rejuvenating benefits of the product are
stressed, e.g., “Feel young again!”

Typical Western values

Competition: Emphasis is on distinguishing a product from its counterparts by aggressive
comparisons. While explicit comparisons may mention competitors’
names, implicit comparisons may use expressions such as “number one”
or “leader.”
Individualism: Emphasis is on the self-sufficiency and self-reliance of an individual —
or on the individual as being distinct and unlike others.
Modernity: (Refer to the definition under the category of symbolic values.)
Sex appeal: Commercial uses glamorous and sensual models or has a background
of lovers holding hands, embracing, or kissing.
Use of Western: The ad shows the symbols that are associated with the West in an
symbols explicit way.

Typical Eastern values

Collectivism: Emphasis is on the individual in relation to others, typically in the
reference group. Individuals are depicted as integral parts of the group.
Family: Emphasis is on family life and family members. The commercial stresses
family scenes: getting married, companionship of siblings, kinship, being
at home. Suggestion that product is good for the whole family.
Respect for the: The commercial displays respect for older people by using elderly
elderly actors/models, or asking the opinions, recommendations, and advice
of elders.
Tradition: The experience of the past, customs and conventions are represented.
Use of Eastern: The ad shows symbols that are associated with the East in an explicit way.
symbols
NB: To check for coder reliability, all ads were coded independently by two coders. The
intercoder reliability exceeds the minimum ratio of eighty-five percent suggested by Kassarjian
(1977). Thus, the coefficients of reliability obtained are believed to be satisfactory.

Coding scheme for language use

Two hypotheses in the present study (H2 and H4) are concerned with language
use, i.e., English mixing and unconventional language use in Chinese Web ads.
For the purpose of hypothesis testing, “English mixing” is coded if English
language is used in a Chinese Web ad, no matter whether it is an occurrence
of one single English word, an English phrase, or an independent English
sentence.
“Unconventional language use” refers to two types: (1) deliberate “misuse”
of fixed Chinese phrases, and (2) use of popular phrases that are confined to
the Chinese youth, i.e., the usage has not been extended to the other segments
of the society. The coding scheme is that any occurrence of (1) or (2) will be
82 Jieyun Wendy Feng and Doreen Wu

marked as “unconventional language use,” and all 119 flash ads were coded
and analyzed.

Results and discussion

A total of 119 flash ads, which were collected from the top nine Chinese
integrated websites, were coded for their value appeals and language use.

Value appeals in Chinese Web ads

The overall frequency/distribution of the twenty value appeals are as follows:

economy (count fifty, thirty-two percent), sex appeal (count thirty-four, twenty-
two percent), enjoyment (count ten, six percent), modernity (count nine, six
percent), convenience (count eight, five percent), effectiveness (count seven,
four percent), individualism, informative, quality (all count six, four percent),
Western symbols (count five, three percent), technology (count four, three
percent), beauty (count two, one percent), tradition, youth (both count one,
one percent), competition, family, collectivism, respect for the elderly, Eastern
symbols, social status (all count zero, zero percent).
We can observe that “economy” (thirty-two percent) is the predominant
value. The value of “economy” is typically conveyed through “digital camera,
free of charge”; “ hot sale, RMB¥ for a disc”, “RMB ¥5 for an Oscar VCD.” It is
apparent that Web advertisers tried to stimulate the younger generation’s buying
behaviors by stressing the quality of “economy” in their products or services.
Next to “economy,” the most important value is “sex appeal,” which
comprised twenty-two percent of all values. The value of “sex appeal” is typically
manifested through “a passionate encounter in a bar,” “let’s register and get
married online!”, and so on. It could be observed that the advertisements
encourage the young people’s free attitude towards love and sexual activity,
which is in striking contrast with the deep-rooted Chinese tradition, i.e., the
values of lifelong love, and sex only after marriage.
In order to test the two hypotheses (H 1 and H3) regarding value appeals,
four types of cultural values (utilitarian, symbolic, Western, and Eastern) were
categorized and added up among the twenty cultural values. See Tables 5.3 and
5.4 for details.
To test the first hypothesis, frequencies of all “Western” values — i.e., values
containing “sex appeal” twenty-two percent, “individualism” four percent,
“modernity” six percent, “competition” zero percent, and “use of Western
symbols” three percent — were summed. The same was done for Eastern values:
“collectivism” zero percent, “family” zero percent, “tradition” one percent,
“respect for the elderly” zero percent, and “use of Eastern symbols” zero percent.
 Cultural Value Change in Mainland China’s Commercial Discourse 83

Table 5.3
A comparison between Western and Eastern cultural values
(flash ads collected from the top nine Chinese websites, February 23–26, 2004)

Categorization of Specific values No. of Percentage

cultural values occurrences
Western values Sex appeal 34 22%
(total: 35%) Modernity 9 6%
Individualism 6 4%
Use of Western symbols 5 3%
Competition 0 0%
Eastern values Tradition 1 1%
(total: 1%) Family 0 0%
Collectivism 0 0%
Respect for the elderly 0 0%
Use of Eastern symbols 0 0%

Table 5.4
A comparison between utilitarian and symbolic cultural values
(flash ads collected from nine Chinese websites, February 23–26, 2004)

Categorization of Specific values No. of Percentage

cultural values occurrences
Utilitarian values Economy 50 32%
(total: 52%) Convenience 8 5%
Effectiveness 7 4%
Quality 6 4%
Information only 6 4%
Technology 4 3%
Symbolic values Enjoyment 10 6%
(total: 14%) Modernity 9 6%
Beauty 2 1%
Youth 1 1%
Social status 0 0%

The results, as reported in Table 5.3, demonstrate the dominance of Western

values in Chinese Web ads. They comprised thirty-five percent of all values, while
the proportion of all Eastern values was as low as only one percent. Thus the
first hypothesis is supported.
Here, the distinction in the use of value appeals between new media and
traditional media merits our special attention. It is interesting to note that “sex
84 Jieyun Wendy Feng and Doreen Wu

appeal” (twenty-two percent), a typical Western value, has been well accepted
by Chinese Web advertisers, although Cheng et al. (1996) suggested that “sex
appeal” is one of the disfavored values in Chinese TV commercials. “Family,” a
typical Eastern value, was reported by Wei (1998) to be the most frequently used
value in the ads of radio and TV, but in our sampling data, there is no
occurrence of this value. It is predicted that Web advertising, which views young
people as their main target group, may resort to Western value appeals more
frequently than traditional advertising media such as TV, newspaper, radio, and
magazine, which cover a wider readership.
To test the third hypothesis, all utilitarian values (economy, convenience,
effectiveness, quality, and information, technology) are added together; the total
percentage is fifty-two. In comparison, if all symbolic values (beauty, enjoyment,
social status, youth, and modernity) are summed up, the percentage reaches
only fourteen. It is obvious that utilitarian values occur more frequently than
symbolic values. Hence, the third hypothesis is supported.
The predominance of utilitarian appeals in the Web ads reflects the fact
that the consumption power of the targeted young Chinese is still limited, as
most of them are either still in university or have not been in a professional
career for a long time. Therefore, offering discounts/gifts or other incentives,
rather than highlighting the symbolic values that their products/services may
embody, has become the most frequently adopted strategy by the Web
advertisers.

Language use in Chinese Web ads

All of the 119 flash ads in our sampling data were analyzed to test the two
hypotheses regarding language use (H2 and H4). It is found that thirty-five
percent of the ads contain English mixing. With regard to unconventional
language use, seventeen percent of the ads employ “misused fixed Chinese
phrases,” and thirty-six percent of the ads use popular phrases confined to
Chinese youth (see Table 5.5).

Table 5.5
Characteristics of language use in Chinese Web ads
(taken from the top Chinese websites, February 23–26, 2004)

Characteristics of language use No. of occurrences Percentages

English mixing 41 35%
Unconventional “Misuse” of fixed 40 34%
language use Chinese phrases
Use of popular phrases 43 36%
among the youth
 Cultural Value Change in Mainland China’s Commercial Discourse 85

English mixing

In our coding scheme, English mixing includes the use of an English word or
an English phrase embedded in a Chinese sentence, and/or the use of an
independent English sentence. The following are several examples of English
mixing in the Web advertisements. Note that the first line in each example is
the original ad with Chinese characters, the second line in parenthesis is the
Chinese Web ad in Pinyin, and the third line is the English translation.
(1) 彩鈴上陣，和“嘟嘟”聲說 bye-bye.
(Cailing Shangzheng, he “dudu” sheng shuo BYE-BYE.)
Many pieces of pleasant ringing music for you to choose, and it’s time to
say BYE-BYE to the monotonous “DuDu” bell!
(2) Who am I? 康師傅冰紅茶。猜！猜！猜！
(Who am I? Kangshifu binghongcha. Cai! Cai! Cai! )
Who am I? Guess! Guess! Guess! Kangshifu (a brand name) black iced tea.
(3) 這就是音樂 just music. Amoi 夏新音樂隨身听Go!
(Zhe jiushi yinyue just music. Amoi Xiaxin yinyue suishenting Go!)
This is just music. Amoi Xiaxin (a brand name) Walkman. Go!

We can observe that Example (1) has an English compound/expression

“bye-bye” mingled in the Chinese sentence, Example (2) contains an
interrogative clause in English, “Who am I?”, and Example (3) not only contains
an English phrase, “just music,” repeating the meaning of the preceding Chinese
words“這就是音樂”(Zhe jiushi yinyue), but also the brand name “Amoi” in
English, and the imperative clause “Go!”. As also indicated in Table 5.5, 41 ads
out of the 119 occur with English mixing, which suggests that English mixing
is quite a distinctive feature in the Chinese Web ads. Therefore, the second
hypothesis is supported.

Unconventional use of language

It is found in our sampling data that Web advertisers tend to break the rule of
language conventions and deliberately “misuse” some long-standing Chinese
phrases. While such practice has been viewed as language decay and has been
strongly criticized by the language regulation authority in Beijing (e.g., Li 2001;
Wang 2001), it is widely adopted by the advertisers in catering and responding
to the needs of the younger generation, who are searching for their own identity
and trying to be different from the majority of the Chinese. For example:
(4) 英語笑話，情趣笑話，辦公室笑話。有情趣，有“性”趣，讓你快樂每一
天！立即訂閱！
(Yingyu xiaohua, qingqu xiaohua, bangongshi xiaohua. You qingqu, you “xingqu,”
rangni kuailei meiyitian! Liji dingyue.)
86 Jieyun Wendy Feng and Doreen Wu

English jokes, sex jokes, and office jokes in our website. Have fun and have
interest in sex. These jokes make you happy every day! Subscribe
immediately!
(5) 新年新“郵”惠新老用戶其享受！
(Xinnian xin “you” hui xinlaoyonghu qixiangshou!)
New year! New discounts in e-mail service that all customers could enjoy!
(6) 做女人“挺”好。
(Zuo nüren “ting” hao.)
It’s great to be a woman and to have big breasts (a breast-beauty product
ad).

Examples (4) to (6) involve the use of puns, to be specific, homophony,

which is taken by the language purists as the “misuse” of set Chinese phrases.
These unconventional usages tend to employ quotation marks to indicate that
the word/phrases within the quotations imply an unorthodox meaning in the
specific context. For example, the conventional meaning of the phrase 有興趣
(you xingqu) in (4) is “have interest in something,” but the use of the pun 有性
趣 makes it mean something different — “have interest in sex.” Similarly, the
phrase 優惠 (youhui) means “discount,” but the use of homophony 郵惠 (youhui)
in Example (5) specifically refers to “discount in e-mail service.” Also, 挺好 (ting
hao) in Example (6) primarily means: “to be great,” but in this case it holds a
double meaning: “to be great to have big breasts.”
Apart from the deliberate “misuse” of set Chinese phrases, a noticeable
unconventional language use in the Chinese Web ads is the use of phrases that
enjoy popularity only among the young Chinese. For example:
(7) 輕松泡泡龍，高手拿本本
(Qingsong papaolong, gaoshou na BENBEN.)
A happy online game. Master-hands win NOTEBOOK COMPUTERS!
(8) 明日炫寶貝 熱烈選拔中 贏取至酷大獎 票選明日明星
(mingri XUAN BAOBEI relie xuanba zhong yingqu zhiku dajiang piaoxuan mingri
mingxing)
The beauty contest is in progress. Come and vote for the dazzling and sweet
beauties. You’ll get a super-cool prize!

The 本本 (benben) in Example (7) is rarely used by most Chinese people,

but it is understandable and popular among the youth, and specifically refers
to “notebook computers.” 炫寶貝 (xuan baobei) in Example (8) refers to
“dazzling girls who participate in a beauty contest,” and it is terminology
confined to the younger generation in China. The usage of these expressions
may puzzle many older Chinese and language specialists.
 Cultural Value Change in Mainland China’s Commercial Discourse 87

To sum up, deliberate “misuse of fixed Chinese phrases” and “use of popular
phrases confined to the youth” are two typical manifestations of unconventional
language use in the Chinese Web ads. Altogether, 40 ads and 43 ads out of 119
(i.e., 34% and 36% of the ads) involve these two types of unconventional
language use. Therefore, the fourth hypothesis is supported, from which we infer
that young Chinese are eager to live their own lives, and the choice of their
own vocabulary is one index of building their own identities.

Conclusion

Incorporating linguistic analysis with value appeal analysis in examining 119

advertisements from the top Chinese websites in 2004, this study has found that
the advertisers have tried to promote consumerism among young Chinese via a
prevalent use of Western value appeals as well as utilitarian appeals and via the
use of English mixing as well as other types of unconventional language usage.
Apparently, in the context of Web advertising, neither the ideal of
“modernization without Westernization” can be realized nor the norm of
standard linguistic practice can be well observed. The predominance of Western
value appeals (i.e., pleasure/sex appeal, modernity, and individualism) as
manifested in the Chinese Web advertising has indicated that China is under
the considerably strong influence of Western culture. It is also evident that the
negative view towards language mixing and other types of unconventional
language use is no longer compatible with the demands of creativity and
development of Web advertising in today’s China.
It appears to us that the domestic forces of modernization as well as the
economic forces of globalization together with the rise of the global media have
set the stage for a dramatic rise in multilingual and multicultural mix in China.
As pointed out by Pan and Wei (1999, 143), four powerful cultures intertwine
with each other in present-day China: Chinese traditional culture typified by
Confucianism, the dominant Marxism and Maoist thought, contemporary
Western culture, and consumerism embodied by flooding commercial
promotions. Apparently, more research is needed in further investigating how
these competing cultures and concurrently the languages or the varieties of the
language(s) coexist and/or are hybridized in forming and transforming the
society and culture of contemporary China.

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6
A Chinese Christmas Story
Gary Sigley

Introduction

The object of this chapter is to tell a Chinese Christmas story. Christmas

iconography in the shape of the Christmas tree, Santa Claus, reindeer, and tinsel
is becoming increasingly visible in China, particularly in urban areas. Where
once such displays were restricted to large hotels that catered to foreigners, and
foreign student dormitories on Chinese university and college campuses, the
iconography of Christmas has now found its way into department stores,
restaurants, nightclubs, and even small “mom and pop” enterprises. Christmas
has become an increasingly important commercial event in the cycles of
consumption that now characterize China’s consumer economy. The Chinese
Christmas story that I wish to tell here attempts to place this phenomenon in
the broader context of China’s unfolding social transformation in a way that
highlights the complexity and interconnectivity of political, economic, and
cultural domains and discourses in contemporary China.
Does the spread of Christmas mean that Christianity is gaining ground in
China? According to official government figures, the number of Christians in
China is only equivalent to approximately one percent of the population. Other
estimates, which include underground churches that do not figure in official
statistics, put the size of the Christian community at ten percent. However, even
if we take the larger figure, this does not explain the dramatic pace, expansion,
and sheer visibility of Christmas in China over the last several years. Put simply,
the majority of persons taking part in Christmas festivities in China are not
Christian. Therefore, rather than viewing it through the grid of religion, we
should read Christmas in China as a manifestation of China’s increasing
integration into a global consumer economy that will have far-reaching political,
economic, and cultural implications.
92 Gary Sigley

Since the beginning of economic and social reform in 1978, the Chinese
party-state has actively encouraged the development of a consumer society. Deng
Xiaoping argued that, in order for socialism to have continued relevance in
China, it had to deliver sustained material benefits to ordinary people. The
primary goal is to resolve the “food and clothing problem” (wenbao wenti). This
has by and large been achieved for many people in urban China, and some rural
areas, particularly along the eastern seaboard. In these locales, the task has
become one of satisfying, and indeed creating, demand for consumer products.
As incomes have risen in these regions, a consumer and leisure economy has
also emerged. The focus on production that was a hallmark of Maoist socialism
has now been supplemented by an emphasis on consumption.
The party-state has taken the visibility of consumption and leisure, which a
visit to a bustling metropolis like Shanghai will confirm, as vindication that the
reform process is reaping benefits for Chinese citizen-consumers. However, the
dazzling display of consumer goods and leisure lifestyles obscures the flipside
of consumption: not all subjects in the People’s Republic qualify as “citizen-
consumers.” In the factories of Guangdong and Zhejiang provinces, migrant
workers toil to make much of the consumer products that will grace the display
panels of department stores and shopping precincts not just in China but in
many other sites around the globe. For many of the migrant workers who come
from poor rural communities, full participation in the consumer society lies out
of reach; they cannot fully share the fruits of their own labor.
The Christmas story that I wish to tell here centers on this duality of
consumption and production. The study of Christmas in contemporary China
affords us an excellent opportunity to examine the complexity of globalization
in a way that cuts across and highlights the interconnectivity of political,
economic, and cultural domains. As a political issue, Christmas in China,
although extremely commercialized and secular, cannot be completely
disassociated from the Christian religion. The Communist Party of China has
always had an uneasy relationship with religion. Christianity is particularly
problematic insofar as it is viewed as closely tied to the penetration of Western
imperialism and colonialism throughout the modern era. Christmas is also
problematic because its sheer visibility in the urban landscape simply reinforces
the fact that the monopoly the party-state once had over public space has long
since eroded; it must now share the streetscape with blatant commercial
interests. In many cases, the party-state has happily reconciled itself to this
situation as it shifts its emphasis from Marxist ideology to a combination of
nationalism and “bread and circuses.” The phenomenon of Christmas, however,
reinforces that this process also contains challenges and pitfalls, especially as
nationalism takes on exclusive cultural forms that look upon foreign influences
as a threat to a core cultural identity. There is, therefore, an uneasy political
alliance between the ever-changing ideology of the party-state and the further
penetration of global capitalism in which the symbolics of Christmas represent
a significant ideological fault line.
 A Chinese Christmas Story 93

As an economic phenomenon, Christmas tells the tale of China’s rapid

economic growth and increasing integration with the global consumer economy.
A semi-autonomous sphere of economic activity has emerged that abides by
commercial interests that work through the mechanisms of the market. The
consumer economy sponsored by the party-state has produced particular
moments of mass consumption, notably during the traditional Chinese New Year
(Spring Festival) and the officially designated “golden weeks” of tourism and
leisure.1 In this connection, Christmas has emerged as a potential new “golden
week” in its own right, as commercial enterprises attempt to further stimulate
the desires of citizen-consumers, especially those who have disposable income,
for more consumption and leisure. For instance, according to the National
Bureau of Statistics, in December 2002, retail sales rose eighteen percent from
November to reach ¥440.4 billion. It thus comes as no surprise that the study
of Christmas within China has been pioneered not so much by academics or
government departments but by market research firms seeking to both
understand and shape consumer behavior. As Arif Dirlik (2001, 15) notes,
advertising and marketing companies have the Chinese consumer under close
scrutiny, extracting a detailed knowledge of habits, patterns and tastes. Alongside
the emergence of other “Western festivals” such as Valentine’s Day and Mother’s
Day, Christmas is thus perhaps one of the first instances of socially engineered
mass consumption that does not bear the mark of official party-state sponsorship.
Instead, the appearance of these global “foreign festivals” (yangjie) indicates that
the Chinese consumer economy has begun to integrate itself with the
consumption cycles of global capitalism.
Finally, as a cultural phenomenon, Christmas in China is an excellent case
study of the tensions between the discourses of cultural nationalism and
globalization as westernization.2 At this point, it should be noted that “culture”
in this instance is understood not as a fixed and timeless entity but a series of
practices, signs, and concepts that form part of the complex terrain of an always
contested national cultural identity. The celebration and visibility of Christmas
has attracted widespread media and public attention. There are those who
lament that Christmas is a form of cultural colonialism undermining traditional
Chinese festivals, especially Spring Festival. For instance, one commentator
describes the growing popularity of Christmas as akin to the rising fortune of a
“concubine” that is about to become a “wife” proper, the wife that is to be
displaced in this instance being Spring Festival (Yang Min 2003). The
conservative cultural nationalism that has come to characterize the ideology of
the party-state, and indeed a large section of the cultural and intellectual élite,
during the 1990s, has undertaken a major volte-face when it comes to traditional
Chinese culture. Whereas Maoist socialism called for the “destruction of the four
olds” (dapo sijiu), during the reform period, the party-state has “rediscovered”
and “reinvented” cultural traditions as a means of bolstering national unity and
providing an alternative value basis that supports the paramount concern with
94 Gary Sigley

“social stability” (shehui wending) (see Bakken 2000). In this case, Christmas is
seen as a foreign intrusion promoting a value system of hedonism and selfish
individual gratification at odds with that project by the party-state and
conservative cultural élite.
Others, by contrast, hold that Christmas is simply part and parcel of
globalization and internationalization. They argue that, as China “gets on track
with the rest of the world” (yu quanqiu jiegui ) and Chinese cities become
increasingly cosmopolitan, it is only right that Christmas, the “global festival,”
should make an appearance. Alongside international events such as exhibitions,
sporting events, and cultural festivals, Christmas is seen by some, even among
some urban officials,3 as a necessary element of modern urban life, without
which a city cannot really claim to be truly cosmopolitan. From this perspective,
Christmas, especially in its non-religious form, is simply another item of choice
in the consumer market. Whether viewed through the grid of
“cosmopolitanization” in which cultural differences dissipate over time, or the
“clash of civilizations” in which the differences become more intense, it is clear
that Christmas as a cultural phenomenon has become a salutary example of the
position “culture” has taken in contemporary China in debates over national
identity and value systems.
However, as I have already alluded to, behind these political, economic, and
cultural dimensions lies another China. Firstly, it is misleading to assume that
the political, economic, and cultural dimensions represented here are unrelated.
On the contrary, they are symbiotically interconnected in multifarious ways. The
phenomenon of Christmas clearly highlights this interconnectivity insofar it is
at once political, economic, and cultural. The story of Christmas in
contemporary China is made up of a number of competing voices and subject
positions, some of which are no doubt louder than others, but as we shall see
they do not neatly fit the “West/non-West” divide. As Shi-xu (2005, 3–4) suggests,
the study of discourse in non-Western contexts must pay sufficient critical
attention to the dominant position of Western discourse analysis in the general
way in which discourse studies have been carried out since its inception. Shi-
xu’s call for a multicultural approach to discourse studies, like Ien Ang and Jon
Stratton’s (1996) call for a “critical transnational cultural studies,” places
emphasis on challenging the discursive domination of the West by shifting our
attention to the existence of a plurality of cultural discourses. This chapter
wholeheartedly concurs with this approach. However, it is also wary to avoid the
pitfall of simply reworking existing binaries that equates cultural discourse as
national discourse. Cultural discourse can no longer be reduced to simple
national forms, since, in this era of global capitalism, a consumer culture with
global characteristics has made its mark transnationally. At the same time,
cultural discourse within nations is also fractured along the lines of those people
who are included or excluded from this celebration of global consumerism.
 A Chinese Christmas Story 95

Secondly, if cultural citizenship is measured by participation in the

consumer economy in which the older “Confucian” notion of “having culture”
(you wenhua) in the refined and aesthetic sense of the term has been grafted
onto the ability to consume in which “culture” is a product purchased in the
“cultural market” (wenhua shichang ) (and thus the sign of being cultured is
defined not so much by the level of education but by the amount of purchasing
power), then the culturally dispossessed are those at the bottom of the consumer
food chain. These subjects can be divided into two major groups. There are
those who make up the production side of the consumption equation. It is
through their labor that the consumer products are made available. In this
regard, and as I discuss further below, we can confidently say that Christmas is
“made in China.” The other group consists of those who fall completely outside
of the “consumption/production” equation. These subjects are those who have
neither the purchasing nor the labor power to take part in the consumer
economy. In the neoliberal celebration of the global consumer economy, these
are the forgotten people who eke out an existence in the “informal economy”
(or what in Chinese Marxist parlance is known as the “natural economy”) (see
Gibson-Graham 1996). Many of these people live in the poorest and remotest
regions of China, and a significant proportion are made up of members of
China’s “minority nationalities” (shaoshu minzu) (see Schein 2001). Through a
study of Christmas in China, I hope to unite these disparate groups into a single
moment that will shed some light on the situatedness of cultural citizenship and
the citizen-consumer in contemporary China and the interconnectivity of
political, economic and cultural domains and discourses. Now on with the story
…

Christmas among the Ha’ni

This Christmas story begins in December 2002, when I had the good fortune
to travel to the town of Lüchun, a county seat in Honghe Prefecture, Yunnan
Province. The population of the county primarily consists of members of the
Ha’ni nationality. In comparison to other places in Yunnan, such as Dali, Lijiang,
and Xishuangbanna, the county is relatively “underdeveloped,” although there
are plans to open the region to mass tourism in the near future.4 As such, there
are no “visible” signs of “globalization as Westernization.” That is, there is no
Wal-Mart, McDonald’s, or other iconic symbol of westernization (or
Americanization). For someone whose life experience has been significantly
shaped by Western (that is, Australian) culture, I looked forward to the
opportunity to experience a “non-Christmas” Other. Given that, even in
Kunming, the provincial capital of Yunnan, Christmas would be hard to avoid,
the visit to Lüchun was a golden opportunity for me to indulge in the fantasy
of what it must be like to exist in a community as yet untouched by Christmas
96 Gary Sigley

consumerism. However, unbeknown to me, my host had organized a special

surprise Christmas party. Thus, on Christmas Eve, members of the local cultural
troupe entertained the guests with a number of local Ha’ni folk songs and
dances, all of which took place around a massive Christmas tree.5
This special event led me to ponder how long it would be before Christmas
and, by extension, other visible aspects of Westernization, made its debut among
the Ha’ni.6 Thus in the following days, when I had the opportunity to speak to
members of the local Ha’ni cultural élite, both in organized seminars and in
private conversation, I was curious to understand how they understood
“globalization.” This curiosity was equally shared by my Ha’ni interlocutors.
However, during the course of conversation, the terminology invariably shifted
from “globalization” (quanqiuhua) to “sinicization” (hanhua). To the Ha’ni
cultural élite, “globalization” was a vague concept that needed some form of
explanation to make it meaningful. As I noted above, there are no “visible” signs,
at least not at the time of writing, of “globalization as Westernization” in Lüchun.
Instead, cultural change is measured by “sinicization,” by which I mean the
cultural influence of Han Chinese culture.7 The signs of modern Han Chinese
culture in architecture, clothing, and popular culture (e.g., karaoke) were much
more palpable. It therefore made more sense to talk about globalization relative
to “sinicization” (hanhua) rather than to “westernization” (xihua).
This cultural encounter reminded me that “globalization” for many people
is at once an abstract concept and a lived experience. The way in which
globalization is understood, and the significance of aspects of globalization such
as Christmas, will depend on the geographical and cultural location of the
observer. As we shall see below, the discussion of Christmas within the
mainstream Chinese media locates Christmas within a dichotomy of “Chinese”
versus “Western” culture in which “Chinese culture” (zhongguo wenhua) stands
for “Han Chinese culture” (hanzu wenhua). In so doing, the positionality of non-
Han Chinese cultural groups, such as the Ha’ni, are rendered silent, as they do
not figure within this dichotomy of “Chinese” and “Western”; their specifically
cultural discourse has been rendered marginalized and excluded. There is,
however, another way in which such groups are made invisible. Even if the plan
of mass tourism is realized in Lüchun, it is unlikely that many of the Ha’ni who
live in the rugged mountain terrain that characterizes this part of Yunnan will
directly benefit in such a way that they become active members of the consumer
economy.8 Hence, to tell the story of Christmas in China that highlights the
interconnectivity of the political, economic, and cultural domains means we must
pay sufficient attention to the silences and gaps within the dominant discourse.
The experience of the Ha’ni as a marginal ethnic community forces us to
develop a more sophisticated and nuanced understanding of globalization and
associated phenomena such as Christmas.
 A Chinese Christmas Story 97

Christmas in Kunming

Thus concludes, for the moment, the part the Ha’ni have to play in this
Christmas story. I would now like to shift our attention to Kunming, where
Christmas, as in other Chinese cities, has become more prominent over the last
several years. Kunming is itself quite a multicultural city, approximately ten
percent of the population made up of ethnic minorities (which is about the
same proportion for China as a whole). Thus, in the sense that many different
peoples share a common environment, Kunming is a multicultural city. Kunming
is also cosmopolitan in the sense that it also has the visible signs of “globalization
as westernization.” Most of the major fast-food chains are now represented (e.g.,
McDonald’s, KFC, Pizza Hut), as are the large foreign retail department stores
(e.g., Wal-Mart, Carrefour). Kunming is also a major transport hub for the mass
tourism that flows into Yunnan, and the city abounds in hotels, restaurants, and
nightclubs of every grade.9
However, in comparison to cities on China’s eastern seaboard, Kunming is
relatively “undeveloped.” Whereas the Ha’ni considered themselves “backward”
(luohou) compared to the Han Chinese, many Han Chinese who I spoke to in
Kunming regarded Kunming, and Yunnan more generally, as “backward” when
compared to the provinces and cities on China’s eastern seaboard. Hence, when
people in Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou talk of “getting on track with the
rest of the world” (yu quanqiu jiegui), in Kunming this also implied “getting on
track with eastern China” (yu zhongguo dongbu jiegui ). Many of the students I
interviewed, who were studying in the universities and colleges of Kunming and
who themselves came from outside of Yunnan, regarded Kunming’s relative
“backwardness” as both a curse and a blessing. On the one hand, they were
critical of the apparent “slackness” of Kunmingnese who didn’t have a strong
entrepreneurial spirit (for instance, many students complained that the shops
did not open until late in the morning). Yet on the other hand, they had great
praise for the “relaxed” pace of life and the high level of tolerance Kunmingnese
displayed towards outsiders.
In any case, even in this environment, Christmas has made itself very visible.
Most of the major department stores, retail centers, and hotels festoon
themselves with decorations in the lead-up to Christmas. There is little doubt
that the major hotels first brought Christmas to Kunming during the reform
era.10 However, these are places off limits to most urban Chinese. Instead, it is
the large foreign department stores and retail outlets that have “christened”
Chinese consumers in the ways of commercial Christmas.11 A number of students
informed me that they would visit Wal-Mart on Christmas Day, not so much to
consume but to enjoy the Christmas decorations and displays and the general
atmosphere of hustle and bustle.12 In order to compete with foreign retailers,
and no doubt just simply to tap into another potential “golden week,” many
Chinese-owned department stores in Kunming are also getting in on the act.
98 Gary Sigley

Christmas has now become so entrenched in the retail and leisure calendar that
even small shops, cafés, and restaurants feel the need to provide Christmas
atmospherics. Christmas is on the verge of becoming “internalized” and
“normalized” as a natural part of the urban streetscape. When I asked several
small businesses why they put up Christmas decorations, the response was a
surprised, “Because Christmas is coming!” as if the answer should have been
self-evident and the question unnecessary in the first place.
As I noted earlier, a number of commentators in the general media have
observed that Christmas is becoming more important for some urban Chinese.
However, most commentators leave open the question of in what way it is
important to some Chinese urbanites. There are a few basic characteristics of
Christmas in Kunming, and by extension Christmas in China generally, that are
worth mentioning in this regard. Firstly, you don’t need to be Christian to
celebrate Christmas. The secular and commercial dimensions of modern
Christmas are no doubt important features in Western societies, but they seem
even more pronounced in China. There is, for instance, no critique of Christmas
from religious institutions in China, at least not one that is carried widely in
the public media. By contrast, in many Western countries, Christian churches
have periodically attacked the commercialization of Christmas and the associated
iconography as paganistic and degrading to the central theme of the Nativity.13
Christmas in China can therefore be disassociated, although not completely,
from its Christian associations. Indeed, the form of commercialized Christmas
that many partake of is devoid of religious imagery and meaning altogether.
For many, it is this secularization and dethronement of Christmas as a religious
festival that makes its celebration acceptable to non-Christians, insofar as it
signifies that Christmas has shed its parochial and religious origins and become
a truly global and secular festival. For instance, an introduction to Christmas at
sina.com, one of China’s largest Web portals, declared, “Christmas has developed
from being a religious festival to a global popular festival (guojixing de dazhong
jieri)” (Anonymous 2003a).
Yet not only is it unnecessary to be Christian in order to enjoy Christmas;
one does not even need to know of its religious connotations in the first place.
Indeed, many people who “celebrate” Christmas are surprisingly ignorant of the
Christmas story. According to a survey conducted in 2002 by China Marketing,
ninety-six percent of urban Chinese residents knew of Christmas, thirty-three
percent said they had celebrated it in some fashion, sixty-six percent of young
people said they had exchanged gifts and held Christmas parties or picnics, but
only nine percent of respondents knew of the Christian associations of
Christmas, the so-called “story of Christmas.” According to an editorial in The
Economist (Anonymous 2003b), in 2001, a Beijing government survey found, “that
30 percent of the capital’s residents planned to celebrate Christmas. Of these
more than half said they did not know the religious origins of the festival and
less than 3 percent said they wanted to mark Christmas for religious reasons.”
 A Chinese Christmas Story 99

Secondly, Christmas in China is not a family affair. Instead, it is generally

celebrated among friends, with an emphasis on the individual sense of pleasure.
In this connection, as is the case in Japan, Christmas has been described as a
“democratic festival” insofar as it implies freedom to partake in a way of
individual choice and avoid the obligations that are a crucial part of more
traditional festivals. By contrast, Spring Festival remains the central festival of
the family in much of China, and that is not likely to change any time soon.
However, a number of respondents stated that Spring Festival was a bit of a
“drag” and not as exciting and enjoyable as Christmas. Celebrating Spring
Festival meant fulfilling one’s familial and social (i.e., workplace related) duties.
Christmas, by contrast, has no such obligations.
Thirdly, and in relation to the second characteristic, the most active and
boisterous time for Christmas celebration is Christmas Eve and not Christmas
Day. In many Western countries, such as Australia, Christmas Eve is generally a
very quiet affair, as the vast majority of stores, restaurants, cafés and nightclubs
are closed and people tend to stay at home. However, in Kunming and other
Chinese cities, Christmas Eve is a major night of consumption, when nightclubs,
hotels, restaurants, and so on, hold Christmas parties (as Christmas is not a state-
designated holiday, Christmas Day is business as usual for most people). On
Christmas Eve 2003, the major public pedestrian shopping mall in Kunming
was packed with people enjoying the department store displays and pyrotechnics
that were provided. Indeed, when asked how they would celebrate Christmas,
many students I interviewed responded with specific acts of consumption which,
depending on budgets, included shopping, travel, nightclubbing, and going to
the cinema. Some even declared that they would celebrate Christmas by having
a romantic candlelit dinner with their partner, which has led some to refer to
Christmas as the “second Valentine’s Day.”
Fourthly, people can manipulate Christmas iconography in ways unthinkable
in Western contexts. For instance, one article promoted the Christmas tree as a
suitable present. From an Australian perspective this is rather odd, as most
families and households would be expected to erect the Christmas tree several
days before Christmas Day. The gifts are then placed around the Christmas tree.
It is, therefore, inconceivable that the Christmas tree be considered as a suitable
gift. However, in China, the citizen-consumer needs to be educated in the ways
of the commercialized Christmas festival, which includes inculcating the practice
of the Christmas tree.14 But given that some consumers may consider it wasteful
to purchase an item that is only to be used for a brief period each year, the
promotional article suggests, “Not only is the giving of a ‘Christmas Tree’ a good
gift that is richly endowed with festive feeling, but even after the festival has
past it can give the home a feeling that spring is in the air” (Chuncheng Wanbao
2002). The Christmas tree can thus become a more permanent feature of the
home and have a life longer than the Christmas Season itself. Indeed, in some
restaurants and bars, Christmas iconography, particularly that of Santa Claus,
100 Gary Sigley

often remains on display many months after the conclusion of Christmas itself.15
As I noted earlier, the rise of Christmas has accompanied perceptions of
the relative decline (danhua) of Spring Festival. 16 Ironically, the same
commercial and material forces that drive consumer Christmas are also
impacting on Spring Festival to such an extent that some lament that the
traditional values which are seen to be embodied in Spring Festival and which
have become important parts of official neoconservative ideology in the reform
period are under threat. Of particular concern is the perceived decline in family
values, but one in which Christmas is not seen as filling the gap. The perceived
decline of Spring Festival in the wake of imported “foreign festivals” such as
Christmas can be read as a statement on the causal relations between
globalization and cultural change. Spring Festival is an iconic cultural practice
that is quintessentially Han Chinese, a festival that focuses on family and
tradition and, unlike Christmas, is endorsed and promoted by the party-state.
The erosion of Spring Festival is a visible sign of cultural transformation insofar
as its once uncontested status is simply no longer uncontested; in both meaning
and consumption, it must compete with other festivals. For many young people
I interviewed in Kunming, Christmas is regarded as “foreign,” “fashionable,” and
“modern,” while Spring Festival is “Chinese,” “conservative,” and “traditional.”
The visible presence of Christmas is thus a challenge to Spring Festival and Han
cultural nationalism; it is emblematic of the other “intrusions” of the foreign
into China in the form of fast food, fashion, and so forth. There is also a concern
that physical “space” will be overwhelmed by the foreign. There is thus a sense
of loss of control over mainstream Chinese identity, particularly with regards to
the capacity for both individual and nation to control and shape identity.

Christmas made in China: The duality of production and consumption

The kind of packaged Christmas we have been discussing here is a heterogenous

assemblage of many different practices and icons that, during the course of the
nineteenth century, became relatively stable and began to spread to many
different locations over the following century. In its most commercial and well-
known form, the global Christmas that emerges in the twentieth century,
particularly after WWII, is made in the United States (US). During this period,
China was, for several decades after 1949, cut off from developments in global
capitalism and its attendant consumer economy. It goes without saying that
Christmas during this time was a virtual non-entity in China.
However, as a result of the policies of reform and openness post-1978,
Christmas has begun to make a comeback. This paper has already noted in some
detail the extent to which Christmas has emerged in recent years as a part of
the cycles of consumption. Yet before Christmas was ever a significant act of
consumption in China, it was first and foremost a site of production. The
 A Chinese Christmas Story 101

modern version of commercialized Christmas may have been invented (or

reinvented to be precise) in the US, but it would be fair to say that, as an act of
mass material production, Christmas is “made in China.” According to the
Customs Bureau of China, in 2002, China exported more than US$1.4 billion
worth of Christmas-related products, over half of which made their way to the
US. The figures of the US Census Bureau reveal that China accounted for
seventy-nine percent of the $1.4 billion worth of Christmas decorations imported
into the US during the first ten months of 1999.
This is the flipside to the Christmas as consumption story and celebration
of “consumer democracy.” The ongoing process of social stratification that is
unfolding in China is dividing the society into a hierarchy of consumption made
up of those who consume, those who produce for those who consume, and those
most marginalized who can only watch others consume from the sidelines. Those
in the consumer category are a motley crew of high- and low-level consumers.
For high-level consumers, Christmas is another opportunity to use their
disposable income in acts of conspicuous and extravagant consumption. For low-
level consumers, such as college students, the emphasis is on how even minimal
consumption allows one to participate in the “democracy of consumption.”
However, for those like the Ha’ni, or the Miao, described by Schein (2001), in
more remote and poorer regions, the desire to be a consumer is very real but
in many ways remains unachievable; the opportunity to consume enjoyed by
many in an increasingly affluent urban China remains out of reach. In the
consumer-driven media, many, like the Ha’ni, are not even hailed as citizen-
consumers and therefore have no rights of participation. As Pun Ngai (2003,
474, 476) notes:
The mass media, especially television programming and newspaper
headlines, all target their audiences as consumers. The intention is to
stimulate the desiring machine of consumption and simultaneously
provide a process of identification for members of the newly emerging
middle class to position themselves as “modern” and “sophisticated”
citizen-consumers … However, not everyone can be a consumer.

As China becomes increasingly integrated into global capitalism, it should come

as no surprise that the citizen-consumer as consumer, located primarily in urban
areas and in particular in greater numbers on the eastern seaboard, has begun
to take part in the great global waves of consumption such as Christmas. It is
this portion of the population that is “getting on track with the world” in
consumption, heralding the emergence of a global middle class, who, rather
than “clashing,” share a common “civilization of consumption.” But there are a
great many more in the factories and in mountainous regions for whom cultural
citizenship in the form of the citizen-consumer is clearly out of reach. The effects
of global capitalism and structural transformation have different effects on
different groups of people. It is clear that discussion of these effects that
102 Gary Sigley

privileges the nation as the privileged space of cultural resistance to

“westernization” runs the risk of overlooking the significance of the transnational
relations that have now emerged and link different populations and
communities within the nation to the global economy in distinct ways. In this
regard, it no longer makes sense to hold to a rigid “West/East” divide where
never the twain shall meet. As Arjun Appadurai (1990, 6) notes, “the global
cultural economy has to be seen as a complex, overlapping, disjunctive order,
which cannot any longer be understood in terms of existing center-periperhy
models (even those which might account for multiple centers and peripheries).”

Conclusion

Christmas is a thus good example of how China is now integrated into global
cycles of production and consumption. It is also a salutary case study of how
the political, economic, and cultural domains within China overlap and
interconnect. As this chapter has demonstrated, Christmas in China is an
economic phenomenon that manifests itself as both a part of the emerging
consumer economy and as an integral site of material production. Christmas is
also intensely political, insofar as it cuts to the core of longstanding concerns
in China over the status of culture as a marker of national identity. In this
connection, I have argued here that the way in which the dominant division
between “Chinese” and “Western” culture is established within mainstream
Chinese discourse excludes minority cultures that do not readily conform to
the pattern of “Han Chinese culture.” If we shift our gaze to the interior of China
we are constantly reminded that participation in “consumer democracy” is itself
based on a material exclusion that privileges those with cultural and material
capital. Any analysis of cultural phenomenon in China needs to bear this in mind
if it is to tell a story worthy of critical attention. The Christmas story I have
presented here attempts to do just that, not by reducing the narrative to the
mainstream story that everyone knows (that is, the celebration of a progressive
consumer individualism), but by unapologetically complicating the story so as
to jar the reader into cognition of a set of much broader and more important
complexities that are crying out for further analysis and storytelling.

Notes

1. The “golden weeks” are the first week of May and the first week of October.
2. For a study of consumer nationalism in China as a form of assertive cultural
nationalism in the retail product sector, see Hooper (2000).
3. In a sign that the control of the party-state in the ideological domain has
in some cases weakened, in 2001, the Chinese postal service issued stamped
postcards bearing the image of a Chinese-style Santa.
 A Chinese Christmas Story 103

4. The county is an officially designated “poor county” (pinkun xian).

5. There is actually a rather interesting connection here between the Christmas
tree and the belief system of the Ha’ni. The Ha’ni practice a form of
animism in which certain trees are designated as sacred. No doubt the
origins of the Christmas tree are similar. Thus in some ways, the Ha’ni may
be closer to the “spirit of Christmas,” especially with regards to the symbolics
of the Christmas tree, than many non-Ha’ni who celebrate Christmas. This
thus brings to our attention the potential possibility of reappropriation of
Christmas symbols and practices in ways that draw on the complex syncretic
history of Christmas itself as a “pagan,” “Christian,” and “consumer” festival
and combines them with elements of local knowledge.
6. As to whether Christmas is celebrated among the minority of Ha’ni who
are Christian, I am at this stage uncertain.
7. The Han Chinese make up approximately ninety-two percent of China’s
total population and thus constitute the dominant political, economic, and
cultural force.
8. These communities are also rendered invisible by sheer geographical
isolation.
9. Although as more direct flights are made available from cities on the eastern
seaboard to tourist destinations such as Lijiang and Jinghong, the number
of tourists passing through Kunming will likely decline.
10. Of course, Christmas celebrations also take place in the officially sponsored
churches, but given that these are relatively few in number and that they
are not places which ordinary people visit daily, they do not constitute a
major component of the visibility of Christmas in the urban landscape.
11. A similar process of induction by large department stores and retailers has
been noted in the Japanese context. For instance, see Creighton (1991) and
Plath (1963). It is also worthwhile noting that the major department stores
and retail centers are very active in the promotion of traditional Chinese
festivals.
12. Of course, this use of the luxury shopping floor as a promenade is not
limited to Christmas but is a much more general feature of what Schein
(2001, 285) refers to as an “imagined cosmopolitanism” and “vicarious
consumption.”
13. For instance, see Claude Lévi-Strauss’s (in Miller ed. 1993, 38–9) graphic
description of the “execution of Father Christmas” by hanging and
incineration at the Dijon Cathedral in 1951.
14. Indeed, many popular Chinese Web portals and magazines provide
extensive introductions into practices associated with Christmas.
15. James Farrer (2003, 313), in his work on youth sexuality in Shanghai, notes
in passing that in nightlife venues, “Santa Claus has become a kind of patron
saint of cheap nightlife, a romantic Western version of the Chinese God of
Fortune who decorates the walls of a similar class of local restaurants.”
104 Gary Sigley

16. I say “relative decline” here because, by all measures, Spring Festival is by
far a greater moment of material consumption than is Christmas.

References

Ang, I. and Stratton, J. (1996) Asianising Australia: Notes toward a Critical

Transnationalism in Cultural Studies. Cultural Studies, 10(1): 16–36.
Anonymous (2003a) Merry Christmas. http://news.sina.com.cn/z/
merrychristmas (accessed December 20, 2003).
Anonymous (2003b) In China, Christmas Is Reason to Party. The Economist ,
December 25.
Appadurai, A. (1990) Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural
Economy. Public Culture, 2(2): 1–24.
Bakken, B. (2000) The Exemplar y Society: Human Impr ovement, Social Control, and
the Dangers of Moder nity in China . Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Chuncheng Wanbao (2002) Give a Christmas Tree. December 24.
Creighton, M. R. (1991) Maintaining Cultural Boundaries in Retailing: How
Japanese Department Stores Domesticate “Things Foreign.” Modern Asian
Studies, 24(4): 675–709.
Dirlik, A. (2001) Markets, Culture, Power: The Making of a Second Cultural
Revolution in China. Asian Studies Review, 25(1): 1–33.
Farrer, J. (2002) Opening Up: Y outh Sex Cultur e and Market Reform in Shanghai ,
Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.
Gibson-Graham, J. K. (1996) The End of Capitalism (As W e Knew It). Cambridge,
MA: Blackwell Publishers.
Hooper, B. (2000) Globalisation and Resistance in Post-Mao China: The Case
of Foreign Consumer Products. Asian Studies Review, 24(4): 439–70.
Miller, D. (ed.) (1993) Unwrapping Christmas. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ngai, Pun (2003) Subsumption or Consumption? The Phantom of Consumer
Revolution in “Globalizing” China. Cultural Anthropology, 18(4): 469–92.
Plath, D. W. (1963) The Japanese Popular Christmas: Coping with Modernity.
Journal of American Folklor e, 76(302): 309–17.
Schein, L. (2001) Chinese Consumerism and the Politics of Envy: Cargo in the
1990s. In Zhang Xudong (ed.) Wither China: Intellectual Politics in
Contemporary China, 285–314. Durham and London.
Shi-xu (2005) A Cultural Approach to Discourse . Basingstoke: Palgrave McMillan.
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7
Western Representations of the Other
Qing Cao

Introduction

Historically, China has been a place of mystery to the Western mind. It is as

remote as it is vast, ancient, alien, and fascinating. The tales of “Cathay” reached
Europe as early as the seventh century, followed by generations of travelers such
as Marco Polo and missionaries. During Western colonial expansion in the
nineteenth century, China remained the last and largest country to resist being
fully opened up, penetrated, and appropriated,1 and as a result it was not
politically, economically, and intellectually possessed by the West.2 It remained,
therefore, one of the least understood among ancient civilizations. Following
World War II, China was suddenly “lost” to Communism and once more
“withdrew”3 into total isolation. A civilization veiled in cultural mystique acquired
a new veneer of the alienness of an ideological enemy. China’s membership in
the Communist camp in 1949 caused fresh fear4 of the spread of Communism
that coexisted alongside a romanticized rosy picture of a socialist utopia. This
double alienness earned China the reputation of being one of the most
unfathomable lands on earth.
Over the last quarter of a century, China has again caught the world’s
attention, first as a communist state that renounced orthodox Communist
ideologies and embraced the market economy, and then as an unrepentant
“dictatorship” refusing “political liberalization.” The 1989 crackdown of student-
led protests, transmitted live into the living room of a global audience,
transformed China’s image overnight. The collapse of the Soviet Empire left a
Cold War style of reporting5 obsolete, as summarized by James Hoge (1995) in
his article The End of Predictability. “God” (human rights concerns) or “Mammon”
(trade with China), as Chris Patten described in East and W est (BBC2, 1998),
have become two dominant but narrow ways of seeing post-Tiananmen China.
The rapid growth of the Chinese economy at an annual rate of over nine
106 Qing Cao

percent6 and the strategic importance of China as a potential global power make
images of China not only more complex, varied, controversial, entangled with
stereotypes, clichés, myths, and fantasies but also show new tensions, concerns,
ambiguities, and contradictions.7
This chapter aims to review critically Western popular representation of
China through an examination of broad patterns of Western images of China
and theoretical and conceptual frameworks applied to the study of such images.
“Image” is used here to indicate general conceptions in the public consciousness
circulated mainly through the mass media. It attempts to explore the much
under-researched area of latent patterns of Western discourse on China that
underpins popular images. Broad features of such patterns are explored in
relation to the historical context of intercultural relations. Drawing on Foucault
(1972, 1980) and Said (1978, 1994), this chapter applies a socio-cultural
approach to the study of representation, accentuating intercultural power
relations as external forces determining underlying meanings conveyed through
images. Representing China is seen as part of “discursive practice” (Foucault
1972) in the symbolic world to manage China as a cultural and ideological
“other.” For Foucault, discourse constructs the topic, defines and produces the
objects of knowledge, governs the way that a topic can be meaningfully reasoned
about, defines an acceptable and intelligible way to talk or write about a topic,
and restricts other ways of talking and writing about it. This socio-political
dimension of discourse forms the basis of the investigation in this chapter.

Defining representation: Establishing a position

Raymond Williams (1976, 269) distinguishes two senses of the word

“representation.” In the world of art, representation means “accurate
reproduction,” which “runs counter to the main development of the political
sense.” In more recent times, “representation” refers mainly to how reality is
“presented” or “re-presented” in cultural and media studies. Hartley (1992, 265)
explains “representation” in semiotic terms as “an abstract ideological concept.”
Hall (1997, 17), however, sees “representation” broadly as the “production of
meaning of the concepts in our minds through language.” Nevertheless, both
follow Williams in referring to “representation” as a political construct in socio-
cultural processes. For Hall, representation constitutes one of the central
practices that produce culture. It is central to the process through which
meaning is produced and exchanged between members of a culture, and, in
an intercultural context, between different traditions and societies.
Crucially, the two senses Williams distinguishes are essential in the study of
cultural representation: “accurate representation” and “social construction.” Hall
is among those who conceptualize representation as a social construction.
According to Hall (1997), representation is realized through what he calls a
 Western Representations of the Other 107

conceptual map . Only through sharing a similar conceptual map can people
communicate meaningfully with one another. It is in this sense that “culture”
can be understood as “shared meanings or shared conceptual maps.” In cross-
cultural communication, however, there are not only different sets of concepts
but different ways of organizing, classifying, and arranging these concepts (du
Gay et al. 1997).
In representing China, a country beyond the Western world, the
“conceptual map” applied is, perhaps inevitably, the one shared within the
Western culture. To a large extent, China has to be understood within a Western
conceptual system. Image formulators employ, consciously or unconsciously,
concepts and categories defined primarily in Western terms both as a necessary
condition and an important mode in mediating the meaning of the cultural
“other.” The conceptual map determines, to a large extent, the framework within
which “stories” about China make sense to a Western audience. It is in this sense
that meaning is not in the object, nor is it in the word, but constructed by the
system of representation. Representation fixes relationships between concepts
and signs, and stabilizes meaning within a culture. At an intercultural level,
representation functions partly to “manage” and “perpetuate” power relations
between the West and non-West, as Said (1978, 1994) demonstrates.
Meaning does not inhere in things but is constructed and produced as the
result of a signifying practice — a practice that makes things mean. This is the
constructivist view summarized by Hall (1997, 15) in contrast to reflective and
intentional views. The reflective approach sees representation functioning like a
mirror8 to reflect true meanings that exist in the world. It is the view that tends
to be held by practitioners in the journalistic profession9 (Fowler 1991; Bell
1991). The intentional approach, as opposed to the reflective one, holds that the
author imposes his or her unique meaning on the world. Words mean what the
author intends them to mean (Austin 1962; Bell and Garrett 1991; Hodge and
Kress 1993).
The constructivist view recognizes the public and socio-cultural character of
representation, and therefore acknowledges that neither things in themselves
nor individual formulators of images can fix meaning in representation (Berger
and Luckmann 1966; Hall 1981, 1984; Adoni and Mane 1984; Gamson et al.
1992). Meaning is constructed through signs in a representational system. The
material world where people exist should not be confused with symbolic practices
and processes through which representation operates (Fowler 1991; Hodge and
Kress 1993; Potter 1996; Hall 1997). This social constructivist view of
representation underpins the analysis of this chapter.

Conceptualizing representation of China: Constructivist or reflective?

Two ways of seeing the representation of China in previous studies — reflective
(or objective) and constructivist — coincide with approaches summarized by Hall.
108 Qing Cao

The reflective view tends to believe there is an objective representation of China

that can be verified as “true” or “false” against the “reality”; the constructivist view
holds that representation is necessarily not equivalent to reality, and that it is
inevitable that observers from another culture see China from a different
perspective and therefore produce a different version of “China.” Different
conceptual frames result in a different focus of analysis. The reflective view
emphasizes “accuracy” of representation, applying typically such terms as
“misrepresentation,” “distortion,” “prejudice,” and “bias,” while the constructivist
view tends to concentrate on the what and why issues — what is represented,
what gives rise to a particular representation, and why.
Drawing on Foucault, Mackerras (1989, 1999) is the first to apply consciously
a constructivist approach in the study of Western images of China, avoiding the
entangled issue and (in his view “unproductive”) debate of what is right or wrong
in the portrayal of China. Following a similar line of inquiry, other studies
(Jenkins 1990; Bennett 1990; Chang 1990, 1993; Wasserstrom 1992, 1993;
Christiansen & Rai 1993, 1996; Jespersen 1996; Zhang 1998; Wang 1998; Yan
1998; MacKinnon 1999; Liss 2003; Peng 2004) focus on what knowledge and
“truths” are constructed in portraying China, in what circumstances, and whose
interests are served. Though limited in scope and varying in depth, such
examinations open up a new dimension in looking at images of China as
connected to a wider socio-cultural context. Wasserstrom (1992, 1993), for
example, argues the representation of Tiananmen can be usefully seen as a myth
construction through eight “tales of Tiananmen”10 produced in different
contexts by different groups of people for different purposes.11 Employing an
ideological angle of Gramsci’s hegemony and Chomsky’s (1989; Herman and
Chomsky 1994) media propaganda model, Wang (1998) sees images of China
as shaped by dominant Western assumptions. Similarly, Zhang (1988, 1992,
1998) focuses on civilizational differences in the “conceptual map” as posing a
“formidable challenge” to interpreting China in its own historical, cultural, and
political contexts.
Arguing for “objective” representation, those who (Jones 1955; Isaacs 1958;
Dawson 1964, 1967; Mosher 1990; Chen 1998) take a reflective view seek to dispel
“distortions” of China. In his China Misperceived, Mosher (1990, 22) criticizes the
romanticization of China following Nixon’s 1972 visit to China and aims to “write
an objective account of the American perception of China,” though he does not
establish the criteria to distinguish “truth” from “fiction.” Dawson (1967, 2–7)
attempts to show whether Western images “accurately reflect the situation there
. . . so that we are more fully conscious of what is true and what is false in them.”
Despite his valuable insights, Dawson, too, fails to tell us how “accurate”
representation is to be fairly judged. The failure to justify a truth claim of
“accuracy” and “objectivity” constitutes an inherent weakness of the reflective view.
What seems to happen is that the criteria of “objectivity” are left largely to a
personal judgment.
 Western Representations of the Other 109

Nevertheless, taking a reflective view does not necessarily mean such study is
invalid. Many studies, including Isaacs’ seminal Scratches on Our Minds (1958)
and Dawson’s Chinese Chameleon (1967), make invaluable contributions to our
understanding of the Western portrayal of China. What seems to be unresolved
is an apparent tension between a truth claim and a convincing justification. The
constructivist approach seems to have resolved the tension by acknowledging the
impossibility of matching representation with reality in an absolute sense, and
therefore shifts the focus to a more productive domain of seeing representation
of China as a discursive struggle for “truths,” and how “truths” are related to,
and serve, power. Inevitably the attention to knowledge and power entails a
scrutiny of images of China in a concrete historical context of Sino-Western
interactions.
However, it is important to note that the word constructivist is a relative term.
As Zhang (1998, 2) notes, no matter how much discursive construction is
involved, representation is not purely “a subjective projection, linguistic
coherence, and ideological control.” Recognizing the constructed nature of
representation does not mean such representations are reducible to a self-
enclosed language game. To distinguish history from discursive construction is
not to go back to a simplistic reflective view but to point to the limitations of
“construction,” and therefore to avoid the danger of absorbing everything in
the notion of “textuality.”

Popular representation of China: Essentialism vs. non-essentialism

Said (1994) argues that maintaining boundaries in cultural identity between the
West and non-West is central in the perpetuation of unequal power relations
and therefore a key component in the orientalist discourse. The fortified
boundary is often demarcated by highlighting the difference between “us” and
“them” as “settled, clear, unassailably self-evident (Said 1994, xxviii). Such
identity marking is defined by Woodward (1997) as the tension between
essentialist and non-essentialist views, or between biological and social constructivist
approaches. They take “the form of a dispute between a view of identity as fixed
and transhistorical on the one hand, and as fluid and contingent on the other”
(Woodward 1997, 4). Located in a long and complex history of Sino-Western
interactions and changing power relations, Western images of China as a cultural
“other” at the popular level are replete with essentialist portrayals.
Crucially, an essentialist representation of China assumes there is a clear and
authentic set of characteristics of Chinese society that can be captured as
“Chinese” identities, through establishing its inherited nature or revealing its
authentic source in history. A non-essentialist representation focuses on
differences as well as common or shared characteristics within Chinese society
and with other cultures. It questions a “true” or “fixed” Chinese identity and
110 Qing Cao

the claim that there are some essential “Chinese” qualities. Essentialist and non-
essentialist popular representations produce a whole range of differing images
and conclusions.
One typical essentialist representation sees China as a monolithic society
characterized by essentialist traits of “Oriental despotism,” “tyranny,” or their
modern version of “totalitarianism.” Christiansen and Rai (1993, 5) emphasize
the influence of a “totalitarian” paradigm in conceptualizing China in
journalism:
Totalitarianism as a model in the study of Chinese politics came to
occupy an important position in popular ideas about China and
especially in journalism. In reportage, the clear-cut image of a
monolithic, repressive state with unlimited power to suppress its citizens
is very attractive for the simplicity of the argument.

Mosher (1990) maintains that China is such a despotic country and that the
American media were not doing enough to convey this “simple truth” to the
public due to, in his view, American realpolitik imperatives of the day. For him,
(Mosher 1990, 33 and 103) China represents a key ideological battlefield
between liberal capitalism and “totalitarian communism”:
Capitalism is also the greatest engine of economic growth known to
men, outperforming all known variants of communism and socialism…
the promotion of democratic capitalism should be a fundamental aim
of government … The idea of China as an unalloyed despotism,
governed by a single, all-powerful emperor through an ideological elite
that brooked no competition, was a horary one. Chinese emperors had
ever been intolerant of political dissent. By insisting on this historical
connection as the primar y explanation of the new r egime …12

It is through essentializing the Chinese tradition that the “historical connection”

is made to conceptualize a contemporary Chinese “despotism.” Having
dichotomized China and the West, Mosher (1990, 216) accuses Western
academics13 of misleading the American public in presenting a rosy China. In
a similar vain, Chris Patten, in his television documentary East and West (BBC2,
1998),14 invokes an image of Chinese “tyranny” and its links to current practice
of brutal politics. Endorsing McCartney’s refusal to “kowtow” to Emperor Qian
Long in 1793, Patten historicizes the Chinese eternal “tyranny” and defines Sino-
Western relations as between “freedom” and “tyranny”:
Above all I formed extremely strong views about the vast country and
the ancient civilisation that lies right at the centre of Asia, China, the
middle kingdom, the last great communist tyranny. We hope on the way
from tyranny to freedom, we can nudge them in the right direction,
because how we manage that is going to have a tremendous effect on
stability and freedom in the next century. (BBC2, East and West)
 Western Representations of the Other 111

However, essentialist representation is marked by a temporal oscillation. That is,

certain essentialist images of China tend to dominate a particular historical
period, either predominately positive or negative (Isaacs 1958, Dawson 1967;
Mosher 1990; Mackerras 1989, 1999). The images are characterized by the
foregrounding of particular sets of “traits” of Chinese traditions. Isaacs (1958,
71) is the first to chronicle the trajectory of the evolution of image shift, followed
by Mosher (1990, 20–1):15
Isaacs’ model: (1) The Age of Respect (Eighteenth century)
(2) The Age of Contempt (1840–1905)
(3) The Age of Benevolence (1905–37)
(4) The Age of Admiration (1937–44)
(5) The Age of Disenchantment (1944–49)
(6) The Age of Hostility (1949–)
Mosher’s update: (6) The Age of Hostility (1949–72)
(7) The Second Age of Admiration (1972–77)
(8) The Second Age of Disenchantment (1977–80)
(9) The Second Age of Benevolence (1980–89)
My own update: (10) The Third Age of Disenchantment (1989–2001)
(11) The Age of Uncertainty (2001–)

Each “age” is marked by essentialist features: Confucian wisdom (1), oriental

despotism (2), a resilient civilization (3), the heroic Chinese (4), the ungrateful
wretches (5), evil communists (6), peaceful communitarian society (7), excessive
revolution16 (8), a modernizing nation (9), and an unrepentant communist state
(10). Following Isaacs and Mosher, I have added the last two ages. In the 1990s,
the pendulum was swung sharply back to a human rights-based image of a
repressive communist state. Following China’s entry into the World Trade
Organization in 2001,17 China’s status as a new powerhouse for global economy
was firmly established. However, the West, in particular the United States, is yet
to gauge the strategic significance and implications of a rising China that has
very different cultural and political traditions. The political uncertainty in
redefining China18 is reflected in the mass media that polarize “God” (politics)
and “Mammon” (economy), as demonstrated by the British media’s highly
negative coverage of President Hu Jintao’s official visit to London in November
2005.19
An inherent nature of discursive practice, as Foucault sees it, is the struggle
for truth within the matrix of power relations. In representation, it is the power
to construct a dominant structure of attitude and reference, while blocking other
structures from emerging, that determines the authority of a particular
discourse. Such mobilizing power shapes the forms of knowledge in relation to
prevalent images, and combines patterns of narrative authority with ideological
formations. The collective essentializing of China at a particular “age” could be
seen as a social conditioning of representation in which the production of
images occurs primarily at a societal level.
112 Qing Cao

A prominent feature of these “ages” is what Woodward (1997, 4) terms

dualism in essentialist representation; that is, an opposition between two
conflicting, polarized positions. The positive/negative dualism in the image
oscillation results from the singling out of “essentialist traits.” Clustered around
each dominant image are a series of discursive constructions. For example, the
image of China in the 1980s is dominated by “harmonious families” and
“hardworking people” with the aspirations of an old civilization to modernize,
while in the 1990s such image was transformed to prison labor, child abuse,
death penalty, Tibet, and Taiwan.
Related to dualism, China as the “other” tends to be projected in an either/
or fashion. That is, China is seen either as deviant (different) and therefore
negative, or as like us and therefore positive. In the vacillating “ages” discussed
above, except the “Age of Respect,” positive periods are marked by qualities that
“we” possess and negative ones by what “we” are not . Mackerras (1999, 184)
observes, “The West has tended strongly to assume a right to influence China.
On the whole, Chinese receptiveness to the influence has resulted in favourable
images in the West, and resistance to it in negative ones.” The only exception
is the “Age of Respect” when China as a fantasized land is used to criticize the
self. The glory of China was grossly exaggerated by the eighteenth-century
French philosophers, in order to address problems in Europe. Disillusioned at
the immorality of his own society, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz argues that China
ought to “send missionaries to us to teach us the purpose and use of natural
theology” (in Mackerras 1999, 33). The decline of Qing power under Western
gunboats in the mid-nineteenth century meant that such fantasies could no
longer be sustained.
The ethnocentric view, well documented in cultural studies (Hall 1992,
1997; Goody 1996; Woodward 1997), is recognized by many scholars
(Wasserstrom 1993, 1999; Zhang 1998, Mackerras 1999). Jespersen (1996, 188)
concludes that images and conceptions of China have been more the product
of domestic attitudes and forces. The very resilience of the notion that China
should be changed to fit an American model reveals how images of China are
motivated. At times, practicing journalists recognize such problems (Fu 1990;
Becker 1992). Bennett (1990, 266), a resident American correspondent in
China, reflects
Romantic/cynic split is an old story for anyone involved with China.
We all know about the love-hate relationship of China students and
scholars and about the extremes of American foreign policy over the
ages … Rather, most distortions reflect our application to China of our
own very powerful, sometimes unarticulated feelings about some of the
very basic American values.

The romantic reporting of China and cynical coverage of the Soviet Union in
the 1980s, according to Bennett, results from the fact that “China and its
 Western Representations of the Other 113

reformers fit neatly into one pre-existing American myth structure, while the
Soviet Union fits another” (Bennett 1990, 266).
It is not difficult, however, to see the parallel between image oscillation and
changes in Sino-Western power relations and Western political interests in China.
Mackerras (1999, 187) argues, “The government influence on popular images
is usually more important than the converse.” Isaacs (1958, 407) observes that
it is more productive to see image as relationship. The underlying force behind
image vacillation about China lies primarily in the “change in the underpinning
of the total relationship between Western and Asian and African men.” For
Isaacs, it is this relationship shift that determines, ultimately, “almost every
Western image of Asian and other non-Western people. Chang (1993, 247)
surveys thirty-five years (1950–84) of American press coverage of China and
concludes the press is “more a surrogate for foreign policy makers than an
independent voice of alternative views in the making of China policy.” In
reporting China, the American press serves as an unofficial instrument for
foreign policy makers to establish the rules of the game. This view is echoed in
another study of New York T imes’ reporting of China from 1949 to 1988 (Yan
1998). The dominant image of each “age” reflects largely Western attitudes
towards China and tends to serve its key strategic interests. For example, in the
1980s China serves as a counterbalancing force against the “Soviet threat” which
disappeared in the 1990s following the demise of the Soviet empire. Such
dramatic changes in global political structures exposed China as the largest
country practicing an alien ideology but with rising economic power. The
challenge to “engage” China “productively” and to balance political and
economic interests is graphically reflected in the conflicting images of China
in the 1990s and early years of the twenty-first century.

Image production: Local discursive struggles

Global patterns of the images of China are often produced through a complex
system of mechanisms in discourse at different levels. Fairclough (1995, 16)
conceptualizes discourse as operating at mainly three levels: situational,
institutional, and societal. Based on Fairclough’s distinction, I see dominant images
of China as being produced mainly through the macro structures of socio-cultural
forces that determine, to a large extent, operational systems at the intermediate
institutional and micro situational levels. Journalistic practice, as exercised by the
individual and the media institution, constitutes local mechanisms through
which patterned discourses of China are generated, filtered through local power
relations particularly at the institutional level.
Frontline journalists are among the first to feel constraints on reporting
China outside the main “script” of the day. Gatekeepers, such as editors at media
institutions, are among the key agents in molding particular images. Mosher
114 Qing Cao

(1990) details how Nixon’s visit to China in 1972 inaugurated an era of rosy
pictures of China, in which the media and the US government orchestrated an
image transformation of China from foe to friend. Journalists complain that
stories that fit into the media editors’ preconceptions of China get into print
or on screen, and those that do not fit never get published or screened. The
Guardian China correspondent, Jasper Becker (1992, 78), recalls his experiences
in the 1980s in Beijing: “the British embassy and the government were always
keen to discourage negative reporting on China. Briefings were always upbeat
and optimistic. To allow them to be otherwise would undermine confidence in
the Hong Kong agreement.”
Roger Smith (1992, 96), a television journalist for Canadian Television in
Beijing from 1985 to 1987, complains, “before Tiananmen the political story
was sometimes a hard one to sell.” Frank Ching (1990, 285), the first Beijing
bureau chief for The Wall Street Journal, observes that, even if a China journalist
was well versed in the Chinese language and culture, it was difficult to convey
sophisticated views of China simply because “the stories had to be tailored so
that they could be digested by editors and readers, many of whom had a pre-
conceived image of China.” Mark Brayne (1992, 66–7), diplomatic
correspondent for the BBC World Service in Beijing from 1984 to 1987, remarks:
“a Western journalist in China, as anywhere else, wants above all to get into print
or onto the air; he or she therefore has to find subjects, and ways of presenting
them, that will interest the editor … Media perceptions and government policy
fed off and reinforced one another.” It is interesting to note that Western
portrayal of China was so positive following Nixon’s visit that even the Chinese
deputy foreign minister at that time, Qiao Guanhua, was quoted as saying “the
American journalists are not critical enough (in the 1970s) … They used to write
that everything in China was wrong. Now they write that everything in China is
right” (in Mosher 1990, 160).
In the 1990s, media practitioners made the opposite complaint about the
difficulties of reporting “balanced” news about China. Alistair Michie,20 a UK
television documentary producer, argues that media reporting of China in the
1990s concentrated on a narrow range of negative topics such as prison labor,
Tibet, Taiwan, and child abuse, resulting in the audience seeing only “trees”
rather the “forest.” To redress the situation, Michie and other producers raised
over US$7 million to produce an eight-part documentary series, China: Dragon’s
Ascent, aiming to broadcast it in 2000, the Chinese year of the dragon. Despite
vigorous marketing, it was not screened by a British broadcaster but by a Chinese
language channel in the UK, Phoenix,21 in March 2004. The series presents
broadly positive images of China, including a hardworking provincial governor
determined to improve the lives of farmers. It gives more voice to Chinese
academics explaining Chinese society and history rather than to Western
“authorities,” as occurs in many other documentaries.
 Western Representations of the Other 115

It is the controlling power behind dominant images that shapes to a large

extent a temporal essentialized China. Individual image formulators such as
journalists and editors may have their own views on China but have to operate
in a specific historical context in which socio-political forces determine largely
what can be represented and to what extent. One example is the British
filmmaker, Francis Gerard, who produced two sharply different images of China
in two of his documentaries: the highly positive Dragon’s Ascent (Phoenix 2004)22
and the highly negative Last Governor (Channel 4, 1997).23 Nevertheless, media
institutions have a different treatment of the two series, the former missing from
British channels and the latter shown in prime time by Channel 4. However,
the relationships between individual journalists and media institutions are
complex. Journalists may feel offended if it is suggested that they are following
a certain political line in reporting. They tend to believe (and often genuinely
so) that they are practicing objective journalism to the best of their knowledge.
The journalists’ local struggle to maintain professional independence is well
known (Curran and Seaton 2003), though often media personnel are
“acculturated” into institutional culture and internalize its invisible rules.
It is at the societal level that global discursive coherence is achieved,
circulated, maintained, and reproduced. Key discursive formations, re-enforced
by homogenous portrayals, establish textual authority that permeates various
forms of representation at the public level. The “regime of truth” is then
established, consolidated, and popularized. Often, one only needs to speak a
language of generality to refer to a known fact, such as cruelty against children
and women in China (images in the 1990s), as if such fact is anchored in
unshakable certainties about the essence of the Chinese tradition, which needs
little elucidation because it is familiar to the audience. Narrow, simple, and
repetitive images are instrumental to producing essentialist representation.

Conclusion: Towards a more productive discourse

For Said (1978), orientalist discourse is part and parcel of managing intercultural
and, in particular, power relations with the Orient. Intercultural representations
— their production, circulation, history, and interpretation — are central to
Western culture. Yet, in his view (Said 1994), the disengagement of intercultural
representations with their full political context represents a major weakness in
current cultural studies. The reconnection of culture with power, the present
with history, and humanist with political inquiry opens up a new horizon for a
clearer and critical understanding of intercultural representation.
However, it is important that the examination of intercultural relations is
situated in concrete historical conditions. Despite uniformity in popular images,
the representation of China has never been monolithic or exerted a totalizing
impact in a linear fashion. Dominant images of a particular “age” often run
116 Qing Cao

parallel with tensions, inconsistencies, and contradictions within them, as a major

“oppositional” documentary, Mandate of Heaven (ITV 1991), demonstrates.24 The
largely essentialist popular images should not be confused with academic studies
on China which present a mixed, highly complex but far wider picture of
China,25 nor with foreign policy rhetoric26 or positive business community
discourse.27 In contrast to the popular simplistic portrayal, academic discourse
has been characterized by an increased diversity, scope, and sophistication in
recent years. Despite its important conceptual relevance, the almost totalizing
orientalist discourse Said28 described in relation to the Middle East does not
readily fit the Chinese situation.
Foucault (1972, 151) maintains “discourse is the path from one
contradiction to another,” and recognizes two levels of such contradictions in
“the history of ideas”: appearance and foundation. Contradictions at the former
level are resolved mainly in the “profound unity” in discourse, while those at
the latter level give rise to discourse itself. It is at the appearance level that
complexities, contradictions, and inconsistencies are erased to transmute China
into an abstract, uniform, and essentialist image in popular representation.
However, it is the “contradictions of ideas” at the foundation level that produce
discourse on China; the popular images are but one, albeit essential, part of it.
Representing China is not only about managing intercultural relations; it is also
about constructing identities of the representing culture itself: “the Orient has
helped to define Europe (or the West)” (Said 1978, 1). A multiplicity of
intertwined but changing interests, relations, positions and perspectives
constitutes the dynamics of discourse production on China at a particular
historical moment.
Nevertheless, discourse on China is not static but in a state of constant
change. The uniformity and circularity in popular representation do not have
to be inhibiting or repressive. The centrally important truth need to be
ceaselessly insisted upon and maintained or they will be lost to other set of
“truths,” as demonstrated by the image swing over the centuries. A discursive
truth has to be fought for in the smokeless war of the symbolic world. A central
mechanism of maintaining dominant positions in discourse is blocking
alternative discourses from emerging, and gaining credit, circulation, and
popularity. However, no dominant discourse has ever been able to hold eternal
truth.
A range of possibilities exists in destabilizing essentialist images of China.
At the foundation level, there have always been competing views of China that
give rise to differing discourses, as reflected in academic writing. Those studies
applying a constructivist view on the representation of China, discussed above,
are one such example. At a structural level, Sino-Western relations are constantly
evolving, which determines eventually how China is conceptualized and
reconceptualized. The intensified image vacillation indicates an accelerating
restructuring of such relations in recent times. At the media institutional level,
 Western Representations of the Other 117

boundaries between what is “appropriate” and “inappropriate” at a particular

moment are not absolute, and there are variations among different institutions
and gatekeepers such as editors. For example, Dragon’s Ascent was shown on the
History channel in America, though it failed to secure a screening on British
television. At an individual level, image formulators seek their own ways of
channeling their “truths” about China, and are successful to varying degrees
one way or another, sooner or later.
In the contemporary, interwoven, and media-saturated global village,
blocking alternative discourses will no longer serve productive purposes. Nor
do we need to be pessimistic about the dominant positions of certain discourses.
The increasingly open, hybrid, and interrelated world presents potentials and
opportunities for a more diverse image of China. Indeed, there will be an
intensified struggle for truths, but in turn truths are harder to be claimed,
insisted upon, and reproduced. It is in this sense that opening up spaces for
new voices or different truths to be in dialogue with existing, often dominant,
ones, represents a productive and empowering engagement in resisting
essentialist representation of the “other” in general and of China in particular.

Notes

1. Hill Gates (1996, 6), for example, argues that China is the only country in
the world that successfully resisted being “reshaped by the pressures of
capitalism originating in Western Europe … (and) to have survived the
Western imperialist remaking of the world in the past few centuries.”
2. At the worst time of Western imperialist invasion of China in the nineteenth
century, China became a semi-colonized society. By 1898, thirteen of China’s
eighteen provinces had been declared foreign “spheres of influence.”
However, the power to rule the country was never officially removed from
Beijing. The humiliating experiences make China deeply resentful of
Western colonialism, and China considers itself a victim of an immoral West.
Suspicion of Western intentions survives even today. For a discussion of
China’s victimhood discourse, see Renwick and Cao (1999).
3. Even this “withdrawal” was a myth circulating in the popular consciousness.
From a Chinese perspective, the US-led embargo forced China into
isolation, despite China’s efforts to break this isolation in early the 1950s,
in particular in Western Europe.
4. The red (Communist) fear has never been totally dissociated from the old
myth of “yellow peril.” The “threat” discourse, from the time of the Mongol
Empire that extended to Europe, has not totally disappeared, but in fact
resurfaced from time to time. A recent example is the widespread concern
in Russian political circles about the increasing number of Chinese going
to Siberia. An extreme example is the alarmist prediction of Chinese
118 Qing Cao

invasion in the novel Dragonstrike: The Millennium W ar by Hawksley and

Holberton (1997). The book compares China to Nazi Germany with a
determination to expand its territory in the near future.
5. Hoge (1995, 111) defines the Cold War style of reporting as “a simple
measuring stick for determining the relevance and importance of
international affairs. Events and trends were calibrated by how much they
added to or subtracted from America’s security versus its ideological
superpower rival.” This could explain, perhaps, a not-too-negative image
of China in the 1970s and 1980s when China and America moved closer
for a strategic alliance against the Soviet Union.
6. The official Chinese figure of the average economic growth rate from 1978
to 2004 is 9.4 percent.
7. However, China has become sensitive to Western reporting of China. In
1995, the Chinese government issued a statement criticizing British Channel
4’s broadcasting of Dying Rooms . However, most criticism was directed to
American reporting.
8. This view is, therefore, also termed a “mirror” attitude towards
representation. For more discussions, see Potter, 1996, 97.
9. For example, the BBC firmly believes that it is reporting “fact” and “truth”
(Richard Francis) (1981, 2). The former director of the BBC News and
Current Affairs holds that “Nobody is more experienced (than the BBC)
in sorting out propaganda from fact.”
10. The following are the eight myths Wasserstrom (1992, 254–65) summarizes:
Romantic Version Number 1 The Students as New May Fourth Heroes
Romantic Version Number 2 The Students as Anti-Communist Heroes
Romantic Version Number 3 The Students as Maoist Heroes
Romantic Version Number 4 The Soldiers as Revolutionary Martyrs
Tragic Version Number 1 1989 as King Lear
Tragic Version Number 2 1989 as Julius Caesar
Tragic Version Number 3 1989 as Romeo and Juliet
Tragic Version Number 4 1989 as Oedipus
11. It is interesting that Wasserstrom also acted as one of the academic advisors
for the documentary The Gate of Heavenly Peace. It is perhaps not surprising
that this documentary offers far wider interpretations of the Tiananmen
tragedy than any other documentary on this topic.
12. The italics are mine.
13. Mosher states (1990, 23) “in the case of China it was academics, expressing
themselves in popular forums rather than in scholarly works, who for the
most part created the epistemological context against which journalists
probed, diplomats evaluated, tourists apprehended, and the public
perceived unfolding events in China.” The academics Mosher (1990, 23)
includes are John K. Fairbank, Ross Terrill, Simon Leys, Maurice Meisner,
John Gurley, and Karl Wittvogel.
 Western Representations of the Other 119

14. The documentary series was written and presented by Chris Patten.
15. Such sketches indicate that the frequency of change has increased in recent
times, in particular following US President Nixon’s visit to China in 1972.
Two factors contribute significantly to the intensification of imagery
oscillation. First, more dramatic events have taken place inside and outside
China since 1972, represented mainly by Deng Xiaoping’s economic reform
and opening-up programs at home, and the collapse of bi-polar
international structure with the demise of Soviet Union. Second, modern
technological advance represented by electronic media not only
transformed the way images are transmitted but the way people receive
information and react to the world.
16. This period (1977–80) was characterized by the discovery of “Maoist
despotism” (in particular during the Cultural Revolution), using Mosher’s
words, in the West inaugurated by the publication of Simon Leys’s Chinese
Shadows (1977).
17. In the British case, the return of Hong Kong in 1997 represents the defining
moment when images of China started to change for the better in the mass
media.
18. Such uncertainty is reflected, for example, in the difficulties in formulating
a relationship with China either as a “strategic competitor” or “strategic
partner” in American foreign policies.
19. The front-page articles and television news are dominated by human rights
and Tibet issues, while trade with China is seen as compromising Western
long-held values.
20. Interview with Michie, April 26, 2000.
21. Phoenix is a Hong Kong-based television company that broadcasts its
programs globally. It has a UK branch based in London.
22. Gerard is one of the three producers of the series.
23. He states that the former aims to present a largely Chinese perspective and
the latter a British one in the run-up to the handover of Hong Kong. In
both cases, Gerard claims he freely expresses his views (interview with
Gerard, July 18, 2000).
24. This documentary applies traditional Chinese Confucian and Taoist values
to critique Western culture.
25. The current chapter is not a review on Western academic study of China.
26. Though popular images could be seen structurally over a period of time as
being compatible with political interests of the day, they are never the same
as foreign policy rhetoric. The mass media do not follow foreign policies
blindly; rather, they serve national interests in their own way. They may share
similar visions with policy makers but operate independently. A good
example is the negative media coverage of President Hu Jintao’s official visit
to London in November 2005, in contrast to the British government’s
upbeat reporting of good relations with China.
120 Qing Cao

27. The business community often presents optimistic views on China, and
represents a strong force in lobbying the government to adopt an
“engagement” policy towards China. The Boeing Company in the US is a
typical example.
28. One important reason is that China was not fully colonized, like much of
the Middle East, by Europe during its colonial expansion. China therefore
has different political, economic, and cultural relations with the West. In
addition, China does not have the kind of complex and at times troubled
religious relations with the West.

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 8
Western Politeness Theory and Non-Western Context
Jung-ran Park

Introduction

During the past few decades, linguistic politeness has drawn significant attention
from Western and non-Western scholars. As indicated by its principal definitional
characteristic as a so-called strategic device for reducing social friction by
smoothening social interactions and by avoiding conflict during social
encounters, linguistic politeness can be seen ultimately as a socio-cultural
phenomenon. As such, it is encoded within linguistic systems through filtering
of given social and cultural attributes. Such linguistic realization can be
conspicuously observed in lexicon and conventionalized linguistic structures.
In Asian languages, lexicalized and grammaticalized items that are filtered
through socio-cultural attributes are rich in their lexicon. One of these
lexicalized items is “face,” a cornerstone in theoretical frameworks of linguistic
politeness. For example, Korean is full of lexical elements that represent “face,”
such as chemyen, nun, imok, and nat. This phenomenon can also be prominently
observed in Japanese and Chinese lexicon (Ervin-Tripp 1995).
From a non-Western perspective, issues and controversies surrounding
theoretical frameworks of linguistic politeness, especially that of Brown and
Levinson (1987), stem from the limitations of such frameworks to fully account
for the socio-cultural phenomena of non-Western societies. In this chapter,
Brown and Levinson’s theory (1987) is examined vis-à-vis the so-called social
indexing approaches (Ide 1989; Matsumoto 1988; Gu 1990; Nwoye 1992; Hill
et al. 1986) based on naturally occurring contemporary Korean discourse.
For data, natural conversations with the author’s family and with friends
in Korea and in the US have been audio-recorded. As well, two contemporary
urban-based television dramas (soap operas) entitled Wulika eti naminkayo (Are
we strangers?) and Nolan sonswuken (Yellow handkerchief) (http://
www.kbs.co.kr/end_program/drama/yellow/index.html) were employed.
124 Jung-ran Park

One of the merits of collecting data on linguistic politeness from these

television dramas is that the full range of linguistic elements denoting politeness
phenomena can be captured. This can be accounted for by the fact that the
drama form covers the gamut of social interaction. McCarthy and Carter (1994,
118) describe the excellent value of drama-based data in the following way:
Data for everyday linguistic genres such as favor seeking are not always
easy to obtain, since such events take place in intimate personal settings.
But dramatized data such as plays and soap operas … are often an
excellent source of data considered by consumers to be “natural.”

Concerning data analysis, I utilized the ethnographic microanalysis method

(Erikson 1996). Through employment of this method, speech contexts and
situated social identities that are manifested multidimensionally in a given
speech context and moment were scrutinized. It is these contexts and situated
social identities that directly influence the employment of linguistic forms, so
that interlocutors express implicit epistemic, affective, and interpersonal stances
in verbal as well as non-verbal modes. Regarding the transcription method, I
romanized the conversations using the Yale system, and then translated the
resulting text morpheme by morpheme, followed by translation into natural
English. However, for general conversations I did not follow morpheme-by-
morpheme translation.

Theoretical frameworks of linguistic politeness: Issues and

controversies

For comprehensive coverage of the literature on politeness phenomena, Kasper’s

works (1990, 2001) are the most suitable. Fraser (1990) classified politeness
studies into four major categories: social norm/social indexing, conversational-
maxim, face-saving, and conversation-contract. To begin with, the
aforementioned theoretical approaches are all couched according to Grice’s
(1975) cooperative-principle (CP) and attendant maxims and in Goffman’s face-
work (1967). In other words, politeness provides a ground for violations of the
Gricean maxims. Also, politeness is derived from the desire to establish and
maintain a public self-image that is “an image of self-delineated in terms of
approved social attributes” in Goffman’s (1967, 5) formulation. Brown and
Levinson (1987, 5), in their “face-saving” framework, take the CP and its four
maxims as “socially neutral (indeed a social) presumptive framework for
communication.” Politeness, in this view, constitutes “principled reasons for
deviation” from the Gricean maxims in the service of and concern for and the
preservation of face.
The verbal activities or face-works for smoothening social interactions and
for enhancing the public self-image of interlocutors are based in strategic
 Western Politeness Theory and Non-Western Context 125

language use. “Conversational-maxim” (Lakoff 1973; Leech 1983; Edmonson

1981; Kasher 1986) and “face-saving” (Brown and Levinson 1987) theoretical
frameworks are constituted with politeness principles and other maxims and
strategies for strategic language use during social encounters. The conversation-
contract view (Fraser 1990) also aligns with the above two perspectives on
strategic politeness. By contrast, the social indexing approach is based on
normative politeness wherein linguistic politeness is seen as being realized by
adhering to and respecting shared and collective socio-cultural norms.
Brown and Levinson’s (1987) face-saving theory has significantly affected
the state of the art of politeness theory; their claimed universality of the theory
has been tested within indigenous social settings and languages beyond the three
unrelated languages (English, Tamil, and Tzeltal) that Brown and Levinson
examined with their politeness formula. As mentioned at the outset, Brown and
Levinson’s theory is founded on Goffman’s notion of face, even though they
deviate from Goffman’s original face notion in the sense that Brown and
Levinson’s face is self-centered while Goffman’s face is founded in and derived
from the relation with the social group and public. In other words, Brown and
Levinson’s (1987, 61) face is “the public self-image that every member wants to
claim for himself”; in contrast, Goffman’s (1967, 5) face is constituted “by the
line others assume he has taken during a particular contact.”
Such deviation in the concept of face has invited great challenges against
Brown and Levinson’s theory, especially from social-indexing perspectives
(Hijirida and Sohn 1986: Korean and Japanese in comparison with Western
contexts; Hill et al. 1986; Ide 1989; Matsumoto 1988: Japanese contexts; Gu 1990;
Mao 1994: Chinese contexts; Kummer 1992: Thai contexts; Nwoye 1992: Igbo
contexts). Following the original Goffman sense of face, Gu (1990) and Nwoye
(1992) proposed the following concept of group face: “an individual’s desire
to behave in conformity with culturally expected norms of behavior that are
institutionalized and sanctioned by society” (Nwyoe 1992, 313). Mao (1994, 471)
also suggested a “relative-face orientation construct” in order to encompass a
dynamic and flexible concept of face across cultures. Ide (1989) proposed that
a distinctive property in Japanese speakers is their sense of place or role in a
given situation relative to social conventions; Ide doubts the value of the notion
of face in her politeness perspective.
Hill et al. (1986) deal with politeness phenomena in cross-cultural contexts
in positing the notion of discernment as universal and a motif for employing
politeness expressions. In contrast to the claims by Brown and Levinson (1978)
and Leech (1983), this study argues that politeness expressions are employed
by the speaker not as strategies for social interactions but as an attribute of
discerning various factors which affect the social interactions between
interlocutors, such as social distance, social power, and the ultimate goal of
communication.
126 Jung-ran Park

Hijirida and Sohn (1986), comparing the different cultural patterning of

honorifics and sociolinguistic sensitivity in English, Japanese, and Korean,
examine the cross-cultural variables that determine the expression of and the
use of honorifics. This study does not allow that the universal politeness claim
by Brown and Levinson (1978) can be applied to the honorific phenomena of
Japanese and Korean. They consider the honorific system of these languages
to be different from politeness expressions.
Brown and Levinson’s face is composed of two Janus-like face aspects
(Brown and Levinson 1987, 61). One is the negative face: “the basic claim to
territories, personal preserves, rights to non-distraction, i.e. to freedom of action
and freedom from imposition.” The other is positive face: “the positive consistent
self-image or “personality” (crucially including the desire that this self-image be
appreciated and approved of) claimed by interactants.” Put another way
regarding these two opposite but interconnected face values, any human being
has desire or longing for freedom from connection toward dissociation,
independence, avoidance, and distance, i.e., negative face, as well as longing
for connection/association, interdependence, proximity and approach, i.e.,
positive face (Durkheim 1915, cited in Wood and Kroger 1991). According to
Scollon and Scollon’s (1983) coinage, “deference” denotes Brown and
Levinson’s negative face, and “solidarity” signifies the positive face.
Matsumoto (1988), Gu (1990), and Nowye (1992) argue that Brown and
Levinson’s negative face has no conceptual ground in Japanese, Chinese, and
Igbo societies in that imposition to the alter is not perceived as a true sense of
imposition in these societies. However, this perspective is legitimate only when
affect value is applied in such social interactions. In other words, as Mastumoto
(1988) described, in asymmetrical dyads, the powered side traditionally has an
obligation to be generous, protective, and solicitous of the powerless side. In
this tradition, when the stronger is asked to do something for the weaker, she
or he is not considered to be imposed upon or to be impeded of her freedom
of action owing to such affective value. However, the concept of affect must be
distinguished from the desire to be free from imposition, i.e., negative-face
desire.
One of the Korean lexical elements concerning interpersonal relationship
is uyeri, “righteousness, faithfulness.” Uye is a link between self and alter. The
practice of uye-ri in Korean society evinces two socio-cultural characteristics: social
reciprocity and interdependence among in-groups tied together by the same
blood, region, and school relations (Yum 1987).
The practice of uye-ri within the in-group in relation to imposition can be
considered as “affect” through social reciprocity and interdependence. However,
the practice of uye-ri is not applicable toward the outside group deviating in
blood, region, and school relations. Thus, the concept of affect and imposition
within in-groups needs to be distinguished from negative-face desire, i.e., the
desire to be free from imposition.
 Western Politeness Theory and Non-Western Context 127

Ide (1989) even doubts that “face” is a focal point or cornerstone of

politeness theory. She argues that “role” instead of face has the central place in
expressing politeness in Japanese society. Such a view presents a dubious
perspective on Brown and Levinson’s basic assumption regarding their theory,
i.e., rationality and face desire. Brown and Levinson built their face-saving theory
on the assumption that modal persons are endowed with face desire and
rationality so that such a model person has an inherent ability to reason in order
to use means to satisfy his or her goal, i.e., face concern.
In the following section, I closely examine face works while comparing the
two theoretical approaches of Brown and Levinson (1987) and social indexing
in Korean socio-cultural contexts.

Face-works in politeness in Korean culture

Politeness, as mentioned at the outset, is a social phenomenon, and thus its

interpretation is dependent upon a given society’s socio-cultural attributes. The
following is Brown and Levinson’s politeness assessment formula: Wx=D (S,H)
+ P (H,S) + Rx. In this formula, W stands for weightiness of a face-threatening
act x. Face-threatening acts (FTA) are utterances or actions that threaten a
person’s public self-image, i.e., face. Social distance between speaker and hearer
is represented as D(S,H). Power of the hearer over the speaker is denoted as
P(H,S). Rx denotes absolute ranking of the imposition, x signifying variable in
a given culture. The linguistic enactment in order to maintain and promote
interlocutors’ face, i.e., face-work, depends on the speaker’s cognitive assessment
of the above social variables. Such variables are independent but culturally
sensitive.
In the above formula, only participants’ social relationship variables,
specifically distance and power, are considered in Brown and Levinson’s
framework. Brown and Levinson do not take into account social contexts/speech
events and settings into their consideration. In consequence, the cognitive
assessment of the weightiness based on Brown and Levinson’s (1987) social
parameters has the inherent vulnerability of giving incorrect predictions for face-
work when applied to non-Anglo American interlocutors.
The following example illustrates how social context affects the speaker’s
speech realization.
(1) A ceki emma, na iket com haycw-e ung.
well mom me this please do-plain/half-talk speech level tag/
solidarity marker
“Well, Mom you will do this for me, won’t you?”
B listens to her daughter and nods
Bystander enters after speech event (1).
128 Jung-ran Park

(2) A emma kuke ta ha-se-ysse-yo.

Mom that all do-subject honorific-past tense-polite speech level
“Mom, did you finish?”
B looks at her daughter

The above interaction occurs between daughter and mother in an informal

setting. In (1), the daughter (A) enters the kitchen and asks her mother to cook
some simple dish. After a while, in (2), the daughter re-enters the kitchen to
see if her mother has finished cooking and finds that her mother’s friend has
come during her absence.
In the above case, participants’ variable information, such as power and
distance relationship, is the same in (1) and (2), and ranking of imposition is
constant during interaction between daughter (A) and mother (B). However,
Speaker A’s linguistic forms are differently enacted in (1) and (2). That is, in
(1) the requestive speech act is realized with the pragmatic marker ceki; “well,”
denoting that the speaker’s interpersonal polite stance toward the addressee
predominantly occurs in informal contexts, the endearment address form emma
“mom,” the internal modification com “please,” a tag/solidarity marker ung, “will
you,” and the plain/half-talk speech level marker/interactional particle -e.
(Korean speech level markers are elaborated further in the following section.)
Thus, the requestive speech act (1) is mitigated with various linguistic devices
so that the illocutionary force becomes weakened. This social interaction is very
similar to that of North American family relationships, i.e., solidarity-oriented
politeness strategies are employed in (1) in much the same way as North
Americans’ social interactions occur in similar speech events.
However, in (2), the speaker’s speech style is noticeably shifted into the
deferential-oriented mode that is colored with the subject honorific marker si
and the informal polite speech level -yo, resulting in demonstrating attitudinal
distance and respect to the alter. As mentioned, context variables are the same
in (1) and (2), except for the introduction of the bystander into the speech
event (2). However, the bystander’s introduction into the speech event (2)
evokes the speaker’s self-awareness of the social value/norm. In consequence,
speaker (A) accommodates her speech style accordingly, i.e., showing deference
to the speaker’s parents. Otherwise, the speaker’s parents would lose their public
self-image/face, since the bystander would judge that the parents failed in giving
their children a proper education.
Thus, this illustration suggests that even Brown and Levinson’s profile
information, such as distance and power, is insufficient when it is applied to
Korean settings. This also suggests that Brown and Levinson’s theory has a
limited capacity to predict verbal behaviors that are highly fluctuant and sensitive
to speech contexts in relation to politeness enactment in a given society. In
consequence, Brown and Levinson’s theory has been evaluated as having an
Anglo-American-centric framework.
 Western Politeness Theory and Non-Western Context 129

In the following section, I elaborate further on the issue of saving face by

introducing the philosophical and cultural roots of Korean society in relation
to the concept of chesin, “discernment.”

Saving face via discernment for the place of self

Yum (1987) describes Korean communication patterns by examining the

philosophical and cultural roots of Korean society, i.e., Confucianism. This
perspective stands to bear an incisive analysis of Korean language uses, especially
in the area of linguistic politeness. The following statement from Yum (1987,
77) indicates the critical aspect of discerning social relationships and speech
settings in Korean society:
The Korean language was especially well developed to accommodate
the Confucian ethical rules of human relationships. The language is
very complex, with special vocabularies … for different degrees of social
status and degree of intimacy, and for formal occasions. Correct usage
of the proper language for certain occasions and for certain
communication partners is regarded as a sure sign of a learned person.
By using a certain language, the relationship can be readily defined as
intimate or formal; it can establish who is elder and who is younger,
and so forth.

According to Hill et al. (1986), discernment is defined as “conforming to

the expected norm” (348). Discernment as a universal feature in politeness
phenomena is further articulated by Ide (1989). According to Ide (1989),
wakimae, “discernment,” in Japanese entails assessing the proper place of self.
Korean is also full of lexical items that denote this concept of discernment. One
such lexical item in Korean is chesin, “place of self.” The concept of chesin
encompasses both verbal and non-verbal acts. Thus, giving gifts on special
occasions to intimates and familiars, acknowledging newcomers in the group
through congregating and having a special dinner, and acknowledging setting
changes (e.g., if the company president enters during a meeting, attendees
stand) are all aspects of face-work through cognitive assessment of complex
social variables for ascertaining the proper place of “self.”
The related lexical elements to chesin are nunchi, “keen perception,
sensitivity,” and pwunwiki phaak , “perception”. Yum’s (1987, 81–5) statement
evinces critical aspects of discerning the place of self during social interaction:
Koreans place high value on catching minute nonverbal cues … Nun-
chi (roughly translated as perceptiveness or sensitivity with eyes) is
regarded as an important communication quality in Korean culture,
since it is through nun-chi that one understands what is going on without
being told. A person without nun-chi is regarded as a crude or
130 Jung-ran Park

unsophisticated person. … the ability to discern hidden meanings is

highly valued … To catch on quickly and to adjust oneself to another’s
position before his/her position is clearly revealed is regarded as an
important communication skill.

The most prominent linguistic realizations that reflect fluctuant social

relationships and speech settings are honorifics and speech level markers.
Speech level markers can be considered interactionally oriented particles
between interlocutors. As illustrated interactions (1) and (2) above show, the
usage of such honorifics and speech level markers is based on interlocutors’
chesin, ”discernment,” and nunchi, “keen perception,” of complex social variables
such as social setting (e.g., presence of bystander), social status, distance, and
age of speech participants.
The agglutinative linguistic characteristics of Korean allows for a linguistic
unit to be combined with various speech level morphemes. Such combinations
are very productive and flexible; for instance, speech level morphemes can be
used in combination with pragmatic markers such as ceki, “well/excuse me.”
Table 8.1 describes these characteristics. The bold-typed morphemes are speech
level markers:
Table 8.1
ceki in combination with speech level morphemes (descending order)

Speech Deferential Polite Moderately Plain/ Most

levels lowering Half-talk lowering
Combinational ceki-mali-pnita ceki-yo ceki-mali-ney ceki-mali-ya ceki-mali-ta
forms

Among the five speech levels shown above in descending order, the
deferential speech level -pnita is mostly employed in the formal and deferential
speech setting. In contrast, the plain/half-talk -a/-e and polite speech level -yo
are most productively used in informal speech settings in contemporary Korean.
As observed by Wang (1990, 32, 36), “panmal [half-talk] conveys an ‘ambiguous’
meaning, nondeferential and noncondesending.” He adds, “The form conveys
relatively ‘soft’ and ‘intimate’ feelings to the addressee by not clearly presenting
the function of ‘talking down’.”
Together with the half-talk speech level, the polite particle yo preceded by
half-talk is conspicuously dominant in contemporary Korean usage. The primary
focus of the polite particle yo is for social-interactional cohesion with the function
of mitigation and politeness. Hence, the functions of the pragmatic marker as
in Table 8.1 agglutinated with the polite particle -yo (e.g., ceki-yo) are here posited
as promoting politeness, solidarity, and intimacy.
Speech events (3) and (4) also illustrate usage of speech level markers based
on interlocutors’ discernment of the place of self in relation to social settings.
The following is from a fellowship meeting of twenty-five church members in a
 Western Politeness Theory and Non-Western Context 131

home setting. An interesting phenomenon to note is that there is a great contrast

in speech style through employment of different speech level markers when
comparing before (3) and during (4) the meeting.
(3) A Uncu camay etisse?
“Where is sister Uncu?”
B ah ceki pansanghoe camkkan naylye kasseyo
“Ah, well (she) went to the meeting of pansanghoe for a just little
while.”

In (3), social interaction before the fellowship meeting is very casual and
informal. Such casualness is reflected in the usage of the bold-typed informal
half-talk marker -e in (3A) which, as mentioned, denotes intimacy and softness
and the informal polite speech level marker -yo in (3B), and usage of the
pragmatic marker ceki, “well,” in (3B). The pragmatic marker ceki, “well,”
denoting the speaker’s interpersonal polite stance toward the addressee,
predominantly occurs in informal contexts; however, it does rarely occur in
formal settings (Park 2004).
(4) … ilehkey ulieykey i sinuy sengphumul cun cacheyka iketi e kyohoelanun
ketipnita. Cenun I tungtaylul thonghayse kyohoelul kwongcanghi yopeney
mwelahalkka nukkyeceysseyo. Kulayse cengmal e sato pauli naykey sanun
keti kulisutoni cengmal naykey sanun ku kulisutoka kyohoe lanun ketipnita.
… pawssulttay motun ketul payselmullo yekinun kulehanketul
pwasstanunkepnita.
“It is the church that imparts to us divine characteristics. Through studying
the symbol of the lighthouse, what can I say … I have really felt the church
very meaningfully. So when the apostle Paul said that ‘To live in me is the
Christ,’ the very Christ is the church itself. … what he had was a vision in
that he could count all outward things as refuse when he realized that Christ
Himself lives in Paul.”
During the meeting, in (4), one member presents a passage he has studied
and learned from the Bible. Contrary to the informal interaction in (3), during
the small fellowship meeting in (4), the speech style is very much formal among
the group, sounding rigid and inflexible in that only certain speech level markers
are employed. Specifically, the bold-typed formal deferential speech level marker
-pnita is dominantly observed. In addition, the occurrence of the informal
pragmatic marker ceki is not observed at all in this formal setting.
This dichotomy in the employment of different speech level markers, even
in the same place and among the same speech participants, indicates an
important factor in the usage of linguistic politeness. In Korean society, the
concept of group awareness is still very solid and fundamental in social
interaction. Thus, during the socialization process, children learn to regard
group harmony and accommodation (Cushman and Kincaid 1987).
132 Jung-ran Park

In accordance with Brown and Levinson’s formula, the speech participants

are identical in (3) and (4), and the value of the social attributes among
participants is low regarding social distance and power gaps. However, within
Brown and Levinson’s framework, the style differences between the two
interactions, including usage of informal speech levels and the pragmatic marker
ceki that indexes intimacy and solidarity in (3), and the deference speech level
marker -pnita that indexes formality in (4) is not captured. This stems from
Brown and Levinson’s drawback as to the ability of speech participants to discern
and access contextual variables such as social setting in relation to formality.

Social variables for discerning the place of self

Let me now turn to the factors that speech participants employ in discerning
the place of self. As Hijirida and Sohn (1986) suggest, in Korean society the
components of age and seniority are significantly weighed as criteria in
discerning the place of self during social interaction. The following dialogue
excerpt is from a contemporary urban-based Korean television drama, Wulika
eti naminkayo? (Are we strangers?). The speech participant Yunho begins to work
at his uncle’s company, and before his first day of work he was informed about
people in the workplace from his uncle. Tonguk was also informed that a new
employee had been hired.
(5) Yunho: Annyenghasi-eyyo, senpaynim.
“How do you do? Senior.”
Tonguk: ah yey …
“Oh, yes …
Yunho: eyi, malssum nacchwuseyyo. Ce 77-nyensayng ieyyo.
“Please use lower speech level to me. I was born in 1977.”
Tonguk: ah, kulem tangyenhi hwupayney. Han Tong-uk iy-a.
“Oh, then I am certainly older than you. I am Han Tonguk.”
Yunho: Pak Yunho i-pnita.
“I am Pak Yunho.”

In his first day at the workplace, in the first line, the new person, Yunho,
greets Tonguk, employing a bold-typed honorific form si- and an address term
senpaynim, “senior.” To this, in the second line, Tonguk greets Yunho with
puzzlement, indicating uncertainty. Such uncertainty is encoded in his hesitant
tone of voice with incomplete expression that is indicated with an ellipsis marker
(…). After apprehending Tonguk’s hesitancy and puzzlement, in his turn Yunho
in the third line brings up his age by saying “I was born in 1977 so please use
lower speech level to me.” Upon hearing Yunho’s age, Tonguk begins to employ
the bold-typed lower speech level, half-talk, to Yunho in the fourth line, before
revealing his name to Yunho by saying, “Oh, then I am certainly older than you.
 Western Politeness Theory and Non-Western Context 133

I am Han Tonguk.” To this, Yunho gives his name in the last line by employing
the bold-typed deferential speech level marker -pnita.
The above dialogue illustrates very important characteristics of social
interaction in Korean society. First, determination of the ages of the participants,
which in turn determines social relationship and language use, is a usual
phenomenon in Korean society. Especially at the beginning of social
interactions, Koreans employ various mechanisms to determine age difference
and social status. For instance, it is common to talk about one’s age directly;
indicating one’s age by sharing information on induction date for the army and/
or college is a ritualistic step. In Korea, each person who registered for either
the army or university has a number that indicates the year that the person
entered the army or university. Such a system is widely employed among Koreans
to discern seniority at the beginning stages of a social relationship.
Second, as indicated in the third line in which speech participant Yunho is
able to immediately perceive Tonguk’s uncertainty regarding his place of self
in their social interaction, he provides his age to the addressee. Such information
resolves Tonuk’s uncertainty, as shown in his next turn. As pointed out earlier,
having nunchi, “keen perception,” during social interactions is highly valued in
Korean society for maintaining and promoting face-work.
Let me now briefly turn to another speech event that illustrates the critical
importance of discerning the place of self through the determination of
seniority. The following interaction occurring in a family setting is from the same
contemporary urban-based Korean television drama as in (5).
(6) ne i casik ttokttokhi tulle-a …
you this jerk carefully listen-half-talk speech level marker
“You jerk, listen carefully … .”
ne-ka amwuli calnako ttokttokhay-to nay-ka
You-case marker no matter what successful smart -even though I-case
marker
hyengiko, nen tongsayngiya.
older brother you-topic marker brother-half-talk speech level marker
“No matter how smart and successful you are, I’m your older brother and
you’re my younger brother.”
Tongsayngi-myen tongsayng tapkey kule. Casik-a
younger-if younger like behave-half-talk level marker. Jerk-half-
talk.
“If you’re younger, you should behave accordingly.”
The speaker has been frustrated by his younger brother’s arrogant attitude, and
he aggressively advises his younger brother by pointing out his brother’s proper
place in their relationship. As indicated by the bold-typed second pronoun ne,
“you” and the half-talk speech level marker -a, the social relationship of the two
134 Jung-ran Park

participants is reflected in the Korean address forms and morpho-syntactic

structure. In Korean society, addressing someone by name or the second
pronoun ne, “you,” as in (6) is highly restricted to members of one’s peer group,
or is used between a superior and subordinate in a unidirectional way. Thus,
the usage of the half-talk speech level marker and the second personal pronoun
by the speaker indicates the social relation to the addressee, i.e., seniority.
In addition, the speaker clearly admonishes his younger brother by pointing
out his brother’s proper place by employing the lexical element tapkey. The
rough translation can be “like, accordingly.” The usage of this lexical element
is pervasively used in Korean with a conditional clause denoting a social role of
a person such as teacher, parent, brother, etc.; for instance, sensayngi-myen
sensaying tapkey kule , “if (you) are a teacher, behave accordingly.” This suggests
that, when a person deviates from the place of self in a certain social context,
such will engender interpersonal relationship, i.e., threatening interlocutors’
face.
The following interaction occurs in the same family between the mother
and the younger son right after the mother learns of the argument between
her two sons as in the above:
(7) Mother: Pwucokhan hyengilayto eleywehako concwung hal cwul
alayahanta.
“You should show deference and respect to your older brother
even though he has shortcomings.”
Son: Myengsimhakeysssupnita.
“I’ll keep that in mind.”

In this illustration, an especially pertinent word to the concept of

discernment is eleywehako in the first line of the mother’s turn. An approximate
translation could be “showing with deference.” The mother stresses seniority
by adding pwucokhan hyengilayto , “even though your older brother has
shortcomings,” prior to pointing out deference and respect toward the older
brother. In the same way as in (6), the usage of speech level markers in the
above illustration (7) defines the social relation between interlocutors, i.e.,
mother and son. As indicated with the bold-typed speech level marker, the
mother employs the most lowered speech level marker, -ta, to her son; conversely,
the son employs the addressee honorific morpheme -sup in addition to the
deferential speech level marker -pnita.
As Yum (1987, 77) points out, “By using a certain language, the relationship
can be readily defined as intimate or formal; it can establish who is elder and
who is younger, and so forth.” Put another way, by observing the usage of certain
speech level markers and other lexical elements such as address forms, the social
relationship between interlocutors and the formality of social settings can be
readily determined. In the above illustrations (1–7), the speech participants
 Western Politeness Theory and Non-Western Context 135

employ certain speech level markers, honorifics, and address forms, based on
discernment of the place of self in relation to the addressee and social setting.
The above illustrations (1–7) also suggest that Korean speakers employ
appropriate polite expressions through discernment of the place of self, based
on conventions emanating from the social relationships and the formality of
the social setting. This observation anchors the claim by Ide (1989) that the
neglected aspect of the universal politeness theory put forth by Brown and
Levinson (1987) is “discernment: speaker’s use of polite expressions according
to social conventions.”

Rethinking face and discernment across cultures

Korean illustrations (1–7) above highlight several essential issues in politeness

theory. First, the notion of face and its constituents:
O’Driscoll (1996) suggests the following face notion: foregrounded culture-
specific face and backgrounded positive/negative face. The culture-specific face
is culturally determined, being of a self-conscious nature, and is therefore
foregrounded. In contrast, the positive/negative face is below the level of
consciousness and therefore is backgrounded.
When applying this face concept to speech events (1–7), it can be seen that
the approach has strength in explaining speakers’ flexible and multifaceted
verbal behaviors. In speech events (2) and (4), culture-specific face that is
culturally determined and partaking of self-awareness is foregrounded. In
consequence, such is reflected into interlocutors’ language use; e.g., neutralized
individual-voice, foregrounded social norms, group awareness, and suppressed
interpersonal affect and formalized social interactions owing to the bystander.
In contrast, in speech events (1) and (3), positive face desire is reflected into
the interlocutors’ language use, i.e., reflective of intimate and close social
relationships, by claiming common ground in accordance with Brown and
Levinson’s positive politeness strategy.
Regarding another issue, Brown and Levinson’s framework, as mentioned
in Section 2, is based on the assumption that their modal persons are endowed
with rationality. Interlocutors assess three social variables (e.g., distance, power,
imposition) based on this rationality, in order to assess the proper degree of
polite strategy appropriate for specific verbal actions. As shown in (1–7),
especially in illustrations (5–7), by discerning the place of self (chesin in Korean,
wakimae in Japanese) through assessing various contextual variables, the speaker
is able to align his or her speech style following the socio-cultural norm. By doing
so, the speaker maintains and promotes the interlocutor’s face. Depending on
the speaker’s cognitive assessment of social variables, appropriate addressee
honorifics, and/or lexical items denoting plain or honored sense can be chosen.
136 Jung-ran Park

In this sense, it is the author’s view that Brown and Levinson’s cognitive
assessment of act, based on endowed rationality in order to have an appropriate
degree of face-work, is to some extent analogous with the concept of
“discernment.” Discernment is acquired through socialization and experiences
of various social interaction based on endowed rationality. Ide (1989) and
Matsumoto (1988) argue that the Japanese use of honorifics is not in the realm
of politeness strategy, more specifically negative politeness strategy; rather,
honorific usage through the speaker’s discernment process is in the domain of
normative politeness that indexes social convention on social distance and
hierarchy. Hill et al. (1986, 348) and Ide (1989) distinguish discernment from
“volition” in the following way:
… once certain factors of addressee and situation are noted, the
selection of an appropriate linguistic form and/or appropriate behavior
is essentially automatic … volition, which allows the speaker a
considerably more active choice, according to the speaker’s intention.

Automatic uses of honorifics through discernment imply homogeneous use

without any individual variations and style shifts. The following illustration from
the television drama Nolan sonswuken (Yellow handkerchief) challenges the
distinction between discernment and volition:
(8) Ca cal tusyeyac-yo.
Well eat (honorific lexeme) polite speech level.
“Eat well.”
Wuli ayeki mani tusyess-sup-nita.
My baby a lot eat (honorific lexeme)-address honorific-deferential
speech level
“My baby has eaten well.”
This interaction occurs when the speaker (grandmother) feeds her grandson,
who is an infant. In this interaction, the speaker employs a variety of honorific
elements such as deferential speech level markers -pnita, addressee honorific
marker sup, and honorific lexical element for the verb tusi-, “eat,” instead of
the plain lexical counterpart mek-, “eat.” With regard to the notion of Hill et al.
(1986, 348) and Ide (1989) regarding discernment, there is a limitation to
account for the usage of honorifics in (8) that deviates from normative and
automatic use of honorifics. Thus, distinguishing discernment from volition is
not critical, since face-work through discernment and the cognitive assessment
of various socio-cultural and psychological variables at a given speech event
includes the usage of honorifics/non-honorifics, formal/informal and non-
verbal behaviors.
Okamoto’s study (1997) of Japanese honorific usage supports the above
argument. She presents mixed usage of honorific and plain forms from the same
speakers, dependent on contextual variables, and argues that honorific usage
 Western Politeness Theory and Non-Western Context 137

is also a strategic politeness device. Cook’s (1999) study on mixed use of the
masu and plain forms, and Lee-Wong’s (2000) study on Chinese politeness,
support the view that honorific usage is not necessarily inherent in the realm
of automatic normative politeness. The style shift and mixed usage of honorifics
with the plain counterparts are dependent on the speaker’s cognitive
assessment/discernment at a given moment of speech events and contexts and
the speaker’s desire for presenting intentional and strategic attitudinal distance
from the addressee or group.
Watts (1992) points out that discernment is in fact applicable to European
speech contexts. The appropriate use of an address term requires the speaker’s
cognitive assessment and discernment concerning social variables that surround
the speaker at a given speech moment. Differences of discernment across
cultures are a matter of degree. In other words, in Asian culture, “self” is founded
in and built into dynamic social relations; these social and cultural relations
directly affect the entity of “self” and, in consequence, “self” appears to be in a
state of constant flux. Thus, discernment of the proper place of self appears in
a salient manner in daily social interactions and is reflected in language use, as
in the speech style shifts in illustrations (1–7).
In contrast, in American culture, discerning the proper place of self for
appropriate face-work does not appear in as conspicuous and salient a manner
as that of Asian societies. The reason is that contextual variables are not
significant elements in shaping “self” in American culture. As Scollon and
Scollon (1983) note, “self” in Britain is constantly affected by contextual
attributes; accordingly, self is manifested as “multirelational” and “multifaceted,”
and such is reflected into the speaker’s language use. However, in American
culture, “self” appears in a rather stable and consistent manner; that is, “self”
in this culture is much less susceptible to the social parameters that surround
“self.”
In this sense, contextual variables, especially in Asian cultures, are
foregrounded and salient; thus, speakers in these cultures are eminently self-
conscious of the contextual variables that surround self. This represents culture-
specific face, which is foregrounded and self-aware. In contrast, in American
society, contextual variables are backgrounded and therefore much less
prominent than those of Asian and other cultures (O’Driscoll 1996).
As pointed out earlier, Brown and Levinson’s weightiness formula, i.e.,
Wx=D (S,H) + P (H,S) + Rx., reflects Anglo-American social relations and thus
has drawbacks in reflecting fluctuant and multifaceted social relations in other
cultures. In addition, in Brown and Levinson’s framework, the contextual
variables, i.e., participant information (distance and power) and imposition, are
independent. However, as Watts et al. (1992) noted, such variables are in fact
dependent, in that absolute ranking of imposition depends on the speaker’s
prior knowledge of power and distance between interlocutors. Power
relationship is also dependent on the speaker’s prior knowledge of distance from
138 Jung-ran Park

the hearer. It was pointed out earlier that the criticism of Brown and Levinson’s
negative-politeness is to some extent due to their neglect of the psychological
variable, i.e., affect in relation to in-group members. It is this affect variable that
is dependant on absolute ranking of imposition.
Lastly, Brown and Levinson (1987, 245) posit Japanese society as an example
of a “negative politeness culture.” Since Korean social structures are to some
degree similar to those of Japan, owing to philosophical common ground in
Confucianism (Tsujimura 1987), the above might be extended to Korean society,
even though Brown and Levinson did not directly point this out. However, their
dichotomous view of positive or negative politeness cultures is too broad a
generalization. In contradiction to Brown and Levinson’s prediction, in Korean
culture, in informal social contexts such as (1) and (3), positive politeness
strategies are dominant; accordingly, linguistic devices for such strategies in
Brown and Levinson’s framework such as in-group identity markers (e.g., emma,
“mom”) and lexical markers denoting common ground and seeking agreement
(ceki, “well/excuse me”; com , “please”; ung, “will you”) are prevalent in these
informal contexts.
Studies in Korean sociolinguistics and historical linguistics also present very
interesting phenomena vis-à-vis linguistic politeness and social structures (Han
199; Pak 1995; Sohn 1986; Yi 1994; Wang 1990). The simplification of addressee
honorifics and speech level markers, decreased use of deferential address forms,
and evolvement of pragmatic markers (e.g., ceki, “excuse me/well”; issci, “you
know”; kuci, ‘right’, etc.) denoting solidarity and intimacy in relation to positive
politeness strategy are evidence that linguistic politeness is a socio-cultural
phenomenon and therefore filtered through socio-cultural as well as
psychological attributes that are dynamic in a historical sense (Park 2003).

Conclusion

In summary, linguistic politeness, as indicated by its principal definitional

characteristic as a device for reducing social friction by smoothening social
interactions and by avoiding conflict during social encounters, can be seen
ultimately as a socio-cultural phenomenon. Issues and controversies surrounding
theoretical frameworks of linguistic politeness, especially that of Brown and
Levinson (1987), stem from the limitations of such frameworks to fully account
for variant socio-cultural phenomena across cultures, especially in relation to
face-works. In Korean culture, “self” is founded in and built into dynamic social
relations; these social and cultural relations directly affect the entity of self and,
in consequence, it appears to be in a state of constant flux. Thus, discernment
of the proper place of self, i.e., chesin in Korean and wakimae in Japanese, is
essential in daily social interactions and is therefore reflected prominently in
language use.
 Western Politeness Theory and Non-Western Context 139

In American culture, in which “self” appears much less susceptible to social

parameters the phenomenon, contextual variables are much less prominent
than in Asian and other cultures. Brown and Levinson’s weightiness formula,
i.e., Wx=D (S,H) + P (H,S) + Rx., reflects Anglo-American social relations and
thus presents drawbacks in reflecting fluctuant and multifaceted social relations
in other cultures. However, notwithstanding differences in degree, discerning
such contextual variables in relation to face-works can be considered a common
phenomenon across cultures for determining appropriate verbal and non-verbal
behaviors.

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9
Discourse, Cultural Imperialism, Black Culture and
Language Research in the United States
Garrett Albert Duncan

1.

In a 1979 New York T imes Op-Ed piece, James Baldwin noted that the public
outcry over a court decision that affirmed the importance of black language in
the education of black children had little to do with language itself. Rather, he
surmised, the chorus of disapproval had more to do with the role of language
and the history it revealed about its speakers. For Baldwin, black language is
the “creation of the black Diaspora.” It is the precipitate of an alchemical
reaction that had transformed diverse linguistic elements into “the political
instrument, means, and proof of power” that bears witness to the historical
processes that created it (1993, 373–4). Speaking to the truth and the integrity
of the language, Baldwin made the following declaration along these lines:
A people at the center of the western world, in the midst of so hostile
a population, has not endured and transcended by means of what is
patronizingly called a “dialect.” We, the blacks, are in trouble, certainly,
but we are not inarticulate because we are not compelled to defend a
morality that we know to be a lie. (1993, 375)

Baldwin’s words point to the indelible imprint of oppression that inflects the
speech of black people; they also point to the capacity of the language to resist
the oppression that seeks to render it mute. Oppression, here, refers not only
to structural and institutional relations, such as exploitation, marginality, and
powerlessness, which attach in material and particular ways to black language.
Rather, his remarks evince a different experience of oppression, one “of existing
in a society whose dominant meanings render the particular perspectives and
point of view of one’s group invisible at the same time as they stereotype one’s
group and mark it out as ‘other’” (Young 1992, 191). This experience, called
144 Garrett Albert Duncan

cultural imperialism, “consists in the universalization of one group’s experience

and culture and its establishment as the norm” (Young 1992, 191). As Baldwin
indicated in the Op-Ed piece, black language reveals the private lives of a people
who refuse to be defined by a dominant language that has never been able to
recognize it. Black language, in effect, disrupts cultural norms that naturalize
its dominant counterpart by rendering them visible and exposing the
particularity of their perspective. To be clear, cultural dominance is not merely
a matter of ignorance, of not knowing. Rather, cultural dominance derives from
a predisposition that reveals such ignorance as being deeply implicated in
specific interests; such a predisposition informs the character of national and
individual identities. W. E. B. Du Bois alluded to this point when he paused at
the dawn of his career to reflect on the meaning of his life’s work. Here, Du
Bois observed:
I had come to a place where I was convinced that science, the careful
social study of the Negro problems, was not sufficient to settle them;
that they were not basically, as I had assumed, difficulties due to
ignorance but rather difficulties due to the determination of certain
people to suppress and mistreat the darker races. I believed that this
evil group formed a minority and a small minority of the nation and
of all civilized peoples, and that once the majority of well-meaning folk
realized their machinations, we would be able to secure justice.
A still further step I was not yet prepared to realize must be taken:
not simply knowledge, not simply direct repression of evil, will reform
the world. In long ... the actions of [women and] men which are due
not to a lack of knowledge nor to evil intent, must be changed by
influencing folkways, habits, customs, and subconscious deeds. (1997,
221–2)

In what follows, I examine Du Bois’ assessment in the context of an appraisal

of black culture and language research in the US. In doing so, my objective is
to go beyond a critique that simply harps on the evils of white supremacy.
Instead, I hope to recast these evils in a different theoretical light to make
transparent their machinations in ways that render them vulnerable and that
make possible their eradication. I do so by employing Johanne Fabian’s (2002)
concept of allochronism as a theoretical device. Allochronism refers to a socio-
temporal feature that characterizes ethnographic reporting. Specifically, it
describes the practice of anthropologists in which they deny the coevalness, or
the sharing of the present, of the cultures they depict in their work. As I illustrate
in my analysis, allochronism is pervasive in social science and contributes to the
intransigence of white cultural dominance in multicultural societies. Perhaps
nowhere is this more evident than in the area of black culture and language
research in the United States.
 Discourse, Cultural Imperialism, Black Culture and Language Research 145

2.
As indicated, allochronism refers to the denial of coevalness, which means the
“sharing of the present” (Fabian 2002, 32). Johannes Fabian offers a critique
of allochronic discourses within his comprehensive analysis of the function of
socio-temporal systems in Western scientific discourses, especially in the
discipline of anthropology. He points to anthropological categories like
“primitive,” “savage,” and “barbaric,” to illustrate the concepts indicative of an
allochronic discourse that confounds the ethnographic project. In the
ethnographic project, both the ethnographer and the “Other” share the present
time in objective and, to a lesser extent, subjective states. However, coevalness
is typically denied in the conventions that regulate how the anthropologist
depicts her or his subject: These subjects are constructed as perpetually existing
in the past, in comparison to unremarkable Western subjects, which are tacitly
constructed as always existing in the present.
Perhaps nowhere are the effects of allochronic discourses more observable
than in the representations of black language in print form. These orthographic
renderings of black language bring into bold relief the deficit assumptions
characteristic of cultural dominance that mark the work of scholarship on black
language. For example, researchers typically render words like “for” as “fo,”
“brother” as “brotha,” “Lord” as “Lawd,” to name just a few. This occurs despite
the call by black social scientists some thirty years ago to abandon practices that
represent black culture as incomplete and corrupted versions of white culture
(e.g., Ladner 1998 [1973]; Williams 1975). In addition, much of the “Black
English” literature is replete with references to “dropped,” “reduced,” and
“deleted” post-vocalic consonant configurations and to “zero” and “absent”
copulas, to name some of the more obvious deficit terms. Such views of language
are incommensurable with a regard for black people as whole, integral beings.
They are, however, consonant with a view of them as incomplete beings and as
works in progress; as Smitherman notes, “a deficit is a deficit by any other name”
(2000, 78). It follows that the assumptions and conceptual codes that we bring
to bear on framing, analyzing, and representing black language are neither
innocent in their applications nor innocuous in their effects. Indeed, people
typically regard grammar and pronunciation, in both oral and written form, as
the touchstone of competent language performance and the means to attribute
social values related as character, morality, and intelligence to individuals.

3.
Certainly, the white dominance that plagues social science research on black
culture and language cannot be attributed to innocent oversight and the absence
of competing points of view. For, some fifty years before Baldwin penned his
146 Garrett Albert Duncan

article for the New York Times, Lorenzo Dow Turner, to name but one scholar,
challenged myths regarding the cultural heritage of Africans in America. In
doing so, he also brought into bold relief the white supremacist underpinnings
that constrained much of the work in this area. A linguist, Turner recorded and
translated songs in the 1930s as part of his study of the Gullah cultures of the
sea islands of South Carolina. Also a student of West Africa, Turner recognized
the Mende culture as the source of these songs and other aspects of Gullah
culture. He used this and other evidence to demonstrate his thesis that certain
aspects of the Gullah language that differed from English could be directly
traced to West Africa. His thesis of the intergenerational transmission of culture
that connected American slaves to their African forebears, though, ran counter
to dominant theories of black culture at the time. These theories held that the
“peculiarities” observable in the Gullah language, for instance, were “traceable
almost entirely to the British dialects of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
and to a form of baby-talk adopted by masters of the slaves to facilitate oral
communication between themselves and the slaves” (Turner 1948, xiii).
Interestingly, the 1948 publication of Turner’s research in the book
Africanisms in the Gullah Dialect was greeted with favorable reviews, some reviewers
going so far as to call his work revolutionary. However, despite the favorable
reception of Turner’s work and subsequent works produced by scholars such
as Frantz Fanon (1963, 1967), Janheinz Jahn (1958), Beryl Bailey (1965, 1966)
and Mervyne Alleyne (1971, 1980, 1993) that supported and extended Turner’s
thesis, the idea of the transmission of African culture to black cultures
throughout the Western hemisphere was never seriously pursued by scholars
in North American universities. Of course, this lapse may be attributable to the
fact that many of the scholars that took up this line of inquiry worked outside
of American academies and focused their attention on black cultures more
generally distributed throughout the Western world. While this argument has
merit, it does not adequately explain the failure of North American scholars to
look to Africa to help understand more fully black culture and life in the United
States.
For example, the publication of Melville Herskovits’s The Myth of the Negr o
Past, in 1941, provided a systematic critique of the scholarship theretofore on
black culture and life. Most significantly, though, Herskovits made a compelling
case, based on historical and empirical evidence, that black culture in the United
States was deeply influenced by the autochthonous African cultures from which
American slaves had originated. Herskovits’s study merits special attention, as
it was commissioned by the Carnegie Corporation of New York as part of
arguably the most important study conducted on race relations in the United
States. The larger study was subsequently published in 1944 in the form of the
3000-page tome, An American Dilemma: The Negr o Problem and Moder n Democracy
by Gunnar Myrdal. One would reasonably expect that The Myth of the Negro Past
would have inspired more of a sustained inquiry into the African origins of black
 Discourse, Cultural Imperialism, Black Culture and Language Research 147

culture in the United States, especially given its prestigious institutional backing,
the widespread publicity given to the larger study and its subsequent purchase
on American social thought, and the fact that Herskovits’s monograph was given
the honor of being published in advance of An American Dilemma.
The foreword to Herskovits’s remarkable book perhaps best foreshadowed
the white supremacist thinking that would continue its dominance on the
scholarship on black culture and life. Writing on behalf of the Carnegie
Corporation and offering effusive praise for The Myth of the Negr o Past , its
chairman Donald Young and his colleagues make the following startling
observation:
Obviously Negroes were not brought to the United States as
culturally naked people, and the problem is to determine what of
their African heritage has been retained to influence life in America
today. We may concede that the greatest significance of the African
heritage lies in the fact that most of it quickly and inevitably was lost
before the ways of life of the dominant white man could be learned.
(Herskovits 1958, x)

However, the very thesis and data presented in The Myth of the Negro Past directly
refute the views expressed in the foreword to the book. In this instance, whether
Young and his colleagues failed to read the book or simply did not understand
the contents is perhaps not so much the point. Rather, at issue here is the
intransigence of white cultural dominance on research on black culture and
how it reasserts itself, even when to do so defies comprehension.
The view of Young and his colleagues makes perfect sense, however, in light
of allochronic discourses that deny black people their status as historical beings,
discourses that inform a conception of black culture and language that relies
on a partial ontology. The partial or incomplete ontology to which I am referring
is expressed in the tacit view that Africans in America are simply an American
ethnic group, like all other immigrant groups. On the surface, this perspective
has egalitarian possibilities. For instance, in accord with the precepts of the
Chicago School of Urban Sociology, which gave this perspective its scholarly
prominence, the ethnicity paradigm holds that, like European ethnic groups,
Africans immigrants — both voluntary and involuntary — will eventually
assimilate into mainstream American society. In addition, assimilation may occur
perhaps in ways to redirect the course of a multicultural American society toward
a more democratic state.
However, in constructing their theoretical formulations, the proponents of
the Chicago School generally dismiss the possibility that distinct black cultures
exist in the United States, let alone those of any social or psychological value
in society or those that owe their origins to autochthonous African cultures.
Robert E. Park, the influential leader of the Chicago School, expressed this view
in the following manner:
148 Garrett Albert Duncan

My own impression is that the amount of African tradition which the

Negro brought to the United States was very small. In fact, there is every
reason to believe, it seems to me, that the Negro, when he landed in
the United States, left behind him almost everything but his dark
complexion and his tropical temperament. It is very difficult to find in
the South today anything that can be traced directly back to Africa.
(Park 1919, 116)

This sentiment maintains a certain purchase on contemporary scholarship,

especially in the area of sociology. For example, Nathan Glazer and Daniel
Patrick Moynihan asserted in Beyond the Melting Pot that it “is impossible for the
Negro to view themselves as other ethnic groups viewed themselves because —
and this is key to much in the Negro world — the Negro is only an American
and nothing else. He has no values and culture to guard and protect” (1963,
53). The partial ontology implied in these views is also evident in contemporary
research studies that examine black language and culture. John Baugh writes,
for instance, that the “linguistic history of slavery denied blacks direct access to
their ancestral heritage and … slave descendants, as involuntary immigrants,
are the only immigrants who cannot trace our linguistic ancestry, especially with
the same accuracy as more recent voluntary immigrants” (2000, 84–5).
Past scholars have attributed the cultural break to which Baugh alludes to
the purported mental plasticity and cognitive fragility that prevented Africans
from withstanding the horrors of the Middle Passage or the ravages of slavery.
For example, early interpreters of black language surmised that Africans, “plastic
as they are by nature, quickly lost their own language, and acquired imperfectly
the dialects of the British peasantry among whom they worked, and by whom
they were generally directed” (cited in Turner 1973, 8). Contemporary
explanations for the alleged cultural break are often couched in more
diplomatic language. Also, these explanations typically rely on commonsense,
albeit unsubstantiated, storylines about the social history and plantation politics
of slavery to make a case for the pidgin-creole hypothesis that they inform. Most
common explanations are variations of the “Tower of Babel” storyline. For
example, Geneva Smitherman, a proponent of the pidgin hypothesis, writes that
it was “the practice of slavers to intermingle linguistically diverse African ethnic
groups so as to impede communication and hinder escape” (2000, 100).
Similarly, noted linguist Steven Pinker evokes this Biblical reference in his
description of the origin of black language. Here, Pinker illustrates how people
create complex language from “scratch” from “two of the more sorrowful
episodes of world history, the Atlantic slave trade and indentured servitude in
the South Pacific.” He writes the following along these lines:
Perhaps mindful of the Tower of Babel, some of the masters of tobacco,
cotton, coffee, and sugar plantations deliberately mixed slaves and
laborers from different language backgrounds; others preferred specific
 Discourse, Cultural Imperialism, Black Culture and Language Research 149

ethnicities but had to accept mixtures because that was all that was
available. When speakers of different languages have to communicate
to carry out practical tasks but do not have the opportunity to learn
one another’s languages, they develop a makeshift jargon called a
pidgin. (1994, 32–3)

Although such assertions have an intuitive appeal, they ignore evidence that
North American slavers exploited not only the physical labor of Africans en
masse but also the skill sets that were specific to particular African ethnic groups.
Such assertions also ignore the role of violence in maintaining the plantation
system of slavery (Adams and Sanders 2004, 17).
Along these lines, published research provides evidence that calls into
question the Tower of Babel storyline and the theories of black language it
informs. For example, Dalby (1972) documents the lingua franca status of Wolof
in the thirteen colonies, and Holloway (1991) reviews studies showing that slavers
systematically assigned slaves jobs according to their African ethnicity, to
capitalize on the skill sets they brought with them from Africa. Both findings
evince conditions that foster the retention of African cultural and linguistic
systems and, moreover, that complicate the thesis of a pidgin-creole origin of
black language that has incredible sway as the dominant explanation for the
origin of black language in the United States.
To reiterate the main point, white cultural dominance is sustained in
multicultural societies in part by an allochronic discourse in research that denies
subjugated people their status as historical beings. The denial of a people as
historical beings works simultaneously to erase any record of their humanity in
the past and to suppress any recognition of their agency in the present. To
reiterate another point, some scholars attribute the absence of a past to inherent
cultural deficiencies and to the inferiority of black people, while others attribute
the breach to external social and political forces. Both explanations, though,
share the premise that black people in general are atomistic and, as such,
incapable of sustaining the subjective and expressive ties that constitute the stuff
of a distinct black culture and language in the United States. The failure to
acknowledge a fuller ontology of black people in North American societies as
people who are at once ethnic American and racial African perpetuates a view
of them as incomplete versions of white people; that is, of the Americans that
they are destined to become.

4.

In a move to counter white dominance in black language research, in 1973,

black scholars coined the term Ebonics to replace contemporaneous
appellations that identified the language behavior of black people as remarkable
150 Garrett Albert Duncan

and deviant forms of the dominant language. They went further and defined
Ebonics as the “the linguistic and paralinguistic features which on a concentric
continuum presents the communicative competence of the West African,
Caribbean, and United States slave descendant of African origin” (Williams 1975,
vii). Concentric continuum refers both to the varieties of Ebonics in the Western
hemisphere as well as to the continued development of the language in response
to the various social and linguistic influences on the people that speak it. In
departing from traditional terms used to describe the distinctive features of black
speech, the scholars sought to provide a description of the language behavior
that both employed and reasserted the norm of indigenous concepts. These
concepts derive descriptively from sources that affirm the culture and agency
of black people with a past and who are engaged in the present. These scholars
reasoned that different terms would give rise to different concepts and change
the ways by which researchers categorized, explained, analogized, generalized,
and solved the problems encountered by black students in schools throughout
the US (Mills 1997).
Certainly, the most controversial claim of the proponents of Ebonics is that
it constitutes a language in its own right. Those who make the claim do so on
two grounds. First, following the Yiddish linguist Max Weinreich, they assert that
any language is simply a dialect that has a navy and an army behind it, a point
that highlights the largely social and political basis of the distinctions made
between the two linguistic categories. Second, they point to the fact that most
languages are typically classified according to the historical kinship of their
grammatical and sound systems. Along these lines, the proponents of Ebonics,
like Turner before them, point to empirical and historical data to establish the
linguistic kinship of black language in the West to autochthonous African
languages. For instance, they point to the previously cited status of Wolof as a
lingua franca among enslaved Africans along the eastern seaboard during the
colonial period (Dalby 1972); to the common Mende cultural heritage among
the descendants of captive West Africans that populated the southeast portion
of the country, including those that eventually migrated to the Midwest US
(Turner 1948); and to the Bantu language shared by Central Africans who toiled
in the plantations of the American South to establish linguistic kinship and to
affirm the African roots of black culture and language in the United States
(Holloway 1991; Vass 1979).
The reintroduction of Ebonics into the popular lexicon in 1996, as the result
of an Oakland Unified School District (OUSD) resolution, has contributed to
its widespread use by the US media and general public. The purpose of the
OUSD resolution was to affirm the role of black language in the education of
black students. In making its case, the architects of the resolution deliberately
moved to formally reestablish black language policy and pedagogy upon a
tradition that is explicit and unapologetic in its affirmation of not only a black
linguistic legacy but of black humanity itself. The board’s gesture was obscured
 Discourse, Cultural Imperialism, Black Culture and Language Research 151

not so much by the firestorm of media criticism and public outcry that came in
the aftermath of the resolution as it was by linguists’ attempts to clarify the
board’s approval of it. For instance, scholars typically used Black English, African-
American English, and African-American Vernacular English interchangeably
with Ebonics and synonymous terms such as African American language and
black language. Prominent among those that conflated the terms was the
Linguistic Society of America (1997), in a January 1997 motion that generally
affirmed the OUSD decision. Clearly, the interchangeable use of Ebonics with
older and newer terms is at variance with the intentions of those who originally
coined the term and effectively reasserts the white cultural dominance that the
caucus of scholars in 1973 assailed by their gesture. Further, as contemporary
researchers and educators continue to conflate Ebonics with those that it was
coined to supplant, the term becomes further removed from its culturally
affirming roots and stripped of its revolutionary impetus in a white-dominated,
multicultural society.

5.

To be clear, language is parasitic upon utterance. That is, the former owes its
abstract[ed] existence to the latter, and what we call the speech of a people is,
on certain levels, quite arbitrary. However, as suggested previously, naming is
also indicative of how we conceptualize phenomena and for how we understand
and evaluate them. For, as the philosopher Charles W. Mills points out:
Concepts are crucial to cognition: cognitive scientists point out that they
help us to categorize, learn, remember, infer, explain, problem-solve,
generalize, analogize. Correspondingly, the lack of appropriate concepts
can hinder learning, interfere with memory, block inferences, obstruct
understanding, and perpetuate problems. (1997, 6–7)

Therefore, how we conceptualize black language has profound implications for

not only theoretical issues related to it but also for the pedagogical policies
implied by different formulations and the economic and social consequences
that result from them (Duncan 2000a, 2000b, 2003; Gaulding 1998). Eradicating
the traces of cultural imperialism has implications for developing social theory
to inform a better understanding of contemporary multicultural societies, a
point that is perhaps best illustrated by the reality of the Louisiana State
Penitentiary, a prison that is located in the southeastern portion of the United
States. The prison is commonly known as Angola, named so for the enslaved
Central Africans who once worked the fields of the plantation where it is
presently located and whose Bantu-speaking descendents now comprise two-
thirds of those incarcerated therein. Ninety percent of Angola’s inmate
population will die within its confines, never again to see the light of freedom.
152 Garrett Albert Duncan

I raise this chilling point as I conclude this chapter, as a reminder to researchers

that cultural imperialism thoroughly imbricates itself in other, more concrete,
expressions of oppression. Moreover, I evoke this example also to emphasize
that the policies implied by the different formulations of black culture and
language we entertain in the academy have profound material consequences
in the world outside of it.

References

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Americans in a White Man’ s Land 1619–2000. New York: HarperCollins.
Alleyne, M. (1971) Linguistic Continuity of Africa in the Caribbean. In H. J.
Richards (ed.) Topics in Afr o-American Studies , 119–134. New York: Black
Academy Press.
———. (1980) Comparative Afr o-American: An Historical-Comparative Study of
English-Based Afro-American Dialects of the New World. Ann Arbor, MI: Karoma.
———. (1993) Continuity versus Creativity in Afro-American Language and
Culture. In S. S. Mufwene (ed.) Africanisms in Afro-American Language Varieties,
167–81. Athens and London: The University of Georgia Press.
Bailey, B. (1965) Toward a New Perspective in Negro English Dialectology.
American Speech, 40: 171–7.
———. (1965) Jamaican Creole Syntax: A Transformational Approach. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Baldwin, J. ([1979] 1993) If Black English Ain’t a Language, Then Tell Me What
Is? In D. Gioseffi (ed.) On Prejudice: A Global Perspective , 372–5. New York:
Anchor Books.
Baugh, J. (2000) Beyond Ebonics: Linguistic Pride and Racial Pr ejudice. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Dalby, D. (1972) The African Element in Black English. In T. Kochman (ed.)
Rappin’ and Stylin’ Out , 170–86. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press.
Du Bois, W.E.B. (1997[1968]) Dusk of Dawn: An Essay toward an Autobiography of
a Race Concept . New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
Duncan, G.A. (2000a). Urban Pedagogies and the Celling of Adolescents of
Color. Social Justice, 27(3): 29–42.
———. (2000b) Race and Human Rights Violations in the United States:
Considerations for Human Rights and Moral Educators. Journal of Moral
Education, 29(2): 183–201.
———. (2004) Ebonics and Education: A Critical Appraisal of the Post-1996
Research Literature. African American Research Perspectives, Spring/Summer,
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Fabian, J. (2002) Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes Its Object. New York:
Columbia University Press.
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Fanon, F. (1963) The Wretched of the Ear th. New York: Grove Press.
———. (1967) Black Skin, White Masks . New York: Grove Press.
Gaulding, J. (1998) Against Common Sense: Why Title VII Should Protect
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10
The Discourse of Chinese Medicine and
Westernization
Zongjie Wu and Qingxia Lü

Introduction

Traditional Chinese discourse is here defined as the language hitherto used for
thousands of years in all spheres of traditional life in China: in education, and
in social, political, and scientific institutions. As a result of the progress of the
modernization of Chinese society starting from the early twentieth century,
particularly the May Fourth Movement,1 such a language has been gradually
withdrawn from our social life. “Within less than one hundred years, the Chinese
language absorbed, or indeed ‘devoured’, the nomenclatures of the most diverse
branches of Western knowledge” (Lackner, Amelun, and Kurtz 2001, 2).
Fundamental changes have taken place in the concrete linguistic performance
that defines the nature of social activities. Modern Chinese discourses, whether
of social or scientific practices or on China’s intellectual and cultural heritage,
are articulated to a large extent in westernized discourse that was normalized
as their own. By saying so, we are not only referring to the fact that modern
Chinese language fills up with new terms translated from the West and that the
syntactical structure is appropriated for assimilating the particularities of
Western-derived notions, but more importantly to the fact that the ways of doing
things with words have been fundamentally changed (Wu 2006, 170). The
discursive practices in law, media, education, government, management,
business and organization, and so on, were to a large degree introduced or
imagined from the West. Because of the distance created by history and space,
people lose the memory of when, where, and for what reasons such a discourse
was imported, and what the social force is that enacted such a process. Chinese
people may take it for granted that the language they speak and write is the
language of their own, without being aware that others’ discourse has taken on
a fundamental and deep significance in the formation of Chinese social life, as
Bakhtin (1981, 342) states:
156 Zongjie Wu and Qingxia Lü

Another’s discourse performs here no longer as information, directions,

rules, models and so forth — but strives rather to determine the very
bases of our ideological interrelations with the world, the very basis of
our behavior; it performs here as authoritative discourse, and an
internally persuasive discourse.

In this chapter, we attempt to investigate such a change process by presenting

one particular case in detail: the modernization of traditional Chinese medicine
(hereafter abbreviated TCM), a traditional discourse that still constitutes a
particular mode of being in Chinese daily life, because of its cultural vitality. As
an illustration, we examine how the discourse is gradually transformed by a
Western concept of what TCM “really” is as a result of cultural domination and
suppression.
In the year 2003, when the Murad Research Center for TCM Modernization
was established at Shanghai University of Traditional Chinese Medicine,
Professor Ferid Murad, a Nobel Prize winner in physiology and medicine, said,
“What we are going to do is to give a scientific justification to the validity of
Chinese herbal medicine in treatment,” and “the pharmacology of its effects
can also be explained in scientific language. Now our key concern is to find
the language.”2 TCM has its own language as a Chinese cultural heritage. Why
do researchers want to seek a new language to replace it? TCM has displayed
its curative capacity in medicine practice by using its own ways of speaking and
writing. Why does it need a language for merely justification? What on earth
are the linguistic “deficiencies” of TCM that we feel are problematic in using
it? What will be the consequences when we try to explain and justify it in a
scientific language? These questions are addressed in this study. This chapter
is based on a yearlong ethnographical study of TCM practice, combined with a
critical analysis of the text (or interaction) collected during the research process
(Wu and Lü 2005).

Ontological ground of TCM discourse

The rejection of TCM language is mainly grounded on the problems of meaning
as reference in the sense that the objects of TCM key words cannot be identified
physically and verified empirically. For a proper understanding of this
phenomenon, we use Wittgenstein’s concepts of “language games” and “forms
of life” to explore the ontological grounds of TCM discourse. Rather than to
see language as the origin of meaning, Wittgenstein (1972, sec. 19) claims, “to
imagine a language means to imagine a life-form.” Meaning is here understood
as something emergent as language in use or language games. For Wittgenstein,
all the propositions in human language are nonsense. Similarly, it is held by
Zhuangzi, an ancient Chinese philosopher in the Warring States Period, that
human language has no difference from birds’ chirping. “It is supposed to be
 The Discourse of Chinese Medicine and Westernization 157

different from the chirping of small birds. Is it really different or is it not, as a

matter of fact?” (Zhuangzi 1999, 16). What is essential is to see what form of
life people construct when they speak a particular language. In other words,
we need not justify or even confirm the truth of TCM using positivist
propositions. For thousands of years, the TCM language has regulated a form
of life in which human beings live harmoniously with nature in the way that
the human body, herbs, food, ways of daily life, including what we eat, when to
sleep, when to get up and where to live, etc. are embraced as a whole.
Wittgenstein maintained that language games, like forms of life, are simply given.
“It is not based on grounds. It is not reasonable (or unreasonable). It is there
— like our life” (1969, 559). “… attempts at justification need to be rejected”
(1972, 200). To say “Qi is the essence of humans” should not be understood as
a descriptive statement. Rather it is a rule of game for the use of the word qi.
TCM and Western scientific medicine (hereafter abbreviated WSM) play
different language games, representing different forms of life. There is no right
or wrong between different language games, but the difference only. The
language propositions in different cultures might be in sharp contrast. For
example, the claim in TCM that “heart controls the mind (xin zhu shenming, 心
主神明)” might not be agreed to in WSM, but this disagreement should not be
opinions in opposition. They are two different things, as Wittgenstein remarks,
“… you can call it believing the opposite but it is entirely different from what
we normally call believing the opposite. I think differently, in a different way. I
say different things to myself. I have different pictures” (1966, 55).
So what are the differences between TCM discourse and WSM discourse
(scientific discourse) in language games? To address this question, we need to
take an ontological investigation into the language practice of TCM, by not
focusing on the internal linguistic structure but by seeing the language as a
game, a picture and a form of life.

Language of absence

TCM employs a language of absence, in contrast to a language of presence used

in WSM. The former has no referent to signify in a literal sense of a term, but
serves the function of evoking difference by allusive hints. The latter is
“grounded upon the possibility of univocal or unambiguous propositional
expressions. This possibility requires criteria for determining the literalness of
a proposition” (Hall 1996, 704). The difference between the two languages is
basically the difference in worldviews. And the two ways of using language are
culturally associated with two different forms of life. The latter is a technical
language that is predominated by the positivist rationality for conquering
humans and nature through technology and science, whereas the former is a
hermeneutical language featured by illumination, implication, and
158 Zongjie Wu and Qingxia Lü

enlightenment. For Saussure (1974, 118), “In the language itself, there are only
differences. In a sign, what matters more than any idea or sound associated with
it is what other signs surround it.” The value of a sign may change simply because
some neighboring signs have undergone a change. “Its value is therefore not
determined merely by that concept or meaning for which it is a token. It must
also be assessed against comparable values, by contrast with other words” (1974,
114). For such an interpretation, language is a system to illuminate
understanding but not actually to signify things on ontological bases. The
indefinite allusiveness in a language illuminates our understanding of the world.
Thus for Lacan (1981, 39), the notion of the “word” itself is a “presence made
of absence,” and the transposition of the thing into language fundamentally
renders the real absent. When talking about the characteristics of traditional
Chinese language, Hall (1996, 705–6) once stated:
In China, tradition, as a communal resource for meaning, more
certainly disciplines the indefinite allusiveness of the language. In fact,
it is tradition as the resource of meaning and value that serves to render
plausible what seemed originally so paradoxical — namely, that Chinese
culture has an appreciation of difference, which, historically, Western
culture has never displayed.

Going back to the language practice of TCM, ordinary people in China can
mostly distinguish food as “cold (leng, 冷)” or “hot (re, 熱),” but when asked
what “cold” or “hot” actually is, no one can explain it clearly. However, someone
might tell a story of a personal way of bodily experience. In contrast, in the case
of food distinction in WSM, scientific terms such as caloric or fat content are
used, so that people seem to understand these terms explicitly and
determinately, at least in a literal sense. To see more of TCM language of this
type, we take a short paragraph from Huang Di’s Inner Classic (Huangdi Neijing,
黃帝內經), an ancient Chinese medical monograph, one of the few classics that
TCM practitioners must read:
Yin excess causing yang deficiency, yang excess causing yin deficiency;
excessive yang generating heat, excessive yin generating cold; extreme
cold generating heat, extreme heat generating cold.

Here, yin (陰) and yang (陽), or cold and hot, are not two different things in
opposition. They represent a relationship of inter-generation (xiangsheng, 相生)
and inter-restriction (xiangke, 相克). Yin is the yin that is going to be yang, and
yang is the yang that is going to be yin. Therefore, we certainly will fail if we try
to find out what is purely the matter of yin and what is the object of yang in
binary opposition. This language with mutual implication of absence and
presence seems to be obscure, but it can bring us truth in the lifeworld. “In the
hollow it has been able to form” (Foucault 2002, 87).
 The Discourse of Chinese Medicine and Westernization 159

TCM language as the connection between word and lifeworld

The context of TCM discourse corresponds with the lifeworld rather than with
the explicitly thematic world that science and theory make. The lifeworld is here
understood in Husserl’s notion, referring to the pre-given, “the surrounding
world of life, taken for granted as valid” (1970, 103), in contrast to the world of
reason and ideas. The lifeworld was always there before science (1970, 123). It
need not and cannot be justified and verified through science. In the context
where authentic TCM language is used, human beings with their body and spirit,
and nature (seasons, weather, plants, etc.) constitute an inseparable organic
whole. They adjust themselves to the pulse of nature’s dynamics. Yin, yang, and
the five basic elements of TCM (wuxing, 五行) as words (metal, wood, water,
fire, and earth) stand as hints to the lifeworld. They are also interpreted as an
inseparable whole; each inter-generates, inter-restricts, and inter-transforms the
other in a process of approaching balance. The words help transform
individuals’ intuition of their life, including body, into “essential insight — a
possibility which is itself not to be understood as empirical but as essential
possibility” (Husserl 1931, 54). Words do not attempt to separate, name, and
explain what is seen, felt, and understood, but to render them to us as the
lifeworld itself.
The connection between words and the lifeworld associated with TCM
practice offers a transparent way of knowing and seeing the world. The language
itself renders nothing meaningful for interpreting. If I want to know yin, I have
to think of my body in its own way. But when TCM language is mixed with WSM
language, it will be disturbed, losing its capacity of knowing, as scientific language
covers a coat on the transparent lifeworld and represents it with this coat of
language. For Heidegger (1998, 20), in our modern technological age, language
is “technologically determined by what is most peculiar to technology.” It is
characterized as an instrument of passing information, a tool of scientific-
technological knowing, referring to objects only, and “a representing and
portraying of the real and unreal.” Thinking and speaking are “exhausted by
theoretical and natural-scientific representation and statement” (Heidegger
1976, 27–8).
Therefore, the TCM language might be considered a language that talks
for something unspeakable, a language essentially for tacit understanding rather
than for the interest in enacting and communication. The language of WSM
has specific communicative purposes. The definitions it makes and the rules it
explains are all in the service of using language to enact the power of language
in the form of “perlocutionary force,” a force for the interest in action and
communication (Austin 1975, 107).
160 Zongjie Wu and Qingxia Lü

Intelligibility and reasonableness

In the linguistic worldview, TCM discourse is not meant to seek positivist reason
but rather reasonableness and intelligibility in a hermeneutic sense. Vincent
Shen (1995) held that traditional Chinese learning, including Confucianism,
Buddhism, and Daoism, is hermeneutic in nature:
Chinese learning is not scientifically rational, though it is reasonable
in a hermeneutic sense. To be scientifically rational, one must control
the gathering of empirical data through technical process, formulate
theories in logico-mathematical structure and establish their
correspondence through interactive processes. But to be reasonable we
must refer to the totality of our existence and its meaningful
interpretation by human life as a whole.

Methods of interpretation in TCM are opposed by the techniques of

formalization in WSM. In Foucault (2002, 325), the former “claim to make
language speak as it were below itself, and as near as possible to what is being
said in it, without it”; the latter “claim to control any language that may arise,
and to impose upon it from above the law of what it is possible to say.” What
the interpretive language is trying to approach is the unspeakable lifeworld.
Language makes it understandable but does not attempt to replace it. By
contrast, technical language, through what can only be told with language,
“reproduces thought in its exactitude” (Foucault 2002, 86).
Practically speaking, interpretive language depends on experiential
knowledge, but not theoretical propositions. The language and what the
language refers to is made plausible only against the horizon of speakers’ life
experience. It provokes intelligibility and reasonableness based on a holistic
grasp of things concerned. For example, pulse-feeling is peculiar to TCM
practice. Interpretation through feeling the patient’s pulse is a
phenomenological act based on experience. It is an approach through which a
TCM doctor interprets the human body relative to, but without specific referent
of, disease, meridians, (jing, 經), and collaterals (luo, 絡), qi (氣), and blood
(xue, 血), and the relative strength of pathogenic factors and the anti-pathogenic
qi. In practice, the doctors put three of fingers, that is, the index finger, the
middle finger, and the ring finger, on the cunkou (寸口), an area close to the
wrist, to diagnose visceral diseases. Cunkou is considered in TCM as the main
convergence of meridians and vessels as well as the artery of the lung meridian.
It can be divided into three regions, cun, guan, chi. On each hand, six kinds of
pulse can be felt, and each pulse can be taken with a gentle, moderate, and
heavy pressure. And each of these regions corresponds to one of the internal
organs in an abstract sense. For this, no unanimous conclusion or exactly
measurable index could be drawn by practitioners throughout the ages. The
description of the normal pulse as even, stable, harmonious, and forceful with
 The Discourse of Chinese Medicine and Westernization 161

regular rhythms, and the abnormal pulse divided into floating, deep, slow, rapid,
deficient, and excessive can hardly be explained clearly to anyone who has no
such diagnostic experience. This understanding cannot be justified, and no
external proof can be found. The TCM language just offers a possibility of
insight.

Uniqueness as a whole

Uniqueness of individuals as a whole is sought in TCM language practice. That

is to say, people try to understand holistically the uniqueness of any individual
case at a specific time, in a specific place (yinren yinshi yindi , 因人因時因地)
(Wang 2002). In WSM discourse, once a disease is confirmed by scientific tests,
people try to explain the commonness and then prescribe the medicine
correspondingly. A set of diversified expressions has been developed in TCM
to grasp the diversified uniqueness. This is the grammar of “treatment with
syndrome differentiation” (bianzheng lunzhi, 辨證論治). For example, in TCM
there are principles such as “different treatments for the same disease” and “the
same treatment for different diseases.” Here, the disease is not a name of a bodily
problem but a description of syndrome differentiation that is always unique
according to the situation, including the season, environment, and the case. If
we follow the scientific way of thinking, we surely do not know what treatment
should be applied for which disease the language names.
“Treatment with syndrome differentiation” is the basic principle in
understanding and treating diseases in TCM practice. There are two key
elements in this principle: to differentiate the syndrome and then to design an
appropriate way of treatment. Syndrome differentiation includes a process of
analyzing and generalizing holistically the information obtained from the four
diagnostic methods (sizhen, 四診): inspection (wang, 望), auscultation and
olfaction (wen, 聞), inquiry (wen, 問), and pulse-feeling and palpation (qie, 切),
and a process of making judgments to differentiate the syndromes. To be exact,
inspection is to examine the physique, facial expression, color of the
complexion, physical condition, the condition of tongue coating, etc. In this
process, doctors examine the general condition of the whole body, the mental
faculty, signs, secretions and excretions of the patients. “Auscultation and
olfaction” is a method of interpreting the body by comprehending the patient’s
voice and breathing, and the odor of the body. Inquiry is a way to interview the
patient, his or her family members to determine the patient’s state of health,
major complaints, progress, duration of the illness, and living environment.
Pulse-feeling is an approach through which a TCM doctor understands the
condition of a disease, meridians and collaterals, qi and blood, and the relative
strength of pathogenic factors, and the anti-pathogenic qi. Palpation means to
examine various parts of the body by touching, to discover abnormal conditions.
162 Zongjie Wu and Qingxia Lü

In TCM, it is the syndrome, not the exact disease, that should be determined
before a treatment is designed or selected. And the prescriptions are made
according to a global consideration of each individual’s condition as a whole
body, both spiritually and physically. There is no fixed formula of “disease —
medicine” to follow. Therefore, with the principle of “treatment with syndrome
differentiation” in mind, uniqueness is sought holistically.

Discourse in the cultural transformation of TCM: A critical analysis

The change of TCM started when modern Western medicine was introduced
into China in the late nineteenth century. Since then, the TCM language has
undergone a tremendous transformation. In the interaction and collision of
different cultures, today’s TCM discourse no longer faithfully represents
traditional Chinese culture. Rather, it has already been mixed up with lots of
“others’ discourse” in the form of hybridity and mixture. However, the others’
discourse performs not only as information but rather strives to transform the
inner structure, cultural connotation, ways of practice, and “forms of life.” How
do the traditional discourses react when they encounter Western discourses?
How do people talk about and carry out TCM practice nowadays? And what is
the relationship between the discourses of TCM and WSM? To address these
questions, we take an empirical analysis of some texts representing modern
forms of TCM discourse.

Analytical framework

The theoretical framework for the analysis of the data adheres to Fairclough’s
approach of critical discourse analysis, in which some categories of discourse
such as genre, text, order of discourse, and intertextuality are operationalized
into specific aspects of social practice. The cultural transformation of TCM is
to be interpreted as a specific mode of texturing in the order of discourse.
Fairclough (1999, 58; 2003, 24) borrowed the phrase “order of discourse” from
Foucault, to refer to a network of social practices in its language aspect, defined
as “the socially ordered set of genres and discourses associated with a particular
social field, characterized in terms of the shifting boundaries and flows between
them.” “Orders of discourse can be seen as the social organization and control
of linguistic variation,” the elements controlling linguistic variability for
particular areas of social life. One of the most important aspects of the orders
of discourse is genre and genre chaining, which is also a key notion in Bahktin
(1986, 60), who held that speech genres are determined by “the specific nature
of the particular sphere of communication,” consisting of three inseparably
 The Discourse of Chinese Medicine and Westernization 163

linked aspects — thematic content, style, and compositional structure. “Each

sphere of activity contains an entire repertoire of speech genres.” They regulate
a way of action, a way of believing and knowing, and fundamentally regulate a
form of life. Fairclough (2003, 28–9) suggests dialectical relationships between
the different categories of discourse in the sense that genre presupposes
culturally different discourses, and discourses enact particular modes of action
that in turn are associated with speaking a subject’s identity and knowledge. The
interpretation of the struggle between different cultural traditions is to analyze
the interconnections between these discourse categories, and to identify their
characteristics. Critical discourse analysis has been accused of “ideological
commitment” and “cultural prejudice” (e.g., Widdowson 1995). Shi-xu (2005)
suggests that discourse studies should take an in-between cultural stance by
avoiding using predetermined categories developed from any one particular
cultural tradition. We thus appropriate our research method by incorporating
ethnographic inquiry, in which the discourse analysis is regarded as an
articulation of our phenomenological understanding of the case as well as an
engagement into the dialogue of different cultures (Wu and Lü 2005, 75). In
other words, we reject “universal” interpretation of any analytical categories but
situate them in the concrete form of cultural worlds, prior to any theoretical
generalization. This research stance takes a view to see cultural values locating
within the horizon of the lifeworld of a specific cultural practice, and “can be
made plausible only in the context of a particular form of life” (Habermas 1986,
42).

Genres and generic structure of TCM practices

For comparison, we first investigate two clinical cases of TCM practice, analyzing
their generic features, genre chaining, to understand the cultural transforming
tendency. First, let us identify the basic generic elements of the traditional way
of diagnosis by looking at a prescription made by a senior doctor of TCM who
strives to use the traditional way of diagnosis. The following is the prescription
the doctor made for the second author of this chapter:

月經淨後胸悶不舒，乳房脹痛，夜間惡夢驚擾，大便如敘，舌苔薄
黃，咽喉微紅，脈象小弱而弦，此為肝鬱氣滯，沖任失調，膽經鬱
熱，治當疏肝清膽，理氣通絡。

炒柴胡 10克 炒白芍 15克 炒枳殼 10克 炒白術 20克

焙丹皮 10克 薑竹茹 10克 炒川連 5克 焦山梔 10克

164 Zongjie Wu and Qingxia Lü

制香附 10克 川郁金 10克 陳膽星 10克 炙甘草 5克

(Suffocation in the chest after routine menstruation, fullness and pain
in the breasts, constant disturbance by nightmares, stool normal as
usual, thin and yellowish tongue coating, slight red throat, weak and
stringy pulse. The syndrome is liver depression and qi stagnation,
disorder of thoroughfare meridian and conception meridian,
depression and heat of gallbladder meridian. For treatment, to soothe
liver depression and clear gallbladder heat, to regulate qi and collaterals.
(Herbal prescription)
(chao chaihu 10g chao baishao 15g chao zhike 10g chao baishu
20g pei danpi 10g jiang zhuru 10g chao chuanlian 5g jiao shanzhi
10g zhi xiangfu 10g chuan yujin 10g chen danxing 10g zhi
gancao 5g )

In this prescription, there are four basic generic elements, representing the basic
procedure of diagnosis and treatment in TCM:
Description (through four diagnostic methods) ➔ Elucidation
(syndrome differentiation) ➔ Designing (therapeutic principles) ➔
Prescription (herb composition and dosage)

The first element contains the information collected from four diagnostic
methods: inspection, auscultation and olfaction, inquiry and pulse-feeling, and
palpation (wang wen wen qie, 望聞問切), shown in the text as the description of
symptoms mainly in TCM terms: suffocation in the chest after r outine menstruation,
fullness and pain in the breasts, constant disturbance by nightmares, normal stool as usual,
thin and yellowish tongue coating, slight red throat, weak and stringy pulse. The second
element of the genre is elucidation — the doctor makes sense of symptoms with
the support of the language of syndromes, which can be basically classified into
four categories: deficiency (of qi, blood, yin, yang, etc.), excess, cold, and heat.
“Elucidation” enlightens the nature and location of the body problem, offering
a description of the disease without specifically naming it. Here, the location,
the doctor told us, has to be understood as a concept or area rather than a
specific organ. This part of language is shown in the text after the phrase “The
syndrome is (ciwei 此為)”: liver depression and qi stagnation (ganyu qizhi, 肝鬱氣
滯), disorder of thoroughfare meridian and conception meridian (chongren shitiao, 沖
任失調), depression and heat of gallbladder meridian (danjing yure, 膽經鬱熱). This
judgment is not based upon logical reasoning of the causal relationships by
locating the cause of the disease; rather, it is an attempt to interpret the body
as a whole. This requires a language that can talk about the body holistically
but not refer to specific things, such as qi, blood (in the abstract), heat, cold,
etc. The third element is the designing of therapeutic principles, which is shown
after “For treatment (zhidang 治當)” in the text, that is, to soothe liver depr ession
and clear gallbladder heat (shugan qingdan, 疏肝清膽), to regulate qi and collaterals
 The Discourse of Chinese Medicine and Westernization 165

(liqi tongluo, 理氣通絡). The principles are formulated according to the result
of syndrome differentiation, to be interpreted as the associations with the
medicinal properties of herbs for formulating a prescription. Generally, there
are eight principles of treatment, such as warming therapy, heat-clearing therapy,
regulating therapy, invigorating therapy, and so on. The fourth element is to
formulate a prescription according to the syndrome differentiation and
therapeutic principles, and by drawing upon the doctor’s experiences
accumulated throughout life, some in the form of secret formulas passed down
from generation to generation. All of the medicaments come from nature,
namely herbs. Usually, a traditional prescription is organized for a specific
syndrome, not a disease as in WSM terms. It is composed of drugs carefully
selected in light of their compatibility of a language shared for describing the
nature of syndromes, herbs, and environments. The selection of herbs, including
the dosage, is made upon the nature of particular herbs in relation to
complementary polar dualistic concepts, such as cold and heat, yin and yang,
etc. For example, Jinyinhua (Flos lonicerae) and Lianqiao (Fructus forsythiae) may
clear away heat and toxins and resolve mass. Such a language associates these
medicinal properties with the human body in a holistic way, embracing all the
domains of nature: earth and sea, season and weather, plants and animals. The
language helps make a prescription, but in the process of making it in the mind,
the doctor can forget the language if he or she has obtained adequate
experience. As for the four generic elements, there might be some variations
in different cases, but in general they represent the four indispensable processes
of traditional TCM practice.
Next, we look at the genre properties of clinical practice in a national TCM
hospital to see how the TCM language is transformed. According to our
observation and related interviews, nowadays in many modernized TCM
hospitals, prescriptions may be generated by the computer. A kind of “expert
system” was established to represent TCM knowledge in a purely linguistic
structure. Language stands out as an instrument of representation in the form
of hybridized text that contains the TCM traditional language, the language of
WSM pathology, and mathematic logic. Here we present the stages of the
modern TCM clinical practice based on a case of treating canker sores. The
doctor first asked the patient to accept a blood density test. After examining
the results, the doctor excluded the possibility that the canker sore was caused
by immune system deficiency and concluded this was a common type of canker
sore. Thereafter, the doctor put into the computer a name of a disease in WSM,
KQKY, the initials of Chinese Pinyin of the disease (Kouqiang Kuiyang). A
corresponding prescription popped up on the screen, which contained the
composition of herbs and their dosage. The doctor then tailored the
prescription based upon the principles of syndrome differentiation obtained
through TCM diagnostic methods. The process is shown in a flow chart as
follows:
166 Zongjie Wu and Qingxia Lü

Testing ➔ identifying a name of disease ➔ inputting the name into

computer ➔ temporary prescription generated by computer ➔ four
diagnostic methods ➔ treatment with syndrome differentiation ➔
modifying the prescription

Referring to the generic structure with staging, Fairclough (2003, 72) states that,
“a point of tension in the social transformation of new capitalism is between
pressures towards instability, variability, flexibility etc., and pressure towards
social control, stabilization and ritualization.” In this case, TCM practice, as a
staged genre, has undergone great changes in generic structure. The genre
elements that are enacted by positivist rationality find their way in the order of
discourse of the traditional practice, pushing towards control, ritualization, and
domination. As is shown above, the stage of four diagnostic methods is replaced
by WSM pathologic discourse in the forms of testing results and disease
identification. The traditional generic elements move towards the end of the
sequence so as to become destabilized and complementary. The fundamental
feature of this change is “to ascribe a name to things, and in that name to name
their being” (Foucault 2002, 132). The language of syndrome differentiation is
normalized as a phrase by which the computer obtains a language to name
diseases.3 So, in modernized clinical practice, doctors of TCM have to think
about the symptoms in the language of WSM pathology. Otherwise, it is
impossible for the computer program to produce a prescription, since there
are no such distinguishable terms to name the diseases in TCM. Disease in TCM
is understood as syndrome differentiation based upon four categories, i.e.,
deficiency (xu, 虛), excess (shi, 實), cold (leng, 冷) and heat (re, 熱), rather than
specific diseases as objects. There is no fixed formula of “disease→medicine”
to follow in TCM practice. The diversified prescriptions are made in accordance
with treatment principles. For example, the therapeutic principle of clearing
away liver fire and lowering the adverse rising lung qi is designed for a cough
categorized as syndrome of liver fire invading the lung. The language used in
TCM (such as yin and yang) is heuristic in nature, opening up a transparent
horizon to the body and nature, and then withdrawing itself to the invisible.
Expressions such as “soothing liver depression and clearing gallbladder heat”
and “regulating qi and collaterals” are thought as “a ladder” for both the doctor
and the patient to reach a status of self-understanding (Wittgenstein 1955, sec.
6.54). The significance of words does not create an object as a name of a disease;
rather, it recalls thinking, indicates it, and then withdraws all substance of itself.
While in the process of TCM modernization and standardization, such a
language has gradually been transformed into descriptions or notes of a Western
name with which language emerges brutally as a thing, the destination of TCM
discourse. The sensory experience it provokes is restricted in the direction of
calculated objects obtained by a technologically controlled form of observation
and testing. To some degree, once a doctor falls into this order of discourse,
 The Discourse of Chinese Medicine and Westernization 167

his or her knowing will be dominated or framed unconsciously by the power of

the genre in which “another’s discourse” (positivist discourse), no matter
whether he or she likes it or not, is speaking for the other’s thought.
The following text is transcribed from the clinical conversation, (.)
indicating a normal pause, (1.0) a pause of one second, and / overlapping.
D: What is wrong with you?
P: Canker sore.
D: (feeling the patient’s pulse) always (1.0) your mouth often goes
rotten?
P: Yeah yeah yeah (.) indeed (.) especially when eating (1.0) when I
bite myself by accident/
D: /bite yourself.
P: Yeah.
D: How about if you don’t bite yourself?
P: If I don’t bite myself (2.0) if I don’t bite myself (.) sometimes when
I feel overtired (1.0) or I talk too much (1.0) This problem actually
began two or three years ago.
D: Canker sore very often?
P: Yeah.
…
D: Let me take a look at your tongue coating (3.0). Stretch it out (8.0).
Kangfuxin has been prescribed several times (looking through the
medical record) (.) right?
P: Yeah.
D: When your mouth is rotten (.) don’t take (.) antipyrotic medicine
(.) unnecessary.
P: Oh (.) don’t take antipyrotic medicine (.) right?
D: Yeah (.) at most spray some Xiguashuang (.) just spray some (.) and
then take some herbal medicine/
P: /But I wonder/
D: /And take some Kangfuxin/
P: /I really want to know (2.0) what on earth has caused this? I (1.0)
I/
D: /Either according to TCM or WSM, it’s due to your poor immunity.
…

The doctor perhaps is struggling to think in TCM discourse (e.g., feeling the
patient’s pulse), but she is forced to talk in a Westernized Chinese language so
as to let her patient understand his ailment. Canker sore as a name of a disease
in WSM terms jumps out at the doctor as the object being interpreted and talked
168 Zongjie Wu and Qingxia Lü

about. Then the terms “antipyrotic medicine” paralyzes the doctor’s TCM
reasoning process and forces her into the flow of positivist consciousness. The
phrase “poor immunity” ruthlessly stands up to make an explanation for the
doctor, who struggles to help the patient understand the cause of the disease
in a TCM language that she is not “allowed” to speak. The drugs mentioned in
the clinic conversation are Chinese patent medicines (Xiguashang, 西瓜霜;
Kangfuxin, 康復新). They are prepared with herbal formulas and are now
modernized through a process of “basic research, manufacture, standardization
and application of biology technology” (Luo et al. 2000). They are prescribed
as functional medicine for treating a particular disease or certain symptoms, in
which the language of syndrome differentiation (a must for traditional practice)
becomes redundant and unnecessary. To be exact, in tradition, the medicinal
features of Xiguashang are defined as “clearing away heat and toxins” (qingre
jiedu, 清熱解毒), but in this case it is explicitly connected with particular diseases
or symptoms, as is shown in the instructions: “mainly for treating garget, aphtha,
acute and chronic faucitis, tonsillitis, stomatitis and canker sore, etc”. Taylor
(2004, 102) explains this as follows:
It was a medicine which could operate with the field of scientific
biomedicine. In other words TCM represented not so much a medicine
of the past but a medicine of the present. And not only had it been
moved into the present, but it had also become a functional medicine.

Since 1958, the Chinese government has advocated a medical policy called
the “integration of Chinese and Western medicines” (zhongxiyi jiehe, 中西醫結
合). Disease is treated with a mixture of Chinese and Western medicine. Many
scientific studies sponsored by governments and pharmaceutical companies
attempt to analyze the chemical and biological elements of TCM drugs (e.g.,
Yu and Tseng 1996; Luo et al. 2000; Jiang et al. 2005). Chinese herbal medicine
is kept for treatment, but its language is on the verge of becoming silenced.
As is mentioned above, the order of discourse is a network of social practices
in its language aspect. Another genre embedded in this network is TCM
research. It is a discourse device that manufactures Westernized TCM discourse
(e.g., expert system) for clinical practice to consume. The text analyzed below
was collected from the 2004 International Conference of Diagnosing and
Treating Difficult Diseases with TCM (Hangzhou, China). The paper is about a
case study using TCM to treat the genetic metabolic disorder of Niemann-Pick
Type A (NPTA, one type of glycogenosis) for an infant girl seven months old.
The author practiced TCM pediatrics for over thirty-five years in both China
and America. This is a typical study of combining TCM and WSM for diagnosing
and treatment. We now edit a diagram to show the diagnosis and treatment in
the case. No changes or modifications have been made to the statements in the
text. This, we envisage, represents a vast majority of TCM research in China,
 The Discourse of Chinese Medicine and Westernization 169

Table 10.1
Relationships of discourses between TCM and WSM

Test Symptoms Syndrome Treatment

results description differentiation selection
Patient’s Western Loose stool, irritability, Damp-heat brewing Removing stasis to
diagnosis confirmed crying, red tongue, internally activate blood;
NPD Type A; abdomen extension soothing liver
blood tests showed High level of liver Liver qi and blood and depression
storage of fat, enzymes (SGOT, stasis regulating qi;
cholesterol, and SGPT ↑); high levels clearing away heat
other metabolites of cholesterol and and toxins.
caused cell death. glucose; mega liver
and spleen
Seizures Liver internal wind

perhaps worldwide (e.g., An and Liu 2005; Han Gang et al. 2004; Hu and Chen
2004; Wu et al. 2005).
As we see from the paper, the author deploys a WSM language to confirm
the therapeutic effect of TCM treatment, in which the language of WSM
pathology establishes itself as the identity and attribution for knowing and
knower. The author uses scientific test results to justify her diagnosis and
treatment of syndrome differentiation. When she is doing the justification for
TCM, she is producing a type of discourse that can be transformed into a
computer recognizable language, providing names and rules by which a TCM
prescription can be automatically generated, as we showed previously. The aim
of this study is not meant to replace TCM with WSM, but the language it
produces promises this possibility. It is done in such a way that the knowledge
tacit and heuristic in nature is transformed into a discourse with absolute
certainty, an implicit assumption of “universalism” (Shi-xu 2005, 44–5). Positivist
discourse stands as a means of “filter” to strip TCM language of all its uniqueness,
to purify it of all its alien elements and intimacy, and to stabilize it as a faithful
object. Finally, the former obtains a “copy” of it, and with this copy it gets the
authority to present TCM in its own way.
In Table 10.1, the two culturally different discourses align in such a way
that one is scrutinizing the other. In the relationships of discourses, one is
positioned as the interpreter and the other, the interpreted. Here, the two
discourses engage in an internal dialogue in the form of intertextuality and
hybridity. “Dialogism is the characteristic epistemological mode in a world
dominated by heteroglossia” (Bakhtin 1981, 426). Holquist (1981, 427) holds
that “a word, discourse, language or culture undergoes ‘dialogization’ when it
170 Zongjie Wu and Qingxia Lü

becomes relativized, de-privileged, aware of competing definitions for the same

things. Undialogized language is authoritative or absolute.” The least dialogical
option is assumption, which leaves “no room for other possibilities” (Fairclough
2003, 46). The relationship of discourses between TCM and WSM is
characterized by the dialogization of the former as representation, and the
undialogization of the latter as the analyzer. Aware of its weakness, the former
seeks other interpretations of itself, while the latter shows itself as judger,
interpreter, and explainer of the former.
Apart from TCM research, there is another genre networking to the order
of TCM discourse under transformation. This is the sector of TCM education
practice that manufactures subjects who can speak a Westernized TCM language.
Before the encounter with Western medicine, the training of TCM doctors
followed the model of apprenticeship. Knowledge was handed down, often in
a family line from generation to generation to ensure the accumulation of
experiences embedded in a particular mode of life. It had never been necessary
to teach Chinese medicine based on a coherent theory. “It was not until after
the Cultural Revolution that a basic theory of TCM (zhongyi jichu lilun, 中醫基
礎理論) emerged as part of a general education” (Taylor 2004, 107). Taylor
(2004, 111) is aware that some high-profile publications by some Western
scholars contributed possibly to the inclusion of such a basic theory of TCM in
the core Chinese medical curriculum. He thus argues, “The pattern of
development of Chinese medicine within China can be seen to be inextricably
linked to Western medicine and to Western audiences in general” (2004, 111).
The institutionalization of TCM education and the emergence of a coherent
TCM curriculum theory contribute to the transformation of TCM educational
practice in which Western discourse — political, institutional, and scientific —
is performing a shaping force to produce the “speakers” of modern Chinese
traditional medicine.
Thus we have seen that a network of genres is established, connecting TCM
clinical practice, TCM research, education, and other social spheres such as
media and legislation. The social transformation of a discourse can be seen as
changes in the networking of social practices, including change in genres
(Fairclough 2003). This network sustains the basic grammatical structure. “For
the word to be able to say what it says, it must belong to a grammatical totality
which, in relation to the word, is primary, fundamental, and determining”
(Foucault 2002, 306). For Philips (1987, 79), genre is a “framing device” as a
force to control linguistic variability. Some discourses are assimilated, while some
others are silenced. In the discursive practices aforementioned, doctors,
researchers, teachers all talk in a Westernized TCM discourse. It is not necessarily
the case that the subjects have no authentic TCM understanding, but more likely
the case that they are caught in an order of discourse in which a deep value of
worldviews is under way. In what sense can we understand this deep force of
value? Next, we analyze a text to reveal the ideology interwoven with the network.
 The Discourse of Chinese Medicine and Westernization 171

Discourse of TCM colonization

As a result of the growing perception of the limitation and harmfulness of

Western science, TCM has recently gained widespread acceptance in the West.
Chinese people are proud of selling their “heritage” to the world. An internally
persuasive discourse of the other for transforming TCM language in China is
enacted to satisfy their will of being glorious, wealthy, and strong, which was
lost in the encounter with the West. Taylor (2004, 93) noticed:
Western scholarly interest in the medicine was one force which was to
leave its mark on this search for identity. The shroud of mystery in
which China was enveloped for much of this time was to give rise to
two fundamentally contradictory attitudes — one side was Chinese,
pushing for a scientification of their medicine, and the other was
Western, pushing for more information on a traditional healing
method.

The tendency to assimilate Western discourse in TCM for whatever reasons

“takes on a deeper and more basic significance in an individual’s ideological
becoming” (Bakhtin 1981, 342). And the others’ discourse demands that the
Chinese medicine community acknowledge and normalize it as their own. The
following text comes from a Chinese scholar in an authoritative TCM research
organization in China:
An important reason why TCM cannot be modernized and globally
accepted is the fact that the way it works can not be explained with
modern scientific theory and the effective ingredients in herbal
medicine cannot be controlled so that the quality and safety of the
medical products cannot be ensured. Chen Kaixian, who comes from
Shanghai Medical Institute said, “To establish such a TCM ingredients
database, our purpose is to make clear what chemical elements in
herbal medicine on earth are functioning in curing the diseases so as
to make TCM as clear and safe as WSM.”4

As is shown in the above text, the Chinese speaker talks about TCM not in
“Chinese” language at all but in a discourse completely alien from Chinese
tradition. Even the word “TCM” was coined from the time of its encounter with
Western medicine, but was made as a particular against the universal (WSM).
In this text, modernization and globalization are assumed as the unchallengeable
and unshakable, leaving no other possibilities but acceptance as the only order
TCM discourse must enter. This discourse in essence represents a particular
value and worldview, but it is represented here as universal, acultural, and
ahistorical. The discourse occupies a fundamental power in relation to all
culturally bound practices. “It was the first sketch of an order in representations
of the world … was the initial, inevitable way of representing representations”
172 Zongjie Wu and Qingxia Lü

(Foucault 2002, 322). However, the language of “modernization” and

“globalization” does not fall into the category of purely scientific discourse
through which it can be verified empirically. Nevertheless, it was positioned as
the absolute condition while TCM discourse, another nonscientific discourse,
must be rejected for the same reason. Thus, we may arrive at the conclusion
that the colonization of TCM discourse by technologizing the language purely
for the purpose of scientific justification is not empowered merely by the science
itself, though it coincided with it, but rather by a discourse of a worldview.
Consequently, the language that regulates the form of life in medical
practice for seeking a harmonious relationship between human and nature is
gradually silenced and removed, which poses a threat to the cultural integrity
in general and the medicine heritage in particular. The social conditions
enacting this transformation are the hegemonic relationships of discourses
between different cultures, which dominate the process of globalization, and
represent technology as a universal discourse for all medical practices. That is
to say, if TCM cannot be accepted into mainstream medicine, this is not due to
its curative effects or medicine safety, as the Chinese scholar claims, but because
of its language: a language that cannot be used to differentiate true from false
cannot be analyzed beneath the gaze of science and fundamentally cannot be
searched for a logic that could clarify and utilize the universal implication of a
discourse assumed to be above all languages of other cultures.
But silently and privately, “no small number of patients has reported cures
or improvements in their ailments in the absence of systematic scientific proof,
and have convinced other patients, neighbors and family members to try
acupuncture treatment” (Unschuld, online). The bodily experienced convictions
call for a language that can be spoken publicly. Professor Murad said that our
key issue now is to find the language. As a matter of fact, the language he is
looking for has already existed, only it has no capacity to replace TCM language
completely for the time being. This language developed in the West in the
nineteenth century. Foucault (2002, 323) once described it as follows:
Hence two constant concerns throughout the nineteenth century. The
first is the wish to neutralize, and as it were polish, scientific language
to the point at which, stripped of all its singularity, purified of all its
accidents and alien elements — as though they did not belong to its
essence — it could become the exact reflection, the perfect double,
the unmisted mirror of a non-verbal knowledge. This is the positivist
dream of a language keeping strictly to the level of what is known:
…The other concern — entirely different from the first, even though
in correlation with it — was the search for a logic independent of
grammars, vocabularies, synthetic forms, and words: a logic that could
clarify and utilize the universal implications of thought while protecting
them from the singularities of a constituted language in which they
might be obscured.
 The Discourse of Chinese Medicine and Westernization 173

Conclusion
Unschuld (2003, 349), in his study of Huang Di’s Inner Classic, concludes, “the
human mind in conceptualizing the human organism has rarely been capable
of creating models independent from the conceptualization of the political
organism.” “The philosophical and socioeconomic heterogeneity of Chinese and
European civilization is reflected in the heterogeneity of the conceptual layers
surrounding the core ideas of its medical and health care systems.” Thus, the
intercultural struggle in medicine discourse is traceable to the political relations
between East and West. Ever since the integrity of Chinese culture was shattered
by the causal power of Western guns and fires during the Opium War, traditional
Chinese discourse has been under continuous siege and attack. Today, this attack
no longer resorts to a military and material power or the power of one country
over another; rather, to what Foucault points out “the multiplicity of force
relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute
their own organization” (Foucault 1978, 92). When a language that is
represented as a universal grammar has occupied a cultural space, unique,
particular, and completely different, and is accumulated to the extent that the
speakers themselves have lost memory and consciousness, they will have to
submit themselves to the demands of a language of which they are not masters.
Today, many Western scholars embark on the difficult task of trying to trace
the authentic elements of classical Chinese medicine (Taylor 2004; Unschuld
2003). These authentic roots cannot be discovered in the language, particularly
the text echoing their own domain of knowing and value. When the Chinese
language has already been distorted, and has lost its transparency and the
capacity of knowing, even a classic like Huang Di’s Inner Classic , written
thousands of year ago, might become unintelligible, not in a literal sense but
in a sense of the nameless. Cultural traditions are not maintained in the
language but in the forms of life in which language plays a role of “bird chirping”
(in Zhuangzi’s terms). Therefore, the first step to rescue a culture or tradition
is to save the form of life that is in a struggle the speakers themselves have no
consciousness of, and to render once more noisy and audible the voices which
are buried in the deep horizon of the life landscape. For the same reason,
Chinese people who want to rediscover the elements of the silenced have to,
first of all, disturb the words they are speaking and denounce the grammatical
habits of their own thinking. The convictions they make for others are not
presented as the correct or effective set in the criteria of the grammatical
structure but as the convictions that underlay the forms of their traditional life.

Acknowledgements
The researchers gratefully acknowledge the support of the MOR Project of Key
Research Institute of Humanities and Social Sciences in Chinese Universities
174 Zongjie Wu and Qingxia Lü

for the research described here. Special thanks to Professor Lu Zheng, the
renowned senior doctor of TCM in the Zhejiang Academy of TCM Research,
for his support of this study.

Notes

1. The event was regarded as the most important intellectual and cultural
movement in modern Chinese history. It was ignited by the Versailles Treaty
in 1919, after Germany was defeated in World War I, against the betrayal
of China national interests. For the first time, Chinese intellectuals abolished
the classical form of written Chinese (wenyan), hitherto used for thousands
of years, and started to reject the basic Chinese values and heritage
according to Confucianism (see Gray 1990, 198–201).
2. This is the authors’ translation from an Internet news report issued by
Xinhua News Agency, available online: http://news.xinhuanet.com/
newscenter/2003-06/16/content_921665.htm (accessed: July 17, 2003).
3. Nominalization is a type of grammatical metaphor that represents processes
as entities by transforming clause (including verbs) into a type of noun
(Fairclough 2003, 220). In Chinese, nominalization is often taken at the
semantic level at which a pattern of expressions is constantly repeated in
use to obtain a psychological image of things.
4. This is a translation from an Internet news report issued by Xinhua News
Agency, available online: http://www.sn.xinhuanet.com/2003-06/14/
content_604588.htm (accessed: July 17, 2003).

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11
Intercultural Communication and Conflict Resolution:
Towards an Iranian Approach
Reza Najafbagy

Introduction

Many failures to international cooperation and conflict resolution seem to be

related to communication problems and cultural differences. In other words,
the establishment of realistic, proper, and effective communication, based on
mutual cultural understanding and goodwill, would solve many national and
international disputes. Such a subject becomes more acute and sensitive, and
eventually more complicated, when a dispute of discussion arises among
individuals or government representatives from the less and more developed
nations, particularly among Western societies.
What are the main conditions of communication between cultures, and
what barriers stand in the way? Behind this issue lies the feeling and perception
of the other party’s problems, and awareness of how to handle relevant
problems. The lack of this knowledge is perhaps the main obstacle to the
solution of international problems and to people or nations helping each other.
Moreover, feelings of superiority give rise to false self-confidence and may
damage the ability and possibility to solve conflict and to achieve desirable
technical cooperation. The principal question that has to be asked about the
communication and cultural barrier is: Can we learn about other present-day
cultures on the basis of what we know and feel about our own past?
With regard to our present knowledge of the barriers that inhibit successful
cross-cultural communication at international levels, it is unfortunate that
insufficient attention is still given to the solution of international problems when
experts or delegates on different nations meet to discuss certain issues. This
indicates that effective communication between cultures requires an acceptance
of difference, and cultural tolerance. Culture is to a society what memory is to
an individual (Traindis 1994). In fact, difficulties in inter-cultural
communication, particularly between Western and Less Developed Nations
178 Reza Najafbagy

(LDNs), are seldom seen for what they are. When people of different countries,
in trying to solve certain problems or to help each other, realize that they are
not understanding one another, each tends to blame it on “those foreigners”
and their ignorance (Hall 1960).
A society can be tolerant of other cultures and civilizations to the extent
that it tolerates within itself a certain degree of difference, and allow the various
parts to communicate about their differences. This condition is rarely met in
the West, and unfortunately, in the past, world central powers have always worked
to suppress those differences and to superimpose a STATE culture.
The intention in this chapter is to discuss two things: First, true and effective
communication arrangements based on cultural understanding, which would
contribute positively to the solution of political, economic, and social problems
among nations; and second, the role and impact of conscious and unprejudiced
experts and representatives who contribute to the implementation of
development programs, should be given serious attention. Today, there is
sufficient evidence of the outcome of work of experts who lack these qualities,
causing more problems, suspicion, and damage to eventual conflict resolution
and cooperation, particularly at the international level.

Effective communication based on intercultural understanding

In all nations, perhaps the most pervasive problem is communication. In other

words, within a culture, communication has many complex effects. When
communication occurs between two cultures, these effects become even more
complicated, primarily because they are symbolized in one context and
transferred into another. Intercultural communication thus needs co-orientation
as a pre-requirement for communication. By co-orientation we mean any effort
that may be necessary to familiarize and train an individual in the life, work,
social relations, norms, values, traditions, religion, and other aspects of the own
and other concerned nation(s). Perhaps, the following principles could clarify
a kind of co-orientation:
• To increase our awareness and understanding of our own culture.
• To become more cognizant of our attitudes and feelings towards people of
a foreign country and vice versa.
• To better understand the social, political, and economic environments of
foreign cultures and their impact on personal behavior.
• To gain a better awareness and appreciation for the similarities and
differences between different cultures.
• To develop our comparative expertise and to improve our interactive and
intercultural communication skills.
• To develop our analytical and problem solving, critical thinking, and
general communication skills.
 Intercultural Communication and Conflict Resolution 179

On the whole, co-orientation among Westerners is easier and more practical

than that between Westerners and people of other parts of the world. But certain
factors facilitate the understanding of other cultures and help in dealing with
peoples of other cultures. The study of history, language, religion, traditional
standards, values, and norms of other nations definitely helps in intercultural
understanding, but it is only the starting point. Goodwill, honesty, and respect
are bases on which to develop cultural knowledge. Moreover, as Hall says, the
real job is not to understand foreign culture but to understand our own.
Effective communication between cultures requires the acceptance of
differences. A fundamental weakness is the failure by most individuals to admit
that it is quite normal that others should be different (Hall 1960).
In the West, technological progress seems somehow to have undermined
the need for sound understanding of various levels of social subsistence, and
cultural reality in general, and particularly commercial situations, are at the
lowest possible cultural level of communication and cannot provide any basis
for the understanding of a national policy regarding the “quality of life” of the
people.
People who are more adventurous and who visit and live in societies other
than their own are able to build up a realistic cultural knowledge. In Middle
Eastern countries, for instance, it is normal behavior to have various visitors
simultaneously and, in between visits, to have a long telephone conversation,
but in the West this is not so.
Latin Americans usually do not arrange individual appointments to the
exclusion of all else. They even enjoy seeing several people on different matters
at the same time (Hall and Whyte 1966). For the Greek businessperson, it is
impractical to ignore the details and to make quick decisions; while in Western
countries, agreement on the main points is important, because the details will
take care of themselves. The Greeks have a deep respect for hierarchy.
Management in traditional Greek family businesses is conservative and
paternalistic, and power is delegated only to a small degree (Puffer 1996). In
this context, Hall and Whyte have given a very real picture about some of the
cultural differences among nations. In Central America, it is traditional that one
should see a business counterpart at least three times before discussing the
nature of business (Hall and Whyte 1966). To anyone of a Middle Eastern
culture, setting up a deadline creates emotional effects and implies putting the
person in a corner. A Jordanian engineer flies to Tokyo to orient a group of
Japanese workers on Arab management before they leave to build a new factory
in Amman-Jordan (Elashmawi 1998).
Lack of attention to these norms, values, and traditions, and lack of basic
knowledge of intercultural communication of different nations, such as business
people, is a general problem even among very top officials and politicians.
Successful communication can only be achieved on the basis of sound and
sincere reciprocity. It is to nobody’s advantage to impose his or her culture on
180 Reza Najafbagy

the others. In fact, cross-cultural contacts are harmful unless they are conducive
to communication, and this can only occur if the visitor or the expatriate has
respect and sympathy for the host culture. It is through acculturation that we
can learn about cultural differences and the need for adaptation. Many harmful
misunderstandings have happened not only because of mistakes in the usage
of words or expression but also because of lack of goodwill and cultural
knowledge, which makes adaptation difficult.
Individuals with self-confidence, who are aware of their own culture, and
have realistic and flexible expectations, can cope better with the different aspects
of other cultures, and with living and working conditions in other than the own
society. It ought thus to be easy for those who are interested in other cultures
and societies to associate with others, and at the same time to learn the norms,
values, and habits of the society concerned.
If only the sincere understanding of other civilizations could be part of
elementary education, then the real conditions for further cross-cultural
understanding would be laid down. It is unfortunate that UNESCO has not
succeeded in inducing nation-states to revise their history books by purging them
of the chauvinistic prejudices with which they are plagued, and by introducing
real information about other great civilizations. It should also be compulsory
in secondary and higher education to pursue at level studies the cultural realities
of other civilizations.
Because we have to build a planetary civilization, it is urgent that all people
should educate themselves in the origins of the human phenomenon in order
to better understand where we come from, who we are compared with others,
so that we may better see where we might go together. Such a program can only
succeed if undertaken on an international basis: UNESCO should have been
an appropriate agency in this respect, and it is important that we understand
its failure.

Factors affecting relationships between Westerners and LDNs

It is through sound communication systems that people are able to reach some
understanding of one another and through which they influence and are
influenced by others. In fact, it is communication that makes cooperation
possible (Nylen et al. 1967). The idea that culture should be seen as
communication is profitable in that it has raised problems that had not
previously been thought of, and as a result has provided solutions that might
not otherwise have been possible. Communication is often blocked by the
deliberate cultivation of cultural prejudice. Feelings of superiority towards people
of the host country, their ignorance and backwardness, are most harmful when
trying to build relationships between two nations.
 Intercultural Communication and Conflict Resolution 181

Preconceptions about LDNs and their people as being hostile, alien,

illiterate, and uncivilized would destroy other sources for development and
success, and create antagonism and pessimism between the two parties. Some
countries are more individualistic than other countries in their orientations,
which may not be realized in cross-cultural communication and may lead to
misunderstanding between them. Individualism can be defined as a social
pattern that consists of loosely linked individuals who view themselves as
independent of collectives and who are motivated by their own preferences,
needs, rights, and contracts (Bhagat 2002).
Among the many factors that inhibit joint cooperation and constructive
relationships between Westerners and LDNs is the expectation of being treated
as important, as exceptional, and the right to enjoy extra privilege. Adjustment
and adaptation to the values of the host country, together with goodwill and
respect for the status quo of the other party, have elements of successful
communication (particularly used by anthropologists). Those who know their
own culture and are strong and content with it can realize and appreciate the
good that they observe in the communities in which they work or live (Daniel
1975).
In the area of technical cooperation, the last decades have shown cross-
cultural conflict, particularly in the realm of education and training. In practice,
educational experts and advisors to the LDNs have mostly transferred the same
type of program that is applied in their own societies. The result of this practice
has varied from total failure to limited success. It is quite obvious that the
application of advanced educational and training programs in the LDNs needs
an appropriate educational infrastructure, which most LDNs do not have. It is
perhaps an understatement to say that developed countries have played a
significant role in attempts to help the LDNs to satisfy their demand for educated
and skilled human resources, but it is now time to learn that intrusion and
cultural imposition freeze rather than promote change, which ought to be
spontaneous and indigenous.
Unfortunately, a consequence of such cross-cultural educational transfer is
to resentment among the people of the LDNs. One reason behind this
resentment seems to be that expatriates in the administration of a university or
ministry often believe that they are more just and fair, that they know what is
appropriate and necessary for the LDNs. It seems obvious, however, that the
organization of a university or ministry or any other type of institution should
be in the hands of the people of the country in which it exists and to which it
belongs, to the extent at least of being predominantly staffed by nationals, and
that the people who make them can give them whatever shape they like. They
also need freedom to choose what they think is best for them, but this rarely
happens.
Another obstacle to the process of cross-cultural communication is that the
upper and upper-middle classes, i.e., mostly wealthy people, industrialists,
182 Reza Najafbagy

merchants, top government and private officials, tend to become integrated into
a transnational socio-cultural system of their own country. Past experience in
the LDNs has shown that such groups have made very little contribution to the
development process and have ignored their duty to orient and give direction
to the expatriates in arranging programs that are right and relevant for the
development of their country.
Other factors include the lack of interest by most expatriates in learning
the language of the host country (even after living a long time in the country).
This, plus lack of cultural adaptation, makes fruitful and constructive
intercultural communication very difficult, and reduces efficiency. But those who
enjoy exploring new avenues of thought and the characters of strange cultures
not only enjoy living abroad but are more successful in their jobs. Life in the
LDNs is not as organized as in the West; the high levels of illiteracy, limited
health facilities, overgrown bureaucracies, and red tape are no longer hidden
to the West. It should be realized that, if such problems did not exist in the
LDNs, there would be no need for Western assistance to them.
The development problems should be regarded both from economic and
cultural perspectives. Because a people’s economy is part of their culture, there
should be no rigid distinction between economic and cultural impact. Culture
asserts its invisible presence in all patterns of day-to-day communications, and
this is not specific to Third World countries (TWCs). Anthropologists understand
culture as the total way of life of a community. Therefore, cultural understanding
is prerequisite to any contribution to the development process. Culture is
inseparable from the process of economic and social development. What is
needed is to make culture an integral part of a national planning, but this is
rarely attempted in the formulation of the national development plans of most
developing countries. Integration of culture into a national plan can be done
through various means such as the utilization of mass media, community
councils, educational institutions and programs, newspapers, radio and
television, and direct participation of people. Unfortunately, the political leaders
of most TWCs are sadly detached from the traditional culture of their larger
community, and thus is the result of political systems that are usually top-down
and authoritarian.
The neglect of culture threatens to undermine the very process of
development. Plans for economic and social development are often left to
economists, whose horizon are less socially and culturally oriented. The result
is that the immense potential of indigenous cultures to mobilize people and to
strengthen national unity lies dormant, and the process of development
continues to be slow. The vast untapped treasure of human resources and the
almost limitless possibilities of the human spirit remain untouched. Basically,
the neglect of culture in its vast term in TWCs arises from the schism between
local cultures and the ruling classes and élites who are dominated by Western
patterns, values, attitudes, and tastes, or by their rigid views on not thinking
globally.
 Intercultural Communication and Conflict Resolution 183

The case of Iran

In “culture and reform” and the degree of success, perhaps one of the vivid
examples of the results of ignoring cultural, historical, political, management,
and language factors in development projects is the case of Iran. In this article,
we try to illustrate some of the main problems that this country has faced since
1952.
Iran as an ancient Asian country with long history and rich culture has been
the land of coexistence of different ethnic groups for centuries. Therefore, it
is an excellent laboratory for sociolinguistic and cultural research. Bilingualism
and multilingualism, language contacts and linguistic variations, are among the
major issues of the Iranian sociolinguistics and cultural studies that need
scientific consideration and investigation. This indicates the complexity of
change and development in any part of social and administration systems in
Iran. Therefore, one should pay careful attention in introducing development
projects in a country like Iran; otherwise, one will face more or less similar
problems, conflicts, and failures as happened to many foreign advisers who have
tried to bring change to administration systems in Iran since the 1950s.
Iran is also a country that has a long history of management and
administrative reforms with many unsuccessful results. Below we try to provide
general information on Iran and then to present part of a document of its
administrative reforms run by foreign experts.
Iran’s population exceeds 67 million, and, according to the Iran Statistic
Center, figures for urban and rural regions stood at over 44,771 million and
22.705 million respectively, which are 66.4 percent and 33.6 percent of the
country’s population. Tehran, Khozestan, Isfahan, Fars, and East Azerbaijan are
the most populated provinces; the capital city of Tehran, with a population of
over 7 million, is the country’s most populated city. Over 11.931 million people
are living in Tehran Province, of which 87 percent live in urban and 23 percent
live in rural areas.
Iran has been struggling for administrative reforms for decades, and
practically no significant success has been achieved yet. Among many attempts
in this context, a major project was to improve the administrative system
launched in 1953 with the help of United Nations advisers and American aid
to Iran. Practically, due to several complexities, this joint development assistance
did not introduce administrative and management improvement in the country,
mainly due to the pre-perception of advisers who came to Iran to contribute to
management systems in the country but did not take cultural, social, and
administrative factors into consideration.
It is essential to remember that most development projects and technical
assistance provided to TWCs do not take cultural and social factors into
consideration. Kottak (1986) believes that many projects incompatibilities have
arisen from inadequate attention to, and consequent lack of or fit with, existing
184 Reza Najafbagy

socio-cultural conditions. We can learn a lot from past experiences, like the case
of failed technical assistance to Iran. In 1980 (a year after the Iran Revolution),
a seminar was organized by a number of American academics and advisers who
had tired for years to introduce reform to Iran. Their lack of understanding of
society, culture, administration, politics, and the history of external agents not
only led to the failure of their reforms, but it created extra problems, conflicts,
and pessimism among the people of the host country.
The aim of the American seminar was to study “the failure of US technical
assistance in public administration: the Iranian case.” American aid to Iran
started in 1953 in the form of aid to Iranian ministries and continued for nearly
twenty-five years. But even after decades, technical assistance failed to produce
the hoped-for result, and there have been many more mistakes than successes.
Explanation for this failure follows:
Nearly all advisers in the public administration program
arrived in Iran with no knowledge of language and with
a superficial knowledge of Iranian culture, its history,
and its social, economic, and political systems.

To attune an American to the internal politics of a strange

country requires radical shifting of his habits and attitudes ...

Although one must be cautious about generalizing from

a single case, or a few cases, there is strong suggestion
from the Iranian case – and others – we do not know how
to help developing nations reform their administrative
structures. (Setiz 1980)

Cultural integration and development

Development is one of the great contemporary world issues. Development

programs without social and cultural considerations have either failed or have
had very little impact on quality of life. For instance, in Saudi Arabia, people
do not like to live in apartments because of social, cultural, and climate factors.
In Iran, a resettlement project for nomads failed because the houses built for
them were inappropriate. Nomads are accustomed to living in an open space,
to moving regularly, to not living in houses with closed and locked doors, and
to not preparing food in the kitchen but in the open air. In reality, the most
fundamental cultural differences were not considered in the plans, and so they
failed for non-economic reasons.
Most countries that became independent after 1945 started to undergo
“development” by attempting to take a shortcut by importing capital, technology,
and know-how from industrial countries. The political élites of TWCs, by
embracing industrialization, share responsibility for failure of these imports to
 Intercultural Communication and Conflict Resolution 185

improve local living standards. Industrial development requires relevant societal

evolution, so the critical question arises: Who is really doing the industrialization?
It is apparent that foreign capital, technology, and enterprise remain in the
hands of foreign economic forces. Most countries implement the strategy at
import substitution industrialization, meaning that the goods previously
imported are now domestically produced or assembled. “Modernization” has
been equated with “development,” material growth was seen as the yardstick of
“progress,” and everything else was to “trickle down.”
To sum up, in the area of cross-cultural communication and conflict
resolution, whatever is done should be planned in such a way that it needs
reciprocity, development, and successful cooperation; if we do that, little else is
needed. Today’s world “order” is crumbling, and there are unprecedented
economic, social, and political crises that cannot be “solved” by traditional
means. This can only be done by the creation of understanding one’s own
culture first and then the culture of the host country. In fact, a new “world
order”, i.e., basically the creation of a world culture, a planetary culture, whereby
all people will develop collaboratively and responsibly to their biological and
cultural environment, not only preserving their biological and cultural heritage
but furthering their natural development with greater awareness and sense of
solidarity. This is a major endeavor, a task that will require several generations,
generosity and patience on the part of the wise toward those who are still in
need for enlightenment, and sufficient realism to accept that it will be impossible
to eradicate other than by an intelligent, insightful, and skillful design.
The case of Iran shows that sound and realistic cross-cultural
communication, plus familiarity with the language, economics, administrative,
and political systems of a host country, is required for the success of development
projects, preventing conflicts, and eventually paving the road for the betterment
and improvement of the quality of our life.

References

Bhagat, R. S. et al. (2002) Cultural Variations in the Cross-border Transfer of

Organizational Knowledge: An Integrative Framework. Academy of
Management Review, 27: 208.
Daniel, N. (1975) The Cultural Barrier. Edinburgh: Western Printing Services Ltd.
Elashmawi, F. (1998) Multicultural Management 2000 , 43. Houston, TX: Gulf
Publishing Company.
Hall, E. T. (1960) The Silent Language . New York: Fawcett Publication, Inc.
Hall, E. T. and Whyte, W. F. (1966) Intercultural Communication: A Guide to
Men of Action. In A. G. Smith (ed.) Communication and Cultur e, 567. New
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
186 Reza Najafbagy

Kottak, C. P. (1986) Dimensions of Culture in Development. In J. C. Condon

and F. S. Yousef (ed.) Introduction to Intercultural Communication. New York:
MacMillan Publishing Company.
Najafbagy, R. (1985). Operations of Multinational Corporations and Local
Enterprises in Arab Countries. Management International Review, 4(85): 46–
57.
Nylen, D. et al. (1967) Handbook of Staf f Development and Human Relations .
Copenhagen: Fibl-Jensene Printing Office.
Puffer, S. M. (1996) Management Across Cultures. Oxford: Blackwell.
Seitz, J. L. (1980) The Failure of U.S. Technical Assistance in Public
Administration: The Iranian Case. Public Administration Review, Sept./Oct.:
409.
Triandis, H. C. (1994) Culture and Social Behavior . New York: McGraw-Hill.
12
Teaching Intercultural Communication in a Chinese
Perspective
Shen Zhaohua

Introduction

In the year 1978, China began to open its doors to the outside world. China
seeks contact with foreign countries at every level — cultural, economic and
political — through language. More and more people find that successful
contact with foreigners involves not only a person’s linguistic competence
(Chomsky 1965) but also intercultural competence (Wiemann 1993; Buttjes and
Byram 1990). Chinese students will live and work in an increasingly multicultural
world in which they will need increasingly sophisticated cultural skills. So, the
goal of intercultural competence for language teaching in China should focus
on developing learners’ competence in the context of intercultural
communication and preparing them to perform verbally in culturally
appropriate ways in the target language (Xu 2000).
However, at present, one of the main problems with teaching English in a
Chinese tertiary setting is that priority is always given to learning the internal
structure of language: grammatical rules, phonological regulation, set phrases,
idiomatic usage and the like. The ability to choose available communication
skills to successfully accomplish interpersonal goals in intercultural
communication (Wiemann 1993) is neglected. Chinese students easily fall into
the trap of assuming that they are learning a new language rather than an
entirely new way of communication. As students study grammar rules and
vocabulary, and practice translating their thoughts into English sentences, there
is a strong tendency for them to focus on the language itself and to assume
that using English is primarily a process of learning to correctly translate English
sentences into Chinese and vice versa. In many ways, it almost seems as if Chinese
students think they are learning a new set of sounds and words to be used for
communicating with other Chinese people.
188 Shen Zhaohua

Of course I am overstating the position somewhat. Chinese students

obviously know that there are cultural differences between them and native
English speakers, and that they need to take these differences into consideration
when deciding what to say and what not to say. One often gets the impression
from Chinese students that they think that, if they learn a few rules of polite
Western behavior, they should be able to solve most communication problems
with native English speakers quite satisfactorily. What this assumption overlooks
is the fact there is a degree of ambiguity inherent in all language use, and
understanding a message always requires a degree of interpretation (Scollon
and Scollon 2000). Students too rarely recognize that virtually every real-life
situation which requires them to use English will involve intercultural
communication and that learning to communicate effectively with people of
radically different cultural backgrounds involves learning not only language itself
but also the cultural rules governing the target language (Crozet 1996).

Problems in intercultural communication

In China, it is not a rare phenomenon that a few EFL learners make great
progress in language courses through hard work. Some are even able to
outperform native English speakers in certain proficiency tests such as TOEFL
and GRE. However, when they are engaged in real contact with native English
speakers, they can neither express themselves appropriately nor understand the
genuine meanings of their interlocutor(s). In most cases, mutual
misunderstandings take place, causing confusion and frustration for all
concerned. Some of the reasons for this are obvious. Participants will generally
not share the same background knowledge and will have different assumptions
and beliefs, hence increasing the chances that one participant will be unable
to follow what the other is talking about, and they evaluate words and actions
differently (Shen 1999). In this chapter, I limit discussion of intercultural
communication to those situations involving face-to-face encounters between
ESL/EFL students and native English speakers. The following case, “the privacy
of price,” came from Dai Fan and Stephen Smith (2003), who work with Chinese
students studying in North America and strive to help them understand the
sometimes strange culture in which they find themselves.
After living in the United States for some time, Ping Li, a Ph.D. student,
observed that Americans like to comment on each other’s looks and clothes.
So, when she saw a fellow American graduate student wearing a nice dress at a
party, she complimented her by saying, “This is a very beautiful dress.” “Oh,
thank you. I bought it last year before Christmas.” The American student was
very pleased. “How much was it?” Ping Li asked. “Well, I don’t quite remember.”
The American student seemed unprepared for the question, and answered a
little hesitatingly. To their embarrassment, communication suddenly broke
down, which caused strain and frustration for both of them.
 Teaching Intercultural Communication in a Chinese Perspective 189

The reason for this breakdown of communication is obvious. Using one’s

own values to judge someone from another culture is bound to result in
miscommunication, even though both parties are well intentioned. The success
in intercultural understanding is based on recognizing the ways in which the
two cultures resemble one another as well as the ways in which they differ (Gao
1999). Attempting to understand another person through the perspective of
that person’s own culture is an important step towards successful
communication.
I am fully aware that “culture” is a big concept. Even people from the same
country frequently fail to understand each other. Therefore, I restrict our
perspective to China and America, whose cultures I am more familiar with.
American culture and Chinese culture here refer to the dominant patterns of
thinking and behaving of mainstream Americans and Chinese. As in the example
above, it is not really a Chinese custom to comment on how well someone looks
in his or her clothes, as this might embarrass the person. However, it has become
increasingly common to do so in recent years. In addition, a more Chinese way
of commenting on clothes would be asking about the price. In doing so, the
person usually has no intention of trying to find out the other person’s financial
status; the interest is more in finding out whether the clothes were a bargain
or not. As the Chinese economy becomes more open to trade and a wider range
of consumer goods becomes available, Chinese people are developing much
more interest in consumerism. Thus they have a natural interest in learning
about the prices of different things. As a result, price is one of the most frequent
topics for discussion when people talk about clothes. As for the American
perspective, “nice people don’t ask someone how much something cost; it’s
rude” is another rule that Americans are taught from the time they are young.
As odd as it may seem, to an American, asking the price of something that a
friend or co-worker shows you is considered to be an invasion of privacy and
marks the person asking as being coarse or too interested in money. One may
be concerned that if the person tells you, you will ridicule him or her for paying
too much. In general, personal finances are very private, and how much one
spends is normally seen as part of personal finances. It would be equally
unacceptable to ask someone how much he or she earns or how much the
person has in a bank account.
The type of “cultural errors” (Hu 1990, 151) made by Chinese student Ping
Li results from the conflict of different value systems, which is manifested by
the Chinese student’s invasion of the American student’s privacy. However, the
concept of “privacy” is one that is really hard for Chinese students to grasp,
because what is regarded as “privacy” in the West may often not be considered
as such in China. Therefore, native English speakers are often bombarded with
questions about the price of an item, income, age, marriage, etc., questions that
are perfectly acceptable in the Chinese culture.
190 Shen Zhaohua

Different people throughout the world have different ways of categorizing

life experiences, and the different ways of categorization can be found in the
language they speak (Zhang and Li 2000). When Chinese learners of English
communicate with native English speakers, they must be aware that such
different categories exist between different languages. But, regrettably, when
Chinese students communicate with native English speakers, they are likely to
ignore “traits of other culture” (Hu 1990, 151), as if their own categories are
universal. Thus they often make cultural errors, the cost of which “might include
appearing ridiculous or offensive” (Bentahila and Davies 1989, 103, 105).

Different views on the nature of miscommunication

One of the most basic characteristics of intercultural encounters is uncertainty.

When people deal with others of their own cultural background, they can usually
predict with a fair degree of accuracy much of what others are likely to do and
say. However, familiar patterns of behavior and communication suddenly
disappear when people begin interacting with people of other cultures. When
strangers1 do not behave according to expected rules of discourse, participants
in intercultural encounters realize that they cannot read all the cues strangers
transmit, and they become uncomfortably aware that their ability to predict and
control the interaction has been dramatically discounted. This, in turn, results
in stress and anxiety and tends to make participants more cautious and
defensive. It also diminishes the willingness to trust others (Barna 1998, 342;
Samovar et al. 1981, 196). All of this inclines participants in intercultural
encounters to be less generous than they might be when communicating with
people of their own culture.
The most serious obstacle to effective intercultural communication is
“ethnocentrism,” the universal human tendency to interpret strangers and their
behavior from the perspective of norms and practices of one’s own culture
(Samovar and Porter 1995, 274). This is quite a natural tendency because people
learn at a very young age to see their approach to life as being the “normal”
one, and the assumption that “our way of doing things is the right way of doing
things” is so deeply rooted in our thinking that we are generally not even
consciously aware of it. Bennett (1998) suggests that ethnocentrism takes a
variety of different forms, and each of these is problematic for intercultural
communication in its own way. At some levels, people tend to assume that
strangers are more or less like them, that once one looks past superficial
differences of appearance and custom, people the world over are essentially the
same (Samovar et al. 1981, 6). The danger of this assumption is that it
encourages people to ignore genuine differences between cultures and can easily
result in misunderstanding and misinterpretation during intercultural
encounters. At other levels of ethnocentrism, people are all too willing to accept
 Teaching Intercultural Communication in a Chinese Perspective 191

the idea that strangers are different, but because people use their own culture
as the standard by which to measure strangers’ culture, the strangers’ cultures
inevitably seem inferior. As Samovar and Porter (1995, 56) note, “Feelings that
we are right and they are wrong pervade every aspect of a culture’s existence.”
According to Shi-xu (2005), power is one of the most salient characteristics
that permeates present-day intercultural communication. The communication
between the West and the non-Western Other2 has always been a matter of power
struggle. “Power is conceived of here as the effect of human social practice
whereby things get down or people are put under control” (Shi-xu 2005, 313).
Shi-xu (2005) maintains that, in intercultural encounters, “the West has never
thought of the non-Western Other as equal, or simply ‘different’. Rather, it has
often dealt with the non-Western Other as deviant, inferior, and so to be
controlled.” This tendency does not necessarily mean that the West will always
take a hostile attitude towards the non-Western Other, but when problems in
intercultural encounters arise, it does predispose the West to denigrate the
behavior of the non-Western Other and to assume superiority of one’s own
culture.
The deeply rooted ethnocentric perspectives provide us with a familiar basis
from which to interpret the behavior of strangers, and this, combined with the
tendency to be uncertain in the interpretation process and the power in
intercultural communication, often leads participants in intercultural encounters
to negatively judge strangers, even when they have little understanding of the
strangers or their culture.

The aims of intercultural communication training

In light of the existing problems and the analysis above, it should be obvious
that the failure to teach Chinese college students intercultural competence is
responsible for the poor performance in their interaction or contact with native
English speakers. We need to recognize that the aim should be not so much to
“teach” culture as to teach intercultural communication skills. It is not possible,
within the confines of the classroom, to expose students to the full range of a
culture. Nor is it possible to prepare students for all situations in which differing
cultural assumptions may cause miscommunication. However, it is also possible
to develop skills that allow participants to recognize when miscommunication
has occurred, to analyze the probable cause, and to attempt to repair the
situation (Jin and Cortazzi 1996). To have a good understanding of the
integration of intercultural communication skills in FLT, all students must
“develop the cultural understandings, attitudes, and performance skills needed
to function appropriately within the segment of another society and to
communicate with people socialized in the culture” (Seelye 1993, 29). So, in
teaching intercultural competence, the following factors appear to us to be the
most important.
192 Shen Zhaohua

1. There is a need for EFL teachers to encourage EFL students to look beyond
instinctive ethnocentric perspectives as they interpret problematic
encounters between EFL students and native English speakers. Of course,
it is difficult for EFL students who have never had any experience with native
English speakers to learn to see the world from their point of view. However,
as Bennett (1998) suggests, empathy towards other viewpoints is in large
part an attitude of willingness to try to move beyond our own cultural
framework, and that is something that is within our power to control.
2. There is also an urgent need to set up teacher training programs
incorporating multicultural education. Many college English teachers in
China who are not native English speakers have had little exposure to the
culture of the English that they are teaching and may be unaware of the
even quite critical differences between their students’ culture and the target
culture. Similarly, many English-speaking teachers from Western countries
have not had to analyze their own cultures to the extent necessary for them
to know what Chinese college students may need to learn. This is an area
in which intuition is not always adequate or appropriate (Crozet and
Liddicoat 2000).
3. There is a need to develop new materials for English teaching that enable
the students to expose themselves to the target culture and to have
opportunities to reflect on their own culture. In writing language teaching
textbooks, no matter what approach the compiler adopts, functional or
communicative, the compiler should pay attention to cultural aspect of
language (He 2000). In selecting or writing passages and dialogues to be
used in the textbooks, writers should not just think of what new linguistic
codes to teach the Chinese college students but also what new knowledge
of culture to impart to these students.
4. There is a need for EFL teachers to provide opportunities for students to
develop their own intermediary place between their own culture and that
of the target language community (Liddicoat et al. 1999). Whether or not
students develop an intercultural perspective depends substantially on
choices that teachers make in their teaching. Culture-oriented courses
should be incorporated in the teaching syllabus. Such courses include survey
courses in English-speaking countries, courses in the society and culture
of English-speaking countries, and courses in the customs and etiquette of
English-speaking nations (He 2000).

The four factors are not simply questions of methods located in the classroom.
They are intercultural approaches to FLT in China. With these international
approaches in mind, EFL teachers will gradually develop their students’ empathy
towards the people of another culture and cultivate their ability to perform
skillfully and appropriately in intercultural communication. This may well pave
 Teaching Intercultural Communication in a Chinese Perspective 193

the way for training intercultural competence in teaching English in a Chinese

setting.

Possible ways of intercultural communication training

Intercultural communication training in teaching English in a Chinese setting

aims at supporting the development of intercultural competence through the
learning of foreign languages and by implication into the learning of how
language and culture connect in one’s first and target languages. What should
EFL training set out to achieve? Cultural understandings and performance skills
in intercultural communication can be developed in EFL training in the
following ways:
1. EFL Students should develop greater awareness of the interpretation
process.

It is generally agreed by scholars of intercultural communication that

training methods should encourage students to suspend or delay judgments so
that they do not judge a situation until they have an adequate understanding
of it (Samovar and Porter 1995). If students develop the habit of seeing their
judgments as preliminary theories until new information becomes available, they
will be less likely to fall into the trap of having their understanding influenced
by premature judgments. Theoretical discussion of these issues with students is
less likely to produce the desired results than is actually helping students see
how people of other cultures might be different from them. As students become
aware of cultural differences, they become less sure of their interpretation, and
this has the positive effect of encouraging students to continue to seek further
information that will either confirm or disprove their premature interpretation.

2. Make frequent comparisons between the concepts of a first language and

those of the foreign language being taught.
As mentioned above, one difficulty in communicating meanings from one
language to another is the differences in the ways different languages organize
the experiences of their native speakers. We can find some expressions in their
categorizations of concepts. We should not assume that concepts have the same
meanings to speakers of different languages. I have learned that, when native
Chinese speakers use the word “individual” in English, they are thinking of
something quite different from what native English speakers mean when they
use the word “individual.” The concept of individual is quite different in
American culture from what it is in Chinese culture. For most Americans,
individualism is an unquestioned positive value. Individual self-fulfillment is
194 Shen Zhaohua

often an expressed aim in life. Individual interests tend to be considered as

primary (Davis 2001). This view contrasts sharply with the view of most Chinese,
a view grounded in traditional Confucian philosophy. According to this view,
private interests are vested in the group, that is, in the family or in the
community, and not in the individual. Any attempt to set up individual interests
in opposition to those of society merely demonstrates a selfish refusal to
recognize the necessity of social relationships and a reluctance to carry out social
responsibilities (Wei 2003). Major differences in such key concepts as the role
of the individual may result in inappropriate behavior.
In making comparisons between the concepts that play a key role in how
people from different cultures interpret the world, the aim is to help EFL
students interpret the behavior of native English speakers and establish mutual
understanding between both groups. In our EFL class, we focus on concepts
that are significantly different from those that native English speakers use to
comprehend the world.
There are some methods that can assist students in understanding more
about the meanings of concepts in other cultures. For example, in the classroom,
take a concept that carries a key cultural meaning, such as duty, propaganda,
relationship, face, etc. Make a list of images or related ideas that are associated
with each concept. Discuss the lists with the students and create one list that
ranks the concepts in the order that the students think is most important. Then
ask a native English speaker what he or she thinks of when using that word.
Share your list with the native English speaker so you can find out from each
other in what ways your concepts are similar and different. In this way, EFL
students can not only appreciate the deeper meaning of the Chinese terms that
contain rich content of culture but also reinforce understanding of target
language culture and cultivate their cultural awareness.
3. Intentionally introduce to EFL students the values and assumptions shared
by people of the target language.
In FLT, it is of vital importance for students to know the values and
assumptions of the target language culture. “Values” are ideas about what is right
and wrong, desirable and undesirable, proper and improper (Lu 2005).
“Assumptions” are the postulates, about people, life, and the way things are (Lu
2005). Most people who grow up in a particular culture share certain values
and assumptions. These values and assumptions overlap and support each other.
A culture can be viewed as a collection of values and assumptions that go
together to shape the way a group of people perceive and relate to the world
around them (Yu 2004). Armed with knowledge in these aspects, EFL students
can then draw inferences from language phenomena as to why people of the
target culture speak that way (Zhang and Li 2000). For example, the
anthropologist Francis Hsu and his associate Hendrick Serrie (1998) identified
the following postulates of basic American values and assumptions. If EFL
 Teaching Intercultural Communication in a Chinese Perspective 195

students have these postulates in mind, they can then have a profound
understanding of American culture.
(1) An individual’s most important concern is self-interest: self-expression, self-
improvement, self-gratification, self-reliance and independence. This takes
precedence over all group interests.
(2) The privacy of the individual is the individual’s inalienable right. Intrusion
into it by others is permitted only by invitation.
(3) Because the government exists for the benefit of the individual and not
vice versa, all forms of authority, including the government, are suspect.
But the government and its symbols should be respected. Patriotism is good.
(4) For Americans, time is money. The future will not be better than the past
or the present unless people use their time for constructive, future-oriented
activities.
(5) An individual should believe in or acknowledge God and should belong to
an organized church or other religious institution. Religion is good. Any
religion is better than no religion.
(6) Americans believe in equality of opportunity and competition, although
there might be exceptions in some situations.
(7) Americans generally consider themselves to be frank, open, and direct. They
tend to assume that conflicts or disagreements are best settled by means of
forthright discussions among people involved.
(8) Being American is synonymous with being progressive, and America is the
utmost symbol of progress.

It is vitally important that EFL students learn at least some of these things. These
are the sorts of things they need to know to have satisfying interaction in
intercultural communication. If they do not understand the postulates of values
and assumptions, then they are likely to be involved in situations in which polite
behavior is interpreted as impolite and friendliness as unfriendliness, thus
guaranteeing a negative experience of the target culture, the people, and the
language. Learning these concepts does not mean that EFL students are to be
assimilated into the target culture; rather, they have to find their own third place
between the two cultures involved (Kramsch 1993). According to Crozet,
Liddicoat, and Bianco (1999, 1), “the notion of ‘the third place’ is the
unbounded points of intersection where interactants from different cultural and
linguistic backgrounds meet and communicate successfully.” Intercultural
language teaching should involve helping EFL students develop a third place
between the native linguaculture and the target linguaculture, between them
and others. As such, it is the EFL students’ choice to decide how much of culture
they will use in constructing this third position; however, in EFL teaching, the
EFL students need information about the culture in order to construct their
identity. It is not vital that EFL students’ language production is like that of a
native English speaker. It is vital that their perception is informed by the norms
of native English speakers (Liddicoat 2000).
196 Shen Zhaohua

Conclusion

This chapter is based on the premise that communication across cultural lines
is quite different from communication with others of one’s own culture. Chinese
college students of English should learn something about intercultural
communication, because virtually every real-life situation that requires them to
use English will also involve intercultural competence. For EFL students to learn
English well in the true sense, they must have both linguistic and intercultural
competence. In other words, if EFL students only possess the abilities of reading,
listening, speaking, and writing, without the ability to perform skillfully and
appropriately in intercultural communication, they can by no means be called
people with actual target language competence. True mastery of a foreign
language involves not only learning the internal structure of language but also
the cultural competence of language. Only when acquisition of linguistic and
cultural competence is synchronized will we be able to expand the students’
horizons and to prepare them to participate in a multicultural world.

Notes

1. In this chapter, I follow Gudykunst and Kim (1984) in using the term
“stranger” to refer to people whose cultural background is different from
one’s own.
2. According to Shi-xu (2005), the term “non-Western Other” refers to people
from non-Western, non-white, and Third-World communities.

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Index

Africa 32, 146 colonization 171

Asia 137, 183 cultural 94, 96
marginalization 96
black language 143 cultural contest 3
oppression 143 cultural transformation 162
pedagogy 151 diversity 7
representations of 145 educational 13
explanation 62
categorization 190 historical dimension 7, 12
China 42, 73, 173, 188 hybridity 162
Christianity 91 internet advertising 74, 75, 82
Confucianism 129, 194 language use 84
cooperation 181 Korean 123
Critical Discourse Analysis 49–51 leftist 39
forms of critique 54–6 liberal 39
culture 107, 177–8, 182 medical 13
acculturation 180 modernist 41
adaptation 182 multicultural research 29
African 146 narrative 32–3
black 144, 146 nationalistic 39, 40
communication 180 of consumption 12
conflict 181 opposing 7
difference 177, 179, 188 orientalist 115
imperialism 144, 151 policy
white dominance 149 postcolonial 34
rhetoric 60
discourse 3, 32–3, 116 scientific 145, 172
argumentation 60 social change 11
Chinese 102, 155, 173 sociocultural 12, 74
modernization of 157 transition 51
conflict 13, 177
200 Index

values 11, 75 method 10, 54

analysis 87 in dialogue 10
appeals 80 ethnographic 124
symbolic 78 Middle East 179
modernism 29–30, 37, 42
East 35 Western rationality 32
education 181, 192 Muslim 42

globalization 5, 73, 92, 96, 171 nationalism 93

capitalism 101
internationalization 94
Westernization 93, 96, 102
history books 180
honorifics 136
identity 10, 12, 35
ideology 73
intercultural communication 13,
177–85, 187–96
ethnocentrism 190
scholarship on discourse 4–5
cultural imperialism 12
modernist paradigm 11
multiculturalist 13, 43
universalizing 6, 29
India 42
Iran 183–4
Islam 41
knowledge 8–9
cultural 180
Western 155
Korea 127, 133, 138
Latin America 179
narratives 40
non-West 33
Other 34–5, 40, 143, 145
otherization 34
politeness 12, 123
as socio-cultural phenomenon
123, 125
categories of 124
face 124–7, 135
non-Western perspective on
123
postmodernism 30–1, 42, 43
power 10, 115, 127, 191
prejudice 180
recontextualization 62–3
representations 12, 35, 61, 106
essentialist 109
ethnocentric 112–3
Romania 49, 56–9, 63, 65
subject 34, 37
Third World
Turkey 30, 33, 37, 40

meaning 107, 188 UNESCO 180

constructionist view 107–9
misunderstanding 188 white dominance 145
reflective view 107–8