(Routledge Approaches To History) Jörn Rüsen - Humanism - Foundations, Diversities, Developments-Routledge (2021)

Humanism
The book describes humanism in a systematic and historical perspective.

It analyzes its manifestation and function in cultural studies and its role in
the present.
Within the book, special attention is given to the intention of contempo-
rary humanism to overcome ethno-centric elements in the cultural orienta-
tion of contemporary living conditions and to develop humane dimensions
of this orientation. This is linked to a fundamental critique of the current
post-human self-understanding of the humanities. Furthermore, the inter-
cultural aspect in the understanding of humanism is emphasized, because
for non-Western cultures also have their own humanistic traditions. Two
further aspects are also addressed: the Holocaust as the most radical chal-
lenge to humanistic thinking and the relationship of humanism to nature.
Sitting at the intersection of history and philosophy, the book is perfect
for those exploring humanism from a historical perspective.
Jörn Rüsen is Senior Fellow at the Kulturwissenschaftliches Institut

(Institute for Advanced Study in the Humanities) at Essen, Germany. He
specializes in the theory and didactics of history and intercultural human-
ism. His recent books include History: Narration, Interpretation, Orien-
tation (2005) and Evidence and Meaning: A Theory of Historical Studies
(2017).
Routledge Approaches to History
37 Far-Right Revisionism and the End of History

Alt/Histories
Edited by Louie Dean Valencia-García
38 Africa, Empire and World Disorder

Selected Essays
A.G. Hopkins
39 History in a Post-Truth World

Theory and Praxis
Edited by Marius Gudonis and Benjamin T. Jones
40 The Primacy of Method in Historical Research

Philosophy of History and the Perspective of Meaning
Jonas Ahlskog
41 Archives and Human Rights

Edited by Jens Boel, Perrine Canavaggio and Antonio González
Quintana
42 Historical Experience
Essays on the Phenomenology of History
David Carr
43 Humanism
Foundations, Diversities, Developments
Jörn Rüsen
For more information about this series, please visit: https://www.routledge.

com/Routledge-Approaches-to-History/book-series/RSHISTHRY
Humanism
Foundations, Diversities, Developments
Jörn Rüsen
First published 2021
by Routledge
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and by Routledge
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© 2021 Jörn Rüsen
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Contents
Foreword vii
Introduction 1
1 What is humanism? 5
2 Classical humanism – a historical survey 12
3 Intercultural humanism – how to perform the

humanities in the era of globalization 31
4 Towards a new idea of humankind – unity and

difference of cultures in the crossroads of our time 43
5 Historizing humanity – some theoretical considerations

on contextualization and understanding with an
outlook on the idea of humanity 54
6 Humanism: anthropology – axial times – modernities 63
7 Humanism in response to the Holocaust – destruction

or innovation? 80
8 Humanism and nature – some reflections on a complex

relationship 91
Bibliography 101
List of first publication 111
Index of names 113
Foreword
This book is a compilation of articles which were published at different

places in the last 12 years. This diversity in place and time cannot hide
their close connection. Therefore, it is obvious to assemble the single texts
together into a book. All texts are outcomes of a research project on “Hu-
manism in the Era of Globalization – An Intercultural Dialogue on Culture,
Humanity, and Values”. This project was pursued by the Kulturwissen-
schaftliches Institut (Institute for Advanced Study in the Humanities) at
Essen (Germany) in close connection with the universities of Bochum, Dort-
mund, and Duisburg-Essen. It took place between 2006 and 2009. It was
sponsored by the foundation Stiftung Mercator. I conceived the idea of this
theme in intensive discussions with Rüdiger Frohn, the leading spirit of this
foundation. I am deeply grateful for his critical engagement and support.
The Institute for Advanced Study in the Humanities at Essen hosted the
project from the beginning to its end. Its intellectual atmosphere essentially
contributed to the vitality of sound academic discussions. Additionally, the
project profted a lot from the support of other institutions like the Institute
for Advanced Study in the Humanities and Social Sciences of the National
Taiwan University, the Goethe-Institutes in Kolkata and Alexandria, the
Stellenbosch Institute for Advanced Study in South Africa, the Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing and departments of many universities
all over the world.
In the framework of the humanism-project I received numerous stimula-
tions in conferences, workshops, lectures, and discussions by the cooperat-
ing scholars. It would lead too far to enumerate them all. So I limit myself
to a few names only. I want to express my gratitude to: in Germany – Jürgen
Straub, Erhard Reckwitz, Heiner Roetz, Dieter Sturma, Helwig Schmidt-
Glintzer; in East Asia – Huang Chin-Chieh, Chen Qineng, Jiang Peng,
Chang Chih-Ming; in Mexico – Oliver Kozlarek; in South Africa – Johann
Tempelhoff; in Brazil – Estevao de Rezende Martins. Thanks also to the as-
sistants of the project for their engaged work in administrating and organ-
izing its many activities: Martin Gieselmann, Irmtraud Seebold, Carmen
Meinert, Aladdin Sarhan.
viii Foreword
Finally (last not least) I thank Angelika Wulff for her critical editing and
my wife Inge for her understanding companionship not only in the making
of this book.
Bochum, September 2019
Introduction
Wherever we look around, we can see that traditional forms of life which
have long been regarded as stable and capable of continuity lose their
self-evidence. Gender, family, nation, nature, and even the traditional con-
cept of culture loses its conceptual contours and dissolve into different, even
opposing determinants of human life practice. Nature, for example, breaks
out of the framework of determination of a mere object of human dispo-
sition and, for the purpose of securing the life of man himself, requires a
cultural meaningfulness that clearly limits human exploitation. In this way,
the clear contrast between nature and culture, which has determined West-
ern culture and global modernity for a long time, becomes an interpretation
problem. The same applies to the sexual differentiation of humans. Their
natural conditions are culturized and thus move into the horizon of cultural
attributions with corresponding challenges to new interpretations.
At the same time, of course, the tiresome identity problem is on the wall-
paper. Can the question of individuals and social communities, who they
are, be rejected as inadmissible or convincingly answered with diversity or
the hybridity’s deformity? Is there still any reliable historical knowledge or
has the historical self-image of man been dissolved into a mere aesthetic
play of objectless signifers?
This series of probing questions of the diagnosis of the present could be
continued almost arbitrarily. In its horizon, the present wins the signature
of a crisis. That’s nothing new. Remember Ernst Troeltsch’s remarks on the
“present crisis of history”.1 He diagnoses a “general world revolution” and
locates this crisis “in the general philosophical foundations and elements
of historical thought, in the conception of historical values from which we
should think and construct the context of history”. Under the impact of the
catastrophic events of the 20th century, he sees a cultural orientation crisis
taking hold, forcing him to make strong words. He speaks of a “destruction
of historical education and of historical knowledge”, which can only be
regarded as “a decision on barbarism and only feasible on the return to bar-
barism in all other areas of life”. With that, he foreshadowed a barbarism
in his horizon of expectation which, when it came with the rule of National
Socialism and Communism, dwarfed everything he could imagine.
2 Introduction
I do not want to exaggerate the analogy to today’s present with the early
21st century. World doomsday scenarios are popular in public discourse
and are accordingly supplied by the intelligentsia. In their radical form,
they are linked to climate change and are made plausible with them. But
the world does not go down that fast. Nevertheless, below the level of a
general end of the world there are clear indications of impending doom:
The civil society foundations of modern Western democracy with their so-
cial substrata, a strong and self-confdent middle class, are crumbling. This
is supported by the widespread electoral success of authoritarian parties in
the West (and the inability of established governments to effectively combat
the consensus decline in political common sense) and authoritarian lead-
ers worldwide. The unifcation of Europe into a political structure, which
is unable of aggression, is threatened; traditional nationalisms are revived
(and have forgotten their destructive potential). The Western value system
of human and civil rights in democracies is losing its cogency. The attempts
of taming and humanizing capitalism collapsed. Disastrous political con-
cepts of salvation of left and right provenance gain attention and strength.
The potential for aggression of political rule hardly fnds any global taming
by international agreements. This potential is charged and enhanced by
religious fundamentalisms.
All these “downfall” projects throw a shadow of possible barbarism. Er-
nst Troeltsch had only an almost resigned attitude to his fears: “We must
carry our bundle on, we can look it over and take it on the other shoulder,
but since all our possessions and all the tools of our lives are in it, we can-
not just throw it away”. 2
What about our time? Are Troeltsch’s explanations suitable for opening
our eyes to a specifc need for interpretation concerning the conditions and
circumstances of our life practice?
In two respects, I would like to answer this question in a positive way:
First, I think that it is high time to conceptualize our present as a problem
of interpretation and to break through the fog that obscures our view of
it. Second, I consider it a vital question to ask for meaning criteria that are
(still) available to us to meet the challenges of a forward-looking cultural
orientation.
The frst concerns the historical soil on which present living conditions
are situated. Here it is necessary to defend the imminent danger of an in-
tellectual bottomlessness. This bottomlessness manifests itself in the wide-
spread attitude of providing historical location provisions of the present
with the prefx “post”. The present is historically understood as something
it is no longer: It enters the meaning of a bygone past.
I list some of these crazy time shifts (I’m sure there are many more):
post-modern, post-structuralist, post-constructivist, post-national, post-
Nazi, post-communist, post-Stalinist, post-industrial, post-secular,
post-human, post-humanistic, post-discursive, post-feminist, post-
black, post-capitalist, post-colonial, post-narrative, post-naturalistic,
Introduction 3
post-positivist, post-orientalist, post-racial, post-theoretical, post-heroic.
Particularly noteworthy is the fact that the Oxford Dictionaries of the Eng-
lish Language 2016 have declared the term “post-truth” to be “Word of the
Year”.3
What does this infation of post-s mean?4 For me, the answer to this
question is clear: The terminological use of the prefx “post-” is a way to
mark the temporal position of discourses on human culture. The respective
authors state that they do not know the disciplinary-historical place of their
expositions. They can name this place only by a temporal negation. They
locate themselves temporally for something and express where they are not
(or better, no more); they are unable to indicate the historical place of their
thinking by a positive name. To put it bluntly, they have lost the historical
soil under their feet.
History is a meaningful interrelation between past, present, and future.
It is based on the experience of the past, the interpretation of which makes
the present understandable, and opens a perspective for the future. History
provides a temporal orientation in and about the living conditions of the
present. This orientation is about to dissolve, or at least is enormously lim-
ited. The historical basis of the present becomes the past in the movement
of its disappearance. As a consequence, the future perspective is also neg-
atively defned.
To cite a typical example:
Post-capitalist, e.g., means that the promises of socialism and com-
munism have lost their credibility. Do we really understand our current
economy and its historical evolution when we say that their future will be
anything but not capitalist?
The second question concerns the principles of cultural orientation to-
day. Here, too, a negative statement emerges in the intellectual and cultural
discourse of the present: The movement of departure from the historical
ground of the present also extends to the relevant aspects for an under-
standing of this present, for its placement in a network of viable points of
view and interpretation perspectives. Dominant is a trend of loss (in the
medium of post-ism as denial of presence). “Posthumanism” is the corre-
sponding term, and post-human is the authoritative reference of cultural
orientation. Thus, man is given up as a source of meaning for his culture.
Does anything convincingly replace it? In my opinion, it is only the nega-
tion of anthropologically plausible answers to the cultural orientation.
The following texts try to outline a countermovement against this cul-
tural ground – and senselessness. They recall what it means to understand
man as a source of meaning in his cultural orientation, and they answer the
challenge of the orientation crisis of the present day with a plea to under-
stand and renew modern humanism as a viable basis of current practical
orientation. This does not mean simply affrming humanism as a tradition
and starting a third or fourth renewal attempt. On the contrary, in view of
the orientation problems raised by modernization and globalization after
4 Introduction
its classic heyday in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, it should be crit-
ically examined, its limit designated and renewed in a contemporary form.
This renewal has three main goals:
1 The current globalization experience is taken into account. Humanism

is liberated from the narrowness of a Western perspective and outlined
as an intercultural idea. However, this strongly opposes the current
popular opinion of being able to score points in cultural studies only
with anti-Western attitudes. The corresponding trends, especially those
of post-colonialism, implicitly use aspects of humanity in their polem-
ics in order to make their opposite plausible in modern Western cul-
ture. These aspects come from just the damned Western culture. This
performative self-contradiction must be dissolved and thus the abstract
negativity of today’s cultural criticism ought to be overcome in favor of
a complex movement in and through contradictions and opposites.
2 Second, modern (classical) humanism as a cognitive driving force of
historical thought should be made plausible and confrmed: in histori-
cal reconstruction and theoretical refection.
3 Finally, this reconstruction attempt of the humanistic foundations of
our civil society culture does not want to avoid the provocative experi-
ences of human inhumanity, with which not only the 20th century, but
the history of all times and spaces are subject to interpretation.
In the time of a profound crisis of orientation, in which very different in-

terpretive strategies clash and threaten to dissolve the sensus communis of
civil society as the basis of democratic rule, it is imperative to ask again who
we are as human beings, how we get along in our ways of life with others in
order to work together to bring out and strengthen our humanity.
Notes
1 Troeltsch: Der Historismus und seine Probleme, 1922, pp. 1–11.
2 Ibid., p. 4.
3 https://languages.oup.com/word-of-the-year/2016/ [04-07-2020].
4 See Rüsen: Post-ism. The Humanities, Displaced by their Trends / Post-ismus.
Die Geisteswissenschaften, ver-rückt durch ihre Trends, in: https://public-
history-weekly.degruyter.com/4-2016-27/postism-displaced-humanities/
[04-07-2020].
1 What is humanism?
The term “humanism” came about in Europe at the end of the 18th and the
beginning of the 19th century. It went along with new ideas in human life,
with a special emphasis on higher education. The basic terms of understand-
ing and interpreting the human world had acquired a new meaning; they
represented a fundamental dynamization and a new refectedness of these
terms (Koselleck).1 This meaning refected and continued the general an-
thropologization of the human world-view and self-understanding, which
is very typical for early modern cultural and intellectual life in Europe.
But at the same time, the meaning of humankind and humanity gained
a wider scope and denser empirical horizon as well as an intensifed nor-
mative quality. Empirically these terms addressed the growing knowledge
of human culture in a global perspective and emphasized the variety and
multifariousness of human life forms in space and time and in their histor-
ical changeability. The growing number of travelers and their accounts of
new lands and cultures entailed an enormous increase of knowledge about
cultural difference; and this knowledge demanded for new frames of under-
standing and interpretation. The normative impact of this knowledge gave
rise to a new awareness of a universal and fundamental equality of being
a human being, expressed by the term “dignity”. Immanuel Kant has ex-
pressed this dignity as an ontological qualifcation of humanity attributed
to every human being: He argued that man as the subject of a moral reason-
ing about his own life and doings, has an extreme high value. This means
that every man (and every social unit as well) is principally more than a
means for the purposes of other people, or even of him-/herself, but is to be
recognized as a purpose within him-/herself. Kant calls this the dignity or
an absolute inner worth of every human being. 2
Attributing dignity to each and every human being could be a general
defnition of humanism. In its modern version this humanism emphasizes
four principles of human life: (1) human reason as the ability to make one’s
own ideas plausible by argumentation; (2) freedom of one’s own will in
guiding all activities in social life; (3) the creativity of bringing about pe-
culiar life forms in a broad scale of differences and changes; and (4) the
inter-subjectivity of negotiating these differences under the rule of mutual
critical recognition.
6 What is humanism?
This modern humanism is based on different historical preconditions.
The most basic one occurred as a “transcendental breakthrough” in the
so-called “axial time”, independently in different advanced civilizations
at different times (Eisenstadt). 3 Its paradigm is the Jewish prophecy, but it
happened in other forms in different cultures like China,4 India, the Med-
iterranean as well. It opened the perspective of human thinking towards
a transcendent divine dimension, apart from the inner-worldly dimension
of human life. Ever since, cultural orientation was brought about in a
complex interrelationship between three separated felds of thought and
experience: the human self, the outside world, and the divine. In this com-
plex interrelationship humankind acquired a universal status. Thus, the
constraints of an ethnocentric restriction of the qualifcations of humanity
to one’s own people were broken. Being human was no longer limited to
one’s own group but, in principle, it was extended to all members of the
human race.
Humanism is the outcome of a long historical process which introduced
the divine quality of the transcendental word into the human nature thus
enriching it with high if not utmost values. In the West this humanization
of humankind started in antiquity. Ancient Greeks created elements of a
later humanism by giving the political order of human life the institution of
a polis. Here political decisions were made, not by referring to a higher di-
vine will, but to the free will of citizens and their ability to handle common
problems of practical life by an open public discussion. Yet, this “human-
ization” of politics was limited to only a small number of citizens. It was
Roman philosophy (Stoa) and political thinking – most prominent in the
work of Cicero5 – which principally generalized the ability of men to use
reason in refecting the order of their lives. It was attributed to every human
being. In the light of this reason human nature got fundamental and gen-
eral values expressed by the terms of humanitas and dignitas. These values
were put into the form of law, the validity of which was made plausible by
the idea of natural law (lex naturae) derived from the order of the cosmos.
Thus, all social differences were transcended – on the level of intellectual
discourse.
Judaism and Christianity took over this idea of natural law and the high
value of being human and strengthened it with the religious concept that
man is created as an image of God (imago Dei). Christianity radicalized
this idea of human dignity with the belief that God himself became man in
Jesus, thus reconciling the gap between transcendental divinity and inner-
worldly human nature.
Within this historical framework of general tendencies Western human-
ism took place in two epochs: (1) in early modernity starting in Italy in the
14th century and dominating intellectual life all over Europe for centuries,
(2) and at the brink of modernity at the end of the 18th and the beginning
of the 19th century, where it deeply infuenced the political culture of West-
ern Europe and North America. It became the moving intellectual force
What is humanism? 7
in the emerging humanities and in higher education (with a special em-
phasis in Germany; here the term “Humanismus” [humanism] was made
well known by the educationist Friedrich Immanuel Niethammer [1808],
and the term “Humanität” [humanity] by the theologian and philosopher
Johann Gottfried Herder).
1 In early modern cultural history humanism became the dominant form

of intellectual life with a strong bias in higher education. Education
was brought about by referring to classical Latin and Greek texts and
works of art in antiquity. This reference took place in special felds of
intellectual life, which were characterized as humaniora, – an early
form of what later was called the humanities. They are centered on
philological issues: editing and interpreting texts. This work included
text-critique of well-known documents. The most famous one was
Lorenzo de Valla’s unmasking of the donatio Constantini, a document
legitimating the Vatican as an independent state, as forged. The experts
of the humaniora were called “humanistas” (humanists). They trans-
formed the strong forms of the mediaeval scholastic system into an
open discourse of interpreting ancient literature and critically applying
them to current issues of intellectual life. A paradigmatic fgure of these
“humanists” – well known all over Europe – was Erasmus of Rotter-
dam (1466/69–1536).6 These intellectuals brought antiquity to a new
life on the level of higher education beyond the limits of ecclesiastical
Christianity (without leaving the framework of Christian worldview).
Since then the reference to Greek and Roman antiquity and its secu-
lar or civil way of thinking (i.e. not primarily oriented by referring to
religious worldviews) became a dominant feature of higher education
in the West. The European intellectual discourse was shaped by a per-
manent reference to antiquity in the form of an open discourse with no
strict authoritarian regulation.
2 The second typical form of humanism came into being at the end of
the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century – it marks the brink
of modernity in understanding human life. Here the general historical
process of humanizing world views and social and political life forms
has brought about secular dimensions of understanding what it means
to be a human being. The divine quality of man as an image of God
was transferred into a secular inner-worldly divinity of man. It was
characterized by the concepts of “spirituality”, “reason” (different to
rationality), and “personality”. It can even be described as a secular di-
vinization. Typical for this way of thinking is the German philosopher
and linguist Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767–1835).7
Secularization became manifest in the way of life of a civil society, the basic
values of which were derived from the ideas of reason, and as qualities of
human nature – both synthesized in the idea of human dignity. Religious
8 What is humanism?
differences became livable in the context of a secular life-form which de-
mands tolerance (with an outlook towards a new culture of mutual critical
recognition).
Inspired by a growing knowledge based on extensive travelling all over
the world the feature of humankind became enriched by difference and
changeability in space and time, and at the same time it got a fundamen-
tally new temporal dimension. The unity of humankind now could only be
perceived in the variety of cultural differences and changes. This synthesis
of unity and difference was paradigmatically explicated by the philosophy
of history of Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803).8 This historization of
the idea of humankind was frst articulated by a new philosophy of his-
tory, which thematized humankind as a comprehensive temporal unit of
development into a future which will principally surpass the horizon of
historical experience. Past and future of humankind became asymmetri-
cal, thus opening up a future perspective into which human agency could
realize further steps of humanization. The German historian Leopold von
Ranke (1795–1886) expressed this idea of a historical humanism in the for-
mulation: that “by attracting different nations and individuals to the idea
of humankind and culture an unconditional progress might by the case”.9
Politically humanism became manifest in the frst Declaration of Human
and Civil Rights (1776 in Virginia). The universalization of these principles
of political legitimacy and social coherence is still going on.
This humanistic idea of humankind was not free from inhumane ele-
ments like the conviction of Western supremacy and ethnocentric tenden-
cies. Understanding otherness could thus be used as a cultural means for
political domination and suppression. But every critique of this inhumanity
(widespread today as post-colonialism) referred to humanistic principles.
They claimed for the dignity of men and their ability to create their life-
forms according to their specifc needs and world views.
During the 19th and 20th century this modern Western humanism met
four kinds of criticism: (1) the idea of equality because reason and liberty
were negated by ideologies of human inequality like Social Darwinism.
Referring to this criticism people could be robbed of their humanity and
treated inhumanely – to the extreme of mass murder and genocide. (2)
Humanism was deconstructed as pure ideology, which asserted the dom-
inating role of male Western middle-class people and – intellectually very
powerful – simply legitimated free market economy (capitalism) with all
its social tensions and clashes. Referring to this criticism the established
life-order of civil society could be destroyed in favor of a so-called “real”
humanism which could only be realized by forcefully converting free cit-
izenship into authoritarian or even totalitarian political systems. In the
name of this “real humanism” individualizing liberty could become a mat-
ter of terrorist destruction. (3) The third critique interprets humanism as a
veil of cultural values covering and hiding the deeply inbuilt inhumanity of
modernity. The cultural forces of modernity are identifed as dominance
What is humanism? 9
of instrumental rationality which dissolves all humane values and replaces
them by the blind will of power of men over men or of non-human systems
and structures over human subjectivity. The followers of this criticism put
human agency into new, but very problematic cultural patterns: either uto-
pian visions running against pre-given conditions and circumstances or a
melancholy of hopelessness. (4) The fourth critique of humanism is more
philosophical. It qualifes humanism as an outdated way of thinking to be
transgressed into a philosophy which is no longer committed to the con-
centration of thought on the nature/culture of human beings, but refers to
other basic elements of philosophical discourse like a post-metaphysical
ontology (Heidegger) or the overwhelming strength of power-directed dis-
courses defning reality beyond the traditional anthropocentrism of mod-
ern world view (Foucault).
But despite and against these waves of criticisms Humanism remained.
It has survived at least as a source of claiming for humaneness against all
forms of suppression, destruction, dissolution, and negation of human dig-
nity. So, the existence of humanism was claimed again and again after the
experiences of massive destruction like the two world wars. Today vis-à-vis
growing conficts between different cultural traditions (very often in their
religious form) humanism has (again) been revitalized as a cultural form of
human life in civil society, which enables people to live together peacefully
with differing cultural identities. Humanism turned out to be a meta-order
within which intercultural communication can be regulated in a peaceful
(“humane”) way.
From its very beginning Western humanism bears an inbuilt logic of
universalization. It has developed into a global dimension within which
non-Western cultures and traditions can come to terms with it.
It is diffcult, if not impossible, to separate this Western humanism from
the issue of cultural identity by simply following its universalistic approach
to humankind. But, nevertheless, the idea of human dignity could be ac-
cepted outside the West and applied to or mediated with non-Western ideas
of mankind and humanity. By doing so, humanism would get the cultural
color of non-Western traditions. An impressive case of humanism beyond
the Western tradition is the Indian poet and philosopher Rabindranath
Tagore (1861–1941).10 As the frst non-Western winner of the Nobel Prize
for literature and as a Citizen of a colonized country he presented his idea
of a universal humanism during the height of Western imperialism. In his
idea of the universal value of being human Western humanism is refected
in an Indian mirror: The West became confronted with its own lost tradi-
tion of humaneness.
In the post-colonial turn humanist ideas were loaded with the power of
cultural identity, won by fghting Western supremacy. Here Western hu-
manism was confronted with inhumane colonialism. One’s own culture
was presented as a source and a chance for real humanism.11 All the hu-
manistic schemes of humanity were applied to the tradition of one’s own.
10 What is humanism?
Non-Western (African, Indian, Chinese, etc.) identity was presented as re-
ally humanistic against assumed wrong humanism of the West. This was,
e.g., the case in the frst African countries after independence. Human-
ism was conceptualized by the new African elite as the essence of their
non-Western identity, called “negritude”, “Ujhamaa”, “Black Conscious-
ness”, “Ubuntu”, or even “Humanism”.
The victims of colonialism had adopted the colonialists’ form of thought
in a reversed value-scheme. This is still true for the topical discourse in
South Africa on Ubuntu as a peculiar African humanism with high so-
cial values strictly distinguished from Western “unsocial” individualism. It
reproduced the form of thought of the suppressor (the West) and only re-
versed the value-scheme, by transferring humanistic values from the center
of European culture into the African one. The ideological function of this
humanism is evident: It serves the need for getting an “indigenous” hu-
manistic tradition which can catch up with Western humanism and asserts
a particular African one. The shortcomings of this alternative humanism
are obvious: lack of historical evidence, exclusive character of pretended
universalism, reproduction of ethnocentrism by negating it, etc. Yet it can
be interpreted as a starting point for an interculturally valid humanism
which opens up space for cultural diversity, and at the same time cultivates
universalism in an inclusive way.12
A third way of referring to Western humanism follows the tendency to-
wards such a diversifcation: Humanistic elements were identifed in one’s
own traditions and applied to the topical intercultural communication.
This can be done, e.g., with the long-lasting and identity-forming tradition
of Confucianism in East Asia. Based on the fundamental value of “ren”
(benevolence) Confucianism can be understood as a tradition of humanism
with its own cultural peculiarity. The difference to the West is evident. The
Chinese had to invent a Chinese word for humanism in early 20th century.
This creating a tradition of humanism apart from the West can be per-
formed with all traditions which originated in the universalistic turn of
culture in the different axial times of universal history. The problem of this
peculiar humanism is its relationship to the West. It has the function of le-
gitimating cultural difference as a necessary condition for identity-forming,
and by doing so it gets an anti-humanistic exclusive character running
against its claim for universalism. This tendency can even end in funda-
mentalist interpretations of one’s own tradition thus leading into aggressive
identity politics, within which the idea of human dignity is weakened if not
destroyed.
The globalization process of today with its challenge for non-ethnocentric
new forms and rules of intercultural communication can be understood as
a new axial time where all the traditional concepts of humanity and hu-
maneness can turn their exclusive universalisms into inclusive ones. This
could be the starting point for a new global humanism. First attempts have
been made in this direction. Hans Küng, e.g., established an international
What is humanism? 11
movement for “world ethos”.13 It is grounded in the idea that every religion
has a humanistic core, the golden rule. Acknowledging this commonality,
the tensions rising from cultural difference in religious believes in identity
politics can be overcome, if not dissolved. The problem of this movement –
despite its worldwide recognition and support – is the simple fact that iden-
tity needs difference, and this difference is not addressed (however, the
golden rule may function as a rule in communicating difference). Therefore,
a new and really universalistic humanism needs interculturally valid rules
for intercultural communication and especially when dealing with cultural
difference and identity. These rules can be justifed by referring to the basic
quality ascribed to every human being by humanism: dignity, as being an
end in itself and not only a means for the purpose of others.
Notes
1 Koselleck: Futures Past, 1985.
2 Kant: Metaphysik der Sitten [1797] § 11, A 93 [The Metaphysics of Morals,
1996].
3 Eisenstadt (Ed.): The Origins and Diversity of Axial Age Civilizations, 1986.
4 Zhang: The Idea of Human Dignity in Classical Chinese Philosophy, 2000;
Wang: Toward a Humanist Interpretation of Tradition, 2005.
5 See e.g. Cancik: “Dignity of Man” and “Persona” in Stoic Anthropology, 2002.
6 Huizinga: Erasmus and the Age of Reformation, 2008.
7 Humboldt: Humanist without Portfolio, 1963.
8 Herder: Letters for the Advancement of Humanity, 2002; id.: Refexions on the
Philosophy of the History of Mankind, 1968.
9 Ranke: Über die Epochen der neueren Geschichte, 1971, p. 80; Humanism in
the Perspective of French History is presented by Todorov: Imperfect Garden,
2002.
10 Tagore: The Religion of Man, 1931.
11 A typical example is Gandhi’s Manifesto: id.: Hindu Swaraj, 1993.
12 Senghor: Negritude, 1998; Ramose: African Philosophy through Ubuntu,
1999; van Binsbergen: Ubuntu and the Globalization of South African Thought
and Society, 2002; Eze: Intellectual History in Contemporary South Africa,
2010; id.: The Politics of History in Contemporary Africa, 2010.
13 Küng (Ed.): Ja zum Weltethos, 1995.
2 Classical humanism – a
historical survey
1 What is “classical humanism”?

There is no culture on earth which does not show any idea of what it
means to be human and thereby has developed a potential for its mem-
bers to make meaning of and regulate their everyday lives. “Humanity”
is a concept that (among others) has come to designate one of the mani-
festations of such an idea. Humanism, in turn, gives a specifc practical
meaning to the way individual existence, moreover the whole social life, is
made meaningful. These terms are anything but clear. They rather cover a
broad spectrum of meanings of the manner in which human beings receive
cultural orientation.1
This spectrum is demarcated by its two extremes: On the one hand hu-
manity comprises the notion of everything men have in common as mem-
bers of the species of Homo sapiens. This common ground is less concerned
with the natural equipment of the genre than with the cultural features
humans share in terms of their various lifestyles. What is implied by this is
the way human beings invariably evolve meaningful operations for order-
ing their lives. “Humanity” in a general sense defnes the essence of being
human as culturally determined. On the other hand, this defnition is con-
fned to a specifc form of this culturally defned essence, which in its turn
concerns some central element of its array of norms. The term “humanity”
thereby acquires a decidedly normative connotation besides its empirical
one. It grounds human existence on a few fundamentals, i.e. with reference
to its specifc relation with nature and the cosmos, which in turn regulates
the way humans are dealing with each other. The cultural nature of being
human in its most extreme form amounts to the constant choice of human
action and suffering between inhumanity and humanity.
The most pronounced form of this interpretation of humanity is called
“humanism”. In the following I will try to explain and depict this specifc
variety so that it may appear as visible and understandable in the context
of its historical background. In doing so I will try to explore the emerging
idea of humanism by a more specifc one, i.e. the idea of humanism as it has
manifested itself in Western culture.
Classical humanism 13
I regard the “classical humanism” of the late 18th and 19th centuries as
the most central manifestation we are dealing here with a universal ten-
dency that appeared in all of Europe, which however took on a different
form in its various regional contexts. Tzvetan Todorov has expounded the
French-variety of this in a most impressive way. 2 Others are still missing. I
am therefore focusing on the German form, which is inseparably connected
with the names of Herder and Humboldt.3
In looking back from today’s perspective this latter type of humanism
can be understood as a constellation of intellectual tropes and a “logic” of
argumentation, that comprises and interconnects the most diverse aspects
of cultural orientation.
The intellectual precondition for this constellation is formed by the an-
thropology of early modern history. Here, for the frst time, the interpreta-
tion of man and the world is no longer grounded in a non-human authority
of meaning making (God or Nature) but is referring only to mankind
itself as the ultimate goal. This has been aptly expressed by Kant in his
famous formula whereby the three fundamental questions of philosophy,
which also form the general guideline for the cultural orientation of human
beings – What can I know?, What must I do?, What can I hope? – converge
into the one question: What is man?4
This recourse to mankind itself as the sole source for the cultural defni-
tion of what it is to be human only becomes humanist in the truest sense if
and when human beings are accorded specifc values as a kind of anthro-
pological principle, and if thereby being human acquires the status of an
absolute norm when it comes to regulating any human practice.
Humanism in its modern form infuses the empirical dimension of human
experience with a normative element. Immanuel Kant has formulated this
in its most defnite form:
[…] Man regarded as a person, i.e. a subject with a moral and practical
reason, is exalted beyond anything, because in that capacity (homo
noumenon) he is not just to be valued for achieving other people’s or
his own ends, but as an end in itself, i.e. he is possessed of a dignity (an
absolute inner worth) whereby he deserves to be respected by all other
rational beings, thus can measure up to all others of this kind and be
on an equal footing with them.5
In classical humanism “mankind” is held to be the ultimate criterion of

any operation of creating meaning. As such this criterion is conceived of as
universally applicable both in an empirical sense (encompassing all of hu-
manity existing in space and time) as well as in a normative one (ascribing
to every subject the dignity of being its own end).
This criterion of meaning is also brought into play as the fundamen-
tal criterion of legitimating political rule. In humanism it is understood
as a legal foundation of the state are formed by human and civil rights.
14 Classical humanism
This universalism is, at the same time, a universal historicism, i.e. that man
and world have to be interpreted and understood in historical terms.
For each human being and for the particular way he/she conceives his/her
life, this kind of humanism takes on a specifc form – that of individuality.
The universal as well as individualized quality of being human is only
conceptualized as an anthropological potential; its realization is condi-
tional for being implemented via an individual process that, at the same
time, has a social dimension. This process can be categorized under the
heading of “education” (German: “Bildung”).
All these features are the essentials for characterizing modern humanism
as an intellectual construct. But this is more than just a mere idea. It has
already become institutionalized in the life form of bourgeois civil society.
The conviction that every religious belief in its various historical manifesta-
tions and its divergence from other beliefs can be integrated into a secular
social order obliging all religions to coexist peacefully (“tolerance”) is an
indispensable aspect of this form of life.
The humanities are conceived by humanism as an organized system of
interpretations that can lay claim on some degree of universal validity. Hu-
man and civil rights, as enshrined in modern constitutions, can be regarded
as the most powerful institution of modern humanism, not in the least be-
cause of the claim to this universal validity.
In the following I am proposing to interpret this concept of humanism in
a historical perspective, i.e. I would like to position it within the temporal
scheme in which the current process of globalization should be assessed.
2 Anthropological premises
Any concept of what it means to be human6 is determined by the fun-
damental difference existing between human and non-human creatures.
In most of the human life-forms the non-human qualities are distributed
among two dimensions: the natural and the divine. Man is located some-
where in between – his place is where the two dimensions (natural, divine
and human) are hierarchically ordered: The highest value is attributed to
the divine world, the lowest to nature, and man who occupies the middle
ground is marked by the “intermediate” quality of being capable of dis-
tinguishing between good and evil, or even being compelled to do so. The
quality of differentiation between good and evil is something that is unique
to him, plus the resulting necessity of having to make practical choices un-
der the term of his divine as well as natural attributes. The moral rules de-
termining human behavior are defned by a clear distinction between good
and evil. The ability to make such a distinction presupposed a certain idea
of what it means to be human: Human beings are defned as persons, they
are individuals in possession of certain physical and psychological consist-
ency, and as such they are responsible for their actions, at least as far as the
sphere of their everyday lives is concerned. This responsibility endows every
human being (to use the current diction) with the quality of dignity, which
in turn demands that it should be met with respect and recognition in social
contexts. The notion of human dignity is also connected with another hu-
man faculty that constitutes an anthropological universal, i.e. of changing
one’s own perspective of cognition and interpretation by adopting that of
another person. The dignity of man is anthropologically rooted in his dis-
cretion between good and evil plus the capacity for empathy.7
As regard to its social dimension, human life is anthropologically deter-
mined by a system of binary distinctions, like the distinction between up
and down in social hierarchies, the distinction between power and the lack
of power, etc.8
The distinction between interior and exterior plays a special role in form-
ing the idea what it means to be a human being. It shapes the difference
between a group of people with a sense of belonging together and with
whom one forms a community – that means they have a collective iden-
tity with strong emotional and cognitive ties – on the one hand and those
people whom one regards and treats as the “others” or “strangers” on the
other hand. This distinction plays an important part in the historical de-
velopment of mankind because it concerns a profound layer of human sub-
jectivity and the formation of identity taking place at that level, which is
of primary relevance for the idea of humanism. The relationship between
one’s social self and the otherness of the other is determined by an elemen-
tary as well as a universal logic of differentiation: It is the logic of ethnocen-
tric discrimination and, at the same time, of hospitality towards strangers.
The cultural effort requires an order to develop the sentiment of hospitality
in the face of the quasi-natural aversion to what is different or strange, yet
it forcefully demonstrates the strength of the ethnocentrism that is at work
in determining of cultural identity. In ethnocentrism the image of oneself
is drawn exclusively in the shape and color of positive values; this enables
human beings to develop a sense of social cohesion as well as an affrmative
attitude both to themselves and all the others belonging to the same life
form – something which is of vital importance. The otherness or alterity of
those existing outside of this life form is, by the same logic, defned in terms
of the lack, or at least the reduction of all those positive values in the alien
life form. The most striking example of such a discriminatory mind-set is
the distinction between civilization and barbarity.9
3 Historical change
It would be tempting to set these anthropological universals as the essen-
tial features of all life forms over against historical change. Such a facile
opposition would prevent any deeper understanding of the changeability
of human culture. Changeability does not run counter to the anthropo-
logical universals but takes place with them. They even permit us to deter-
mine the directedness of those changes in human life forms that usually
are called by the name of “history”. History is much more than arbitrary
or accidental change. In terms of its quality as a process of development,
it is structured. This process derives its force from the continual attempts
on the part of humans to achieve an acceptable balance among the distinc-
tions listed above – distinctions which are also oppositions, and as such
they are constantly generating tensions. Human life is driven onwards
by the permanent struggle to overcome the destructive forces, “the anti-
social sociability” (Kant), inherent in any social organization, which are
caused by the tensions generated between the alternatives that have been
mentioned. In all social conficts and struggles, the ideal of a life-form
acceptable to all acts as the fundamental driving force of human social
behavior.
Which evolutionary tendency may be assumed as the most likely out-
come of such an internal dynamic or as one can also formulate it, of the
historicity of human life? The only possibility of fnding an answer to this
question that is logically convincing consists in matching up present expe-
rience and future expectations and then look backwards at the experience
of the temporal change humans and their world have undergone, and then
to explore the conditions of possibility for realizing the future as desired.10
Two essential aspects of historical thinking should be borne in mind.
When one proceeds in this manner: frst, the global dimension of hu-
man interaction, which these days makes the abstract collective concept
of “mankind” appear as an empirical fact, and second the requirement of
establishing amiable coexistence between diverse traditions and ideas of
being human. In accordance with this, one can expect the future histori-
cal development to comprise essential processes of universalization, just as
much as a tendency of emphasizing the difference as well as the intercon-
nectedness between one’s own self and the others.
Three essential stages in human development or cultural evolution can
be differentiated11:
1 Archaic forms of life, where most, if not all, qualities of being human
are based on kinship relations to the extent that all others with whom
one is not connected by blood-ties are not regarded as human. They are
seen to be lacking the essential features that defne their own human-
ity.12 This is made evident by the simple fact that a lot of the names
that people living in such conditions give themselves testify such a par-
ticularity: one calls oneself “man”. Names like “Bantu”, “Khoikhoi”,
“Apache”, and numerous others have this meaning.
The cultural rules of these life forms are based on the one fundamen-
tal imperative of maintaining the tradition and perpetuating it under
all circumstances in order to inoculate it into the minds and hearts of
the people. Social relations are dominated by the principle of mutuality.
There is a double standard: on the one hand the principles of how one
treats one’s own people prescribing mutuality, on the other hand the
exploitation and subjection of the others, the strangers. Nothing proves
this more strikingly than the fact cannibalism is a wide-spread strategy
of forcibly acquiring the vital and mental power of the others.
2 Life forms of a higher social complexity, in which the ethnic borders
of being human are inevitably transgressed (as was the case in large
empires). I would like to designate the step towards this type of univer-
sality by the term of “axial time” (“Achsenzeit”), following suggestions
made by Jaspers, Eisenstadt, and others.13 From now on the ethnic lim-
its of being human were capable of being transgressed in the direction
of a new universality of mankind.
3 The human life-form within the system of “multiple modernities”,14
where the hitherto evolved mental forms of cultural difference are,
or – better – should be, reconciled with the new form of an integrating
universalism. Two new factors that have proved to be decisive for the
latest epoch in the development of humanity: scientifc rationality and
the secular (i.e. not defned and legitimated in religious terms) ordering
social life. The natural sciences and later also the humanities and social
sciences were instrumental in demystifying the natural as well as the
human world.
4 The humanization of mankind in modern

European history
The dawning of the Modern Age was marked by the appearance of various
new tracts in philosophy and theology concerning “mankind” as such: its
dignity, its risks, as well as its potential. Giovanni Pico della Mirandola’s
Oratio de hominis dignitate (Treatise on the Dignity of Man) of 1486/87
became famous in this context.15 In the early 17th century the term “an-
thropology” was also created. The Modern Age, however, is additionally
marked by the concept of humanity and became a matter of much contro-
versy, which resulted in the various refections upon its nature with an obvi-
ously more and more plural and divergent appearance. In the 17th century
the discipline of theology, which initially held the monopoly on defning
what man is like, was superseded by philosophy, with which, in turn, the
anthropological discourse of jurisprudence, medicine, and the new sciences
were competing. But besides the level of theoretical refection, it was also in
the feld of cultural practice itself where changes in the concept of man oc-
curred: in the religious, political, and social areas of activity; since the 17th
century literature and the visual arts, which had become increasingly au-
tonomous; furthermore in technology, which, based on scientifc insights,
became more and more dominant in everyday life. They gave rise to the
human type of homo faber, of man thinking only in terms of what is tech-
nically feasible. In addition, the concept of mankind was greatly infuenced
by the changes in people’s material lives. They were due to the advances
in technology and later in industrial production, i.e. the successful fght
against hunger, illness, infant mortality. They resulted in the growth in
population owed to these improvements and the consequences of migration
and the colonial expansion of Europe.
The modern understanding of mankind rests on endowing the tradi-
tional grounding of humanity with some transcendental authority and
adding now a new human quality, i.e. to transfer the spiritual quality
implicit in this authority to the idea of man himself.16 This process is of a
universal historical relevance, and it can only be compared to the revolu-
tionary changes in the concept of mankind during axial times: One could
defne this modern process as the humanization of mankind. However, at
the same time, one should not overlook that this moral progress was not
accompanied by a decrease in inhumanity. “Humanization” rather refers
to a change in the understanding humankind has of itself; this process
can be concretized and differentiated as: (a) secularization, (b) univer-
salization, (c) naturalization, (d) idealization, (e) historicization, and (f)
individualization.
a) Secularization
In the Modern Age the autonomy of a mankind acting as its own authority
conficted with the religious precepts of cultural orientation. The tradi-
tional Christian doctrine of salvation and its religious interpretation of
the world was incapable of keeping pace with the ever-increasing stock of
knowledge provided by the sciences and the humanities. In the 17th cen-
tury the traditional interpretation of the world became differentiated into
various areas of knowledge, in which empirical explanations without any
reference to a transcendental authority became increasingly frequent and
relevant for humanity’s perception of itself. The most striking example
of this is the Copernican turn in the sciences, which can be regarded as
a philosophical-scientifc revolution directed against the ancient geocen-
tric world image of what was “natural” as sanctioned by the Christian
Church.
Looking back on classical antiquity was of decisive importance for this
process of secularization. Ever since the Renaissance and the humanist
movements associated with this, it has played a vital role in forming the
intellectual self-concept of the educated classes all over Europe.17
Without completely falling into oblivion as a source of meaning, the
Christian religion, however, still listed its interpretative authority with
regard to providing some orientation in the here and now. Morally and
intellectually discredited by various religiously motivated civil wars, the
Christian churches in the 17th century were submitted to a critique of reli-
gion, as a consequence of which the subjectivity of Modern Man that had
previously been grounded in the Christian religion was now solely defned
in secular terms. Religious truth claims that had found their expression in
various denominations (“positive” articulations of faith) were replaced by
a universally human morality whose base was formed by the law of reason
(take e.g. G.E. Lessing’s philosophical drama “Nathan the Wise” of 1779,
where in its “Parable of the ring” Lessing pronounces the equality of the
three mosaic religions).
With this new morality a new secular cultural orientation of human life
came into existence that derived its authority from civil society. In this con-
text religious faith was conceived as a merely private matter because of the
fundamental rule of tolerance. Due to the infuence of the Enlightenment
a secular understanding of man arose as a being that can freely dispose of
his world in accordance with the precepts of reason. This became the very
cultural foundation of modern civil society.
b) Universalization
With the increased knowledge supplied by human and natural sciences the
idea of the unity of humanity had to be reconsidered. In racial theory it
was therefore possible to abandon the Unitarian concept altogether, as pre-
sented by I. LaPeyrre, Voltaire, E. Long, or Ch. Meiners, and others.18 In
the end, however, the acknowledgment of the monogenetic unity of man-
kind prevailed against the idea of its polygeny.19 This general frame of what
humans have in common was flled with the ever increasing knowledge of
the multiplicity of the cultural forms of human life. Especially travelogues
played an important role in this process because with their descriptions of
the ways of human existence in areas of the world previously unknown they
managed to question the global claim for universality on the part of homo
europaeus. On the one hand the concept of humanity had to be adapted
to the rapidly increasing knowledge of the world that had been accumu-
lated ever since the early Modern Age, on the other hand the newly gained
knowledge had to be integrated into the task of drawing a generalizing
picture of humanity that was up-to-date.
The interpretation of cultural difference continued to be governed by the
typical assumption that all men were naturally endowed with the capacity
to freely as well as rationally choose their cultural identity. This assump-
tion became part of political culture in the form of codifed human rights
that went back to a long-standing debate on natural rights. The history of
this culture has extended from the modern democratic constitutions, which
were still confned to single nations, all the way down to the “General Dec-
laration of Human Rights” by the United Nations in 1948, which included
all of mankind.
This amounted to a break-away from the ethnocentric asymmetry of
the way in which cultural identity was constituted, and where inclusion
or exclusion were charged with different positive or negative values. Even
though the Western cultures claimed to process higher civilizatory stand-
ards than other cultures, the legitimization of exploitation and suppres-
sion that went along with this, was clearly limited – at least on level of
theological, philosophical, legal, and moral refection. In attributing also
to the “others” certain human qualities by including them in the human
race, their barbaric treatment (in the name of a higher civilization) was
laid open to critique in the light of minimal human standards and in the
name of a higher kind of civilization, which, in turn, meant that it could
be limited by legal means.
The political rule of men over men thus became restricted in theoretical
terms, and its legitimacy was premised upon the essential freedom of every
individual subjected to such rule. This implied a fundamental claim to par-
ticipation in political rule. The modern humanization of man had its po-
litical apogee, especially in Europe and the United States, in the evolution
of constitutionally enshrined and sanctioned human and civil rights that is
continuing until now.
Since human rights by defnition were derived from and pertained to the
entire human race, they could also be claimed for such individuals that,
either on account of actual lack of freedom (e.g. in the case of suppression)
or the actual lack of some of the basically defning elements of humanity (as
in the case of small children, or the mentally handicapped, or of morality
in the case of social deviants), did not come up to the standard defnition of
a free, reasonable, and ethical human being. In the meantime, the modern
process of regulating political rule and social life by constitutional means,
that began in Western Europe and the United States, has become globalized
to some degree.
c) Naturalization
Ever since the beginning of the Modern Age, man discovered himself in
terms of the sharp contrast and the dialectical mediation between his status
as a natural and an intellectual creature at the same time: On the one hand
he thus became a thing, i.e. a corporeal object of rational analysis and,
based on this, of technological domination and manipulation. On the other
hand, he became the very master of domination and manipulation. This
distinction is due to the fact that man studying himself can never describe
himself as such, but always in relational terms only because of his natural
qualities as an animal and because of his spiritual status as a being related
to God. Man, thus was divided into an object of scientifc observation on
the one and a spiritual being on the other hand.
René Descartes expressed this dichotomy in man’s relationship to himself
and the world in a highly momentous formula by differentiating between
“res cogitans” – an exclusively intellectual substance or a non-corporeal
spirit – and “res externa” – a mere piece of matter. As res extensa man
was on an equal footing with the material objects of the world, especially
the non-thinking ones, and thus could be made the object of scientifc
research. 20
The scientifc dimension the refection upon mankind had acquired
through this can be seen as a special aspect of the process of naturali-
zation and rationalization. Science became split up into a variety of spe-
cialized disciplines. Until the late 18th century this resulted in a relatively
rigid distinction between a purely scientifc observation of mankind (e.g. in
biology and anatomy) and its interpretation in the humanities (especially
in philosophy and theology). Towards the end of the 18th century both
approaches were joined in the form of a comprehensive philosophy of life.
The spirit that belonged exclusively to man was now conceived as a natural
drive or force, which transformed and completed itself in the guise of mold-
ing the human world (e.g. in J.F. Blumenbach and J.G. Herder). Classical
humanism – e.g. as propounded by Herder or the two Humboldt brothers,
but especially by Goethe – was the attempt to reconnect human culture,
which had been created by the non-material spirit, with material
nature, thereby imparting to the latter a “humane” dimension that was
replete with normative meaning.
Since the middle of the 19th century new areas of science came into exist-
ence at the interface between the natural and cultural concepts of humanity
with new methodological approaches, especially of an analytical nature,
such as ethnology, psychology, psychiatry, and sociology. Due to the spe-
cifc focus of these disciplines the understanding of human life-forms was
extended to become a more comprehensive, even if specialized and method-
ologically heterogeneous, study of the human sciences that far exceeded the
old humanities with their paradigm of textual interpretation.
d) Idealization
Concomitant and in a complex interchange with the naturalizing view of
humanity the historical tendency of idealization evolved, during which the
concept of human nature assumed a distinctly spiritual character. In the
process the religious tradition of man being made in God’s image mutated
to become a secular, worldly divinity of man; it was characterized by terms
such as “spirituality”, “good sense” (as opposed to reason), and “person”.
As early as the 15th century neoplatonic thinkers like Nicolaus Cusanus
and Marsilus Ficino saw the human being as an artist, an “alter deus”, who
is capable of issuing forth the divine in nature, and thereby also in human
nature.
In the early 16th century, artists like Leonardo da Vinci and Albrecht
Dürer created their works in accordance with this. Man now was not only
regarded as the reifed object of analysis and rational explanation (and con-
sequently as dominated by technology), but at the same time, he fgured as
their subject in the role of “maitre et possesseur de la nature” (Descartes).21
Even the human being reifed as a corpse and as a source of scientifc insight
became an object of aesthetic fascination, especially the act of anatomy
itself, e.g. in Rembrandt’s “The anatomy of Dr. Tulp” (1632). Leonardo,
who himself conducted the anatomic incisions of corpses, represented the
human fgure as a spiritual object of the highest order. The most compre-
hensive explanation and explication of this spiritualization of man as a
natural being was supplied by German idealism.
The most important historical precondition for this anthropological con-
cept of a moral personality was the idea of man being made in the image
of God plus the religious practice – above all in Protestantism – of a direct
as well as personal relationship with God. “Standing before God” now be-
came part of humanity’s concept of itself. Thus e.g. Dürer gave Christ-like
traits to his self-portrait of 1500. This interiorization of the relationship
with God on the part of the individual subject led to an idea of human sub-
jectivity, which is marked by the freedom of conscience and self-responsible
action. Man now becomes aware of his ability to sink to the status of an
animal or ascend to God-like spheres by means of his very actions. The
cultural autonomy of humankind resulting from this act of religious eman-
cipation with regard to determining itself and its world was succinctly ex-
pressed by G. Pico della Mirandola (1486), when, on the occasion of his
creation of the world, he had God say to humanity: “The limited nature
of the others is circumscribed by the laws that I passed. Unfettered by any
constraints you shall determine your own nature according to your own
will, whose power I have lent you”. 22
This concept of the spiritual nature of man also manifested itself in the sys-
tematic foundation of human self-interpretation. This is made evident by the
hermeneutical turn of the humanities in the late 18th and early 19th century.
They took up impulses from the philosophy of life and rationally and evolved
it into a specifc method for investigating the human world in the variety of
its historical manifestations.23 Human cultures thus became the object of
comprehensive research, which was theoretically grounded in a “method
of systematic understanding” (J.G. Droysen)24; and the self-understanding
of mankind was inextricably tied up with the ability to perceive and recog-
nize cultural diversity. Human culture was produced because of the “educa-
tional drive” (Blumenbach)25 of all natural beings – although far beyond the
limits of nature. For Herder, who designated man as the frst “emancipated
being of creation”, 26 human cultural achievements became measurable by
the standard of how they realized the potential of being human, in short of
its “humanity”. Based on this humanist conception of man being an end in
himself, the humanities were evolved at the end of the 18th century with a
twofold approach that was anthropological and historical at the same time.
The aesthetization of the human perception of the self and the world
forms a separate process in this development. In the medium of art the
natural and spiritual qualities of human existence have become reconciled;
and this humanist synthesis of nature and the human world is harmonized
in such a way that it can be brought in line with the autonomous self-
defnition of mankind.
e) Historization
The temporalization of the concept of mankind is specifc to the Modern
Age. Its nature was now conceived as the result of an evolutionary process,
and consequently its culture became amendable to being interpreted in tem-
poral terms: The exemplary mode of historical meaning – that had found
its traditional expression in the understanding of history as magistra vitae –
was replaced by a genetic mode. It emphasized the open future caused by
the changes historical conditions underwent and rendered progress into an
essential aspect of historical evolution. This revolution in the concepts of
mankind and their relationship with nature occurred during the “saddle
time” around 1750–1850 and caused the idea of human nature’s immuta-
bility to be abandoned. Instead each person along with his/her own specifc
historical interest is understood to be the intellectual product of himself/
herself or of other people in other cultures and times.
This historicity appeared in different contexts. In connection with a the-
ory of civil society, the Scottish Enlightenment of the late 18th century (e.g.
D. Hume, A. Smith, A. Ferguson, J. Millar) transformed the foundation
and legitimization of particular forms of life provided by natural law into a
genuinely historical one. Within the framework of “theoretical history” the
social nature of man was being completely determined by history. Man, as
an animal sociale, goes through several stages of a universalizing historical
evolution that fnally culminates in the life-form of modern civil society. 27
As a consequence of the ever-increasing knowledge about the multifar-
iousness of human forms of life the idea of a generalizing and a temporal
law, which applies to all humans and regulates their lives, came to be dis-
persed. Instead, the concept of “humanity” as a fundamental category of
defning human nature acquired a temporal dimension. To theorize about
this condition, initially became the task of the philosophy of history in the
(early) Enlightenment. It provided the inherent temporality of human life
forms with a general sense of direction. Being human was thereby dilated
into the qualitative difference between past and future. The intellectual
processing of past experiences was the principle that enabled man to exceed
this closed “experiential space” and to transform it into an open “horizon
of expectation”. Due to his capacity for self-determination he could open
and realize new human potentials both in thinking as well as in acting. 28
The movement of historicism in the humanities of the 19th century was
instrumental in guiding the historicity of mankind into the strategic basis
of historical research. This strategy was guided by the insight that history
amounted to the “gnoti se auton” (“understand yourself”) of humanity
(J.G. Droysen). 29 While initially referring to mankind in its entity, the focus
of interest became increasingly narrowed down so as to eventually extend
only to the European and national sphere. The potential ethnocentrism im-
plicit in this was relativized, if not suspended, by the hermeneutical princi-
ple that each epoch was in itself valuable in terms of giving insights into the
cultural nature of mankind, and also that any interpretation of past human
life-forms had to be systematically aware of the cultural perception of their
own. Accordingly, the unity of mankind was held to manifest itself in the
variety of its cultures.30 Ranke expressed this idea as follows: “In attract-
ing different nations and individuals to the idea of humankind and culture
progress is unconditional”.31
f) Individualization
As early as in the late Middle Ages a religiously motivated process of in-
dividualization sets in, whereby the uniqueness of everyone (before God
and all other humans) became perceptible. The Reformation, the reform
of Catholicism, and the emergence of mystical forms of religiousness in
all denominations all the way to Pietism or religious Enlightenment fos-
tered this process of far-reaching consequences for cultural practices. The
individuality thus formed became absorbed, sometimes without prob-
lems, sometimes amidst a lot of struggle, by the concept of individual
autonomy.
In the 17th and 18th centuries this gave rise to new ideas about the way
man and mankind were related to each other. However, this relationship
was interpreted as a biological-anthropological one by recognizing every-
one as a part of the same human species. On this basis it was then possible,
in theoretical terms, to deduce the social cohesion of mankind from a fcti-
tious social contract concluded by autonomous individuals for the sake of
securing their common survival. This idea – frst developed in an exemplary
fashion by Thomas Hobbes in his “Leviathan” (1651) – found its classical
expression in John Locke’s “Two Treatises on Government” (1690) and
above all in Jean Jacques Rousseau’s “Du Contrat Social” (1762). The in-
dividual was thought of in the social form of a family father; what was
decisive, however, was his personal will to socialize as the foundation of
human society.32
This concept of human individuality was derived from the idea that man
could acquire the ownership of nature by the input of labor. The concept
of humanity dominating the post-corporate life form of bourgeois society
thus had its basis in man’s equality with all other men and the freedom to
accumulate property. As the owner of property, he associated himself with
other property owners to form the bourgeois society. By becoming a part
of it he was granted the status of a citizen who enjoyed the protection of his
human rights as guaranteed by the constitution and who, together with all
other citizens, was the very foundation of statehood and political rule.33
Parallel to this social individualism of civil society there appeared theo-
ries concerning the existence of a spiritual link among human beings, e.g.
in G.W. Leibniz’s idea of a pre-established harmony, in G.F. Fichte’s deri-
vation of individual from absolute self-awareness and other representative
of German Idealism, or in J.G. Herder’s and W. von Humboldt’s notion of
the communality of all humans via their individual participation in certain
transcendental ideas.34 The experience of a profound religious belief was
the expression of man’s personal relationship with God in the sense that his
individualism as a human being was guaranteed by an authority beyond
the here and now. The culturally determined nature of humanity – defned
in terms of reason and freedom – now manifested itself in an unlimited
plenitude both in space and time, as e.g. in the universal histories of the
German Enlightenment historians A.L. Schlözer, J.Ch. Gatterer, 35 or in
J.G. Herder’s philosophy of history.36 The spiritual desire for creating cul-
ture ascribed to mankind in its entity became noticeable in the multiplicity
of life-forms. At the same time it became a precept for every human to
individually regulate and give shape to his life. The specifc achievement
of such an individualization of mankind was termed “general education”
(“Bildung”), and it became the guiding concept of human socialization as
well as individualization informing educational programs and artistic prac-
tices. In Germany, e.g., this was implemented through the reform of the
educational and university-systems at the end of the 19th century, which
were mainly infuenced by Wilhelm von Humboldt and Friedrich Schleier-
macher, or it manifested itself in the literary genre of the “Bildungsroman”
that found its exemplary expression in Goethe’s “Wilhelm Meister’s Ap-
prenticeship” (“Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre”) (1795/96). This educational
concept, which is still valid today, can be regarded, both structurally and
genetically, as the projection of the category of historicism onto that of
individualization.
g) Steps towards the future

The historicity plus the plurality of the idea of mankind – especially the
latter that has given rise to the category of individuality – have had con-
siderable repercussions for the use of this idea in the process of shaping
personal identity.
First and foremost, the power of individualization has increased enor-
mously due to the process of globalization caused by world economy and
the advance of technology. The Western notion of humanity was spread all
over the world due to colonization and imperialism, thus threatening the
validity of other concepts of what is constitutive of mankind and of other
interpretations of the world connected with these. There were two ways
of countering this threat by treating it as a challenge. One could adopt the
Western way of thinking along with its conviction of man being able to
dominate the world. The 4th of May Movement in China and the ideas
propounded by Hu Shi may serve as an example of this.37 Alternatively
one could radically reject Western culture in the way Gandhi did with his
notion of Hindu Swaraj.38 The currently most widespread and infuen-
tial intellectual trends in Subaltern Studies and Postcolonialism belong to
this second alternative. To some extent the critique of Western intellectual
dominance thus formulated may be understandable, to directly oppose it
is not very convincing because it reproduces the exact counterpart to the
Western ethnocentrism which it is opposed to.
Postmodern cultural realism and relativism is another attempt to avoid
the trap of ethnocentrism. It has certainly sharpened our view of the multi-
fariousness of culture in human life while, at the same time, obfuscating the
sway universalism holds in intercultural communication. Ethnocentrism
becomes an unavoidable element in the shaping of cultural identity as long
as human beings – as individuals as well as social formations (“communi-
ties”) – conceive themselves as different from others and treat others ac-
cordingly. As we have seen above, in this approach positive values are solely
ascribed to one’s own self while the otherness of the others is determined as
a negative aberration from this norm.
But this does not mean that the manner in which universalizing def-
nitions of humanity are employed in the process of identity formation is
caught up in this binary logic. On the contrary, this logic is fexible, it is
“open”. It even offers the opportunity to humanize, if not to overcome,
the “clash of civilizations”. This chance rests upon altering the univer-
salizing concept of what man is or should be from an exclusive into an
inclusive one.
Through inclusion, the otherness of the other is shifted from the sphere
of everything that is outside the self into the area of a common humanity, of
a diverse “humanity” (in a synthesis of empirical and normative elements).
By this shift, this fundamental change in perspective, otherness becomes
the specifc manifestation of the human qualities of man that may tran-
scend all differences. Thereby it acquires a uniqueness, which is universal
and in common with the uniqueness of the self. It should be seen within
a conceptual framework in which cultural difference as a determinant of
one’s own identity does not disappear but still plays an important role. In
this sense the difference from the other one becomes a way of acquiring a
quality of one’s self by being refected by the other; thus being recognized. 39
A mutual and inclusive understanding of humans is thus capable of miti-
gating the bitterness of ethnocentrism by turning it into an opportunity of
humanizing both sides.40
This fundamental change is more than a theoretical postulate far re-
moved from reality. There are some historical achievements in which this
is already foreshadowed: First, of all in the enrichment of the idea of man-
kind by the aesthetic dimension. Within this sphere – but only here – the
harshness of political and social differentiation is toned down by means of
its imaginary resolution. Schiller’s “Briefe über die ästhetische Erziehung
des Menschen” amount to a classical formulation of man’s humanization
of man by the infuence of art.41 Another manifestation of inclusive univer-
salism is formed by the humanities and their hermeneutical method, where
a rich arsenal of understanding otherness and difference has been evolved.
The principles of reconciling universalization and individualization applied
there amount to a realistic chance of recognizing cultural difference. A very
good example of this is Shmuel Eisenstadt’s concept of “multiple moderni-
ties”.42 Meanwhile the humanities have also managed to point out hidden
elements of otherness in one’s own self.43 Insights like these may tend to
alternate the constraints that cause the self to project all those negative
elements, which are considered to be irreconcilable with the formation of
its own subjectivity, into those traits that constitute the otherness of the
other. We have come to realize that these traits are nothing but the exterri-
torialized shadow of ourselves. Finally, the secular life form of civil society
should be mentioned. In cultural terms based on the idea of human dignity
it opens the opportunity of living with difference. The principle of tolerance
was a frst step in this direction. Over and above this the important step
from tolerance to recognition is attempted in numerous contexts.44
Nevertheless, the idea of mankind founded on the principle of human
dignity is under threat. Considering the overwhelming strength of market
economy and the instrumental logic of technology the notion of the moral
autonomy and self-determination of mankind seems to be but an illusion.
Powerful political movements like Fascism or Communism were inspired by
the idea of overcoming the given status of man in favor of a “new man” or
“super-man”, who were thought capable of leaving behind all the imperfec-
tions of human life as it existed in its present form in exchange for a brave
new world.53 The attractiveness of this idea was enhanced by the enormous
opportunities of manipulating not only human culture but also – due to the
advances made in biology, artifcial intelligence, and brain research – even
human nature itself. As we can see, so far all these attempts have ended cat-
astrophically. The same should apply to the current intellectual movements
of transhumanism, which takes up all the dreams of happiness and salva-
tion by promising to realize them via a change in the biological equipment
of man and by enhancing his intellectual capacity by means of the artifcial
intelligence of computers hooked up with him.
What is man? This question has not lost any of its topicality, open to in-
numerous controversial attempts at answering it. If one sees the latest intel-
lectual endeavors at providing an answer to the challenge by globalization
to fnd a sustainable cultural orientation in the light of the developmental
boost concomitant with the universal theory of axial times, we may dis-
cover a lot of indications that Modern Humanism is a special symptom: It
seems to indicate that we, ourselves, are right in the middle of a second ax-
ial time. What is at stake here is a revision (in the sense of a qualitative im-
provement) of all the achievements of the universalist concepts of humanity
evolved in the frst axial time. Such a revision requires a “Renaissance”, a
productive reception and further development of the concept of mankind.
In modern humanism and to this day this concept has determined a variety
of cultural traditions that in a decidedly intercultural communication are
still vying with each other for a recognition so that they may not be sub-
sumed under the unitary culture of modernity.45
In whatever way the idea of humanity will be further developed, there
is one elementary as well as universal factor of human life that has been
brought into play again: It is the fact of human suffering. So far it has been
totally underrepresented in human thinking, if not even disregarded. In
view of the numerous crimes against humanity, which, as ever, are a de-
pressing experience of our times and which the human and social sciences
are still trying to understand, human suffering must be focused much more.
It should predominantly be approached in terms of the question where not
only the opportunities but also the limits of our humanization are to be
seen. Without systematically taking into account the universal as well as
fundamental anthropological qualities of man, his basic and inescapable
fragility, fallibility, and vulnerability any realistic refection upon humanity
is impossible.
Notes
1 Cf. e.g. Giustiniani: Homo, Humanus, and the Message of “Humanism”, 1985.
2 Todorov: Imperfect Garden, 2002.
3 This historically specifc defnition of the term “humanism” is not the domi-
nant one in the international literature on the subject. In this context the term
is meant in the sense of a philosophical dorm of discourse that is typical of
early modern humanism, i.e. the way in which in those days the “humanistas”
(people educated in classical antiquity) cultivated the “humaniora” (the intel-
lectual disciplines in which the classical antiquity was researched and debated)
in terms of their critical distance from the discursive logic of scholasticism and
its ties with ecclesiastical dogmatism. From this a more general intellectual
attitude towards life can be distilled. An exemplar of this is Edward Said’s
defnition of humanism as the liberal, open-minded, and critical attitude of
the humanities (“as open to all classes and backgrounds, and as a process of
unending discourse, discovery, self-criticism, and liberation”, id.: Humanism
and Democratic Criticism, 2004, p. 28 f.). In this defnition humanism loses its
historical specifcity and becomes the stylized formula of intellectual liberalism
– beyond all its concrete manifestations that are due to particular historical
circumstances.
4 Kant: Kritik der reinen Vernunft [1781], A805, p. 677; Kant: Logik, A. 26,
1968, p. 448.
5 Kant: Metaphysik der Sitten [1797], 1968, p. A93, 569.
6 For the following cf: Antweiler: Was ist den Menschen gemeinsam? Über Kul-
tur und Kulturen, 2009; Antweiler: Mensch und Weltkultur. Für einen real-
istischen Kosmopolitismus im Zeitalter der Globalisierung, 2011 (English
translation: Inclusive Humanism. Anthropological Basics for a Realistic Cos-
mopolitanism, 2012).
7 This corresponds to certain norms of moral behavior whose status is equally
universal: fairness in competition and a cooperative organization of labor.
8 For an enlarged list of these differences see Chapter 6.
9 The logic of ethnocentrism is dealt with more extensively in: Rüsen: How to
Overcome Ethnocentrism, 2004.
10 The logic underlying historical thinking briefy outlined here is that of a recon-
struction with a future orientation. It is an alternative to the long time prevail-
ing but no longer plausible logic of a teleology that is grounded in same origin.
11 An enlarged form of these stages can be found in Chapter 6.
12 In order to designate this exclusive as well as particular universality of being
human in archaic societies, Klaus E. Müller has coined the ftting term “abso-
luteness of one’s own world” (Müller (Ed.): Menschenbilder früher Gesellschaf-
ten, 1983, p. 15).
13 Jaspers: Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte [1949], 1963 [English: The Or-
igin and Goal of History, 1976]; Eisenstadt, S. (Ed.): Kulturen der Achsenzeit,
vol. I–III, 1987–1992; Arnason; Eisenstadt; Wittrock (Eds.): Axial Civilisa-
tions and World History, 2005.
14 Eisenstadt: Multiple Modernities, 2000; id.: Die großen Revolutionen und die
Kulturen der Moderne, 2006.
15 Pico della Mirandola: Oratio de Hominis Dignitate, 1997.
16 Van Dülmen (Ed.): Entdeckung des Ich, 2001.
17 Cf. Cancik: Europa – Antike – Humanismus, 2011.
18 La Peyrre, I.: Prae-Adamitae [1655], 2009; Voltaire: Essai sur les moeurs et
l’esprit des nations et sur les principaus faits de l’histoire depuis Charlemagne
jusqu’a Louis XIII [1756], 1963; Long: History of Jamaica [1774], 2009; Mein-
ers: Grundriß der Geschichte der Menschheit [1785].
19 The anthropology of Johann Friedrich Blumenbach was typical of this as well
as highly infuential in discursive terms. Id.: De generis humani varietate nativa
liber [1775]. On the cultural and historical context cf. Reill: Vitalising Nature
in the Enlightenment, 2005.
20 Descartes: Meditationes de Prima Philosophia, 1985.
21 Descartes: Discours de la Methode [1637], VI, p. 2 (Discours de la Methode,
1966, p. 168; German translation: Abhandlung über die Methode, 1919, p. 51).
22 Pico della Mirandola: Oratio de Hominis Dignitate, 1997.
23 Reill: The German Enlightenment and the Rise of Historicism, 1975; Reill:
Vitalizing Nature in the Enlightenment, 2005.
24 Droysen: Historik, 1977, p. 22 and others.
25 Blumenbach: Über den Bildungstrieb, 1791.
26 Herder: Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit [1784–91], 2002,
p. 135.
27 Ferguson: An Essay on the History of Civil Society [1767], 1995; Millar: The
Origin of the Distinction of Ranks, 1806.
28 Koselleck: “Erfahrungsraum” und “Erwartungshorizont” – zwei historische
Kategorien, 1979.
29 Droysen: Historik, 1977, p. 41.
30 Jaeger; Rüsen: Geschichte des Historismus, 1992.
31 [“In der Herbeiziehung der verschiedenen Nationen und der Individuen zur Idee
der Menschheit und der Kultur ist der Fortschritt ein unbedingter.”] Ranke:
Über die Epochen der Neueren Geschichte, 1971, p. 80 [my translation].
32 Van Dülmen: Die Entdeckung des Individuums 1500–1800, 1997.
33 Macpherson: The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism, 1962.
34 Leibniz: Monadology, 1714. Fichte: Die Bestimmung des Menschen, 1979; id.:
Die Anweisung zum seligen Leben, oder auch die Religionslehre, 1994; Herder:
Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte zur Bildung der Menschheit, 1990; Hum-
boldt: Über die Aufgabe des Geschichtsschreibers, 1960.
35 Schlözer: Vorstellung seiner Universalhistorie, 1772; Gatterer: Abriß der Uni-
versalhistorie in ihrem ganzen Umfange, 1765.
36 Herder: Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit [1784-91], 2002.
37 Hu Shi: Autobiography at 40, 2016. See also Grieder: Hu Shih and the Chinese
Renaissance, 1999; Eglauer: Wissenschaft als Chance, 2001.
38 Gandhi: Hindu Swaraj, 1993.
39 Emmanuel Levinas has radicalized this argument in the sense of conceiving the
self in terms of the other (Levinas: Humanismus des anderen Menschen, 1989).
40 Cf. Rüsen: How to Overcome Ethnocentrism, 2004.
41 Schiller: Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen in einer Reihe von
Briefen [1795], 2004.
42 Eisenstadt: Multiple Modernities, 2000.
43 Waldenfels: Vielstimmigkeit der Rede, 1999.
44 If, however, the life forms of secular civil society are pluralistically understood
to be just one among others, the chance of making otherness livable is missed.
Civil society is a meta-order that enables the pluralism of cultural orientation
in the frst place. See Küenzlen: Der neue Mensch, 1997.
45 Cf. Rüsen; Laass (Eds.): Humanism in Intercultural Perspective, 2009; Rüsen;
Laass (Eds.): Interkultureller Humanismus, 2009.
3 Intercultural humanism –
how to perform the
humanities in the era
of globalization
We are living live in a time of a growing density of intercultural communi-

cation. The globalization process in the economy and on the level of mass
media has transgressed all limits of life forms all over the world and it
forces people to readjust their lives according to the changes these processes
have brought about.
In the realm of academic work, this globalizing tendency has already
been established in many felds. This is evident for the natural sciences,
but in all other felds of academic thinking, similar processes of interna-
tionalization and interculturalization have also taken place. I would like to
analyze some fundamental issues of this process in the humanities.
In the modern form, the humanities emerged at the end of the 18th and
the beginning of the 19th century. During the 19th century, many of its
disciplines achieved a well-established form, which is still valid today.
This form is characterized by a special feld of investigation and a specifc
method of research. Its development started in Europe in the late 18th cen-
tury. At that time, the frames of reference and patterns of signifcance for
studying the human world were universalistic. An accelerating amount of
knowledge about different cultures had to be systematized. This was done
by establishing a universalistic perspective, in which humankind became
the basic category of signifcance and meaning. This can easily be demon-
strated by the approaches to “universal history”1 and the new philosophical
discipline called “Philosophy of History” – the term invented by Voltaire.
His “Essai sur les mœurs et l’esprit des nations” (1756) destroyed the tra-
ditional sacred historical framework of universal history in the Western
world. It transgressed its limitation by the temporal dimension of the bible,
and it widened the horizon of historical experience and interpretation into
a global perspective. The Scottish Enlightenment is another example of the
universalistic approach to the human world at the end of the 18th century.
The Scottish intellectuals developed a so-called “theoretical history”
which presents a universalistic concept of stages of social evolution all over
the world.
A new understanding of history emerged, intending to integrate all peoples
and times into one comprehensive temporal totality from the origin of the
32 Intercultural humanism
human species to the present-day-situation with a clear future perspective.
These universalistic ideas and concepts gave rise to a new understanding of
the human world. It was an understanding in which temporal change was
the most important quality of human life. This evaluation of change strictly
runs against the enormous efforts of the human mind in premodern times to
overcome change by stressing the duration and continuity of the true human
life form or the supertemporal validity of its values and norms. In the logic of
historical sense generation, this new approach to the temporal dimension of
human life has brought about a shift in the basic concept of historical sense,
from an exemplary mode of historical sense generation to a genetic one.2
European intellectuals have developed an idea of humankind in the form
of a universal temporal development of civilization. Civilization has been
understood as the outcome of a fundamental and universal ability of men
to improve their life conditions by using the power of reason and by accu-
mulating knowledge across the change of generations by education. The
humanities in the West are historically rooted in the fundamental presup-
positions of this understanding of civilization as the work of the human
mind and spirit (Geist).3 By these mental and spiritual forces, humans were
able to improve their life conditions by gaining knowledge about how to
technologically dominate nature and by morally organizing human life
according to a solid and growing knowledge about its forces, determina-
tions, possibilities, and developments. Since it is the human mind and spirit
that bring about this civilization and keep it in its permanent temporal
change and development, the humanities are a work of the same spirit, and
therefore they are able to disclose the logic of this formation and temporal
change of the human world: The knowledge brought about by the human-
ities is a mirror which refects the real world with its constitutive mental
forces governing the variety and changes of human life forms. It is a mirror
of humanism in a universal historical perspective. Looking into this mirror,
the present-day situation gets a temporal feature, which allows an outlook
into the future. This outlook can serve as a cultural orientation of human
agency bringing about further progress in realizing the potentials of the
human mind and spirit to create a humane world, based on the essence of
the human mind: freedom and reason.4
This humanistic idea of civilization has been deeply infuenced by the
paradigmatic experience of the educated people’s ability in the West to cre-
ate a new world according to their insight into the moving mental forces of
history. With their abilities they have furnished their world with progress in
its different dimensions: in economy by the forces of market economy and
the use of scientifc knowledge in technological innovations, in social life
by dissolving all limits of the feudal society and by opening up a free labor
market, in politics by gaining a growing participation in political domina-
tion by the dominated people, and in culture by the forces of methodical
rationality and their disenchanting the understanding of nature and of the
human world.
Intercultural humanism 33
It was the same spirit and mind (Geist) of the educated people in the
West which has initiated the humanities. It gave the intellectual world a
discursive form of an international discussion inspired by a permanent im-
provement of knowledge about the human world due to the methodical
procedures of empirical research.
So far, I have referred to the master narrative of the West presenting the
cultural origins of modernity. It is a narrative of achievements and of pro-
gress, which leads into a future perspective of a growing humanism all over
the world.5 Telling this story today makes it necessary to integrate into it
the dark shadows Western civilization has thrown over the rest of the world
and (not to forget) over itself: a growing potential of destructive forces lead-
ing to radical inhumane events and tendencies.
What happened to the concept of universal history and its corresponding
idea of world civilization? The answer to this question is short and provoc-
ative: It has fallen into pieces.
In the West, the traditional assumptions of the constitutive forces of the
human mind and spirit and their potential for improving human life con-
ditions by the use of reason and rationality have remained, but the univer-
salistic approach of the cognitive forces in the humanities has narrowed.
The progress of knowledge could only be organized by specialization. The
realm of civilization or culture has become compartmentalized into the
special realms of different disciplines. This fragmentation in the study of
the human world went along with the emergence and growing power of
nationality as a moving force for politics. During the 19th century, the
humanities got a clear national form within which they shared the ten-
sional interrelationship of nations in the struggle for power. Within this
struggle, the humanistic approach of the humanities weakened. Finally
leading Western intellectuals, starting with Nietzsche, including Heidegger
and ending with the French master thinkers Foucault, Derrida, and Lacan,
dominated Western self-understanding with a radical criticism of the tradi-
tion of humanism.6
Until now, the work of the humanities breathes the spirit of nationalism.
The universalistic idea of humankind as the regulative idea of the discourse
in the humanities in the period of Enlightenment has broken into a variety
of nationally featured life forms. The unity of humankind has become a
constellation of diverse nations and their tensional relationship – at least
this can be seen in the self-awareness of Europe and the West as it is re-
fected in the work of the humanities and their representation of human life
in the variety of time and space.
But one should not forget that the national boundaries of the work of the
humanities have never been closed. There have always been international
discourses, transnational perspectives, and generalizing approaches in re-
search and interpretation, but the shaping power of national identity has
been very strong. Today we can observe a weakening of this power. It goes
along with the weakening of national states in pursuing independent policy
and the emergence of supranational forms of life like the globalizing econ-
omy or the media of communication. But the spirit of national diversity is
still effective. What makes it so strong? The reason for its dominating role
in shaping human life on the cultural level is the necessity of collective iden-
tity formation under the conditions of modern life forms.
Identity is a matter of difference, of a fundamental distinction between
belonging to a certain group of people and being different from other
groups of peoples. National identity is the most successful concept of po-
litical identity in modern times. It is very dynamic, thus meeting the ac-
celerating change of human life conditions in the modernizing processes.
It is very fexible and has developed a broad variety of forms, contents,
and functions, thus responding to the various circumstances of establishing
modern states. It is rather diffcult to defne the concept of nation. For me
the most convincing defnition of a nation is: a historical consciousness
with the relationship to a territory shared by a group of people and realized
in the form of their political identity.
With the growing globalization process, national identity has not van-
ished nor lost its cultural importance in shaping the political mentality of
most of the peoples in the world. Nevertheless, the realm of political ex-
periences has substantially changed and therefore more and more sub- and
super-national dimensions of identity have emerged and achieved political
power in the minds of the people. The best example is the peoples of Eu-
rope. They have not given up their national identity, yet they are developing
(to very different degrees) a supranational historical and political identity of
a European dimension.7 Corresponding to these tendencies in widening the
horizon of togetherness and being different from others there is a growing
complexity of identity in the sub-national realms of human life: Regions
are gaining in importance. Here the most interesting examples in Europe
are Spain, Belgium, and Great Britain, where movements of regionalism are
increasing (in political power).
One of the most remarkable dimensions of supranational identity is that
of cultural identity. Here “culture” means a very wide realm of together-
ness and difference integrating different regions and nations. In the more
elaborated form of a so-called “world civilization” it is the broadest per-
spective within which identity has emerged. Very often geographical terms
like “the West”, “the Near East”, “Africa”, “East Asia” were used in order
to designate this realm. Yet it is not a geographical dimension which is of
concern, but a dimension of identity.8 It has its cultural place just one level
under the most general dimension of human identity, namely the identity of
being a human being or belonging to humankind.
These civilizations or cultures are addressed when universal or global
history is in concern and when cultural difference and intercultural com-
munication are discussed on the fundamental level of world views, modes
of self-understanding, and life forms shaped by basic principles of thought,
feeling, and intentionality.
The idea of “culture” or “civilization” as a variety of unities of human
life forms can be understood as a result of the same process of fragmen-
tation that the idea of nationality has brought about. The universality of
humankind has fallen into the pieces of different civilizations. They are – so
to speak – supranational nations.
It is not yet suffciently clear what “culture” or “civilization” in this
broader scope really means. Nevertheless, the category is very important
in the topical political, cultural, and academic discussions about human
identity and intercultural communication. It is the intention of this chapter
to contribute to more analytical clarity in using the concepts of “culture”
or “civilization” as a supranational dimension of human identity in the
discourse of the humanities.
The frst step of my argumentation is criticism.
The most problematic way of conceptualizing civilization or culture is
to essentialize its features into a semantic totality of a fundamental world
view, which remains unchanged in the historical changes of time rather as a
core and basic element of cultural orientation. With this conceptualization,
the theory of civilizations follows the tradition of an ethnic understanding
of nationality. Although nations have been conceptualized (“invented”) in
an intellectual discourse, which has deeply infuenced the minds of non-
intellectual people to an astonishing degree, this understanding of the dis-
tinctive nature of nationality has been a metaphysical one ascribing to this
dimension of togetherness and of being different from other essential men-
tal factors. They were understood as originating in a rather early time and
continuing through the changes of time in history as remaining the same
in different forms of their manifestations. This may have found a politi-
cal realization in a state, the inhabitants of which to a large degree share
this nationality, but it could also be manifest against or besides states as a
“culture” in the minds of the citizens of these states. Friedrich Meinecke
stated this very important distinction between “Staatsnation” and “Kul-
turnation” and found wide recognition here.9 But in every case, the core of
the nation in this understanding is a longue durée of the cultural specifcity
in world views and self-understanding, which endows the people concerned
with self-esteem and a clear awareness of their peculiarity and difference
from others.
These kinds of essentializing dimensions and realms of identity have been
applied to the broader scope of cultural identity, or civilization, as a totality
of a life form shared by a lot of people in a supranational constellation of
their relationship to each other and their distinction from others. The most
important and infuential example of this essentialized understanding of
culture is the work of Oswald Spengler.10
For Spengler civilizations are semantically composed totalities of life
forms which live according to a specifc cultural code. They follow their
own internal law of development, of rise, fourishing, and fall. Their rela-
tionship to each other is only an external one. The metaphorical expression
of this understanding of cultures (as it is used by many academics in il-
lustrating intercultural comparison or communication) is a line of circles
placed besides each other without any intersection. A more complicated
way of conceptualizing cultures in this way has been presented by Arnold
Toynbee.11 He argues in a much more empirically and historically ori-
ented style, but the logic of his thinking of world civilizations principally
is the same. Until today, this understanding of cultures or civilizations is
a very powerful element within and outside of the academic discourse.12
Very often, it is presented in an implicit way, as an unrefected and un-
discussed epistemological presupposition of intercultural comparison.
The usual oppositions of “East” and “West”, the insistence of “Asian
values” against “Western values” (recently Putin claimed for “Russian
values” against the Western ones – simply to legitimate the permanent
violation of human and civil rights in Russia) follow the Spenglerian line
of argumentation. Such a line can be explicated and presented in a highly
sophisticated and intellectually fascinating form. A good example for this
theoretical explication is Johann Galtung’s typology of World Civiliza-
tions.13 He characterizes six different world civilizations by a set of basic
assumptions in understanding man and world; and by doing so he gives
these civilizations sharp and fundamental distinctions from each other,
ignoring the historicity of these world-views, their commonality and in-
tersections. Anthropological universals are not addressed at all, neither is
the possibility of transcending these cultural codes into a comprehensive
typology made plausible.
This kind of essentialization of cultural differences is based on an anthro-
pological universal: that every social unit is defned by a self-awareness of
its members, within which they draw a clear distinction between themselves
and the others outside their group. The widest horizon of this fundamental
distinction between self and others refers to these realms of “cultures” or
“civilizations”. But this anthropological necessity of humans to live a life
characterized by setting and keeping up differences does not necessarily
have a metaphysical or essentialist form.
In an essentialized form its historicity, its intersections with each other,
its changes and potentials of critical self-refection have been marginalized
or even vanished. If one takes the essentialist concepts seriously, they even
lead into a contradiction: There is no place outside such a semantic total-
ity of a culture; therefore, there is no possibility of presenting the variety
and differences of cultures or their typological peculiarity and difference
in a plausible way. Everybody lives in the semantic constraints of cultural
world views, so the awareness of otherness is determined by the presuppo-
sition of one’s own culture. Therefore, any idea of cultural diversity and any
characterization of world civilizations, which follow the Spenglerian line of
conceptualizing culture or civilization, is rendered impossible – although
exactly this conceptualization occurs all the time outside and inside the
academic discourse, implicitly and explicitly.
Any acceptable distinction between cultures and any idea of cultural va-
riety and differences needs reasons for their plausibility, which go across the
idea of culture as a semantic totality in a monadic structure. How should
understanding between different world views be possible if one could not
refer to something common going across this difference?
So, every conceptualization of cultures or civilizations and their rela-
tionship should start with a comprehensive and more dynamic concept of
civilization or culture. In order to do so, one meets a special diffculty: It
should emphasize sameness and distinctiveness at the same time. How is
this possible?
I see two possibilities:
Starting with the present-day situation one can look at the main features
of a world civilization going across all cultural differences. One could call
that an ecumenical civilization.14 There are a lot of examples for this kind
of worldwide civilizatory elements. I only mention a few in a random se-
quence: Pop Music, entertainment in the new media (Disney parks all over
the world, Hollywood and Bollywood at the same time), trends in fashion
and food, basic elements of market economy, elementary mathematics, the
methodical rationality of the sciences, highly developed technology, human
and civil rights. Even our academic discourse in the humanities has become
a universal phenomenon of scholarly life all over the world.15 These ele-
ments may stem from the West, in the mean time they have become com-
mon use all over the world, where the life forms of modernity have evolved.
They have become universal and they constitute what we could address as
ecumenical world civilization.
This argumentation emphasizes sameness. What about difference? This
question can easily be answered, since this ecumenical world civilization is
lived by the people in a diversity of cultural life forms. Apparently, there
is not one and only modernity, but a multiplicity of modernities as Shmuel
Eisenstadt and others have clearly demonstrated.16
This way of looking at cultural diversity can be fruitful for a lot of re-
search in the social sciences and in the humanities. But I doubt whether it
meets the core of the problem of cultural difference: namely the cultural
procedures of identity formation. Identity is not a variation of a general
world view, but something which is defned by difference and distinction
from the very beginning onwards. Civilizational universals belong to the
context of human life, within which identity emerges, develops, is kept
up and related to other identities, but they do not belong to the core of
the phenomenon. Identity, however, is rooted in a fundamental basic self-
relatedness of every human being in his/her personal and social way of life.
What does this mean for the concept of culture or civilization and the
interrelationship between civilizations? They should be conceptualized not
as a diversity of variations of one world civilization, but as an individual-
ization of the cultural potentials of humankind. In order to understand
what cultures are about in respect to the powerful forces of human identity,
one should indeed start from anthropological universals, basic and elemen-
tary features of human life. These general features should be applied to the
variety of human life forms in space and time. On the level of theoretical
refection and explication of concepts of academic thinking, this step would
mean to proceed from anthropological universals to historical ideal types,
which disclose the realm of difference and variety.17 In order to meet the
core of identity formation, this difference and variety should be considered
as the outcome of cultural processes of identity formation. They should be
disclosed in the depth of human subjectivity.
Human life is impossible without the ability of making distinctions in
personal and social life. Humans should refer to themselves as possessing
a coherent subjectivity, either personal or social, and that means that they
should distinguish themselves from others. Belonging to others and being
different from others is an elementary and universal form of human life. We
usually call its manifestation “identity”.
What identity is about and how it can be conceptualized is a matter of
controversial debate.18 Two main strategies of understanding identity can
ideal typologically be distinguished: An essentialist and a procedural one.
The essentialists think that identity is constituted by a fxed set of elements,
which defne the peculiarity of a person or a social unit. The procedural-
ists think that this peculiarity is a matter of a permanent work the people
should bring about by permanently interpreting themselves and by nego-
tiating their interpretation with others they should live with. There is no
essence in this interpretation and negotiation; everything is a matter of in-
vention and construction. There are good arguments on both sides. From
the very beginning every human being lives in a relationship to itself, which
should be developed towards a coherent personality and social standing.
This is the pre-given “essence” of human identity. But the outcome of this
development is a matter of circumstances and mental activities. Identity is
pre-constructed and constructed at the same time. It is the outcome of com-
pelling destiny and creative freedom. Goethe expressed this in the saying
“Geprägte Form, die lebend sich entwickelt”. (“Coined form self-evolving
in life”.)19
Stating differences and dealing with them constitutes the life-form of
human identity. Therefore, the issue of cultural difference is of highest im-
portance for human life in respect to its internal dimension we call “subjec-
tivity”. Subjectivity is a matter of mental work within a pre-given cultural
pattern of orientation. The work consists of internalizing these patterns
into the constitutive human self-relatedness, and at the same time, of exter-
nalizing the inner world of subjectivity into the social world of intersubjec-
tive relationships. In this process of individualization and socialization, the
cultural patterns of human life display enormous dynamics. Here lies one
of the roots of the historicity of human life forms. For our understanding
of intercultural communication, it is necessary to stress one very powerful
quality of this dynamics: tension and struggle.
We all know Samuel Huntington’s famous thesis that the basic form of
intercultural communication is clash.20 This has been intensively criticized,
but one should not overlook that there is an inbuilt tendency of clash in the
procedures of human identity formation. The reason for this is rather sim-
ple: In order to bring about a coherent and sound self-relationship in per-
sonality and social belonging humans tend to furnish their self-relatedness
with a set of positive values and norms. Otherness stands for its opposite.
We can attribute this asymmetrical evaluation in the constitution of self as
being different from others by ethnocentrism. 21 The logic of this ethno-
centrism can be characterized by three main principles: First, the already
mentioned asymmetrical evaluation; second, the idea of an unbroken con-
tinuity of oneself in all temporal changes; and third, a perspective of world
interpretation and self-understanding, which places oneself and one’s own
life-form into the middle of the world. In this monocentric perspective,
others are fundamentally marginalized.
This ethnocentric logic of identity formation has a quasi-natural power
in the mental activities of human life. Its way of referring to otherness
is reproduced by the others, and this constitutes a tension or a “clash”.
This “clash” is a part of the unsocial sociability of humans, which Im-
manuel Kant has described as the moving force of historical change in
universal history. 22 There are not only mental forces constituting this
clash, of course. Human nature is characterized by a structural surplus
of needs and desires essentially reaching beyond the possibilities of ful-
flling them. Every fulflled need in human life creates a qualitatively
new one which is not yet fulflled. Thus, human life is characterized by
a fundamental shortage of the material means to achieve the pursuit
of happiness. In addition to this materialistic dimension in the clash of
civilizations a mental or spiritual shortage should be taken into account:
Since the self-affrmation of humans in their personality as well as in
their social life-form needs recognition by the others with whom they
live, the ethnocentric form, within which this self-affrmation is cultur-
ally realized, cannot structurally bring about a suffcient recognition by
the others because of its unbalanced impact of values in the image of
oneself and of the others.
Consequently, there is an inbuilt unrest in human culture emerging from
the vital procedures of identity formation. This unrest is a matter of fact
in human life, which should be taken into account by the humanities. Not
only it is a matter-of-fact, it is a matter of interpreting this fact as well: The
humanities as a part of human society fulfll the social function of produc-
ing a convincing idea of their own culture as well as of that of the others.
Considering the “unsocial sociability” (Kant) of human identity forma-
tion, the humanities may proceed in a twofold way to meet their task of
information and orientation.
By assuming the quasi-natural form of human life, which leads to a
clash by ethnocentrism, the humanities might become a part of the clash.
They may even offer themselves as producers of cultural weapons for this
clash. The best examples stem from nationalistic concepts of historical in-
terpretation and presentation.
By striving to civilize and mediate this struggle they should apply – at
least – a minimum of recognition in conceptualizing otherness, so that the
ethnocentric power of identity formation may be stripped of its aggressive
quality. Here in this attempt to civilize the potential tensions in intercul-
tural communication we can rely on a solid potential quality in human
nature, since most humans share a fundamental interest in survival by their
interrelationship.
We can call this interest the inbuilt humanism in humankind. It enables
people to realize their survival by cultural means in a way that the others,
from whom they differ in their identity, have a chance to survive as well.
Hobbes’ well-known political theory, that on the level of elementary life
forms all men are struggling against each other, can thus be accomplished
by a cultural theory of human life, which stresses the sense-generating
forces of the human mind in all the constitutive unrest of practical life.
What does this mean for the humanities, which address the issue of inter-
cultural communication today?
At frst I would propose to ask for what we should not do, what we
should avoid in conceptualizing, researching, and representing difference.
Otherwise, there are two mistakes which very often occur: a traditional
one and a rather new one. The traditional one is falling back into the traps
of Spenglerianism. This is the case, when civilizations are addressed as au-
tonomous units of human life, as self-suffcient and defned by a defnite
set of basic assumptions about the world and human life. Then we speak of
“the West”, “East Asia”, “Africa”, “the Near East”, or “the Islamic World”,
terms which may transport this kind of assumption, even if used not de-
liberately. This may easily end up in a cultural essentialism of civilizations.
Next, we should not overlook the power of differentiation in the social and
even natural world and in the human mind. It has often been addressed as
“construction” or as “invention”; and this metaphor implies the idea of ne-
gating the elements of experience and factuality in the cultural processes of
settling and coming to terms with differences. Accordingly, the concept of
hybridity has become very fashionable. I do not want to deny its analytical
usefulness in disclosing special forms of human identity, but I see the dan-
ger that it tends to underestimate the power of deeply structured exclusive
identities as the ethnic, national, or religious ones are and which bear the
sharp distinction between self and others.
Instead, the anthropologically universal ethnocentric tendency in hu-
man identity formation should be recognized, but at the same time the
internal dynamics of its cultural and intercultural manifestation should be
systematically taken into account. In order to do so, a good deal of theoret-
ical refection should be done in order to develop a framework of research
and representation, which may enable the academic work of fulflling its
function in civilizing ethnocentrism. 23 If an intercultural comparison is set
up, this refection may bring about a paradigm of comparison which does
not measure other cultures along the lines of one’s own.
If intercultural communication on issues of identity is asked, these ele-
ments of discourse should be strengthened for avoiding the principles of
ethnocentrism. So the principles we need are the following.
The unbalanced or asymmetrical evaluation should be replaced by the
value of equality and by the rule of mutual recognition of differences.
The concept of an unbroken teleological continuity of identity-forming
concepts should be replaced by a stronger historicity of these concepts
stressing their internal dynamics and the importance of contingent
circumstances.
The monocentric world view should be replaced by a temporal multi-
perspectivity and a multi-centered spatial dimension of human life, kept
together by the inclusive universality of the regulative idea of mutual recog-
nition of cultural differences.
The plausibility of this rule depends upon the degree to which it can be
supported by convincing examples of its practical plausibility. One of the
most striking experiences of recognizing differences is the Fine Arts. In
its aesthetic understanding, Fine Art furnishes the human mind with an
unlimited openness for variety and change. It has essentially overcome the
constraints of aggressive distinctions and exclusions; it loosens the rigid-
ity of coherence in human identity and integrates otherness into the self-
relatedness of the human mind. This achievement has its limits indicated by
the fundamental distinction between fction and fact, fantasy, and experi-
ence. But even beyond the realm of an aesthetic disburdening from the load
of reality there are achievements of recognition in history. The most promi-
nent example I can offer is the idea of human dignity and its embodiment in
political and social life-forms. Another most prominent example is human
and civil rights. We all know about the fragility of the basic and universal
value of recognition. Even more I think that it is necessary to concretize and
develop its validity by our work as humanists.
Notes
1 A remarkable beginning was the Universal History from the Earliest Account of
Time, which was published in London between 1736 and 1766 in 66 volumes.
2 See Rüsen: History: Narration – Interpretation – Orientation, 2005, pp. 9 sqq.
3 See Jaeger; Rüsen: Geschichte des Historismus, 1992, pp. 30 ff.
4 Immanuel Kant has presented this essence in his “Idea of a Universal History in
a Cosmopolitan Intent” [1784]. See Rüsen: Following Kant: European Idea for
a Universal History with an Intercultural Intent, 2003.
5 Leopold von Ranke, who radically criticized the Enlightenment’s idea of pro-
gress, nevertheless expressed this universalistic and humanistic perspective in
the following way: “In der Herbeiziehung der verschiedenen Nationen und
der Individuen zur Idee der Menschheit und der Kultur ist der Fortschritt ein
unbedingter”. (In attracting the different nations and individuals to the idea of
humankind and culture, progress is unconditional) Ranke: Über die Epochen
der neueren Geschichte, 1971, p. 80.
6 Givsan: Heidegger: Das Denken der Inhumanität, 1998; Ferry; Renaut: Antihu-
manistisches Denken, 1987.
7 See Rüsen, Future-directed Elements of a European Historical Culture, 2007.
8 For Africa e.g., see Macamo: Was ist Afrika?, 1999.
9 Meinecke: Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat, 1922.
10 Spengler: Der Untergang des Abendlandes, 1973.
11 Toynbee: Der Gang der Weltgeschichte, 1979.
12 An example: Amaury de Riencourt thematizes “the soul of India” and deals
with the Indian civilization as “self-contained, self-inclosed and autonomous”.
de Riencourt: The Soul of India, 1986, p. XIV.
13 Galtung: Die “Sinne” der Geschichte, 1997; id.: Six Cosmologies, 1996.
14 With this term I pick up Hermann Lübbe’s idea about “Die Zivilisationsöku-
mene”. Id.: Die Zivilisationsökumene, 2005.
15 This all the more the case, when cultural differences are academically discussed.
The scholars worldwide use the same logic of argumentation in stressing the
diversity of contexts within which they pursue their work. See e.g., Rüsen (Ed.):
Western Historical Thinking, 2002.
16 Eisenstadt: Multiple Modernities, 2000; id.: Theorie und Moderne, 2006.
17 I have tried such an approach to intercultural comparison of historical think-
ing in: Rüsen, History: Narration – Interpretation – Orientation, 2005,
pp. 109–128.
18 See Eisenstadt: Theorie und Moderne, 2006; Straub: Identitätstheorie, Em-
pirische Identitätsforschung und die Postmoderne Armchair Psychology, 2000;
id.: Personale und kollektive Identität, 1998; id.; Renn (Eds.): Transitorische
Identität, 2002.
19 Goethe: Urworte, orphisch, 1998.
20 Huntington: The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order,
1996.
21 See Rüsen: How to Overcome Ethnocentrism, 2004.
22 Kant: Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht, 4. Satz
[Idea of a Universal History in a Cosmopolitan Intent, Thesis 4].
23 I doubt whether “a sympathetic and self critical attitude” is suffcient, as David
Carr proposes in his very subtle, precise and clear analysis of my theoretical
approaches to historical thinking suggests. See Carr: History as Orientation:
Rüsen on Historical Culture and Narration, 2006, cit. p. 243. I think that a
“self-critical attitude” should include theoretically explicated frameworks of
interpretation.
4 Towards a new idea of
humankind – unity and
difference of cultures in the
crossroads of our time
1 The challenge of globalization for cultural identity

Cultural identity is determined by basic sense criteria shared by a group of
people. They feel committed to them and understand themselves by this
commitment. They think and feel that their lives are conditioned and ded-
icated by a set of values and value-molded experiences. They understand
themselves as an embodiment of this set of values based on fundamental
criteria of interpreting the world and themselves. With this conviction they
ascribe uniqueness to themselves and draw a clear line of distinction from
others. Such self-understanding and distinction from others have taken
place in all times and all over the world. We can call it being a self. This be-
ing a self is a basic element of human life. It is defned by an indivisible unit
of two mental activities: relationship to oneself and discrimination from
others. Both have strong normative elements with a general commitment,
and, at the same time, both refer to commonly shared experiences. Both
together are preserved and presented in the realm of cultural memory.1
In a specifc meaning cultural identity refers to the widest horizon of
this self-reference, discrimination, and common experience. We speak of
“world civilizations” and think of unique forms of human life, which char-
acterize the feeling of belonging together, and being different from others,
and which are shared by a great number of people. The widest horizon of
human identity is defned by the species of humans and their difference
from animals. The frst distinction within this horizon refers to “cultures”
or “civilizations” as the second largest unit of people does in respect to
their identity. I will not go deeper into the long-lasting and still vivid and
controversial discussion about the conceptualization of these cultures or
world civilizations. Instead, I want to pick up some usual distinctions of
these great units of identity and tackle some basic issues of their interrela-
tionship in a historical and systematical perspective.
The historical perspective is related to the globalization process. By glo-
balization I mean a historical development within which some basic elements
of pursuing human life spread across most, if not all, differences between
already established human life-forms characteristic for a great number of
people and vast spaces in the world. It is a process which confronts different
44 Towards a new idea of humankind
life forms with powerful general conditions of human life forcing them to
adapt to them. In respect to the present-day globalization we all know these
conditions: scientifc rationality, market economy, global communication
by the new media, etc.
This adaptation is a fundamental problem of cultural identity. Why? Why
can’t people take over new life forms and remain what they have always
been? The problem is not primarily the ability of civilizations to integrate
new elements into their specifc life forms (although one should not under-
estimate the shock such a confrontation with new forms of life has meant
for the people of substantially different, so-called “traditional” life forms).
The problem I would like to address is basically to be found on the fun-
damental cultural level of human identity formation: Since every identity is
specifc and peculiar, even unique, how can it come to terms with general
and universal elements and concepts of life orientation? The inbuilt univer-
sal elements in the globalization process are a radical challenge for cultural
identity despite an ability or non-ability of adaptation. Globalizing one’s
own identity in a strict sense means to lose it by dissolving its peculiar and
individual unique character.
This sounds astonishing since we are used to look at the globalization
process as a struggle between cultures. There are cultures representing the
globalizing power of changing traditional human life forms. There are oth-
ers which are forced into this change. In modern times the former were
addressed as “the West”, and the latter as the South and the East. These
are geographical terms, but their distinction includes qualitative elements
of domination and subjugation, aggression and defense, superiority and
inferiority – in short, this distinction includes struggle and clash.
In the public opinion of today we can discover many examples for this
clash. Let me present you a German one: the cover of the leading German
weekly “Der Spiegel”, issue 32, August 8, 2005. Here the white-headed ea-
gle representing The United States and the dragon symbolizing the People’s
Republic of China are struggling for superiority in the world of tomorrow.
The picture of the cover uses traditional symbols of collective identity to
illustrate this struggle.
The starting pictures of the chapter show that the two countries share
the feature of unlimited capitalistic market economy and consumer society,
both of which are global items.
I’m not primarily looking at politics, economy, and social life in the glo-
balizing process. Instead, I want to consider the cultural orientations, the
specifc concepts of sense and meaning, which are related to it, and which
have strong effects in forming collective identity. In this realm of identity,
the universality of principles is not a problem per se. If the cultural features
of oneself and the difference from others – that always means a peculiarity
of the identity of oneself – are shaped by universal elements, why should
this universality be threatening?
Towards a new idea of humankind 45
In fact, most traditional concepts of cultural identity are based on univer-
salistic elements. Basic sense criteria which play a decisive role in generating
and presenting identity are always universal. This can be easily demon-
strated by the fact that archaic people ascribe the quality of being human
only to their own group. Others are no humans. The widespread idea, that
one’s own people represent civilization and the others stand for its contrary,
namely barbarism, includes a general concept of cultural normativity and
evaluation. One can even say, the more universalistic features the people
ascribe to their self-image the stronger the cultural identity is settled in a
clear discrimination of the others.
If a different universalistic concept of human life challenges one’s own
concept and has the power to change or even to negate it, a “clash of civili-
zations” on the level of cultural orientation is inevitable.
This exactly characterizes the encounter of cultures in the globalizing
process. It can be described as a struggle between different universal-
isms, e.g., the struggle between the globalizing power of scientifc reason
against different modes of interpreting nature and the human world, like
mythical ones. For centuries, globalization has meant a dominance of
Western world views over the non-Western ones. This dominance has very
often been a form of suppression and negation of other cultures, but it
even has had a higher potential of validity: the validity of being successful
in convincing the others of this mental superiority. The Opium War and
the Fourth of May-Movement together demonstrate these two forms of
superiority in the case of the Chinese civilization and its relationship to
the West.
The present-day situation of this struggle between different identity-
forming cultural universalisms in the process of globalization is charac-
terized by a change in the hitherto unbalanced, unequal, non-equitable
interrelationship of different cultures. At least on the level of sophisticated
intellectual discourses on cultural identity the domination of the West is
fading away and the non-Western cultures and civilizations are eager to re-
gain a new awareness of their cultural identity, which at least compensates
the loss of self-esteem in the period of Western domination.
This weakening of the Western concept of cultural universalisms is based
on a double critique: an internal and an external one. The internal cri-
tique has originated in the West itself; it is directed against its traditional
universalistic approaches to other cultures. In Western intellectual life the
devastating consequence of spreading Western life forms to non-Western
societies and countries has been realized and led to a denunciation of the
universalistic elements in Western cultural identity. Postmodernism is the
most speaking example for this denunciation. Universalism is replaced by
self-criticism, and, in the end, the result is a universalistic relativism in
respect to the validity of cultural values in all their different forms and
developments. This self-criticism goes along with a radical criticism by
non-Western intellectuals concerning the globalizing cultural elements
originating in the West. Typical examples of this criticism are the post-
colonial and subaltern discourses in the humanities.
Does this double critique end the clash of civilizations in the globaliz-
ing process? I think that the contrary is true. As to the relativism in
post-modern thinking, it is only a noble form of legitimating this clash,
since it does not claim any cross-culturally valid principles and ideas,
which may limit or even oppose the tensions between different collec-
tive identities. As to the non-Western critique of Western dominance, we
should not overlook the fact that it is a means in the struggle for power
itself and does not intend to end it. Tensions between identities are gener-
ally caused by the power of ethnocentrism. The non-Western criticism of
the traditional Western universalistic approaches to other cultures does
not (lie beyond) stand above this ethnocentric power but is a means of
it. A closer analysis of anti-Western critique shows that it is guided by a
negative ethnocentrism and has a clear intent: By criticizing the West the
non-Western cultures receive a qualitatively higher value and a normative
superiority over the West. So, in my opinion the old game of domination
and superiority is simply continued. Only the attitudes of the parties have
changed.
This can be demonstrated by a widespread metaphor, which is typical
for the anti-Western culture critique. I think of the intellectually very ef-
fective slogan “provincializing the West”.2 Everybody agrees, that there is
a convincing meaning in this slogan, namely that the traditional Western
“empire”, which used to dominate and subjugate the non-Western “prov-
inces”, should and even has come to an end. But if the West becomes a
province, the logical consequence of this metaphor simply is, that the em-
pire has moved into another part of the world. Where else but into one of
the non-Western countries? This is not explicitly articulated, but it is an
implicit meaning of this slogan. So, the old power game is going on, only
the role of the conficting parties has been redistributed.
We see, the clash of civilizations is still going on, and it is evident that it
has got a new threatening and radical nature. This evidently is the case in
the fundamentalist movements of today. Here a specifc universalistic con-
cept of world interpretation, mainly in a religious form, strictly contradicts
different life forms with their inbuilt universalistic elements and found new
forms of warfare. But fundamentalism is not the only place where the clash
of civilizations takes place. Even on the much more peaceful level of inter-
cultural communication we can fnd it. It is culturally rooted in the simple
fact that the universalisms, which constitute cultural difference on the level
of collective identity, exclude each other. If cultural difference is based on
different universalistic value systems, the people are committed to one of
them and negate the others. This seems to be evident in respect to religious
beliefs, but even in respect to more secular value systems as well, we can
observe this mutual exclusion.
An example is the negation of Western ideas of universal Human and
Civil Rights by referring to the fundamentally different Confucian ethics,
as it has been the case (and maybe still is the case) in the offcial political
philosophy of Singapore. It is exactly this powerful element of universal va-
lidity inbuilt in the peculiar features of cultural identity which charges the
intercultural interaction with the power of tension and confict. It poten-
tially negates constitutive elements of the cultural identity of the others by
the distinctive nature and peculiarity of one’s own identity. Cultural iden-
tity therefore should be a battlefeld of fghting universalisms. This fght can
be pursued in a more civil way, and then we call it intercultural communi-
cation, or in a more violent way, then we call it “clash of civilizations” or
even a war of mentalities.
Is there any chance to end that tension, clash, struggle, and even war on
the mental level of forming cultural identity and communicating cultural
differences? My frst answer to this question is no; there is no chance to end
it as long as we conceptualize culture in the traditional way of furnishing it
with strong universalisms as elements of distinction. Since this distinction
is the case in the cultural procedures of identity generation, where the oth-
ers refer to us as their others, we should deal with two different universal-
isms, both claiming for general validity.
But at second sight we should ask if we can defne culture as something
that goes beyond this mutual exclusion. In order to answer this question,
we should critically refect the presuppositions, under which the present-day
international and intercultural communication in the humanities, as well as
in other forms of communication, are conceptualized.
The most widespread and powerful concepts of interrelating cultures is
that of separate semantic universes, each following its own specifc code
being essentially different from the code of other cultures. Code means
the constitutive system of sense criteria and modes of interpreting the
world and understanding oneself. The most prominent representatives
of this concept of culture and cultural differences are Oswald Spengler
and Arnold Toynbee. Unfortunately, Spenglerianism is not an outdated
concept in the humanities. We can fnd it on the level of an explicit the-
ory of culture and methodology of intercultural comparison, 3 but it is
even more effective in the practical works of historians and humanists
doing intercultural comparison and thematizing aspects of intercultural
communication.
In order to compare cultures, it is quite natural to treat them as com-
pletely separate units. But what is the parameter of comparison? In an
unrefected way many historians simply use an established paradigm of
interpretation such as a parameter, and here very often the Western one.
Today we can observe a turn to non-Western ones.4 Those who criticize the
dominance of Western historical thinking follow the same logic with the
only difference that they use another paradigm without systematically re-
fecting the presuppositions under which they thematize cultures as units of
comparison. They have overlooked that it is not possible to simply step out
of one’s semantic context and cultural code in order to do this comparison.
This ought to be refected as well.
The Spenglerian presuppositions in some of the humanists’ work studies
are not convincing at all. Culture cannot be reduced to a fxed set of sense
criteria being substantially different from other sets which constitute other
cultures. Cultures are dynamic, changing, discursive, open in their modes
of interpreting the world. They enable their people to understand them-
selves and their difference to others. Cultures interfere; they share univer-
salistic elements of human life and human thinking. Thus, we should give
up any concept of cultures that claim separate universes of meaning and
only coexist in external relationships.
It is necessary to invest a good deal of theoretical refection in order to
fnd a plausible alternative. In the context of this argumentation I cannot go
into the details of such a theoretical conceptualization. I can only indicate
a possible way of approaching this new task in the humanities: Theorizing
on culture means to look for anthropological universals and to conceptu-
alize cultural differences. My proposal – methodologically it refers to Max
Weber – is to create ideal types of different possibilities to realize these
universals under different conditions, as they change in space and time. The
result will be a complex concept of culture in a mixture of universalistic
features and a typology of possible differentiations. With this mixture we
can approach the variety and the change in human cultural life. In such a
perspective cultural difference appears as a peculiar and specifc constella-
tion of elements that are (potentially) shared by all cultures.5
Such a refection and conceptualization may enable the scholars to com-
municate about the cultural difference of their traditions and contexts
without falling into the trap of ethnocentric or Spenglerian presupposi-
tions. Cultural difference will not disappear, but it becomes a subject mat-
ter of discourse. The rules of this discourse transcend the ethnocentric
logic of forming cultural identity. Such a discourse may break the power
of struggling with each other in using universalistic criteria of sense and
meaning (loaded with normative validity). It may curtail this power in
the process of individualizing one’s own culture, of making it unique by
distinguishing and separating it from others in an unbalanced way. It may
stop the provocation or, at least, the irritation of the others who pursue
the same strategies in forming their cultural identities at the costs of their
others.
How can this new way of thinking about cultural difference (with all
their political implications) be brought down to earth in the practical
processes of identity formation as well as in their academic refection?
Is there any realistic chance of making plausible this new way of thema-
tizing cultural difference by using a new concept of universalistic sense
criteria? It is rather easy to postulate an alternative to the power of sep-
arating cultures by ethnocentric thinking. But what about the power
of this mode of thinking rooted in a quasi-natural necessity of human
self-esteem, which accumulates positive elements in the image of oneself
and less positive if not negative elements into the image of the others? Is
such a postulate not unrealistic or utopian? This seems to be even more
the case if one takes systematically into account, that in the processes
of identity formation not only individuals, but in general people tend to
project the dark shadows in their self-awareness into the otherness of the
others. They tie this otherness to their self-esteem and make it uncon-
sciously dependent upon it.
How should we proceed to form cultural identity in a non-ethnocentric
way? Let’s start with elements of a comprehensive character bridging the
difference between selfness and otherness. They consist in the universalistic
principles of sense generation inbuilt in the peculiarity and individuality of
one’s cultural identity. Logically universal principles integrate the others.
Yet the very peculiar way of working with universals in identity formation
is a problem, because it radically separates us from the others and creates
tension. Since identity necessarily is peculiar and individual, the elements
of universalism even sharpen this division and opposition of selfness and
otherness. But is this the only procedure of synthesizing peculiarity and
universalism in identity formation?
My answer is: This is defnitely not the case.
This answer seems to be astonishing, but haven’t I argued so far that
these universals have an exclusive character in relationship to the others’
universals? Didn’t I say that in cultural identity the universal elements in
the cultural orientation of human life become particularized? But being
different does this necessarily mean exclusion? When recognized as consti-
tuted by universals this particularity can be understood as only one single
manifestation of its inbuilt universality besides others. Now otherness ap-
pears in a horizon of sameness. Thus, the mode of relating one’s own iden-
tity to that of the others dramatically changes: Now otherness is a different
manifestation of one’s own universals. Therefore, it can be recognized and
acknowledged. It is this recognition which at least is intended in the univer-
sals of one’s own culture as long as they are really universal.
This still is an abstract logical argumentation. But I think it can be used
to change our view at our own traditions and at their interrelationship to
different cultures. We should not exchange the universalistic elements of
our own culture for a new relativism in order to give otherness a place. On
the contrary, we should take our own universalism more seriously, since it
potentially has already a place for others. Yet they have been kept out by the
particularization of our own universal elements in identity. But stressing
their universalistic character we principally transgress all particularity and
open up an entrance to this option for universalism.
Only those cultural universals really are universal which are presented
in their individual feature as universal and not as particular and tense.
This tension is the result of an inability to recognize the particularity and
limits of one’s own universalism. This inability follows the logic of identity
formation, in which everything is focused around one’s own peculiarity
and self-esteem. Therefore, in the global historical development of cultural
universals we can observe a strong tendency of exclusion. All those life
forms which are not similar or the same as those which use universalis-
tic approaches to understand the world are excluded and discriminated or
disdained. So, one can say that in a universalistic perspective of cultural
history the development of universals starts with a tense universalism. Fun-
damentalism today is a legacy and a radicalization of this tension. It is
loaded with ethnocentric elements and power. But at the same time cultural
universalism reaches beyond ethnocentrism since the others are integrated
into the universals of one’s own sense creating interpretation of the world
and of human life.
2 The renaissance of axial time origins

To understand the radical change of cultural universals from exclusion to
inclusion, we should go back to the origins of all those forms of cultural
identity which have made up their specifc features by introducing univer-
sals. There is a specifc term to characterize these origins: that of axial time.
We owe the term to the philosophy of history by Karl Jaspers. According to
Jaspers the so-called “world civilizations” developed their traditional qual-
ity in an axial time.6 Different cultures have different axial times, but in a
universally valid historical perspective these axial times together mean an
important step, a threshold, in the cultural evolution of humankind.
In the very roots of this very beginning we can fnd a potential for the
solution of the problems of our time. The solution is the deeply rooted
universalism in cultural identity. In an unchanged, traditional way it is, of
course, not the solution, but the problem. The solution cannot be found
against it, but within it and according to it, namely within its historical
development. Axial times are no timeless origins of a metaphysical status
across all temporal changes. What has originated in this very past has be-
come a matter of temporality, of historicity. It essentially is open for change
and development. According to this historicity it is not a utopian question
to ask for a new approach and practical treatment of traditionally deeply
rooted cultural universalisms, which still are powerful elements of cultural
identity today.
This universalism should be reshaped, reformed from an exclusive into
an inclusive one. What we need for the intercultural discourse of today is
a renaissance of axial times by which the original universalism is kept up
and changed at the same time. This should not be a rupture, but a trans-
formation of one’s own traditions. It should not be a high threshold, but
an open door for a topical approach: It is a transformation which can be
characterized as a new axial time, which goes along with the topical glo-
balization process and answers its challenges of cultural identity.
3 The role of the idea of humankind
One of the most important universals in cultural identity is the idea of
humankind. With this idea the social dimension of identity is generalized
so that it includes all others as long as they all share the basic features of
humanity. It took a long historical process to be a human being with the es-
sential quality of self-awareness and self-esteem. Humankind has enlarged
the scope of identity empirically and deepened its normative quality. To be
a human being now is loaded with widespread historical experiences and
with normative elements shared by all other human beings.
Cultures can be called humanistic if they assume a highly normative
quality for being human. Humanism has played an important role in the
Western tradition, and as to China, everybody who has ever had a look into
the Lun Yü knows, that “humanness” (ren) plays a decisive role in Confu-
cius’ attempt to develop a system of normative regulations for social and
political life. In the Jewish tradition we fnd a proverb signifying human-
ism: Who rescues one human being, rescues humankind. A similar proverb
can be found in the Muslim tradition. The Koran says:
If somebody kills a man, it should be considered as if he had killed

mankind in general, and if somebody preserves the life of a human be-
ing, it should be considered as if he had preserved the life of mankind.7
In Africa we fnd a Zulu-proverb of a similar meaning: Umuntu ngumuntu

ngabantu (a human being is a human being by the otherness of other hu-
man beings).8 And in numerous other cultures we can fnd similar sayings.
These universalistic elements in different cultures like humankind and
humanity are manifest in different forms and expressions: They express the
same idea in a different way thus signifying the very peculiarity of cultural
identity. If one stresses this universal element within the cultural peculiarity
of one’s own culture one can indicate a chance of looking at the otherness
of the others in a non-ethnocentric, in an equitable and balanced way. The
others share the same normative quality of being a human being one has
something in common with them, which, in turn, is important for one’s
own self-esteem.
Here lies an important chance for respect and recognition in the interre-
lationship between self and others. But it is only a chance. This chance will
be missed if one simply identifes one’s own peculiarity with the quality of
being a human. In this case the others are not as human as oneself. And
therefore, one can treat them in a different and, of course, more negative
way than the people to whom one belongs.
This double morality is a cultural phenomenon all over the world and in
all times. But if one relates one’s own peculiarity to the universalistic and
general element of humanness as a fundamental sense criterion of one’s
own culture in a more refected way, then the difference of the others can
be realized as a different manifestation of the same humanness, which is
inscribed into the features of one’s own identity.
This is the point of my argumentation. When I characterize the present-
day situation in a globalizing process as a new axial time, I mean that we
should use this chance of the different cultural traditions of conceptual-
izing humanity as a chance of respect and recognition. Traditionally the
normative power of humanity very often served as an element of discrim-
inating the others by ascribing the higher standards of humanity to one’s
own people and only a lower one to the otherness of the others. In extreme
cases otherness could even be defned as being non-human. An impressive
example is the Nazi-ideology, which robbed the Jews of the quality of hu-
man beings. Such a devaluation of the others by denying their humanness is
still effective in topical controversies about identity. A black South African
intellectual, e.g., did it by comparing the Afrikaans-speaking white males
in his country with baboons and bonobos.9
An ethnocentric use of the general concept of humankind in identity
formation can be called a limited humanism or – more critical – an in-
verted or inhuman humanism. In respect to this limitation the universal
historical perspective within which these universalistic concepts of hu-
mankind get their temporal dimension can be called an unfulflled devel-
opment. It is on us today, to take a decisive step forward: to conceptualize
the idea of humankind in such a way that being human can be historically
perceived as manifest in different forms of human life. This difference is
not an unlimited variety. The limits of this variety and the limits of rec-
ognition and respect are exactly there where the others do not share this
universalistic element and do not realize it in a different, but comparable
way, that is, by developing their specifc mental strategies of respect and
recognition.
In the light of such a historical perspective, intercultural communication
achieves the dynamics of a new axial time. These dynamics may grant an
exchange of possibilities and potentials of conceptualizing the general nor-
mative quality of a human being. This will apply to every member of the
human species in a different way under different circumstances and histor-
ical presuppositions.
It is on me to present the Western options for such a communication
and I am waiting for the non-Western answers, proposals, criticisms, com-
ments, and maybe for some consent.
Notes
1 Assmann: Collective Memory and Cultural Identity, 1995.
2 Chakrabarti: Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical
Difference, 2000; Lal: Provincializing the West: World History from the Per-
spective of Indian History, 2003.
3 For example, Galtung: Six Cosmologies: An Impressionistic Presentation,
1996.
4 An example is Huang: Salient Features of Chinese Historical Thinking, 2004;
cf. Rüsen: A Comment on Professor Huang’s “Salient Features of Chinese His-
torical Thinking”, 2005.
5 I have concretized such a strategy of intercultural comparison in respect to his-
torical thinking in the following article: Rüsen: Some Theoretical Approaches
to Intercultural Comparison of Historiography, 1996.
6 Jaspers: The Origin and Goal of History, 1976; Eisenstadt (Ed.): Kulturen der
Achsenzeit, Vol. I–III, 1987–1992; Eisenstadt (Ed.): The Origins and Diversity
of Axial Age Civilizations, 1986; Arnason; Eisenstadt; Wittrock (Eds.): Axial
Civilisations and World History, 2005.
7 Koran Sura 5, Verse 33.
8 Shutte: Philosophy for Africa, 1993, p. 19.
9 Makgoba: Wrath of Dethroned White Males, 2005, p. 23.
5 Historizing humanity – some
theoretical considerations
on contextualization and
understanding with an outlook
on the idea of humanity
Contextualizing and understanding are not particular new issues to the

humanities. On the contrary, they belong to the basic assumptions of their
specifcally modern way of dealing with the human world in academic dis-
courses. They originated in the fundamental change in historical sense gen-
eration from the exemplary to the genetic1 mode at the end of the 18th and
the beginning of the 19th century. 2 They have become essentials of the
academic disciplines of the humanities and their rational approach to the
human world. These disciplines were established in Europe during the 19th
century, and ever since they have spread all over the world. (In my follow-
ing argumentation I mainly refer to the discipline of history as a paradigm
for the humanities.)
This can be easily understood by referring to the pre-given dominating
way of doing history in pre-modern times. Here it was the exemplary way
of making sense of the past which shaped historical thinking in most, if
not all, cultures for a very long time. It was exactly this logic of historical
thinking against which the specifcally modern one, the logic of genetic
sense generation, was directed. Exemplary thinking was interested in deriv-
ing general rules of human conduct out of a special case of historical events.
Historical experience proved as a great stock for morality and political
insight. Cicero expressed this logic of historical thinking with the famous
slogan historia magistra vitae.
These rules were looked at as being super-temporally valid – beyond the
specifc context of time and space, within which human life occurs. Within
the framework of this logic of history the understanding of the past as
meaningful for the present meant that both time-dimensions merged into
the validity of super-temporally valid rules. Understanding followed the
logic of judgment (Urteilskraft): General rules were generated from specifc
cases of the past and applied to similar, but different cases in the pres-
ent. Thus history enabled the historically educated people to deal with the
events of the present according to the rich experience of the past. This his-
torical understanding is guided by the logic of rule-competence.
Understanding of what happened in the past referred to one single con-
text only – the unity of mankind, or better: the nature of humankind.
Historizing humanity 55
Understanding meant to fnd the general rules of human conduct in every
single historical event.
Modern historical thinking started with a fundamental critique of this
exemplary way of making sense of the past. Ranke’s famous slogan, he only
wanted to demonstrate “how it really was” (wie es eigenlich gewesen), is
explicitly directed against this logic of generating general rules out of spe-
cifc events.3 Instead, he stated that we should look at the events of the past
within a framework of interpretation into which the self-understanding of
the people of the past has systematically been integrated. This is the mean-
ing of Ranke’s other famous slogan: that each epoch is immediate to God.4
This means that each epoch has its historical meaning in itself. It does not
achieve it by its direct relationship to the present-day patterns of signif-
cance at all (the most relevant concept of this direct relationship is the con-
cept of progress); on the contrary, its meaning is defned by its difference
from the present. Thus past and present get a new temporal relationship
characterized by difference and no longer by the super-temporal sameness
of human life in respect to its basic principles of practical life despite all
different contexts.
This change in the formation of temporal categories of historical think-
ing can be characterized by the terms temporalization or historization.
According to this new logic of history, understanding has acquired a new
meaning: It realizes this temporality or historicity of human life in the men-
tal processes of representing the past as meaningful for the present (and
its future-perspective). Understanding includes an awareness of different
patterns of sense and meaning, thus giving the event or the text in concern
the “dignity of difference”.5
The basic category of this hermeneutic treatment of the human world
is the category of individualization. Contextualized phenomena of the
human world can only be understood if their individuality, in fact their
uniqueness in relationship to other phenomena of the same kind, is system-
atically taken into account.
If contextualization and understanding are already inbuilt principles of
the professional work in the established disciplines of the humanities, we
may ask: Why is it necessary to raise this issue again? There are two an-
swers to this question: a simple and a provocative one. The simple one
refers to the tradition of meta-history within the established discipline, to
the inner-academic refection on concepts and methods. The provocative
one puts the academic discourse into its context of cultural orientation in
social and political life.
The simple answer refers to the fact that the conceptions and methods of
the humanities have never been established for once and all. They were con-
ceived at the very beginning of modern thinking about the human world,
and they became effective in the development of historical thinking as fex-
ible and dynamic modes – corresponding to the temporalization and histor-
ization of their subject matter, history itself.
56 Historizing humanity
Contextualization and understanding, or historicity and hermeneutics,
tend to change in the process of disciplinary discourses. This change can
even be explicitly brought about by a refection within these discourses.
(This refective input into the basic concepts and methods of historical
thinking especially takes place in times of so-called “crisis of fundamental
principles” (Grundlagenkrise) – like the Lamprecht-Controversy in Ger-
many. But it could also take place as an undercurrent in well-established
institutions of research, interpretation, and representation.) Well-known
examples of this change are the long discussion about generalization and in-
dividualization, about explaining and understanding, and nowadays about
rationality and poetics in the humanities (mainly in historical studies).
Therefore it is useful to continue this refection from time to time in order
to prove, to confrm, and to (re-)establish the conceptual and methodical
solidity and stability of the humanities (as to its correspondence to topical
experiences of temporal change and as to the needs for historical orienta-
tion vis-à-vis these experiences).
There are two issues in this more or less permanent self-refection in
historical studies, which demand attention: The frst issue is indicated by
the question of how to apply the concept of contextualization to the cogni-
tion itself brought about by the humanities and their research work. Does
such an application not destroy any claim for intersubjective validity? The
other issue is addressed by the question: How can historicity be under-
stood, or what mode of understanding meets the historicity of the human
world? Why is this a fundamental problem of hermeneutics? Modern her-
meneutics follows the rule to understand different life forms by using its
self-understanding, its own semantic potentials. But how to understand the
historical change of the life forms? They happened to the people beyond
and even against of what they wanted to happen. Only afterwards, by look-
ing back at the change, its meaning can be noticed (not ignoring the under-
standing of the people who had to live or undergo it, of course). In order to
realize it, a reference to later-on developed semantic potentials is unavoid-
able. This reference goes on from epoch to epoch till it fnally brings the
semantic horizon of the life-form of the scholars themselves into the game
of understanding. How can this basic “intertemporal” relationship of un-
derstanding, which bridges the gap between past and present, be mediated
with the constitutive temporal difference, which modern hermeneutics has
systematically taken into account?
If one takes these moving problems seriously, i.e. if one relates them to
basic issues of cultural orientation today, the question why contextualiza-
tion and understanding should be thematized again will get a more pro-
voking character. Contextualization and understanding should be refected
in a new radical and critical way vis-à-vis the challenge of globalization
in- and outside the humanities. Globalization inside the humanities means
that their hermeneutical endeavor and its results claim for universal (and
that means: transcultural) validity. How is such a claim possible? If every
cultural manifestation in the past can only be understood if it becomes
contextualized, what about the interpretative work of the humanities? Is it
possible to understand it beyond its specifc cultural context? Doesn’t the
variety and difference of contexts contradict any universal validity? How-
ever, can we think about the cognitive work of the humanities brought
about by their methodically ruled research without such a claim for an
inter-subjective validity?
This epistemological and methodological question acquires its sharpness
and radical form if it is taken out of the academic life and put into the cul-
tural context of the humanities and becomes confronted with the problems
of intercultural communication of today. Here it refects and repeats the
challenge of globalization outside the humanities. This challenge emerges
from a very specifc cultural experience: It is the Western domination in the
worldwide process of modernization. This process includes the expansion
of modern humanities all over the world and their establishment in the ac-
ademic life in all non-Western civilizations.6 Can they ignore the changes
and differences in their cultural contexts? Is the validity of their cognitive
outcome context-free, i.e. really global and universal despite the mental
power of different cultural traditions in the countries where they sustain
their academic life?
The idea of objectivity, which underlies this claim for universal validity,
has been rather powerful in the self-awareness of historical studies. But
nevertheless, from the very beginning of modern humanities onwards it
was epistemologically invalid. The dependence of hermeneutic interpre-
tation upon the cultural context or upon the so-called “point of view” or
“standpoint” of the professionals in the cultural context of their societies
has been noticed and refected already in the late 18th century.7 It became
an important logical element in the self-understanding and self-refection
of the new academic disciplines of the humanities. This took place exactly
at the same time and in systematic interrelationship with the emergence
and the development of the new methodical rationality, which defned
the humanities as academic disciplines. In full awareness of this ration-
ality they called themselves in the non-English speaking world (Germany,
France, Italy) “sciences”. Their scholarly or academic character was de-
fned by the professionalism of the scholars. And this professionalism was
manifest in the scholars’ ability to bring about progress of cognition by
research.
It was this professionalism and the effciency of the new methods of re-
search which made the modern form of thinking in the humanities irresist-
ible and feasible, so that they could be transferred into the academic life all
over the world.
The present-day situation of the humanities in the globalization process
is – as I have said before – characterized by a radical challenge of this uni-
versalism.8 More and more it has undergone criticism as a pure ideology
of Western cultural domination and as a suppression of different ways of
thinking and cognition about the human world and its history.9 This is
obvious in the so-called “postcolonial turn” in the humanities and social
sciences. Similar movements are the subaltern discourse and many manifes-
tations of post-modernism.
The harshness and radical form of this criticism stems from the simple,
but very powerful fact that all cognitive approaches to the human world also
function as elements and factors in the practice of cultural orientation. The
work of the humanities is part of the cultural process by which the issue of
cultural identity is treated; it directly or indirectly functions in providing the
people with a livable identity. By identity I understand the basic cultural fact
that every person and every social unit need an idea of who they are and what
the others are, from whom they distinguish themselves in the many realms of
human life. Whether they like it or not, whether they perform it deliberately
or unknowingly – the humanities are always a part of identity politics.
The issue of identity belongs to the context, which is in concern in the
discourses on and in the refections about contextualization and under-
standing. It motivates the work of the humanities to emphasize difference,
since identity basically is a matter of distinction, of difference, and of
discrimination.
There are two possibilities to realize and to pursue this constitutive im-
beddedness of the humanities in the cultural processes of identity forma-
tion and its related policy. The humanities can be used as a means for the
purposes of identity formation. They can help to bring about a positive
self-image at the cost of the image of the others. Doing so, they follow
the logic of ethnocentrism.10 Or the humanities can be used as a cogni-
tive strategy of inter-subjectivity. Such a strategy mediates between self and
otherness and transfers difference into a common life-form where it doesn’t
vanish, but becomes livable in a humane way. So in the cultural game of
identity formation the humanities can be either a weapon or a bridge.
In this text I would like to show that the only way the humanities can
realize their work is that of a full awareness of their dependence upon con-
texts. At the same time, they should remain committed to the principle of
intersubjectivity. Without this principle they can’t bridge cultural difference
by understanding. Of course, understanding can also be a very powerful
weapon in a struggle, or even a clash between different life forms and civili-
zations. In this function, understanding is used within a strategy of confict
and games of power. But I do emphasize the other way of understanding:
It does not follow the logic of a strategy of self-preservation or even self-
enhancement with the consequence of subjugation and domination in the
relationship to the others, and it is not inspired by the mental forces of eth-
nocentrism. Instead, understanding can follow the logic of communication
with the aim of giving and receiving recognition. Here the peculiarity if not
uniqueness of one’s own life form and difference from others is concerned.11
This alternative is not a matter of free choice or of arbitrary moral inclina-
tions; instead, it is a matter of rational argumentation. Here understanding
is not possible without at least some elements of recognizing differences.
It can’t be brought about without a change of perspectives so that one’s
own life-form is not perceived as unilateral, but in a relational way by the
awareness of otherness. Besides, nobody can overlook the simple fact that
the degree and the level of understanding rises with the degree and level of
empathy and recognition.
To meet the challenges of anti-Western critique and the demand for rec-
ognizing difference in the topical intercultural communication, the work
and the procedures of the humanities should confrm difference in a more
extended and more profound way. At the same time, an extended and in-
tense way of treating the idea of transcultural concepts and methods should
be renewed as necessary means of cognition. These concepts enable the
humanities to avoid the danger of ethnocentric thinking and to mediate
differences so that universal truth claims remain solid principles of inter-
cultural communication.
How is such transcultural dimension of cognition possible? Does it not
contradict the hermeneutical insight into the context-relatedness of under-
standing meaning and signifcance in cultural orientation of human prac-
tical life? Does not every step towards transculturally valid hermeneutical
cognition fall back behind the achievements of temporalization and histor-
ization in modern humanities?
Indeed, bringing about transcultural validity into the humanities at the
cost of contextualization is not convincing at all. Only by a methodical
strengthening of contextualization the idea of intercultural validity can be
made plausible. By this strengthening I understand the methodical advan-
tages of a systematically refected contextualization. My argument is rather
simple. By refecting contexts, the human mind transgresses their borders.
What is the semantic dimension of this transgression? Since the ability to
refect its cultural orientation (or, as Richard Rorty once said, to speak
about language) constitutes the peculiarity if not the uniqueness of being
human – this dimension is humanity.
With this argumentation I pick up the pre-modern idea of understanding
by referring to the very same cultural nature of man. But it is a thoroughly
historized and individualized cultural nature. The idea of this temporalized
cultural nature of humankind should be systematically taken into account
as the conceptual, better: the categorical precondition for intersubjectivity
in the hermeneutical work of the humanities.
This is a philosophical task within and for the sake of the humanities
and their academic status. Instead of giving up a young topological turn of
modern worldviews and its inbuilt logic of universalism we should continue
to elaborate our understanding of what it means to be a human being.
I would like to give you an example for such an elaboration from the project
“Humanism in the Era of Globalization – An Intercultural Dialogue on Hu-
manity, Culture, and Values”. Here we pursued the problem: How is it possi-
ble to bring different humanistic traditions together into one comprehensive
concept without ignoring the difference and their importance for forming
cultural identity?12 Each humanism refers to an idea of what it means to be a
human being; each has an idea of humanity. In order to develop such an idea
we should pick up a concept of humanity, which is already effective in the
pre-given cultural context of one’s own work. We should refect such a con-
cept more or less critically and develop it further. In my own work on human-
ism, I started with such an idea and concept by referring to Immanuel Kant’s
statement that every human being is always more than only a means to the
purpose of others, but a means in him- or herself. Kant calls this quality of
each human being to be a purpose in him- or herself his or her dignity.13
It would be a mistake to take this statement as a fxed basis for intercultural
communication, although I don’t see convincing arguments for contradicting
it. In the context of an academic intercultural discourse this fundamental
idea of human dignity should be brought into an argumentative movement.
It should be contextualized and used as a principle of understanding. With
such a principle, different traditions and life-forms receive the dignity of be-
ing understood in the horizon of their own world view as an outcome of their
history. Let us call it the dignity of cultural autonomy.
There is a danger in ascribing this autonomy to all of the various cultures
or civilizations in time and space. I would like to call this danger “Spen-
glerization”. It means that every culture is looked at as being basically in-
dependent from all others and only follows its specifc internal potentials
of making sense of the world. In this perspective of interpretation, inter-
cultural communication appears only as an external interrelationship and
ignores cross-cultural elements as well as the dynamics of historical change
brought about by the exchange of ideas and material goods. Additionally,
the epistemological question couldn’t be answered: How is it possible to
understand cultures, which follow different patterns of world view and not
the semantics which determines the approach of understanding?
Understanding is impossible without cross-cultural or even universal el-
ements, which combine both sides: the side of understanding and the side
of being understood. Furthermore, in each act of understanding the con-
text of those who pursue it will not be left behind but will merge with it.
Here we must be aware of the luring danger of alienating the others when
subjugating them under the framework of one’s own way of thinking. It is
the danger of fundamentally ignoring the difference which provokes the
subtlety of the hermeneutical procedures. Thus, the otherness of the others,
which they think of as being the essence of their identity, might be missed.
This danger can be avoided by a basic openness in the hermeneutical
approach to others, which is guided by a principal interest in difference.
This openness demands an idea of humanity, which stresses difference and
change under the presupposition of anthropological universals like the idea
of dignity. Such universals do exist, of course.14 They essentially belong
to the interpretative frame of conceptualizing difference in hermeneutical
thinking. In order to progress from anthropological universals to cultural
peculiarities one should construct ideal types. They lie open under what
conditions the universals get their peculiar manifestations. Here contextual-
izing achieves methodical strictness in the cognitive work of the humanities.
Every culture has an idea of what it means to be a human being. This
idea is manifest in a great variety of ideas of humankind. Today it is the
task of the humanities to understand these variations by bringing them
into an intercultural perspective. This, however, is challenged by the topical
problems of intercultural communication. What we need is a theory of hu-
manity, which fundamentally historizes the meaning of being human and
by doing so renders the variety of this meaning understandable.
I would like to call this theory of humanity a new philosophy of history,
which picks up and develops the classical one of the late 18th and the early
19th century.15 This philosophy categorically shapes history in general as
temporalized humanity. Following this idea, historians’ attention should
focus on those experiences where humanity articulated itself, where it pro-
nounced what it means to be human. The universal frame of reference thus
fnds its empirical affrmation.
Articulating humanity – this may serve as the red thread of making sense
of the past. How to bind all the different cultural manifestations of human-
ity together into one history, which stands for humankind as a totality? In
order to bring about this achievement of historical thinking, the red thread
of history needs an encompassing idea of temporal change. This basic trend
or direction of time should express the totality of humankind, which is in
concern. Therefore, it only can be conceptualized as a trend or process of
universalization. Such a universalization – transgressing all limits of human
togetherness and principally ascribing the quality of being human to all
members of the human species – took place in different places of the world
and in different epochs. Karl Jaspers gave us an input into such a concept of
history by his idea of axial times.16
Within this universal historical perspective, humanity appears as a va-
riety of universalisms articulating the cultural nature of humans in differ-
ent forms. Difference or – to use a traditional concept – individuality has
become an essential feature of humanity. For a long time, and even today
(in the power of tradition), these universalisms have excluded each other.
These exclusions are effective as limits of understanding. But these limits
can be transgressed to the degree to which the universals of humanity no
longer exclude each other, but, on the contrary, change the logic of ex-
clusion into the logic of inclusion. This change will open up new chances
of understanding. Using them, the humanities can successfully answer the
challenges of intercultural communication in the age of globalization.
Notes
1 The word “genetic” could be misunderstood. It’s meaning here has nothing to
do with the genes in the human body, but refers to the Greek word “genesis”,
which means “production”, “generation”, “coming into being”. I understand by
“genetical” a temporal mode of the human world emphasizing change.
2 The classical text describing this change is Koselleck: Historia magistra vitae,
1979 [English 1985]. I have analyzed these two types in the framework of a
general typology of historical sense-generation in: Rüsen: History: Narration –
Interpretation – Orientation, 2005, pp. 9–39.
3 “Man hat der Historie das Amt, die Vergangenheit zu richten, die Mitwelt zum
Nutzen zukünftiger Jahre zu belehren, beigemessen: So hoher Ämter unter-
windet sich gegenwärtiger Versuch nicht: er will bloß zeigen, wie es eigentlich
gewesen”. (History has been allotted the task of judging the past, to teach the
contemporary world for the beneft of the future. Our present effort does not
claim for such a prestigious task: It only aims at showing, how matters really
were [how matters were really like; how things really happened; how it actually
was – translated by Jörn Rüsen]; Ranke: Geschichten der romanischen und ger-
manischen Völker von 1494–1514, 1855, p. VIII. [Also in Ranke: The Theory
and Practice of History, 1973, p. 137.])
4 “Jede Epoche ist unmittelbar zu Gott”. Ranke: Über die Epochen der neueren
Geschichte, 1971, p. 59 sq. [English in: Ranke: The Theory and Practice of
History, fn. 2, p. 53].
5 Sacks: The Dignity of Difference, 2003.
6 This expansion is described in the case of history by Iggers; Wang: A Global
History of Modern Historiography, 2008.
7 It is signifcant, that the explication of historical studies as “Wissenschaft” (sci-
ence) went along with the insight of this dependence. This is paradigmatically
indicated by Chladenius: Allgemeine Geschichtswissenschaft, 1985.
8 This challenge adopted a historical form by Novick: That Noble Dream, 1988.
9 A good example is Fuglestad: The Ambiguities of History, 2005; see Rüsen:
The Horror of Ethnocentrism, 2008. Vinay Lal went so far as to declare the
Western approach of historical thinking to India as “cultural genocide”, since
India never had a tradition of historical thinking like the West (Lal: Provincial-
izing the West, 2003, p. 288 sq.).
10 Just to give one example:
[…] Indian philosophy started some time around 2000 B.C. and has lasted
up to the present day, whereas the writer on Greek philosophy starts usually
with Thales of the seventh century B.C. and ends with the Alexandrians
of the third century A. D. […] While Indian thought has had as continuity
of about 4000 years […] Greek thought had a continuity of only about a
thousand years.
(Raju: The Concept of Man in Indian Thought, 1960, p. 206)
11 See Rüsen: How to Overcome Ethnocentrism, 2004.
12 First steps to sharpen this question and to prepare answers were presented in
Rüsen; Laass (Eds.): Humanism in Intercultural Perspective, 2009.
13 Kant: Metaphysik der Sitten [1797] § 11, A93 [English: http://praxeology.net/
kant7.htm [09-04-2020]]. The constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany
started with the confrmation of this dignity in all human beings in its article
1: “Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the
duty of all state authority”. http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/GG.htm#1
[09-04-2020].
14 Antweiler: Menschliche Universalien, 2007.
15 A typical example is Kant: Idea for a universal history with a cosmopolitan
purpose [1784], 1991, pp. 41–53.
16 Jaspers: Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte [1949], 1963 [English: The
Origin and Goal of History, 1976].
6 Humanism
Anthropology – axial
times – modernities
1 Cultural identity and the quest for humanism

Humanism is a commandment of our time. Why? Because we need a cul-
tural orientation of our lives, which covers the variety of traditions and
world views by universal standards and which, at the same time, systemati-
cally considers this variety. Cultural difference has always been a challenge,
the answer to which may achieve an integration of difference and common
ground at the same time.
This is true for every single person as well as for every social formation
of human life. They all need an integration of different relationships into
the context, within which they live, so that a stable unity of personal or
social life can be established. In this unity the differences don’t vanish but
become organized and interrelated into a coherent structure of the personal
and social “self”.
One of the most important elements in the cultural constitution of this
“self” is to dissociate and distance oneself from others.1 This is evident for
every single person. Subjectivity is organized by a clear self-relationship,
a strong awareness of his or her own self and at the same time by a clear
distinction of this self from other persons with whom one lives. This to-
getherness is, of course, very important and essential for human life, but
it is always structured by an awareness of the distinction between self and
others. These others may have become a part of oneself (or in the lan-
guage of psychoanalysis are introjected into the self) like parents or beloved
ones, but nevertheless, they remain different from this individual and its
fundamental self-relatedness. From the very beginning of human life this
self-relatedness is a basic psychic fact. It may be totally abstract or un-
differentiated in its beginning and it gets its “personal” characteristics by
communication with others, but it is a fundamental form of human life and
not only the result of social conditions. On the contrary, it is a necessary
condition for the possibility for social life.
The personal and the social self have different structures. But, never-
theless, the human social self shares the similar element and factor of dis-
tinction and distance. Without the distinction between people to whom
64 Humanism: anthropology
somebody belongs and people who don’t belong, social life in its human
form would be impossible. This distinction between self and others is a
decisive part of the humans’ subjectivity of humans and cannot simply be
attributed to the external life conditions.
The fundamental difference between self and others is realized in a vast
variety of life-forms. According to its fundamental logic of difference it
is variable, highly changeable in space and time. One of the most funda-
mental activities of the human mind lies in its permanent work in bringing
about identity vis-à-vis the complexity of life conditions and their perma-
nent challenge to the stability of the human personal and social self. So it is
the outcome of a permanent mental process working out a livable balance
between the one’s own desires and the demands of the others. “Identity”
is the term which expresses this balance in the personal and social human
self-relatedness. 2
The cultural life of today should meet specifc challenges in this process
of constituting the human self in the struggle between internal and external
demands and internal and external conditions, limits, and chances. One of
the most important challenges is the encounter of different cultural tradi-
tions in shaping the human self. The process of globalization has heavily
shaken the deeply rooted pre-given patterns of belonging to one culture in
its difference to others. China, India, Africa, Europe, the West, and com-
parable terms have a clear geographical meaning. But beyond geography
they play an important role in forming social identity on the level of cul-
tural sense generation. They denominate world view and life forms and
their interrelationship with other forms. They are a product of pre-given
and historically deeply rooted mental structures and have become a second
“nature” of human life. At the same time, they are issues of controversial
debates, struggles, and political activities.
For a very long time these different mentalities and life forms could
coexist besides each other in relative distance. The others were relatively
far away, and their being different, their strangeness did not really bother
one’s own life. They had their places outside the well-known world of one’s
home. There have always been some connections, mainly by trade, but they
have not touched the center of one’s own world and its mental and spiritual
shape.
In a universal historical perspective this juxtaposition has now become a
source of growing problems, tensions, and conficts. Colonialism and impe-
rialism have radically shaken many established concepts of self and other-
ness; they have made evident that cultural identity is an issue of permanent
struggle within and outside the realm of established life forms. Globaliza-
tion is a specifc form of historical change in the interaction of different
peoples and cultures.3 It is characterized by an emergence of transculturally
effective elements and forms of human life and their dominance across es-
tablished differences in the organization of human life in all its dimensions.
This is not only true for economic life where the power of capitalism (or
Humanism: anthropology 65
free market economy) is effective. It also applies to the political, social, and
cultural dimensions of life as well. Today, besides economy, the environ-
mental consequences of modern industry prove as the most urgent “global”
problem for human survival. It has become an urgent issue to pursue a
transcultural common activity of all peoples in the world to meet the dan-
gers of catastrophic developments.
In the cultural dimension of globalization, a radical challenge of a dif-
ferent kind is taking place. Here the emergence of global forms of human
life confronts the necessity of differentiation between self and others in the
processes of identity formation, which tackles the deepest level of human
subjectivity all over the world. Humankind is emerging as a real dimension
of human life in all its manifestations. It unites humans across their cultural
differences in a way that it excludes keeping up the traditionally pre-given
concepts of the self in difference to the others. What will remain in estab-
lishing difference in the identity-forming process which, of course, is still
necessary for human life?
At the frst glance global common ground and cultural difference seem
to exclude each other. The contrary is true. Difference is not only evident
in the political approaches to the environmental problems. It has shaped
the established forms of capitalistic economy as well. Though capitalism in
the United States, in Europe, in China, and India follow the same rules in
bringing about proft, it is performed in clearly distinguishable ways, which
even compete with each other.4 Similar examples can be shown in many
other realms of global life forms. Take for example the realm of secularism.
Here in a feld of mental activities, which aim at spheres free from religion,
and which have an undeniable importance for human life, difference as a
dominating fact can be noted. Secularism is a necessary condition for sci-
ence, and no country can deny the necessity of science and its technological
applications in human life today, but the extension, depth, and form of
secularism in human cognition is a matter of controversy all over the world.
One of the most urgent questions of cultural life in the globalization pro-
cess is the compatibility of global humanity and identity-forming difference
in personal and social life. Modern humanism should be understood as an
answer to this question5: It refers to the common cultural nature of humans
as a source for cultural orientation. And by doing so it crosses all cultural
differences by addressing the sameness of being a human being. It under-
stands this anthropological sameness as a chance for identifying general
and fundamental values valid for all humans despite their cultural differ-
ences. One of the most convincing expressions of this normative element in
being a human being was formulated by Immanuel Kant. In his philosophy
of ethics he attributed dignity to every human being. By dignity he meant
that he or she always is more than only a means for the purposes of others
but a purpose within him- or herself.6
At the same time, modern humanism underlines the fact that this common
cultural nature of being a human being is only a potential, the realization
of which leads to very different forms of life owed to the fact that they are
generated by different conditions and in different contexts.7 In this con-
cept of humankind, normative and empirical facts are synthesized. This
is performed in a way that the identity-forming idea of difference does no
longer contradict the anthropological sameness of humans and its cultural
realization in global forms of human life.
a) Humanism as philosophy of history

To make such a humanistic idea of humankind plausible I will undertake
to work it out into a new philosophy of history. It picks up the traditional
form of modern philosophy of history. This philosophy conceptualizes the
human past as a comprehensive temporal totality of humankind. History
now is a master narrative of humankind. As such it has offered a pattern of
signifcance and meaning for the experience of the human past. This “sense
in history” – which can function as a guideline for all detailed work in
representing the past so that it may serve as orientation for the present – is
based on the experience of the past in its temporal dimension; thus it may
offer a future perspective.
In its classical manifestation of the late 18th and early 19th century
this philosophy integrated the accelerating knowledge of the variety of
human life in space and time into an all-encompassing concept of human
development. This concept gave a meaning to the dynamics of change in
the modernization process. It carried a potential of inspiring human ac-
tivity. It anchored the identity of people into the core of temporal change.
Temporal change was understood as moved by the power of the human
mind and spirit. The historical insight into this depth of history reas-
sured this master-narrative’s addressees of their identities as an individ-
ual representation of humankind. They could understand their life-form
and their identity in and by it as a moment in the general development of
humankind.
This humanistic philosophy of history was only an episode in the his-
torical culture of modern (Western) societies. The emerging institution of
historical studies as an academic discipline criticized it as missing the me-
thodical rationality of historical research, and the universalistic outlook
at the wide felds of historical experience was consequently narrowed in
favor of a national perspective of historical thinking. The human frame of
historical identity received a national feature. And the humanistic values of
universal history were limited to the idea of one’s own nation as represent-
ing humankind. Otherness as a necessary condition for this idea of one’s
own social self was defned by a lack or aberration of humanity.
In seeing this narrowing angle, it is but plausible to put and answer the
following questions: Why should we go back to this classical point-of-view
in thematizing the issue of intercultural communication in the process of
globalization? What makes it worthwhile to pick up the traditional Western
philosophy of history at the brink of modernity? There are four reasons for
this return: This philosophy contained
1 a universalistic approach to historical experience;

2 a general historization of the idea of humankind;
3 a general individualization of the idea of humankind;
4 a general cognoscibility of history by hermeneutics.
Ad 1: It is evident that historical thinking needs a universalistic perspective

in the age of globalization. Its challenging experience requires a globali-
zation of history as well, the adequate dimension of which is humankind.
Humankind is an anthropological fact with normative impacts, and as such
it can function as a historical category to defne the feld of historical expe-
rience and to work out perspectives of its interpretation. It covers the whole
feld of the human past in all its variety. At the same time, it is both a value-
laden idea, since it addresses not only a simple biological unit, and the
cultural nature of humankind, since it defnes what makes it specifc and
different from all other creatures. Since culture is defned by the ability of
humans to organize their lives according to norms and values, humankind
is a comprehensive and inclusive idea of the normative systems of values in
human culture.
Ad 2: The variety and multitude of human life-forms can only be
brought into a coherent concept of understanding, if humankind as a
whole becomes fundamentally historized. History prevents any idea of
a super-temporal cultural nature as the essence of human life from pre-
vailing for once and all despite all changes. So, it bars the assumption
that all differences might only be understood as variations of the same
substance. Instead history endows the “nature” of human culture with
the “substance” of temporality, so that change becomes its essential at-
tribute. The “nature” of human culture has a potential of differences in
store. But at the same time history combines difference with temporal
change. The variety of differences receives a coherent structure by the
perspective of an encompassing development. Therefore we can observe a
distinctive shape and structure in historical narratives; differences do not
vanish in favor of some general features; but on the contrary historical
narratives give different life-forms a unique character as single occur-
rences by stressing their peculiar character within comprehensive trends
of temporal change.
Ad 3: This kind of historical thinking bridges the gap between general
concepts like humankind on the one hand and single and unique human
life forms on the other by the category of individualization. Every single
human being and every single human life form represent the general mental
and spiritual quality of human culture in a unique way. Humankind fnds
its historical reality in the variety of human life forms and their temporal
interconnections. Individuality is a pattern of signifcance, which prevents
any devaluation of peculiarity and difference in favor of generalizations,
where the specifc historical features of events and structures in the human
past are dimmed and disappear.
Ad 4: Cognition is impossible without integrating single facts or partial
information about them into conceptual patterns of meaning, where gen-
eralizations play an important role. To keep up the individualistic aspect
of temporal appearances of human culture it is necessary to develop a
specifc way of thinking, namely the hermeneutical one. Hermeneutics
is based on difference in the articulation of the human mind and spirit
in its interrelationship with the world. It starts when we experience that
there is something strange outside and beside us, something different
which moves our minds and states the high importance of difference in
the cultural organization of human life. Understanding means to dissolve
strangeness into difference. Strange articulations of meaning in practical
life become recognizable. They can be translated into a familiar form of
symbolizing the world. In this form of translation – that is the essence of
hermeneutics – the difference in symbolization will not vanish but fnds
an articulation.
The concrete way these four principles were realized has met with fun-
damental criticism. The core of this criticism lay in its quest for a synthesis
of commonness and difference in human life. This, however, usually stems
only from one culture, and when applied to the way of thinking about the
otherness of other cultures, features of its own specialty are introduced into
the difference. Logically this procedure alienates, if not essentially misses
them.
The argument that there is no neutral standpoint in viewing cultural dif-
ference is true. According to the logic of individualization and historization
there is no starting point of thinking about humankind apart from its dif-
ferent manifestations in space and time. But this does not necessarily lead
to relativism. There is always a possibility of refecting the peculiarity of
one’s own life form vis-à-vis other life forms; and there is always a pos-
sibility of communicating with the people of these other life forms about
their peculiarity and their awareness of one’s own culture. One can’t deny
the fact that in every communication there are elements of political power,
which play a role. But this does not prevent insights into difference. There
might be attempts to dominate the others by imposing one’s own world-
view on the cognitive approaches of understanding other world views and
life forms. Yet there is a specifcally cognitive (and essentially humanistic)
interest in hermeneutics to get a better insight into the peculiarity of one’s
own culture by mirroring it in the otherness of the others.
This does not mean that the idea of humankind along the lines of tradi-
tional and modern humanistic thinking is free of any ethnocentric biases
and elements. The question is not how to completely overcome them in
favor of a “pure” humanism, but how to domesticate, tame, or “humanize”
them.
In the following argumentation I will attempt a “humanized and human-
izing” humanism, which is committed to the tradition of Western Human-
ism (in full awareness of its limits and failures, especially in respect to the
Western attitude of dominating non-Western forms of thought in intercul-
tural communication).8
b) Anthropological foundations
It is not my intention to give a future-directed interpretation of classical
modern humanism. I will refer to this tradition to present a meaning to the
term of “humanistic” approach to a philosophy of history. I will try to indi-
cate its intellectual place in the different approaches to come to terms with
the challenges of globalization and to fnd a “global” cultural orientation,
within which the identity-forming differences are recognized.
I want to start by indicating and making plausible the taming power of
humanism in the struggle about cultural identity. So let me begin my ar-
gumentation with an anthropology of difference in human life. In order to
avoid the widespread methodological mistake of speaking about cultural
difference by using the above-mentioned culturally specifc patterns of in-
terpretation (mainly the Western one) I would like to start with anthro-
pological universals as a ground for a theory of universal history.9 Very
often the “universal” character of a historical perspective is not more than
a generalized specifc perspective, which does not take us any further. So,
I turned to anthropological universals with their potential to help avoiding
this wrong generalization.
I am looking for cultural elements and factors of human life, which have
two attributes as preconditions: They should be shared in all life forms and
they should bear the temporal dynamics of change. The second attribute
opens up the possibility of variety in pursuing human life, whereas the frst
one keeps this multitude and diversity together in one single coherent fea-
ture of humankind. It is not suffcient to identify structures and procedures
of human life, which remain the same in all its different manifestations in
space and time. Such a concept would lock history in an anthropological
stand still, whereas an anthropological foundation of historical change and
variation allows a perception of its dynamical power. Human life should
be conceptualized in such a way that allows its basic structures to become
visible as remaining the same in all times and spaces. This is working when
we apply a specifc perspective, which shows the forces of change – the un-
rest of time – within them.
The dynamics of time becomes visible on the level of anthropological
universals, if fundamental antagonisms become explicated in these fun-
damentals, within which human life is pursued, and which permanently
challenge the human mind and spirit to come to terms with them. These
antagonisms are the basic patterns of human life defning the space, where
its specifc human form takes place.
I would like to list them up in the form of a simple enumeration without
a distinct systematical order:
Human life always takes place in the following antagonisms or
juxtapositions:
• between a position of above and below in social ranking;

• between center and periphery as a position in the special organization
of social life;
• between man and woman, defning the realm of gender and its specifc
communication;
• between old and young, defning intergenerational relationship;
• between the internal and external dimension in forming identity;
• between power and powerlessness in interaction, deciding about the
ability to give commands and fnd obedience;
• between the necessity to die and the possibility to kill, defning the
social space of violence10;
• between friend and foe in dimensioning the feld of political activity;
• between master and servant structuring the intersection of social, po-
litical, and economic life;
• between poor and rich defning the distribution of economic wealth;
• between individuality and collectivity in dimensioning human
subjectivity;
• between the conscious and unconscious structuring the mental life of
individuals and social communities;
• between good and evil defning the moral dimension of human activity
and suffering;
• between the inner-worldly and the outer-worldly dimension of human
worldview;
• between human and non-human dimension in categorizing the under-
standing of reality.
This list can be easily enlarged (its singularities depend upon the question,
the answer of which is demanded by the universal historical perspective).
But for the purpose of explaining the anthropological basis of philosophy
of history, it is suffcient. All these single items are interrelated with each
other, so together they are logically structured as a network of universals.
The whole feld of historical experience can be categorized by this network.
It endows the past and its experience in the present with a time-bridging
meaning; this meaning is structured by categories which are valid for the
experience of the past as well as its historical understanding.
It is the antagonistic and tensional nature of these universals, which ex-
plains why human life forms permanently change in the course of time.
Wherever a person or a group of people is situated in this network of condi-
tions in the human world – they should refer to them. This reference takes
place in two different ways: passively in the mode of suffering, actively in
the way of acting; both ways are inseparately interconnected. These struc-
tural conditions are pre-given to every human life, but in a principally open
way: open to the mental work of sense generation by the people in concern.
In the concrete situations of human life these structural conditions are im-
pregnated with sense and meaning. But this pre-given conditioning sense
and meaning is never totally suffcient for pursuing life since suffering from
them is an anthropological universal as well. Pre-given sense should be ac-
tively tackled to become effective in the human mind.
By this tackling the pre-given life-form can be accepted or refused, le-
gitimated or changed – but in any case, it never simply remains the same
after it has been interpreted and practically executed in the course of time
and the change of ages and generations. This is the reason for the historical
movement of the human world.
It is this mental activity, which defnes the historical character of the
human world. History is more than only a temporal change in human life,
which happened in the past. Actually, it is a sense- and meaningful inter-
relation between past and present. Today the prevalent interpretation of
this character of sense and meaning has been agreed upon as (only) a con-
struction, as an invention of the present reference to the past. To me this is
not convincing at all, since the sense generating process of historical think-
ing always takes place in the context of pre-given, i.e., socially powerful
patterns of signifcance in cultural life. These patterns are the outcome of
developments in the past ending in the life situation of the people of today.
They, however, deliberately refer to the past and its experience in order to
get an idea of the temporal dimension of their present day lives. Thus, one
can say that the past has already brought along elements of its meaning for
the present. This meaning is effective in the circumstances of the cultural
processes of historical sense generation itself. Before it constructs, it has
already been constructed.
How does this pre-given sense and meaning come about, how is it gener-
ated? It emerges from the cultural processes, by which the past generations
came to terms with the above-listed tensions of their living conditions. Tem-
poral change always happens in the network of anthropological universals,
and it is always impregnated by the meaning with which the people in con-
cern are placed and place themselves within the challenging oppositions
in their personal and social lives. With this meaning the change of human
life caused by the juxtapositions in its conditions of possibilities gets a di-
rection. The human mind culturally inscribes a temporal direction into the
relationship of the people to the network of their tensional life conditions.
This direction ontologically changes temporal change into historical devel-
opment. (To be precise, “development” as an objective character in the tem-
poral change of human life is not historical in the full meaning of the word,
since it can be only applied in the way it is interpreted later on in aware-
ness of what has happened after the events the historical meaning of which
are in concern.) Afterwards they receive their historical character. By this
post-festum interpretation the temporal changes in the past are put into a
meaningful interrelation with the present. Only in the framework of such a
comprehensive idea of time mediating its three dimensions into a pattern of
signifcance, the changes of human life in the past are historically shaped.
But this pattern has necessarily integrated the cultural meaning by which
the people in the past have answered the challenge of their life conditions.
I wouldn’t mind to call this integration a “construction” since it is much
more than only a repetition of the cultural efforts by the past. Instead it is
a cultural effort of the present when coming to terms with the pre-given
structures of sense and meaning manifest in the real-life conditions, under
which historical thinking takes place.
The consequences of this argument for the philosophy of history are evi-
dent: On the level of anthropological universals basic cultural principles of
sense generation should be identifed. These principles must be as universal
as the juxtapositions are, which they render livable. Here is not the place to
systematically explicate them. I only can give examples and focus my argu-
mentation on those principles which anthropologically underlie the idea of
humanism as an outcome of long-lasting developments in universal history.
All these principles are ideas of legitimation (including the criticism of
pre-given legitimacy). They can take the form of morality and concerning
rules of behavior, the form of justice and its realization by a set of laws, and
other forms of interpretation, which make human life livable and transform
suffering into activity.
Humanism as it has emerged in the formative period of modernity in the
West is one of these ideas covering most of the enumerated juxtapositions.
It orientates human life
• in the juxtaposition between above and below with the idea of justice
brought into the form of basic human and civil rights;
• in the juxtaposition between center and periphery with the idea of
polycentrism, based on the principle of mutual recognition of cultural
differences;
• in the juxtaposition between men and woman with the principle of
equality;
• in the juxtaposition between young and old with the idea of solicitous-
ness, and especially so with a concept of education and self-cultivation
(Bildung);
• in the juxtaposition between power and powerlessness with the idea of
political equality (so that on principle the dominated can and should
dominate as well);
• in the juxtaposition between the necessity to die and the possibility
to kill with an idea of life in an emphatic meaning (of “humane” or
“good” life and not only biological survival);
• in the juxtaposition between friend and foe with an idea of peace;
• in the juxtaposition between master and servant with the idea of social
equality;
• in the juxtaposition between poor and rich with the idea of suffciency;
• in the juxtaposition between individuality and collectivity with the idea
of mutual recognition;
• in the juxtaposition between conscious and unconscious with an idea
of psychic coherence or stability;
• in the juxtaposition of good and evil with principles of universal morality;
• in the juxtaposition between the inner-worldly and the otherworldly
dimension of human worldview with an idea of the spiritual quality of
human subjectivity;
• and, fnally, in the juxtaposition between the human and the non-
human dimension in categorizing the understanding of reality with the
idea of awe and respect.11
This humanism in its reference to the anthropological universals is a his-

torical peculiarity. In order to make it plausible it is necessary to develop
an idea of an encompassing historical development from archaic to modern
societies and insert it into this development. This idea should bring about
two achievements in historical thinking: It should cover the realm of uni-
versal history in a twofold way – making visible a general line of change by
culturally treating the juxtapositions of human life, and at the same time
making visible fundamental cultural differences.
I will try to outline such an idea in three steps of argumentation:
• frst by depicting basic similarities in archaic societies,

• second by holding up the idea of an evolutionary step of humankind in
the so-called “axial times” of world civilizations,
• third by interpreting the step of humankind into modernity as a second
axial time.
I will not address all juxtapositions in their singularity but concentrate on

one of the fundamental principles of orientating human life in the juxtapo-
sition of its social conditions. It is the principle which is simply derived from
the elementary fact of being a human being. It is not related to one or two
of the juxtapositions, but addresses most, if not all of them. Indeed, there is
no human life form where being a human being does not play a role in the
cultural orientation of life. The meaning of this anthropological universal
has substantially changed in the course of time, of course. It is this change
which may furnish a red thread of historical thinking and be a cue to meet
the demands of coming to terms with the globalizing process of today (as I
have pointed out at the beginning of this chapter).
c) Stages of development
In all cultures at all times and places in the world human life is morally reg-
ulated by a clear distinction between good and evil and by related principles
of human conduct.12 The ability for such a distinction and its application to
human agency presupposes a certain idea of what it means to be a human
being13: Humans are defned as persons; they are individuals with a physi-
cal and psychic continuity. As such they are responsible for what they do or
fail to do – at least on the level of everyday life. This responsibility furnishes
every human being with the quality of dignity (as we would express it in
our modern language). This “dignity” demands respect and recognition in
all social contexts of life.14
This idea of a substantial moral quality in every human being is based on
another anthropologically universal quality of humans, namely the ability
to change one’s own perspective of perception and interpretation by taking
over the perspectives of others. The humanistic idea, or the idea of “dig-
nity” of man, is anthropologically rooted in the human ability of making
decisions in the tension between good and evil and in the ability for empa-
thy. This anthropological quality demands forms of human cooperation,
which, across all cultural differences, are important for the social organi-
zation of human life.
Out of these roots grows the tree of human culture with its numerous
branches and leaves. In order to come closer to its multitude and variety
some basic temporal differentiations are useful. They are very abstract, but
for the concept of universal history, extremely necessary, so that this multi-
tude and variety can be placed in it and get its historical meaning.
a Archaic societies
Archaic societies are the oldest ones. In the framework of a human-
istic philosophy of history they can be generally characterized by their
cultural defnition what a human being is, namely: only the people of
one’s own community own this quality. The people living beyond one’s
own sphere of life are not perceived as human; they are lacking essen-
tial elements of one’s own humanity.15
The cultural rules of this form of life are characterized by the im-
perative to keep up tradition, to inscribe it into the minds and hearts
of one’s people and by all means to continue it. Social interrelationship
is cultivated according to the principle of reciprocity. Morality is not
universal but split into ethical principles of treating one’s own people
(pre-scribing this reciprocity) on the one hand and the exploitation and
subjugation of those outside on the other. Slavery and cannibalism are
speaking examples.
b Axial time societies
The term “axial time” implies a fundamental change in human world-
view.16 It goes along with changes in the other dimensions of human
life as well, of course. Taking all these developments together one can
speak of the new life form of so-called “advanced civilizations”. They
came about at different times in different places, (but roughly between
600 BC and 600 AC). As life-forms they share essential elements, qual-
ities and factors, which defne their epoch-making historical novelty.
For the purpose of my argumentation the most important quality in
this change is the universalization of the idea of humankind. Now not
only one’s own people are humans with their special abilities, but (prin-
cipally) all the other members of the human race are endowed with this
quality as well.
This cultural turn of the axial times is characterized by a new way
of distinguishing and interrelating the human self, from the divine and
the sub-human world, or the human, extra-human, and super-human
sphere of reality. These spheres become more separated, and therefore
their interrelationship develops new forms of cultural activities. For
the cultural orientation of practical life, the most important change
lies in the transformation of the divine world into a new dimension
of transcendence and the increase in subjectivity of the human self. In
this respect the universalization of the moral quality of being a human
being is, at the same time, a subjectivation of the human self. Univer-
salizing humankind is a consequence of the new transcendent character
of the divine. God is no longer the God of one people (when the others
have another God of their own), but the God of every human being.
This is evident in the monotheistic religions, which emerge in the evo-
lutionary step of axial time. But it applies as well to the previous axial
time transformations of archaic societies into advanced civilizations.
In Buddhism, Hinduism, Confucianism, and Daoism, for instance, the
use of the idea of a metaphysical order allows to interpret the world.
This order is not simply evident for the senses but requires intellectual
efforts to apply them to human affairs. It is expressed using highly ab-
stract and universal concepts or principles like Dharma, Brahma, Dao,
Li, Logos. These are evident, true, and obligatory for everybody.
The evolutionary step of axial times has brought about an increase
in transcendence and in subjectivity. Both together give humanity a
new cultural shape. In the perspective of humanism this shape shows
an increase in humanity. The moral quality of being a human becomes
humanized. A very speaking example for this axial time humanism is
Confucianism and its moral principle of “ren” (benevolence).17 Moral-
ity bears its own universalism, expressed by the “golden rule”. In both
cases humanity broke the constraints of ethnicity.18 This is expressed
in central statements of the different axial time religions (we call them
“world religions”). In the Christian relationship between the single in-
dividual and God all differences among men vanish19; and it is possible
to say that the killing of one single human being tackles humankind in
general. 20
For the philosophical perspective of universal history, the para-
digm of axial times ensues the existence of a second epoch after the
frst epoch, the breakthrough of which we have just mentioned. This
is characterized by the universalization and, at the same time, by the
subjectivation of humankind vis-à-vis an “objectivation” of the world.
One point in this philosophical perspective should be emphasized: in
difference and deviating from the traditional philosophy of history – as
it is represented by Kant or Hegel, the epoch-defning feature of the
axial time theory addresses the variety of cultures besides each other
and does not attribute the philosophical importance of change only
to one of them (in a temporal sequence with others). This quality of
multifariousness is the reason why the axial times theory is so impor-
tant for historical thinking in our era of globalization. It synthesizes a
universal approach to history with an interest in difference, multitude,
and diversity.
In this respect the axial time evolutionary turn in universal history
can be regarded as a step to the solution of the problems of intercultural
communication today. But its universalization and subjectivation of
humans and objectivation of the world in manifold different life forms
is only a step in the right direction. Cultural difference remains in the
universalized forms of humankind. (It can even be an issue within
themselves, not only an observation from an outsider’s perspective.)
Different cultures refer to each other (if at all) in a negative way. One’s
own idea of universalism is thought to be the real, the true one; the oth-
ers are either a deviation or simply wrong. In a very radical form this is
the case in the monotheistic concepts of religious belief. One almighty
and all-encompassing God excludes every other divine being; only one’s
own belief is true; the others’ belief is not only perceived as different
(as in polytheism), but as wrong. And it is rather easy to devaluate the
value of humanity of the others because of their differing belief.
The universalism of axial time civilizations in understanding man
and his relationship to the divine world (the guaranty of the order of
his life) is an exclusive one. This exclusion causes tensions and clashes,
but since the different civilizations used to live apart from each other,
they didn’t endanger the plausibility of the single universalisms and
their shaping of subjectivity nor the ensuing awareness of nature and
the human world. For thousands of years this coexistence of living be-
side each other has prevailed. Even today on the everyday life level, it
is still the dominant form of intercultural relationship, even in intel-
lectual discourse. But it has no future, since globalization means that
the different life forms and their cultural regulations come closer and
closer together, and they may even merge.
On the level of creating meaning it is a question of common survival
whether this exclusiveness can be overcome and even changed into its
contrary. This exactly is a question of modernity, and I think that mod-
ern humanism as it was established in the West at the end of the 18th
and the beginning of the 19th century is one frst attempt to fnd an an-
swer. I don’t say that it is already an adequate answer, 21 but it indicates
its possibility and therefore it indicates the direction of further histori-
cal development in the perspective of a philosophy of universal history.
Modernity as a second axial time
The step to modernity took place all over the world. It was taken
under the strong infuence of Western culture, but it was more and dif-
ferently practiced than only a process of westernization. To describe
it one should follow Shmuel Eisenstadt’s proposal – one of the most
prominent representatives of axial time theory – and speak of “mul-
tiple modernities” instead of one single unifying modernity. 22 In the
framework of a philosophy of history this idea of a multitude of mo-
dernities, as it has already been applied to the concept of axial time,
should be translated and transferred into the characterization of mo-
dernity as the third great epoch in universal history. This can easily
be done on the philosophical level, since the change to this epoch is
a change in the logic of the already achieved (multiple) universalism
in understanding humanity. I think that we can identify a lot of fac-
tual and theoretical evidence of the specifc character of modernity
as a shift from exclusive to inclusive universalisms in understanding
mankind.
An established paradigm of this inclusive humanism is not yet in
view. But single elements of this paradigm can already be identifed.
A universalistic dimension of understanding humankind has already
been established in the previous epoch, and there are no reasons for
giving it up in favor of any kind of relativism. (Relativism may be useful
to criticize dogmatic universalisms, but vis-à-vis the globalization pro-
cess it proves as an intellectual hands-up in the clash of civilizations,
which yields the efforts of solving intercultural tensions to the power
game of politics.)
But what about the inclusive character of this universalism? How can
its historically pre-given logic of exclusion be changed into a completely
contrary one? We can observe developments in cultural orientation,
which may demonstrate the feasibility of this change. I can’t give a
systematic account of these developments; this would demand an elab-
orate theory of modernity in the realm of cultural sense-generation ori-
entation, but I can explicate signs and examples of a historical process
of establishing inclusive universalisms in conceptualizing and under-
standing humanity. One of the strongest indications is, of course, mod-
ern Western humanism. Though this humanism has its shortcomings,
it has a strong merit; it has brought about ideas of inclusiveness, which
could be interculturally accepted. 23 In the beginning of this chapter I
have already mentioned some of these ideas. The most convincing of
these is Kant’s idea of human dignity – that every human being is more
than only a means to the purpose of others, but a purpose within him-
or herself. Difference in cultural orientation belongs to this dignity,
but we should not overlook at the same time, that dignity is a crite-
rion for criticizing cultural orientations which violate basic elements
of humanity.
As I have outlined it in this chapter, philosophy of history is such an
element of inclusive universalism. When refecting modernity, it con-
tributes to the cultural efforts to give modernization – in the guise of
globalization – a direction into the future. Here the hope for estab-
lishing humane factors in the cultural orientation of human life has
a strong voice. The academic discourse may contribute to this, if it
picks up the challenge of globalization concerning cultural identity
and works on an answer of humanism. Here otherness and selfshness
should be designed as enriching each other in their interrelationship in
the framework of a shared idea of what it means to be a human being.
Notes
1 See the special issue on “The Interaction between Self and the Others in the Age
of Globalization”, in: Taiwan Journal of East Asian Studies 7.2 (Issue 14), Dec.
2010.
2 Friese (Ed.): Identities – Time, Difference, and Boundaries, 2002; Straub (Ed.):
Narration, Identity, and Historical Consciousness, 2005.
3 Osterhammel; Petersson: Globalization: A Short History, 2009.
4 A teaching example of this difference (between Germany and the United States)
is presented by Abelshauser: The Dynamics of German Industry, 2005.
5 See Rüsen; Laass (Eds): Humanism in Intercultural Perspective, 2009.
6 Man as a person, i.e., as the subject of a morally-practical reason, is exalted
above all price. For such a one (homo noumenon) he is not to be valued merely
as a means to the ends of other people, or even to his own ends, but is to be
prized as an end in himself. This is to say, he possesses a dignity (an absolute
inner worth) whereby he exacts the respect of all other rational beings in the
world, can measure himself against each member of his species, and can esteem
himself on a footing of equality with them (Kant: Metaphysik der Sitten, A93
[1797]. English: http://praxeology.net/kant7.htm [07-04-20].
7 In this respect the philosophy of history by Johann Gottfried Herder, an antago-
nist of Kant, is paradigmatic: Herder: Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der
Menschheit [1784-91], 2002 [Ideas for the Philosophy of History of Human-
ity]: Nur Zeiten, nur Örter und Nationalcharaktere, kurz, das ganze Zusam-
menwirken lebendiger Kräfte in ihrer bestimmtesten Individualität entscheidet,
wie über alle Erzeugungen der Natur, so über alle Ereignisse im Menschenre-
iche. Lasset uns dies herrschende Gesetz der Schöpfung in das Licht stellen, das
ihm gebühret.
(Only times, only places, and national characters – in short, the whole concur-
rence of vital forces in their most distinctive individuality decides upon all events
in the realm of humanity as it decides upon all creatures of nature. Let us put this
dominating law of creation into the light which is due to it. Book 12, chapter 6).
8 See Rüsen: Traditionsprobleme eines zukunftsfähigen Humanismus, 2009.
9 I owe Reinhart Koselleck and Christoph Antweiler a lot of inspiration. See
Koselleck: Historik und Hermeneutik, 1987; also in: Koselleck: Zeitschichten,
2000, pp. 97–118; Antweiler: Muster im Meer der Vielfalt, 2011.
10 A more general juxtaposition would be between agency and suffering.
11 Johann Wolfgang von Goethe has presented this idea as the guiding rule in the
“pedagogical province” of his novel “Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre” [Wil-
helm Meister’s Journeyman Years, 1829]. [Goethe: Wilhelm Meister’s Travels,
1991].
12 I mainly refer to Antweiler: Pankulturelle Universalien – Basis für einen inklu-
siven Humanismus?, 2010.
13 A logical confrmation of this anthropological universal is given by Gethmann:
The Special Status of the Human Being as a Topic of Practical Philosophy,
2004.
14 Müller: Das kleine Dorf und die große Welt, 2004.
15 Klaus E. Müller had characterized this excluding particular universality of be-
ing a human being in archaic societies with the term “Eigenweltverabsoluti-
erung” (setting one’s own world as absolute): Müller: Einleitung, 1983, p. 15.
16 The following part is mainly based on the work of Shmuel N. Eisenstadt. Id.:
(Ed.): The Origins and Diversity of Axial Age Civilizations, 1986; see Arnason;
Eisenstadt; Wittrock (Eds.): Axial Civilisations and World History, 2005.
17 See Huang: Humanism in East Asian Confucian Contexts, 2010.
18 It is important to note that “evolution” does not mean that the older forms of
cultural orientation dissolve and vanish. They remain in very different manifes-
tation, including vast regions of the subconscious. But they change their place
in the framework of culture. Ethnicity in modern time, e.g., is different from
ethnicity in archaic societies.
19 Most characteristic are the word of St. Paul: “There is neither Jew nor Greek,
there is neither bond nor free, there is neither male nor female, for ye are all one
in Christ Jesus” (Gal. 3,28).
20 See Quran 5,32: We decreed for the Children of Israel that whosoever killeth a
human being for other than manslaughter or corruption in the earth, it shall be
as if he had killed all mankind, and whoso saveth the life of one, it shall be as
if he had saved the life of all mankind.
21 I have criticized this modern Western humanism in the perspective of the de-
mands for intercultural communication in the era of globalization and else-
where. See Rüsen: Traditionsprobleme eines zukunftsfähigen Humanismus,
2009.
22 Eisenstadt: Multiple Modernities, 2000.
23 See the contributions of Chakrabarty; Arkoun; Zhang in Rüsen; Laass (Eds.):
Humanism in Intercultural Perspective, 2009.
7 Humanism in response to the
Holocaust – destruction or
innovation?
So far we have pursued our option for a new worldwide humanism, but
it still should brave the harsh experiences of history. It is rather easy to
postulate humanistic values as a guideline for intercultural encounter and
communication, but it is diffcult to make this humanistic set of values plau-
sible, to bring it down to earth, and to give it a place in real life, and make it
effective in the course of history. And the harshest proof among many in the
historical abyss will be the Holocaust. So it is the intention of this chapter to
confront this plea with the historical experience of the Holocaust.
As I have already pointed out several times, there are a lot of arguments in
favor of creating a new humanism to solve the problem of intercultural com-
munication in the globalizing process of today. In this process, different cul-
tural traditions should come to terms with their difference. At the same time,
they should be acquainted with the necessity of a trans- or cross-cultural set
of values, which can solve conficts in a peaceful and sustainable way. I don’t
believe, of course, that conficts mainly are a matter of values or cultural
orientations, but culture plays an important role in them: It articulates con-
ficts, gives them sense and meaning by interpretation, and it is necessary to
solve them according to dominant patterns of signifcance and interpretation.
These patterns allow or prevent the search for peaceful solutions; they decide
whether human interaction is fundamentally or even exclusively driven by
a blind will to power, or whether the human will to power has “an eye” of
thinking and refecting, which gives human agency a sense-directed inten-
tion, referring to acts of understanding and a search for alternatives.
Such an anthropology, where culture – the human ability of making
sense of the world – is not simply a tool for pursuing interests but also a
mode of conceptualizing them, is a basis for a new humanism. This human-
ism is a framework of cultural orientation, which confronts the conficts
and clashes between different cultural traditions with a comprehensive idea
of humankind. It includes a general and fundamental normative quality
of human life. Humankind is both: the widest horizon of the validity of
social norms and the widest horizon of experiencing human life. It has a
normative and an empirical dimension, which can only be artifcially dis-
tinguished from each other.
Humanism in response to the Holocaust 81
Humanism is an explication of this synthesis. It can be expressed in the
Kantian formulation: that every human being is not only a means for the
purposes of others, but a purpose in itself.1 The normative meaning of this
statement is clear: Human intersubjectivity should be guided by the rule
that everyone should recognize everybody else as a subject of his or her
own, with his or her own will and ability to guide it by sense- and mean-
ingful intentions. The empirical meaning of this statement articulates an
approach to the vast feld of culture, where these intentions have become
manifest in different life forms changing in space and time.
There is an established category of this synthesis of regulating and ex-
periencing human life in the vast variety of its cultural orientations: It is
history. According to my defnition, history presents humankind as a realm
of experience and as a realm of normativity, called ethics. And here lies the
problem of humanism: It inevitably refers to history, and it is this reference
which confronts it with a sharp difference between a general ethical rule of
human conduct and the reality of human life. The awareness of difference
is not new, but its austerity is.
This difference has two sides: First the variety and even heterogeneity
of value systems in human life contradicts the idea of a universal valid
humanistic value system. Since this variety includes different humanisms
with claims for universal validity, any approach to this validity creates con-
ficts and clashes. To avoid them, the only plausible and realistic humanism
seems to be relativistic.
History may have a second objection to humanism, and this is the overall
and obvious fact of human inhumanity. The Holocaust is a paradigm for
this inhumanity. 2 It represents it in utmost radicality. Its logic is the ethno-
centric asymmetrical evaluation in distinguishing between self and other-
ness, between belonging together and being different from others. And its
factuality is the murder of six million people. They were robbed of their
quality of being human by an imposed defnition of their identity, which
condemned them to death. It is the ethnocentric negation of the victims’
status as human beings. Thus, their ascribed identity meant their deaths.
(As to the problem of difference and relativism it can’t be treated in the
context of my consideration of the importance of the Holocaust experience
for the new worldwide humanism. I only can indicate a possible solution:
One should establish a meta-level of normativity referring to the level of
cultural diversity.3 On this meta-level, diversity can be affrmed and, at the
same time, overcome in a universal rule. It is a meta-rule of mutual recog-
nition of cultural difference in intercultural communication.4)
But what about the Holocaust experience? It is the Holocaust as a world-
wide accepted paradigm of inhumanity, which seems to negate any attempt
to a humanistic world view. Has the tradition of Western humanism not
been murdered in Auschwitz? Doesn’t its effect as “Zivilisationsbruch”
(rupture of civilization)5 forbid any idea of humanism as one of the tradi-
tional essentials of Western culture?
82 Humanism in response to the Holocaust
As a historical fact, the Holocaust indeed negates universal humanism in
a twofold way of dehumanizing: It dehumanizes victims and the perpetra-
tors as well. The victims are robbed of their humanity and physically killed,
and the perpetrators mentally killed their own humanity by dehumanizing
and killing the others. The relationship among them is asymmetrical, of
course; it is characterized by the difference between suffering and acting.
By only looking at the dehumanization of victims and perpetrators, the
Holocaust is presented in a too narrow perspective. In its social context
one should consider those who profted from it and those who were the
bystanders. Both groups shared the process of dehumanization in general
in different degrees. Profting from the dehumanization of others dehuman-
izes those who proft from this but witnessing the acts of dehumanization
and keeping distance and neutrality breaks the humanity of the bystanders,
which they share with the victims.
How can humanism, which claims a universal normative quality for
every human being simply because he or she is a human being, come to
terms with this experience of radical and universal dehumanization?
On a meta-historical level Dan Diner’s thesis that the Holocaust repre-
sents a “rupture of civilization” should be taken seriously. How is it possible
to formulate this thesis? As long as such a thesis can be understood in the
context of Western humanism, namely a claim or even a lamentation of its
negation, the possibility of a “new” humanism is at least not unthinkable.
This can easily be proven by the frst and most convincing answer to the
question what the Holocaust means for humanism, namely the normative
statement that this should never happen again. Such a statement refers to
the basic humanistic principle that men cannot be treated in the way they
were treated in the Holocaust. Adorno called this appeal a new categorical
imperative and described it as the essence of our relationship to the Holo-
caust.6 But does this appeal represent the new humanism we need for our
cultural orientation? I don’t think so. The reason is that it destroys the syn-
thesis between the empirical and the normative dimensions and elements
of humanism. It stands for its contrary, since it simply states a dichotomy
between fact and norm, experience and value, between that which is the
case and that which ought to be. It weakens the normative elements of
humanism to a sheer postulate, which is spared from reality and puts the
burden of inhumanity on the realm of historical experience. We may call
Adorno’s idea a desperate humanism, which attributes to it only a negative
meaning, that there should not be any inhumanity, without saying a word
of what humanism could or should be.
A plausible humanism should overcome this form of an abstract and neg-
ative appeal. There is no way leading around or against history as long as
humanism synthesizes normativity and experience into the idea of histor-
ical dynamics, which includes the present and gives a stimulating future
perspective. But when we refer to history don’t we apply historical sense cri-
teria to the Holocaust to make it compatible with humanism? Indeed, if we
simply continued the traditional procedure of historical sense-generation
we would miss the challenge of the Holocaust as a historical event.7 It
would deprive it of its traumatic character, by which it destroys all his-
torical sense criteria that would provide the temporal chain between past,
present, and future with a continuous meaning expressed in the form of a
coherent narrative.
Modern historical thinking has mainly conceptualized this meaning of
history as essentially humanistic. And it is this inherent inner-worldly sec-
ular humanism which has lost its credibility by the events of inhumanity in
the history of 20th century, culminating in the Holocaust.
So the only way of keeping up the reference of humanism to history is
to reconceptualize historical thinking. We should change its sense criteria
and open them to catastrophic experiences of inhumanity strictly running
against the traditional humanism as it has been embedded in the founda-
tion of modern historical thinking to a large extent.
In order to answer the challenge of the Holocaust as a historical event,
and to prepare the ground for a new humanism in historical thinking, a
new strategy of historical sense-generation and a new category of historical
thinking therefore should be introduced. Categories open up dimensions of
experience and possibilities of interpreting them. And sense-generation is
the way such an interpretation is brought about. The new strategy which
should be introduced into historical thinking is mourning, as an intellec-
tual activity and the new category should be suffering.
Considering mourning, we will soon discover that its traditional mean-
ing and understanding is too narrow. It has only been a procedure of emo-
tions directed to personal losses. But in its extended version mourning can
be pursued by thinking as well, and it can address losses in a far-reaching
past. By mourning, the loss of humanity – which the Holocaust has brought
about –may be recognized, and accepted as a fact. By kneading this into our
historical understanding we can become aware of what it means to be hu-
man; thus, the lost humanism is kept present and given a future perspective
in its absence.8
The category of suffering has not played a role in the established tradi-
tions of the humanities and social sciences. A general overview of Western
culture (at least in its intellectual form – less in literature) can lead to the
diagnosis of a deeply rooted and long-lasting tradition of blindness to, or
forgetfulness of suffering. (To forget, if not to suppress, is a way of com-
ing to terms with it.) This is true for historical thinking as well. History
has never neglected the fact that human beings suffer. Hegel, for instance,
characterized world history as a slaughter bench, and Ranke described his
feelings while looking at the surface of human history in the following way:
The multitude of facts can’t be overlooked; their impression is wretched.

We always see how the more powerful one overcomes the weaker till
a more powerful one takes him and destroys him, until the process of
our times has come, which in turn will endure the same. […] Nothing
remains but the feeling of vanity of all things and a disgust for many a
heinous crime, by which men have stained themselves. We don’t see, for
what all these things occurred […].9
Herder wrote a long paragraph on the senselessness of history in his “Re-

fections on the Philosophy of the History of Mankind”10 but all three
thinkers – and they are representative of modern historical thinking (with
a few exceptions like Freud, Foucault, and Girard) – conceptualized his-
torical meaning beyond this senselessness rooted in human suffering.
They even did not use the word “suffering” in a prominent way in spite
of its daily evidence.11 Historical thinking should draw away this veil
of forgetfulness of suffering and tear it into shreds thus opening up the
threatening view at suffering as an anthropological universal in its man-
ifold realizations in the varieties of human life. By suffering I don’t only
think of pain, injustice, brutality, horror, murder, and unpleasant feel-
ings, but of a category of the sense-generating interpretation of the hu-
man world.
This runs strictly against any optimism and triumphalism, which very
often has accompanied the idea of humanism. If humanism were nothing
but a concept of human enhancement, self-empowerment, and the ability to
dominate nature and the human world (which inevitably leads to the idea of
progress in a normative meaning), this humanism has defnitely been killed
in Auschwitz.
But we also should bear in mind that humanism has always been more
and different from simple human self-empowerment. In its origins in stoic
philosophy12 it emphasized fragility (fragilitas) and weakness as charac-
teristics of human nature. Its idea of the normative quality of being a
human being has always related to this insuffciency of human nature.
To Cicero man’s characteristic qualities were fragility, vulnerability, and
fallibility. In modern times the greatest representatives of humanism have
declared this insuffciency not only as constitutive for human culture, but
as an insurmountable limit to its development. In Kant’s “Idea of a uni-
versal History with a cosmopolitan intent” (from 1786), this modesty of
humanism is expressed in the context of a philosophy of history, which
presents progress as a leading criterion of historical sense. And it is exactly
in this context of what we are used to call enlightenment’s optimism that
Kant says: “One cannot fashion something absolutely straight from wood
that is as crooked as that of which man is made”.13 In the 20th century,
Emmanuel Levinas has found similar words for human nature: “The I
is, from head to toe, to the core of his bones, vulnerability”.14 Instead of
self-empowerment humanism stressed the vulnerability of every human
being as a key source of social solidarity. It requires cultural power to
overcome this fragility and to bring about a livable life. This overcoming
means education, and education means cultivation. The culture of this
cultivation is based on the principles of equality; and the ability of organ-
izing one’s life according to plausible sense criteria is principally shared by
the others in one’s own social context.
This is a rather abstract and ideal typological characterization of human-
ism, ignoring its historical variety. I only want to stress the aspect of the
fragility and vulnerability of human life as a starting point for the concepts
of humane values in human nature. They lead to the need for education,
self-cultivation, and social solidarity.
In respect to the Holocaust we should not only stress this anthropolog-
ical starting point. We should radicalize it to the fundamental concept
of a fundamental fallibility of men. This meets one of the most threat-
ening items of our knowledge of the perpetrators and victims. Yehuda
Bauer articulated this insight into the fundamental potentials of the hu-
man mind by the remarkable words: “I have learned for myself, that we
all have small parts of Adolf Eichmann and Heinrich Himmler within
us, but we also have small parts of helpers within us”.15 And in respect
to the victims we know from shocking examples, how easily they can
become perpetrators themselves.16 So we should realize that the perpe-
trators are normal people – people like ourselves17 – and that the victims
rather easily can become perpetrators. It depends upon the circumstances
whether “normal” human beings – even human beings who feel commit-
ted to humanistic values – become inhumane and commit crimes against
humanity.
Fragility as an anthropological universal includes moral ambivalence.18
Therefore humanism can no longer present the normative quality of being
a human being as a natural gift to humankind. Instead it depends upon
circumstances and is not a reliable disposition of the human mind, but a
matter of will and decision of the human subject. Suffering can be relieved
at the cost of others or by intersubjective cooperation. What prevails is a
matter of contingency. In his statement Yehuda Bauer went on by pointing
to this contingency as a manifestation of human freedom: “It depends upon
us, what decision we make and whether a new genocide will occur. Eich-
mann is a horrible warning”.
This categorical revision of the anthropological foundations of human-
ism does not give up its traditional categories of freedom and reason. It
only attributes to them a more contingent and ambivalent quality. Free-
dom is still a valid element since the humane values are a matter of the
free will. But this will is now put into conditioning contexts with an
overwhelming determining power. And reason keeps it as a fundamental
dependency of the free will upon the world view and its inbuilt rules
of conduct in the minds of people. Even the most horrible crimes were
committed within a framework of values the perpetrators claimed for
themselves.19
When remaining in the realm of its (idealistic) tradition, humanism has
become one-sided, and in its universalism simply Euro-centric.20 In order
to enlarge its scope for the purpose of intercultural communication today,
the traditional categories of freedom and reason should be changed into
anthropologically universal ones. In the case of freedom this is rather sim-
ple: Every human being tends to oppose dependence from foreigners and
strangers. Humans only accept a life-form, which they think of as their
own. Reason can be understood as the ability of men to argue in order to
make their claims for plausibility acceptable. This ability is a universal ele-
ment of human culture.
Traditionally, suffering as a feature of humanity has vanished in the con-
cept of a humane culture. Today we should emphasize this feature. It ought
to be applied even more to the traditionally pre-given concepts of human-
ism. Suffering can be relieved, but never overcome. This anthropological
insight makes humanism modest. It prevents the human mind from the
typical modern human self-esteem of seeking (in the words of Max Weber)
to dominate everything by calculation. 21 Humanism has traditionally in-
cluded this attitude of domination (mainly in respect to nature, but only in
a somewhat limited way). 22 According to nature it was the idea of a cosmo-
logical order, which stands for harmony, and in respect to the human world
it was the idea of human dignity, which limited domination through a set of
basic human and civil rights. Both limitations should be re-conceptualized
in respect to the new insights into the fallibility of the human mind as a
starting point for a new humanism. They should be strengthened, radi-
calized, and historized according to the conditioning power of historical
contexts.
The Holocaust as historical experience does not only stand for the an-
thropological universal of suffering. In its traumatic character it also stands
for senselessness as an integral part of historical sense-generation. This
senselessness breaks the coherence of a thoroughly meaningful narrative
in historical interpretation and representation. It evokes ruptures and inco-
herence in the narrative formation of history. It defnitively gives it an open
form concerning its meaning within the cultural framework of human life,
open for failure as well as for success. What does this mean for a plausible
concept of humanism? Humanism should enclose a fundamental ambiva-
lence into its concept of the normative dimension of being a human being.
This corroborates the potential of inhumanity in humankind’s vulnerabil-
ity and fallibility. 23
This does not mean skepticism concerning the cultural power of hu-
manism. It only distinctly hints at the individual’s subjective responsibility.
It shapes it into the feature of practical reason transgressing the hitherto
developed forms of cultural life. It criticizes any established tradition of
humanism as a fxed element of cultural orientation missing something. It
makes it restless and gives it a utopian transcendence.
Does this utopian element not move humanism away from history? Does
it not pull away the ground of historical experience from under its feet?
This would only be the case if history were traditionally understood as the
contrary of utopia. But this juxtaposition is not valid. 24 Elements of exu-
berance belong to social reality, and they should be realized as such when
humanism refers to history.
The increase of contingency and discontinuity in historical thinking 25
brought about by the traumatic experience of the Holocaust demands a
new awareness of contra-factual concepts of sense and meaning in human
life and its impact on the process of historical developments. This is not the
same as a plea for a revitalization of traditional modern utopian thinking.
On the contrary, the confounding mixture of negating pre-given conditions
and circumstances of human life and, at the same time, of presenting a uto-
pian vision in the form of a program for political and social practice, has
led to the crimes against humanity in modern societies.
In respect to these historical experiences the end of utopia has been pro-
claimed after 1989, at latest. But exuberance is an anthropological uni-
versal, which can’t be wiped out from the human culture of an unlimited
pragmatism. Pragmatism without visions of humanity is empty. At the
same time, visions of humanity without pragmatism are inhumane since
they neglect the fundamental vulnerability and fallibility of the cultural
nature of humankind.
This brings a new relationship between humanism and religion into con-
sideration. Humanism has always had a critical relationship to religion. 26
As far as religious transcendence limited or even negated the value of hu-
man life, humanism has defended this value against all religious attempts
to outbid it. With this claim in the long run it was rather successful as
an essential part of Enlightenment. On the brink of modernity humanism
belonged to those cultural forces which established the secular life form
of a modern civil society. But religion did not vanish in this life form, nei-
ther did it dissolve into a universal morality. This dissolution was expected
by the Enlightenment, and later predicted by prominent sociologists (like
Max Weber), who foresaw an irreversible trend of rationalization and dis-
enchantment inherent in the modernization process. Yet religion prevailed
as a specifc relationship to the divine world with the promising power of
redemption, or it turned into a secular form and became a political and
social ideology of inner-worldly redemption, covering human suffering by
a forced happiness. 27
However, traditional humanism under-estimated the internal ambiva-
lence of humanity and the potential of inhumanism lurking in the depths
of the human mind and the cries for redemption. The implausibility of
secular religions (they remain a contradiction in themselves) and the ina-
bility of secular humanism to overcome the potential of inhumanity in the
human mind, has led to a new constellation in the relationship between
humanism and religion. In an unbroken continuity humanism still should
civilize all religious ideas of the divine world, limiting or relativizing the
internal value of being a human being. But in a new way humanism can
open religious forces, which may strengthen these values by the power of
religious belief. Religion, however, should reshape its forms of belief in the
context of a secular life form with a humanistic cultural orientation. It
should be stripped of its temptation to use political power for universaliz-
ing its peculiar form of belief at the cost of other forms of belief, including
secularism.
So, I may conclude that the Holocaust experience endows humanism
with an increased realism concerning the inbuilt inhumanity in the human
mind. And at the same time and as the other side of the same coin, it fur-
nishes humanism with an increase in the exuberant forces of the human
mind, which will always be challenged by its potentials to decide between
good and evil. So, it never will be satisfed with pre-given forms of human
life and their unavoidable insuffciencies. It will permanently inspire them
by the desire to imprint humanity into the mind of every human being.
Notes
1 “Man in the system of nature (homo phaenomenon, animal rationale) is a being
of little signifcance and, along, with the other animals, considered as products
of the earth, has an ordinary value […]. But man as a person, i.e., as the
subject of a morally-practical reason, is exalted above all price. For such one
(homo noumenon) is not to be valued merely as a means to the ends of other
people, or even to his own ends, but is to be prized as an end in himself. This is
to say, he possesses a dignity (an absolute inner worth) whereby he exacts the
respect of all other rational beings in the world, can measure himself against
each member of his species, and can esteem himself on a footing of equality
with them. The humanity in one’s own person is the object of the respect which
he can require of every other being, but which he also must not forfeit. Conse-
quently, he can and should value himself by a measure at once small and great,
according to which he regards himself as a sensible being (according to his ani-
mal nature) or as an intelligible nature (according to his moral predisposition).
But since he must regard himself not merely as a person in general but also as
a man, i.e., as a person having duties which his own reason has imposed upon
him, his insignifcance as a human animal cannot injure the consciousness of
his dignity as a rational man. And he should not disavow the moral self-esteem
of such a being, i.e., he should pursue his end (which in itself is a duty) neither
cringingly nor servilely (animo servili) as though seeking favour, nor should he
deny his dignity; but, rather, he should always pursue his end with an aware-
ness of the sublimity of his moral nature (and such awareness is already con-
tained in the concept of virtue). This self-esteem is a duty of man to himself.
[…]” – Kant: The Metaphysics of Morals, 1797, p. 93: English translation at
http://praxeology.net/kant7.htm [27-06-07].
2 Fritz Stern has called it “the universal potential of humankind for evil” (“das
universelle Potential der Menschheit zum Bösen”). See Stern: Fünf Deutschland
und ein Leben, 2007, p. 10.
3 See Rüsen: Culture: Universalism, Relativism or What Else?, 2004.
4 For a broader presentation of this thesis see Rüsen: How to Overcome Ethno-
centrism, 2004.
5 Diner: Zivilisationsbruch, 1988.
6 Adorno, Negative Dialektik, 1977, pp. 356, 358.
7 See Rüsen: Krise, Trauma, Identität, 2001; id.: The Logic of Historization,
2005; id.: Holocaust-Memory and German Identity, 2005.
8 A more detailed argument can be found in Rüsen: Trauer als historische Kate-
gorie, 1996, pp. 57–78; id.: Historisch trauern – Skizze einer Zumutung, 2001,
pp. 63–84. See also Rüsen: Trauma and Mourning in Historical Thinking,
2004, pp. 10–21.
9 Ranke: Vorlesungseinleitungen, 1975, p. 185 sq.
10 Herder: Refections on the Philosophy of the History of Mankind, 1968, Part
3, Book 15, Introduction.
11 This is the case even today. A short overview of prominent encyclopaedias
of the humanities and social sciences show a remarkable lack of the entry
“suffering”.
12 I mainly refer to the work of Cancik: Humanismus, 1993, pp. 173–185; id.: En-
trohung und Barmherzigkeit, 2003; id.: Dignity of Man, 2002; Humanismus,
1993; Europa – Antike – Humanismus, 2011.
13 Idea for a Universal History with Cosmopolitan Purpose, translated by T. M.
Green and H. Hudson, frst published 1786, sixth principal; www.everything2.
com/index.pl?node_id=929350 [27-06-07].
14 Levinas: Humanismus des anderen Menschen, 1989, p. 94 (“Das Ich ist, vom
Scheitel bis zur Sohle, bis ins Mark seiner Knochen, Verwundbarkeit”).
15 “Ich habe für mich gelernt, daß wir alle kleine Teile von Adolf Eichmann und
Heinrich Himmler in uns haben, wir haben aber auch kleine Teile der Retter
in uns. Und es hängt von uns ab, welche Entscheidungen wir treffen und ob es
einen neuen Genozid geben wird. Eichmann ist eine fürchterliche Warnung”.
Interview in Der Spiegel 10/2000, p. 38. [My translation.] – Fritz Stern, a prom-
inent Jewish historian who had left Germany early enough not to become a
victim of the Holocaust, has confrmed this insight: “I have come to the con-
viction that no country is immune to the seduction of such pseudo-religious
movements” (Fünf Deutschland und ein Leben, 2007, p. 10.)
16 Sack: An Eye for an Eye, 1993.
17 Cf. Welzer: Täter, 2005.
18 “Die Erfahrung zeigt sowohl für das individuelle wie für das gesellschaftliche
Leben, daß wir in besonderer Gefahr zum Bösen sind, wenn wir gar zu sehr
das ‘Gute’ wollen […]” (Müller-Hohagen: Verleugnet, verdrängt, verschwiegen,
2005, p. 229).
19 Welzer called this framework “ethics” – and in a neutral meaning this word
addresses the interpretative power of the human mind which can be addressed
as reason (in a perverted way, of course, according to our understanding) – the
ability to make sense of one’s own life even in its darkest abysses.
20 I thank Ranjan Seth for this critical hint.
21 Weber: Wissenschaft als Beruf, 1994, p. 9.
22 Cf. Rüsen: Humanism and Nature – Some Refections on a Complex Relation-
ship, 2007.
23 It is not very easy to accept this anthropological fundamental without defning
humanism as a way to overcome it (an example can be found in Küenzlen: Der
neue Mensch, 1997, p. 222). But exactly such a “humanistic” attempt inevita-
bly leads into inhumane behavior. A real end of human fragility and fallibility
can only be conceptualized in a totalitarian way. This kind of “humanism”
leads to its contrary.
24 Cf. Rüsen: Rethinking Utopia: A Plea for a Culture of Inspiration, 2005.
25 My argumentation comes rather close to ideas of Jacob Lomranz on
“Aintegration”. See Lomranz: An Image of Aging and the Concept of Ainte-
gration, 1998.
26 A topical example is Reemtsma: Muß man Religiosität respektieren?, 2005; id.:
Christen und wir. Einige Gedanken aus gegebenem Anlaß, 2005.
27 See Küenzlen: Der neue Mensch, 1997.
8 Humanism and nature – some
refections on a complex
relationship
1 What has humanism to do with nature?

What has humanism to do with nature or even with ecology? In order to
answer this question, I would like to start with some remarks about what
humanism is1: Humanism is an idea of the cultural nature of human beings,
an attitude of intersubjectivity and a historical tradition mainly in the West
referring to certain values and forms of discourse. As an idea it emphasizes
specifc values, which are ascribed to all humans in all times and spaces. At
the core of these values there is a high esteem of the simple fact that some-
body is human. In the West we call that core value human dignity. In his
philosophy of morality Immanuel Kant expressed it in the following way:
Each human being should not only be considered as a means for purposes
of somebody else, but as a purpose in him- or herself. 2
Evidently, in this description of humanism “nature” does not occur. On
the contrary, humanism exclusively refers to all those attributes and qual-
ities of man by which he or she essentially differs from nature. But never-
theless, this difference is a reference, and it has a lot of consequences for
human self-understanding and man’s attitude towards nature.
Thus, the frst reference of humanism to nature is owed to the human-
istic idea of what it means to be a human being. Here the difference made
between nature and culture is decisive: The special values ascribed to the
humans are an essential cultural matter and not a natural one. In the older
idea of humanism, they may be given to man by nature, but with their
culture humans transgress the realm of nature and become a species of its
own, essentially being different from all other natural beings. This repeats
and confrms the frst reference.
A second reference to nature can be detected in the topical discussion
about humanism. Here humanism is defned as the opposite of naturalism,
which means that we cannot understand what humans are by simply refer-
ring to their biological qualities.
A third reference to nature occurs in the discussion about humanism,
as soon as the ecological crisis of today comes up. Here we can fnd argu-
ments pointing at an inbuilt destructive element in the Western tradition of
92 Humanism and nature
humanism. It says that in this tradition men are put into a relationship to
nature which is defned by exploitation and destruction. Humanism is ac-
cused of being a cultural reason for the disastrous form in which the culture
of modernity refers to nature. It is said to have brought about the crisis or
even the catastrophe of our ecological situation. By emphasizing the dignity
of man humanism renounces an acceptable relationship of man and na-
ture. Descartes’ idea that man is “master and owner of nature” (maitre et
posesseur de la nature) expresses this relationship. It robs human life of its
natural quality as being part of an overall encompassing nature.
Fourth and fnally nature becomes an issue of discussion, when we look
for principles and rules to which we can and must refer when we want to
heal the disturbed relationship to nature striving for an order which guar-
antees the physical survival of humankind.
In my following argumentation I will tackle these four points of refer-
ence. By doing so, I hope that I can sketch an idea of humanism, which
may reconcile humankind and humanity as a key issue of our cultural self-
understanding and orientation of our lives.
2 Nature and culture in humanism

In the modern understanding of humanism, nature is a counter-concept
of humanity. By speaking of “humanity” as a principle of human self-
understanding and as a guideline of human practical life, humanism empha-
sizes the cultural quality of men, by which it essentially differs from nature,
let alone from all other species in the visible world. Herder expressed this
trans-natural “nature” of humankind by addressing men as “Freigelassene
der Schöpfung” (released slaves of the creation). This should be understood
as being liberated from the constraints of nature, from the submission to the
commands of its laws. Man has brought about another order of life with
new laws, namely the laws of reason and morality, and the commitment
to which defnes the humanity of humans. Different from all other natural
beings, which were thrown into a pre-given order of life, men have created
this order by themselves, this was facilitated by the competence of generating
the sense criteria of their lives themselves. Realizing this competence in the
manifold, manifestations of culture human life should be understood as a
process of bringing about one’s own human character. Humanity is a pro-
cess of self-empowerment of humans, which goes beyond all natural limits
and leads to the world of culture. Culture is the contrary of nature. It is con-
stituted by a set of values and norms, which should be ascribed to each single
member of the human species. This set of values has changed in the course of
time, but some common features, nevertheless, can be enumerated: The idea
of equality, the entitlement to basic rights, social solidarity as a consequence
of the fragility of human life, and the general moral rule that the values and
norms, which a person or social group feels entitled to or committed to,
should be valid for each other person and social group as well.
Humanism and nature 93
By this emphasis on culture, humanism can be characterized as trans-
natural understanding of men. Their ability to follow rules generates the
moral character, which originates in cultural processes of sense generation.
3 The challenge of naturalism

It is this emphasis on a normative concept of the “cultural nature of man”
which puts humanism in a strict contrast and opposition to all tendencies of
naturalizing human nature. For naturalism, the human world is exclusively
defned with reference to the biological attributes of the human race. Today
humanism is challenged by a powerful biological determinism in under-
standing the human world which refers to the genetic conditions of human
life and its regulation by the physiological procedures of the human brain.
In this respect humanism can be understood and actually so presents
itself as a critique of such a concept of human nature.3 It claims for a
non-natural character of human life in so far as it is pursued in forms of
practical life and social relationship, where all participants refer to cultural
orientations. By this reference they can understand each other and give
reason for what they are doing, suffering and failing. Humanism makes
human life understandable by referring to (subjective) reasons for what the
people do something and not to (objective) the causes of their doing. Hu-
manism emphasizes human subjectivity as a constitutive element for the
understanding of the human world, whereas naturalism refers to conditions
and determinations of human life, which have an external relationship to
human subjectivity. Humanism insists on the values, norms, and rules of
human culture, which cannot be replaced by scientifc knowledge. Human-
ism insists on the principal difference between cultural knowledge humans
always use in giving their lives meaning and signifcance on the one hand
and the logic of scientifc knowledge and its rational explanation on the
other hand by referring to causal laws.
4 Humanism an attitude of subjugating nature?

In this respect humanism emphasizes the difference between man and na-
ture. In doing so it creates, or at least supports, cultural attitudes, by which
man refers to nature as a matter of domination and possession, as a matter
of subjugation. Is humanism therefore nothing but an ideology of human
mastery over nature, which fnally ends in the ecological catastrophe of
today? This simple question demands a rather complex answer.
First of all, one should emphasize that in the world-view of pre-modern
times it was nature itself in its divine dimension, which shaped human life
and gave it a constitutive cultural feature characterized by general norms
of dignity, benevolence, and solidarity. In this understanding nature has
a divine quality, by which it brings about culture. In its deepest ground
nature is already culture. But nevertheless, it is the separation from nature
which defnes the specifcity of humanity. The strong emphasis on educa-
tion as a form of self-creation or self-cultivation of every human being may
serve as an evidence for this separation. Because of the effects of this culti-
vation man has a higher value then all other natural beings. Wild animals
are cruel by their nature, humans can be humane by their culture. In the
philosophical context of the ancient Roman humanism the non-human na-
ture is understood as being been made for the sake of the gods and the
humans. Animals are created for the beneft of man. He can eat and use
them. With the animals men share the force of drives, but the human ability
of reason separates them from the animal world as well as from the rest of
nature. Reason must govern the natural drives. “All dominion […] over the
resources of the earth belongs to man”.4 And it is this superiority which
constitutes human dignity according to Cicero.5 So already in its antique
origins Western humanism included the idea that man subjugates and dom-
inates nature.6 This way of thinking refects the urban civilization of a city,
where human life is no longer close to nature though its original base was
grounded on agriculture.
This attitude has not changed in early modern history, when the hu-
manists referred to the idea of creation. Here God has put the humans into
the center of the world and has entitled them to relate the whole creation
to themselves, since in humankind the cosmos refects itself in its sense-
bearing order. At the same time the humans are entitled to create the order
of their world on their own. We can fnd this idea in Pico della Mirandola’s
famous Oration on the Dignity of Man (1486/87), where God says to his
creation, man:
The nature of all other creatures is defned and restricted within laws
which We have laid down; you, by contrast, impeded by no such re-
strictions, may, by your own free will, to whose custody We have as-
signed you, trace for yourself the lineaments of your own nature. I have
placed you at the very center of the world, so that from that vantage
point you may with greater ease glance round about you on all that the
world contains. […] You may, as the free and proud shaper of your own
being, fashion yourself in the form you may prefer. It will be in your
power to descend to the lower, brutish forms of life; you will be able,
through your own decision, to rise again to the superior orders whose
life is divine.7
Within a pre-given religious order governed by divine law, men form the
center of the cosmos, not only refecting its order in their own physical,
mental, and spiritual structure; but at the same time they can create the
order of their lives on their own. This concept continues the human self-
empowerment, which started in antiquity. Does it consequently lead to the
modern idea that humans are entitled to be the masters and owners of na-
ture? The early modern humanism has still put human empowerment into
the limits of divine cosmological order, where every being has its proper
place. Only if this (in our eyes) “non-natural” or divine order is dissolved,
the extraordinary position of man in nature gets the character of unlimited
domination. Only then man becomes entitled to dominate nature by calcu-
lation, by methodical rationality of their knowledge and its technological
application, or – in the words of Max Weber “that one can in principle
master all things by calculation”?8
In such a historical perspective the world of modernity appears as a
world of human domination over nature, in which nature is only a matter
of appropriation. I would like to illustrate it by a slogan, which quali-
fes the basic cultural value system for modern societies: It’s the threefold
values of liberty, equality, and property. This holy trinity of the modern
secular world expresses the guidelines of human agency as follows: All
humans are equal in the liberty to acquire property. Property is the result
by appropriating nature. Appropriating nature is done by exploiting it as
means to realize human purposes. In this cultural context nature is an ob-
ject of exploitation. It becomes exploited in three dimensions: Cognitively
by science, practically by technology, and socially by economy. Nature
has lost its internal divinity, its quality to include cultural-like elements of
meaning and signifcance for the human world. In this radically natural-
ized form nature has become a raw material, which should be formed only
by man. It has no inbuilt values. It is silent and should obey the human
language.
Is this the hidden core of humanism? The anti-humanist philosophy of the
20th century answers this question positively. It criticizes humanism as an
ideology, which covers the real forces of human self-empowerment, namely
the naked and brute will of power with a veil of morality and norms. Karl
Marx, for instance, criticized the idea of human rights as a simple ideology,
which allows to impose a capitalistic exploitation of man by man.9 Human
and civil rights are only rules of law, which entitle the members of civil
society to pursue their brute interests in gaining property. (By the way, the
declared anti-Marxist intellectual of civil society, Max Weber, has a very
similar understanding of human rights.10)
Is humanism therefore nothing but an ideology of human self-
empowerment to govern the world, to exploit nature, and to rule the human
world according to its own purposes? The answer to this question depends
upon the understanding of these purposes. Nietzsche presented a very radi-
cal and simple understanding: The purpose of human self-empowerment in
its relationship to nature and the human world as well is the empowerment
itself. The will to power, which inspires all cultural procedures of human
empowerment, has only one purpose – its own self, its growth. Values and
norms are only means of this increase, but not an end to it.
Arguing in this way the fundamental humanistic argumentation is given
up: that human life cannot be pursued without the validity of values, norms,
and rules. The driving force of human self-empowerment got a natural or
at least a quasi-natural quality. But is that plausible? Is the will to power in
human life really blind and only related to itself? A simple look at practical
life can problematize this presupposition: The mental forces driving human
activity are always shaped or infuenced by purposes, intentions, culturally
articulated needs. What is the specifc human character of the action driv-
ing will? It’s not at all its blindness; on the contrary, it is its intentionality
which – so to speak – eyes its object and cannot be described without a
reference to normative elements of cultural orientation.
Humanism is an elaborated and historically deeply rooted form of this
cultural orientation. It emphasizes the competence of every human being
to bring about its competence for this orientation by a special activity. We
call this activity by a German name, Bildung, which I would like to trans-
late not as “education”, but as “self-cultivation”. This “Bildung” means
indeed self-empowerment, but an empowerment to receive the power of
value-guided activity. And the basic value of this guidance is humanness
in itself. It bears that already mentioned quality of being a human being,
which Immanuel Kant described in such a logical clarity: In all cultural life-
forms every human being should be treated as a purpose in itself and not
only a means to the purpose of others.
5 Humanism and environment – back to nature or forward

to culture?
Has this humanism any impact on the environmental problems of today?
At frst glance we could answer no, it hasn’t. There are two reasons for
this. One is the fact that humanism, as I have presented it here, is a typical
Western cultural product, whereas the ecological problems of today are
global. In its own understanding Western humanism is universalistic, but
whether this universalistic approach is valid in respect to cultural otherness
is an open question.11
The second denial refers to the non-natural quality humanism attributes
to the human life form. Humanism fundamentally distinguishes the hu-
man life form from nature. This distinction can be understood as one of
the main cultural causes for the disturbed relationship between man and
nature in the ecological crisis of today. As much as non-Western cultures
refer to a different understanding of humanity without this gap between
humankind and nature, this second denial confrms the frst one. Referring
to such a different cultural tradition, humanism is out of the game of ecol-
ogy. This indeed is an issue in the current discussion about our understand-
ing of the relationship of humankind and nature. Many intellectuals look
for paradigms, to which they can refer, if they want to replace the Western
gap between humankind and nature (creating the human attitude of dom-
inating, subjugating, and exploiting nature). In doing so they rather often
refer to non-Western paradigms, which emphasize a balanced relationship
or even a harmony between humankind and nature. An example is the
new emphasis on so-called “indigenous knowledge” of the people who have
been colonized by the West and understand themselves as victims of this
attitude of subjugation and exploitation.
Should we then give up our claims for humanity in favor of a new vision
of humankind’s nature as an integrative part of an encompassing natural
order of our lives?
There is a lot of sympathy for this tendency of a radical return to nature
in understanding the environmental or ecological dimension of human life
as a fundamental condition for the survival of humankind in general.
Should we give up our attitudes of self-empowerment in favor of another
logic of the human relationship to nature – the relationship of harmony and
brother – or sisterhood or even the relationship, which refers to the general
motherhood of nature?
I think that all these tendencies are sympathetic and heart-warming ro-
manticisms with an inbuilt failure. The failure is rather simple, and be-
cause of its simplicity it’s even fundamental: There has never been a human
relationship to nature without elements of technologically mastering the
natural conditions for human life. Every so-called “indigenous knowledge”
is full of the techniques of this approach of mastering. Magic, for instance,
is such a technology; and human life in general can’t be led without appro-
priating nature to the human world by labor, and labor means to change
nature into a means for human purposes.
Additionally, the criteria of balance and harmony run against elementary
experiences of humankind in all places and times: Nature is a challenge and
a potential danger for man. It is full of catastrophes; it is the permanent
challenge of contingency, which should be brought into an idea of order by
cultural processes of human sense generation. Finally, all sympathetic ro-
manticism fails vis-à-vis the simple fact, that we cannot solve any ecological
problem of today without referring to natural science and modern technol-
ogy. This, however, means to confrm their inbuilt relationship to nature. In
the realm of natural sciences and modern technology, nature has no meaning
and does not give any hint to an order which can orient the human activity
related to it. The idea of an order of nature is an essentially cultural input.
The most prominent form of imposing order on nature after its disen-
chantment by modern cognitive rationality is the aesthetization of nature.
But can an aestheticized nature play a role in a frame of reference for our
practical relationship to nature in economy for instance? That is an open
question.
Traditionally aesthetization is a compensation for the loss of meaning
and sense in the modernizing process of disenchantment brought about by
the increasing importance of methodical rationality in science and technol-
ogy. I do not see that such a compensation can really fll the place of order,
which it only compensates. But then, I think that an aestheticized order of
nature may give us a hint at the direction we should follow when we speak
about environment and ecology. Indeed, we can experience nature as being
beautiful. In his “Critique of Judgment” Kant already looked at this beauty
as a hint to a non-cognitive and non-technological relationship between
man and nature. By aesthetization nature gains a humane quality, and with
this quality it even can fulfll practical functions in human life. Man must
destroy nature in order to live by it. This is evident in daily life. Eating is
such a destruction. But not all human use of nature is destructive. Nature
can be preserved and function as an element of human culture. But such
aesthetic relationships to nature cannot replace the one where man should
appropriate nature for his or her biological existence. It only shows that the
human relationship to nature in modern times is not necessarily destructive.
But to fnd a convincing idea of how to orient our activities in the eco-
logical dimension of our lives we should take up this hint and, at the same
time, we should transcend the limits of aesthetics. Traditionally the cate-
gory of fction indicates these limits. The order of nature is a fction, if it
runs against the experience of its unbalanced contingent and challenging
character in human life.
What we need is a trans-aesthetic idea of the human relationship to na-
ture, in which the human nature is seen as a synthesis of nature and cul-
ture, as a bridge combining both into a coherent life form, namely our
human life form. This is the most important challenge to our interpretation
of nature and of ourselves. We should no longer emphasize the gap between
humanity and nature, but its togetherness, its interrelatedness.
We should start from the elementary human life form, which always has
already integrated nature simply by the fact that we are born with a human
body. But our body is also the natural place for manifesting culture; it is a
necessary condition of bringing it into existence, of coining a human face
onto nature. By the body, pre-given natural circumstances of human life are
transformed into appropriated ones.
This transformation has a temporal perspective. Thematizing this tem-
porality or historicity, we should ask anew for the evolutionary process,
which combines human history and natural history into one encompassing
procedure. Doing this we follow the track of argumentation, Johann Got-
tfried Herder, one of the leading German humanists in the axial time of
modernity, in the 18th and early 19th century, has left to us.12
But this argumentation leads us to an open question and an unsolved
problem. Till now the evolutionary process as a matter of the history of
nature has been interpreted without any reference to elements of sense,
meaning, and signifcance as they are effective in human life.13 The bio-
logical idea of evolution does not include any element of meaning, which
can be picked up and introduced into the cultural framework of the human
world view, of understanding nature and the human world. However, the
usual patterns of human history refer to criteria of historical sense, which
exclude nature, at least in its reference to the non-natural character of the
constitutive factors of human culture.
A renaturalization of human culture would be no solution because it
excludes convincing sense criteria as long as we take our scientifc and tech-
nological relationship to nature seriously. However, a culturalization of na-
ture is no solution either. It would put the whole realm of nature under the
category of culture, which has been developed to indicate the difference
between the natural world and the human world with its values and norms
and patterns of meaning, sense, and signifcance.
So, at the end of my argumentation I present an intellectual embarrass-
ment. But that should not lead us into despair and intellectual escapism
(like pseudo-natural romanticism or a culturalism in understanding na-
ture). Instead, it should encourage us to look at the human nature as an al-
ready achieved synthesis of nature and culture. I understand this argument
as a plea for a humanism, which may overcome the distinction between
humankind and nature not by ignoring their difference, but by looking at
their synthesis in an encompassing temporal perspective.
Within such a perspective humanism becomes mediated if not reconciled
with nature. When coping with this task humanism enters a new epoch
of its development. It can keep up its traditional reference to nature as a
potential for the cultural achievements of humankind. At the same time
humanism receives anew future perspective within which it gains a new
transcultural universalism. Since nature, which should be re-integrated into
culture, is shared by all human beings, its fundamental “culturalization”
should be understood as transculturally universalistic. We humans start
our lives as cultural beings in the same way. Before we become culturally
different (mainly by language), we are already the same cultural beings.
We share the constitutive abilities of the human mind, which distinguishes
us from the animals.14 On the level of intercultural discourse today this
common ground has not yet been suffciently explicated. We may and we
should fnd ourselves as humans again by sharing common humanity, not
beyond but within our cultural diversity and plurality. This new humanism
is a necessary cultural condition for solving the ecological problems we all
are endangered by.
Notes
1 Cancik: Humanismus, 1993.
2 Kant: Metaphysik der Sitten [1797] § 11, A93 [The Metaphysics of Morals,
1996].
3 See Sturma (Ed.): Philosophie und Neurowissenschaften, 2006.
4 Cicero: De Natura Deorum, 1896, II, 60, p. 152.
5 Cancik: Entrohung und Barmherzigkeit, 2003, pp. 23–41, p. 33.
6 Ibid., p. 30.
7 Pico della Mirandola: Oratio de Hominis Dignitate, 1997, p. 9.
8 Weber: Science as a Vocation, 1964, p. 139.
9 Marx: Zur Judenfrage, 1972.
10 Weber: Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 1964, p. 921.
11 Without any doubt there are humanistic traditions in other cultures as well.
Even more, some intellectuals are convinced that there is a universal element of
humanism in all cultures. Wole Soyinka, e.g., speaks of a “simple humanism,
which is the common denominator of all civilizations”. He fnds it expressed in
the words of Jeremy Cronin: “To live close to every tree, which you ever have
planted. Our century has been its greatest destroyer” (Soyinka: Die Angst, das
Unersetzliche zu verlieren, 2006, cit. p. 344) [My translation from the German
Text].
12 See Reill: Vitalising Nature in the Enlightenment, 2005.
13 A remarkable exemption is Hüther: Die Evolution der Liebe, 2003.
14 Cf. Tomasello: Die kulturelle Entwicklung des menschlichen Denkens, 2002.
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List of frst publication
Chapter 1: What is humanism? – original title: Humanism, in: Anheier,

Helmut K.; Juergensmeyer, Mark (Eds): Encyclopedia of
Global Studies. Vol. 2. Los Angeles: SAGE 2012, S. 822–826.
Chapter 2: Classical Humanism, in: Rüsen, Jörn (Ed.): Approaching Hu-
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Chapter 4: Towards a New Idea of Humankind – Unity and Difference
of Cultures as a Challenge for Education in the Globalizing
Process.
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Contextualization and Understanding regarding the Idea of
Humanity, in: Taiwan Journal of East Asian Studies, Vol. 7,
No. 1 (Issue 13), June 2010, pp. 1–19.
Chapter 6: Humanism: Anthropology – Axial Ages – Modernities, in:
Kozlarek, Oliver; Rüsen, Jörn; Wolff, Ernst (Eds): Shaping a
Humane World. Civilizations – Axial Times – Modernities –
Humanisms. Bielefeld: Transcript 2012, pp. 55–79.
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novation?, in: Postcolonial Studies, Vol. 11, No. 2, June 2008,
S. 191–200.
Chapter 8: Humanism and Nature – Some Refections on a Complex Re-
lationship, in: The Journal for Transdisciplinary Research in
Southern Africa, Vol. 2, No. 2, December 2006, S. 265–276.
Index of names
Bauer, Yehuda 85 Kant, Immanuel 5, 13, 16, 39, 60, 65,

Blumenbach, Johann Friedrich 21, 22 76, 77, 81, 84, 91, 96, 98
Koselleck, Reinhart 5
Cicero, Marcus Tullius 6, 54, 84, 94 Küng, Hans 10
Cusanus, Nicolaus 21
Lacan, Jacques 33
da Vinci, Leonardo 21 Leibniz, G.W. 24
de Valla, Lorenzo 7 Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim 19
Derrida, Jacques 33 Levinas, Emmanuel 84
Descartes, René 20, 21, 92 Locke, John 24
Diner, Dan 82 Long, Edward 19
Dürer, Albrecht 21, 22
Meinecke, Friedrich 35
Eichmann, Adolf 85 Meiners, Ch. 19
Eisenstadt, Shmuel N. 6, 17, 27, Millar, J. 23
37, 77
Niethammer, Friedrich Immanuel 7
Ferguson, A. 23 Nietzsche, Friedrich 33, 95
Fichte, G.F. 24
Ficino, Marsilius 21 Pico della Mirandola, Giovanni 17,
Foucault, Michel 9, 33, 84 22, 94
Freud, Sigmund 84
Ranke, Leopold von 8, 24, 55, 83
Galtung, Johann 36 Rembrandt van Rijn 22
Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand 25 Rorty, Richard 59
Gatterer, J.Ch. 25 Rotterdam, Erasmus of 7
Girard, René 84 Rousseau, Jean Jacques 24
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von 21,
25, 38 Schiller, Friedrich 26
Schleiermacher, Friedrich 25
Heidegger, Martin 9, 33 Schlözer, A.L. 25
Herder, Johann Gottfried 7, 8, 13, 21, Smith, Adam 23
22, 24, 25, 84, 92, 98 Spengler, Oswald 35
Himmler, Heinrich 85
Hobbes, Thomas 24, 40 Tagore, Rabindranath 9
Hu Shi 25 Todorov, Tzvetan 13
Humboldt, Wilhelm von and Alexander Toynbee, Arnold 36, 47
von (brothers) 7, 13, 21, 24, 25 Troeltsch, Ernst 1, 2
Hume, D. 23
Huntington, Samuel 39 Voltaire 19, 31
Jaspers, Karl 17, 50, 61 Weber, Max 48, 86, 87, 95

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Humanism

The book describes humanism in a systematic and historical perspective.

Jörn Rüsen is Senior Fellow at the Kulturwissenschaftliches Institut

37 Far-Right Revisionism and the End of History

38 Africa, Empire and World Disorder

39 History in a Post-Truth World

40 The Primacy of Method in Historical Research

41 Archives and Human Rights

For more information about this series, please visit: https://www.routledge.

ISBN: 978-0-367-77261-1 (hbk)

2 Classical humanism – a historical survey 12

3 Intercultural humanism – how to perform the

4 Towards a new idea of humankind – unity and

5 Historizing humanity – some theoretical considerations

6 Humanism: anthropology – axial times – modernities 63

7 Humanism in response to the Holocaust – destruction

8 Humanism and nature – some reflections on a complex

This book is a compilation of articles which were published at different

1 The current globalization experience is taken into account. Humanism

In the time of a profound crisis of orientation, in which very different in-

1 In early modern cultural history humanism became the dominant form

1 What is “classical humanism”?

In classical humanism “mankind” is held to be the ultimate criterion of

4 The humanization of mankind in modern

g) Steps towards the future

We are living live in a time of a growing density of intercultural communi-

1 The challenge of globalization for cultural identity

2 The renaissance of axial time origins

If somebody kills a man, it should be considered as if he had killed

In Africa we fnd a Zulu-proverb of a similar meaning: Umuntu ngumuntu

Contextualizing and understanding are not particular new issues to the

1 Cultural identity and the quest for humanism

a) Humanism as philosophy of history

1 a universalistic approach to historical experience;

Ad 1: It is evident that historical thinking needs a universalistic perspective

• between a position of above and below in social ranking;

This humanism in its reference to the anthropological universals is a his-

• frst by depicting basic similarities in archaic societies,

I will not address all juxtapositions in their singularity but concentrate on

The multitude of facts can’t be overlooked; their impression is wretched.

Herder wrote a long paragraph on the senselessness of history in his “Re-

1 What has humanism to do with nature?

2 Nature and culture in humanism

3 The challenge of naturalism

4 Humanism an attitude of subjugating nature?

5 Humanism and environment – back to nature or forward

Chapter 1: What is humanism? – original title: Humanism, in: Anheier,

Bauer, Yehuda 85 Kant, Immanuel 5, 13, 16, 39, 60, 65,

Jaspers, Karl 17, 50, 61 Weber, Max 48, 86, 87, 95

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