A.C. No.

11095

EUFEMIA A. CAMINO, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. RYAN REY L. PASAGUI, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

Before the Court is a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution1 filed by Complainant Eufemia
A. Camino, relative to the Court's Per Curiam Decision dated September 20, 2016 in A.C.
No. 11095.

In a Disbarment Complaint dated July 13, 2011 filed by complainant against respondent
Atty. Ryan Rey L. Pasagui (Atty. Pasagui) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CED), docketed as CBD Case No. 11-3140, now A.C. No.
11095, complainant alleged, among other things, that respondent violated their agreement
for the latter to facilitate and secure a loan in order to finance the payment of necessary
expenses to transfer the title of a certain property under her name. She claimed that
respondent obtained a loan in her name and that of her husband, using their property as
collateral, but Atty. Pasagui arrogated the proceeds thereof to himself.

In a Per Curiam Decision2 dated September 20, 2016, the Court, ruling in favor of the
complainant, found that respondent was guilty of deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct
for converting the money of his client to his own personal use without her consent. By his
failure to make good of their agreement to use the proceeds of the loan for the transfer of
the title in complainant's name, Atty. Pasagui not only betrayed the trust and confidence
reposed upon him by his client, but he is likewise guilty of engaging in dishonest and
deceitful conduct. For his acts, Atty. Pasagui degraded himself and besmirched the fair
name of an honorable profession. Thus, the Court affirmed the findings and conclusions of
the IBP Board of Governors, but modified the recommended penalty and instead imposed
the penalty to Disbarment. The Court also ordered Atty. Pasagui to return the loan proceeds
he received from Perpetual Help Credit Cooperative, Inc. (PHCCI) on behalf of the
complainant, with interest, together with all the documents pertinent to the loan application
and those he received from the complainant, to wit:

WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XXI-2014-938 dated December 14, 2014 of the IBP-Board of
Governors which found respondent Atty. Ryan Rey L. Pasagui GUILTY of violation of Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to
the penalty. Respondent Atty. Ryan Rey L. Pasagui is instead meted the penalty
of DISBARMENT. Respondent is further ORDERED to immediately RETURN the loan
proceeds amounting to ₱1,000,000.00 and to pay legal interest at the rate of twelve percent
(12%) per annum computed from the release of the loan on February 15, 2011 up to June
30, 2013, and six percent (6%) per annum from July 1, 2013 until fully paid, as well as, the
₱l20,000.00 received for the purpose of transferring the title in the name of the complainant
and to pay legal interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum computed from
receipt of the amount on February 3, 2011 up to June 30, 2013, and six percent (6%) per
annum from July 1, 2013 until fully paid. He is likewise ORDERED to RETURN all other
documents pertinent to the loan obtained from PHCCI and those received from complainant.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended
to the personal record of respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and the Office of
the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country for their information and
guidance.

This Decision shall be immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.3

In the present Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution, complainant now prays for the
issuance of a Writ of Execution for the enforcement of the said judgment.

Generally, once a judgment or order becomes final and executory, the judgment obligee
may file a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution in the court of origin as provided for
under Rule 39, Sec. 1, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, viz.:

SEC. 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. - Execution shall issue as a matter
of right, on motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding
upon the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected.

If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution may forthwith be
applied for in the court of origin, on motion of the judgment obligee, submitting therewith
certified true copies of the judgment or judgments or final order or orders sought to be
enforced and of the entry thereof, with notice to the adverse party.

The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest of justice so
requires, direct the court of origin to issue the writ of execution.

Likewise, a judgment or final order may also be executed pending appeal as provided for in
Rule 39, Sec. 2, as follows:

SEC. 2. Discretionary execution. -

(a) Execution of a judgment or final order pending appeal. - On motion of the

prevailing party with notice to the adverse party filed in the trial court while it has
jurisdiction over the case and is in possession of either the original record or the record on
appeal, as the case may be, at the time of the filing of such motion, said court may, in its
discretion, order execution of a judgment or final order even before the expiration of the
period to appeal.

After the trial court has lost jurisdiction, the motion for execution pending appeal may be
filed in the appellate court.

Discretionary execution may only issue upon good reasons to be stated in a special order
after due hearing.

(b) Execution of several, separate or partial judgments. - A several, separate or

partial judgment may be executed under the same terms and conditions as execution of a
judgment or final order pending appeal.
Corollarily, judgments declared to be immediately executory, as in the present case, are
enforceable after their rendition. Similar to judgments or orders that become final and
executory, the execution of the decision in the case at bar is already a matter of right. 4 The
judgment obligee may, therefore, file a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution in the
court of origin as provided for under Rule 39, Sec. 1, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

In this particular case, however, the case did not originate from the lower courts, but
instead is an original action for disbarment filed by the complainant against Atty. Pasagui,
accusing the latter of Estafa through Abuse of Confidence. 5

Consequently, pursuant to Section 6,6 Rule 135 of the Rules of Court, the Clerk of Court of
the Supreme Court should issue the Writ of Execution prayed for. But, in as much as this
Court does not have a sheriff of its own to execute its own decision and considering that the
complainant resides in Tacloban City, the Ex-Officio Sheriff of Tacloban City is directed
to execute the money judgment against the respondent in accordance with Rule 39, Section
97 of the Rules of Court. Likewise, the Ex-Officio Sheriff of Tacloban City is ordered to
enforce the Court's directive for respondent to return all the pertinent documents in his
possession to the complainant pursuant to Section 118 of the Rules of Court.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to GRANT complainant's Motion for
Issuance of Writ of Execution by DIRECTING the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court to
issue the Writ of Execution prayed for ORDERING respondent ATTY. RYAN REY L.
PASAGUI:

1. To IMMEDIATELY RETURN to complainant EUFEMIA A. CAMINO the amount of

₱l,000,000.00, plus interest of 12% per annum from February 15, 2011 up to June
30, 2013; and interest of 6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until fully paid;

2. To pay to complainant EUFEMIA A. CAMINO the further amount of ₱120,000.00,

plus interest of 12% per annum from February 3, 2011 up to June 30, 2013; and
interest of 6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until fully paid; and

3. To forthwith return to complainant EUFEMIA A. CAMINO all other documents

pertinent to the loan obtained from PHCCI and those received from complainant.

The Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court shall transmit the Writ of Execution to the
Clerk of Court and Ex Officio Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court in Tacloban City
(with the certified copies of this Resolution and the decision promulgated on
September 20, 2016) for prompt service and implementation either directly or by a
duly authorized deputy sheriff.

The legal fees for the service and implementation of the Writ of Execution as
provided in Rule 141 of the Rules of Court shall be paid by respondent ATTY.
PASAGUI.

The Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court in Tacloban City is hereby
expressly authorized to oversee the proceedings of execution; act on and resolve
any incident arising therefrom; issue alias writ of execution, if necessary, as if the
judgment under execution was rendered by the Regional Trial Court; receive and
approve the Sheriff’s Return on satisfaction (full or partial) or failure of
satisfaction; and to submit a final Report on the execution to the Clerk of Court of
the Supreme Court.

Complainant "EUFEMIA A. CAMINO is directed to hereafter deal with the Clerk of

Court and Ex Officio Sheriff of Tacloban City in relation to the enforcement of the
decision promulgated in this adminisrative matter.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 10135 January 15, 2014

EDGARDO AREOLA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. MARIA VILMA MENDOZA, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

This refers to the administrative complaint1 filed by Edgardo D. Areola (Areola) a.k.a.
Muhammad Khadafy against Atty. Maria Vilma Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza), from the Public
Attorney s Office (PAO) for violation of her attorney s oath of office, deceit, malpractice or
other gross misconduct in office under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court,
and for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In the letter-complaint dated November 13, 2006 addressed to the Honorable

Commissioners, Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
Areola stated that he was filing the complaint in behalf of his co-detainees Allan Seronda,
Aaron Arca, Joselito Mirador, Spouses Danilo Perez and Elizabeth Perez. He alleged that on
October 23, 2006, during Prisoners Week, Atty. Mendoza, visited the Antipolo City Jail and
called all detainees with pending cases before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 73,
Antipolo City where she was assigned, to attend her speech/lecture.2 Areola claimed that
Atty. Mendoza stated the following during her speech:

"O kayong may mga kasong drugs na may pangpiyansa o pang- areglo ay maging praktikal
sana kayo kung gusto ninyong makalaya agad. Upang makatiyak kayo na hindi masasayang
ang pera ninyo ay sa akin ninyo ibigay o ng kamag-anak ninyo ang pera at ako na ang
bahalang maglagay kay Judge Martin at Fiscal banqui; at kayong mga detenidong mga
babae na no bail ang kaso sa drugs, iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si Judge Martin at palalayain na
kayo. Malambot ang puso noon."3

Atty. Mendoza allegedly said that as she is handling more than 100 cases, all detainees
should prepare and furnish her with their Sinumpaang Salaysay so that she may know the
facts of their cases and their defenses and also to give her the necessary payment for their
transcript of stenographic notes.4
Areola furthermore stated that when he helped his co-inmates in drafting their pleadings
and filing motions before the RTC Branch 73, Antipolo City, Atty. Mendoza undermined his
capability, to wit:

(1) Atty. Mendoza purportedly scolded detainee Seronda when she learned that the
latter was assisted by Areola in filing a Motion to Dismiss for Violation of Republic Act
No. 8942 (Speedy Trial Act of 1998) in the latter’s criminal case for rape, which was
pending before the RTC, Branch 73, Antipolo City. She got angrier when Seronda
retorted that he allowed Areola to file the motion for him since there was nobody to
help him.

(2) Areola assisted Spouses Danilo and Elizabeth Perez in filing their Joint Motion for
Consolidation of Trial of Consolidated Offenses and Joint Motion to Plead Guilty to a
Lesser Offense. The spouses were likewise scolded for relying on the Complainant
and alleged that the respondent asked for ₱2,000.00 to represent them.

(3) Areola helped another co-detainee, Mirador in filing an "Ex-parte Motion to Plead
Guilty to a Lesser Offense". When Atty. Mendoza learned of it, she allegedly scolded
Mirador and discredited Areola.5

In her unverified Answer6 dated January 5, 2007, Atty. Mendoza asseverated that the filing
of the administrative complaint against her is a harassment tactic by Areola as the latter
had also filed several administrative cases against judges in the courts of Antipolo City
including the jail warden of Taytay, Rizal where Areola was previously detained. These
actuations show that Areola has a penchant for filing various charges against anybody who
does not accede to his demand.7 Atty. Mendoza contended that Areola is not a lawyer but
represented himself to his co-detainees as one.8 She alleged that the motions/pleadings
prepared and/or filed by Areola were not proper.

After both parties failed to appear in the Mandatory Conference set by the IBP on August
15, 2008, the Investigating Commissioner considered the non-appearance as a waiver on
their part. Nonetheless, in the interest of justice, both parties were required to submit their
respective position papers.9

On December 29, 2009, the Investigating Commissioner issued his Report and
Recommendation.10 The Investigating Commissioner stated that the Complainant is
knowledgeable in the field of law. While he may be of service to his fellow detainees, he
must, however, be subservient to the skills and knowledge of a full fledged lawyer. He
however found no convincing evidence to prove that Atty. Mendoza received money from
Areola’s co-detainees as alleged. The charges against Atty. Mendoza were also
uncorroborated, viz:

There is no convincing evidence that will prove that the respondent received money from
the inmates since the charges are uncorroborated. In fact, the complainant is not the proper
party to file the instant case since he was not directly affected or injured by the act/s being
complained of. No single affidavits of the affected persons were attached to prove the said
charges. Hence, it is simply hearsay in nature.11

Nonetheless, Atty. Mendoza admitted in her Answer that she advised her clients and their
relatives to approach the judge and the fiscal "to beg and cry" so that their motions would
be granted and their cases against them would be dismissed. To the Investigating
Commissioner, this is highly unethical and improper as the act of Atty. Mendoza degrades
the image of and lessens the confidence of the public in the judiciary.12 The Investigating
Commissioner recommended that Atty. Mendoza be suspended from the practice of law for
a period of two (2) months.13

In a Notice of Resolution14 dated November 19, 2011, the Board of Governors resolved to
adopt and approve the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.

Atty. Mendoza sought to reconsider the Resolution15 dated November 19, 2011 but the IBP
Board of Governors denied her motion in its Resolution16 dated May 10, 2013. The
Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors was transmitted to the Court for final action
pursuant to Rule 139-B, Section 12, Paragraph b17 of the Revised Rules of Court.

The Court’s Ruling

After a judicious examination of the records, the Court finds that the instant Complaint
against Atty. Mendoza profoundly lacks evidence to support the allegations contained
therein. All Areola has are empty assertions against Atty. Mendoza that she demanded
money from his co-detainees.

The Court agrees with the IBP that Areola is not the proper party to file the Complaint
against Atty. Mendoza. He is not even a client of Atty. Mendoza. He claims that he filed the
Complaint on behalf of his co-detainees Seronda, Arca, Mirador and Spouses Perez, but it is
apparent that no document was submitted which would show that they authorized Areola to
file a Complaint. They did not sign the Complaint he prepared. No affidavit was even
executed by the said co-detainees to substantiate the matters Areola raised. Consequently,
the Court rejects Areola’s statements, especially as regards Atty. Mendoza’s alleged
demands of money.

The Court agrees with the observations of the Investigating Commissioner that Areola
initiated this complaint when he felt insulted because Atty. Mendoza refused to acknowledge
the pleadings and motions he prepared for his co-detainees who are PAO clients of Atty.
Mendoza.18 It appears that Areola is quite knowledgeable with Philippine laws. However, no
matter how good he thinks he is, he is still not a lawyer. He is not authorized to give legal
advice and file pleadings by himself before the courts. His familiarity with Philippine laws
should be put to good use by cooperating with the PAO instead of filing baseless complaints
against lawyers and other government authorities. It seems to the Court that Areola thinks
of himself as more intelligent and better than Atty. Mendoza, based on his criticisms against
her. In his Reply19, he made fun of her grammatical errors and tagged her as using carabao
english20. He also called the PAO as "Pa-Amin Office"21 which seriously undermines the
reputation of the PAO. While Areola may have been frustrated with the way the PAO is
managing the significant number of cases it deals with, all the more should he exert efforts
to utilize his knowledge to work with the PAO instead of maligning it.

Interestingly, Atty. Mendoza admitted that she advised her clients to approach the judge
and plead for compassion so that their motions would be granted. This admission
corresponds to one of Areola’s charges against Atty. Mendoza—that she told her clients "
Iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo. Malambot ang puso noon."
Atty. Mendoza made it appear that the judge is easily moved if a party resorts to dramatic
antics such as begging and crying in order for their cases to be dismissed.

As such, the Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors that Atty. Mendoza made
irresponsible advices to her clients in violation of Rule 1.02 and Rule 15.07 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. It is the mandate of Rule 1.02 that "a lawyer shall not counsel or
abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system."
Rule 15.07 states that "a lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the laws and
the principles of fairness."

Atty. Mendoza’s improper advice only lessens the confidence of the public in our legal
system. Judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence from external forces or
factors22 according to the merits of a case. Atty. Mendoza’s careless remark is uncalled for.

It must be remembered that a lawyer’s duty is not to his client but to the administration of
justice.1âwphi1 To that end, his client’s success is wholly subordinate. His conduct ought to
and must always be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics. Any means, not
honorable, fair and honest which is resorted to by the lawyer, even in the pursuit of his
devotion to his client’s cause, is condemnable and unethical.23

In spite of the foregoing, the Court deems the penalty of suspension for two (2) months as
excessive and not commensurate to Atty. Mendoza’s infraction. Disbarment and suspension
of a lawyer, being the most severe forms of disciplinary sanction, should be imposed with
great caution and only in those cases where the misconduct of the lawyer as an officer of
the court and a member of the bar is established by clear, convincing and satisfactory
proof.24The Court notes that when Atty. Mendoza made the remark "Iyak-iyakan lang ninyo
si Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo. Malambot ang puso noon", she was not compelled by
bad faith or malice. While her remark was inappropriate and unbecoming, her comment is
not disparaging and reproachful so as to cause dishonor and disgrace to the Judiciary.

In several administrative cases, the Court has refrained from imposing the actual penalties
in the presence of mitigating factors. Factors such as the respondent’s length of service, the
respondent’s acknowledgement of his or her infractions and feeling of remorse, family
circumstances, humanitarian and equitable considerations, respondent’s advanced age,
among other things, have had varying significance in the Court’s determination of the
imposable penalty.25 The Court takes note of Atty. Mendoza’s lack of ill-motive in the
present case and her being a PAO lawyer as her main source of livelihood.26 Furthermore,
the complaint filed by Areola is clearly baseless and the only reason why this was ever given
consideration was due to Atty. Mendoza’s own admission. For these reasons, the Court
deems it just to modify and reduce the penalty recommended by the IBP Board of
Governors.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds Atty. Maria Vilma Mendoza GUILTY of
giving improper advice to her clients in violation of Rule 1.02 and Rule 15.07 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and is accordingly meted out the penalty of REPRIMAND, with the
STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more
severely.

A.C. No. 7387, November 07, 2016

MANUEL ENRIQUE L. ZALAMEA, AND MANUEL JOSE L.
ZALAMEA, Petitioners, v. ATTY. RODOLFO P. DE GUZMAN, JR. AND PERLAS DE
GUZMAN, ANTONIO, VENTURANZA, QUIZON-VENTURANZA, AND HERROSA LAW
FIRM, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA,** J.:
This is a Petition for Disbarment which petitioners Manuel Enrique L. Zalamea and Manuel
Jose L. Zalamea filed against their lawyer, Atty. Rodolfo P. de Guzman, Jr., for acquiring
their property by virtue of their lawyer-client relationship, in violation of the Lawyer's Oath
and the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The following are the factual antecedents of the case:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryIn 2000, petitioners Manuel Enrique Zalamea and Manuel Jose

Zalamea (the Zalamea brothers) sought respondent Atty. Rodolfo P. de Guzman, Jr.'s
advice on the properties of their ailing mother, Merlinda L. Zalamea, who had a property
situated at Scout Limbaga, Quezon City under her name. When Merlinda passed away, De
Guzman then prepared a letter for a possible tax-free transfer of the Scout Limbaga
property to the Merlinda Holding Corporation which was sought to be incorporated to handle
Merlinda's estate, and notarized the incorporation papers of said corporation.

In September 2001, the Zalameas put up EMZEE FOODS INC., (EMZEE) a corporation
engaged in lechon business, with De Guzman providing the capital and operational funds.
Sometime in 2002, Manuel Enrique informed De Guzman about the property located at
Speaker Perez St. (Speaker Perez property) which was then under the name of Elarfoods,
Inc. (Elarfoods), a corporation owned and run by the Zalamea brothers' aunts and uncles.
Since said property had been mortgaged to Banco de Oro (BDO), the bank foreclosed it
when Elarfoods failed to pay the loan. Elarfoods likewise failed to redeem the property,
resulting in the consolidation of the ownership over the property in BDO's name.

Later, Manuel Enrique approached De Guzman and convinced him to help in the
reacquisition of the Speaker Perez property from BDO. De Guzman thus negotiated with
BDO and was able to secure a deal over the property for P20 Million. The bank required
10% downpayment of the total price or P2 Million, to be paid in thirty-six (36) monthly
installments, without interest. Due to lack of funds on Manuel Enrique's part, De Guzman's
wife, Angel, agreed to shoulder the P2 Million downpayment in order not to lose the good
opportunity, but under the condition that the Speaker Perez property would later be
transferred in the name of a new corporation they had agreed to form, the EMZALDEK
Venture Corporation, a combination of the names EMZEE Foods, Zalamea, and Dek de
Guzman. By this time, EMZEE had also relocated to Speaker Perez.

Subsequently, Angel was forced to pay the monthly installments and the additional 20%
required for EMZEE to be able to transfer its office to the Speaker Perez property, since
Manuel Enrique still could not produce sufficient funds and EMZEE continued to incur losses.
All in all, Angel paid P13,082,500.00.

Not long after, the relationship, between the Zalamea brothers and the Spouses De Guzman
turned sour. The Spouses De Guzman wanted reimbursement of the amounts which they
had advanced for the corporation, while the Zalamea brothers claimed sole ownership over
the Speaker Perez property. Hence, the brothers filed a disbarment case against De Guzman
for allegedly buying a client's property which was subject of litigation.

After a careful review and evaluation of the case, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) recommended the dismissal of the complaint against
De Guzman for lack of merit on October 12, 2011.1 On December 29, 2012, the IBP Board
of Governors passed a Resolution2adopting and approving the recommended dismissal of
the complaint, thus:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryRESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously

ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A,"
and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering that the complaint is without merit, the same is
hereby DISMISSED.
The Court's Ruling

The Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the findings and recommendations of the
IBP.

An attorney may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath or of his duties as
an attorney and counselor, which include statutory grounds enumerated in Section 27,3 Rule
138 of the Rules of Court.4chanrobleslaw

Under Article 1491 of the Civil Code, lawyers are prohibited to acquire by purchase, even at
a public or judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation of another, their
client's property and rights in litigation, hence:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
ART. 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial
auction, either in person or through the mediation of another:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
xxxx

5. Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other
officers and employees connected with the administration of justice, the property and rights
in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or
territory they exercise their respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of
acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and rights
which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their
profession.

6. Any others specially disqualified by law.

Indeed, the purchase by a lawyer of his client's property or interest in litigation is a breach
of professional ethics and constitutes malpractice. The persons mentioned in Article 1491
are prohibited from purchasing said property because of an existing trust relationship. A
lawyer is disqualified from acquiring by purchase the property and rights in litigation
because of his fiduciary relationship with such property and rights, as well as with the client.
The very first Canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility5 provides that "a lawyer shall
uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
process." Canon 17 states that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall
be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him, while Canon 16 provides that "a
lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his
possession." Further, Section 3, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court requires every
lawyer to take an oath to obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities. And for any violation of this oath, a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred by
the Court. All of these underscore the role of the lawyer as the vanguard of our legal
system. The transgression of any provision of law by a lawyer is a repulsive and
reprehensible act which the Court will never countenance.6chanrobleslaw

Here, the accusation against De Guzman stemmed from his wife's purchase of the Speaker
Perez property from BDO when Manuel Enrique did not have the means to buy it. The
Zalameas claim that De Guzman, as their counsel, could not acquire the property, either
personally or through his wife, without violating his ethical duties. De Guzman therefore has
breached the same when his wife purchased the subject property.
However, the prohibition which the Zalameas invoke does not apply where the property
purchased was not involved in litigation. De Guzman clearly never acquired any of his
client's properties or interests involved in litigation in which he may take part by virtue of
his profession. There exists not even an iota of proof indicating that said property has ever
been involved in any litigation in which De Guzman took part by virtue of his profession.
True, they had previously sought legal advice from De Guzman but only on how to handle
their mother's estate, which likewise did not involve the contested property. Neither was it
shown that De Guzman's law firm had taken part in any litigation involving the Speaker
Perez property.

The prohibition which rests on considerations of public policy and interests is intended to
curtail any undue influence of the lawyer upon his client on account of his fiduciary and
confidential relationship with him. De Guzman could not have possibly exerted such undue
influence, as a lawyer, upon the Zalameas, as his clients. In fact, it was Manuel Enrique who
approached the Spouses De Guzman and asked them if they would be willing to become
business partners in a lechonbusiness. It was also Manuel Enrique who turned to De
Guzman for help in order to reacquire the already foreclosed Speaker Perez property. They
had agreed that De Guzman would simply pay the required downpayment to BDO and
EMZEE would pay the remaining balance in installment. And when EMZEE continued
suffering losses, Angel took care of the monthly amortizations so as not to lose the
property.

Clearly, the relationship between the Spouses De Guzman and the Zalamea brothers is
actually one of business partners rather than that of a lawyer and client. Atty. De Guzman's
acquisition of the Speaker Perez property was a valid consequence of a business deal, not
by reason of a lawyer-client relationship, for Which he could not be penalized by the Court.
De Guzman and his wife are very well allowed by law to enter into such a transaction and
their conduct in this regard was not borne out to have been attended by any undue
influence, deceit, or misrepresentation.

A.C. No. 11078, July 19, 2016

VERLITA V. MERCULLO AND RAYMOND VEDANO, Complainants, v. ATTY. MARIE
FRANCES E. RAMON, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
This case concerns the complaint for the disbarment of Atty. Marie Frances E. Ramon for
violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibilityand the Lawyer's Oath
for deceiving the complainants in order to obtain the substantial amount of P350,000.00 on
the pretext of having the foreclosed asset of the latter's mother redeemed.
Antecedents

In the period from 2002 to 2011, the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation
(NHMFC) sent several demand letters to Carmelite T. Vedaño1regarding her unpaid
obligations secured by the mortgage covering her residential property in Novaliches,
Caloocan City.2 To avoid the foreclosure of the mortgage, Carmelita authorized her children,
Verlita Mercullo and Raymond Vedaño (complainants herein), to inquire from the NHMFC
about the status of the obligations. Verlita and Raymond learned that their mother's arrears
had amounted to P350,000.00, and that the matter of the mortgage was under the charge
of respondent Atty. Ramon, but who was not around at that time.

On June 20, 2012, Carmelita received a letter from the sheriff of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Caloocan City, stating that her property would be put up for auction in July 2013.
Verlita and Raymond thus went to the NHMFC to see the respondent, who advised them
about their right to redeem the property within one year from the
foreclosure.3chanrobleslaw

In August 2013, Verlita and Raymond called up the respondent, and expressed their
intention to redeem the property by paying the redemption price. The latter agreed and
scheduled an appointment with them on August 30, 2013.

On August 30, 2013, the respondent arrived at the designated meeting place at around
1:30 p.m., carrying the folder that Verlita and Raymond had seen at the NHFMC when they
inquired on the status of their mother's property. After the respondent had oriented them
on the procedure for redemption, the complainants handed P350,000.00 to the respondent,
who signed an acknowledgment receipt.4The respondent issued two acknowledgment
receipts for the redemption price and for litigation expenses,5 presenting to the
complainants her NHMFC identification card. Before leaving them, she promised to inform
them as soon as the documents for redemption were ready for their mother's
signature.6chanrobleslaw

On September 4, 2013, the respondent met with Verlita and handed a letter7 that she had
signed, along with the special power of attorney (SPA) for Carmelita's signature.8 The letter
reads:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex Officio Sheriff
Regional Trial Court
Caloocan City

Re: Redemption of the property covered by EJF No. 7484-2013

Dear Arty. Dabalos,

Please assist Ms. Carmelita Vedano, through her Attorney-in-Fact in redeeming the property
covered by EJF No. 7484-2013. Please provide the necessary computation as to the full
redemption amount in order for Ms. Vedano to redeem the same.

Thank you. Truly yours,

(Sgd.)
Atty. Marie Frances E. Ramon

Verlita and Raymond went to the NHMFC on September 9, 2013 to follow up on the
redemption, but discovered that the respondent had already ceased to be connected with
the NHMFC. On September 20, 2013, they met with her at Branch 145 of the Regional Trial
Court in Makati City where she was attending a hearing. She informed them that the
redemption was under process, and that the certificate of redemption would be issued in
two to three weeks time.9chanrobleslaw

After communicating through text messages with the respondent, Verlita and Raymond
finally went to see the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court in Caloocan City On
November 27, 2013 to inquire on the status of the redemption. There, they discovered that
the respondent had not deposited the redemption price and had not filed the letter of intent
for redeeming the property.10chanrobleslaw
On December 5, 2013, Verlita and Raymond again went to Branch 145 of the Regional Trial
Court in Makati City where the respondent had a hearing, and handed to her their demand
letter requiring her to return the amount she had received for the redemption.11 She
acknowledged the letter and promised to return the money on December 16, 2013 by
depositing the amount in Verlita's bank account. However, she did not fulfill her promise
and did not show up for her subsequent scheduled hearings in Branch 145.12chanrobleslaw

With their attempts to reach the respondent being in vain, Verlita and Raymond brought
their disbarment complaint in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
Findings and Recommendation of the IBP

The respondent did not submit her answer when required to do so. She also did not attend
the mandatory conference set by the IBP despite notice. Hence, the investigation
proceeded ex parte.13chanrobleslaw

IBP Commissioner Arsenio P. Adriano submitted his Report and Recommendation,14 whereby
he found the respondent to have violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for engaging in deceitful conduct, and recommended her suspension from the
practice of law for two years, and her return to the complainants of P350,000.00. with legal
interest from December 2, 2013.

The IBP Board of Governors adopted Commissioner Adriano's recommendation as stated in

its Resolution No. XXI-2014-929,15viz.:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED AND APPROVED, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation to be fully
supported by the evidence on record and applicable laws, and for violation of Rule 1.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Marie Frances E. Ramon is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years and Ordered to
Return the amount of Three Hundred Fifty Thousand (P350,000.00) Pesos to
Complainant.

Ruling of the Court

The Court declares the respondent guilty of dishonesty and deceit.

The Lawyer's Oath is a source of the obligations and duties of every lawyer. Any violation of
the oath may be punished with either disbarment, or suspension from the practice of law, or
other commensurate disciplinary action.16 Every lawyer must at no time be wanting in
probity and moral fiber which are not only conditions precedent to his admission to the Bar,
but are also essential for his continued membership in the Law Profession.17 Any conduct
unbecoming of a lawyer constitutes a violation of his oath.

The respondent certainly transgressed the Lawyer's Oath by receiving money from the
complainants after having made them believe that she could assist them in ensuring the
redemption in their mother's behalf. She was convincing about her ability to work on the
redemption because she had worked in the NHFMC. She did not inform them soon enough,
however, that she had meanwhile ceased to be connected with the agency. It was her duty
to have so informed them. She further misled them about her ability to realize the
redemption by falsely informing them about having started the redemption process. She
concealed from them the real story that she had not even initiated the redemption
proceedings that she had assured them she would do. Everything she did was dishonest and
deceitful in order to have them part with the substantial sum of P350,000.00. She took
advantage of the complainants who had reposed their full trust and confidence in her ability
to perform the task by virtue of her being a lawyer. Surely, the totality of her actuations
inevitably eroded public trust in the Legal Profession.

As a lawyer, the respondent was proscribed from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct in her dealings with others, especially clients whom she should serve
with competence and diligence.18 Her duty required her to maintain fealty to them, binding
her not to neglect the legal matter entrusted to her. Thus, her neglect in connection
therewith rendered her liable.19 Moreover, the unfulfilled promise of returning the money
and her refusal to communicate with the complainants on the matter of her engagement
aggravated the neglect and dishonesty attending her dealings with the complainants.

The respondent's conduct patently breached Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and for legal processes.

Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.

Evil intent was not essential in order to bring the unlawful act or omission of the respondent
within the coverage of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility20 The Code
exacted from her not only a firm respect for the law and legal processes but also the utmost
degree of fidelity and good faith in dealing with clients and the moneys entrusted by them
pursuant to their fiduciary relationship.21chanrobleslaw

Yet another dereliction of the respondent was her wanton disregard of the several notices
sent to her by the IBP in this case. Such disregard could only be wrong because it reflected
her undisguised contempt of the proceedings of the IBP, a body that the Court has invested
with the authority to investigate the disbarment complaint against her. She thus exhibited
her irresponsibility as well as her utter disrespect for the Court and the rest of the Judiciary.
It cannot be understated that a lawyer in her shoes should comply with the orders of the
Court and of the Court's duly constituted authorities, like the IBP, the office that the Court
has particularly tasked to carry out the specific function of investigating attorney
misconduct.22chanrobleslaw

The respondent deserves severe chastisement and appropriate sanctions. In this regard, the
IBP Board of Governors recommended her suspension for two years from the practice of
law, and her return of the amount of P350,000.00 to the complainants. The recommended
penalty is not commensurate to the gravity of the misconduct committed. She merited a
heavier sanction of suspension from the practice of law for five years. Her professional
misconduct warranted a longer suspension from the practice of law because she had caused
material prejudice to the clients' interest.23 She should somehow be taught to be more
ethical and professional in dealing with trusting clients like the complainants and their
mother, who were innocently too willing to repose their utmost trust in her abilities as a
lawyer and in her trustworthiness as a legal professional. In this connection, we state that
the usual mitigation of the recommended penalty by virtue of the misconduct being her first
offense cannot be carried out in her favor considering that she had disregarded the several
notices sent to her by the IBP in this case. As to the return of the P350,000.00 to the
complainant, requiring her to restitute with legal interest is only fair and just because she
did not comply in the least with her ethical undertaking to work on the redemption of the
property of the mother of the complainants. In addition, she is sternly warned against a
similar infraction in the future; otherwise, the Court will have her suffer a more severe
penalty.

WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and HOLDS ATTY . MARIE FRANCES E. RAMON guilty of
violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer's
Oath; SUSPENDS HER FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW FOR A PERIOD OF FIVE YEARS
EFFECTIVE FROM NOTICE, with the STERN WARNING that any similar infraction in the
future will be dealt with more severely; ORDERS her to return to the complainants the sum
of P350,000.00 within 30 days from notice, plus legal interest of 6% per annumreckoned
from the finality of this decision until full payment; and DIRECTS her to promptly submit to
this Court written proof of her compliance within the same period of 30 days from notice of
this decision.

Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to
Atty. Marie Frances E. Ramon's personal record as an attorney; to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines; and to the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts
throughout the country for their information and guidance.

A.M. No. RTJ-15-2417 July 22, 2015

[Formerly known as OCA IPI No. 10-3466-RTJ]

ELADIO D. PERFECTO, Complainant,

vs.
JUDGE ALMA CONSUELO D. ESIDERA, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

LEONEN, J.:

On July 15, 2010, Eladio Perfecto filed an administrative Complaint1 against Judge Alma
Consuelo Desales-Esidera of Branch 20 of the Regional Trial Court of Catarman, Northern
Samar for falsification of public document and dishonesty.

Eladio Perfecto (Perfecto) alleged that Judge Alma Consuelo Desales-Esidera (Judge
Desales-Esidera) was first married to Richard Tang Tepace on May 7, 1987 at the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila.2

On October 3, 1990, Judge Desales-Esidera gave birth to a daughter with Renato Verano
Esidera at Capitol Medical Center in Quezon City.3 Her marriage to Richard Tang Tepace was
later declared void on January 27, 1992.4

Based on her certification of marriage records dated February 21, 2009, Judge Desales-
Esidera married Renato Verano Esidera on June 3, 1992.5

Perfecto further alleged that Judge Desales-Esidera falsified her daughter’s birth certificate
to make it appear that she and Renato Verano Esidera were married on March 18, 1990 and
that their daughter was a legitimate child.6 No marriage took place on that date based on a
certification of no marriage issued by the Office of the City Civil Registrar of Paranaque
City.7 Judge Desales-Esidera did not take any step to rectify the error on her daughter’s
birth certificate.8

Perfecto prays for Judge Desales-Esidera’s dismissal from office for her alleged
dishonesty.9 Judge Desales-Esidera filed her Comment with Motion to Dismiss on December
30, 2010.10 She argued that Perfecto did not comply with the requirement of personal
knowledge under Rule 140, Section 1.11 He should have supported his Complaint "with
affidavits of persons who knew her personally or with authenticated copies of documents
that supported his allegations."12 Otherwise, Perfecto’s allegations were nothing more than
"tsismis" or hearsay.13Perfecto perjured himself when he subscribed to facts that were not
based on his personal knowledge.14

Judge Desales-Esidera brought this court’s attention to the allegedly malicious means by
which Perfecto obtained the documents supporting his allegations.15 According to her, the
documents were secured in connivance with persons involved in or were related to parties in
other administrative cases. Perfecto also connived with court employees who violated either
the law or Supreme Court circulars by bringing court records outside the court without the
judge’s knowledge or consent.16 Judge Desales-Esidera claimed that this affects Perfecto’s
credibility and integrity.17

Moreover, Judge Desales-Esidera claimed that the persons involved in obtaining the
documents "desperately want[ed] [her] out of the judiciary so that they could continue their
illegal activities in the office[,] like temporary borrowing of funds in the Office of the Clerk of
Court . . . and the abuse of the accreditation of [Perfecto][,] whose newspaper [was] not
printed and circulated generally and regularly in Northern Samar."18

Judge Desales-Esidera further argued that the charges against her were personal and not
judicial.19 She did not participate in the accomplishment of the birth certificate.20 She had
planned to correct her daughter’s birth certificate, but she and her husband decided against
it for the best interest of her daughter.21

On the question of integrity, honesty, and morality, Judge Desales-Esidera argued that
everything she did was legal and in accordance with her religious beliefs. She was, indeed,
married to her second husband on March 18, 1990, but only under recognized Catholic
rites.22 The priest who officiated their marriage had no authority to solemnize marriages
under the civil law.

Further, Judge Desales-Esidera argued that while her religious marriage was done before
the declaration of nullity of her first marriage, the prevailing jurisprudence at that time was
that "there was no need for a judicial decree to establish the invalidity of void
marriage."23 She described her state of mind and motivations for her acts as follows:

When I got married the first time, it was not our intention to live together as husband and
wife. It was a secret marriage solemnized by a judge. We planned of a church wedding
supposedly on my birthday of the same year. However, Richard reasoned out that he was
still confused because his mother was sick while his father, a Chinese, would not agree
because it was the Year of the Dragon. As established by the evidence in the annulment
case (Decision, page 4 onwards, Annex C of Complaint), I continued living with my parents
and using my paternal name. Never for a moment did we live together as husband and wife.
For some reasons we cooled off and finally called it quits. When I met my second husband, I
found it very much unfair to be bound in a marriage that was never consummated. I wanted
the marriage annulled. But the annulment process was long and I was not getting any
younger. Then, I got pregnant. I knew it was against my values but I had no choice. I heard
that getting pregnant beyond thirty was more risky.

Renato and I are both religious. We both wanted to correct what we have started wrongly. I
consulted at least two priests who were knowledgeable on Canon Law, a certain Fr. Albarico
from San Sebastian Church and Rev. Fr. David J. Tither, C.SS.R of the Redemptorist Church
in Baclaran. I also made my own research on Catholic annulment and got a copy of the
deliberations on "psychological incapacity" as a ground for annulment under the Family
Code. I need not over emphasize that in view of the separation of the Church and the State,
civil marriages are not recognized by the Catholic Church. Couples who are civilly married
are considered living in state of sin, and may be ex-communicated. They cannot receive the
sacraments. Thus, my marriage to Richard Tang was not recognized by the Catholic Church.
Moreover, in my research I found this digest in Vol. 1, Civil Code Annotated, Ambrosio
Padilla, p. 454, 1975 edition:

"People vs. Whipkey, (CA) 69, O.G. 9678. – Pursuant to Art. 66 of the Civil Code, before a
marriage license can be obtained by a citizen or subject of a foreign country, he must first
present a certificate of legal capacity to contract marriage to be issued by the diplomatic or
consular official of his own country. The law stresses the mandatory character of this
requirement by the use of the word "necessary", so that marriage license secured in
violation of Article 66 of the Civil Code is a void license."

I need not go into details. But anybody knows that a marriage solemnized with a void
license is no marriage at all. My marriage to Richard Tang, a Chinese, was void ab initio. If I
am not mistaken, at that time, the jurisprudence was that there was no need for a judicial
decree to establish the invalidity of void marriage. (People vs. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033, cited
on page 470 of the same book).

The logical conclusion, therefore, was that there was no impediment for Renato and I to get
married although we still need the court order to cancel the registration. But we both can
receive the sacrament. Our primary purpose in availing of the Sacrament of Holy Matrimony
was to continue living in a state of grace while waiting for the result of the annulment case
which came two years later. So after consultations and a little catechesis with Fr. David
Tither, he finally officiated the sacramental marriage rite in one of the confessional rooms in
the parish office of Baclaran Church with two other priests. Rev. Fr. Patrick J. Deane, C.SS.R
and Rev. Fr. Desmond de Souza, C.SS.R., as witnesses. Our second marriage on June 3,
1992 was again in a religious ceremony but with all the formalities required by law.

That pregnancy was very complicated. In fact, it was diagnosed as ectopic pregnancy. After
two sessions with Fr. David Tither, also a known healer and exorcist, the fetus finally went
down from the fallopian tube to the womb but was born prematurely. It was also difficult
and painful giving birth to her. So, my husband Renato took charge of everything, including
the preparation for the registration of the baby.

Complainant accuses me of falsifying the birth certificate of my daughter, Mary Joyce.

However, her certificate of live birth form was accomplished by her father in his own
handwriting and signed by him. My husband Renato is not a lawyer. To him, what matters is
that our union is blessed by God and that before the eyes of the Almighty, our daughter is
legitimate.
The date of marriage which my husband supplied in the birth certificate of our daughter,
Mary Joyce, is the date we received the Sacrament of Holy Matrimony on March 18, 1990.
Fr. David Tither had no license to solemnize marriage from the National Archives or from
the civil government. . . . It was a purely sacramental marriage rite, without legal effect but
definitely valid and recognized by the Roman Catholic Church. It is called "matrimoña de
conciencia". All he could give us was a blank certificate of marriage but signed by him and
the two priest witnesses, a certification and a covering letter (Annex E, F and G). The need
referred to in the covering letter did not arrive because our second marriage (June 3, 1992)
came before Mary Joyce attended the pre-school, so the form remained blank up to this
date. If I were as scheming as my accusers, I should have filled it up a long time ago. But I
am too honest and honorable to do that. According to the Order to comment, I am also
accused of immorality. The basis of morality is generally the do’s and don’ts set by the
Church of whatever religion. As Catholics, we have the Ten Commandments. I have sinned
against one but I took advantage of the Sacrament of Reconciliation and the Sacrament of
Matrimony. I did not, and do not live with anybody not my husband as defined by my
Catholic faith. Chastity is a virtue. Even if one is civilly married but if there is no religious
ratification, in the eyes of my God, the spouses are living in sin and cannot take the
Sacrament of the Holy Eucharist.

From the day I saw the certified copy of the birth certificate of our daughter, I already
planned to correct it. But, being married, anything that would affect our family must be a
conjugal decision. We decided against it, not because I am a lawbreaker, dishonest or
immoral, but because not to disturb her birth record will serve her best interest and welfare.
It will save her the embarrassment of being different in some way from her sisters; and the
repercussion of being branded an "illegitimate" by her teachers and peers. As a mother, I
have to protect her from everything detrimental to her well-being. More than a judge, I am
a mother and a wife. As a lawyer, I agreed because it can always be corrected when the
time or need comes. This case has already affected my daughter emotionally, especially
when she learned that somebody secured her birth certificate and pretended to be "Mary
Joyce." She could not understand why she should be dragged in this controversy using her
birth certificate which is supposed to be confidential. Neither do I. If the Xerox copies
appended to the Complaint were perused carefully, my children, especially Mary Joyce,
would have been saved from emotional shock and trauma. Being appointed to the Judiciary
is not a license to pry on our personal life before I became a judge and criticize our wisdom.

Finally, my life and the status of our firstborn could not have escaped the scrutiny of all
those involved in the selection process in the appointment to the Judiciary, including those
who conducted the background investigation. It is personal and has nothing to do with my
professional life then, and now, with my judicial life. My love story is the best proof of my
morality and my honesty. I never kept it a secret; but I cannot allow it also to be publicized
unnecessarily. The first civil marriage was never consummated because of our agreement to
have a church wedding first. The second marriage was purely a sacramental rite in
obedience to the Law of God, so that my husband and I would continue living together
without offending our God until the annulment process was finalized. The third marriage
was made to finally formalize our status in the eyes of the law of man.

The reason for these administrative cases is that I cannot be like my accusers. I cannot join
them because I value my dignity and my peace of mind.

We all have our stories to tell. Nobody’s perfect. What is important is we learn from our
mistakes, amend our lives and avoid further wrongdoings. If the Honorable Court
Administrator, through the Legal Office, would only conduct discreet investigation on the life
of my accusers and their lifestyles, the Office would realize who among us is leading an
immoral life.24 (Emphasis in the original)

On September 29, 2014, the Office of the Court Administrator recommended that Judge
Desales-Esidera be found guilty of disgraceful, immoral, or dishonest conduct and that she
be suspended from judicial service for 15 days with the warning that a repetition of a similar
offense would be dealt with more severely.25

The Office of the Court Administrator found that Judge Desales-Esidera condoned the
misrepresentation made on her child’s birth certificate.26

The Office of the Court Administrator also found that Judge Desales-Esidera engaged in an
"illicit affair" and contracted a second marriage while another marriage subsisted.27 She
contracted the second marriage knowing that there were legal impediments to that
marriage.28 Judge Desales-Esidera "did not comport herself according to her Roman Catholic
faith."29

We find that Judge Desales-Esidera’s omission to correct her child’s birth certificate is not
sufficient to render her administratively liable under the circumstances. The error in the
birth certificate cannot be attributed to her. She did not participate in filling in the required
details in the document. The birth certificate shows that it was her husband who signed it as
informant.30 Judge Desales-Esidera is also not guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct
under the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Morality refers to what is good or right conduct at a given circumstance. In Estrada v.

Escritor,31 this court described morality as "‘how we ought to live’ and why."32

Morality may be religious, in which case what is good depends on the moral prescriptions of
a high moral authority or the beliefs of a particular religion. Religion, as this court defined in
Aglipay v. Ruiz,33 is "a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to
his Creator."34 A conduct is religiously moral if it is consistent with and is carried out in light
of the divine set of beliefs and obligations imposed by the active power.

Morality may also be secular, in which case it is independent of any divine moral
prescriptions. What is good or right at a given circumstance does not derive its basis from
any religious doctrine but from the independent moral sense shared as humans.

The non-establishment clause35 bars the State from establishing, through laws and rules,
moral standards according to a specific religion. Prohibitions against immorality should be
based on a purpose that is independent of religious beliefs. When it forms part of our laws,
rules, and policies, morality must be secular. Laws and rules of conduct must be based on a
secular purpose.36

In the same way, this court, in resolving cases that touch on issues of morality, is bound to
remain neutral and to limit the bases of its judgment on secular moral standards. When
laws or rules refer to morals or immorality, courts should be careful not to overlook the
distinction between secular and religious morality if it is to keep its part in upholding
constitutionally guaranteed rights.37
There is the danger of "compelled religion"38 and, therefore, of negating the very idea of
freedom of belief and non-establishment of religion when religious morality is incorporated
in government regulations and policies. As explained in Estrada v. Escritor:39

Otherwise, if government relies upon religious beliefs in formulating public policies and
morals, the resulting policies and morals would require conformity to what some might
regard as religious programs or agenda. The non-believers would therefore be compelled to
conform to a standard of conduct buttressed by a religious belief, i.e., to a "compelled
religion" anathema to religious freedom. Likewise, if government based its actions upon
religious beliefs, it would tacitly approve or endorse that belief and thereby also tacitly
disapprove contrary religious or non-religious views that would not support the policy. As a
result, government will not provide full religious freedom for all its citizens, or even make it
appear that those whose beliefs are disapproved are second-class citizens. Expansive
religious freedom therefore requires that government be neutral in matters of religion;
governmental reliance upon religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of
neutrality.40

The Office of the Court Administrator recommended that we find respondent judge guilty of
immoral conduct based on, among others, her alleged affair and her failure to comport
herself according to the Roman Catholic faith.

This court may not sit as judge of what is moral according to a particular religion. We do not
have jurisdiction over and is not the proper authority to determine which conduct
contradicts religious doctrine. We have jurisdiction over matters of morality only insofar as
it involves conduct that affects the public or its interest.

Thus, for purposes of determining administrative liability of lawyers and judges, "immoral
conduct" should relate to their conduct as officers of the court. To be guilty of "immorality"
under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer’s conduct must be so depraved as to
reduce the public’s confidence in the Rule of Law. Religious morality is not binding whenever
this court decides the administrative liability of lawyers and persons under this court’s
supervision. At best, religious morality weighs only persuasively on us.

Therefore, we cannot properly conclude that respondent judge’s acts of contracting a

second marriage during the subsistence of her alleged first marriage and having an alleged
"illicit" affair are "immoral" based on her Catholic faith. This court is not a judge of religious
morality.

We also do not find that respondent judge’s acts constitute immorality for purposes of
administrative liability. Under the circumstances, respondent judge’s second marriage and
her alleged affair with her second husband were not of such depravity as to reduce
confidence in the Rule of Law. Respondent judge and her first husband never really lived
together as husband and wife. She claimed that her first husband did not want to have a
church wedding. She and her husband did not have a child. She claimed that this marriage
was not recognized by her church. Eventually, their marriage was declared void,41 and she
was wed civilly to her second husband, with whom respondent judge allegedly had an affair.

Moreover, respondent judge’s acts were not intrinsically harmful. When respondent judge
married her second husband, no harm was inflicted upon any one, not even the
complainant. There was no evidence on the records that the first husband, who was the
most interested person in the issue, even objected to the second marriage.
While we do not find respondent judge administratively liable for immorality, we can
determine if she is administratively liable for possible misconduct. The Code of Professional
Responsibility directs lawyers to obey the laws and promote respect for the law.42

We cannot conclude that, for purposes of determining administrative liability, respondent

judge disobeyed the law against bigamy when she and her second husband conducted a
marriage ceremony on March 18, 1990.

Respondent judge claimed that this marriage was merely a sacramental marriage entered
into only to comply with the requirements of their religious beliefs. It was valid only under
the Roman Catholic Church but has no legal effect. Their solemnizing officer was not
licensed to solemnize marriage from the National Archives or from the civil government.43

Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code prohibits a second or subsequent marriage before the
legal dissolution of a first marriage:

Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who
shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.

The second or subsequent marriage contemplated under this provision is the marriage
entered into under the law. Article 1 of the Family Code defines marriage as "a special
contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with
law for the establishment of conjugal and family life[.]"

Thus, the validity of the second marriage, if not for the subsistence of the first marriage, is
considered one of the elements of the crime of bigamy. The elements of bigamy are:

(a) the offender has been legally married; (b) the marriage has not been legally dissolved
or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead
according to the Civil Code; (c) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (d)
the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. The felony is
consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage. It is
essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the
essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first
marriage.44 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Respondent judge’s act of participating in the marriage ceremony as governed only by the
rules of her religion is not inconsistent with our law against bigamy. What the law prohibits
is not second marriage during a subsisting marriage per se. What the law prohibits is a
second marriage that would have been valid had it not been for the subsisting marriage.
Under our law, respondent judge’s marriage in 1990 was invalid because of the solemnizing
officer’s lack of authority.

Marriages entered into in accordance with the law may or may not include marriages
recognized in certain religions. Religious marriages are recognized in and may be governed
by our laws only if they conform to legal requirements. Religious marriages that lack some
or all the requirements under the law are invalid.45 They are not considered to have been
entered into. They do not enjoy the benefits, consequences, and incidents of marriage
provided under the law.
The lack of authority of the officer that solemnized respondent judge’s marriage in 1990
renders such marriage invalid. It is not recognized in our law. Hence, no second marriage
can be imputed against respondent judge while her first marriage subsisted.

However, respondent judge may have disobeyed the law, particularly Article 350 of the
Revised Penal Code, which prohibits knowingly contracting marriages against the provisions
of laws. Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

ART. 350. Marriage contracted against provisions of laws. – The penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon any person who,
without being included in the provisions of the next preceding article, shall contract
marriage knowing that the requirements of the law have not been complied with or that the
marriage is in disregard of a legal impediment. (Emphasis supplied)

Respondent judge knew that the solemnizing officer during her and her husband’s marriage
in 1990 had no civil authority to solemnize marriages. It is clear from her Comment that she
and her husband’s only consideration for their 1990 marriage was the recognition from the
Roman Catholic Church. She stated that:

Fr. David Tither had no license to solemnize marriage from the National Archives or from
the civil government. Hence, he was not under obligation to register our marriage. It was a
purely sacramental marriage rite, without legal effect but definitely valid and recognized by
the Roman Catholic Church. It is called "matrimoña de conciencia."46

However, Article 350 may be of doubtful constitutionality when applied to religious exercise
and expression insofar as it prescribes upon individuals and religious communities formal
requirements for the conduct of their religious ceremonies. It puts a burden47 upon the
exercise of beliefs by criminalizing marriages performed in accordance with those beliefs,
but lacks some or all the requisites of a valid marriage under the law. These requirements
include not only age and consent, but also formal requisites such as marriage license and
civil authority of the solemnizing officer even though violence, fraud, or intimidation was not
present under the circumstances. It may, therefore, limit religious exercise and expression
to the formalities of law.

Thus, unless respondent judge’s act of participating in a marriage ceremony according to

her religious beliefs violates other peoples’ rights or poses grave and imminent danger to
the society,48 we cannot rule that respondent judge is administratively liable for her
participation in her religious marriage ceremony.49

In Estrada,50 this court ruled that in religious freedom cases, the test of benevolent
neutrality should be applied. Under the test of benevolent neutrality, religious freedom is
weighed against a compelling state interest:

Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals and
interests but at the same time strives to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent
possible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality contemplated by
laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on
religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests.51 (Emphasis in the original)

We find that there is no compelling state interest that may limit respondent judge’s right to
participate in religious and merely ceremonial acts that are non-violative of other people’s
rights and with no legally binding effect. The institution of marriage is not threatened when
we accommodate respondent judge’s freedom to participate in such ceremonies even if they
have secular counterparts under our laws.

In any case, respondent judge did not ask that she and her husband be given the same
rights as civilly married partners before their civil wedding in 1992. She does not ask that
our laws recognize her marriage in 1990 as valid. Respondent judge also does not seem to
be against civil marriages. She and her husband were even civilly wed after her marriage
with her first spouse was declared void.

However, benevolent neutrality and claims of religious freedom cannot shield respondent
judge from liability for misconduct under our laws. Respondent judge knowingly entered into
a civil marriage with her first husband. She knew its effects under our laws. She had sexual
relations with her second husband while her first marriage was subsisting.

Respondent judge cannot claim that engaging in sexual relations with another person during
the subsistence of a marriage is an exercise of her religious expression. Legal implications
and obligations attach to any person who chooses to enter civil marriages. This is regardless
of how civil marriages are treated in that person’s religion.

Moreover, respondent judge, as a lawyer and even more so as a judge, is expected to abide
by the law. Her conduct affects the credibility of the courts in dispensing justice. Thus, in
finding respondent judge administratively liable for a violation of her marriage obligations
under our laws, this court protects the credibility of the judiciary in administering justice. In
the words of Justice Carpio in his dissenting opinion in Estrada:

Court employees, from the highest magistrate to the lowliest clerk, are expected to abide
scrupulously with the law.1âwphi1They are held to a higher standard since they are part of
the judicial machinery that dispenses justice. . . . [T]here exists a compelling state interest
to hold Escritor to the same standards required of every court employee. If unsanctioned,
Escritor’s unlawful conduct would certainly impair the integrity and credibility of the
judiciary.52

Lawyers are not and should not be expected to be saints. What they do as citizens of their
faiths are beyond this court’s power to judge. Lawyers, however, are officers of court. They
are expected to care about and sustain the law. This court’s jurisdiction over their actions is
limited to their acts that may affect public confidence in the Rule of Law. Our state has
secular interests to protect. This court cannot be expected to condone misconduct done
knowingly on account of religious freedom or expression.

Finally, the Office of the Court Administrator and the Administrators of lower courts should
look into the motives of persons who file complaints against our judges and officers of court
when allegations point to possible administrative violations. This is not to say that
complainants’ motives are relevant to their causes of actions. However, complainants who
come to court with unclean hands should not be spared from liability just because they were
the first to submit their accusations.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Judge Alma Consuelo Desales-Esidera guilty of violating

Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent Judge Desales-Esidera is
SUSPENDED from judicial service for one (1) month with a warning that repetition of a
similar offense will be dealt with more severely. She is STERNLY WARNED that repetition of
the same violations in the future will be dealt with more severely.
The Office of the Court Administrator is ORDERED to conduct an investigation regarding
respondent's claims of illegal court activities.

A.C. No. 12174, August 28, 2018

ALFRED LEHNERT, Complainant, v. ATTY. DENNIS L. DIÑO, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

LEONEN, J.:

Complainant Alfred Lehnert (Lehnert) filed this administrative Complaint1 before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines on November 11, 2015. He prayed that respondent Atty.
Dennis L. Diño (Atty. Diño) be permanently disbarred for violating the lawyer's oath, as well
as the Code of Professional Responsibility, when he committed two (2) violations of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22.

In his Complaint, Lehnert narrated that an Information against Atty. Diño was filed with
Branch 34, Metropolitan Trial Court, Quezon City, charging him with two (2) counts of
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. A Warrant of Arrest2 was then issued for Atty. Diño's
arrest. Members of the Philippine National Police and National Bureau of Investigation
attempted to serve the warrant on Atty. Diño. However, despite their exhaustive efforts,
they were unable to locate him at his residential addresses in Bulacan, Quezon City, San
Lazaro, and Sta. Cruz, or even at his office address in Intramuros, Manila.3 Thus,
considering that Atty. Diño was hiding to evade arrest, Lehnert prayed for his immediate
disbarment.4

In a Notice of Mandatory Conference dated March 4, 2016, Atty. Diño and Lehnert were
directed to submit their respective mandatory conference briefs, and to appear before the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines on April 29,
2016.5 However, Atty. Diño did not appear or submit any brief to the Commission on Bar
Discipline.6

On June 29, 2016, the Investigating Commissioner found Atty. Diño guilty of violating
Canon 1, Rule 1.017 of the Code of Professional Responsibility by issuing in favor of Lehnert
post-dated checks, which were subsequently dishonored. Moreover, the Investigating
Commissioner noted that although Atty. Diño had not yet been convicted of the crime
charged, his acts of evading arrest and failing to participate in the administrative
proceedings before the Commission on Bar Discipline further gave the impression that he
was probably guilty. Thus, she recommended that Atty. Diño be suspended from the
practice of law for two (2) years.8

On July 17, 2017, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines passed
Resolution No. XXII-2017-1164, adopting the findings of fact and recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner imposing on Atty. Diño the penalty of suspension of two (2)
years from the practice of law.9
This Court agrees with the findings of the Board of Governors and sustains its recommended
penalty.

In Lao v. Medel,10 this Court stressed that a lawyer's payment of financial obligations is part
of his duties:

Verily, lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, to the
courts and to their clients. As part of those duties, they must promptly pay their financial
obligations. Their conduct must always reflect the values and norms of the legal profession
as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. On these considerations, the Court
may disbar or suspend lawyers for any professional or private misconduct showing them to
be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor — or to be unworthy to
continue as officers of the Court.

It is equally disturbing that respondent remorselessly issued a series of worthless checks,

unmindful of the deleterious effects of such act to public interest and public
order.11 (Citations omitted)

This Court continues to state that the issuance of worthless checks constitutes gross
misconduct and violates Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates
all members of the bar "to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law." Issuance
of worthless checks also violates Rule 1.01 of the Code, which mandates that "[a] lawyer
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."

Thus, this Court has imposed the penalty of one (1)-year suspension from the practice of
law for a cavalier attitude toward incurring debts.12 This Court has imposed a higher penalty
of two (2)-year suspension on a lawyer who issued worthless checks and also disregarded
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines' orders in administrative proceedings.13

In light of the foregoing, this Court finds the recommended penalty of two (2)-year
suspension from the practice of law proper.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Dennis L. Diño is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
two (2) years. He is likewise WARNED that a repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with
more severely.

The respondent, upon receipt of this Resolution, shall immediately serve his suspension. He
shall formally manifest to this Court that his suspension has started, and copy furnish all
courts and quasi-judicial bodies where he has entered his appearance, within five (5) days
from receipt of this Resolution. Respondent shall also serve copies of his manifestation on
all adverse parties in all the cases he entered his formal appearance.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to be attached
to Atty. Dennis L. Diño's personal record. Copies of this Resolution should also be served on
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its proper disposition, and the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

A.C. No. 9604 March 20, 2013

RODRIGO E. TAPAY and ANTHONY J. RUSTIA, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. CHARLIE L. BANCOLO and ATTY. JANUS T. JARDER, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This administrative case arose from a Complaint tiled by Rodrigo E. Tapay (Tapay) and
Anthony J. Rustia (Rustia), both employees of the Sugar Regulatory Administration, against
Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo (Atty. Bancolo) and Atty. Janus T. larder (Atty. Jarder) for violation
of the Canons of Ethics and Professionalism, Falsification of Public Document, Gross
Dishonesty, and Harassment.

The Facts

Sometime in October 2004, Tapay and Rustia received an Order dated 14 October 2004
from the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas requiring them to file a counter-affidavit to a
complaint for usurpation of authority, falsification of public document, and graft and corrupt
practices filed against them by Nehimias Divinagracia, Jr. (Divinagracia), a co-employee in
the Sugar Regulatory Administration. The Complaint1 dated 31 August 2004 was allegedly
signed on behalf of Divinagracia by one Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo of the Jarder Bancolo Law
Office based in Bacolod City, Negros Occidental.

When Atty. Bancolo and Rustia accidentally chanced upon each other, the latter informed
Atty. Bancolo of the case filed against them before the Office of the Ombudsman. Atty.
Bancolo denied that he represented Divinagracia since he had yet to meet Divinagracia in
person. When Rustia showed him the Complaint, Atty. Bancolo declared that the signature
appearing above his name as counsel for Divinagracia was not his. Thus, Rustia convinced
Atty. Bancolo to sign an affidavit to attest to such fact. On 9 December 2004, Atty. Bancolo
signed an affidavit denying his supposed signature appearing on the Complaint filed with the
Office of the Ombudsman and submitted six specimen signatures for comparison. Using
Atty. Bancolo’s affidavit and other documentary evidence, Tapay and Rustia filed a counter-
affidavit accusing Divinagracia of falsifying the signature of his alleged counsel, Atty.
Bancolo.

In a Resolution dated 28 March 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman provisionally dismissed
the Complaint since the falsification of the counsel’s signature posed a prejudicial question
to the Complaint’s validity. Also, the Office of the Ombudsman ordered that separate cases
for Falsification of Public Document2 and Dishonesty3 be filed against Divinagracia, with
Rustia and Atty. Bancolo as complainants.

Thereafter, Divinagracia filed his Counter-Affidavit dated 1 August 2005 denying that he
falsified the signature of his former lawyer, Atty. Bancolo. Divinagracia presented as
evidence an affidavit dated 1 August 2005 by Richard A. Cordero, the legal assistant of Atty.
Bancolo, that the Jarder Bancolo Law Office accepted Divinagracia’s case and that the
Complaint filed with the Office of the Ombudsman was signed by the office secretary per
Atty. Bancolo’s instructions. Divinagracia asked that the Office of the Ombudsman dismiss
the cases for falsification of public document and dishonesty filed against him by Rustia and
Atty. Bancolo and to revive the original Complaint for various offenses that he filed against
Tapay and Rustia.

In a Resolution dated 19 September 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed the
criminal case for falsification of public document (OMB-V-C-05-0207-E) for insufficiency of
evidence. The dispositive portion states:

WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence, without
prejudice to the re-filing by Divinagracia, Jr. of a proper complaint for violation of RA 3019
and other offenses against Rustia and Tapay.

SO ORDERED.4

The administrative case for dishonesty (OMB-V-A-05-0219-E) was also dismissed for lack of
substantial evidence in a Decision dated 19 September 2005.

On 29 November 2005, Tapay and Rustia filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) a complaint5 to disbar Atty. Bancolo and Atty. Jarder, Atty. Bancolo’s law partner. The
complainants alleged that they were subjected to a harassment Complaint filed before the
Office of the Ombudsman with the forged signature of Atty. Bancolo. Complainants stated
further that the signature of Atty. Bancolo in the Complaint was not the only one that was
forged. Complainants attached a Report6 dated 1 July 2005 by the Philippine National Police
Crime Laboratory 6 which examined three other letter-complaints signed by Atty. Bancolo
for other clients, allegedly close friends of Atty. Jarder. The report concluded that the
questioned signatures in the letter-complaints and the submitted standard signatures of
Atty. Bancolo were not written by one and the same person. Thus, complainants maintained
that not only were respondents engaging in unprofessional and unethical practices, they
were also involved in falsification of documents used to harass and persecute innocent
people.

On 9 January 2006, complainants filed a Supplement to the Disbarment Complaint Due to

Additional Information. They alleged that a certain Mary Jane Gentugao, the secretary of the
Jarder Bancolo Law Office, forged the signature of Atty. Bancolo.

In their Answer dated 26 January 2006 to the disbarment complaint, respondents admitted
that the criminal and administrative cases filed by Divinagracia against complainants before
the Office of the Ombudsman were accepted by the Jarder Bancolo Law Office. The cases
were assigned to Atty. Bancolo. Atty. Bancolo alleged that after being informed of the
assignment of the cases, he ordered his staff to prepare and draft all the necessary
pleadings and documents. However, due to some minor lapses, Atty. Bancolo permitted that
the pleadings and communications be signed in his name by the secretary of the law office.
Respondents added that complainants filed the disbarment complaint to retaliate against
them since the cases filed before the Office of the Ombudsman were meritorious and
strongly supported by testimonial and documentary evidence. Respondents also denied that
Mary Jane Gentugao was employed as secretary of their law office.

Tapay and Rustia filed a Reply to the Answer dated 2 March 2006. Thereafter, the parties
were directed by the Commission on Bar Discipline to attend a mandatory conference
scheduled on 5 May 2006. The conference was reset to 10 August 2006. On the said date,
complainants were present but respondents failed to appear. The conference was reset to
25 September 2006 for the last time. Again, respondents failed to appear despite receiving
notice of the conference. Complainants manifested that they were submitting their
disbarment complaint based on the documents submitted to the IBP. Respondents were also
deemed to have waived their right to participate in the mandatory conference. Further, both
parties were directed to submit their respective position papers. On 27 October 2006, the
IBP received complainants’ position paper dated 18 October 2006 and respondents’ position
paper dated 23 October 2006.

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

On 11 April 2007, Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, the Investigating Commissioner of the

Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP, submitted her Report. Atty. Quisumbing found that
Atty. Bancolo violated Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility while
Atty. Jarder violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the same Code. The Investigating

Commissioner recommended that Atty. Bancolo be suspended for two years from the
practice of law and Atty. Jarder be admonished for his failure to exercise certain
responsibilities in their law firm.

In her Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner opined:

x x x. In his answer, respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo admitted that his signature
appearing in the complaint filed against complainants’ Rodrigo E. Tapay and Anthony J.
Rustia with the Ombudsman were signed by the secretary. He did not refute the findings
that his signatures appearing in the various documents released from his office were found
not to be his. Such pattern of malpratice by respondent clearly breached his obligation
under Rule 9.01 of Canon 9, for a lawyer who allows a non-member to represent him is
guilty of violating the aforementioned Canon. The fact that respondent was busy cannot
serve as an excuse for him from signing personally. After all respondent is a member of a
law firm composed of not just one (1) lawyer. The Supreme Court has ruled that this
practice constitute negligence and undersigned finds the act a sign of indolence and
ineptitude. Moreover, respondents ignored the notices sent by undersigned. That showed
patent lack of respect to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines’ Commission on Bar Discipline
and its proceedings. It betrays lack of courtesy and irresponsibility as lawyers.

On the other hand, Atty. Janus T. Jarder, a senior partner of the law firm Jarder Bancolo
and Associates Law Office, failed to exercise certain responsibilities over matters under the
charge of his law firm. As a senior partner[,] he failed to abide to the principle of "command
responsibility". x x x.

xxxx

Respondent Atty. Janus Jarder after all is a seasoned practitioner, having passed the bar in
1995 and practicing law up to the present. He holds himself out to the public as a law firm
designated as Jarder Bancolo and Associates Law Office. It behooves Atty. Janus T. Jarder
to exert ordinary diligence to find out what is going on in his law firm, to ensure that all
lawyers in his firm act in conformity to the Code of Professional Responsibility. As a partner,
it is his responsibility to provide efficacious control of court pleadings and other documents
that carry the name of the law firm. Had he done that, he could have known the unethical
practice of his law partner Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo. Respondent Atty. Janus T. Jarder failed
to perform this task and is administratively liable under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.7
On 19 September 2007, in Resolution No. XVIII-2007-97, the Board of Governors of the IBP
approved with modification the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner. The Resolution states:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with

modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, and considering Respondent Atty. Bancolo’s violation of Rule 9.01, Canon 9 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for one (1) year.

However, with regard to the charge against Atty. Janus T. Jarder, the Board of Governors
RESOLVED as it is hereby RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby AMENDED the
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the
case for lack of merit.8

Tapay and Rustia filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Likewise, Atty. Bancolo filed his Motion
for Reconsideration dated 22 December 2007. Thereafter, Atty. Jarder filed his separate
Consolidated Comment/Reply to Complainants’ Motion for Reconsideration and Comment
Filed by Complainants dated 29 January 2008.

In Resolution No. XX-2012-175 dated 9 June 2012, the IBP Board of Governors denied both
complainants’ and Atty. Bancolo’s motions for reconsideration. The IBP Board found no
cogent reason to reverse the findings of the Investigating Commissioner and affirmed
Resolution No. XVIII-2007-97 dated 19 September 2007.

The Court’s Ruling

After a careful review of the records of the case, we agree with the findings and
recommendation of the IBP Board and find reasonable grounds to hold respondent Atty.
Bancolo administratively liable.

Atty. Bancolo admitted that the Complaint he filed for a former client before the Office of
the Ombudsman was signed in his name by a secretary of his law office. Clearly, this is a
violation of Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:

CANON 9
A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE UNAUTHORIZED
PRACTICE OF LAW.

Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any
task which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.

This rule was clearly explained in the case of Cambaliza v. Cristal-Tenorio,9 where we held:

The lawyer’s duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice
of law is founded on public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law
be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The
permissive right conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited privilege subject to
withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The
purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or
dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of
the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that this purpose is attained. Thus, the canons
and ethics of the profession enjoin him not to permit his professional services or his name
to be used in aid of, or to make possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency,
personal or corporate. And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to
disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law.

In Republic v. Kenrick Development Corporation,10 we held that the preparation and signing
of a pleading constitute legal work involving the practice of law which is reserved exclusively
for members of the legal profession. Atty. Bancolo’s authority and duty to sign a pleading
are personal to him. Although he may delegate the signing of a pleading to another lawyer,
he may not delegate it to a non-lawyer. Further, under the Rules of Court, counsel’s
signature serves as a certification that (1) he has read the pleading; (2) to the best of his
knowledge, information and belief there is good ground to support it; and (3) it is not
interposed for delay.11 Thus, by affixing one’s signature to a pleading, it is counsel alone
who has the responsibility to certify to these matters and give legal effect to the
document.1âwphi1

In his Motion for Reconsideration dated 22 December 2007, Atty. Bancolo wants us to
believe that he was a victim of circumstances or of manipulated events because of his
unconditional trust and confidence in his former law partner, Atty. Jarder. However, Atty.
Bancolo did not take any steps to rectify the situation, save for the affidavit he gave to
Rustia denying his signature to the Complaint filed before the Office of the Ombudsman.
Atty. Bancolo had an opportunity to maintain his innocence when he filed with the IBP his
Joint Answer (with Atty. Jarder) dated 26 January 2006. Atty. Bancolo, however, admitted
that prior to the preparation of the Joint Answer, Atty. Jarder threatened to file a
disbarment case against him if he did not cooperate. Thus, he was constrained to allow
Atty. Jarder to prepare the Joint Answer. Atty. Bancolo simply signed the verification
without seeing the contents of the Joint Answer.

In the Answer, Atty. Bancolo categorically stated that because of some minor lapses, the
communications and pleadings filed against Tapay and Rustia were signed by his secretary,
albeit with his tolerance. Undoubtedly, Atty. Bancolo violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility by allowing a non-lawyer to affix his signature to a pleading. This violation Is
an act of falsehood which IS a ground for disciplinary action.

The complainants did not present any evidence that Atty. Jarder was directly involved, had
knowledge of, or even participated in the wrongful practice of Atty. Bancolo in allowing or
tolerating his secretary to sign pleadings for him. Thus, we agree with the finding of the IBP
Board that Atty. Jarder is not administratively liable.

In sum, we find that the suspension of Atty. Bancolo from the practice of law for one year is
warranted. We also find proper the dismissal of the case against Atty. larder.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the complaint against Atty. Janus T. larder for lack of merit.

We find respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo administratively liable for violating Rule 9.01 of
Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for one year effective upon finality of this Decision. He is warned that a
repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo's record in
this Court as attorney. Further, let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate
them to all the courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 9834, August 26, 2015

SAMUEL B. ARNADO, Complainant, v. ATTY. HOMOBONO A. ADAZA, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is an administrative case against Atty. Homobono A. Adaza (respondent) for his failure
to comply with the requirements of the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) under
Bar Matter No. 850.

The Antecedent Facts

In a letter, dated 15 March 2013, Atty. Samuel B. Arnado (complainant) called the attention
of this Court to the practice of respondent of indicating "MCLE application for exemption
under process" in his pleadings filed in 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012, and "MCLE Application
for Exemption for Reconsideration" in a pleading filed in 2012. Complainant informed the
Court that he inquired from the MCLE Office about the status of respondent's compliance
and received the following Certification, dated 2 January 2013, from Prof. Myrna S. Feliciano
(Prof. Feliciano), MCLE's Executive Director:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

This is to certify that per our records, ATTY. HOMOBONO A. ADAZA with Roll Number 14118
of IBP MIS AMIS ORIENTAL Chapter did not comply with the requirements of Bar Matter
[No.] 850 for the following compliance periods:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

a. First Compliance Period (April 15, 2001 -April 14, 2004)

b. Second Compliance Period (April 15, 2004 -April 14, 2007)
c. Third Compliance Period (April 15, 2007 -April 14, 2010)

This is to further certify that Arty. Adaza filed an Application for Exemption from the MCLE
requirement on (sic) January 2009 but was DENIED by the MCLE Governing Board on (sic)
its January 14, 2009 meeting.1

In its Resolution dated 17 June 2013, the Court referred this case to he MCLE Committee for
evaluation, report and recommendation.

In a letter, dated 5 August 2013, Atty. Jesusa Jean D. Reyes (Atty. Reyes), Assistant
Executive Officer of the MCLE Office, forwarded to the Court the rollo of the case together
with the MCLE Governing Board's Evaluation, Report and Recommendation.2 In its
Evaluation, Report and Recommendation3 dated 14 August 2013,4 the MCLE Governing
Board, through retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Bernardo P. Pardo (Justice Pardo),
MCLE Chairman, informed the Court that respondent applied for exemption for the First and
Second Compliance Periods covering 15 April 2001 to 14 April 2004 and 15 April 2004 to 14
April 2007, respectively, on the ground of "expertise in law" under Section 3, Rule 7 of Bar
Matter No. 850. The MCLE Governing Board denied the request on 14 January 2009. In the
same letter, the MCLE Governing Board noted that respondent neither applied for exemption
nor complied with the Third Compliance period from 15 April 2007 to 14 April 2010.

In its 9 December 2013 Resolution, the Court directed the Second Division Clerk of Court to
furnish respondent with complainant's letter of 15 March 2013. The Court likewise required
respondent to file his comment within ten days from notice.

In his Compliance and Comment5 dated 3 February 2014, respondent alleged that he did
not receive a copy of the 5 August 2013 letter of Atty. Reyes. He stated that he was
wondering why his application for exemption could not be granted. He further alleged that
he did not receive a formal denial of his application for exemption by the MCLE Governing
Board, and that the notice sent by Prof. Feliciano was based on the letter of complainant
who belonged to Romualdo and Arnado Law Office, the law office of his political opponents,
the Romualdo family. Respondent alleged that the Romualdo family controlled Camiguin and
had total control of the judges and prosecutors in the province. He further alleged that the
law firm had control of the lawyers in Camiguin except for himself.

Respondent enumerated his achievements as a lawyer and claimed that he had been
practicing law for about 50 years. He stated:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

xxxx

Fifth, with a great degree of immodesty, I was the first outsider of the Supreme Court
WHOM PRESIDENT CORAZON C. AQUINO, offered, immediately after she took over
government in February 1986, a seat as Justice of the Supreme Court but I refused the
intended appointment because I did not like some members of the Cory crowd to get me to
the SC in an effort to buy my silence;

Sixth, I almost single-handedly handled the case of CORAZON C. AQUINO in the canvassing
of the results of the 1986 snap elections, DISCUSSING CONSTITUTIONAL and legal issues
which finally resulted to the EDSAI revolution;

xxxx

Eighth; I was one of the two lead counsels of now SENATOR MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO
in the national canvassing before the National Canvassing Board when she ran for President
against then GENERAL FIDEL RAMOS. The other counsel was former Justice of the Supreme
Court SERAFIN CUEVAS;

Ninth, I handled the 1987 and 1989 as well as the 2003 COUP CASES for leading generals
like ABENINA and COMMENDAOR and COLONELS like GREGORIO HONASAN as well as the
SIX OAKWOOD CAPTAINS, including now SENATOR ANTONIO TRILL ANES;

Tenth, I filed a case with the Supreme Court contesting the constitutionality and validity of
the 2010 national elections, still undecided up to this day;

Eleventh, I filed together with another lawyer, a case in the Supreme Court on the
constitutionality and legality of the Corona impeachment which the SC only decided after
the Senate decided his case and former SC Chief Justice Corona conceding to the decision,
thus the SC declaring the case moot and academic;

Twelfth, I have been implementing and interpreting the Constitution and other laws as
GOVERNOR OF MISAMIS ORIENTAL, COMMISSION OF IMMIGRATION and the senior
member of the Opposition in the regular Parliament in the Committee on Revision of Laws
and Constitutional Amendments;

Thirteenth, I was the leading Opposition member of Parliament that drafted the Omnibus
Election Law;

Fourteenth, I was the leading member of the Opposition in Parliament that prepared and
orchestrated the debate in the complaint for impeachment against PRESIDENT FERDINAND
MARCOS;

Fifteenth, I have been practicing law for about fifty years now with appearances before the
Supreme Court when Justices were like Concepcion, Barrera and JBL REYES; in the Court of
Appeals; and numerous courts all over the country;

Sixteenth, I have been engaged as lawyer for a number of lawyers who have exemptions
from the MCLE;

x x x x6

Respondent further claimed that he had written five books: (1) Leaders From Marcos to
Arroyo; (2) Presidentiables and Emerging Upheavals; (3) Beginning, Hope and Change; (4)
Ideas, Principles and Lost Opportunities; and (5) Corona Impeachment. Thus, he asked for
a reconsideration of the notice for him to undergo MCLE. He asked for an exemption from
MCLE compliance, or in the alternative, for him to be allowed to practice law while
complying with the MCLE requirements.

In its 2 June 2014 Resolution, the Court referred respondent's Compliance and Comment to
the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and recommendation.

The Report and Recommendation of the OBC

In its Report and Recommendation dated 25 November 2014, the OBC reported that
respondent applied for exemption for the First and Second Compliance Periods on the
ground of expertise in law. The MCLE Governing Board denied the request on 14 January
2009. Prof. Feliciano informed respondent of the denial of his application in a letter dated 1
October 2012. The OBC reported that according to the MCLE Governing Board, "in order to
be exempted (from compliance) pursuant to expertise in lp.w under Section 3, Rule 7 of Bar
Matter No. 850, the applicant must submit sufficient, satisfactory and convincing proof to
establish his expertise in a certain area of law." The OBC reported that respondent failed to
meet the requirements necessary for the exemption.

The OBC reported that this Court requires practicing members of the Bar to indicate in all
their pleadings filed with the courts the counsel's MCLE Certificate of Compliance or
Certificate of Exemption pursuant to 6ar Matter No. 1922. The OBC further reported that the
MCLE Office has no record that respondent filed a motion for reconsideration; and thus, his
representation in a pleading that his "MCLE Application for Exemption [is] for
Reconsideration" in 2012 is baseless.
The OBC further reported that under Rule 12 of Bar Matter No. 850 and Section 12 of the
MCLE Implementing Regulations, non-compliance with the MCLE requirements shall result to
the dismissal of the case and the striking out of the pleadings from the records.7 The OBC
also reported that under Section 12(d) of the MCLE Implementing Regulations, a member of
the Bar who failed to comply with the MCLE requirements is given 60 days from receipt of
notification to explain his deficiency or to show his compliance with the requirements.
Section 12(e) also provides that a member who fails to comply within the given period shall
pay a non-compliance fee of PI,000 and shall be listed as a delinquent member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the recommendation of the MCLE Governing
Board. The OBC reported that the Notice of Non-Compliance was sent to respondent on 13
August 2013. The OBC also reported that on 14 August 2013, the MCLE Governing Board
recommended that cases be filed against respondent in connection with the pleadings he
filed without the MCLE compliance/exemption number for the immediately preceding
compliance period and that the pleadings he filed be expunged from the records.

The OBC found that respondent had been remiss in his responsibilities as a lawyer. The OBC
stated that respondent's failure to comply with the MCLE requirements jeopardized the
causes of his clients because the pleadings he filed could be stricken off from the records
and considered invalid.

The OBC recommended that respondent be declared a delinquent member of the Bar and
guilty of non-compliance with the MCLE requirements. The OBC further recommended
respondent's suspension from the practice of law for six months with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely. The OBC
also recommended that respondent be directed to comply with the requirements set forth
by the MCLE Governing Board.

The Issue

The only issue here is whether respondent is administratively liable for his failure to comply
with the MCLE requirements.

The Ruling of this Court

Bar Matter No. 850 requires members of the IBP to undergo continuing legal education "to
ensure that throughout their career, they keep abreast with law and jurisprudence, maintain
the ethics of the profession and enhance the standards of the practice of law."8 The First
Compliance Period was from 15 April 2001 to 14 April 2004; the Second Compliance Period
was from 15 April 2004 to 14 April 2007; and the Third Compliance Period was from 15 April
2007 to 14 April 2010. Complainant's letter covered respondent's pleadings filed in 2009,
2010, 2011, and 2012 which means respondent also failed to comply with the MCLE
requirements for the Fourth Compliance Period from 15 April 2010 to 14 April 2013.

The records of the MCLE Office showed that respondent failed to comply with the four
compliance periods. The records also showed that respondent filed an application for
exemption only on 5 January 2009. According to the MCLE Governing Board, respondent's
application for exemption covered the First and Second Compliance Periods. Respondent did
not apply for exemption for the Third Compliance Period. The MCLE Governing Board denied
respondent's application for exemption on 14 January 2009 on the ground that the
application did not meet the requirements of expertise in law under Section 3, Rule 7 of Bar
Matter No. 850. However, the MCLE Office failed to convey the denial of the application for
exemption to respondent. The MCLE Office only informed respondent, through its letter
dated 1 October 2012 signed by Prof. Feliciano, when it received inquiries from complainant,
Judge Sinfroso Tabamo, and Camiguin Deputy Provincial Prosecutor Renato A. Abbu on the
status of respondent's MCLE compliance. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration after
one year, or on 23 October 2013, which the MCLE Governing Board denied with finality on
28 November 2013. The denial of the motion for reconsideration was sent to respondent in
a letter9 dated 29 November 2013, signed by Justice Pardo.

Clearly, respondent had been remiss in his responsibilities by failing to comply with Bar
Matter No. 850. His application for exemption for the First and Second Compliance Periods
was filed after the compliance periods had ended. He did not follow-up the status of his
application for exemption. He furnished the Court with his letter dated 7 February 201210 to
the MCLE Office asking the office to act on his application for exemption but alleged that his
secretary failed to send it to the MCLE Office.11 He did not comply with the Fourth
Compliance Period.

In its 1 October 2012 letter to respondent, the MCLE Office enjoined him to comply with the
requirements for the First to Third Compliance periods. It was reiterated in the 29
November 2013 letter denying respondent's motion for reconsideration of his application for
exemption. The OBC also reported that a Notice of Non-Compliance was sent to respondent
on 13 August 2013. Under Section 12(5) of the MCLE Implementing Regulations,
respondent has 60 days from receipt of the notification to comply. However, in his
Compliance and Comment before this Court, respondent stated that because of his
involvement in public interest issues in the country, the earliest that he could comply with
Bar Matter No. 850 would be on 10-14 February 2014 and that he already registered with
the MCLE Program of the University of the Philippines (UP) Diliman on those dates.

Section 12(5) of the MCLE Implementing Regulations provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

Section 12. Compliance Procedures

xxxx

(5) Any other act or omission analogous to any of the foregoing or intended to circumvent
or evade compliance with the MCLE requirements.

A member failing to comply with the continuing legal education requirement will receive a
Non-Compliance Notice stating his specific deficiency and will be given sixty (60) days from
the receipt of the notification to explain the deficiency or otherwise show compliance with
the requirements. Such notice shall be written in capital letters as
follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

YOUR FAILURE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE JUSTIFICATION FOR NON-COMPLIANCE OR PROOF

OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE MCLE REQUIREMENT WITHIN 60 DAYS FROM RECEIPT OF THIS
NOTICE SHALL BE A CAUSE FOR LISTING YOU AS A DELINQUENT MEMBER AND SHALL NOT
BE PERMITTED TO PRACTICE LAW UNTIL SUCH TIME AS ADEQUATE PROOF OF
COMPLIANCE IS RECEIVED BY THE MCLE COMMITTEE.

The Member may use the 60-day period to complete his compliance with the MCLE
requirement. Credit units earned during this period may only be counted toward compliance
with the prior period requirement unless units in excess of the requirement are earned in
which case the excess may be counted toward meeting the current compliance period
requirement.
A member who is in non-compliance at the end of the compliance period shall pay a non-
compliance fee of PI,000.00 and shall be listed as a delinquent member of the IBP by the
IBP Board of Governors upon the recommendation of the MCLE Committee, in which case
Rule 13 9-A of the Rules of Court shall apply.

Even if respondent attended the 10-14 February 2014 MCLE Program of UP Diliman, it
would only cover his deficiencies for the First Compliance Period. He is still delinquent for
the Second, Third, and Fourth Compliance Periods. The Court has not been furnished proof
of compliance for the First Compliance Period.

The Court notes the lackadaisical attitude of respondent towards Complying with the
requirements of Bar Matter No. 850. He assumed that his application for exemption, filed
after the compliance periods, would be granted. He purportedly wrote the MCLE Office to
follow-up the status of his application but claimed that his secretary forgot to send the
letter. He now wants the Court to again reconsider the MCLE Office's denial of his
application for exemption when his motion for reconsideration was already denied with
finality by the MCLE Governing Board on 28 November 2013. He had the temerity to inform
the Court that the earliest that he could comply was on 10-14 February 2014, which was
beyond the 60-day period required under Section 12(5) of the MCLE Implementing
Regulations, and without even indicating when he intended to comply with his deficiencies
br the Second, Third, and Fourth Compliance Periods. Instead, he asked the Court to allow
him to continue practicing law while complying with the MCLE requirements.

The MCLE Office is not without fault in this case. While it acted on respondent's application
for exemption on 14 January 2009, it took the office three years to inform respondent of the
denial of his application. The MCLE Office only informed respondent on 1 October 2012 and
after it received inquiries regarding the status of respondent's compliance. Hence, during
the period when respondent indicated "MCLE application for exemption under process" in his
pleadings, he was not aware of the action of the MCLE Governing Board on his application
for exemption. However, after he had been informed of the denial of his application for
exemption, it still took respondent one year to file a motion for reconsideration. After the
denial of his motion for reconsideration, respondent still took, and is still aking, his time to
satisfy the requirements of the MCLE. In addition, when respondent indicated "MCLE
Application for Exemption for Reconsideration" in a pleading, he had not filed any motion for
reconsideration before the MCLE Office.

Respondent's failure to comply with the MCLE requirements and disregard of the directives
of the MCLE Office warrant his declaration as a delinquent member of the IBP. While the
MCLE Implementing Regulations state that the MCLE Committee should recommend to the
IBP Board of Governors the listing of a lawyer as a delinquent member, there is nothing that
prevents the Court from using its administrative power and supervision to discipline erring
lawyers and from directing the IBP Board of Governors o declare such lawyers as delinquent
members of the IBP.

The OBC recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of aw for six months. We
agree. In addition, his listing as a delinquent member pf the IBP is also akin to suspension
because he shall not be permitted to practice law until such time as he submits proof of full
compliance to the IBP Board of Governors, and the IBP Board of Governors has notified the
MCLE Committee of his reinstatement, under Section 14 of the MCLE Implementing
Regulations. Hence, we deem it proper to declare respondent as a delinquent member of
the IBP and to suspend him from the practice of law for six months or until he has fully
complied with the requirements of the MCLE for the First, Second, Third, and Fourth
Compliance Periods, whichever is later, and he has fully paid the required non-compliance
and reinstatement fees.

WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

(1) REMIND the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Office to promptly act on matters
that require its immediate attention, such as but not limited to applications for exemptions,
and to communicate its action to the interested parties within a reasonable period;

(2) DENY the prayer of Atty. Homobono A. Adaza to be exempted from MCLE compliance as
the matter had already been denied with finality by the MCLE Governing Board on 28
November 2013;

(3) DECLARE Atty. Homobono A. Adaza as a delinquent member of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and SUSPEND him from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS, or until he
has fully complied with the MCLE requirements for the First, Second, Third, and Fourth
Compliance Periods, whichever is later, and he has fully paid the required non-compliance
and reinstatement fees.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Homobono A. Adaza's personal record in the
Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and to all courts in the land. Let copies be also furnished the MCLE Office and
the IBP Governing Board for their appropriate actions.

MARIA VICTORIA G. BELO-HENARES, Complainant, v. ATTY. ROBERTO "ARGEE" C.

GUEVARRA, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

The instant administrative case arose from a verified complaint1 for disbarment filed by
complainant Maria Victoria G. Belo-Henares (complainant) against respondent Atty. Roberto
"Argee" C. Guevarra (respondent) for alleged violations of Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 1;
Rule 7.03, Canon 7; Rule 8.01 of Canon 8; and Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The Facts

Complainant is the Medical Director and principal stockholder of the Belo Medical Group, Inc.
(BMGI), a corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws2 and engaged in the
specialized field of cosmetic surgery.3 On the other hand, respondent is the lawyer of a
certain Ms. Josefina "Josie" Norcio (Norcio), who filed criminal cases against complainant for
an allegedly botched surgical procedure on her buttocks in 2002 and 2005, purportedly
causing infection and making her ill in 2009.4

In 2009, respondent wrote a series of posts on his Facebook account, a popular online social
networking site, insulting and verbally abusing complainant. His posts include the following
excerpts:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Argee Guevarra Quack Doctor Becky Belo: I am out to get Puwitic Justice here! Kiss
My Client's Ass, Belo. Senator Adel Tamano, don't kiss Belo's ass. Guys and
girls, nagiisip na akong tumakbo sa Hanghalan 2010 to Kick some ass!!! I will launch a
national campaign against Plastic Politicians No guns, No goons, No gold - IN GUTS I
TRUST!

Argee Guevarra Dr. Vicki Belo, watch out for Josefina Norcio's Big Bang on Friday - You
will go down in Medical History as a QUACK DOCTOR!!!! QUACK QUACK QUACK
QUACK. CNN, FOX NEWS, BLOOMBERG, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, L.A. TIMES c/o my partner in
the U.S., Atty. Trixie Cruz-Angeles :) (September 22 at 11:18pm)5

Argee Guevarra is amused by a libel case filed by Vicki Belo against me through her office
receptionist in Taytay Rizal. Haaaaay, style-bulok at style-duwag talaga. Lalakarin ng
Reyna ng Kaplastikan at Reyna ng Payola ang kaso... si Imelda Marcos nga sued me
for P300 million pesos and ended up apologizing to me, si Belo pa kaya? (September 15 at
12:08pm)6

Argee Guevarra get vicki belo as your client!!! may 'extra-legal' budget yon. Kaya
lang, histado ko na kung sino-sino ang tumatanggap eh, pag nalaman mo, baka
bumagsak pa isang ahensya ng gobyerno dito, hahaha (August 9 at 10:31pm)7

Argee Guevarra ATTENTION MGA BATCHMATES SA DOJ: TIMBREHAN NIYO AKO KUNG
MAGKANONG PANGSUHOL NI BELO PARA MADIIN AKO HA???? I just [want] to know
how much she hates me, ok? Ang payola budget daw niya runs into tens of
millions.... (September 15 at 3:57pm)8

Argee Guevarra thinks aloud how the payola machinery of vicki belo killed the news
of a picket demonstration in front of the Belo clinic. I wonder how television, print[,]
and radio programs can kill the story when the next rallies will have the following numbers
100, 200, 500 and 1000. Kung magkaasaran pa, 10,000 demonstrators will be assembled in
front of the Belo Medical Clinic at Tomas Morato on July 27, 2009. Hahahahaha! (July 17 at
7:56pm)9

Argee Guevarra Nakakatawa nga, 10milyon pa budget... [I] didn't know that my reputation
is worth that much. Aba ako kaya magdemanda sa kanila :) Ikot-ikot daw ang
mga P.R. ni Belo trying to convince editors to pin me down with something eh
alam ko na wala naman akong sex video!!! Adik talaga sa botox si Aling Becky at
may tama na sa utak - eh kung gagastos ka lang ng 10 milyon para sa tirang-
pikon laban sa akin at to protect your burak na reputasyon as a plastic surgeon, i-
donate mo na lang yon sa biktima ni Ondoy, Pepeng at Ramil! Yung
mga homeboys ko sa Pasig na nilimas [ni] Ondoy ang kukubra sa yo! (October 23 at
5:31pm)10

Argee Guevarra is inspired by Jose Norio's courageous act of showing her face on national
television to expose the Reyna ng Kaplastikan, Reyna ng Kapalpakan. Inspired by
shock nevertheless by the fact that the much needed partial restoration of her behind would
cost a staggering $500,000-$1,000,000 Stanford Medical Hospital and she will still remain
permanently disabled for the rest of her life... (July 11 at 2:08am)11

Argee Guevarra Just got my internet connection. WILL EMAIL U THE LURID
UNASSAILABLE FACTS ABOUT VICKI BELO'S QUACK DOCTORING. (October 27,
2009)12
Argee Guevarra yeah... actually the issue is simple and you will easily see which side you'll
be taking- just pay Ms. Josie Norcio a visit at St. Luke's at talagang binaboy siya ng
Reyna ng Kaplastikan (July 10 at 12:08am)13
chanrobleslaw
The complaint further alleged that respondent posted remarks on his Facebook account that
were intended to destroy and ruin BMGI's medical personnel, as well as the entire medical
practice of around 300 employees for no fair or justifiable cause,14 to
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Argee Guevarra yup... [I'll] even throw the kitchen sink at her. Enjoy nga ito, we will
paralyze the operations of all her clinic and seek out her patients and customers to
boycott her. [So] far, good response – 70% decrease in her July sales... (August 9 at
10:29pm)15

Argee Guevarra Guys, pandemonium has broken loose in [BMGI's] 6 clinics after Ms. Josie
Norio's tell-all. With only 2 surgeons of BMGI certified by PAPRAS, there is real-and-present
danger that surgeries like liposuction, nose lift, boob jobs which have been performed by
[BMGI's] physicians, every patient runs the risk of something going wrong with the
procedures they have undergone under [BMGI's] hands:(" (July 12 at 12:21am)16

Argee Guevarra [T]hey perform plastic surgery procedures without licensed and trained
doctors, they nearly killed a client of mine, medical malpractice, use of banned
substances/fillers on patients. just recently, in flawless clinic, a patient who had a simple
facial landed in the hospital ... (August 9 at 10:04pm)17

Argee Guevarra braces for typhoon Ramil without forgetting to ask comrades and friends in
Cebu to greet Vicki Belo with a boycott once she visits there on Oct. 20. Cebu's royal set
already knows that she is not a certified plastic surgeon: Boycott Belo, Flawless
Reckless, Belat Essentials!!!! (October 18 at 6:23pm)18

Argee Guevarra [W]ell, with all the kababuyan of the Belo clinic, its money-making
machines, dapat convert them into public health clinics!!! instead of pandering to the
vanities of those who want to look like Dra. Belo. (July 11 at 2:16am)19

Argee Guevarra darling kellyn, so far, i have 3 other ex-belo patients who will tell all
too!!!!! Grabe pala ang mga kapalpakan niyan. So did u leave Belo Clinic because it
has become a Frankenstein Factory? (July 11 at 2:30am)20

Argee Guevarra BOYCOTT BELO! FLAWLESS RECKLESS! BELAT ESSENTIALS!!! I'll be

gone for a week to a place where there will be no facebook so please, add Trixie Cruz-
Angeles if you want to find out more about our anti-quack doctor campaign! (September 24
at 3:00pm)21

Argee Guevarra Anyone care to sponsor T-shirts bearing this slogan? - BOYCOTT BELO!
FLAWLESS RECKLESS! BELAT ESSENTIALS! (September 23 at 12:17arn)22

Argee Guevarra Pare, eksena on Thursday I will go to the hearing with a placard
- BOYCOTT BELO!!! FLAWLESS RECKLESS!!! BELAT ESSENTIALS!!! I will vote for Adel
Tamano (La Salle-Ateneo lower batch sa akin at mabuti ang pamilya niyan)... BUT WOULD
YOU??? (September 23 at 1:50am)23

Argee Guevarra advocates a national patients' boycott of the Belo Medical Group. To all my
friends and comrades, please stay away from Belo's clinics. I have 2 cousins and 3
friends already who have canceled their lipo from belo. Please help me shut down the
Belo Medical Group until they perform their moral and legal obligation to Ms. Josie
Norcio... (July 17 at 2:12pm)24
chanrobleslaw
Moreover, respondent, through his Facebook account, posted remarks that allegedly
threatened complainant with criminal conviction, without factual basis and without
proof,25 as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Argee Guevarra Mr. Jay, by next year- GMA will no longer be president and she will be jailed
for plunder; Vicky Belo will no longer be a doctor and she will be in the middle of a
criminal prosecution.The General Surgeon of France will have a Philippine version. By
October and November, some congressmen I have spoken with will be issuing summons to
Vicky Belo for a congressional inquiry; the subject - legislation regulating the practice of
cosmetic surgery! (September 22 at 11:31pm)26

Argee Guevarra Celso de1os Angeles can still get medical attention in prison - from Vicky
Belo after she gets convicted too for criminal negligence and estafa (July 15 at
10:05am)27

Argee Guevarra is preparing himself for a campaign against the Belo Medical Group for
its criminal negligence which nearly killed Ms. Josie Norcio over a botched butt
augmentation procedure. He found out that the Dr. Belo herself marketed the product to
Ms. Norcio, the operation was carried out by her doctors who were not licensed by the
Philippine Association of Plastic Reconstructive and Aesthetic Surgeons.............. (July 9 at
8:54pm)28
chanrobleslaw
Complainant likewise averred that some of respondent's Facebook posts were sexist, vulgar,
and disrespectful of women,29 to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Argee Guevarra but can u help me too with maricar reyes? who's the hottest cebuana chic
chick there nowadays? haven't been there for quite some time... pa-chicks ka naman!!! I'm
sure marami kang 25-and-below naprends diyan (August 10 at 8:36pm)30

Argee Guevarra hay joseph!!! how's the gayest lawyer in cebu? our forces will soon picket
the belo clinic there, can u tell me where that is? halato ko na sayo si hayden,
promise!" (August 10 at 12:23am)31

Argee Guevarra joseph, i can't say i love u too - baka belo's team will use all sorts of
attacks na against me. to thwart them, being the gayest gay in the philippines, can u issue
a certification that i am so not like your type? at yung preferred ko lang
ay thin, thalino and thisay? (September 23 at 12:01am)32
chanrobleslaw
Finally, complainant averred that the attacks against her were made with the object to
extort money from her, as apparent from the following reply made by respondent on a
comment on his Facebook post:33chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Kellyn Conde Sy utang mo! Pay up time:) (July 11 at 2:37am)

Argee Guevarra kellyn, sisingilin ko muna si belo... at saka sabi mo naman, maibagsak
ko lang ang kaplastikan ni belo, quits na tayo ...(July 11 at 2:38am)34
chanrobleslaw
Asserting that the said posts, written in vulgar and obscene language, were designed to
inspire public hatred, destroy her reputation, and to close BMGI and all its clinics, as well as
to extort the amount of P200 Million from her as evident from his demand letter35 dated
August 26, 2009, complainant lodged the instant complaint for disbarment against
respondent before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), docketed as CBD Case No.
09-2551.
In defense,36 respondent claimed that the complaint was filed in violation of his
constitutionally-guaranteed right to privacy,37 asserting that the posts quoted by
complainant were private remarks on his private account on Facebook, meant to be shared
only with his circle of friends of which complainant was not a part.38He also averred that he
wrote the posts in the exercise of his freedom of speech, and contended that the complaint
was filed to derail the criminal cases that his client, Norcio, had filed against
complainant.39 He denied that the remarks were vulgar and obscene, and that he made
them in order to inspire public hatred against complainant.40 He likewise denied that he
attempted to extort money from her, explaining that he sent the demand letter as a
requirement prior to the filing of the criminal case for estafa, as well as the civil case for
damages against her. 41 Finally, respondent pointed out that complainant was a public figure
who is, therefore, the subject of fair comment.42

After the mandatory conference had been terminated,43 the parties were directed to file
their respective position papers.44 Thereafter, the IBP, through the Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD), set the case for clarificatory hearing.45Upon termination thereof, the case
was deemed submitted for report/recommendation.46

IBP's Report and Recommendation

In its Report and Recommendation47 dated August 13, 2013, the IBP-CBD recommended
that respondent be suspended for a period of one (1) year from the practice of law, with a
stem warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more
severely.48 It held respondent liable for violation of Rule 7.03,49 Rule 8.01,50 and Rule
19.0151 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for having posted the above-quoted
remarks on his Facebook account, pointing out that respondent cannot invoke the "private"
nature of his posts, considering that he had at least 2,000 "friends" who can read and react
thereto. Moreover, the IBP-CBD maintained that the criminal cases he had filed against
complainant on behalf of Norcio had been dismissed for insufficient evidence; therefore, he
can no longer campaign against complainant whose alleged crimes against Norcio had not
been established.52

In a Resolution53 dated September 27, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt
and approve the August 13, 2013 Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD.

Respondent moved for reconsideration,54 arguing that there was no specific act attributed to
him that would warrant his suspension from the practice of law. He also averred that the
libel cases filed against him by an employee of BMGI had already been dismissed, without
prejudice, for lack of jurisdiction.55

In a Resolution56 dated October 28, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors partially granted
respondent's motion, reducing the penalty from one (1) year to six (6) months
suspension.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The Issue Before the Court

The sole issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not respondent should be held
administratively liable based on the allegations of the verified
complaint.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
 The Court's Ruling

The Court has examined the records of this case and concurs with the IBP's findings, except
as to the penalty imposed on respondent.

At the outset, the Court notes that respondent never denied that he posted the purportedly
vulgar and obscene remarks about complainant and BMGI on his Facebook account. In
defense, however, he invokes his right to privacy, claiming that they were "private remarks"
on his "private account"57 that can only be viewed by his circle of friends. Thus, when
complainant accessed the same, she violated his constitutionally guaranteed right to
privacy.

The defense is untenable.

Facebook is currently the most popular social media site, having surpassed one (1) billion
registered accounts and with 1.71 billion monthly active users.58 Social media are web-
based platforms that enable online interaction and facilitate users to generate and share
content. There are various classifications59 of social media platforms and one can be
classified under the "social networking sites" such as Facebook.60

Facebook is a "voluntary social network to which members subscribe and submit

information. x x x It has a worldwide forum enabling friends to share information such as
thoughts, links, and photographs, with one another."61 Users register at this site, create a
personal profile or an open book of who they are, add other users as friends, and exchange
messages, including automatic notifications when they update their profile. A user can post
a statement, a photo, or a video on Facebook, which can be made visible to anyone,
depending on the user's privacy settings.62

To address concerns about privacy, but without defeating its purpose, Facebook was armed
with different privacy tools designed to regulate the accessibility of a user's profile, as well
as information uploaded by the user. In H v. W,63 the South Gauteng High Court of
Johannesburg, Republic of South Africa recognized this ability of the users to "customize
their privacy settings," but with the cautionary advice that although Facebook, as stated in
its policies, "makes every effort to protect a user's information, these privacy settings are
however not foolproof."64

Consequently, before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her online social
networking activity - in this case, Facebook - it is first necessary that said user manifests
the intention to keep certain posts private, through the employment of measures to prevent
access thereto or to limit its visibility. This intention can materialize in cyberspace through
the utilization of Facebook's privacy tools. In other words, utilization of these privacy tools is
the manifestation, in the cyber world, of the user's invocation of his or her right to
informational privacy.65

The bases of the instant complaint are the Facebook posts maligning and insulting
complainant, which posts respondent insists were set to private view. However, the latter
has failed to offer evidence that he utilized any of the privacy tools or features of Facebook
available to him to protect his posts, or that he restricted its privacy to a select few.
Therefore, without any positive evidence to corroborate his statement that the subject
posts, as well as the comments thereto, were visible only to him and his circle of friends,
respondent's statement is, at best, self-serving, thus deserving scant consideration.66
Moreover, even if the Court were to accept respondent's allegation that his posts were
limited to or viewable by his "Friends" only, there is no assurance that the same - or other
digital content that he uploads or publishes on his Facebook profile - will be safeguarded as
within the confines of privacy, in light of the following:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(1) Facebook "allows the world to be more open and connected by giving its users the
tools to interact and share in any conceivable way";

(2) A good number of Facebook users "befriend" other users who are total strangers;

(3) The sheer number of "Friends" one user has, usually by the hundreds; and

(4) A user's Facebook friend can "share" the former's post, or "tag" others who are
not Facebook friends with the former, despite its being visible only to his or her
own Facebook friends.67

chanrobleslaw
Thus, restricting the privacy of one's Facebook posts to "Friends" does not guarantee
absolute protection from the prying eyes of another user who does not belong to one's circle
of friends. The user's own Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or her own
Facebook friend thereto, regardless of whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook
friends or not with the former. Also, when the post is shared or when a person is tagged,
the respective Facebook friends of the person who shared the post or who was tagged can
view the post, the privacy setting of which was set at "Friends."68 Under the circumstances,
therefore, respondent's claim of violation of right to privacy is negated.

Neither can the Court accept the argument that the subject remarks were written in the
exercise of his freedom of speech and expression.

Time and again, it has been held that the freedom of speech and of expression, like all
constitutional freedoms, is not absolute.69 While the freedom of expression and the right of
speech and of the press are among the most zealously protected rights in the Constitution,
every person exercising them, as the Civil Code stresses, is obliged to act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.70 As such, the constitutional right of
freedom of expression may not be availed of to broadcast lies or half-truths, insult others,
destroy their name or reputation or bring them into disrepute.71

A punctilious scrutiny of the Facebook remarks complained of disclosed that they were
ostensibly made with malice tending to insult and tarnish the reputation of complainant and
BMGI. Calling complainant a "quack doctor," "Reyna ng Kaplastikan," "Reyna ng
Payola," and "Reyna ng Kapalpakan," and insinuating that she has been bribing people to
destroy respondent smacks of bad faith and reveals an intention to besmirch the name and
reputation of complainant, as well as BMGI. Respondent also ascribed criminal negligence
upon complainant and BMGI by posting that complainant disfigured ("binaboy") his client
Norcio, labeling BMGI a "Frankenstein Factory," and calling out a boycott of BMGI's services
all these despite the pendency of the criminal cases that Norcio had already filed against
complainant. He even threatened complainant with conviction for criminal negligence
and estafa which is contrary to one's obligation "to act with justice."·

In view of the foregoing, respondent's inappropriate and obscene language, and his act of
publicly insulting and undermining the reputation of complainant through the subject
Facebook posts are, therefore, in complete and utter violation of the following provisions in
the Code of Professional Responsibility:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner
to the discredit of the legal profession.

Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper.

Rule 19.01 - A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful
objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present
unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding.
chanrobleslaw
By posting the subject remarks on Facebook directed at complainant and BMGI, respondent
disregarded the fact that, as a lawyer, he is bound to observe proper decorum at all times,
be it in his public or private life. He overlooked the fact that he must behave in a manner
befitting of an officer of the court, that is, respectful, firm, and decent. Instead, he acted
inappropriately and rudely; he used words unbecoming of an officer of the law, and
conducted himself in an aggressive way by hurling insults and maligning complainant's and
BMGI's reputation.

That complainant is a public figure and/or a celebrity and therefore, a public personage who
is exposed to criticism72 does not justify respondent's disrespectful language. It is the
cardinal condition of all criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls
of decency and propriety.73 In this case, respondent's remarks against complainant
breached the said walls, for which reason the former must be administratively sanctioned.

"Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct committed in their private capacity, as
long as their misconduct reflects their want of probity or good demeanor, a good character
being an essential qualification for the admission to the practice of law and for continuance
of such privilege. When the Code of Professional Responsibility or the Rules of Court speaks
of conduct or misconduct, the reference is not confined to one's behavior exhibited in
connection with the performance of lawyers' professional duties, but also covers any
misconduct, which—albeit unrelated to the actual practice of their profession—would show
them to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which their license and the law
invest in them."74 Accordingly, the Court finds that respondent should be suspended from
the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, as originally recommended by the IBP-CBD,
with a stem warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more
severely.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Roberto "Argee" C. Guevarra is found guilty of violation of

Rules 7.03, 8.01, and 19.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, effective upon his
receipt of this Decision, and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar
acts will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts.

HEIRS OF JUAN DE DIOS E. CARLOS, NAMELY, JENNIFER N. CARLOS, JOCELYN N.

CARLOS, JACQUELINE CARLOS-DOMINGUEZ, JO-ANN CARLOS-TABUTON, JIMMY N.
CARLOS, LORNA A. CARLOS, JERUSHA ANN A. CARLOS AND JAN JOSHUA A.
CARLOS, Complainants, v. ATTY. JAIME S. LINSANGAN, Respondent.

DECISION

TIJAM, J.:

Complainants are children of the late Juan De Dios E. Carlos (Juan) who presently seek to
disbar respondent Atty. Jaime S. Linsangan (Atty. Linsangan). Atty. Linsangan acted as
counsel for their late father in several cases, one of which involving the recovery of a parcel
of land located in Alabang, Muntinlupa City. Complainants alleged that Atty. Linsangan
forced them to sign pleadings and documents, sold the parcel of land in Alabang,
Muntinlupa City in cahoots with complainants' estranged mother, and evaded payment of
income taxes when he divided his share in the subject property as his supposed attorney's
fees to his wife and children, all in violation of his oath as lawyer.

The Facts and Antecedent Proceedings

The parcel of land located in Alabang, Muntilupa City and covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 139061 with an area of 12,331 square meters was previously owned by the
Spouses Felix and Felipa Carlos. Their son, Teofilo Carlos (Teofilo), convinced them to
transfer said title to his name with a promise to distribute the same to his brothers and
sisters. Teofilo delivered the owner's duplicate copy of the title to his brother, Juan.
However, Teofilo sold the entire property to Pedro Balbanero (Pedro). Pedro, however, failed
to pay the agreed installment payments.

For purposes of recovering the subject property from Teofilo (and Teofilo's supposed wife,
Felicidad), and from Pedro, Juan engaged the services of Atty. Linsangan. It appears that
Atty. Linsangan, for Juan, filed the following cases: (a) a case1 against Felicidad which was
settled with the latter acknowledging Juan's one-half interest and ownership over the
property; (b) a case against Pedro which was concluded on September 12, 1997; and (c)
another case2 against Felicidad, albeit filed by another lawyer who acted under the direct
control and supervision of Atty. Linsangan. In this case against Felicidad, it appears that the
other half of the property was adjudicated to Juan, as Teofilo's sole heir. Said adjudication
was appealed to the CA.3

It further appears that Atty. Linsangan represented Juan in the following cases, likewise all
involving the subject property: (a) an action for partition4 filed by Bernard Rillo against
Pedro; (b) an ejectment case5 filed by Juan against Pedro; and (c) Juan's intervention in the
case6 between Pedro and Teofilo.

It finally appears that Atty. Linsangan also represented Juan in the certioraricases and
petitions for review filed before the CA7 and this Court,8 likewise involving the same
property.

During the pendency of the above cases, or on September 22, 1997, Atty. Linsangan and
Juan executed a Contract for Professional Services9 enumerating the above cases being
handled by Atty. Linsangan for Juan. In said Contract, Atty. Linsangan and Juan agreed, as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxxx

WHEREAS, the Parties have decided to consolidate their agreements in connection with
ATTORNEY's engagement as CLIENT's attorney to recover the subject property;

NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises, the parties hereto
have mutually agreed and bound themselves as follows:

1. That ATTORNEY shall continue to take all legal steps to recover the 10,000 square meters
covered by TCT No. 139061, or any portion thereof acceptable to CLIENT, through any or all
of the Court cases mentioned above, or such other Court cases as may be necessary;

2. That ATTORNEY shall not enter into any compromise agreement without the written
consent of CLIENT. CLIENT may enter into any compromise agreement only upon
consultation with ATTORNEY;

3. That ATTORNEY shall avail of all legal remedies in order to recover the property and shall
continue the prosecution of such remedies to the best of his knowledge, ability, and
experience, all within legal and ethical bounds;

4. That CLIENT shall shoulder all necessary and incidental expenses in connection with the
said cases;

5. That considering, among others, the extent of services rendered by ATTORNEY; the value
of the property sought to be recovered; the importance of the case to CLIENT; the difficulty
of recovery (considering that the Balbanero spouses have a favorable Court of Appeals[']
Decision in C.V. No. 29379, while Felicidad Sandoval's name appears in the TCT No. 139061
as wife of the registered owner, Teofilo Carlos), the professional ability and experience of
ATTORNEY; as well as other considerations, CLIENT hereby confirms and ratifies that
he has agreed and bound himself to pay ATTORNEY a contingent fee in an amount
equivalent to FIFTY PERCENT (50%) of the market value of the property, or
portion thereof, which may be recovered, or the zonal value thereof, whichever is
higher.

The said attorney's fees shall become due and payable upon recovery of the property, or
any portion thereof, (a) upon finality of a favorable Court decision, or (b) compromise
settlement, whether judicially or extrajudicially, through the execution of any document
acknowledging or transferring CLIENT's rights over the property, or any portion thereof,
whether or not through ATTORNEY's, CLIENT's, or other person's efforts or mediation, or (c)
or by any other mode by which CLIENT's interest on the subject property, or a portion
thereof, is recognized, or registered, or transferred to him; or (d) should CLIENT violate this
contract; or (e) should CLIENT terminate ATTORNEY's services without legal or just cause.

6. That CLIENT undertakes and binds himself to pay the said attorney's fees to the
following:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) To ATTORNEY himself;
(b) In case of ATTORNEY'S death or disability, to LORNA OBSUNA LINSANGAN;
(c) In case of death or disability of ATTORNEY and LORNA OBSUNA LINSANGAN, jointly and
severally, to LAUREN KYRA LINSANGAN, LORRAINE FREYJA LINSANGAN, and JAMES
LORENZ LINSANGAN;
(d) In default of all the [foregoing], to the estate of ATTORNEY.
7. That this Contract shall be binding and enforceable upon CLIENT's heirs, successors-in-
interest, administrators, and assigns, if any.

8. That finally, CLIENT hereby authorizes, at ATTORNEY's option, the annotation of this
contract on TCT No. 139061 or any subsequent title which may be issued. (Emphasis
supplied)

x x x x10
However, it was not only Juan who went after the property, but also Bernard Rillo and Alicia
Carlos, a sister-in-law. The latter also filed an action11 for recovery of their share and by
Compromise Agreement, an area of 2,331 square meters was awarded in their favor,
leaving a 10,000 square meter portion of the property.12

This remaining 10,000 square meter portion was eventually divided in the case filed by Juan
against Felicidad (which Atty. Linsangan admits13 to have filed albeit through another lawyer
who acted under his control and supervision), through a Compromise Agreement wherein
7,500 square meters of the subject property was given to the heirs of Juan while the
remaining 2,500 square meters thereof was given to Felicidad.14 In said Compromise
Agreement, the parties likewise agreed to waive as against each other any and all other
claims which each may have against the other, including those pending in the CA15 and this
Court. This Compromise Agreement was approved by the trial court on December 11,
2009.16

Subsequently, a Supplemental Compromise Agreement17 dated December 16, 2009 was

submitted by the heirs of Juan and Atty. Linsangan, dividing among them the 7,500 square
meter-portion of the property as follows: 3,750 square meters to the heirs of Juan and
3,750 square meters to Atty. Linsangan pursuant to the Contract for Professional Services.
In said Supplemental Compromise Agreement, Atty. Linsangan waived in favor of his wife
and children his 3,750 square meter share, except as to the 250 square meters thereof, as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) To Mrs. Lorna O. Linsangan - 2,000 square meters;
(b) To Lauren Kyra O. Linsangan - 500 square meters;
(c) To Lorraine Freyja O. Linsangan - 500 square meters;
(d) To James Lorenz O. Linsangan - 500 square meters;
(e) To Atty. Jaime S. Linsangan - 250 square meters.18
Said Supplemental Compromise Agreement was likewise approved by the trial court in its
Decision19 dated December 18, 2009. There was no mention in the record, however, that
the Compromise Agreement and the Supplemental Compromise Agreement were likewise
presented for approval before the several courts where the other cases were pending.

On December 10, 2015, Atty. Linsangan executed a Deed of Absolute Sale20 with a certain
Helen S. Perez (Helen) covering the entire 12,331 square meters of the subject property for
a purchase price of One Hundred Fifty Million Pesos (PhP150,000,000). Atty. Linsangan sold
the entire property using the following:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. a Special Power of Attorney21 dated August 26, 2010, executed by his wife Lorna
Linsangan, and children, Lauren Kyra O. Linsangan, Lorraine Freyja O. Linsangan and James
Lorenz O. Linsangan to sell their shares in the subject property;

2. a Special Power of Attorney22 dated September 2009, executed by Juan's wife, Bella N.
Vda. de Carlos, and their children, Jo-Ann Carlos Tabuton, Jacqueline Carlos-Dominguez and
Jimmy N. Carlos to represent them in all cases involving their interests and shares in the
properties of Juan;

3. a Special Power of Attorney23 dated September 30, 2009 executed by Lorna A. Carlos,
Jerusha Ann A. Carlos and Jan Joshua A. Carlos to represent them in all cases involving
their interests and shares in the properties of Juan;

4. a Special Power of Attorney24 dated May 2013 executed by Porfirio C. Rillo and Jose Rillo
to sell their shares consisting of 200 square meter portion and 199 square meter portion,
respectively, of the subject property;

5. a Special Power of Attorney25 dated October 15, 2009 executed by Jocelyn N. Carlos and
Jennifer N. Carlos to represent them in all cases involving their interests and shares in the
properties of Juan;

6. a Special Power of Attorney26 dated May 28, 2010 executed by Bernard Rillo in favor of
Alicia D. Carlos to sell his share in the subject property by virtue of a Compromise
Agreement dated September 3, 1987 in the case of Bernard Rillo, et al. vs. Teofilo Carlos, et
al., Civil Case No. 11975, Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch CXLIV.
On November 28, 2015, Helen issued several checks27 in varying amounts either made
payable to Cash or to Jaime S. Linsangan or Lorna O. Linsangan and simultaneous thereto,
Atty. Linsangan released the owner's duplicate original of TCT No. 139061 to Helen.28 It
further appears that in lieu of one check in the amount of PhP2,500,000, Atty. Linsangan
received, in cash, the amounts of PhP2,000,000 on December 4, 2015,29 and PhP500,000
on December 10, 2015,30 from Helen.

Upon learning of the sale, complainants allegedly requested from Atty. Linsangan for their
shares in the proceeds and for the copies of the Special Power of Attorney as well as the
case records, but that Atty. Linsangan refused.31Complainants also requested from Atty.
Linsangan, this time through another lawyer, Atty. Victor D. Aguinaldo, that their shares in
the subject property be at least segregated from the portion sold.32

On August 20, 2016, complainants wrote a letter33 to Atty. Linsangan revoking the Special
Power of Attorney which they executed in the latter's favor. In said letter, complainants
accused Atty. Linsangan of conniving with their mother, Bella N. Vda. De Carlos, in
submitting the Compromise Agreement and in selling the subject property. Complainants,
however, recognized Atty. Lisangan's services for which they proposed that the latter be
paid on the basis of quantum meruitinstead of fifty percent (50%) of the subject property.34

Subsequently, or in September 2016, complainants filed the instant administrative

complaint35 against Atty. Linsangan accusing the latter of forcing them to sign pleadings
filed in court, copies of which were not furnished them; of selling the subject property in
cahoots with their mother; of evading the payment of income taxes when he apportioned
his share in the subject property to his wife and children.36

By way of Comment,37 Atty. Linsangan avers that the Supplemental Compromise Agreement
was never questioned by the complainants until now38 and that they had never requested
for a copy thereof from him. Atty. Linsangan admits that the subject of the sale with Helen
is the property in Alabang, Muntinlupa City and that complainants were not given a share
from the payments because such were specifically made applicable to his and his family's
share in the subject property only.39 Atty. Linsangan also contends that the proposal that he
be paid on the basis of quantum meruit is only for the purpose of reducing his 50% share as
stated in the Contract for Professional Services he executed with Juan, so that the balance
thereof may accrue to complainants.40
 The Issue

The threshold issue to be resolved is whether respondent is guilty of violating his lawyer's
oath.

The Ruling of this Court

After a careful review of the record of the case, the Court finds that respondent committed
acts in violation of his oath as an attorney thereby warranting the Court's exercise of its
disciplinary power.

We begin by emphasizing that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by
the State upon those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the
qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege.41Whether or not a lawyer
is still entitled to practice law may be resolved by a proceeding to suspend or disbar him,
based on conduct rendering him unfit to hold a license or to exercise the duties and
responsibilities of an attorney. The avowed purpose of suspending or disbarring an attorney
is not to punish the lawyer, but to remove from the profession a person whose misconduct
has proved him unfit to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to an
office of an attorney, and thus to protect the public and those charged with the
administration of justice.42 The lawyer's oath is a source of obligations and its violation is a
ground for suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action.43

The record shows and Atty. Linsangan does not deny, that while the cases involving the
subject property were still pending resolution and final determination, Atty. Linsangan
entered into a Contract for Professional Services with Juan wherein his attorney's fees shall
be that equivalent to 50% of the value of the property, or a portion thereof, that may be
recovered. It is likewise not denied by Atty. Linsangan that he apportioned upon himself,
and to his wife and children, half of the property awarded to complainants as heirs of Juan,
through a Supplemental Compromise Agreement. Similarly, such Supplemental Compromise
Agreement was entered into by Atty. Linsangan and the heirs of Juan concurrently with the
pendency of several cases before the CA and this Court44involving the very same property.
What is more, Atty. Linsangan, probably anticipating that he may be charged of having
undue interest over his client's property in litigation, caused another lawyer to appear but
all the while making it absolutely clear to Juan that the latter's appearance was nevertheless
under Atty. Linsangan's "direct control and supervision."

Plainly, these acts are in direct contravention of Article 1491(5)45 of the Civil Code which
forbids lawyers from acquiring, by purchase or assignment, the property that has been the
subject of litigation in which they have taken part by virtue of their profession. While Canon
10 of the old Canons of Professional Ethics, which states that "[t]he lawyer should not
purchase any interests in the subject matter of the litigation which he is conducting," is no
longer reproduced in the new Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), such proscription
still applies considering that Canon I of the CPR is clear in requiring that "a lawyer shall
uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
process" and Rule 138, Sec. 3 which requires every lawyer to take an oath to "obey the
laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein."46 Here, the law
transgressed by Atty. Linsangan is Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code, in violation of his
lawyer's oath.

While jurisprudence provides an exception to the above proscription, i.e., if the payment of
contingent fee is not made during the pendency of the litigation involving the client's
property but only after the judgment has been rendered in the case handled by the
lawyer,47 such is not applicable to the instant case. To reiterate, the transfer to Atty.
Linsangan was made while the subject property was still under litigation, or at least
concurrently with the pendency of the certiorari proceedings in the CA and the petitions for
review in this Court.48 As mentioned, there was nothing in the record which would show that
these cases were likewise dismissed with finality either before the execution of, or by virtue
of, the Compromise Agreement and the Supplemental Compromise Agreement between
complainants and Atty. Linsangan.

What is more, Atty. Linsangan, at the guise of merely waiving portions of the subject
property in favor of his wife and children, actually divided his attorney's fee with persons
who are not licensed to practice law in contravention of Rule 9.02,49 Canon 950 of the CPR.

Another misconduct committed by Atty. Linsangan was his act of selling the entire 12,331
square meters property and making it appear that he was specifically authorized to do so by
complainants as well as by the other persons51 to whom portions of the property had been
previously adjudicated. However, a perusal of the supposed Special Power of Attorney
attached to the Deed of Absolute Sale, save for that executed by his wife and children, only
authorizes Atty. Linsangan to represent complainants in the litigation of cases involving
Juan's properties. Nothing in said Special Power of Attorney authorizes Atty. Linsangan to
sell the entire property including complainants' undivided share therein.

Atty. Linsangan's reasoning that he only took it upon himself to sell the property because
complainants were unfamiliar with real estate transactions does not exculpate him from
liability. If indeed that were the case, then it is incumbent upon Atty. Linsangan to make it
clear to the complainants that he was acting in such capacity and not as their lawyer.52 But
even this, Atty. Linsangan failed to do.

Worse, Atty. Linsangan does not deny having received the downpayment for the property
from Helen. Atty. Linsangan does not also deny failing to give complainants' share for the
reason that he applied said payment as his share in the property. In so doing, Atty.
Linsangan determined all by himself that the downpayment accrues to him and immediately
appropriated the same, without the knowledge and consent of the complainants. Such act
constitutes a breach of his client's trust and a violation of Canon 1653 of the CPR. Indeed, a
lawyer is not entitled to unilaterally appropriate his client's money for himself by the mere
fact that the client owes him attorneys fees.54 The failure of an attorney to return the
client's money upon demand gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it
for his own use to the prejudice and violation of the general morality, as well as of
professional ethics; it also impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves
punishment. In short, a lawyer's unjustified withholding of money belonging to his client, as
in this case, warrants the imposition of disciplinary action.55

Pointedly, the relationship of attorney and client has consistently been treated as one of
special trust and confidence. An attorney must therefore exercise utmost good faith and
fairness in all his relationship with his client. Measured against this standard, respondent's
act clearly fell short and had, in fact, placed his personal interest above that of his clients.
Considering the foregoing violations of his lawyer's oath, Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code,
Rule 9.02, Canon 9, and Canon 16 of the CPR, the Court deems it appropriate to impose
upon respondent the penalty of six (6) months suspension from the practice of law.56

WHEREFORE, We find Atty. Jaime S. Linsangan LIABLE for violations of his lawyer's oath,
Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code, Rule 9.02, Canon 9, and Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for SIX
(6) months effective from the date of his receipt of this Decision. Let copies of this
Decision be circulated to all courts of the country for their information and guidance, and
spread in the personal record of Atty. Linsangan.