Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 62 (2019) 103925

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Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries

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A capping technique for emergency response in offshore blowout accidents T

a b b,*
Huixing Meng , Guoming Chen , Xiuquan Liu
a
Department of Industrial Engineering, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China
b
Centre for Offshore Engineering and Safety Technology, China University of Petroleum (East China), Qingdao, China

ARTICLE INFO ABSTRACT

Keywords: Capping stack is an emergency shut-in technique that can effectively control offshore blowout accidents. This
Offshore safety technique stemmed the spilled oil well (Macondo) in 2010 Deepwater Horizon blowout accident. However, few
Blowout accidents efforts have been devoted to studying the way to efficiently and safely conduct the operation of capping stack. In
Capping stack this paper, program evaluation and review technique (PERT) was employed to quantitatively design the op-
Orthogonal test
eration procedure of capping stack. A mechanical model was established to determine the configuration scheme
Emergency preparedness
of capping stack. And a sensitivity analysis of operational factors of capping stack was conducted through or-
thogonal tests. Experimental results recommend to optimize the operation process by reducing the working time
of diamond cutting tool down-pass, Lower Marine Riser Package (LMRP) upper riser incision, LMRP and original
Blowout Preventer (BOP) separation, and LMRP recovery, in order to guarantee that the whole operation can be
completed as scheduled. The results show that the number of ram BOPs has little effect on the equivalent stress
of conductors. To improve system reliability, a five-ram capping stack is recommended to be applied in the
defined accident scenario. The maximum equivalent stress of conductors rates the drilling vessel offset as the
primary factor, followed by shut-in pressure, ocean current and top tension. The drilling vessel offset needs to be
given the priority control and the shut-in pressure should be jointly monitored.

1. Introduction
The offshore oil industry is highly dangerous (Shaughnessy et al.,
2007; Khan et al., 2017; Abimbola& Khan, 2018; Perez& Tan, 2018).
With the rapid increase of oil and gas production from subsea wells, it is
even more demanding to maintain offshore activities at an acceptable
risk level. Many offshore accidents have happened in recent years
(Wang et al., 2011; Hayes, 2012; Verweijen& Lauche, 2019). Blowout
accidents attracted huge public attention due to their significant con-
sequences, especially in the wake of the Deepwater Horizon or Ma-
condo accident (Skogdalen et al., 2012), which caused 11 fatalities,
poured around 490 × 104bbl (1bbl = 0.159 m3) crude oil into the Gulf
of Mexico (GOM) and led to the largest oil spill disaster in US history
(U.S. Coast Guard, 2010; Dadashzadeh et al., 2013).
Blowout remains one of the riskiest accidents in offshore oil industry
(Skogdalen et al., 2011; Skogdalen and Vinnem, 2012; Cai et al., 2013;
Liu et al., 2018). As the oil industry moves towards deeper waters and
harsher operating environment, it is even more challenging to effec-
tively manage blowout risk. Due to huge personnel casualties, property
losses and environmental disasters that deepwater blowout accidents
could cause, it is significant to conduct research on emergency
techniques for the damage mitigation of deepwater blowout (Xue et al.,
2013).
Several deepwater blowout emergency techniques have been dis-
cussed (Meng et al., 2019). Massey (2014) described the progress of
Marine Well Containment Company (MWCC). Hurzeler and
Scheuermann (2012) presented the efforts of Helix Well Control Group
(HWCG). Besides MWCC and HWCG, many organizations have con-
tributed significantly to emergency response techniques for deepwater
blowout since 2010. They mainly devoted themselves to the industrial
research and application of capping stack. Ren et al. (2012) designed a
rescue equipment for uncontrolled blowout. The fluid mechanic prop-
erty of their proposed equipment was studied. Wolinsky (2011) devel-
oped and demonstrated a device that can contain oil spewing from a
defective blowout preventer (BOP) stack on seabed. Meng et al. (2012)
presented operational principle, working process, applicable condi-
tions, design philosophy, maturity degree, and research emphasis of
each emergency technique for deepwater blowout. Furthermore, Lower
Marine Riser Package (LMRP) cap was quantitatively designed based on
program evaluation and review technique (PERT) (Meng et al., 2019).
The emergency techniques employed in Macondo emergency rescue
represent the state-of-the-art in offshore oil industry (Osi, 2011; Smith,

*
Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: menghuixing@tsinghua.edu.cn, huixing.meng@hotmail.com (H. Meng), gmchen@upc.edu.cn, offshore@126.com (G. Chen),
lxqmcae@163.com (X. Liu).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jlp.2019.103925
Received 8 February 2019; Received in revised form 21 June 2019; Accepted 20 July 2019
Available online 22 July 2019
0950-4230/ © 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
H. Meng, et al. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 62 (2019) 103925

Table 1
Rapid emergency techniques for deepwater blowout accidents (Meng et al., 2019).
Emergency techniques Brief description Characteristics

ROV intervention To trigger or repair failed BOP Rapid but depends heavily on BOP integrity
Top kill To pump mud with high pressure and high flow rate into wellbores through High pressure can lead to damage of BOP, wellhead and casings
choke and kill lines
Capping stack A new BOP assembly of fewer blind shear rams, to be installed on former Effective, but needs to notice similar risk as to Top kill
(failed) BOP
Static kill Similar to Top kill but merely can be applied after capping the well, that is, Effective but needs the well to be capped
stemming the flow
Containment dome To lower a big dome over leakage points on seabed and inducing oil to sea Confronted with a high risk of natural gas hydrates
surface through a pipe
Top hat Similar to Containment dome but smaller shape Facing risk of ice hydrates, but smaller than Containment dome,
meanwhile, lower oil recovery capacity
RITT To insert a long tube with a smaller diameter into the broken riser on seabed Oil recovery capacity is limited as there exist other leaking points, such as
and induce the oil to sea surface wellhead
LMRP cap A cap which is similar to Top hat, but installed on former BOP Effective, but require BOP up-right

2012; Spier et al., 2013). Table 1 gives a brief introduction of rapid

emergency techniques for deepwater blowout accidents (Meng et al.,
2019). Compared with relief well technique, rapid emergency techni-
ques are expected to control the deepwater oil spill in a short time (from
days to weeks). ROV denotes remotely operated vehicles. RITT implies
the riser insertion tube tool. ROV intervention is time-saving and direct.
Capping stack is effective. Top kill is practical for the rescue platform to
pumping high-pressure mud into wellbores. Static kill comes the last,
due to its application should behind shut-in of wellheads. LMRP cap can
capture the most spilled oil. RITT can also recover the oil effectively.
However, Containment dome and Top hat have higher risk to be
blocked by gas hydrate, thus their oil-recovery capacities are limited.
Among these techniques, capping stack remains the unique tech-
nique that can stem the Macondo blowout promptly, therefore the
capping stack has been studied in this paper.
The contribution of this paper includes three parts. An approach has
been proposed for quantitative procedure design of the capping stack
operation. A procedure was come up with for determining the config-
uration scheme of capping stack based on mechanical models. A sen-
sitivity analysis of its operational influencing factors has been con-
ducted with orthogonal tests.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the
capping stack is introduced. In Section 3, an approach for quantitative
operational design of capping stack is proposed. In Section 4, a con-
figuration scheme of capping stack is presented. In Section 5, a case
study is conducted to demonstrate the quantitative operational design
and configuration scheme. Section 6 discusses and compares this study Fig. 1. Structure of capping stack system.
with related works. Eventually, Section 7 concludes this paper.
deepwater blowout accidents (BOEMRE, 2010). Industries have con-
2. Capping stack ducted several field experiments of capping stacks, as is depicted in
Table 2, to demonstrate and validate their capabilities. Since industries
An overview of the development of capping stack after Macondo actively developed capping stack systems (a key factor), the US gov-
blowout was given (Rassenfoss, 2013; Chen et al., 2013; BSEE, 2016). ernment lifted the ban on deepwater exploitation afterward.
The capping stack operation procedure for deepwater tension leg
platform (TLP) platform was introduced according to blowout accident
3. Quantitative operational design
scenarios (Henley et al., 2013). American Petroleum Institute (API) is-
sued recommended practices for the design, manufacture and usage of
Since time is a key factor during the emergency rescue process, it is
capping stack (API, 2014).
helpful to quantitatively design the capping stack procedure. It is es-
A capping stack is a subsea mechanical barrier which has a cap-
sential to design the operation of capping stack firstly. The program
ability to shut in and divert uncontrolled flow (API, 2014). The capping
evaluation and review technique (PERT) has already been applied in oil
stack comprises of ram preventers, wellhead connector, flange transi-
and gas industries (Badiru and Osisanya, 2016).
tion spool, and flexible joint flange. Operators unlock the bolt between
To design the capping stack operation using PERT method, it is
broken risers and original BOPs, remove former LMRPs, install the
necessary to first clarify the logical relationships and estimated time of
capping stack onto original BOP and close the capping stack to control
sub-operations. Several characteristic values are defined as (Hillier and
blowout. Generally, a capping stack is composed of several blind ram
Lieberman, 2002; Hu, 2004; Winston& Goldberg, 2004):
preventers. The structure of capping stack system is shown in Fig. 1.
In the wake of the Macondo accident, US regulators required that tES (i, j ) = max {tEF (k, i )}
(1)
offshore activities should demonstrate disposal capabilities for k

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H. Meng, et al. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 62 (2019) 103925

Table 2
Industrial field experiments of capping stack.
Time Experimental sea Brief introduction

August 2017 Fensfjorden, Norway PSW Group conducted a capping stack exercise
April 2013 GOM, WD > 1524m Carried out by BSEE, Nobel Energy, HWCG. The capping stack was 6.10m tall, weighted 66.22t, with an experimental
wellhead pressure of 57.92 MPa.
July 2012 GOM, WD 2103m Accomplished by MWCC and Shell. The capping stack was 9.14m tall, weighted 100t, with an experimental wellhead
pressure of 68.95 MPa.
July 2011 UK Shetland, WD 305m Conducted by UK OSPRAG and Total. Capping stack was 7.14m tall, weighted 40t, can bear well pressure of 103.4 MPa and
temperature of 121 °C
May 2011 West Africa, Angola, WD > 2000m Completed by BP and Subsea 7, Oceaneering, FMC, Cameron

tEF (i, j) = tES (i, j) + t (i , j ) (2) 4.2. Mechanical model

tLF (i, j) = min{tLS (j , k )} The mechanical model of a capping stack system is shown in Fig. 2.
(3)
k
The riser system is affected by top tension, self-weight, ocean cur-
rent and wave load, etc. The differential equation of the riser system is
tLS (i , j ) = tLF (i, j) t (i , j ) (4) given as (Sparks, 2007; Ju et al., 2012; Liu et al., 2016):
d4y d2y dy
R (i , j ) = tLF (i, j) tEF (i, j) = tLS (i, j) tES (i, j) (5) EI T (x ) w = f (x )
dx 4 dx 2 dx (7)

F (i , j ) = min{tES (j , k )} tES (i , j ) t (i, j) = min{tES (j , k )} tEF (i, j) where E denotes the elasticity modulus, Pa. I represents the cross-sec-
j j
tional moment of inertia, m4. W is the riser unit weight, kN. The top
(6) tension of the riser is given by:
where t (i, j) implies the activity duration time, tES and tEF are earliest l
T (x ) = T0 (D 2 d2) + d2 D2 B dx
activity start and finish time, respectively, tLS and tLF denote latest al- 0 4 s
4 m
4 l
(8)
lowable activity start and finish time, respectively, R indicates the total
where T0 is the top tension, kN. l is the whole length of the riser, m. D
activity slack, which measures the excess time available to complete a
and d are the outer and inner diameter of the riser, separately. s , m , l
project, F represents the activity free slack, with positive values in-
are the density of the riser, drilling fluid and seawater, respectively. kg/
dicating that a task is ahead of schedule, negative values implying that
m3;B is the unit buoyancy force of the riser buoyancy block, kN.
a task falls behind the schedule and with zero values revealing that a
Fc(x) denotes the unit ocean current force, kN, which is given as:
task is on time.
f (x ) = c D D u u + c M uD2
2 4 (9)
4. Configuration scheme
where cD is the drag coefficient, cM is the inertia coefficient. ρ denotes
Another key issue of capping stack is to determine the configuration the seawater density, kg/m3. D is the outer diameter of the riser, m. u
scheme (i.e., the number of ram preventers). Firstly, the operation risk represents the water particle speed, m/s. u is the acceleration speed of
analysis of capping stack is conducted through Preliminary Hazard the water particle, m/s2.
Analysis (PHA). Subsequently, the configuration scheme of capping The conductor is loaded by the vertical and horizontal force from
stack is proposed based on its mechanical model. bottom flexible joint, buoyant weight of BOP and wellhead, horizontal
wave-induced current force, skin friction and lateral soil reaction, thus
the conductor is vulnerable. The differential equation of the conductor
4.1. Risk analysis for static analysis is given as (Sparks, 2007; Liu et al., 2013; Yan et al.,
2015)
PHA analysis can identify, provide suggestions to prevent and
d2 d2y d dy
control risk (Vinnem, 2014). During an emergency plan design stage, it EI (x ) 2 + N (x ) + DC (x ) p (x , y ) = q (x )
is helpful to apply PHA to conduct risk analysis of emergency rescue
dx 2 dx dx dx (10)
process. The PHA analysis of capping stack is tabulated in Table 3. where DC (x ) is the outer diameter of conductors, m , N (x ) is the axial
Human and environmental factors can directly or indirectly influ- force, kN , p (x , y ) represents the horizontal base pressure per unit area,
ence the implementation of capping stack technique. Human errors can kPa/m2 , where positions above the mud line are zero, q (x ) is the ex-
lead to operational failures in emergency situations (Musharraf et al., ternal load per unit length, kN/m , positions below the mud line are
2019; Deacon et al., 2010). In Table 3, precautionary measures are zero, EI (x ) is the bending rigidity of the integrated string composed of
mainly related to human factors. Regarding environmental factors, se- the conductor, the concrete sheath, and the surface casing, kN m2 .
vere conditions in deep waters can significantly influence the success of The higher shut-in pressure of the capping stack, the higher failure
this technique, including sea state and hydrate. For instance, sea cur- risk of the conductor. The axial force of the conductor incorporated the
rent has been simulated in the mechanical model (see Fig. 2). shut-in pressure is given by:
As shown in Table 3, the collapse contributes actively to the op-
1 l
erational risk of capping stack. Since riser, capping stack, conductor, N (x ) = Tbottom + 2
Dsbop Pshut w (x )dx + Dc (x ) f
4 l1 (11)
and formation composes a coupling system, which can introduce vessel
offset, top tension, wave and ocean current load into the BOP, wellhead where Tbottom is the residual axial tensile force at the riser bottom, kN.
and conductor (Sun, 2009). Furthermore, capping stack brings addi- Dsbop represents the inner diameter of capping stack, m. Pshut is the shut-
tional large weight on the conductor. The conductor is vulnerable in the in pressure, kPa. w(x) is the conductor wet weight per unit length, kN. l
coupling system due to its risky load conditions. A mechanical model of and l1 are positions of conductor ends, m. f is the side frictional force
the capping stack system has been established (including the con- per unit area, kPa.
ductor). To ensure the conductor safety during the operation of capping

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H. Meng, et al. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 62 (2019) 103925

Arrange work according to sea state forecast

Closely monitor wellbore temperature and

1. Closely monitor temperature and pressure

Arrange work based on sea state forecast

Equip a standby flange transition spool

Equip a standby cable of capping stack

Monitor well pressure during shut-in

Pre-job verification of cable strength

Pre-job verification of bolt strength

2. Verify inhibitor injection system

Pre-job model and calculation

Control operation parameters
3. Circulate hotwater system
Precautionary measures

Equip two cables

pressure
1.
2.
3.
1.
2.
3.

1.
2.
3.
4.
1.
Lead to work failure and secondary
Cannot tightly close rams
Work delayed heavily

Enlarge oil spill

Work delayed
Consequences

accidents

Fig. 2. Mechanical model of capping stack.

stack, the following should be followed:

Has not seriously checked inhibitor injection/

Wellbore pressure exceeds formation pressure

Has not closely monitored temperature and

(12)
Hydrate inhibitor injection system is failed

< [ ]
Has not scrupulously verified bolt strength

max
The high- pressure and low- temperature
Strength of lowering cable is insufficient

Has not carefully verified cable strength

Strength of the conductor is insufficient

Connection bolt strength is insufficient

where σmax is the maximum equivalent stress of conductor, MPa. [σ] is

Flange transition spool is overload

the allowable stress of conductor, MPa.

Offset of the vessel is too large
Capping stack is overloaded

Shut-in pressure is too high

4.3. Combination forms

Sea state is serious

Sea state is serious

To meet the ram BOP performance and to efficiently collocate a

capping stack during an emergency situation, a capping stack can be
environment

selected based on API standards (API, 2012). By considering the worst

hotwater
pressure

working condition and seeking a greater safety coefficient, the rated

working pressure of 15kpsi (103.5 MPa) has been selected. In this
Causes

condition, API standard recommends four BOP assemblies, that is,

1.
2.
3.
1.
2.
3.
4.
1.

2.
3.

4.

1.
2.
3.
4.
1.

three-ram or four-ram preventer combines respectively with one-an-

nular or two-annular preventer.
Since the wellhead is cleared before the installation of capping
Flange transition spool falls onto

stack, there is no drill string in wellbore. Since annular preventers are of

Capping stack falls onto seabed

Subsea underground blowout

no use, only ram preventers are reserved. To enhance the reliability of

Collapse of capping stack

capping stack system, a five-ram capping stack is added, the combi-

nation forms of capping stack are given in Fig. 3.
According to parameters of capping stack applied in the Macondo
Form hydrate

accident, the parameters of proposed capping stacks are presented in

Table 4.
Preliminary hazard analysis of capping stack.
Hazards

seabed

4.4. Configuration scheme procedure

I. Flange transition spool installation

Under the strength requirement of conductors, it is prior to select a

III. Close capping stack (shut-in)

capping stack which holds more ram preventers to guarantee its op-
erational reliability. Nevertheless, the increment of the height and
II. Lower capping stack

weight of the capping stack can increase the failure risk of the con-
ductor.
By considering harsh operating environments in deepwater blowout
emergency scene, the most serious conditions are given priority to be
Work stage

considered, the five-ram capping stack was analyzed simultaneously

Table 3

(i.e., the initial number of the ram preventers i0 is 5). Once the con-
ductor strength can meet requirements, accident site decision makers

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H. Meng, et al. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 62 (2019) 103925

ram number is reduced to four. The configuration scheme procedure of

the capping stack is summarized in Fig. 4.

5. Case study

5.1. Quantitative operational design of capping stack

5.1.1. Deepwater blowout accident scenario

The water depth of the hypothetical sea is 1500m. The accident
scenario is shown as follows.

(1) The original BOP fails to stem a well.

(2) The subsea well and the original BOP exist no large-scale leakage, in
terms of oil equipment.
(3) The supporting vessels, workers, and facilities are ready for the
emergency operation of capping stack.
(4) To assume the emergency working safety, the dispersant is already
injected into seabed and sea surface.

5.1.2. PERT chart of capping stack

Fig. 3. Combination forms of the capping stack.
By considering with the Macondo accident emergency process
(BOEMRE, 2011; National Commission, 2011), the interrelationships
Table 4 and the time duration of each activity of capping stack are shown in
Configuration parameters of capping stack. Table 5 and Fig. 5.
Ram number Three Four Five Let tES (1, 2) = tES (1, 3) = tES (1, 4) = 0. It is assumed that all work
shall be finished within 2d (48 h), namely, tLF (2, 10) = tLF (6, 10) = tLF
Height/m 5.5 6.1 7.2
(9, 10) = 48. The calculation process of the PERT network is shown in
Weight/kN 803.6 891.3 1052.0
Table 6. Dummy activities usually require no time (Hillier and
Lieberman, 2002), which are utilized to represent precedence re-
lationships. For instance, (3, 2) means that both A and B must finish
before G or H can start.

5.1.3. Critical path of capping stack

The critical path holds the longest time span through the total
system of events. The critical path of capping stack is C – D – E − F, as
is shown in Fig. 6. Its duration is 55 h, which is more than the supposed
48 h. It is recommended to fulfill the emergency operation on time by
shortening the time of lowering diamond cutting tool, cutting riser
above original LMRP, separating LMRP from original BOP and re-
trieving original LMRP.
Since time is a crucial factor in emergency situations, it deserves to
further investigate specific steps that cost long time in emergency op-
erations. For instance, it is necessary to discover ways to reduce time of
those steps (activities), such as lowering the diamond cutting tool and
cutting the riser above original LMRP. Ways to lower and lift emergency
equipment between sea bed and surface normally include riser, drill
pipe and wirerope. In generic, loading capacities of riser, drill pipe and
wirerope decrease in sequence. Adversely, their lowering and lifting
efficiency increases in order. On the condition of fulfilling the re-
quirement of loading capacity, it is recommended to apply wirerope,
drill pipe and riser sequentially. To decrease the time of cutting work,
more powerful cutter can be considered. Besides that, in order to save
time, additional accumulators can be placed onto seedbed to directly
separate original BOP and LMRP. In a nutshell, thorough emergency
preparedness can contribute to save time in emergency situations.

5.2. Configuration scheme of capping stack

In this part, we first determined the configuration scheme of cap-

ping stack based on the procedure proposed in Section 4.4. Subse-
Fig. 4. Configuration scheme procedure of the capping stack. quently, a sensitivity analysis of capping stack operation is carried out
with orthogonal tests.

can choose any of the abovementioned capping stack forms. However, a 5.2.1. Basic parameters
five-ram capping stack is recommended at first. On the condition that The initial shut-in pressure of capping stack during the Macondo
the five-ram capping stack fails to satisfy the strength requirement, the accident is 45.5 MPa. The rated working pressures of the recommended

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H. Meng, et al. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 62 (2019) 103925

Table 5
Completion time and interrelationships of capping stack operation.
No. Name of the activity Symbol Duration/h Preceding activities

1 Lower capping stack A 12 –

2 Land accumulator and its control system B 10 –
3 Lower diamond cutting tool C 8 –
4 Cut riser above original LMRP D 5 C
5 Separate LMRP from original BOP E 2 D
6 Retrieve original LMRP F 40 E
7 Inject hydrate inhibitor G 15 A, B
8 Debug capping stack on the seabed H 5 A, B (simultaneously with G)
9 Land and lock capping stack I 3 H, E (simultaneously with G)
10 Analyze wellhead parameters and determine shut-in strategy J 6 I (simultaneously with G)
11 Close capping stack K 2 J (simultaneously with G)

Fig. 5. PERT of capping stack emergency operation. Fig. 6. The critical path of capping stack operation.

subsea blowout preventer in API standard (API, 2012) are
13.8–103.5 MPa. Therefore, shut-in pressures of capping stack in this
study are set between 30 and 90 MPa.
The configuration scheme of capping stack in a deepwater well in
the South China Sea is studied, and its related parameters are listed in
Table 7. The material of the conductor is X-56, and the allowable stress
is 257.3 MPa under the safety factor of 1.5.
5.2.2. Configuration scheme
The mechanical model of capping stack system in the above well
was established. After the primary computation, four operation condi-
tions are set using the vessel offset of 80, 85, 90 and 95m. First, the
maximum equivalent stress of conductors is obtained. Second, based on
the linear interpolation, the maximum allowable vessel offset is gained.
Finally, the configuration scheme of the capping stack in the South
China Sea is tabulated in Table 8.
The results in Table 8 show that all forms of capping stack can be
applied once the vessel offset is less than 83.70m. Nevertheless, the
five-ram capping stack is preferred to be employed for enhancing the
work safety redundancy. Once the vessel offset is over 83.70m, the
configuration scheme of capping stack is recommended to follow
Table 8.
5.2.3. Sensitivity analysis
The operational factors of capping stack include top tension, vessel
offset, ocean current speed and shut-in pressure. Based on orthogonal
tests, a sensitivity analysis of operational factors for capping stack is
carried out.
5.2.3.1. Range analysis. During an emergency scenario of deepwater
blowout, four levels of each four parameters are put forward to
establish an orthogonal table of L16(45). The range analysis of the
orthogonal test is shown in Table 9. It has been learned that the
maximum equivalent stress of conductors is affected by vessel offset,
shut-in pressure, ocean current speed, and top tension successively.
5.2.3.2. Variance analysis. Since the accuracy of above range analysis is
low, it can lead to misjudgment when the test error is large. Given a
variance analysis can make full use of test information, its judgment
accuracy is higher. Because the quadratic sum of the error of top tension
and ocean current speed is little, they are classified into the error line.
The variance analysis for the maximum equivalent stress of conductors
is shown in Table 10.
From orthogonal test results, it is found that vessel offset has a
highly significant effect of the conductor stress under a significant level

Table 6
Computational table of capping stack operation.
Symbol Activity (i,j) t(i,j) tES(i,j) tEF(i,j) tLS(i,j) tLF(i,j) R(i,j) F(i,j)

A (1, 2) 12 0 12 20 32 20 12
B (1, 3) 10 0 10 22 32 22 12
C (1, 4) 8 0 8 −7 1 −7 8
H (2, 7) 5 12 17 32 37 20 5
G (2, 10) 15 12 27 33 48 21 21
dummy activity (3, 2) 0 10 10 32 32 22 2
D (4, 5) 5 8 13 1 6 −7 0
E (5, 6) 2 13 15 6 8 −7 0
dummy activity (6, 7) 0 15 15 37 37 22 2
F (6, 10) 40 15 55 8 48 −7 −7
I (7, 8) 3 17 20 37 40 20 0
J (8, 9) 6 20 26 40 46 20 0
K (9, 10) 2 26 28 46 48 20 20

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H. Meng, et al. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 62 (2019) 103925

Table 7
Related parameters of deepwater well in the South China Sea.
WD/m Former BOP length/ Former BOP weight/ LMRP length/m LMRP weight/kN Conductor length/m Conductor thickness/ Outer diameter of conductor/
m kN mm mm

1260.0 7.8 1806.4 3.9 537.7 92.7 38.1 914.4

Table 8 emergency operation considered in accident scenario should consider

Configuration scheme of the capping stack in the South China Sea. capabilities and availabilities of emergency equipment, even in early
Working condition (rescue vessel Optional capping stack combinations
stage of emergency preparedness.
offset/m) In this study, the water depth of 1500m has been considered. The
methodology proposed in this work is applicable with growing depth of
> 90.90 Fails to meet requirement, needs to adjust water. In such situations, increasing top tension, self-weight, ocean
working parameters
88.04–90.90 Three-ram capping stack
current and wave load (see Fig. 2) will be applied on the capping stack
83.70–88.04 Three or four-ram capping stack system. To meet strength requirement, the number of capping stacks
＜83.70 Three, four or five-ram capping stack can be adjusted, the platform offset needs to be controlled. Regarding
operational design, lowering and lifting operations are related to water
depth. Except preparation time, lowering and lifting time is normally
of 0.01. Meanwhile, shut-in pressure holds a significant effect on the proportional to water depth.
conductor stress under a significant level of 0.05. Since the vessel offset
is adjustable, the capping stack operation should focus on controlling
the rescue vessel offset and monitoring the shut-in pressure. 7. Conclusions

6. Discussion In this paper, approaches to conduct the quantitative operational

In this work, a capping stack technique has been investigated.
Operational risk analysis, operational mechanical analysis, as well as
sensitivity analysis of operational factors have been carried out.
In similar studies from the domain of deepwater blowout, blowout
risk analysis has been conducted (Abimbola& Khan, 2018; Khan et al.,
2017). Their works focused on risk analysis of blowout accidents in
offshore activities, rather than operational risk analysis of emergency
techniques as in this work. However, the risk analysis method applied
in this work is PHA, which is qualitative. Sophisticated and quantitative
risk analysis techniques can be implemented for emergency techniques
to simulate dynamic and complex characteristics of emergency sce-
narios.
In a joint industry project report (Neal Adams Firefighters, 1993),
emergency techniques are mainly related to shallow waters. Referred
emergency techniques are normally not applicable to deepwater si-
tuations, which are operated with high pressure and low temperature.
Regarding other emergency techniques in deepwater domain, Meng
et al. (2019) focused on an oil recovery (collection) technique. Deep-
water emergency techniques can be classified into two categories,
which are relief well (usually takes several months) and rapid response
techniques (normally takes several days or weeks). Furthermore, rapid
techniques can be classified into oil recovery techniques and temporary
control techniques. LMRP cap technique studied in (Meng et al., 2019)
is a representative of oil recovery techniques. Capping stack in-
vestigated in this paper represents temporary control techniques.
In terms of capping stack, its operation has been described in (BP,
2010; Commission, 2011). However, mechanical analysis of the system
has not been publicly reported. As in emergency operations, time is the
core concern. However, few public works have been devoted to analyze
the critical path and steps in emergency operations. Note that the
design and determine the configuration scheme of capping stack have
been proposed.
The operation of capping stack includes the clearance of accidental
wellhead, separation of former LMRP and BOP, and installation and
closure of capping stack. Based on the hypothesis accident scenario
with the water depth of 1500 m, the PERT network of capping stack is
proposed. The critical path duration of capping stack is obtained.
Collapse possesses a high risk of the capping stack. Under the con-
ductor strength threshold, a mechanical model of the integrated system
including riser, capping stack, and conductor is put forward. The con-
figuration scheme of capping stack system is obtained based on the
integrated mechanical model.
Based on a sensitivity analysis of capping stack operation, it has
been discovered that the maximum equivalent stress of conductors is
affected by vessel offset, shut-in pressure, ocean current speed, and top
tension successively. Since the vessel offset is adjustable, in order to
avoid operational failures of the capping stack, the capping stack op-
eration needs to focus on controlling the rescue vessel offset and closely
monitoring the shut-in pressure simultaneously.
This work is a preliminary work to analyze the emergency operation
in deepwater blowout accidents. In the manuscript, aleatory un-
certainties have been considered in the computation of total operational
time. Due to incomplete knowledge of emergency techniques, epidemic
uncertainties for each operation are also required.
Moreover, vulnerability of emergency systems including human,
equipment, material, regulation and environmental factors are inter-
ested to be investigated in a systematic way. In further steps, in the era
of artificial intelligence (AI) and internet of things (IoT), performance
of autonomous emergency techniques in emergency accident situations
are also required to be studied.

Table 9
Range analysis for the maximum equivalent stress of conductor.
Factors Top tension Vessel offset Ocean current speed Shut-in pressure Random error

Mean of Level 1 208.11 175.30 205.19 184.42 195.35

Mean of Level 2 200.62 185.58 194.23 212.90 198.63
Mean of Level 3 205.13 223.94 201.25 198.57 203.31
Mean of Level 4 196.49 225.54 209.68 214.46 213.05
Range 11.62 50.24 15.46 30.04 17.70
Factor rank 5 1 4 2 3

7
H. Meng, et al.
Table 10
Variance analysis for the maximum equivalent stress of conductors.
Error source Quadratic sum of the error Degree of freedom
Vessel offset 8066.01 3 15.73
Shut- in pressure 2374.98 3 4.63
Total error 3029.70 9
Total 11979.77 15
Acknowledgment
This work is partially supported by the National Natural Science
Foundation of China (Grant No. 51809279), the National Key R&D
Program of China (Grant No. 2017YFC0804501), the Fundamental
Research Funds for Innovation Program of Seventh-generation Ultra
Deepwater Drilling Platform (Grant No. 2016[24]), and the
Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities
(17CX02025A).
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