Loundo 2015

The Journal of Hindu Studies 2015;8:65–96 doi:10.
1093/jhs/hiv001
Advance Access Publication 16 February 2015
Adhy@ropa-apav@da Tarka: The Nature and

Structure of the Soteriological Argument in
Śaṅkar@c@rya’s and Swami Satchidanandendra
Saraswati’s Advaita Ved@nta
Dilip Loundo*
Federal University of Juiz de Fora, Minas Gerais, Brazil.
*Corresponding author. Email: loundo@hotmail.com
Abstract: The article highlights some of the basic features of contemporary

Ved@ntin writer Swami Satchidanandendra Saraswati’s Advaita Ved@nta
as presented in his magum opus Ved@nta Prakriy@ Pratyabhijñ@
(The Method of the Ved@nta). Elaborating on Śaṅkar@c@rya’s postulation
of the UpaniXads as ‘secret knowledge’ or ‘secret instruction’ (rahasya-
upadeśa), Saraswati posits a sort of apophatic mystagogy that seeks to
reinstate UpaniXadic thinking (vic@ra) as a rigorous rational discipline under-
stood as a ‘device of imagination’ (kalpita-up@ya) acceptable only on account
of its results, viz., self-realisation (anubhava). Described as a systematic pro-
cess of deliberate superimposition of attributes followed by their retraction
(adhy@ropa-apav@da), UpaniXadic thinking aims at eliminating the various
manifestations of the fundamental and recurrent error of objectifying the ul-
timate Reality (@tman/brahman).
Introduction
A proper understanding of Advaita Ved@nta’s soteriology involves, among other
things, a careful investigation into the nature and ultimate status of
Śaṅkar@c@rya’s argumentative language. Śaṅkar@c@rya’s perfect balance between
the critical rigours of a rational inquiry (vic@ra) and an abiding faithfulness in
śruti—that is, the UpaniXads—suggests that the whole set of arguments put for-
ward, combining positive and negative propositions and abounding in analogical
narratives, are existentially subsumed by a unifying ‘liberating knowledge’ (@tma/
brahma-vidy@). In other words, what is common to all Śaṅkar@c@rya’s propositional
arguments—and as consequence, to each and every UpaniXadic sentence—is an in-
built transforming capability, that is, a ‘mysterious’ inherent power to transform
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66 Adhy@ropa-apav@da Tarka
the seeker. Their ‘proof’ of truthfulness is, ultimately, a matter of metalinguistic

existential efficacy: The locus of reconciliation of such a multifaceted argumenta-
tion is a transformed being, one who goes radically beyond the root cause of
suffering and attains mokXa. To understand the precise nature of that unique
soteriological power of language or, in other words, the precise foundational
structure that permeates each and every argumentative sentence, one has to
put circumstantially into brackets what Śaṅkar@c@rya said and thought, and con-
centrate on how he said and thought. This involves an investigation into the so-
teriological method and the hermeneutical, exegetical, and logical tools employed.
In addition to post–Śaṅkar@c@rya commentarial tradition, one needs to pay special
attention to the contributions of Ny@ya and Mam@:s@ schools, respectively.
As a contribution to those endeavours, the present article aims at critically
discussing the work of Swami Satchidanandendra Saraswati (1880–1975)1 and, in
particular, his peculiar approach to Śaṅkar@c@rya’s philosophy as a systematisation
and hermeneutical application of a soteriological method of reasoning. Widely
acknowledged as a major contemporary representative of Advaita Ved@nta, a trad-
itional master in-line with the guru-śiXya-para:par@ system and a controversial
protagonist of recent debates among Advaita Ved@ntins, Saraswati’s works remains
relatively unknown in western academic circles.2 In my analysis, I will resort
primarily to Saraswati’s Sanskrit magnum opus Ved@nta Prakriy@ Pratyabhijñ@
(VPP) (1964)3—lit., The Way to Recognise the Method of Ved@nta. 4 The primary con-
cern of this ‘encyclopaedic’ work is precisely to unveil the general features of
Śaṅkar@c@rya’s method and to distinguish it from what it is not. Considering the
scope of the article and the limitations of time and space, I will endeavour by and
large to present Saraswati’s own perspective and cogency of arguments. Towards
the end, I will briefly advance some areas of concern, as they have been pointed
out by both insiders and outsiders of Advaita Ved@nta circles.
Saraswati, Śaṅkar@c@rya and the UpaniXadic reasoning (vic@ra)

The fundamental question that spreads over the entire span of Saraswati’s works
and life is the one set at the very beginning of VPP: ‘Where and how to recognise
the method (prakriy@)?’5 This immediately points to the major objective of the
work, set out in the Introduction: ‘to reinstate in the heart of the spiritual en-
quirers the pure traditional method of the UpaniXads’.6 The imperious need to do
so, adds Saraswati, is due to the relative oblivion of the method in modern times
due, to some extent, to pre-modern and modern tendencies, within advaita trad-
ition itself, to conceptually reify instructional language rendering it inefficient.7 In
other words, Saraswati’s self-assumed mission is to re-energise the pragmatic
principle of self-transformation as the ultimate criterion to assess discursive con-
sistency. This emphasis on a pragmatic ved@nta is reflected in the centrality
(pr@dh@nya) given by Saraswati to the ved@ntin method, understood as the basic
revelation of the UpaniXads and a major subject of Śaṅkar@c@rya’s work of
Dilip Loundo 67
systematisation.8 Saraswati’s self-declared ‘return’ to Śaṅkar@c@rya’s words9

should not, therefore, be construed as a matter of historical archaeology of
ideas or atavic doctrinal faithfulness, but as a contemporary outcry for
UpaniXadic efficacy. In other words, the authoritative legitimacy of
Śaṅkar@c@rya’s words of systematisation of the method revealed by the
UpaniXads is not a matter of past-personal authorship, but instead, of contempor-
ary verification through efficient application of that very method. Śaṅkar@c@rya
and, above all, the UpaniXads, are, therefore and ultimately, the name for an
efficient epistemological event of self-transformation. Saraswati says: ‘It has
been pointed out how the UpaniXads do not derive their authority as a means
of knowledge solely from the fact of their being included among the texts of the
Vedas. They derive it from their power to lead ultimately to a direct experience of
the Self, arising from the cancelation of all play of the empirical means of know-
ledge with their objects.’10
The UpaniXadic soteriological project that stands out in Saraswati’s assessment
of Śaṅkar@c@rya’s works presents the following five main characteristics:
(i) It’s a method of reasoning (tarka/yukti) with no ultimate instance of positive,

theoretical, or doctrinal set of propositions; it’s eliminative reasoning inher-
ently ‘practical’ and ‘final’: Practical as it eradicates suffering (du$kha) and its
cause (avidy@), viz., the errors about oneself and the world, and ‘final’ as it
leaves no room for further subjective (interested) action;
(ii) it’s a method enshrined, as an essential dimension, in the traditional sources
of (cognitive) authority (śruti/UpaniXads), leaving no room for substantive
conflicts between traditional authority and reason;
(iii) it’s a method whose actual application, overseen by the traditional sources of
authority, involves structures of dialogical articulation between a master
(@carya—the knowers of the method) and apt disciples or seekers (śiXya),
much beyond the confinements of a mere ‘text’;
(iv) the expression ‘non-duality’ (advaita) is descriptive of the method’s operation-
ality, rather than of any monist metaphysics: Wherever an erroneous ‘substan-
tive other-ness’ (dvaita) is detected, the cutting edge of ‘non-duality’ should be
applied; instead of affirming an ontology of the One at the expenses of Many,
advaita acts as an ontology of disclosure, resorting to the concept of brahman to
critically rebut ‘substantive other-ness’ and ‘substantive self-ness’;
(v) the ontological and ever-present oneness suggested by the expression ‘non-
duality’ is to be realised (mokXa), under the method’s intervention, as a fun-
damental non-difference between the aggregating concept of subject-ness or
awareness (@tman) and the aggregating concept of object-ness or totality
(brahman).
Elaborating on Śaṅkar@c@rya’s postulation of the UpaniXads as ‘secret know-

ledge’ or ‘secret instruction’ (rahasya-upadeśa), Saraswati posits a sort of apophatic
mystagogy that seeks to reinstate UpaniXadic project as a rigorous rational discip-

line understood as (i) a ‘devise of imagination’ (kalpita-up@ya)11 acceptable only
on account of its results, viz., (ii) self-realisation (anubh+ti/anubhava) (Loundo
2011, p.94). Accordingly, Saraswati sustains that Śaṅkar@c@rya’s words, faithfully
reflecting the UpaniXadic principles, are essentially words of instruction having no
positive epistemological relevance ‘per se’. Any attempt at extracting from them a
metaphysics, a cosmology, a psychology or any other form of speculative philoso-
phy (svamati) is doomed to represent a dangerous misunderstanding.12 What, then,
emerges as the quintessence of UpaniXadic project of systematic reasoning is its
pure negative character, summed up in Śaṅkar@c@rya’s maxim: ‘The knowers of
the scriptures state that the validity (of the scriptures) is derived from their neg-
ation (nivartakatva) (of positive qualities of the self).’13 In other words, the
UpaniXads are called a pram@>a (‘means of knowledge’) not because they, actually,
reveal @tman but because they remove the natural misconceptions about its nature.
This being so, instead of dogmatic propositions, the UpaniXads reveal, essen-
tially, a method of thinking which constitutes an unprecedented ‘mysterious’ articu-
lation of familiar fundamental concepts. Accordingly, the word UpaniXad is
described by Śaṅkar@c@rya, in the beginning of most of his commentaries on the
UpaniXads, as knowledge (jñ@na) whose efficacy lies in its power to destroy the
ignorance that conceals the real nature of @tman/brahman.14 Its operationality
could be compared to a therapeutic intervention, a kind of medicine, which in-
stead of positively producing health—the natural state of the patient— acts only by
removing the cause of disease. This idea is superbly expressed in Aitareya UpaniXad
Bh@Xya where Śaṅkar@c@rya retells a story traditionally told by the knowers of
@tman. A man having committed a sin was told by someone: ‘You are no man.’
Believing in such a statement he approached another man and asked: ‘Who am I?’
Understanding the ignorance that had taken possession of this man, the other man
decided to instruct him by means of a gradual process. He showed him he was not
a motionless thing, and so on. Then, he concluded: ‘You are not a no-man,’ thus
remaining in silence. To emphasise the limits of the teaching up to this stage,
Śaṅkar@c@rya adds: ‘How can he, who does not realise being a man when told “you
are not a non-man”, understand himself to be a man even when told “you are a
man”?’15
The idea of a mere process of removal of natural misconceptions is in per-
fect agreement with the UpaniXadic nature of @tman (‘non-dual’, i.e. the ‘non-
substantive other-ness’). In fact, (i) the notion of radical oneness (advaita) renders
impossible a positive revelation by words. The three kinds of substantial differ-
ences which make a thing amenable word denotation—viz., internal difference
(svagatabheda), external difference from objects of the same class (svaj@taya), and
external difference from objects of different classes (vij@taya)—are absent in @tman.
And (ii) the notion of self-evidence, implying ever-presence, makes such type of
positive revelation something unnecessary. In fact, just like the rope that remains
at all times present during the appearance of the snake, made up of sheer
Dilip Loundo 69
(positive) ignorance, all that is needed to the realisation of the former is the
removal of the error of the latter. Says Saraswati:
‘For all these reasons it (@tman/brahman) does not need any special positive
teaching. So, the UpaniXads do not fulfil their function as authoritative means
of knowledge, in this context, through revealing a hitherto unknown object, in
the manner of perception and the other means of knowledge. How, then, do
they fulfil this function? The competent authorities in this field quote the text
“But when all become his own Self, then what could a person see and with
what?” (BPhad@ra>yaka UpaniXad IV.v.15) And they say that it is only by a figure
of speech that the UpaniXads are spoken of as an authoritative means of know-
ledge. For their function is to communicate that reality in its true nature,
beyond the play of the means of knowledge and their objects, merely by putting
an end to the superimpositions onto it of attributes it does not possess.’16
Thus, the only thing that separates man from knowledge is the fundamental
ignorance (avidy@), otherwise known as superimposition (adhy@sa), that is, a pro-
cess by which @tman/brahman appears as something else out there, an object
(unsubstantial entity). Again, Śaṅkar@c@rya says: ‘when a mother-of-pearl appears
through mistake as a piece of silver, the non-apprehension of the former, although
it is being perceived all the while, is merely due to the obstruction of the false
impression (of the remembered silver)’.17 It’s precisely on account of its role of
immediate subordination to the ever-present unitary experience (anubhava), that
Śaṅkar@c@rya calls the UpaniXadic reasoning ‘soteriological reasoning’ (śrutyanugPhita),
the ‘(immediate) means to realisation’ (anubhav@ṅga).18 ‘The nearest equivalent in the
English language - says S. Iyer, a major contemporary influence on Saraswati - may
be Pure Reason or, better still, the Ved@ntic Reason, inasmuch as the Pure Reason
of the German philosophers differs from the Ved@ntic Reason’ (Iyer 1955, p.390).
This means that its unique negative task is not to be followed by any positive one,
as it deals with an ever present entity, circumstantially forgotten (an@digata),
whose realisation leaves no room for any further subjective (interested)
agency.19 In other words, its apophatic task is not to be followed by any subsequent
extraordinary subjective experience—in the 19th century’s mysticism fashion—but
by an extraordinary clarification of one’s overall ordinary experience.20 In his
minor work, The Salient Features of Śaṅkara’s Ved@nta, Saraswati states: ‘That’s
why the reason proposed by śruti, claims superiority over any other ordinary
speculative reason. It is based upon universal experience (anubhava) while the
other speculations are barren since they have no such support’ (Saraswati 1967,
p.23).21
In Saraswati’s opinion, therefore, the UpaniXads constitute the core and soul of
the path to moks a (‘self-realisation’)—the realisation of @tman/brahman—on account
of their being the foundation of a peculiar form of systematic reasoning: A con-
tinuous process of reasoning without a single instance of ultimate valid
conceptualisation (concerning the entity to be known). In other words, the

UpaniXads are, phenomenically, the revelation of an uninterrupted current of
thought whose conclusion is silence (mauna). The systematic, rigorous, and yet
strictly instrumental character of its various sets of propositions could perhaps be
appropriately described for the lack of a better expression and in order to distin-
guish it from postmodern deconstructivism, as ‘instrumental metaphysics’. In
Sanskrit terminology, this could roughly be construed as a sui generis combination
of two words: siddh@nta, a set of specific ‘doctrinal’ principles; and up@ya or yukti, a
word that points to the instrumental, strategic, and ultimately pedagogical char-
acter of those ‘doctrines’ as events of reasoning. The procedural unity of the
various yuktis, constitutive of such unreifiable thinking, is summed up by
the word vic@ra (‘reflexive/meditative thinking’)—described by Śaṅkar@c@rya as
the direct means of self-realisation (avagatyarthas@dhana).22
Saraswati’s emphasis on the UpaniXads as the source of proper discriminative
reasoning is as much decisive as his explanation of its actual operationality. Vic@ra
is described by Saraswati as a unique form of reasoning whose modus operandi
conforms to the Sanskrit expression adhy@ropa-apav@da. The expression is expli-
citly mentioned by Śaṅkar@c@rya in the Bhagavad-Gata-Bh@Xya as the traditional
summing-up of the UpaniXadic method of imparting the knowledge of brahman/
@tman. He says: ‘The knowers (wise men) of tradition state that, “that which is by
nature inexpressible becomes expressible/taughtable through adhy@ropa-apav@da
method” ’.23 The expression describes a combined process of deliberated peda-
gogical superimpositions of attributes (adhy@ropa) followed by their retraction/
elimination (apav@da). The first step (adhy@ropa) should be outrightly distinguished
from the ‘natural’ (existentially constitutive) superimposition founded in ignor-
ance (avidy@/adhy@sa), as it is deliberately framed by the instructional process in
order to remove precisely the various manifestations of the latter. Thus, every
pedagogical superimposition is actually effective, inasmuch as it undertakes the
removal of ‘natural’ superimpositions. The second step (apav@da), on the contrary,
prompts the removal of that very pedagogical superimposition, so as to avoid its
ultimate reification. To illustrate, Saraswati cites Gaunap@d@c@rya’s words from the
M@>n+kya-UpaniXad-K@rik@: ‘Since by taking the help of incomprehensibility (of
brahman) as a reason, all that was earlier explained is negated by the text “the Self
is that which has been described as not this, not that”, therefore the birthless Self
becomes self-revealed.’24 And he further explains:
‘The meaning is that, simply for the purpose of instruction, the Veda first
attributes to the Self, as principle of reality, features that he does not in fact
possess. And it does this even though the Self is that which alone exists, within
and without, and is also unborn and without differentiation. Then, when the
Self has been thus taught, and the work of positive instruction is complete, the
Veda itself retracts whatever it had previously taught, to show that none of it
was the final truth’.25
Dilip Loundo 71
Thus, the initial superimposition negates previously believed attributes of

the Self (negation A) and the retraction negates the superimposed attribution
(negation B). The permanence and continuity of the Self beyond the negations A
and B proves that (i) the Self transcends them all and that (ii) the attributes
negated are unsubstantial, since they depend on the Self to appear. This is the
discriminative process (viveka) between the real @tman/brahman and the unreal
non-@tman/brahman. In short, as summed up by Saraswati, adhy@ropa-apav@da is a
method through which ‘imaginary characteristics are first attributed to @tman
(adhy@ropa) thus serving as a negation of whatever is incompatible with them;
then later even the falsely attributed characteristics are negated (apav@da)’. 26
In his essay, ‘Human Reason and Vedic Revelation in Advaita Ved@nta’, Halbfass
(1992, pp.131–204)27 uses the expression anvaya-vyatireka instead of adhy@ropa-
apavada to describe the rational method enjoined by the UpaniXads. This follows
Śaṅkar@c@rya and Sureśvar@c@rya’s explicit mention and extensive application of
it, in the Upadeśa S@hasri (e.g. 1979, XVIII.96, p.246) and NaiXkarmya-Siddhi (e.g.
1968, II.8, p.136), respectively. Though in some circles the two expressions are
taken as synonymous, it would be more appropriate to say that anvaya-
vyatireka—‘reasoning by agreement and difference’—constitutes an important di-
mension of adhy@ropa-apav@da method without, however, exhausting it. In fact,
both Śaṅkar@c@rya and Sureśvar@c@rya limit the efficacy of anvaya-vyatireka to
the first stage of the UpaniXadic undertaking—that is, as we will see below, the
‘purification of meaning’ (pad@rtha-śodhana) of each of the two major soteriological
concepts (aham/tvam/@tman and tat/brahman). The ultimate stage, on the contrary,
would be solely accomplished through the hearing/uttering of the sentences of
oneness (mah@v@kya śrava>a/ukti). Accordingly, Sureśvar@c@rya states: ‘This know-
ledge (resulting from anvaya-vyatireka) contains the notion of difference (bheda). In
the Witness (s@kXin) condition, there is no (idea of) difference. It (difference) is a
consequence of ignorance. Sentences of oneness remove (ignorance) and reveal
the Self as pure awareness.’28 In other words, anvaya-vyatireka would enable an
awareness of @tman as distinguished from its recurrent identifications (body, etc.),
but it would not immediately lead to the realisation of oneness or non-difference
(abheda) of Reality. Only the hearing of the sentences of oneness would enable the
final discrimination to take place.
Saraswati does not often refer to the expression anvaya-vyatireka. We come to
learn about his stand from his comments on Śaṅkar@c@rya’s Upadeśa S@hasri and
Sureśvar@c@rya’s NaiXkarmya-Siddhi, and especially on his work Kleś@pah@rina, a
commentary on the latter. In perfect line with Sureśvar@c@rya, Saraswati acknow-
ledges the importance of anvaya-vyatireka as an intrinsic and initial stage of
adhy@ropa-apavada, bearing some of the main operational features of the latter.
He says: ‘To enable the realisation of the self-evident nature of (the oneness of) the
self, the UpaniXads resort to the unique method of adhy@ropa-apavada-prakriy@
(deliberate superimposition and retraction) and its ancilliary (prakriy@śeXa)
form of argument, also based on experience, known as anvaya-vyatireka-ny@ya
(tracing the constant reality through all the variable appearances).’29 He is cau-
tious to distinguish its empirical usage30 from the one enjoined by the upaniXads.
The latter, coming under the preview of adhy@ropa-apav@da, prevents the reifica-
tion of @tman and, concomitantly, of its negatum, in the process of distinguishing
the former from the latter (body, etc.).31 Unable, finally, to directly lead to the real-
isation of oneness, anvaya-vyatireka gives way to mah@v@kya śrava>a, the ultimate
dimension of adhy@ropa-apav@da. Again, Saraswati agrees in toto with
Sureśvar@c@rya’s detailed explanation of the sentences of oneness and their oper-
ational efficacy in leading one to the realisation of the oneness of Reality: Their
efficacy lies in a (radical) event of rational discriminative elimination marked by
what Sureśvar@c@rya describes as the ‘negation of negation’ (niXedhasya apahnava)
(see further).
Still, some later commentators32 and, specially, modern orientalists have
reduced the complexity of Sureśvar@c@rya’s posture to a duality of faculty
usage: The first stage constitutes a rational/analytical/discriminative event; and
the second, constitutes an experiencial/synthetic/mystical event, a sort of positive
novelty, a magic jump into the ‘ocean of brahman’! And they did so in the name of
preserving the authority of śruti (the UpaniXads) as a means of knowledge distinct
from inferential (empirical) reasoning (anum@na), the only recognised reasoning in
the West. The counteraction of Saraswati was directed, precisely, to the dismissal
of those prejudices: (i) First, by positing that the discriminative/eliminative
rational process is present throughout, both in the first stage—wherein
adhy@ropa-apav@da assumes the form of anvaya-vyatireka—as well as in the ultimate
stage—wherein adhy@ropa-apav@da assumes the form of mah@v@kya śrava>a/ukti—of
the soteriological undertaking;33 (ii) secondly, by emphasising that the rational
method par excellence, adhy@ropa-apav@da, is not a method to interpret or even
understand the UpaniXads, but, instead, the essential gift—or revelation, so to
speak—of the UpaniXads themselves, as a means to enable men to overcome
suffering and realise their real nature; (iii) and thirdly, by showing that
adhy@ropa-apav@da represents a superior form of reasoning (Heidegger’s ‘medita-
tive thinking’, 1966, pp.46–7) involving, in its application, a superior type of man
(@c@rya/brahmavid), apt seekers (adhik@ri śiXya), and a pedagogical and dialogical
structure—all that constitutive of what the UpaniXads stand for. Thus, under the
general umbrella of adhy@ropa-apav@da, anvaya-vyatireka is reminded of its utmost
commitment to eliminating/removing existentialised forms of erroneous cogni-
tions—that is, one’s constitutive attachments—instead of promoting ‘dry reason-
ing’ (śuXka-tarka), that is, mere linguistic negations or conceptual/theoretical
refutations (as it happens, e.g. in the case of Christian apophatic theology).34
That is equally in this sense that the well-known expression synthetising the
eliminative character of the UpaniXads—neti, neti (@tman is ‘not this, nor that’)
(BPhad@ra>yaka UpaniXad 1983, II.iii.6, p.287)—should be understood.
The correct ascertainment and pursuance of the UpaniXadic method of
adhy@ropa-apav@da, otherwise known as śruti-anugPhata-tarka35—lit., ‘reasoning
Dilip Loundo 73
granted (taught or enjoined) by the UpaniXads’36—requires two ancillary rational

procedures. The first is mam@:s@-tarka—‘exegetical reasoning’—comprising a set of
exegetical rules meant to ascertain the purportful centrality (t@tparya) of
the UpaniXads as the knowledge of @tman/brahman and the revelation of the
adhy@ropa-apav@da method.37 It resorts to the exegetical principles set by the
Mam@:s@ school38 to single out the teleological specificity of the Upanisads
(mokXa) vis-à-vis the Br@hma>as (dharma), the two autonomous and yet organically
integrated sections of the Vedas. If, on the one hand, the Br@hma>as—together
with the sa:hit@s, the primary concern of Mam@:s@ school—are devoted to trad-
itional textual injunctions leading to the performance of ritual actions as a means
to obtain svarga (‘the paradise’, i.e. a superior transmigratory form of existence),
the UpaniXads—the primary concern of ved@nta school—on the other, is devoted to
the knowledge of Reality (@tman/brahman jñ@na) as a means to one’s definitive
overcoming of suffering and the erroneous notion of ‘being an agent’. The
second ancillary rational procedure—mainly meant to persuade outsiders or to
strengthen the faith of Ved@ntin neophytes—is known as avirodha/aviruddha-
tarka—‘reasoning not contradicting the UpaniXads’ (Śaṅkar@c@rya 1983h, II.i.i,
p.281). It consists of a set of positive rational arguments (i) ‘proving’ the plausi-
bility of UpaniXadic propositions as if they were doctrinal theories or (ii) refuting
others’ doctrines, by resorting to positives inferences as a means of knowledge
other than śruti. Avirodha/aviruddha-tarka should not be confused with śruti-
anugPhata-tarka: While the first stands for a reasoning from outside, aiming at
‘proving’ the plausibility of the UpaniXadic propositions—coming close to
Christian theological discourse in relation to the Bible and its proofs of the exist-
ence of God—the second stands for a reasoning from inside, that is, running along
the methodological lines taught by UpaniXads, aiming at leading one to mokXa
(Chattopadhaya 2000, p.122).
While undertaking the critique of V@caspati Miśra, a later commentator of
Śaṅkar@c@rya, Saraswati points to the absolute necessity of distinguishing those
three different types of reasoning39 used by Śaṅkar@c@rya, viz., śruti-anugPhata
tarka, mam@:s@ tarka, and avirodha/aviruddha tarka, in order to understand their
contextual usage and hierarchical dispensation. He says: ‘Our own view is that he
(V@caspati Miśra) does not draw any clear lines between reasoning as exegesis
(mam@:s@ tarka) and other forms of reasoning, between reasoning granted by the
Vedas (śruti-anugPhata tarka) and reasoning not in conflict with it (aviruddha tarka),
and between all these forms of reasonings (resorted to by Śaṅkar@c@rya) and
“empty” reasoning (śuXkatarka).’40
The operationality of the UpaniXadic method (adhy@ropa-apav@da)

Adhy@ropa-apav@da is, therefore, the UpaniXadic method of elimination of the dif-
ferent manifestations of the fundamental error of ‘substantive other-ness’ (dvaita)
and, consequently, the direct means for the realisation of oneness, that is, the
realisation of the non-difference between @tman and brahman. The reason as to

why the oneness of @tman/brahman becomes manifested as the ‘substantive other-
ness’ (dvaita) of this manifold world is declared by the UpaniXads to be avidy@
(ignorance).41 This being so, @tman, brahman, and avidy@ constitute three funda-
mental limit concepts42 or, perhaps better, soteriological concepts, that is, special
instruments of the method. The first two words, indicative of oneness, are those
around which the whole method revolves. To ensure that they are able to fulfil the
double task of (i) distinguishing themselves from every other word/object of the
world (ii) and functioning as pointers to the sole ontological substratum on which
the unsubstantiality of the world rests, the method should not allow them to ever
be conceptually reified. The concept of avidy@, on the contrary, being suggestive of
the cause of one’s existential condition of suffering and self-alienation, should
equally be refractory to any form of reification. In fact, Saraswati is emphatic
about the fact that, being by definition a mere error, a false concept
(mithy@pratyaya), an absence of discrimination (aviveka), or an illegitimate super-
imposition (adhy@sa)43, any form of ontological objectification of avidy@ would
seriously threaten the oneness of Reality and render its elimination an impossible
task.44 He quotes Śaṅkar@c@rya’s passages that point to the futility of any search
for the ontological origins of avidy@. In the Brahma S+tra Bh@Xya, when asked ‘to
whom, finally, belongs this ignorance (aprabodha)?’ Śaṅkar@c@rya answers: ‘We say
that it is you yourself who asks thus.’45 In other instances, Śaṅkar@c@rya simply
states that avidy@ is ‘without beginning’ (an@di),46 and therefore no objective cause
of it should be looked for.47
The method of adhy@ropa-apav@da constitutes a kind of linguistic game where
each and every sentence of the UpaniXads is epistemologically relevant, not on
account of what it intrinsically refers to, but on account of what it implicitly
negates (Saraswati 1964, III.xxi, p.29). This constitutes, as Saraswati emphasises,
the purportful character of the UpaniXads as a unique linguistic dealing, where
words bearing conventional meanings are ‘forced’ to convey unconventional,
‘transwordly’, and, more precisely, eliminative or apav@dic ones. This being so,
more than an outright rejection of empirical reasoning, the UpaniXads resort to
the same reasoning to undertake the reversal way, the deconstruction of quotidian
‘metaphysical’ fantasies. If mundane usage of logic deals with positive (unsubstan-
tial) entities, its UpaniXadic usage goes the reversal way: Instead of a subversion of
logic, it’s a logic of deconstruction, whose efficacy lies precisely in its being as
rigorous and accurate as any constructive dynamics. Eliminative accuracy is,
here, synonymous to topical efficacy, since it targets not mere theoretical con-
structions, but instead constitutive constructions subjectively revealed and
marked by suffering. As such, the eliminative character of adhy@ropa-apav@da
method does not coincide with propositional negation. Both positive and negative
propositions, which are seen mundanely to depend on substantive other-ness, can
be instrumentalised in an eliminative way. That’s precisely the uniqueness of the
Dilip Loundo 75
UpaniXadic reasoning: More than just a judgement, it implies the usage of language
as an act of resolution, as an act of decision. Let’s see closely how that happens.
Following the explicit contents of Parts I and II of Sureśvar@c@rya’s NaiXkarmya
Siddhi, Saraswati points, respectively, to the two basic stages of adhy@ropa-apav@da
method: (i) In the first, the meaning of the two fundamental soteriological con-
cepts is ascertained separately (pad@rtha-śodhana or ‘purification of meanings’)—
brahman/tat as objective-ness in general (pervasiveness/oneness) and, specially,
@tman/aham/tvam as subjective-ness in general (consciousness); (ii) in the second
and ultimate, the two terms are placed in syntactic apposition (sam@n@dhikara>a)
so as to promote, definitely, the realisation of their fundamental non-difference
(mah@v@kya śrava>a/ukti—‘hearing/uttering of sentences of oneness’).48 Now, says
Sarswati, ‘The method employed throughout all the classical UpaniXads though
one in essence, assumes many different forms (n@n@r+pa).’49 The ‘many different
forms’ are as much instances or applications of the method, suiting the removal of
particular modes of ignorance. As regards the ascertainment of the meaning of
brahman, we could mention, among others, the following applications: (i) The
method of ‘cause and effect relationship’ (k@ryakara>a); (ii) the method of the ‘uni-
versal and particular relationship’ (s@m@nyaviśeXa); (iii) the method of ‘the Lord and
the souls’ (javeśvaravibh@ga); (iv) the method of ‘creation’ (sPXbi); and (v) the method
of ‘Brahman with qualities (sagu>a) and without qualities (nirgu>a)’ (Saraswati
1964, III.xxxiii–xxxvii, pp.52–60 and xlix, pp.86–9). As regards the ascertainment
of the meaning of @tman, besides the five applications mentioned above, we should
also mention, among others, the following: (vi) The ‘method of the five sheaths
(pañca-kośa)’; (vii) ‘the method of the three states (avasth@ traya)’; and (viii) the
method of ‘the seer and the seen’ (dPXbadPśya) (Saraswati 1964, III.xxxix, p.65–6 and
III.xl-xlv, p.67–76). The topical application or concurrent combination of those
modalities of the method, enabling one’s understanding of each of the terms,
separately, opens the way for the ultimate stage to emerge and succeed: The
mutual and final purification of meaning that takes places when the two concepts
(brahman/tat and @tman/aham/tvam) are placed in syntactic apposition
(sam@n@dhikara>a) in the hearing/uttering of the sentences of oneness (mah@v@kya
śrava>a/ukti). This mutual purification of meanings is finally conducive to the
realisation of non-duality (akha>n@rtha bodha).
I will refer below to some examples given by Saraswati from Śaṅkar@c@rya’s
works of how to recognise the functioning of the soteriological argument in dif-
ferent modalities of the method. First, sentences about creation (sPXbi-v@kya) are
helpful in denying the idea of an independent existence of the world from
brahman. From the UpaniXadic perspective, they are not meant to actually describe
the origin of the world, but only to suggest the sole reality of the cause (@tman/
brahman) Accordingly, the creationist suggestion is subsequently denied.50
Secondly, fundamental negative definitions of brahman such as the so-called
svar+pa-lakXa>a ‘knowledge, truth and infinite’51 or ‘partless, actionless, motionless,
faultless, untainted’52 are relevant as long as they help us to negate worldly
attributes and, as such, to point to or indicate something above and beyond, but
they are not resorted to from their intrinsic point of view (svata$).53 Glossing with
the well-known passage of the UpaniXads—‘Brahman (is spoken of as) unknown
(inexpressible) to those who know it well’54—Śaṅkar@c@rya is unambiguous about
the fact that brahman is indicated (lakXye) by, not denoted (ucyate) by, the
UpaniXadic words: ‘It is proved that brahman is indescribable and that unlike the
construction of the expression “a blue lotus”, brahman is not to be construed as
the import of any sentence (av@ky@rthatvam).’55
Thirdly, texts which appear to posit @tman as the experiencer of three different
states (avasth@-traya)—viz., awaking (j@grat), dream (svapna), and deep sleep
(suXupti)—are also peculiarly instructive. For example, the identification of @tman
as an experiencer of the dream state (svapna-avasth@) is helpful in removing the
idea that the subject is subservient to the objects or, in other words, that the latter
has an ontological and independent existence apart from the former, as it seems to
occur in worldly dealings of the waking state on account of the intercourse be-
tween subject and object through sense-contact. Says Śaṅkar@c@rya: ‘The topic of
dream was introduced for revealing the self-effulgence of the witnessing Self as a
distinct fact. This is done because in the waking state we have the existence of the
contact between the objects and sense and an admixture of the light of the sun,
etc., so that the self-effulgence of the Self cannot be distinguished from them.’56
But the idea that the dream state has itself any type of ontological status is sub-
sequently denied by Śaṅkar@c@rya by entrusting the UpaniXadic words describing
it a purely metaphorical sense (nimitta-m@tra). In the words of Saraswati: ‘Waking
and dream, and the worlds of waking and dream, are never perceived in the
absence of the Self as Consciousness. From this it follows that the states are
unreal, and that the Self is real and of sovereign omnipotence.’57 Fourthly, the
word @tman is identified and subsequently distinguished, in succession, with each
of the five familiar ego-sheaths—the so-called pañca-kośa, viz., anna, pr@>a, manas,
vijñ@na, @nanda. Further ahead Śaṅkar@c@rya is unequivocal while rejecting any
denotative dimension to the word @tman. And yet he preserves it as an indispens-
able pointer to the Self, as an instrument for error elimination:
‘(opponent) Is not even the Self denoted by word “Self”? (reply) No . . . The word
@tman which is primarily used in the world of duality to denote the individual
soul as distinct from the body it possesses, is here resorted to in order to
indicate the entity that remains after the rejection of the body and other
selves, which, ultimately, can never be referred to by any form of denomin-
ation. The word @tman is used here to reveal what is really inexpressible by
words (av@cya).’58
In short, the elimination of (erroneous) attributes, instead of skeptical state-

ments, constitutes, basically, a mechanism that proscribes objective (or objectify-
ing) cognoscibility as a way to resolve the existential dilemma.
Dilip Loundo 77
Considering that retractions can only be accomplished with deliberate superim-

positions, the complete removal of each and every ‘natural’ or erroneous superim-
positions, demands a limit-situation where the instrument of deliberate
superimposition is itself simultaneously eliminated by the erroneous attribute
being eliminated. That’s precisely what happens in the ultimate stage of the process
(mah@v@kya śrava>a/ukti), in the final discriminative/analytical procedure: The
hearing/uttering of the sentences of oneness (mah@v@kyas), where the syntactic
apposition (sam@n@dhikara>a) between the concepts of @tman and brahman takes
places. Later tradition mentions four major mah@v@kyas, stating the fundamental
non-difference between @tman and brahman: ‘That is you’ (tat tvam asi) (Ch@ndogya-
UpaniXad 1983, VI.viii.7, p.384); ‘I am Brahman’ (aham brahm@smi) (BPhad@ra>yaka-
UpaniXad. 1983, I.iv.10, p.121); ‘This @tman is brahman’ (ayam @tman brahman)
(M@>n+kya-UpaniXad. 1983, I.2, p.399); and ‘Consciousness is brahman’ (prajn@nam
brahma) (Aitareya UpaniXad. 1983, III.3, p.599). In his explanation, Saraswati resorts
extensively to the teachings of Sureśvar@c@rya, with special emphasis on two
works, viz., NaiXkarmya Siddhi and M@nasoll@sa59. The first is a detailed develop-
ment of the verse section of Śaṅkar@c@rya’s Upadeśa S@hasri. Most of Saraswati’s
remarks are recorded in his commentary on NaiXkarmya Siddhi titled Kleś@pah@rina.
As if reflecting closely an actual dialogical situation of soteriological pedagogy,
the sentence ‘tat tvam asi’ (‘That is you’), wherein tat stands for brahman and tvam
for @tman, has traditionally been given a certain prominence. In Sureśvar@c@rya’s
fundamental hermeneutics, the intrinsic and inescapable/undroppable (apari-
tyajya) meaning of the word tat, as ascertained during the first stage (pad@rtha-
śodhana), implies a unity/totality characterised by ‘mediateness’ or ‘remoteness’
(parokXya), that is, something not directly experienced (‘non-conscious pervasive-
ness/oneness’); while the intrinsic and inescapable/undroppable meaning of the
word tvam, as equally ascertained during the first stage (pad@rtha-śodhana), implies
direct experience it is freed from the identification of the ‘I’ (aham) or the ‘mine’
(mama), and yet as characterised by (undetermined) sorrowfulness (sa8s@rin) or a
state of ‘being in bondage’ (‘limited/sorrowful consciousness’).60 Now, these attri-
butes are incompatible with one another. Thus, when placed in syntactical appos-
ition (sam@n@dhikara>a), connected by the verbal form ‘is’, the only possible result
is their mutual exclusion (b@dhaka).61 Since they are constitutive of the denotative
character of the words (tat and tvam), their mutual negation can leave no room for
a ‘remaining’ denotation in either terms. In other words, tvam as tvam and tat as tat
are definitely eliminated. This means that not only the functionality of each term
but also the combined functionality of the sentence is purely negative. They are
equipollent terms in a peculiar etymological sense: Their nature possesses equal
potency and an equal destructive power; in this way only, the ‘indirectness/
remoteness of oneness’ (tat) and the ‘directness/consciousness of sorrow’ (tvam)
are related.62 This being so, the verbal form ‘is’ does not act as a declaration of
identity as in conventional usage, but as a declaration of non-difference involving,
extraordinarily, an absolute and simultaneous double negation of the terms (and
their attributes). This mutual elimination constitutes, in the words of

Sureśvar@c@rya in his BPhad@ra>yaka UpaniXad Bh@Xya V@rtika (I.ii.28), ‘the negation
of negation’, that is, a negation that eliminates the very instruments of negation.63
Perhaps the most unequivocal statement about the eliminative/discriminative
character of the ultimate stage of mah@v@kya śrava>a/ukti comes in the Upadeśa
S@hasri when Śaṅkar@c@rya details its modus operandi in the following terms: ‘Thus,
both of them in conjunction (gamayet@m parasparam) express the same meaning as
implied by the sentence “not this neither that” (neti neti).’64 Again, in his com-
mentary on the Ch@ndogya UpaniXad, he states: ‘The conclusion arrived at is that
this sentence “Thou are that” is the remover the identification of the Self with the
individual soul involved in change and unreality.’65
Thus, the understanding of sentences like ‘tat tvam asi’, subsumed by the very
principles of adhy@ropa-apav@da constitutes, in Saraswati’s view, the very nature of
the UpaniXads.66 Notwithstanding this, later commentators have sought shelter in
conventional theories of meaning.67 Among these, the recourse to the secondary
meaning of the words (lakXa>@) has earned priority and considerable dissemin-
ation. According to it, when the two terms (tat and tvam) are placed in syntactical
apposition a part of their intrinsic meaning is mutually eliminated (or abandoned)
leaving as remainder a meaning which is identical in both terms. The sentence
thus presents a positive unitary meaning, actually denotative (by implication) of
the entity concerned (@tman/brahman). According to Saraswati, this position con-
trasts sharply with the idea of non-difference (advaita/abheda) to be realised by
means of the absolute mutual negation of the meanings of the two terms (b@dha).
It, instead, suggests an ultimate identity between them. In the words of Karl
Potter: ‘Padmap@da’s approach is to emphasise the positive identity between java
and @tman/brahman . . . Thus, the function of “That art thou” (tat tvam asi) for
Padmap@da is not merely to remove error or ignorance, as it seems to have
been for Śaṅkar@c@rya and Sureśvar@c@rya, but it actually propounds a declaration
of identity between a reflection and its prototype’ (Potter 1981, p.73).
This theory presents three major problems. First, it disregards the UpaniXadic
principle according to which brahman/@tman is never denoted (nor requires such
denotation) by any word or sentence. Secondly, it disregards the linguistic prin-
ciple according to which an entity that can never be denoted through primary
meaning (mukhya-artha) can never either be known through a secondary one
(lakXa>@/gu>a-artha). Thirdly, while evoking the teachings of Sureśvar@c@rya in
its support, it mistakes the word lakXa>a, abundantly used by the latter and also
by Śaṅkar@c@rya, for the word lakXa>@, which actually and technically means ‘sec-
ondary meaning’. Consequently, the ultimate identity between java and @tman/
brahman proposed by those later commentators constitutes a deformed result of
a teaching in which an inflated ‘I’ (in secondary or whatsoever other sense it may
be intended) thinks itself to be the Absolute (brahman).
In which sense, finally, does the expression ‘tat tvam asi’ prompts the realisation
of @tman? In a strict negative sense, as discussed above, and following the
Dilip Loundo 79
eliminative principles of adhy@ropa-apav@da and neti neti. In Sureśvar@c@rya and

Śaṅkar@c@rya, the word lakXa>a, instead of ‘primary meaning’ (a definition) or
‘secondary meaning’, stands for an ‘indicative meaning’ (s+caka), that is, a meaning
that is over and above any word or sentence (av@cya) and, at the same time, stands
as the support of them all (@śraya/adhiXbh@na). In other words, the word tvam is
indicative of @tman/brahman not because it assumes any type of secondary sense
when in apposition with tat, but because it is completely sublated by the latter, and
vice-versa, simultaneously.68 Sublation (b@dha) is the peculiar nature of UpaniXadic
indication which, instead of ‘destroying’ tvam or tat—their being not a ‘thing’ but
erroneous I-ness and other-ness, respectively—totally reinvests them with a
higher meaning. That is what Śaṅkar@c@rya points at when he says that ‘tvam
and tat deliver (by indication) a special meaning, resulting from the knowledge
of @tman/brahman. They no longer express any other meaning contrary to it, even
if, taken separately, their linguistic denotations remain’.69 In other words, indica-
tion is an act of total self-sacrifice of tvam and tat, as it unveils @tman/brahman as
the substantive ground (@śraya) that, in ignorance, appears as I-ness (tvam) and
other-ness (tat). Discarded I-ness and other-ness, the ‘I’ and the ‘other’ find an
ontological reconciliation in @tman/brahman. This purely eliminative function of
indicative words within the sentences of oneness, as two simultaneous events of
adhy@ropa-apav@da, is summed up by Sureśvar@c@rya by resorting to the well-
known analogy of snake-rope (viz., the mistaken/illusory awareness of a snake
in a place where actually stands a rope). He says: ‘Even as the snake indicates the
rope, the ego (tvam) is the indicator of the inner Self (@tman). The import of the
sentence is grasped by a sublation of the ego. The Self, on the other hand, is
capable of being so indicated (i.e., through mere sublation) because it is the sub-
stratum of the ego (tvam)’.70 In short, sentences of oneness instead of sentences of
identity should be classified as sentences of double simultaneous negation. In the
hermeneutical event they lead to (v@kya-bodha), more than just a ‘meaning’ in
traditional linguistic terms, constitutes a metalinguistic realisation: ‘from the sen-
tence emerges a meaning beyond the sentence’.71 In other words, says Saraswati,
‘(adhy@ropa-apav@da or) neti neti is also explained (by Sureśvar@c@rya) as a text
which has the form of a negation but it is not actually a negation’72:
Underneath the formal negation, lies a positive teaching, the affirmation of
Reality. The removal of the fundamental superimposition—which is nothing but
a superimposition of ideas (jn@n@dhy@sa) rather than objects (arth@dhy@sa)
(Saraswati 1964, VIII.137, p.285)—opens the way for the all-encompassing oneness
of Reality, always intact and complete (siddha), to shine forth as ever.
The pedagogical context of UpaniXadic reasoning (adhy@ropa-apav@da)

Our last topic deals with the very special conditions under which the UpaniXadic
method of adhyaropa-apav@da is set to develop and be able to bring about its
expected fruits (mokXaphala). It basically involves a pedagogical structure (upadeśa)
that sets out a platform for a lasting experience of dialogue between a master
(@c@rya) and an apt seeker (śiXya). In fact, the meta-subjectivist goals it leads to
demands a process of reasoning which is necessarily a conversational and inter-
subjective one. From Gaunap@da to Saraswati, the term @gama has been used pre-
cisely to designate the UpaniXads as a pedagogical structure,73 whose effective
embodiment, the adhy@ropa-apav@da method, lies at the root of their (methodo-
logical) unity.
The absolute necessity of a master (@c@rya), a knower of @tman/brahman (brah-
mavid) and whose essential qualities are his teaching skills and an abiding com-
mitment to the task by making it ‘the sole aim of his life’,74 is synthesised in
Śaṅkar@c@rya’s two maxims, the first being an UpaniXadic quotation: ‘A man
having a teacher acquires knowledge’75 and ‘He, who has not been instructed in
the traditional line of teachers (samprad@ya), may be considered an idiot, even
though well versed in the scriptures.’76 According to Saraswati, Śaṅkar@c@rya’s
statements are justified on a two-fold account: (i) To go beyond his constitutive
ego, the seeker needs external prompting and continuous supervision from some-
one who stands ‘beyond’ the ego, one who is the personification of knowledge; and
(ii) adhy@ropa-apav@da, being a purely eliminative procedure, can only succeed if it
is customised to suit the specificities or ‘state of art’ of each seeker’s ignorance
(adhik@ribheda), something the master only can do. In short, adhy@ropa-apav@da
cannot, in any circumstance, be pursued solipsistly, lest it would inevitably lead
the seeker to fall prey to the pitfalls of the ego. Says Saraswati: ‘Brahman has to be
attained through the teachings of an @c@rya who knows the true UpaniXadic trad-
ition’.77 The seeker (śiXya), on the contrary, should fulfil specific prerequisites as
per the doctrine of catu$s@dhana (four disciplines). Two of them are absolutely
decisive: (i) viveka, a mind familiar with discriminative processes between the
eternal and the non-eternal; (ii) and vair@gya, a state of detachment from all ob-
jects of desire, from this and other worlds.78
As amply discussed above, the UpaniXadic soteriological undertaking strength-
ens those dispositions by bringing its various procedures under the centrality of
(the cutting-edge of) viveka, the discriminative substance of vic@ra (‘meditative
thinking’), and its modus operandi, the adhy@ropa-apav@da method. It contemplates
three major disciplines, viz., śrava>a (hearing), manana (pondering), and nidid-
hy@sana (meditating), following the statement of the BPhad@ra>yaka UpaniXad.79
Despite later commentators80 and modern orientalists’ speculative digressions as
to what differentiates them, Saraswati stresses that they are all variants of the
same fundamental Upanisadic thinking, viz., adhy@ropa-apav@da. Following the
UpaniXadic statement that commits them all with the realisation (draXbavya) of
@tman, he quotes Śaṅkar@c@rya in his support: ‘Right knowledge of the Absolute
only as the sole reality only dawns when these three disciplines (hearing, ponder-
ing and meditating) are fused into one, and not otherwise . . . In any case, ponder-
ing must be carried out by reasoning in accordance with the Vedas. And
meditation must be performed on what was reasoned in accordance with the
Dilip Loundo 81
Vedas.’81 Śaṅkar@c@rya refutes the idea that śrava>a, manana, and nididhy@sana can
be distinguished textually or operationally in the context of the UpaniXadic teach-
ing. The three disciplines should, therefore, be solely distinguished in regard to the
intervenient pedagogical factors/instances: śrava>a is the teaching of the master,
manana is the reflection of the seeker in accordance with the master’s orientation,
and nididhy@sana is the reiteration and further existential assimilation of those
teachings.
Finally, we should note that the status of the instructional language—the con-
ceptualised knowledge of non-duality (advaita-jñ@na)—of the UpaniXads is equally
unsubstantial as any other phenomenal entity. Even the sentences of oneness
(mah@v@kya) such as ‘tat tvam asi’ (‘That is you’), though leading to immediate
liberation, are ultimately unsubstantial because they are language and, as such,
products of ignorance. Still, says Śaṅkar@c@rya, this does not amount to any ab-
surdity because one can be liberated by hearing a falsehood, just like a terrifying
‘black man with black teeth, if seen in a dream, causes the death of the dreamer; in
other words, true death is indicated by false dream itself’.82 A process of instruc-
tion by means of something which is ultimately unsubstantial is designated by
Śaṅkar@c@rya as a (soteriological) ‘device of imagination’ (kalpita-up@ya). The dif-
ference between this and other mental modifications (manovPtti) consists ‘only’ in
the fact that the UpaniXadic device is one by means of which the root of (errone-
ous) mental modifications—viz., ‘the cognitions of all such differences as agents,
instruments, actions, and results’—is itself completely destroyed.83 For this reason,
the UpaniXads are called the ‘last means of knowledge’ (antya-pram@>a)
(Śaṅkar@c@rya BSB: II.i.14, p.313). This follows closely the statement of the
UpaniXads which declare their own vacuity for liberated men: ‘there (in mokXa)
the Vedas are no more the Vedas’.84
In short, the epistemological relevance of the UpaniXads lies, fundamentally, in
its pedagogical method. While empirical judgments imply the ascertainment of a
particular entity by means of separating it from all other things, an instructional
sentence aims at restoring the original unity of all things in @tman/brahman by
pointing to the locus of a manifestation of the fundamental error (avidy@). In other
words, a judgement is a disjunctive result, while an instruction is the conjunctive (all-
inclusive) result of an analytic process of reasoning. That is, precisely, what adhy@ropa-
apav@da (‘false attribution and subsequent retraction’) stands for as the modus
operandi of the UpaniXadic method of ‘systematic unsaying’ or ‘systematic neg-
ation’: ‘It’s not this, it’s not that’ (neti, neti) (BPhad@ra>yaka UpaniXad 1983, II.iii.6,
p.287). According to Saraswati (1964 III.19, p.41), the passage below from
Śaṅkar@c@rya represents a fine illustration of the UpaniXadic method:
‘Just as, in order to explain the nature of numbers from one up to a hundred,
thousand, billions, a man superimposes them on certain lines (digits), calling
one of them one, another ten, another hundred, yet another thousand, and so
on, and in so doing he only expounds the nature of numbers but he never says
that the numbers are the lines; or just as in order to teach the alphabet, he has
recourse to a combination of leaf, ink, lines, etc., and through them explains the
nature of the letters, but he never says that the letters are the leaf, ink, lines,
etc., similarly in this exposition the one entity brahman, has been inculcated
through various means such as the projection (of the universe). Again, to elim-
inate the differences created by those imagined means (kalpita-up@ya) the truth
has been summed up as ‘not this, not that’ (neti, neti).’85
Conclusion
Saraswati constitutes, in my opinion, a landmark event in modern Ved@ntic trad-
ition. For this I do not mean that he was either an atavic traditionalist or a radical
modernist or even both.86 I think those categories, often resorted to by western
scholars (e.g. ‘traditional Ved@ntins’, ‘neo-Ved@ntins’), tend to essentialise authors
and ideas, and often fail, as a consequence, to comprehend the historiality and
dialogicality of foundational seed-texts such as the UpaniXads. In fact, hermeneut-
ical plurality, both across synchronic and diachronic lines, is at the core of the
UpaniXadic tradition. Its basic teleology, being as it is an existential efficacy—that
is, a capability to lead men to mokXa—implies, necessarily, a plurality of ‘hermen-
eutical experiences or applications’, to use a Gadamerian expression (Gadamer
2006, pp.306–36), suiting the specificities of one’s circumstances, space and time.
In other words, the efficacy of the UpaniXadic method requires, necessarily, a
dynamic and flexible tradition. Here lies, in my opinion, the key to understand
the nature of Saraswati’s intervention: He was a man of his time, a contemporary
Ved@ntin, rather than a traditionalist or a modernist, who recognised that an ef-
fective critical-philosophical attitude always demands an abiding awareness of
one’s contemporaneity. I would even call Saraswati a postcolonial thinker, after
purging this expression from the homogenising tendencies of third-worldism, south-
ism, or cultural hybridism. The adjective ‘postcolonial’ contemplates, here, a local
hermeneutical response, within a particular sphere of human intervention, to the
dialogical interlocution of one’s times, marked by what Walter Mignolo calls ‘the
colonial difference’ (Mignolo 2000, p.262–3).
What is, then, the philosophical context that merits Saraswati’s response? In my
opinion, Saraswati’s intervention should be understood in the context of contem-
porary tendencies to reify doctrinal events of an otherwise meta-doctrinal
UpaniXadic project. That is the dominant thrust of orientalist discourse and its
internal ramifications in India, marked by a deliberate evaluation of Indian philo-
sophical thinking through the lens of western ideas.87 Modern narratives of
ved@ntic tradition tend to feature authors as subjectivist producers of theories,
who clash dialectically over a whole range of topical issues in a quasi-Hegelian
fashion. In traditional advaita circles, Saraswati identifies the proliferation of
‘Vedantic scholars of a later day who suppose that the Advaita propounded by
(Śaṅkara) Bhagavadp@da can be preserved merely by refuting the objections raised
Dilip Loundo 83
by the commentators of other schools.’88 What basically bothered Saraswati was

not, per se, the speculative tendency of ved@ntin discourse, its conceptual accuracy,
or otherwise, but its growing inefficiency in terms of self-transformation. In other
words, the problem lied in a philosophical thinking that produced speculations
and theories at the cost of neglecting the basic commitment to lead men to mokXa.
Saraswati’s uncompromising emphasis on adhy@ropa-apav@da should, therefore, be
seen as a call to modern Advaita Ved@nta tradition to effectively function as a
s@dhana (‘path’). This is, in my opinion, the major contribution of Saraswati to
modern Indian philosophical tradition.
Notwithstanding, the undisputed merit of pointing to the centrality of the
method as the quintessential dimension of the UpaniXads, Saraswati‘s work pre-
sents some areas of concern. As a contextual critique of contemporary develop-
ments within advaita tradition, Saraswati’s task is expected to mainly target
contemporary deviations from the transformational paradigm. This would include
contemporary advaita masters and writers and contemporary appropriations of
masters and writers of the past. Saraswati, however, adds to that list, with the
exception of Sureśvar@c@rya, the major masters of the past, including direct dis-
ciples of Śaṅkar@c@rya, and main representatives of Bh@mati and Vivara>a sub-
schools. These schools constitute the two major hermeneutical developments of
Advaita Ved@nta tradition since Śaṅkar@c@rya and their influence is paramount
among his modern successors and heads of the five mabhas founded by him.89
The suggestion that contemporary misappropriations could also be a consequence
of the misunderstandings of those past masters, especially the oblivion of the
method, could sound like a condemnation of tradition90 right from its inception.91
Moreover, if contemporary deviations from the method can be verified by its
actual inefficiency, the same does not obviously hold true for its past applications.
In the case of the Bh@mati and Vivava>a subschools, the fact of having being ‘tested’
over generations and generations, in discipular succession, could indicate, instead,
a minimum level of soteriological efficiency. Thus, in the absence of the actual
pedagogical contexts, Saraswati’s attempts to ‘prove’ past deviations of the method
solely on the basis of textual evidences could turn out to be a counterproductive
task. In fact, the textual debate on Śaṅkar@c@rya’s concept of avidy@ has been
mostly described as a ‘theoretical’ debate, even if Saraswati’s basic intent was,
instead, to reject any possibility of theoretical arrest of avidy@. In the ultimate
analysis, defining avidy@ (i) as (only) adhy@sa (Saraswati’s position) or (ii) as
bh@var+pa-m+l@vidy@ (Bh@mati and Vivara>a’s position) constitutes, in both the
cases, modalities of conceptual objectification based on Śaṅkar@c@rya’s work,
even admitting that the former hangs primarily on Śaṅkar@c@rya’s passages of
‘figurative and picturesque’ simplicity. What ultimately decides whether one def-
inition is an irreversible reification or not, are the contextual pedagogies. In prin-
ciple, I do not see any reason why both the cases should not be amenable to an
instrumental usage as ‘instructional events’, instead of being taken as ultimate
ontologies. As Comans rightly puts it, Bh@mati and Vivara>a subschools do not
present any ‘fundamental discontinuity between Śaṅkara and later Advaita’

(Comans 2000, p.267). In short, Saraswati and the representatives of Bh@mati
and Vivara>a should equally be seen as legitimate advaitins and expressions of
the hermeneutical plurality that so peculiarly distinguishes Indian philosophy in
general and Advaita Ved@nta in particular.92
To conclude, Saraswati’s hermeneutical path of rigorous soteriological reasoning
represents a powerful and timely reminder of the centuries-old commitment of
philosophy to spiritual goals and a ‘way of life’.93 And it also reminds us that Indian
philosophical traditions, such as those enshrined in the UpaniXads and in the
Sanskrit language, are not a matter of the past, but a contemporary event.
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Notes
1 I will resort, from this point onwards, to the abbreviation ‘Saraswati’.
2 I should mention, in this connection, the pioneer contribution of A. J. Alston, Paul
Hacker, and Karl Potter. To the first we owe the English translations of some of
Dilip Loundo 87
Saraswati’s Sanskrit texts. Hacker (1995, pp.58–65) and Potter (1981, p.79) support
Saraswati’s position of distinguishing the original meaning of Śaṅkar@c@rya’s works
from the interpretations of some of his commentators, in particular with regard to
the nature and status of the concept of ignorance (avidy@). More recently, authors
like Comans (2000), Doherty (1999 & 2005), and Hirst (2005) have studied and dis-
cussed critically the work of Saraswati in greater detail.
3 Translated by A. J. Alston as The Method of Ved@nta in 1989. I will resort, from this
point onwards, to the abbreviation VPP.
4 Saraswati wrote over 200 works in a variety of languages including Sanskrit,
English, and Kannada. Besides VPP (Sanskrit, 1964), I also recommend the reading
of the following works of Saraswati, all published by Adhyatma Prakasha Karyalaya
of Holinarsipur: (i) Śuddha-Śaṅkara-Prakriy@-Bh@skara (Sanskrit, 1964); (ii) The
Essential Gaunap@da (Kannada with English translation, 1997); (iii) Misconception
about Śaṅkara (English, 1973); (iv) Śaṅkara’s Clarification of Some Ved@ntic
Concepts (English, 1969); (v) Viśuddha-Ved@nta-S@ra (Sanskrit, 1968); (vi)
Viśuddha-Ved@nta-Paribh@X@ (Sanskrit, 1969); (vii) M@>n+kya Rahasya VivPti
(Sanskrit, 1968); (viii) Sugama (Sanskrit, 1969); (ix) Kleś@pah@rina (Sanskrit, 1968);
and (x) M+l@vidy@nir@sa (Sanskrit, 1929). Three important biographies have been
recently written on Saraswati’s life and works: D. B. Gangolli’s Sri Satchidanandendra
Saraswati Swamiji: An advent of Adi Sankaracharya in Our Own Times (1997), Savithri
Devaraj’s Sri Sri Satchidanandendra Saraswathi (Life History & His Contributions to
Sankara Vedanta) (2008), and A. Ranganath’s Contribution of Sacchidanandendra
Sarswathi to 20th Century Advaita (2005).
5 ‘athaiva prakriy@ kutra katham pratyabhijñ@tavy@’ (Saraswati 1964, I.x., p.14).
6 ‘tadetad yath@vadupap@dya ved@ntopadeśaprak@ratattvam bubhuts+n@m
hPdayam@gamayitum’ (Saraswati 1964, Introduction, p.136).
7 He says: ‘There are Vedantic scholars of a later day who suppose that the Advaita
propounded by Śra Śaṅkara Bhagavadp@da can be preserved merely by refuting
the objections raised by the commentators of other schools.’ (‘bh@Xy@ntarak@rot-
th@pit@n@m@kXep@>@m parih@ram@tre>a bhagavatp@dasammat@dvaitasa:rakXa>am
kPtamityabhimanyam@n@$’) (Saraswati 1964, Introduction, p.136). Among
traditional advaita commentators whose teachings have been particularly
amenable to misunderstanding, Saraswati lists some of the representatives of
Vivara>a subschool, specially Padmap@da and his Pañcap@dik@ and Prakaś@tman
and his Pañcap@dik@ Vivara>a; and the representatives of Bh@mati subschool,
specially Vacaspati Miśra and his Bh@mati and Amal@nanda and his Ved@nta-
Kalpataru.
8 Despite Paul Hacker’s sharp distinction between ‘neovend@ntins’ (‘inauthentic trad-
ition’, co-opted by colonial thinking) and ‘traditionalists’ (‘authentic tradition’,
including ‘modern traditionalists’ like Saraswati) (cited in Halbfass 1995, p.8–12),
the opposition does not seem to be fair. In fact, both represent, in my opinion,
legitimate, distinct, and creative postcolonial responses, fundamentally concerned
with the ‘modernity’ of ‘practical Ved@nta’: (i) As a response to western purely
theoretical rationality, Saraswati reinstates the experientiality and transforming
capability of the UpaniXadic rational method; (ii) and as a response to Western
ethical dilemma, Vivekananda postulates a compatibility between non-duality and
ethical commitment, where principles of self-detachment would inspire larger

social and political forms of participation (see also Halbfass 2010).
9 Considering contemporary confusion over the basic revelation of the Upanis ads,
Saraswati recommends that ‘Among the various commentaries, only those of Śra
Śaṅkara Bhagavad-P@da (Śaṅkar@c@rya) should be followed for determining the
method’ (‘bh@XyeXu madhye śraśaṅkarabhagavadp@day@nyev@nusPtya prakriy@
nirdh@ry@’. Saraswati 1964, I.x, p.14). Besides Śaṅkar@c@rya, Saraswati considers
the works of Gaunap@d@c@rya, Sureśvar@carya, and the latter’s V@rtika subschool
as faithful sources of the method.
10 ‘viśeXe>a c@tra śrutan@m pr@m@nyam na kevalam vedav@kyatv@t, api tu sarva vya-
vah@ram+lasya pram@tPtvasy@vidy@pura$saratvapradarśanap+rvakam sarva-
pram@>aprameyavyavah@rab@dhanena @tm@nubhavaparyavas@yitv@t’ (Saraswati
1964, Introduction, p.137).
11 Śaṅkar@c@rya 1983c, IV.iv.25, p.658.
12 See Saraswati 1964, I.i-x, pp.1–17. In particular, he states: ‘Certain teachers . . . in-
terpreted the UpaniXadic teachings to their pupils in all sorts of different ways,
according to their personal understanding (svamati).’ (‘svamatikauśal@danya-
th@nyath@dhyavasitaved@nt@rthai$ prasth@n@ntar@>yeva s@mprad@yikatvena sva-
śiXyebhya upadiXb@ni’, Saraswati I. ii. 2).
13 ‘siddham tu nivartakatv@t ity@gamavid@m s+tram’ (Śaṅkar@c@rya 1983f, II.32, p.446).
14 In his words, the Upanis ads’ secret instructions ‘entirely remove this relative world
together with its cause (avidy@)’ (‘seyam brahmavidy@ upaniXacchabdav@cy@
tatpar@>@m saheto$ sa:s@rasy@tyant@vas@dan@t’ Śaṅkar@c@rya 1983c, I.i.1, pp.3–4).
15 ‘n@syamanuXya ityukto’pi manuXyatvam@tmano na pratipadyate ya$ sa katham
manuXyo’satyukto’pi manuXyatvam@tmana$ pratipadyeta’ (Śaṅkar@c@rya 1983a,
IV.i.1, p.586).
16 ‘(svata$ siddhatv@t) na pPtag vaktavyam, ata eva ved@nt@ atra na pratyakX@diva-
dajñ@t@rthajñ@pakatvena pr@m@>yam@tmana$ pratipadyante, kim tahim, ‘yatra
svasya sarvam@tmaiv@bh+t tatkena kam paśyet’ ity@divadantata$ pram@-
aprameyavyavah@r@tatatvena tatsatattvam samarpayanto’dhy@ropit@taddharm
nivartakatvam@tre>a pram@>amityupacaryante ityabhiyukt@$’ (Saraswati 1964,
Introduction, p.135).
17 ‘yath@ gPhyam@>@y@ api śuktik@y@ viparyaye>a rajat@bh@s@y@ agraha>am
viparatajñ@navyavadh@nam@tram’ (Śaṅkar@c@rya 1983c, I.iv.7, p.116).
18 ‘śrutyanugPhata eva hyatra tarko’nubhav@ṅgatven@śrayate’ (Śaṅkar@c@rya 1983h,
II.i.6, p.350).
19 This is, precisely, the core teaching of Sureśvar@c@rya in the Bŗhad@ra>yaka Bh@Xya
V@rtika (see Potter 1981, p.448).
20 See, in particular, Halbfass’ article ‘The Concept of Experience in the Encounter
between India and the West’ (1988, pp.378–402), which deals with the western
philosophical concept of ‘experience’ and its similarities and dissimilarities vis-à-
vis the Ved@ntic notion of anubhava.
21 The English rendering of anubhava as ‘intuition’ may be open to misunderstandings,
unless a qualification is made. Anubhava is not another ‘means of knowledge’
(pram@>a) but, instead, that without which no pram@>a can operate, the ever present
reality without which no object is revealed. Thus, it’s only from the perspective of
Dilip Loundo 89
the seeker that one says that reasoning in accordance with śruti (anugPhita-tarka) is
conducive to anubhava. In fact, what the successful seeker does is, in fact, to re-
cognise what has always been there as the most intimate dimension of himself/
herself.
22 ‘avagatyarthatv@nmanananididhy@sanayo$’ (Śaṅkar@c@rya 1983h, I.i.4, p.77).
23 ‘tath@ hi samprad@yavid@m vacanam ‘adhy@ropa-apav@d@bhy@m niXprapañcam pra-
pañcyate’ iti’ (Śaṅkar@c@rya 1983b, XIII-13, pp.384–5).
24 ‘sa eXa neti netati vy@khy@tam nihnute yata$ sarvamagr@hyabh@vena hetun@’jam
prak@śate’ (Gaunap@d@c@rya 1983, III.26, p.473).
25 ‘sa b@hy@bhyantare’je hy@tmtattve nirviśeXe’pi upadeś@rthamev@dhy@ropy@td-
dharm@n tattvamupadiśya upadeśak@rye nirvPtte tatp+rvam yadyad vy@khy@tam
tasya tasy@param@rthat@m jñ@payitum śruti$ svayameva nihnute’ (Saraswati 1964,
Introduction, p.136).
26 ‘adhy@ropaprakriy@y@ hi javitamidam yanmithy@vikalp@napi brahma>yadhy@ropya
tatr@dhy@ropit@danyasya pratidvandvina$ pratiXedha$ tatastasy@pyadhy@ropitasy@-
pav@da iti’ (Saraswati 1964, III.xxi, p.29).
27 This article constitutes, in my opinion, one of the most lucid critiques on
Śaṅkar@c@rya and Advaita Ved@nta. It comes remarkably close to the principles
enunciated by Saraswati. Somewhat surprisingly, Halbfass does not mention
Saraswati, neither in this article nor in any other of his writings that I was able
to consult.
28 ‘bhedasamvididamjñ@nam bhed@bh@vaśc s@kXi>i k@ryametadavidy@y@ jñ@tman@
ty@jayed vaca$’ (Sureśvar@c@rya 1968, III.6, p.245). In the BPhad@ra>yaka UpaniXad
Bh@Xya V@rtika (IV.iii.400–1), he says: ‘Anvayavyatireka operates in the realm
of cause and effect. Thus, it cannot throw definitive light on the Reality
(taught by the UpaniXads)’ (‘na k@rye k@ra>e v@to vastutattvam samakXyate
anvayavyatirek@bhy@m’ (cited in Saraswati 1964, VII.118, p.232). See also
Śaṅkar@c@rya 1979, XVIII.99–100, pp.247–8. For a detailed account of
Sureśvar@c@rya’s view on anvayavyatireka, see Hino (1991, pp.47–53).
29 ‘svata$siddhasvayamprak@śatattvasamarpa>a ved@nt@$ adhy@rop@pav@d@khyapra-
kriy@viśeXamevorakusvanti anubhav@nus@ri>am ca tarkamanvayavyatireka-
ny@yar+pam prakriy@śeXa prayuñjate ca iti’ (Saraswati 1968b, p.10).
30 Anvaya-vyatireka is a technical term of Indian logic (Ny@ya), used in contexts of
ascertainment of vy@pti—the universal concomitance between events—an indispens-
able tool for positive and negative inferential procedures.
31 He says, ‘Only by resorting to anvayavyatireka, ignorance is not removed.
Anvayavyatireka enables one to distinguish the self from the body, etc., as the cog-
nitive content of ‘tvam’ (in the mah@v@kya)’ (‘kevalam anvayavyatirekan-
y@y@nusara>@nn@vidy@nivPtti$ sy@t deh@divilakXa>o’ham iti ityeva tvabh@var+pam
jñ@nam tenopaj@yate’, Saraswati 1968a, Introduction, p.28).
32 In particular, Saraswati has in mind Padmap@da’s Pañcap@dik@ and its subsequent
developments. The idea of java (@tman covered by ignorance) as a (existent) reflec-
tion of the original prototype brahman (‘javasya brahmapratibimbatva’, Saraswati
1964, XII. ccxlii, p.548)—an idea grounded in the concept of ignorance as an existent
power (bh@va-m+l@vidy@)—would, necessarily, imply an ultimate stage which would
trigger, instead of just the removal of ignorance, an actual ‘mystical’ merging, or
identification, between two objective terms, the reflection and its prototype. In his
rebuttal, Saraswati says: ‘The autoritativeness of (UpaniXadic) revelation as a valid
means of knowledge does not lie in any power to produce knowledge which has the
supreme Self as its object (viXeya)’ (‘śabda pr@m@nyam tu na para-
m@tmaviXeyakajñ@notp@danena’, Saraswati 1964, XII. ccliv, p.580).
33 He says: ‘Knowledge of the true nature of the Absolute (brahman) arises simultan-
eously with the understanding of the negations, so we cannot admit the anything
further requires to be done for the knowledge of brahman once the negations are
understood’ (‘tasm@t pratiXedhavijñ@nasamak@lameva brahmasvar+papratipattiriti
na tatpratipattyartham punaryatn@ntaram kartavyamiti pratibh@ti’, Saraswati
1964, VII. cxvi, p.234). Again, citing Śaṅkar@c@rya: ‘The function of teachings like
“Tat thou art”, associated with reasoning over their meaning, is merely to negate
the non-Self element of the Self, which is already existent and evident as “I am”.
The process is like the negation of the idea of a snake falsely imagined in a rope’
(‘siddh@dev@hamityasm@dyuXmaddharmo niXidhyate rajjv@miv@hidharyukty@
tattvamity@diś@sanai$’, Śaṅkar@c@rya 1979, XVIII.4, p.219).
34 In his BPhad@ra>yaka UpaniXad Bh@Xya V@rtika (II.iii.214), Sureśvar@c@rya points
clearly to the difference between an empirical negative attribution and an indicative
statement (lakXa>a) that points to something underlying the negatum: ‘(The negative
text “neither this, not that”) is not primarily concerned with negating what has to be
negated (such as the gross and subtle aspects of the universe) but with an indirect
(indicative) method of communicating the true nature of the hearer. If the text
merely negated the universe (in its gross and subtle aspects), and the Absolute
were not established by some other positive cognition, the result would be a void’
(‘na niXedho niXedhy@rtho lakXan@rthaparatvata$ brahma>o m@ntar@siddhe$
ś+nyataiva prasajyate’, cited in Saraswati 1964, VII.116, p.234).
35 ‘Only reasoning as enjoined by the UpaniXads is resorted here as a means to attain
realization.’ (‘anugPhata eva hyatra tarko’nubhav@ṅgatven@śrayate’, Śaṅkar@c@rya
1964, II.i.6, p.296).
36 The concept of śruti-anugPhata- tarka, where śruti means a pedagogical structure
involving appropriate methods, requisites, masters, and disciples, rules out the
idea of an ‘independent rational inquiry’ as suggested by Doherty (2005, p.233).
The latter would be, perhaps, more appropriately conveyed by the expression
śuXka-tarka (‘dry reasoning’).
37 ‘śrutit@tparyanirdh@ra>asamarth@ prakriy@’ (Saraswati 1964, I.10, p.14).
38 ‘The meaning of the texts must be settled according to the (axiomatic) criteria of
“opening” and “conclusion” of a topic, etc., observed by the established experts in
the field (the Mam@:s@kas). The latter recognize also six Forms of Evidence
(for deciding which passages are fundamental and which subordinate). They are:
direct relation (śruti), indirect implication (liṅga), syntactical connection in a sen-
tence (v@kya), context (prakara>a), position (sth@na) and etymology of names (śadba)’
(‘ato v@kyamam@:s@bhiyuktasam@dPtopakramopasamh@r@dit@tparyaliṅgairv@ky@r-
thanirdh@ra>am śrutiliṅgav@kyaprakara>@dan@m p@radaurbalyam’, Saraswati 1964,
I.10, p.14).
39 The idea of a ‘tribasic reason’ is derived from S. Iyer’s homonymous expression.
Iyer, however, uses this expression in a different way. According to him and in
Dilip Loundo 91
contrast with western unidimensional (empirical) reasoning, the Upanis ads postu-
late a tri-dimensional reasoning that would cover the entirety of human experience.
This would include not only the awaking state (j@grat) and its prevailing empirical
reasoning, but also the dream (svapna) and the deep sleep (suXupti) conditions, in
conformity with the Upanis adic method of avasth@-traya, as uniquely pursued by
Gaunap@d@c@rya and Śaṅkar@c@rya in their commentaries on the M@>n+kya
Upanis ad (Iyer 1955, pp.249–50).
40 ‘atra mam@:s@r+patarkasya śrutyanugPhatatadaviruddhatarkayo$ śuXkatarkasya ca
vivecanam na spaXbatay@ kPtamityasmanmati$’ (Saraswati 1964, X.189, p.415). For a
detailed account of those three types of reasoning, see Loundo’s unpublished PhD
thesis, The Role and Function of Reasoning (Tarka) in Śaṅkar@c@rya’s Advaita Ved@nta
(1992).
41 Saraswati quotes here Śaṅkar@c@rya’s words from the Brahma-S+tra-Bh@Xya:
‘Ignorance, which assumes the form of duality, is a wrong idea, like the wrong
idea of a man that we may have when we misperceive a tree-stump. Until one puts
an end to Ignorance through realizing the true nature of one’s own Self as the
constant and eternal Witness, raised above all change, in the conviction “I am
Brahman”, the individual soul will remain an individual soul.’ (‘y@vadeva hi
sth@>@viva puruXabuddhim dvaitalakXa>@mavidy@m nivartayank+basthanityadPk-
svar+pam@tm@nam “aham brahm@smi”iti na pratipadyate t@vajjavasya javatvam.’,
Śaṅkar@c@rya 1983h, I.iii.19, p.174).
42 Gadamer’s idea of limit concepts as unavoidable tolls of philosophical discourses
comes close to the advaita position: ‘The language of philosophy is a language that
sublates itself, saying nothing and turning towards the whole at one and the same
time’ (Gadamer 1997, p.42).
43 This follows Śaṅkar@c@rya’s description in the Brahma S+tra Bh@Xya:
‘tametamevamlakXa>amadhy@sam pa>nit@ avidyeti manyante’ (Śaṅkar@c@rya
1983h, I.i.1, p.3).
44 He says: ‘(Vivara>a subschool) imagines something never perceived by anyone – an
Indeterminable ignorance conceived as the material cause of the world. And it
openly contradicts the teaching of the Vedas which runs “One attains Brahman
here in this very body” and “Knowing Brahman, he becomes Brahman”; for
(Vivara>a) treats liberation essentially as the liberation that occurs with the fall
of the body at death’. (‘mithy@jñ@nasy@pyup@d@nabh+t@nirvacanay@jñnamadPXbam
parikalpya . . . videhamuktereva mukhyatv@p@danena “atra brahma samaśnute”
“brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati” ity@diśrutyarthab@dhanam.’, Saraswati 1964,
XII. 252, p. 575). Thus, if avidy@ is conceived as a ‘power of creation’, liberation is
tantamount to an escape from the world, that is, to a denial of oneness, a false
liberation.
45 ‘kasya punarayam aprabodha iti cet j yastva: pPcchasi tasya ta iti vad@ma$’
(Śaṅkar@c@rya 1983h, IV.i.3, p.774–5). While agreeing with Saraswati’s position, ac-
cording to which avidy@ means only adhy@sa, Paul Hacker makes a curious comment
on Śaṅkar@c@rya’s passage: ‘It is not philosophically exact, but pedagogically im-
pressive’ (cited in Murthy 2009, p.172). Perhaps for the likes of Śaṅkar@c@rya and
Saraswati, ‘impressive pedagogy’ is itself at the core of (a transformative)
philosophy.
46 ‘evam ayam an@dir ananto naisargiko’dhy@so’ (Śaṅkar@c@rya 1983h, I.i.1, p.5).

47 The concept of avidy@ has been at the centre of one of the most heated debates in
modern times among advaita ved@ntins. In 1976, after the death of Saraswati, a
symposium was organised by the ŚPṅgera Mabha to discuss this issue. The subtleties
of the discussion lie beyond the scope of this article. Yet, it is important to note that
Saraswati’s rebuttal of the tendency among the followers of the Bh@mati and
Vivara>a subschools of Advaita Ved@nta to lend an ontological status to avidy@—
crystalised in the notions of bh@var+pa-m+l@vidy@ (‘ignorance-root as an existent’),
@vara>a/vipXepa śakti (‘power of concealment and projection’), and up@d@na-k@ra>a
(‘material cause of the world’)—‘is not just a theoretical exercise; it is important
because of its soteriological consequences’ (Comans 2000, p.257). For Saraswati, it is
a reflection of the oblivion of the UpaniXadic method of adhy@ropa-apav@da. He says:
‘This view of those who accept the power of ignorance implies a different method of
interpreting the Vedas from the method of ady@ropa-apav@da accepted by
Bhagavadp@da Śaṅkara’ (‘bhagavadp@dasammat@dhy@rop@pav@daprakriy@to
vilakXa>am avidy@śaktyup@d@naprakriy@mavalambam@n@n@m matamidam’,
Saraswati 1964, VIII. 135, p.282). Accordingly, Saraswati argues that words like
m@y@, prakPti, and avyakta, treated by Śaṅkar@c@rya, in some passages, as synonym-
ous of avidy@, should be accepted as ‘material cause of the world’ or ‘power of
creation’ only from a vyavah@ra (empirical) perspective. To frame those other pos-
sible meanings of avidy@ as valid only from a vyavah@ra perspective means, pre-
cisely, to entrust them with the character of being an ‘instance of instruction’ with
no ultimate or ontological (param@rthika) status. In short, in order to preserve the
soteriological efficacy of adhy@ropa-apav@da, limit concepts such as avidy@, @tman,
and brahman should not entertain any ultimate objectified/reified ontology.
48 Saraswati 1968a, Introduction, pp.24–9. Sureśvar@c@rya sums up the sequenciality of
the two major hermeneutical tasks with the following words: (i) ‘(the understanding
of the sense of the words and) which attributes (in each of them) constituting
contraries should be removed’ and (ii) ‘the understanding of a sentence such as
“that thou art” (tat-tvam-asi)’. ‘pad@rth@dhigati$ p+rvam tatastadabhisaṅgati$
viruddh@rthahnuti$ paśc@ttato v@ky@rthabodhanam’ (Sureśvar@c@rya 1896,
p.1268). See also Potter (1981, p.490).
49 ‘saiX@ prakriy@ sarvaved@ntasamuddiXb@ ekaiva sati n@n@r+p@>i dhatte’ (Saraswati
1964, Introduction, p.136).
50 Śaṅkar@c@rya’s commentary is peremptory: ‘The Vedic passages referring to the
creation of the world, etc., do not actually refer to any real creative process. They
aim solely at pointing to the oneness of @tman’ (‘sPXby@div@ky@n@m@tmai-
katvapratipattyarthaparatv@tprakPtameva tasya darśanam’. Śaṅkar@c@rya 1983c,
I.iv.7, p.103).
51 ‘satyam jñ@nam anatam brahma’ (Taittiraya-UpaniXad 1983, II.i.1, p.662).
52 ‘niXkalam niXkriyam ś@ntam niravadyam nirañjanam’ (Śvet@śvatara-UpaniXad.
1986,VI.19, p.199).
53 It should be noted that Śaṅkar@c@rya gives to the terms ‘knowledge’ (jn@na) and
‘truth’ (satya)—along with the more obvious ‘ananta’ (‘without an end’)—a literal
negative sense. As predicate nouns instead of adjectives (such as the corresponding
‘knowledgeable’ and ‘truthful’), they both are used to deny agency in brahman and,
Dilip Loundo 93
therefore, to show uniqueness and dissimilarity to each and every object. He says:
‘evam saty@diśabd@ itaretarasannidh@n@danyonyaniyamyaniy@mak@$ santa$
saty@diśadbav@cy@t nivartak@ brahma>a lakXa>@rth@śca bhavantati’ (Śaṅkar@c@rya
1983g, II.i.1, p.671). Thus, as part of the adhy@ropa-apav@da strategy, the role of those
attributes is different from that of empirical negations, since they are not meant to
prove that brahman is ontologically different from the world but that world does
not exists ontologically apart from brahman. T. R. V. Murti states: ‘There is the
demand to know brahman intrinsically as what it is (svar+pa lakXa>a). From the
nature of the case, this knowledge has to be negative; we have to negate by criti-
cism the anthropomorphic character of religious knowledge. What remains after
this negation cannot be expressed discursively through concepts’ (Murti 1983,
p.376).
54 ‘avijñ@tam vij@nat@m vijñ@tamavij@nat@m’ (Kena UpaniXad 1983, II.3, p.100).
55 ‘ca av@cyatvam nalotpalavadav@ky@rthatvam ca brahmana$’ (Śaṅkar@c@rya 1983g,
II.i.1, p.671).
56 ‘api ca j@garite viXayendriyasa:yog@d@dity@dijyotirvyatikar@cc@tmana$ svayamjyo-
tiXbvam durvivecanamiti tadvivecan@ya svapna upanyasta$’ (Śaṅkar@c@rya 1983h,
III.ii.4, p.566).
57 ‘j@gratsvapnayostadantargataprapañcayośca @tmacaitanyavyatireke>@nupalabdhe$
mithy@tvam avasth@n@m satyatvam sarvamahattvam c@tmana$ sidhyati’
(Saraswati 1964, III.xl, p.67).
58 ‘nanv@tm@py@tmaśabdena abhidhayate? na . . . dehavati pratyag@tmani bhedaviXaye
prayujyam@na$ śabda$ deh@dan@m@tmatve praty@khy@yam@ne yatpariśiXbam sat
av@cyamapi praty@yayati’ (Śaṅkar@c@rya 1983d, VII.i.3, p.418).
59 Sureśvar@c@rya’s authorship of M@nasoll@sa is a matter of controversy among the
critique.
60 ‘tadityetatpadam loke bahv@rthapratip@dakam aparityajya p@rokXyamabhidh@not-
thameva tata tvamityapi padamtadvats@kX@nm@tr@rthav@ci tu sa8s@rit@masan-
tyajya s@pi sy@dabhidh@naj@’ (Sureśvar@c@rya 1968, III.23-24, p.262).
61 ‘sa8s@rit@dvitayena p@rokXyam c@’tman@ saha pr@saṅgikam viruddhatv@ttat-
tvambhy@m b@dhanam tayo$ . . . svamarthamaparityajya b@dhakau st@m
viruddhayo$’ (Sureśvar@c@rya 1968, III.23-24, p.321).
62 Saraswati summarises thus: ‘Those sentences have pairs of words in subject-predi-
cate relation. From this we conclude that the meaning of the words in each such
pair stand as qualified and qualifier. By the process of qualification the element of
the “sufferer” (the individual experiencer) is eliminated from the meaning of the
word “thou”, and the element of “not directly known” ’ is eliminated from the
meaning of the word “tat” (‘v@kyeXu padayo$ saman@dhikara>yam tata$
pad@rthayorviśeXyaviśeXa>abh@v@vagama$, tataśca tvampad@rthagatadu$khitvasya
tatpad@rthagatap@rokXyasya ca nivPtti$’, Saraswati 1964, VII.116, p.231).
63 ‘k@ra>@diniXedhena na c@dvaitamabhapsitam aik@tmyabodham@tre>na
niXedhasy@pyapahnav@t’ (cited in Saraswati 1964, VII.118, p.236).
64 ‘evam ca netinetyartham gamayetam parasparam’ (Śaṅkar@c@rya 1979, XVIII.198,
p.277).
65 ‘vik@r@nPt@dhikPtajav@tmavijñ@nanivartakameva idam v@kyam “tattvamasi” iti
siddhamiti’ (Śaṅkar@c@rya 1983d, VI.xvi.3, p.412).
66 ‘Thus, we find texts like “that thou art” and “I am the Absolute” having pairs of
words in subject-predicate relation (saman@dhikara>ya). Thence, (through these
texts one attains). . . the knowledge of the identity of the Self. This knowledge is
immediate experience of that (transcendent principle) which is not the meaning of
any sentence’ (‘tatra “tattvamsi” “aham brahm@smi”—ity@di v@kyeXu padayo$
saman@dhikara>yam tata$ . . . bhedasa:sarg@ny@bh@vaś+ny@v@ky@rth@nubhava$’,
Saraswati 1964, VII.116, p.231).
67 These theories of meaning are prevalent among the representatives of
Vivara>a subschool. They are based on the idea of java (the individual soul) as
a positive (real) reflection of @tman (pratibimbav@da) (Saraswati 1964, XII.242,
pp.548–50).
68 Says Potter: ‘. . . the designation of “that” (tat) excludes “thou” (tvam) and the des-
ignation of “thou” excludes “that” and yet they are identified in the sentence. So we
are immediately led to forget the literal meaning as well the figurative meaning, in
as much as this is an identity statement’ (1981, p.73).
69 ‘(tattvamśabdau) sv@rthasya hyaprah@>ena viśiXb@rthasamarpakau pratyag@tm@va-
gatyantau n@nyo’rth@dvirodhyata$’ (Śaṅkar@c@rya 1979, XVIII.173, p.269).
70 ‘lakXa>am sarpavadrajjv@$ prataca$ sy@daham tath@ tadb@dhenaiva v@ky@rtham
vetti so’pi tad@śray@t’ (Sureśvar@c@rya 1968, III.27, p.262).
71 ‘v@ky@d ev@v@ky@rtha$’ (Sureśvar@c@rya 1968, III.27, p.237).
72 ‘ath@nyen@pi prakare>a netv@ky@rtho var>yate, n@tro niXedho niXedh@rtha$’
(Saraswati 1964 VII.116, p.233).
73 Says Saraswati: ‘ “traditional instruction (@gama) refers (not simply to the texts of
the UpaniXads but) to a special method of teaching’ (‘@gamo’tropadeśakramaviśeXa
vivikXita iti gamyate’. Saraswati 1964, III.39, p.59).
74 ‘kevalapar@nugrahaprayojana’ (Śaṅkar@c@rya 1979, I.6, p.5).
75 ‘@c@ryav@n puruXo veda’ (Ch@ndogya-UpaniXad 1983, VI.xiv.2, p.399).
76 ‘asamprad@yavit sarvaś@stravidapi murkhavadeva upeksanaya$’ (Śaṅkar@c@rya
1983b, XIII.2, p.367).
77 ‘ved@ntasamprad@yavid@c@ryopadeśagamyatvam brahma>a iti’ (Saraswati 1964,
III.53, p.96).
78 The others are: (i) The longing for final liberation (mumukXutva); (ii) and the so-
called six virtues (Xabsampatti), viz., calmness (śama), self-control (dama), forbearance
(titikX@), faith (śraddh@), and concentration of mind (sam@dh@na).
79 ‘@tm@ v@ are draXbavya$ śrotavyo mantavyo nididhy@sitavyo maitreyy@tmano v@ are
darśa>ena maty@ vijñ@nenedam sarva viditam’ (BPhad@ra>yaka UpaniXad 1983, II.iv.5,
p.303).
80 In this particular, Saraswati has in mind Vacaspati Miśra’s Bh@mata and its subse-
quent developments. Differently from Śaṅkar@c@rya’s position where the three dis-
ciplines are committed to the understanding of the meaning of the sentence which
is itself the realisation of oneness, Vacaspati Miśra sustains that the meaning of the
sentence is a matter of śrava>a and manana and that it gives only an indirect
knowledge (parokXa). Only after that, in sustained mediation (nididhy@sana/
jñ@n@bhy@sa) understood as an after-instructional subjective effort, the realisation
of oneness would take place. This would render nididhy@sana/jñ@n@bhy@sa an injunc-
tion similar to yoga meditative practices. Saraswati says: ‘Bhamati introduces here a
Dilip Loundo 95
doctrine of sustained meditation not taught by Śaṅkar@c@rya’s’ (‘Bh@mata tvatr@ś-

rutam jñ@n@bhy@sam@nayati’, Saraswati 1964, X.205, p.461).
81 ‘yad@ ekatvamet@nyupagat@ni tad@ samyagdarśanam brahmaikatvaviXayam
prasadati na anyat@ . . . sarvath@pi tu yath@ @gamen@vadh@ritam tarkatastathaiva
mantavyam yath@ tarkato matam tasya tark@gam@bhy@m niścitasya tathaiva nidid-
hy@sanam kriyata iti’ (Śaṅkar@c@rya 1983c, II.iv.5 and II.v.i, pp.304 and 324). For a
detailed account of the unnecessary complexity brought subsequently into the
analysis of the disciplines of vic@ra see Roodurmum (2002).
82 ‘atha ya$ sapne puruXam kPX>adantam paśyati sa enam hanti / ity@din@
ten@sastyenaiva svapnadarśanena satyamara>m s+cyata iti darśyati’
(Śaṅkar@c@rya 1983h, II.i.14, p.312).
83 ‘Yath@ advaitajñ@nam manovPttim@tram tath@ any@nyapyup@san@ni man-
ovPttir+p@>i ityasti hi s@m@nyam . . . sv@bh@vikasya @tmanyakriye’dh@ropitasya
kartr@dik@rakakriy@phalabhedavijñ@nasya nivartakamadvaitavijñ@nam’
(Śaṅkar@c@rya 1983d, I.i.1, p.9).
84 ‘(mokXe) ved@ aved@$’ (BPhad@ra>yaka UpaniXad 1983, IV.iii.22, p.572).
85 ‘yath@ ekaprabhPty@par@rdhasa8khy@svar+paparijñ@n@ya rekh@dhy@ropa>am kPtv@
– ekeyam rekh@ daśeyam śateyam sahasreyam – iti gr@hayati avagamayati sa8-
khy@svar+pam kevalam na tu sa8khy@y@rekh@tmatvameva yath@ ca ak@r@danyakXa
r@>i vijigrayiXu$ patramaXarekh@disa:yogop@yam@sth@ya var>@n@m satatt-
vam@vedayati na patramaXy@dy@tmat@makXar@n@m gr@hayati tath@ ceha utpat-
ty@dyanekop@yam@sth@ya ekam brahmatattvam@veditam puna$
tatkalpitop@yajanitaviśeXapariśodhan@rtham neti netati tattvopasamh@ra$ kPta$’
(Śaṅkar@c@rya 1983c, IV.iv.25, p.658).
86 This seems to be the meaning of Doherty’s characterisation of Saraswati’s work as
an ‘inevitable hybrid’: The oscillation between an idealised ‘return to a “pure” form
of the tradition’ and an ‘independent rational inquire’ (Doherty 2005, pp.233–4, 237).
87 The problem resides, to a large extent, in (the limitations of) philological oriental-
ism and linguistic historicism. To circumvent those limitations, one needs to en-
trust hermeneutical philosophy with a more significant role. As Sheldon Pollock
rightly states ‘such texts do not exist only to be understood historically; they exist
to become valid for us’, that is, they should perform the ‘the role of the old her-
meneutic stage of application’ (Pollock 2009, p.957).
88 ‘bh@Xy@ntarak@rotth@pit@n@m@kXep@>@m parih@ram@tre>a prasth@nasa:rakXa>am
kPtamityabhimanyam@n@$’ (Saraswati 1964, Introduction, p.136).
89 These are: Dv@rak@, in the west; Jagann@tha Puri, in the east; ŚPṅgera and K@ṅci in the
south; and Badrik@śrama in the north. The K@ṅca Mabha is a disputed one, for the lack
of traditional consensus as to whether it was actually founded by Śaṅkar@c@rya.
90 My understanding here is that what one calls the ‘tradition of Śaṅkar@c@rya’ is not a
matter of historical subjectivity or authorship: It involves, necessarily, a discipular
succession (guruśiXya parampar@) that both precedes and succeeds Śaṅkar@c@rya,
coming down till the present times.
91 It is true that the magnitude of Saraswati’s criticism was, somewhat, overestimated
outside advaita circles. Instead of a flat accusation of soteriological inefficiency,
Saraswati could just be pointing to ‘seeds of oblivion of the method’, particularly
in his topical analysis of the concept of avidy@. The respectful and amicable
relationship between Saraswati and some of the heads of the Śaṅkar@c@rya mabhas,
right in the midst of the avidy@ debate, could favour that interpretation. According
to Gangolli (1997, pp.2 and 30), Sri Chandraśekharendra Saraswati Swamiji of the
K@ṅca Mabha and Sri Abhinavavidy@tartha Swamiji of ŚPṅgera Mabha have described
Saraswati as ‘a living example of a sage who had lived all his life steeped in con-
templation on the Param@rtha’ and a ‘a true devotee indeed’, respectively. The
latter, who undertook a personal visit to Saraswati, has reportedly stated that ‘By
my personal visit many of my doubts have been solved’ (Gangolli 1997, p.30).
92 To remain faithful to the spirit of Saraswati’s criticism, I tend to read it as a warning
against modern tendencies, in some advaita circles and academic philosophical
spheres, to soften pedagogic requirements and, as a consequence, to reify and
ontologise doctrines and concepts of past traditional masters. In this sense,
Saraswati’s critique could help one to relativise reifications and be able to read
those masters more appropriately, instead of rejecting them.
93 See Pierre Hadot’s homonymous book (1999). See also Loundo (2011).
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The Journal of Hindu Studies 2015;8:65–96 doi:10.

Adhy@ropa-apav@da Tarka: The Nature and

Abstract: The article highlights some of the basic features of contemporary

the seeker. Their ‘proof’ of truthfulness is, ultimately, a matter of metalinguistic

Saraswati, Śaṅkar@c@rya and the UpaniXadic reasoning (vic@ra)

systematisation.8 Saraswati’s self-declared ‘return’ to Śaṅkar@c@rya’s words9

(i) It’s a method of reasoning (tarka/yukti) with no ultimate instance of positive,

Elaborating on Śaṅkar@c@rya’s postulation of the UpaniXads as ‘secret know-

mystagogy that seeks to reinstate UpaniXadic project as a rigorous rational discip-

conceptualisation (concerning the entity to be known). In other words, the

Thus, the initial superimposition negates previously believed attributes of

granted (taught or enjoined) by the UpaniXads’36—requires two ancillary rational

The operationality of the UpaniXadic method (adhy@ropa-apav@da)

realisation of the non-difference between @tman and brahman. The reason as to

In short, the elimination of (erroneous) attributes, instead of skeptical state-

Considering that retractions can only be accomplished with deliberate superim-

their attributes). This mutual elimination constitutes, in the words of

eliminative principles of adhy@ropa-apav@da and neti neti. In Sureśvar@c@rya and

The pedagogical context of UpaniXadic reasoning (adhy@ropa-apav@da)

by the commentators of other schools.’88 What basically bothered Saraswati was

present any ‘fundamental discontinuity between Śaṅkara and later Advaita’

Śaṅkar@c@rya. 1983d. Ch@ndogya-UpaniXad-Bh@Xya (Sanskrit original). Madras: Samata Books.

ethical commitment, where principles of self-detachment would inspire larger

46 ‘evam ayam an@dir ananto naisargiko’dhy@so’ (Śaṅkar@c@rya 1983h, I.i.1, p.5).

doctrine of sustained meditation not taught by Śaṅkar@c@rya’s’ (‘Bh@mata tvatr@ś-

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