ABROGAR vs. COSMOS BOTTLING COMPANY and INTERGAMES INC.

could not be excused from liability by hiding behind the waiver executed by Rommel and the
permission given to him by his parents because the waiver could only be effective for risks
G.R. No. 064749 inherent in the marathon, such as stumbling, heat stroke, heart attack during the race, severe
exhaustion and similar occurrences; that the liability of the respondents towards the participants
March 15, 2017 and third persons was solidary, because Cosmos, the sponsor of the event, had been the principal
mover of the event, and, as such, had derived benefits from the marathon that in turn had carried
responsibilities towards the participants and the public; that the respondents' agreement to free
Cosmos from any liability had been an agreement binding only between them, and did not bind
third persons; and that Cosmos had a cause of action against Intergames for whatever could be
Facts: recovered by the petitioners from Cosmos.

This case involves a claim for damages arising from the negligence causing the death of a All parties appealed to the CA. The petitioners contended that the RTC erred in not awarding
participant in an organized marathon bumped by a passenger jeepney on the route of the race. damages for loss of earning capacity on the part of Rommel for the reason that such damages
The issues revolve on whether the organizer and the sponsor of the marathon were guilty of were not recoverable due to Rommel not yet having finished his schooling; and that it would be
negligence, and, if so, was their negligence the proximate cause of the death of the participant; on premature to award such damages upon the assumption that he would finish college and be
whether the negligence of the driver of the passenger jeepney was an efficient intervening cause; gainfully employed. The CA reduced the issues to four, namely:
on whether the doctrine of assumption of risk was applicable to the fatality; and on whether the
heirs of the fatality can recover damages for loss of earning capacity of the latter who, being then
a minor, had no gainful employment.
1. Whether or not appellant Intergames were negligent in its conduct of the 1st Pop Cola Junior
Marathon" held on June 15, 1980 and if so, whether its negligence was the proximate cause of
the death of Rommel Abrogar.
In the RTC decision dated May 10, 1991, judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiffs-spouses
Romulo Abrogar and ErlindaAbrogar and against defendants Cosmos Bottling Company, Inc. and
Intergames, Inc., ordering both defendants, jointly and severally, to pay and deliver to the
2. Whether or not appellant Cosmos can be held jointly and solidarity liable with appellant
plaintiffs the amounts of Twenty Eight Thousand Sixty One Pesos and Sixty Three Centavos
Intergames for the death of Rommel Abrogar, assuming that appellant Intergames is found to
(P28,061.63) as actual damages; One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as moral damages;
have been negligent in the conduct of the Pop Cola marathon and such negligence was the
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as exemplary damages and Ten Percent (10%) of the total
proximate cause of the death of Rommel Abrogar.
amount of One Hundred Seventy Eight Thousand Sixty One Pesos and Sixty Three Centavos
(P178,061,63) or Seventeen Thousand Eight Hundred Six Pesos and Sixteen Centavos
(P17,806.16) as attorney's fees. On the cross-claim of defendant Cosmos Bottling Company, Inc.,
defendant Intergames, Inc, is hereby ordered to reimburse to the former any and all amounts 3. Whether or not the appellants Abrogar are entitled to be compensated for the "loss of earning
which may be recovered by the plaintiffs from it by virtue of this Decision. capacity" of their son Rommel.

The RTC observed that the safeguards allegedly instituted by Intergames in conducting the 4. Whether or not the appellants Abrogar are entitled to the actual, moral, and exemplary
marathon had fallen short of the yardstick to satisfy the requirements of due diligence as called damages granted to them by the Trial Court. In its assailed judgment on March 10, 2004 and in
for by and appropriate under the circumstances; that the accident had happened because of view of the fact that both defendants are not liable for the death of Rommel Abrogar, appellants-
inadequate preparation and Intergames' failure to exercise due diligence; that the respondents spouses are not entitled to actual, moral, exemplary damages as well as for the "loss of earning
capacity" of their son. The third and fourth issues are thus moot and academic. UPON THE VIEW
OF THIS CASE, THUS, the judgment appealed from must be, as it hereby is, REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and another entered DISMISSING the complaint a quo. The appellants shall bear their
respective costs.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the CA gravely erred in reversing the RTC Decision, (and) in holding that
respondent Intergames was not negligent considering that:
A. Respondent Intergames failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the
conduct of the marathon in that it did not block off from traffic the marathon route; and
B. Respondent Intergames' preparations for the race, including the number of marshal during the
marathon, were glaringly inadequate to prevent the happening of the injury to its participants.
2. Whether or not the CA gravely erred in reversing the RTC Decision, (and) in holding that the
doctrine of assumption of risk finds application to the case at bar even though getting hit or run
over by a vehicle is not an inherent risk in a marathon race . Even assuming arguendo that
deceased Abrogar made such waiver as claimed, still there can be no valid waiver of one's right to
life and limb for being against public policy.
3. Whether or not the CA gravely erred in reversing the RTC Decision (and) in absolving
respondent Cosmos from liability to petitioners on the sole ground that respondent Cosmos'
contract with respondent Intergames contained a stipulation exempting the former from liability.
4. Whether or not the CA gravely erred in reversing the RTC Decision and consequently holding
respondents free from liability, (and) in not awarding petitioners with actual, moral and exemplary
damages for the death of their child, Rommel Abrogar.
Held:
1. Yes. Negligence is the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person
that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby
such other person suffers injury. Under Article 1173 of the Civil Code, it consists of the
"omissionof that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with
thecircumstances of the person, of the time and of the place. The Civil Code makes liability for
negligence clear under Article 2176, and Article 20.
2. Yes. The doctrine of assumption of risk means that one who voluntarily exposes himself to an
obvious, known and appreciated danger assumes the risk of injury that may result therefrom. It
rests on the fact that the person injured has consented to relieve the defendant of an obligation of
conduct toward him and to take his chance of injury from a known risk, and whether the former
has exercised proper caution or not is immaterial. In other words, it is based on voluntary
consent, express or implied, to accept danger of a known and appreciated risk; it may sometimes
include acceptance of risk arising from the defendant's negligence, but one does not
ordinarilyassume risk of any negligence which he does not know and appreciate . As a defense in
negligence cases, therefore, the doctrine requires the concurrence of three elements, namely; the
plaintiff must know that the risk is present;he must further understand its nature; and his choice
to incur it must be free and voluntary. Neither was the waiver by Rommel, then a minor, an
effective formof express or implied consent in the context of the doctrine of assumption of risk.
There is ample authority, cited in Prosser, to the effect that a person does not comprehend the
risk involved in a known situation because of his youth, or lack of information or experience, and
thus will not be taken to consent to assume the risk. Clearly, the doctrine of assumption of risk
does not apply to bar recovery by the petitioners.
3. No. The sponsorship of the marathon by Cosmos was limited to financing the race. Cosmos did
nothing beyond that, and did not involve itself at all in the preparations for the actual conduct of
the race. This verity was expressly confirmed by Intergames, through Castro, Jr.

4. Yes. Art. 2202. In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which
are the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. It is not
necessary that such damages have been foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen by the
defendant.
AlanovsMagud-Logmao
GR No. 1755540 April 7, 2014
Facts: At around 9:50pm of March 1, 1988, ArnelitoLogmao then 18 y/o, was brought to the East
Avenue Medical Center (EAMC) in Quezon City by two sidewalk vendors, who allegedly saw the
former fall from the overpass near the Farmer’s Market in Cubao, Quezon City. The patient’s data
sheet identified the patient as AngelitoLugmoso of Boni Ave., Mandaluyong. However, the clinical
abstract prepared by Dr.Paterno F. Cabrera, the surgical resident on-duty at the emergency room
of EAMC, stated the patient is AngelitoLogmao. Dr. Cabrera reported that Logmao was drowsy
with alcoholic breath, was conscious and coherent; that the skull x-ray showed no fracture; that
at around 4:30am of March 2, 1988, Logmao developed generalized seizures and was managed by
the neuro-surgeon resident on-duty; that the condition of Logmao progressively deteriorated and
he was intubated and ambu-bagging support was provided; that admission to the ICU and
mechanical ventilation support became necessary, but there was no vacancy at the ICU and allthe
ventilation units were being used by other patients; that a resident physician of NKTI, who was
rotating at EAMC, suggested that Logmao be transferred to NKTI; and that after arrangements
were made, Logamo was transferred to NKTI at 10:10am. At the NKTI, the name AngelitoLogmao
was recorded as AngelitoLugmoso. Lugmoso was immediately attended to and given the necessary
medical treatment. As Lugmoso had no relatives around, Jennifer Misa, transplant coordinator
was asked to locate his family by enlisting police and media assistance. Dr. Enrique Ona,
chairman of the Department of Surgery, observed that severity of the brain injury of Lugmoso
manifested symptoms of brain death. He requested the laboratory section to conduct tissue typing
and tissue cross-matching examination, so that should Lugmoso expire despite the necessary
care and medical management and he would be found to be a suitable organ donor and his family
would consent to organ donation, the organs thus donated could be detached and transplanted
promptly to any compatible beneficiary. The identity of Lugmoso was verified by Misa from EAMC
and she was furnished the patient’s data sheet. She then contacted several radio and television
stations to request for air time for the purpose of locating the family of AngelitoLugmoso of Boni
Ave., Mandaluyong who was confined at NKTI with severe head injury after allegedly falling from
the Cubao overpass, as well as police station no. 5 Eastern Police District. Lugmoso was
pronounced brain dead on March 3, 1988 7:00am. Two hours later, Dr.Ona was informed that
EEG recording exhibited a flat tracing thereby confirming his brain death. He was found to be a
suitable donor of the heart, kidneys, pancreas, and liver, and after theextensive search, no
relatives were found. Dr.Ona then requested the removal of the specific organs of Lugmoso from
the herein petitioners, Dr.Alano, the director of NKTI who thereafter issued a memorandum
stating that only after the requirements of RA 349 as amended by PD 856 was complied, they can
remove the specified organs of Lugmoso. Lugmoso’s remains was brought at La Funeraria Oro. A
press release made by NKTI announcing a double organ transplant led to the findings of the
relatives of Lugmoso.
Issue: Whether or not the removal of Lugmoso’s organs were valid.
Held: Yes. The internal organs of the deceased were removed only after he had been declared
brain dead; thus the emotional pain suffered by respondent due to the death of her son cannot be
in any way be attributed to petitioner. Neither can the court find evidence or second to show that
respondent’s emotional suffering at the sight of the pitful state in which she found her son’s
lifeless body be categorically attributed to petitioner’s conduct.
Thus, there can be no cavil that petitionersemployed reasonable means to
disseminatenotifications intended to reach the relatives of the deceased. The only question that
remains pertains to the sufficiency of time allotted for notices to reach the relatives of the
deceased.
If respondent failed to immediately receive notice of her son’s death because the notices did not
properly state the name or identity of the deceased, fault cannot be laid at petitioner’s door. The
trial and appellate courts found that it was the EAMC, who recorded the wrong information
regarding the deceased’s identity to NKTI. The NKTI could not have obtained the informationabout
his name from the patient, because as found by the lower courts, the deceased was already
unconscious by the time he was brought to NKTI.
Naguiat, doing business under the name and style Sergio F. NaguiatEnt., Inc. & Clark Field Taxi,
Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission (Third Division), National Organization of
Workingmen and its Members, Leonardo T. Galang, et. al.
G.R. No. 116123, March 13, 1997
269 SCRA 564
336 Phil. 545
FACTS:
Clark Field Taxi, Inc. (CFTI) held a concessionaire contract within the Clark Air Base. Its
President and Vice-President were Sergio F. Naguiat and AntolinNaguiat, respectively. They also
owned Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises, Inc, a trading business. These two corporations are family-
owned. The President, Sergio F. Naguiat supervised and determined the employment terms of the
drivers of their taxi business while no evidence was offered on the extent of his son,
AntolinNaguiat’s participation in the management or operation of the business. They stopped
their taxi business due to the expiration of the RP-US military bases agreement which resulted to
the phasing out of Clark Air Base. The employees of CFTI who were separated from service
because of the closure of Clark Air Base filed an action for the payment of their separation pay.
ISSUE:
Are officers of corporations ipso facto liable jointly and severally with the companies they
represent for the settlement of its corporate obligations?
RULING:
No. In case of close corporations, not all are personally liable but only those who were actively
engaged in the management or operation of the business. Section 100 paragraph 5 of the
Corporation Code states that the stockholders shall be held to strict fiduciary duties to each other
and among themselves to the extent that the stockholders are actively engaged in the
management or operation of the business and affairs of a close corporation. Said stockholders
shall be personally liable for corporate torts unless the corporation had obtained reasonably
adequate liability insurance. Therefore, the President who had actively engaged in the
management and operation of CFTI is held solidarily liable however, the Vice-President in the
absence of evidence on the extent of his participation in the operation of the business cannot be
held solidarily liable.
The rule that a corporate officer cannot be held solidarily with a corporation in the absence of
evidence that he had acted in bad faith or with malice is not applicable in this case.
NOTES:
Firmly, we reiterate the rule that in a petition for certiorari filed pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, which is the only way a labor case may reach the Supreme Court, the petitioner/s must
clearly show that the NLRC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion.
Administrative Law
Long-standing and well-settled in Philippine jurisprudence is the judicial dictum that findings of
fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies, which have acquired expertise because
their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only great respect but
even finality; and are binding upon this Court unless there is a showing of grave abuse of
discretion, or where it is clearly shown that they were arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the
evidence on record.
Evidence; Estoppel
In their amended complaint before the Regional Arbitration Branch in San Fernando, Pampanga,
herein private respondents set forth in detail the work schedule and financial arrangement they
had with their employer. Therefrom they inferred that their monthly take-home pay amounted to
not less than $240.00. Herein petitioners did not bother to refute nor offer any evidence to
controvert said allegations. Remaining undisputed, the labor arbiter adopted such facts in his
decision. Petitioners did not even appeal from the decision of the labor arbiter nor manifest any
error in his findings and conclusions. Thus, petitioners are in estoppel for not having questioned
such facts when they had all opportunity to do so. Private respondents, like petitioners, are
bound by the factual findings of Respondent Commission.

Business Losses
Petitioners also claim that the closure of their taxi business was due to great financial losses
brought about by the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo which made the roads practically impassable to
their taxicabs. Likewise well-settled is the rule that business losses or financial reverses, in order
to sustain retrenchment of personnel or closure of business and warrant exemption from payment
of separation pay, must be proved with clear and satisfactory evidence. The records, however, are
devoid of such evidence.
Estoppel
On the question of NOWM’s authority to represent private respondents, we hold petitioners in
estoppel for not having seasonably raised this issue before the labor arbiter or the NLRC. NOWM
was already a party-litigant as the organization representing the taxi driver-complainants before
the labor arbiter. But petitioners who were party-respondents in said complaint did not assail the
juridical personality of NOWM and the validity of its representations in behalf of the complaining
taxi drivers before the quasi-judicial bodies. Therefore, they are now estopped from raising such
question before this Court. In any event, petitioners acknowledged before this Court that the taxi
drivers allegedly represented by NOWM, are themselves parties in this case.
Administrative Law
Unfortunately, the NLRC did not discuss or give any explanation for holding Naguiat Enterprises
and its officers jointly and severally liable in discharging CFTI’s liability for payment of separation
pay. We again remind those concerned that decisions, however concisely written, must distinctly
and clearly set forth the facts and law upon which they are based.This rule applies as well to
dispositions by quasi-judicial and administrative bodies.
Labor-only contracting and Independent contractors, explained
We find no reason to make a contrary finding. Labor-only contracting exists where: (1) the person
supplying workers to an employer does not have substantial capital or investment in the form of
tools, equipment, machinery, and work premises, among others; and (2) the workers recruited
and placed by such person are performing activities which are directly related to the principal
business of the employer. Independent contractors, meanwhile, are those who exercise
independent employment, contracting to do a piece of work according to their own methods
without being subject to control of their employer except as to the result of their work.
Corporation Law
Sergio F. Naguiat, admittedly, was the president of CFTI who actively managed the business.
Thus, applying the ruling in A. C. Ransom, he falls within the meaning of an “employer” as
contemplated by the Labor Code, who may be held jointly and severally liable for the obligations
of the corporation to its dismissed employees.
Close Family Corporations
Moreover, petitioners also conceded that both CFTI and Naguiat Enterprises were “close family
corporations” owned by the Naguiat family. Section 100, paragraph 5, (under Title XII on Close
Corporations) of the Corporation Code, states:
“(5) To the extent that the stockholders are actively engage(d) in the management or operation of
the business and affairs of a close corporation, the stockholders shall be held to strict fiduciary
duties to each other and among themselves. Said stockholders shall be personally liable for
corporate torts unless the corporation has obtained reasonably adequate liability insurance.”
Corporate Torts
Our jurisprudence is wanting as to the definite scope of “corporate tort.” Essentially, “tort”
consists in the violation of a right given or the omission of a duty imposed by law.[35] Simply
stated, tort is a breach of a legal duty.[36] Article 283 of the Labor Code mandates the employer to
grant separation pay to employees in case of closure or cessation of operations of establishment
or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, which is the condition
obtaining at bar. CFTI failed to comply with this law-imposed duty or obligation. Consequently, its
stockholder who was actively engaged in the management or operation of the business should be
held personally liable.
Due Process
Furthermore, Sergio and AntolinNaguiat voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of
the labor arbiter when they, in their individual capacities, filed a position paper together with
CFTI, before the arbiter. They cannot now claim to have been denied due process since they
availed of the opportunity to present their positions.
LiwaywayVinzons-Chato vs. Fortune Tobacco, Corp.
on 6:55 AM in Case Digests, Civil Law 0
G.R. No. 141309, June 19, 2007
FACTS:
This is a case for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code filed by Fortune against Liwayway as
CIR.
On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted RA 7654, which provided that locally manufactured
cigarettes which are currently classified and taxed at 55% shall be charged an ad valorem tax of
“55% provided that the maximum tax shall not be less than Five Pesos per pack.” Prior to
effectivity of RA 7654, Liwayway issued a rule, reclassifying “Champion,” “Hope,” and “More” (all
manufactured by Fortune) as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign brand subject to the
55% ad valorem tax. Thus, when RA 7654 was passed, these cigarette brands were already
covered.
In a case filed against Liwayway with the RTC, Fortune contended that the issuance of the rule
violated its constitutional right against deprivation of property without due process of law and the
right to equal protection of the laws.
For her part, Liwayway contended in her motion to dismiss that respondent has no cause of
action against her because she issued RMC 37-93 in the performance of her official function and
within the scope of her authority. She claimed that she acted merely as an agent of the Republic
and therefore the latter is the one responsible for her acts. She also contended that the complaint
states no cause of action for lack of allegation of malice or bad faith.
The order denying the motion to dismiss was elevated to the CA, who dismissed the case on the
ground that under Article 32, liability may arise even if the defendant did not act with malice or
bad faith.
Hence this appeal.
ISSUES:
Whether or not a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in
connection with the discharge of the functions of his/her office
Whether or not Article 32, NCC, should be applied instead of Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code
HELD:
On the first issue, the general rule is that a public officer is not liable for damages which a person
may suffer arising from the just performance of his official duties and within the scope of his
assigned tasks. An officer who acts within his authority to administer the affairs of the office
which he/she heads is not liable for damages that may have been caused to another, as it would
virtually be a charge against the Republic, which is not amenable to judgment for monetary
claims without its consent. However, a public officer is by law not immune from damages in
his/her personal capacity for acts done in bad faith which, being outside the scope of his
authority, are no longer protected by the mantle of immunity for official actions.
Specifically, under Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code, civil liability may arise where there is
bad faith, malice, or gross negligence on the part of a superior public officer. And, under Sec. 39
of the same Book, civil liability may arise where the subordinate public officer’s act is
characterized by willfulness or negligence. In Cojuangco, Jr. V. CA, a public officer who directly or Three days later, Bladimir went about his usual chores of manning the gate of the company
indirectly violates the constitutional rights of another, may be validly sued for damages under premises and even cleaned the company vehicles. Later in the afternoon, Hao gave
Article 32 of the Civil Code even if his acts were not so tainted with malice or bad faith. BladimirP1,000.00 and ordered Silangga, a co-worker, to bring Bladimir to the nearest hospital.

Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private Bladimir was brought to theCaybiga Community Hospital (Caybiga Hospital), a primary-care
capacity for acts done in the course of the performance of the functions of the office, where said hospital around one kilometer away from the office of the company. He was then confined and
public officer: (1) acted with malice, bad faith, or negligence; or (2) where the public officer was not permitted to leave the hospital. He was then transferred to the Quezon City General
violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff. Hospital (QCGH) by his parents where he was placed in the intensive care unit and died the
following day.

On the second issue, SC ruled that the decisive provision is Article 32, it being a special law,
which prevails over a general law (the Administrative Code). The death certificate issued by the QCGH recorded Bladimir’s immediate cause of death as cardio-
respiratory arrest and the antecedent cause as pneumonia. On the other hand, the death
certificate issued by Dr.Frias recorded the causes of death as cardiac arrest, multiple organ
system failure, septicemia and chicken pox.
Article 32 was patterned after the “tort” in American law. A tort is a wrong, a tortious act which
has been defined as the commission or omission of an act by one, without right, whereby another
receives some injury, directly or indirectly, in person, property or reputation. There are cases in
which it has been stated that civil liability in tort is determined by the conduct and not by the Bladimir’s parents filed before the RTC complaint for damages against petitioners, alleging that
mental state of the tortfeasor, and there are circumstances under which the motive of the Hao was guilty of negligence which resulted in the deterioration of Bladimir’s condition leading to
defendant has been rendered immaterial. The reason sometimes given for the rule is that his death. The court dismissed the complaint and ruled that Hao was not negligent.
otherwise, the mental attitude of the alleged wrongdoer, and not the act itself, would determine
whether the act was wrongful. Presence of good motive, or rather, the absence of an evil motive,
does not render lawful an act which is otherwise an invasion of another’s legal right; that is,
liability in tort in not precluded by the fact that defendant acted without evil intent. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the lower court and ruled that Hao’s failure to bring
Bladimir to a better-equipped hospital constituted a violation of Article 161 of the Labor Code.
Thus, making them liable for damages.

CASE DIGEST: OCEAN BUILDERS CONSTRUCTION CORP., and/or DENNIS HAO v. SPOUSES
ANTONIO and ANICIA CUBACUB. (G.R. No. 150898; April 13, 2011).
ISSUE: Did Hao exercise the diligence more than what the law requires, hence, not liable for
damages?

FACTS: BladimirCubacub (Bladimir) was employed as maintenance man by petitioner company

Ocean Builders Construction Corp. at its office in Caloocan Cit y. Bladimir was afflicted with
chicken pox. Thus, he was advised by petitioner Dennis Hao (Hao), the company’s general
manager, to rest for three days which he did at the company’s “barracks” where he lives free of
HELD: To successfully prosecute an action anchored on torts, three elements must be present,
charge.
viz: (1) duty (2) breach (3) injury and proximate causation. The assailed decision of the appellate
court held that it was the duty of petitioners to provide adequate medical assistance to the
employees under Art. 161 of the Labor Code,failing which a breach is committed.The
Implementing Rules of the Code do not enlighten what the phrase “adequate and immediate”
medical attendance means in relation to an “emergency.” It would thus appear that the
determination of what it means is left to the employer, except when a full-time registered nurse
orphysician are available on-site as required, also under the Labor Code.
The Court determined that the actions taken by petitioners when Bladimir became ill, to take a 3-
day rest and to later have him brought to the nearest hospital, amounted to the
“necessaryassistance” to ensure “adequate and immediate medical attendance” toBladimir as
required under Art. 161 of the Labor Code, to provide to a sick employee in an emergency.
Chicken pox is self-limiting. Hao does not appear to have a medical background. He may not be
thus expected to have known that Bladimir needed to be brought to a hospital with better
facilities than the Caybiga Hospital, contrary to appellate court’s ruling.
Moreover, the alleged negligence of Hao cannot be considered as the proximate cause of the death
of Bladimir. Proximate cause is that which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an
efficient intervening cause, produces injury, and without which, the result would not have
occurred. An injury or damage is proximately caused by an act or failure to act, whenever it
appears from the evidence in the case that the act or omission played a substantial part in
bringing about or actually causing the injury or damage, and that the injury or damage was either
a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the act or omission. Thus, the petitioners
are not guilty of negligence.GRANTED.
FAUSTO BARREDO, petitioner, vs. SEVERINO GARCIA and TIMOTEO ALMARIO, respondents
No. 48006. July 8, 1942
Facts:
A head-on collision between a taxicab owned by Barredo and a carretela occurred. The
carretelawas overturned and one of its passengers, a 16-year old boy, the son of Garcia and
Almario, diedas a result of the injuries which he received. The driver of the taxicab, an employee
of Barredo, was prosecuted for the crime and was convicted. When the criminal case was
instituted, Garcia and Almario reserved their right to institute a separate civil action for damages.
Subsequently, Garcia and Almario instituted a civil action for damages against Barredo, the
employer of the taxicab driver.
Issue:
Whether or not they can file a separate civil action against FaustoBarredo making him primarily
and directly responsible
Held:
(Foreword: The Barredo case was decided by the Supreme Court prior to the present Civil Code.
However, the principle enunciated in said case, that responsibility for fault or negligence as quasi-
delict is distinct and separate from negligence penalized under the Revised Penal Code, is now
specifically embodied in Art. 2177 of the Civil Code.)
The defendant maintains that Fontanilla’s negligence being punishable by the Penal Code, his
(defendant’s) liability as an employer is only subsidiary, according to said Penal Code, but
Fontanilla has not been sued in a civil action and his property has not been exhausted. To decide
the main issue, we must cut thru the tangle that has, in the minds of many, confused and
jumbled together delitos and cuasidelitos, or crimes under the Penal Code and fault or negligence
under Articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. According to the Supreme Tribunal of Spain:
“Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-delict or ‘culpa aquiliana’ is a separate
legalinstitution under the Civil Code, with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is
entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime. Upon this principle, and on the wording
and spirit of Article 1903 of the Civil Code, the primary and direct responsibility of employers may
be safelyanchored.
“It will thus be seen that while the terms of Article 1902 of the Civil Code seem to be broad
enough to cover the driver’s negligence in the instant case, nevertheless Article 1903 limits cuasi-
delitos TO ACTS OR OMISSIONS ‘NOT PUNISHABLE BY LAW.’ But inasmuch as Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code punishes not only reckless but even simple imprudence or negligence, the
fault or negligence under Article 1902 of the Civil Code has apparently been crowded out. It is this
overlapping that makes the “confusion worse confounded.’ However, a closer study shows that
such a concurrence of scope in regard to negligent acts does not destroy the distinction between
the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for cuasi-delitos or culpa extra-
contractual. The same negligent act causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a
crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; or create an action for cuasi-delito or culpa
extra-contractual under Articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. “Some of the differences between
crimes under the Penal Code are:
“1. That crimes affect the public interest, while quasi-delitos are only of private concern.
“2. That consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act, while the Civil Code,
by means of indemnification, merely repairs the damage.
“3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because for the former are punished only if
there is a penal law clearly covering them, while the latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts in which
‘ any kind of fault or negligence intervenes.’ However, it should be noted that not all violations of
the penal law produce civil responsibility, such as begging in contravention of ordinances,
violation of the game laws, infraction of the rules of traffic when nobody is hurt.
“The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate individuality of cuasi-delitos or culpa
aquiliana under the Civil Code. Specifically they show that there is a distinction between civil
liability arising from criminal negligence (governed by the Penal Code) and responsibility for fault
or negligence under Articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and that the same negligent act may
produce either a civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or a separate
responsibility for fault or negligence under Articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Still more
concretely the authorities above cited render it inescapable to conclude that the employer – in this
case the defendant-petitioner – is primarily and directly liable under Article 1903 of the Civil
Code.”
CANGCO VS MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY G.R. L-12191 OCTOBER 14, 1918
FACTS:
On January 20, 1915, Jose Cangco was riding the train of Manila Railroad Company where he
was an employee. As the train drew near to his destination, he arose from his seat. When he was
about to alight from the train, Cangco accidentally stepped on a sack of watermelons which he
failed to notice because it was already 7:00pm and it was dim when it happened. As a result, he
slipped and fell violently on the platform. His right arm was badly crushed and lacerated which
was eventually amputated.
Cangco sued Manila Railroad Company on the ground of negligence of its employees placing the
sacks of melons upon the platform and in leaving them so placed as to be a menace to the
security of passenger alighting from the company’s trains.
The company’s defense was that granting that its employees were negligent in placing an
obstruction upon the platform, the direct and proximate cause of the injury suffered by plaintiff
was his own contributing negligence.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a contributing negligence on the part of the plaintiff.
HELD: In determining the question of contributory negligence in performing such act – that is to
say, whether the passenger acted prudently or recklessly – the age, sex, and physical condition of
the passenger are circumstances necessarily affecting the safety of the passenger, and should be
considered.
The place was perfectly familiar to the plaintiff as it was his daily custom to get on and off
thetrain at the station. There could, therefore, be no uncertainty in his mind with regard either to
the length of the step which he was required to take or the character of the platform where he was
alighting. The Supreme Court’s conclusion was that the conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking to
alight while the train was yet slightly under way was not characterized by imprudence and that
therefore he was not guilty of contributory negligence.
PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as Ascendants of AgapitoElcano,
deceased,plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural Guardian of said minor,
defendants-appellees.
G.R. No. L-24803 [May 26, 1977]
Facts of the Case:
Respondent Reginald Hill killed the son of the plaintiffs named AgapitoElcano. A criminal
complaint was instituted against him but he was acquitted on the ground that his act was not
criminal, because of lack of intent to kill, couple with mistake. Subsequently, plaintiffs filed a
complaint for recovery of damages against defendant Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of
the occurrence, and his father, the defendant Marvin Hill, with who he was living and getting
subsistence, for the same killing. A motion to dismiss was filed by the defendants. The Court of
First Instance of Quezon City denied the motion. Nevertheless, the civil case was finally dismissed
upon motion for reconsideration.
Issues:
1. WON the present civil action for damages is barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal
case.
2. WON Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code may be applied against Atty. Hill,
notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence complained of. Reginald,
though a minor, living with and getting subsistence from his father, was already legally married.
Ruling of the Court:
1. No, the present civil action for damages is not barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the
criminal case. Firstly, there is a distinction as regards the proof required in a criminal case and a
civil case. To find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is
required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay
in damages. Furthermore, a civil case for damages on the basis of quasi-delict does is
independently instituted from a criminal act. As such the acquittal of Reginald Hill in the criminal
case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the
instant action against him.

2. Yes, the above mentioned provision may still be applied against Atty Marvin Hill. Although
parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child, emancipation by marriage is not
absolute, i.e. he can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or
guardian. As in the present case, killing someone else contemplated judicial litigation, thus,
making Article 2180 apply to Atty. Hill.However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of
age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to that of his
son.
Torts and Damages Case Digest: Natividad V. Andamo, et al., v. Intermediate Appellate Court et
al. (1990)
G.R. No. 74761 November 6, 1990
Lessons Applicable: Elements of Quasi-Delict (Torts and Damages)
FACTS:
Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious corporation, built through its agents,
waterpaths, water conductors and contrivances including an artificial lake within its land
inundated and eroded the spouses Emmanuel and NatividadAndamo's land, caused a young man
to drown, damaged petitioners' crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the lives
of petitioners and their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed plants and other
improvements to destruction
July 1982:spouses instituted a criminal action
February 22, 1983: spouses filed a civil case for damages
CA affirmed trial court issued an order suspending further hearings in Civil Case until after
judgment in the related Criminal Case
spouses contend that the trial court and the Appellate Court erred in dismissing Civil Case since
it is predicated on a quasi-delict
ISSUE: W/N there is quasi-delict even if done in private propety
HELD: YES. REVERSED and SET ASIDE
All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit:
(a) damages suffered by the plaintiff
(b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond
(c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the
damages incurred by the plaintiff
While the property involved in the cited case belonged to the public domain and the property
subject of the instant case is privately owned, the fact remains that petitioners' complaint
sufficiently alleges that petitioners have sustained and will continue to sustain damage due to the
waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation
It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the
Civil Code provides that "the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to
injure the rights of a third person." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Moreover,
adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each must use his
own land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of others.
Although we recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his land, such structures must
be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to
adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and expected forces of nature. If the
structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the latter can
claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.
Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate
and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff
cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
whether it be conviction or acquittal would render meaningless the independent character of the
civil action and the clear injunction in Article 31, that his action may proceed independently of
the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter
GASHEEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T.
GONZALES, respondents
G. R. No. 97336. February 19, 1993
FACTS:
Petitioner was a medicine student at Lyceum Northwestern Colleges at Dagupan City. He was an
Iranian exchange student and was 29 years old. Respondent was a former waitress on a
luncheonette, and was 22 years old. Petitioner was allegedly the lover of the respondent, and was
said to promise marriage to the latter, which convinced her to live with him in his apartment. It
was even alleged that the petitioner went to the house of the respondent to inform her family
about the marriage on the end of the semester. However, the marriage did not materialize, with
several beatings and maltreatment experienced by the respondent from the petitioner.
The case was filed in the RTC of Pangasinan, and the decision was held in favor of the
respondent. However, the petitioner claimed that the judgment of the RTC was an error, for the
claims of the respondent are not true, and that he did not know about the custom of the Filipinos;
his acts were in accordance of his custom. The decision of the RTC was affirmed in toto by the
Court of Appeals. Hence, the petitioner filed an appeal to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent could claim payment for the damages incurred by the petitioner.
RULING:
Mere breach of marriage is not punishable by law. However, since the respondent was proved to
have a good moral character, and that she had just let her virginity be taken away by the
petitioner since the latter offered a promise of marriage, then she could ask for payment for
damages. Furthermore, since she let her lover, the petitioner, “deflowered” her since she believed
that his promise to marry was true, and not due to her carnal desire, then she could have her
claims against the petitioner. Moreover, the father of the respondent had already looked for pigs
and chicken for the marriage reception and the sponsors for the marriage, and then damages
were caused by the petitioner against the respondents, which qualified the claims of the
respondent against the petitioner.
PORFIRIO P. CINCO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
HON. MATEO CANONOY, Presiding Judge of the Third Branch of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu, HON. LORENZO B. BARRIA City Judge of Mandaue City, Second Branch ROMEO HILOT,
VALERIANA PEPITO and CARLOS PEPITO, respondents-appellees
G.R. No. L-33171 May 31, 1979
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a complaint in the City Court for recovery of damages on account of
a vehicular accident involving his car and a jeepney driven by respondent Romeo
Hilot and operated by respondents ValerianaPepito and Carlos Pepito.
Subsequently, a criminal case was filed against the driver. At the pre-trial of the civil
case counsel for the respondents moved for the suspension of the civil action
pending determination of the criminal case invoking Section 3(b), Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court. The City Court granted the motion and ordered the suspension of
the civil case. Petitioner elevated the matter on certiorari to the Court of First
Instance, alleging that the City Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in
suspending the civil action for being contrary to law and jurisprudence. The Court of
First Instance dismissed the petition; hence, this petition to review on certiorari.
 "once the criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising from the

same offense can be prosecuted and the same shall be suspended in whatever stage

ISSUE: it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered".

Whether or not there can be an independent civil action for damages to property during the The civil action referred to in Section 2(a) and 3(b), Rule 11 of the Rules of Court
pendency of the criminal action.
which should be suspended after the criminal action has been instituted is that

arising from the criminal offense and not the civil action based on quasi delict.

HELD:
The concept of quasi-delict enunciated in Article 2176 of the New Civil Code is so broad that it
The Supreme Court held that an action for damages based on Articles 2176 and
includes not only injuries to persons but also damage to property. It makes no
2180 of the New Civil Code is quasi-delictual in character which can be prosecuted
distinction between "damage to persons" on the one hand and "damage to
independently of the criminal action.Where the plaintiff made essential averments in the
property" on the other. The word "damage" is used in two concepts: the "harm"
complaint that it was the driver's fault or negligence in the operation of the jeepney
done and "reparation" for the harm done. And with respect to "harm" it is plain that
which caused the collision between his automobile and said jeepney; that plaintiff
it includes both injuries to person and property since "harm" is not limited to
sustained damages because of the collision; that a direct causal connection exists
personal but also to property injuries. An example of quasi-delict in the law itself
between the damage he suffered and the fault or negligence of the defendant-driver
which includes damage to property in Article 2191(2) of the Civil Code which holds
and where the defendant-operator in their answer, contended, among others, that
proprietors responsible for damages caused by excessive smoke which may be
they observed due diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees, a
harmful "to person or property". Respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in upholding the
defense peculiar to actions based on quasi-delict , such action is principally predicated decision of the city court

on Articles 32176 and 2180 of the New Civil Code which is quasi-delictual in nature suspending the civil action based on quasi-delict until after the criminal action is

and character. Liability being predicated on quasi-delict , the civil case may proceed finally terminated.

as a separate and independent court action as specifically provided for in Article

2177. Section 3 (b), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court refers to "other civil COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. CA and MS. LYDIA GERONIMO

actions arising from cases not included in Section 2 of the same rule" in which, G.R. No. 110295 October 18, 1993
Petition for review on certiorari (under Rule45) the decision of the CA
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
FACTS: Private respondent was the proprietress of Kindergarten Wonderland Canteen in Dagupan
City. In August 1989, some parents of the students complained to her that the Coke and Sprite
soft drinks sold by her contained fiber-like matter and other foreign substances. She brought the
said bottles for examination to DOH and it was found out that the soft drinks “are adulterated.”
As a result, her per day sales of soft drinks severely plummeted that she had to close her shop on
12 December 1989 for losses. She demanded damages from petitioner before the RTC which
dismissed the same on motion by petitioner based on the ground of Prescription. On appeal, the
CA annulled the orders of the RTC.
ISSUE: WON the action for damages by the proprietress against the soft drinks manufacturer
should be treated as one for breach of implied warranty under article 1561 of the CC which
prescribes after six months from delivery of the thing sold.
RULING: Petition Denied.
The SC agrees with the CA’s conclusion that the cause of action in the case at bar is found on
quasi-delict under Article 1146 of the CC which prescribes in four years and not on breach of
warranty under article 1562 of the same code. This is supported by the allegations in the
complaint which makes reference to the reckless and negligent manufacture of "adulterated food
items intended to be sold for public consumption."
FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION v. G.P. SARMIENTO TRUCKING CORPORATION, GR No.
141910, 2002-08-06
Facts:
G.P. Sarmiento Trucking Corporation (GPS) undertook to deliver thirty units of Condura white
refrigerators aboard one of its Isuzu truck, driven by Lambert Eroles, from the plant site of
Concepcion Industries, Inc., to the Central Luzon Appliances in Dagupan City. While the truck
was traversing the north diversion road along McArthur highway, it collided with an unidentified
truck, causing it to fall into a deep canal, resulting in damage to the cargoes.
FGU Insurance Corporation (FGU), an insurer of the shipment, paid to Concepcion Industries,
Inc., the value of the covered cargoes. FGU, in turn, being the subrogee of the rights and interests
of Concepcion Industries, Inc., sought reimbursement of the amount it had paid to the latter from
GPS. Since the trucking company failed to heed the claim, FGU filed a complaint for damages and
breach of contract of carriage against GPS and its driver Lambert Eroles with the Regional Trial
Court, which dismissed the case on the basis that GPS is not a common carrier . Thus, the laws
governing the contract between the owner of the cargo to whom the plaintiff was subrogated and
the owner of the vehicle which transports the cargo are the laws on obligation and contract of the
Civil Code as well as the law on quasi delicts.
"Thus, the laws governing the contract between the owner of the cargo to whom the plaintiff was
subrogated and the owner of the vehicle which transports the cargo are the laws on obligation and
contract of the Civil Code as well as the law on quasi delicts.
"Considering that plaintiff failed to adduce evidence that defendant is a common carrier and
defendant's driver was the one negligent, defendant cannot be made liable for the damages of the
subject cargoes."
Issue:
WHETHER RESPONDENT GPS MAY BE CONSIDERED AS A COMMON CARRIER AS DEFINED
UNDER THE LAW
Ruling:
Defendant GPS is not a common Carrie. GPS, being an exclusive contractor and hauler of
Concepcion Industries, Inc., rendering or offering its services to no other individual or entity,
cannot be considered a common carrier. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or
associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by
land, water, or air, for hire or compensation, offering their services to the public whether to the
public in general or to a limited clientele in particular, but never on an exclusive basis. The true
test of a common carrier is the carriage of passengers or goods, providing space for those who opt
to avail themselves of its transportation service for a fee. Given accepted standards, GPS scarcely
falls within the term common carrier.
The above conclusion nothwithstanding, GPS cannot escape from liability.
Calalas v. CA
Facts:
Private respondent Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by
petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was already full, Calalas gave Sungaan stool at the back
of the door at the rear end of the vehicle. Along the way, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger
off. Sunga stepped down to give way when an Isuzu truck owned by Francisco Salva and driven
by IglecerioVerena bumped the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured. Sunga filed a complaint
against Calalas for violation of contract of carriage. Calalas filed a third party complaint against
Salva. The trial court held Salva liable and absolved Calalas, taking cognisance of another civil
case for quasi-delict wherein Salva and Verena were held liable to Calalas. The Court of Appeals
reversed the decision and found Calalas liable to Sunga for violation of contract of carriage.
Issues:
(1) Whether the decision in the case for quasi delict between Calalas on one hand and Salva and
Verena on the other hand, is res judicata to the issue in this case
(2) Whether Calalas exercised the extraordinary diligence required in the contract of carriage
(3) Whether moral damages should be awarded
Held:
(1) The argument that Sunga is bound by the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490 finding the driver and
the owner of the truck liable for quasi-delict ignores the fact that she was never a party to that
case and, therefore, the principle of res judicata does not apply. Nor are the issues in Civil Case
No. 3490 and in the present case the same. The issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was whether Salva
and his driver Verena were liable for quasi-delict for the damage caused to petitioner's jeepney.
On the other hand, the issue in this case is whether petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage.
The first, quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, has as its source
the negligence of the tortfeasor. The second, breach of contract or culpa contractual, is premised
upon the negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation. Consequently, in quasi-delict,
the negligence or fault should be clearly established because it is the basis of the action, whereas
in breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract
and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger
safely to his destination. In case of death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code
provides that common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently
unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of
the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the common carrier the burden of proof. It is
immaterial that the proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney and the truck was the
negligence of the truck driver. The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for
quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing
liability to a person where there is no relation between him and another party. In such a case, the
obligation is created by law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties, it is the parties themselves who create the obligation, and the function of the law is
merely to regulate the relation thus created.
(2) We do not think so. First, the jeepney was not properly parked, its rear portion being exposed
about two meters from the broad shoulders of the highway, and facing the middle of the highway
in a diagonal angle. Second, it is undisputed that petitioner's driver took in more passengers than
the allowed seating capacity of the jeepney. The fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension seat"
placed her in a peril greater than that to which the other passengers were exposed. Therefore, not
only was petitioner unable to overcome the presumption of negligence imposed on him for the
injury sustained by Sunga, but also, the evidence shows he was actually negligent in transporting
passengers. We find it hard to give serious thought to petitioner's contention that Sunga's taking
an "extension seat" amounted to an implied assumption of risk. It is akin to arguing that the
injuries to the many victims of the tragedies in our seas should not be compensated merely
because those passengers assumed a greater risk of drowning by boarding an overloaded ferry.
This is also true of petitioner's contention that the jeepney being bumped while it was improperly
parked constitutes casofortuito. A casofortuito is an event which could not be foreseen, or which,
though foreseen, was inevitable. This requires that the following requirements be present: (a) the
cause of the breach is independent of the debtor's will; (b) the event is unforeseeable or
unavoidable; (c) the event is such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation
in a normal manner, and (d) the debtor did not take part in causing the injury to the creditor.
Petitioner should have foreseen the danger of parking his jeepney with its body protruding two
meters into the highway.
(3) As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages predicated on a doing, it has struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the flange of the car and the limb was
breach of contract for it is not one of the items enumerated under Art. 2219 of the Civil Code. As broken. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violence.
an exception, such damages are recoverable: (1) in cases in which the mishap results in the death
of a passenger, as provided in Art. 1764, in relation to Art.2206(3) of the Civil Code; and (2) in the
cases in which the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith, as provided in Art. 2220. In this case,
there is no legal basis for awarding moral damages since there was no factual finding by the ISSUE:
appellate court that petitioner acted in bad faith in the performance of the contract of carriage.

PICART, plaintiff-appellant, vs. FRANK SMITH, JR., defendant-appellee

Whether or not the defendant was negligent.

G.R. No. L-12219 March 15, 1918

RULING:

FACTS:
On December 12, 1912, on the Carlatan Bridge, at San Fernando, La Union the plaintiff was
riding on his pony over said bridge. Before he had gotten half way across, the defendant
approached from the opposite direction in an automobile, going at the rate of about ten or twelve
miles per hour. As the defendant neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to
give warning of his approach. He continued his course and after he had taken the bridge he gave
two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the man on horseback before him was not
observing the rule of the road.
YES. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal
judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless,
blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines
liability by that. Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case we think
that negligence is clearly established. A prudent man, placed in the position of the defendant,
would in our opinion, have recognized that the course which he was pursuing was fraught with
risk, and would therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as reasonable
consequence of that course. Under these circumstances the law imposed on the defendant the
duty to guard against the threatened harm.

The plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting
The plaintiff saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. However, being perturbed himself on the wrong side of the road. But the defendant was also negligent; and in such case the
by the novelty of the apparition or the rapidity of the approach, he pulled the pony closely up problem always is to discover which agent is immediately and directly
against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going to the left. As the automobile
approached, the defendant guided it toward his left, that being the proper side of the road for the
machine. In so doing the defendant assumed that the horseman would move to the other side.
responsible. Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to
The pony had not as yet exhibited fright, and the rider had made no sign for the automobile to
avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without
stop. Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, the defendant, instead of veering to the right
reference to the prior negligence of the other party. While contributory negligence on the part of
while yet some distance away or slowing down, continued to approach directly toward the horse
the person injured did not constitute a bar to recovery, it could be received in evidence to reduce
without diminution of speed. When he had gotten quite near, the defendant quickly turned his car
the damages which would otherwise have been assessed wholly against the other party.
sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse alongside of the railing where it as then
standing; but in so doing the automobile passed in such close proximity to the animal that it
became frightened and turned its body across the bridge with its head toward the railing. In so