Laguna Lake Development Authority vs CA GR No. 120865-71; Dec.

7 1995
FACTS:

The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through Republic Act No. 4850. It was granted, inter alia,
exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all surface water for any project or activity in or affecting the said
region including navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like.

Then came RA 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991. The municipalities in the Laguna Lake region interpreted its
provisions to mean that the newly passed law gave municipal governments the exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing
privileges within their municipal waters.

ISSUE:

Who should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishing
privileges is concerned, the LLDA or the towns and municipalities comprising the region?

HELD:

LLDA has jurisdiction over such matters because the charter of the LLDA prevails over the Local Government Code of
1991. The said charter constitutes a special law, while the latter is a general law. It is basic in statutory construction
that the enactment of a later legislation which is a general law, cannot be construed to have repealed a special law.
The special law is to be taken as an exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a
contrary conclusion.

In addition, the charter of the LLDA embodies a valid exercise of police power for the purpose of protecting and
developing the Laguna Lake region, as opposed to the Local Government Code, which grants powers to municipalities
to issue fishing permits for revenue purposes.

Thus it has to be concluded that the charter of the LLDA should prevail over the Local Government Code of 1991 on
matters affecting Laguna de Bay.

KAISAHAN v. GOTAMCON SAWMILLS, 80 PHIL 521

FACTS: During the pendency of the labor dispute between the petitioners and the respondents, the CIR managed to
forge a voluntary agreement which results into a return-to-work order, and the respondents was prohibited to, among
others, lay-off any of the petitioners. Barely 4 months the contract, petitioners again staged a strike, violating the
condition of the agreement. The latter countered by assailing the Sec 19 of CA 103, the law upon which the voluntary
agreement was based, arguing that the same results to involuntary servitude.

ISSUE: Should a voluntary agreement with a condition that workers must return to work be voided upon a ground of
involuntary servitude?

HELD: No. An employee entering into a contract of employment voluntarily accepts, among other conditions, those
prescribed in Section 19 of CA 103. The voluntariness of the employee's entering into it or not--with such implied
condition, negatives the possibility of involuntary servitude ensuing.

pg. 1
Borovsky vs Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No. L-4362 (1951)
FACTS:

Petitioner, claims to be a stateless citizen, born in Shanghai, China, of Russian parentage. He came to the Philippines
in 1936 and had resided herein ever since, if the period of his detention be included.

The Commissioner of immigration of the Philippines has ordered to arrest the petitioner for investigation of his past
activities. A warrant for deportation was also issued by the Deportation Board on the grounds that he has been found
to be an undesirable alien, a vagrant and habitual drunkard.

Petitioner was deported to China but he was not provided with an entry visa because he was not a national of China.
He was therefore brought back to Philippines and was confined to the new Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa. Thereafter,
was granted provisional release by the President through Secretary of Justice for a period of six months. Before the
expiration of that period, the Immigration department rearrested him and brought him to Cebu for the purpose of
placing him on board a Russian vessel carrying out the deportation order issued against him. However, said
deportation failed to materialize as the captain of the ship refused to take him on board without permission from the

Russian government. As such, petitioner was again detained. The Immigration Officials alleged that while in detention,
they have been taking steps regarding the disposition of those foreigners subject to deportation while awaiting
availability of transportation or arrangements to the place where they may be sent.

Petitioner then filed for a writ of habeas corpus to which the court denied as mainly on the ground that such detention
was merely temporary. Over two years had elapsed since the decision was promulgated, but still the Government had
not found ways and means of removing the petitioner out of the country. Hence this second petition for writ of
habeas corpus.

ISSUE:

WON petitioner be continuously detained without a fix period pending deportation

HELD:

Aliens illegally staying in the Philippines have no right of asylum therein, even if they are "stateless," which the
petitioner claims to be. Foreign nationals, not enemy, against whom no criminal charges have been formally made or
judicial order issued, may not indefinitely be kept in detention. The protection against deprivation of liberty, without
due process of law and except for crimes committed against the laws of the land is not limited to Philippine citizens
but extends to all residents, except enemy aliens, regardless of nationality. Whether an alien who entered the country
in violation of its immigration laws may be detained for as long as the Government is unable to deport him, is beside
the point and we need not decide.

Moreover, Art. II, Sec. 3 of the Philippine Constitution States provides that the

Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of Nation. And in a
resolution entitled "Universal Declaration of Human Rights" and approved by the General Assembly of the United
Nations of which the Philippines is a member. lt was there resolved that "All human beings are born free and equal in
degree and rights.

pg. 2
Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines vs. Honorable Secretary of Agrarian
Reform G.R. No. 78742 July 14, 1989
Facts: These are consolidated cases which involve common legal, including serious challenges to the constitutionality
of the several measures such as P.D. No. 27, E.O. No. 228, Presidential Proclamation No. 131, E.O. No. 229, and R.A.
No. 6657.

G.R. No. 79777

The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on grounds inter alia of separation of powers,
due process, equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken for public use
without just compensation. G.R. No. 79310

G.R. No. 79310

This petition seeks to prohibit the implementation of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229. They contend that taking must
be simultaneous with payment of just compensation as it is traditionally understood, i.e., with money and in full, but
no such payment is contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O. No. 229.

G.R. No. 79744

The petitioner argues that E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are violative of the constitutional provision that no private property
shall be taken without due process or just compensation.

G.R. No. 78742

Petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention because the
Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules required under the above-quoted
decree.

Issue: Whether agrarian reform is an exercise of police power or eminent domain

Ruling: There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the power of eminent domain that logically
preclude the application of both powers at the same time on the same subject. Property condemned under the police
power is noxious or intended for a noxious purpose, such as a building on the verge of collapse, which should be
demolished for the public safety, or obscene materials, which should be destroyed in the interest of public morals. The
confiscation of such property is not compensable, unlike the taking of property under the power of expropriation,
which requires the payment of just compensation to the owner.

The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the question of compensable taking is concerned. To the
extent that the measures under challenge merely prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise of the
police power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such
regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum
area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation
is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the
surrender of the title to and the physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in
favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the police power but of the power of eminent
domain

pg. 3
Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil 115
FACTS

Petitioner entered the country to take advantage of business opportunities in the Philippines.

He and his fellow Chinese businessmen enjoyed a monopoly in the local market. However,

Congress passed the RA No. 1180 or the Retail Trade Nationalization Act. In effect it nationalizes the retail trade
business.

Petitioner and other alien residents’ corporations and partnerships were adversely affected by the enactment of
Republic Act. No.1180. They had brought an action to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional,
arguing that the act has violated international treaties and obligations

ISSUE: WON the Act violates international treaties and obligations.

HELD : It cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually been
entered into on the subject and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other
conventional agreement.

All that a treaty guarantees is equality of treatment of aliens, subject to the same terms of Filipino nationals in any
other country. However, in the conduct of engaging into retail trade, foreign nationals, except those of the United
States, who are granted special rights by the Constitution, are all prohibited to such conduct.

Montero vs Chief of Police ( Not Found )

People vs. Cuizon, GR. No. 109287, digested
Facts: In the case at bar, it was not established that an offense has been committed and the arresting officers has
personal knowledge of facts that the accused-appellant had committed a crime since his warrantless arrest was based
on suspicion that he committed a crime. Accused-appellant questions the validity of the warrantless search made at
his residence subsequent to his warrantless arrest. Accused-appellant contends that the shabu seized is inadmissible
as evidence against him.

Issue: Whether or not the warrantless search subsequent to his warrantless arrest is valid.

Held: No. There are instances where a search without a warrant may be conducted. However, where a person is
searched without a warrant and under circumstances other than those which justifies a warrantless arrest, a mere
suspicion that a crime has been committed, the search made and as well his arrest is illegal.

Valmonte v. De Villa, G.R. No. 83988 September 29, 1989 (173 SCRA 211)
I. THE FACTS

On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of
Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting security operations
within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense,
maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political

pg. 4
development of the National Capital Region. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed
checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.

Petitioners Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, who is a resident of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and the Union of Lawyers and
Advocates For People’s Rights (ULAP) sought the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and
elsewhere as unconstitutional. In the alternative, they prayed that respondents Renato De Villa and the National
Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) be directed to formulate guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints
for the protection of the people. Petitioners contended that the checkpoints gave the respondents blanket authority
to make searches and seizures without search warrant or court order in violation of the Constitution.

II. THE ISSUE

Do the military and police checkpoints violate the right of the people against unreasonable search and seizures?

III. THE RULING [The Court, voting 13-2, DISMISSED the petition.]

NO, military and police checkpoints DO NOT violate the right of the people against unreasonable search and seizures.

xxx. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search
is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case.

Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair
grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these do not constitute unreasonable search.

The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be considered as a
security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and
maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart
plots to destabilize the government, in the interest of public security. In this connection, the Court may take judicial
notice of the shift to urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the
increased killings in cities of police and military men by NPA “sparrow units,” not to mention the abundance of
unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not all of which are
reported in media, most likely brought about by deteriorating economic conditions – which all sum up to what one can
rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal times. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence
and promote public welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless search which is however reasonably
conducted, the former should prevail.

True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in the same manner
that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even
irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are
part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community

PEOPLE VS. BOLANOS [211 SCRA 262; G.R. NO. 101808; 3 JUL 1992]
Facts: Oscar Pagdalian was murdered in Marble Supply, Balagtas Bulacan. According to Pat. Rolando Alcantara and
Francisco Dayao, deceased was with two companions on the previous night, one of whom the accused who had a
drinking spree with the deceased. When they apprehended the accused they found the firearm of the deceased on the
chair where the accused was allegedly seated. They boarded accused along with Magtibay, other accused on the
police vehicle and brought them to the police station. While in the vehicle Bolanos admitted that he killed the
deceased. RTC convicted him hence the appeal.

Issue: Whether or Not accused-appellant deprived of his constitutional right to counsel.

pg. 5
Held: Yes. Being already under custodial investigation while on board the police patrol jeep on the way to the Police
Station where formal investigation may have been conducted, appellant should have been informed of his
Constitutional rights under Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution, more particularly par. 1 and par. 3.

People v Basay G.R. No. 86941

FACTS: Jaime Ramirez and Teodoro Basay were accused of killing four (4) people and burned their house after. Both
accused signed a Joint waiver, but was disregarded by the court because when they signed sain joint waiver, they were
not represented by a counsel. Basay was Acquitted,however, Jaime Ramirez was sentenced with life imprisonment
because the court admitted in eveidence the so-called extra-judicial confession of jaime Ramirez as part of the res
gestate the alleged statement of Bombie Toting (victim) to the police constabulary SGt. Tabanao. Jaime Ramirez is a
farmer, he only finished Grade II and that he doesn’t know how to read. He, however, understands the Cebuano
dialect. The referred sworn statement in English was taken on March 7, 1986 and subscribed and sworn to only on
March 14, 1986 before Judge Teopisto Calumpang.

ISSUE: W/N the constitutional right of the accused to counsel and to remain silent during custodial investigation were
violated.

RULING: The SC declared in People v Nicandro that one’s right to be informed of the right to remain silent and to
counsel contemplates the “Transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory
recitation of an abstract constitutional principle”. Thus it is not enough for the interrogatot to merely repeat to the
person under investigation the provisions of Section 20, Article III of the 1987 Constitution; the former must also
explain the effects of such provision in practical terms. The rights “to be informed” carries with it a correlative
obligation on the part of the police investigator to explain, and contemplates effective communication which results in
the subjects understanding of what is conveyed.

Javier v COMELEC G.R. Nos. L-68379-81 September 22, 1986

Facts:

The petitioner and the private respondent were candidates in Antique for the Batasang Pambansa in the May 1984
elections. On May 13, 1984, the eve of the elections, the bitter contest between the two came to a head when several
followers of the petitioner were ambushed and killed, allegedly by the latter’s men. Seven suspects, including
respondent Pacificador, are now facing trial for these murders.

It was in this atmosphere that the voting was held, and the post-election developments were to run true to form.
Owing to what he claimed were attempts to railroad the private respondent’s proclamation, the petitioner went to the
Commission on Elections to question the canvass of the election returns. His complaints were dismissed and the
private respondent was proclaimed winner by the Second Division of the said body. The petitioner thereupon came to
this Court, arguing that the proclamation was void because made only by a division and not by the Commission on
Elections en banc as required by the Constitution.

On May 18, 1984, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections directed the provincial board of canvassers of
Antique to proceed with the canvass but to suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate until further orders.
On June 7, 1984, the same Second Division ordered the board to immediately convene and to proclaim the winner
without prejudice to the outcome of the case before the Commission. On certiorari before this Court, the
proclamation made by the board of canvassers was set aside as premature, having been made before the lapse of the

pg. 6
5-day period of appeal, which the petitioner had seasonably made. Finally, on July 23, 1984, the Second Division
promulgated the decision now subject of this petition which inter alia proclaimed Arturo F. Pacificador the elected
assemblyman of the province of Antique. The petitioner then came to this Court, asking to annul the said decision on
the basis that it should have been decided by COMELEC en banc.

The case was still being considered when on February 11, 1986, the petitioner was gunned down in cold blood and in
broad daylight. And a year later, Batasang Pambansa was abolished with the advent of the 1987 Constitution.

Respondents moved to dismiss the petition, contending it to be moot and academic.

Issues:

1. Whether it is correct for the court to dismiss the petition due to the petitioner being dead and the respondent
missing.

2. Whether the Second Division of the Commission on Elections was authorized to promulgate its decision of July 23,
1984, proclaiming the private respondent the winner in the election?

Held:

1. No.

The abolition of the Batasang Pambansa and the disappearance of the office in dispute between the petitioner and the
private respondent-both of whom have gone their separate ways-could be a convenient justification for dismissing this
case. But there are larger issues involved that must be resolved now, once and for all, not only to dispel the legal
ambiguities here raised. The more important purpose is to manifest in the clearest possible terms that this Court will
not disregard and in effect condone wrong on the simplistic and tolerant pretext that the case has become moot and
academic.

The Supreme Court is not only the highest arbiter of legal questions but also the conscience of the government. The
citizen comes to us in quest of law but we must also give him justice. The two are not always the same. There are
times when we cannot grant the latter because the issue has been settled and decision is no longer possible according
to the law. But there are also times when although the dispute has disappeared, as in this case, it nevertheless cries
out to be resolved. Justice demands that we act then, not only for the vindication of the outraged right, though gone,
but also for the guidance of and as a restraint upon the future.

2. No.

The applicable provisions are found in Article XII-C, Sections 2 and 3, of the 1973 Constitution.

Section 2 confers on the Commission on Elections the power to:

(2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of all member of the Batasang
Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials.

Section 3 provides:

The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in three divisions. All election cases may be heard and decided by
divisions except contests involving members of the Batasang Pambansa, which shall be heard and decided en banc.
Unless otherwise provided by law, all election cases shall be decided within ninety days from the date of their
submission for decision.

pg. 7
We believe that in making the Commission on Elections the sole judge of all contests involving the election, returns
and qualifications of the members of the Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials, the Constitution
intended to give it full authority to hear and decide these cases from beginning to end and on all matters related
thereto, including those arising before the proclamation of the winners.

As correctly observed by the petitioner, the purpose of Section 3 in requiring that cases involving members of the
Batasang Pambansa be heard and decided by the Commission en banc was to insure the most careful consideration of
such cases. Obviously, that objective could not be achieved if the Commission could act en banc only after the
proclamation had been made, for it might then be too late already. We are all-too-familiar with the grab-the-
proclamation-and-delay-the-protest strategy of many unscrupulous candidates, which has resulted in the frustration
of the popular will and the virtual defeat of the real winners in the election. The respondent’s theory would make this
gambit possible for the pre- proclamation proceedings, being summary in nature, could be hastily decided by only
three members in division, without the care and deliberation that would have otherwise been observed by the
Commission en banc.

WHEREFORE, let it be spread in the records of this case that were it not for the supervening events that have legally
rendered it moot and academic, this petition would have been granted and the decision of the Commission on
Elections dated July 23, 1984, set aside as violative of the Constitution.

People vs. Ramos (122 SCRA 312)

MAJOR LEGAL PREMISE

“Whether the accused Ramos should be adjudged guilty of violating the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972”

Facts of the Case

a) The police officers, placed Malcon Olevere under arrest after they found in his possession dried marijuana leaves,
which the suspect declared that he bought the recovered marijuana leaves from one ROGELIO RAMOS. Mr. ramos was
arrested and place under custodial investigation by the Drug Enforcement Section of the WPD.

b) Malcon Olevere executed a written sworn statement implicating the accused as the source of the marijuana leaves.

The accused, alledgedly, verbally admitted for the commission of the offense charged.

c) Court of First Instance of Manila (now the Regional Trial Court) found the accused-appellant Ramos guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged in view of the verbal admission given by the appellant himself and the
evidence offered and admitted in court.

MINOR LEGAL PREMISES

The prosecution’s failed to present necessary evidence to establish Ramos’ guilt.

The accused was denied the due process of law when a sworn statement was admitted as evidence but the witness
was not presented in the court.

The following evidences produced by the prosecution establish nothing to support the conviction of the accused.

- Exhibit "A" The Booking Sheet and Arrest Report of accused Rogelio Ramos prepared by witness Patrolman Cruz

- Exhibit "B" Crime Report dated May 6, 1981 also prepared by the witness Patrolman Cruz;

- Exhibit "C" Sworn Statement of Malcon Olevere y Napa;

pg. 8
- Exhibit "D" examined marijuana leaves;

- Exhibit "E" the envelope containing the marijuana leaves which was confiscated from Malcon Olevere.

- Oral testimonies

- The constitutional right to meet witnesses face to face in order not to deprive persons of their lives and properties
without due process of law is well-protected in our jurisprudence. People vs. Toledo (85 SCRA 355) - The court relied
on on Olevere’s sworn statement, which is considered a hearsay evidence. The adverse party was not given the right
to cross-examine the witness which would easily facilitate the fabrication of evidence and the perpetration of fraud.
Such kind of evidence is considered hearsay

MINOR LEGAL PREMISES

The oral testimonies given by the witnesses for the prosecution prove nothing material and culpable against the
accused.

- As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General not anyone of the three witnesses presented testified on the basis
of their personal knowledge that the appellant sold the marijuana leaves to Malcon Olevere. Under Rule 130, Sec. 30
of the Revised Rules of Court, "a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his own knowledge, that is,
which are derived from his own perception

The accused’s constitutional rights to silence and to counsel was denied when an extrajudicial admission was taken

- It is fatal to the admissibility of appellant's verbal admission that the apprisal was sufficiently manifested and
intelligently understood and accepted by the appellant. It is not enough that the police investigator merely informs
him of his constitutional rights to silence and to counsel, and then taking his statements down, the interrogating
officer must have patience in explaining these rights to him

- People vs. Caquioa (95 SCRA 2)

- Morales and Moncupa vs. Enrile

CONCLUSION

The guilt of the accused has not been established beyond reasonable doubt and he is, therefore, entitled to acquittal.

CHAVEZ VS CA
FACTS:

Petitioner herein was charged of qualified theft of a motor vehicle,one Thunderbird car, with accessories amounting to
P22,000.

That this theft was committed when the petitioner with the help of one, Asistio have completed a deed of sale of
Thunderbird which belongs to Johnson Lee. Chavesz telephoned Lee and made an appointment for the sale of
Thunderbird with Sumilang as a introduced buyer.

As payment was made to Eugene’s restaurant in Quezon City, all of them then drove to the place. Chavez and
Sumilang, pretending to get the money for the perfection of sale of the Thunderbird car, left the two Chinese alone,
Johnson Lee and his brother.

pg. 9
When the two Chinese went outside to look for Chavez and Sumilang, they could no longer locate the former and the
Thunderbird car was also from the parking lot.

Nevertheless the Thunderbird was impounded however, it was already been repainted.

During the trial, the Fiscal Grecia presented Chavez as a witness. And despite of Chavez’s objection being aware that
the latter would be self incriminated, the Court sustained the stand of the Fiscal saying.

“What he will testify to does not necessarily incriminate him, counsel.”

“And there is the right of the prosecution to ask anybody to act as witness on the witness stand including the
accused.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner’s statement against himself can be used to convict him.

HELD:

No. It is in the context that we sat that the constitutional guarantee may not be treated with unconcern. To repeat, it
is mandatory: it secures to every defendant a valuable and substantive right.

The court may not extract from a defendant’s own lips and against his will an admission of his guilt.

In reality, the purpose calling an accused as a witness for the People would be to incriminate him.

In the case at bar, the petitioner did not volunteer to take the witness stand in his own defence; he did not offer
himself as a witness; on the contrary, he claimed the right upon being called to testify.

There is not even a valid waiver of the privilege. To be valid and effective, a waiver must be certain and unequivocal,
and intelligently, understandably and willingly made.

Wherefore the accused is acquitted.

BELTRAN VS. SAMSON [53 PHIL 570; G.R. NO. 32025; 23 SEPT 1929]
Facts: Beltran, as a defendant for the crime of Falsification, refused to write a sample of his handwriting as ordered by
the respondent Judge. The petitioner in this case contended that such order would be a violation of his constitutional
right against self-incrimination because such examination would give the prosecution evidence against him, which the
latter should have gotten in the first place. He also argued that such an act will make him furnish evidence against
himself.

Issue: Whether or not the writing from the fiscal's dictation by the petitioner for the purpose of comparing the latter's
handwriting and determining whether he wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified, constitutes evidence
against himself within the scope and meaning of the constitutional provision under examination.

Held: The court ordered the respondents and those under their orders desist and abstain absolutely and forever from
compelling the petitioner to take down dictation in his handwriting for the purpose of submitting the latter for
comparison. Writing is something more than moving the body, or the hands, or the fingers; writing is not a purely
mechanical act, because it requires the application of intelligence and attention; and in the case at bar writing means
that the petitioner herein is to furnish a means to determine whether or not he is the falsifier, as the petition of the

pg. 10
respondent fiscal clearly states. Except that it is more serious, we believe the present case is similar to that of
producing documents or chattels in one's possession. We say that, for the purposes of the constitutional privilege,
there is a similarity between one who is compelled to produce a document, and one who is compelled to furnish a
specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases, the witness is required to furnish evidence against himself. It cannot be
contended in the present case that if permission to obtain a specimen of the petitioner's handwriting is not granted,
the crime would go unpunished. Considering the circumstance that the petitioner is a municipal treasurer, it should
not be a difficult matter for the fiscal to obtained genuine specimens of his handwriting. But even supposing it is
impossible to obtain specimen or specimens without resorting to the means complained herein, that is no reason for
trampling upon a personal right guaranteed by the constitution. It might be true that in some cases criminals may
succeed in evading the hand of justice, but such cases are accidental and do not constitute the raison d' etre of the
privilege. This constitutional privilege exists for the protection of innocent persons.

People vs Austria
FACTS:

It appears from the records that in the morning of August 10, 1975, the police dug out of the ground in a sugarcane
field in sitio Palanas, Sagay, Negros Occidental, the lifeless body of Tomas Azuelo. Found near his grave were the
traces of blood and a bloodstained piece of wood. Post mortem examination showed that Tomas Azuelo's skull was
fractured and his body sustained eighteen (18) stab wounds, fifteen (15) of which were fatal. The payroll, together
with the sum of P771.40 intended for the wages of laborers of Hacienda Austria, of which Azuelo was the overseer,
was missing.

Four suspects for the death of Tomas Azuelo were picked up by the police working together with the Philippine
Constabulary. One of the suspects, Pablo Austria, was the last person who was seen with Tomas Azuelo. They boarded
a tricycle together, on August 9, 1975 at about 3:30 p.m., from the poblacion of Sagay and alighted at about 4:00 p.m.
at crossing Tupas.

The other suspects were implicated based on the sworn statement dated September 17, 1975 of Pablo Austria, who
imputed to his son Eduardo, his brother-in-law Jaime de la Torre and Leopoldo Abanilla, the commission of the crime.

On September 17, 1975, Gregorio Eras, Deputy Chief of Police, Sagay, Negros Occidental, filed a complaint for robbery
with homicide against Eduardo Austria, Pablo Austria, Jaime de la Torre and Leopoldo Abanilla, After preliminary
examination, Judge Emilio Ignalaga, Acting Municipal Judge, Sagay, Negros Occidental, issued a warrant of arrest
against herein appellants. All the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge.

Pablo Austria testified that Tomas Azuelo was his second degree cousin. On August 9, 1975, he was summoned by the
wife of Tomas Azuelo to fetch water. He was in Azuelo's house from 11:00 o'clock in the morning, took his lunch
thereat upon invitation of Azuelo's wife and waited for Tomas Azuelo up to 7:00 o'clock in the evening for his
compensation in plowing their farm. On August 14, 1975, he was picked up without a warrant of arrest by a policeman
and a PC soldier while working on the concrete cover of the deceased's tomb. He was investigated without informing
him of his right to remain silent and to counsel. After six (6) days in detention he was released upon the intercession of
Iluminada, wife of the deceased. On September 17, 1975 he was again picked up by Voltaire Yee at about 7:00 o'clock
in the evening. Jaime de la Torre, who was with him in the PC stockade, struck him in the head with a revolver on
orders of a certain Torenas, a PC soldier. Later, he was brought out of the PC stockade and Torenas kicked and boxed
him. The following day, Alberto Olario, the commanding officer, again maltreated him as he refused to admit
participation in the killing of Tomas Azuelo. On orders of the commanding officer, Voltaire Yee prepared an affidavit.

pg. 11
He did not read the affidavit, as he does not know how to read, nor was it read to him. Voltaire Yee forced him to affix
his thumbmark in the affidavit inside the office of Judge Ignalaga. (TSN, December 4, 1978, pp. 171-200)

In his testimony, Jaime de la Torre disowned the statements attributed to him during the investigation conducted by
Sgt. Vicente Aquino and instead declared that it was not Eduardo Austria but Carlos Capitle, Jr. who borrowed his hoe
in the afternoon of August 9, 1975. He also contradicted the statements contained in the affidavit that he saw Pablo
Austria, Eduardo Austria and another person standing near the body of the deceased. Instead, he testified that in the
sugarcane field that day (August 14, 1975), he saw Carlos Capitle, Jr. and Celestino Capitle with another person looking
at the dead body of Azuelo. He helped cover the dead with grass on orders of Carlos Capitle with warning not to tell
his family or anybody, otherwise his family will be killed. He admitted ownership of the hoe but denied any
participation in the killing. He also claimed that he was arrested without warrant and detained for more than a month
in the PC headquarters, at Sagay, Negros Occidental. During said detention he was investigated and allegedly
maltreated by Captain Olario (TSN, January 22, 1980, pp. 149-170, 210-221, 393-404).

On March 18, 1980, the trial court rendered its decision convicting appellants of the imputed crime

ISSUE: W/N the appellant’s guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt by the circumstantial evidence of the
prosecution.

RULING: NO.

In the first place, as stated in the appealed decision, the evidence of the prosecution against appellant Eduardo Austria
is merely circumstantial. Aside from the extra-judicial confessions of the deceased appellants, there is neither direct
evidence nor actual witness to the commission of the crime.

The series of circumstances proved must be consistent with each other and that each and every circumstance must be
consistent with the guilt of the accused and inconsistent with his innocence. To warrant conviction in criminal cases
based upon circumstantial evidence, it must constitute an unbroken chain of events so as to lead to a conviction that
the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. In the case at bar, the circumstantial evidence do not prove an
unbroken link of events that could give rise to a reasonable and fair conclusion that appellant committed the imputed
offense.

As regards appellant Eduardo Austria, the only evidence against him is that he was seen at about 1:00 o'clock in the
afternoon of August 9, 1975 along the road going to Hda Austria. This evidence even if tied up with the testimony of
Iluminada Azuelo that Austria harbored ill-feelings against the deceased because he was dismissed from the hacienda
by the deceased does not establish or support an inference, much less a conclusion, that he participated in the
commission of the offense charged. The conviction of appellant Eduardo Austria on an inference based on another
inference cannot be maintained.

To overcome the presumption of innocence, proof beyond reasonable doubt is needed. Thus, in People v. Dramayo,
42 SCRA 60 [1971], this Court held:

Accusation is not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt; the prosecution must overthrow the
presumption of innocence with proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. To meet this standard, there is need for the
most careful scrutiny of the testimony of the state, both oral and documentary, independently of whatever defense is
offered by the accused. Only if the judge below and the appellate tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that the crime
had been committed precisely by the person on trial under such an exacting test should the sentence be one of
conviction. It is thus required that every circumstance favoring his innocence be duly taken into account. The proof
against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment.

RICARDO DE LA CAMARA VS. HON. LOPEZ ENAGE

pg. 12
Facts:

Petitioner De la Camara was the Mun. Mayor of Misamis Oriental who was arrested and detained at the Prov. Jail of
Agusan for his alleged participation in the killing of 14 & wounding of 12 other laborers at the Tirador Logging Co., at
Agusan del Sur. The Prov. Fiscal of Agusan filed with the CFI a case for multiple frustrated murder and another for
multiple murder against petitioner. He then filed an application for bail filed with the lower court asserting that there
was no evidence to link him with such fatal incident which the court granted and fixed the amount at Php
1,195,200.00 which is the sum of Php 840,000.00 for the information charging multiple murder and Php 355,200.00
for the offense of multiple frustrated murder.

Issue: W/N the amount of bail required by the court is proper?

Held: NO!

Before conviction, every person is bailable except if charged with capital offenses when the evidence of guilt is strong.
Such right flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not subjected to the loss of
freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Where,
however, the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that is excessive. So the
Constitution commands. It is understandable why. If there were no prohibition, the right to bail becomes meaningless.
Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than that the challenged order fixing the amount of bail at Php 1,195,200.00 as the
bail should be posted by petitioner is clearly violative of the constitutional provision.

Ople vs. Torres [Rights of Privacy] GR No. 127685. July 23, 1998
FACTS:

This is a petition raised by Senator Blas Ople to invalidate the Administrative Order No. 308 or the Adoption of a
National Computerized Identification Reference System issued by President Fidel V. Ramos.

The petitioner contends that the implementation of the said A.O. will violate the rights of the citizens of privacy as
guaranteed by the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not A.O. No. 308 violates the right of privacy.

HELD: Yes.

The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully
deserving of constitutional protection.

The right of privacy is guaranteed in several provisions of the Constitution:

"Sections 3 (1), 1, 2, 6, 8 and 17 of the Bill of Rights

Sec. 3. The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or
when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.

Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws.

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath

pg. 13
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except
upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security,
public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.

Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions,
associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.

Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

Read: Soliven vs. Makasiar

The right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to
show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is
predicated on two considerations:

(1) the need to provide our citizens and foreigners with the facility to conveniently transact business with basic
service and social security providers and other government instrumentalities and

(2) the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by persons seeking
basic services. It is debatable whether these interests are compelling enough to warrant the issuance of A.O. No.
308. Ople vs. Torres [Rights of Privacy]

But what is not arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if
implemented will put our people's right to privacy in clear and present danger.

The possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN, biometrics and computer technology are accentuated when
we consider that the individual lacks control over what can be read or placed on his ID, much less verify the
correctness of the data encoded.

They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of Rights seeks to prevent.

The petition is granted and declared the Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National
Computerized Identification Reference System" null and void for being unconstitutional.

Villavicencio vs. Lukban, G.R. No. L-14639

In 1918, the mayor of Manila had 170 "women of ill repute" forcibly rounded up, put on a ship, and sent to Davao as
laborers. A writ of habeas corpus was filed against him. The Supreme Court said that the women were not chattels but
Filipino citizens who had the fundamental right not to be forced to change their place of residence. This case justifies
one of the basic rights of citizen, the right of domain.

Issue:

The writ of Habeas Corpus was filed by the petitioner, with the prayer that the respondent produce around 170
women whom Justo Lukban et, al deported to Davao. Liberty of abode was also raised versus the power of the
executive of the Municipality in deporting the women without their knowledge in his capacity as Mayor.

pg. 14
Facts:

Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor together with Anton Hohmann, the city's Chief of Police, took custody of about
170 women at the night of October 25 beyond the latters consent and knowledge and thereafter were shipped to
Mindanao specifically in Davao where they were signed as laborers. Said women are inmates of the houses of
prostitution situated in Gardenia Street, in the district of Sampaloc.

That when the petitioner filed for habeas corpus, the respondent moved to dismiss the case saying that those women
were already out of their jurisdiction and that , it should be filed in the city of Davao instead.

The court ruled in favor of the petitioner with the instructions;

For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were open: (1) They could have
produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; or (2) they could have shown by affidavit
that on account of sickness or infirmity those persons could not safely be brought before the court; or (3) they could
have presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their attorney waived the right to be present.

Held:

The court concluded the case by granting the parties aggrieved the sum of 400 pesos each, plus 100 pesos for nominal
damage due to contempt of court. Reasoning further that if the chief executive of any municipality in the Philippines
could forcibly and illegally take a private citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and then,
when called upon to defend his official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person was under no
restraint and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this other municipality.

We believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his
power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be compelled to do
so. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a person before the
application for the writ is no reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no
authority of law, could deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same officials must necessarily have
the same means to return them from Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the reach of process, may not be
permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with
impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ
of liberty may not thus be easily evaded.

Marcos vs Manglapus
Facts:

Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent “people power”
revolution and was forced into exile. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die.
But President Corazon Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the
stability of government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move
forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Marcos and his family.

Aquino barred Marcos from returning due to possible threats & following supervening events:

failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by Marcos leaders channel 7 taken over by rebels & loyalists plan of Marcoses to
return w/ mercenaries aboard a chartered plane of a Lebanese arms dealer. This is to prove that they can stir trouble
from afar Honasan’s failed coup Communist insurgency movements secessionist movements in Mindanao devastated
economy because of accumulated foreign debt plunder of nation by Marcos & cronies

pg. 15
Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus and prohibition to order the respondents to issue them their travel
documents and prevent the implementation of President Aquino’s decision to bar Marcos from returning in the
Philippines. Petitioner questions Aquino’s power to bar his return in the country. He also questioned the claim of the
President that the decision was made in the interest of national security, public safety and health. Petitioner also
claimed that the President acted outside her jurisdiction.

According to the Marcoses, such act deprives them of their right to life, liberty, property without due process and
equal protection of the laws. They also said that it deprives them of their right to travel which according to Section 6,
Article 3 of the constitution, may only be impaired by a court order.

Issue:

Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses
from returning to the Philippines.

Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines poses a serious threat to national
interest and welfare and decided to bar their return.

Decision: No to both issues. Petition dismissed.

Ratio: Separation of power dictates that each department has exclusive powers. According to Section 1, Article VII of
the 1987 Philippine Constitution, “the executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.” However, it
does not define what is meant by “executive power” although in the same article it touches on exercise of certain
powers by the President, i.e., the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to
execute the laws, the appointing power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons… (art VII secfs. 14-23).
Although the constitution outlines tasks of the president, this list is not defined & exclusive. She has residual &
discretionary powers not stated in the Constitution which include the power to protect the general welfare of the
people. She is obliged to protect the people, promote their welfare & advance national interest. (Art. II, Sec. 4-5 of the
Constitution). Residual powers, according to Theodore Roosevelt, dictate that the President can do anything which is
not forbidden in the Constitution (Corwin, supra at 153), inevitable to vest discretionary powers on the President
(Hyman, American President) and that the president has to maintain peace during times of emergency but also on the
day-to-day operation of the State.

The rights Marcoses are invoking are not absolute. They’re flexible depending on the circumstances. The request of
the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the constitutional
provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which
clearly never contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as a matter that is
appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the
paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such request or
demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it
must be granted or denied.

For issue number 2, the question for the court to determine is whether or not there exist factual basis for the
President to conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses in the Philippines. It is
proven that there are factual bases in her decision. The supervening events that happened before her decision are
factual. The President must take preemptive measures for the self-preservation of the country & protection of the
people. She has to uphold the Constitution.

pg. 16
Ebralinag, et al vs. Div. Supt. of Schools of Cebu G.R. No. 95770, March 1, 1993
Facts:

In 1989, DECS Regional Office in Cebu received complaints about teachers and pupils belonging to the Jehovah’s
Witness, and enrolled in various public and private schools, which refused to sing the Phil. National Anthem, salute the
flag and recite the patriotic pledge.

Division Superintendent of schools, Susana B. Cabahug of the Cebu Division of DECS and her Assistant issued Division
Memorandum No. 108, dated Nov. 17, 1989, directing District Supervisors, High School Principals and Heads of Private
Educational institutions to remove from service, after due process, teachers and school employees, and to deprive the
students and pupils from the benefit of public education, if they do not participate in daily flag ceremony and doesn’t
obey flag salute rule.

Members of the Jehovah’s Witness sect find such memorandum to be contrary to their religious belief and choose not
to obey. Despite a number of appropriate persuasions made by the Cebu officials to let them obey the directives, still
they opted to follow their conviction to their belief. As a result, an order was issued by the district supervisor of Daan
Bantayan District of Cebu, dated July 24, 1990, ordering the ‘dropping from the list’ in the school register of all
Jehovah’s Witness teachers and pupils from Grade 1 to Grade 6 who opted to follow their belief which is against the
Flag Salute Law, however, given a chance to be re-accepted if they change their mind.

Some Jehovah’s Witness members appealed to the Secretary of Education but the latter did not answer to their letter.

On Oct. 31, 1990, students and their parents filed special civil actions for Mandamus, Certiorari and prohibition,
alleging that the respondents acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in
ordering their expulsion without prior notice and hearing, hence, in violation of their right to due process, their right
to free public education and their right to freedom of speech, religion and worship. Petitioners prayed for the voiding
of the order of expulsion or ‘dropping from the rolls’ issued by the District Supervisor; prohibiting and enjoining
respondent from barring them from classes; and compelling the respondent and all persons acting for him to admit
and order their(Petitioners) re-admission I their respective schools.

On November 27, 1990, Court issued a TRO and writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, commanding the
respondents to immediately re-admit the petitioners to their respective classes until further orders.

On May 31, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated comment to the petitions defending the expulsion orders issued
by the respondents.

Petitioners stressed that while they do not take part in the compulsory flag ceremony, they do not engage in ‘external
acts’ or behavior that would offend their countrymen who believe in expressing their love of country through
observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony to show their respect for
the right of those who choose to participate in the solemn proceedings. Since they do not engage in disruptive
behavior, there is no warrant for their expulsion.

Issue: Whether or not the expulsion of the members of Jehovah’s Witness from the schools violates right receive free
education.

Held: The expulsion of the members of Jehovah’s Witness from the schools where they are enrolled will violate their
right as Philippine citizens, under the 1987 Constitution, to receive free education, for it is the duty of the state to
‘protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education, and to make such education accessible to all (Sec. I,
Art XIV). Nevertheless, their right not to participate in the Flag Ceremony does not give them a right to disrupt such
patriotic exercises. If they quietly stand at attention during flag ceremony while their classmates and teachers salute

pg. 17
the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, we do not see how such conduct may possibly
disturb the peace, or pose ‘a grave and present danger of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or
any legitimate public interest that the state has a right and duty to prevent.

It is appropriate to recall the Japanese occupation of our country in 1942-1944 when every Filipino, regardless of
religious persuasion, in fear of the invader, saluted the Japanese flag and bowed before every Japanese soldier,
perhaps if petitioners had lived through that dark period of our history, they would not quibble now about saluting the
Phil. Flag.

The petitions for certiorari and prohibition are granted and expulsion orders are hereby annulled and set aside.

pg. 18
SANIDAD VS COMELEC G.R. NO. L-44640
FACTS: On September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 991 to call for a national
referendum on October 16, 1976 through the so-called Citizens Assemblies (“barangays”). Its primary purpose is to
resolve the issues of martial law (as to its existence and length of effectivity).

On September 22, the president issued another proclamation (P.D. 1033) to specify the questions that are to be asked
during the referendum on October 16. The first question is whether or not the citizen wants martial law to continue,
and the second one asks for the approval on several proposed amendments to the existing Constitution.

The COMELEC was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the national referendum in October 16.

Father and son, Pablo and Pablito Sanidad filed for prohibition with preliminary injunction to enjoin the COMELEC
from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16, and to declare without force and effect
Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution.

Another petitioner, Vicente Guzman filed for prohibition with preliminary injunction, asserting that the power to
propose amendments or revisions of the Constitution during the transition period is expressly conferred to the interim
National Assembly under Section 16, Article XVII of the Constitution.

Another set of petitioners, Raul Gonzales and Alfredo Salapantan sought to restrain the implementation of
Presidential Decrees relative to the forthcoming Referendum-Plebiscite of October 16. They assert that the incumbent
President cannot act as a constituent assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution and a referendum-
plebiscite is untenable under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973.

The submission of the proposed amendments in such a short period of time for deliberation renders the plebiscite a
nullity. To lift Martial Law, the President need not consult the people via referendum; and allowing 15-.year olds to
vote would amount to an amendment of the Constitution, which confines the right of suffrage to those citizens of the
Philippines 18 years of age and above.

The Solicitor General contends that petitioners have no standing to sue, and that the issue raised is political in nature –
and thus it cannot be reviewed by the court. The Solicitor General also asserts that at this state of the transition
period, only the incumbent President has the authority to exercise constituent power; the referendum-plebiscite is a
step towards normalization.

ISSUE: WON the issue poses a justiciable question (specifically on the constitutionality of PDs 991 and 1033).

HELD: YES. 7 Justices of the Court held that the issue is a justiciable question, while only 3 maintained it was of political
nature and thus not justiciable.

The Court did not agree with the Solicitor General’s contention that the issue is a political one. This is because the
1973 Constitution expressly provided that the power to propose amendments to the constitution resides in the
interim National Assembly in the period of transition.

After that transition period, and when the regular National Assembly is in its active session, the power to propose
amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular National Assembly. The normal course has not been
followed.

Rather than calling the National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly, the president undertook the
proposal of amendments through Presidential Decree 1033 and in effect, through a Referendum-Plebiscite on October
16. Unavoidably, the irregularity of the amendment procedure raises a contestable issue.

pg. 19
Ayer Vs Capulong G.R. No. 82380
Petitioner McElroy an Australian film maker, and his movie production company, Ayer Productions, envisioned,
sometime in 1987, for commercial viewing and for Philippine and international release, the historic peaceful struggle
of the Filipinos at EDSA. The proposed motion picture entitled "The Four Day Revolution" was endorsed by the MTRCB
as and other government agencies consulted. Ramos also signified his approval of the intended film production. It is
designed to be viewed in a six-hour mini-series television play, presented in a "docu-drama" style, creating four
fictional characters interwoven with real events, and utilizing actual documentary footage as background. David
Williamson is Australia's leading playwright and Professor McCoy (University of New South Wales) is an American
historian have developed a script. Enrile declared that he will not approve the use, appropriation, reproduction and/or
exhibition of his name, or picture, or that of any member of his family in any cinema or television production, film or
other medium for advertising or commercial exploitation. petitioners acceded to this demand and the name of Enrile
was deleted from the movie script, and petitioners proceeded to film the projected motion picture. However, a
complaint was filed by Enrile invoking his right to privacy. RTC ordered for the desistance of the movie production and
making of any reference to plaintiff or his family and from creating any fictitious character in lieu of plaintiff which
nevertheless is based on, or bears substantial or marked resemblance to Enrile. Hence the appeal.

Issue: Whether or Not freedom of expression was violated

HELD : The Court would once more stress that this freedom includes the freedom to film and produce motion pictures
and to exhibit such motion pictures in theaters or to diffuse them through television The respondent Judge should
have stayed his hand, instead of issuing an ex-parte Temporary Restraining Order one day after filing of a complaint by
the private respondent and issuing a Preliminary Injunction twenty (20) days later; for the projected motion picture
was as yet uncompleted and hence not exhibited to any audience. Neither private respondent nor the respondent trial
Judge knew what the completed film would precisely look like. There was, in other words, no "clear and present
danger" of any violation of any right to privacy that private respondent could lawfully assert. The subject matter, as set
out in the synopsis provided by the petitioners and quoted above, does not relate to the individual life and certainly
not to the private life of private respondent Ponce Enrile The extent of that intrusion, as this Court understands the
synopsis of the proposed film, may be generally described as such intrusion as is reasonably necessary to keep that
film a truthful historical account. Private respondent does not claim that petitioners threatened to depict in "The Four
Day Revolution" any part of the private life of private respondent or that of any member of his family. His participation
therein was major in character, a film reenactment of the peaceful revolution that fails to make reference to the role
played by private respondent would be grossly unhistorical. The right of privacy of a "public figure" is necessarily
narrower than that of an ordinary citizen. Private respondent has not retired into the seclusion of simple private
citizenship. he continues to be a "public figure." After a successful political campaign during which his participation in
the EDSA Revolution was directly or indirectly referred to in the press, radio and television, he sits in a very public
place, the Senate of the Philippines. The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case between the
constitutional freedom of speech and of expression and the right of privacy, may be marked out in terms of a
requirement that the proposed motion picture must be fairly truthful and historical in its presentation of events

VALMONTE vs BELMONTE G.R. No. 74930

FACTS : Petitioners in this special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke their right to
information and pray that respondent be directed: (a) to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang
Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before
the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or (b) to furnish
petitioners with certified true copies of the documents evidencing their respective loans; and/or (c) to allow
petitioners access to the public records for the subject information On June 20, 1986, apparently not having yet

pg. 20
received the reply of the Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy General Counsel, petitioner
Valmonte wrote respondent another letter, saying that for failure to receive a reply, "(W)e are now considering
ourselves free to do whatever action necessary within the premises to pursue our desired objective in pursuance of
public interest."

ISSUE : WON Valmonte, et. al. are entitled as citizens and taxpayers to inquire upon GSIS records on behest loans
given by the former First Lady Imelda Marcos to Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban
political parties.

HELD : Respondent has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege of confidentiality as regards the
documents subject of this petition. His position is apparently based merely on considerations of policy. The judiciary
does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is, and not what the law should be. Under our
system of government, policy issues are within the domain of the political branches of the government, and of the
people themselves as the repository of all State power. The concerned borrowers themselves may not succeed if they
choose to invoke their right to privacy, considering the public offices they were holding at the time the loans were
alleged to have been granted. It cannot be denied that because of the interest they generate and their
newsworthiness, public figures, most especially those holding responsible positions in government, enjoy a more
limited right to privacy as compared to ordinary individuals, their actions being subject to closer public scrutiny The
"transactions" used here I suppose is generic and, therefore, it can cover both steps leading to a contract, and already
a consummated contract, Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution which, though not binding upon
the Court, are nevertheless persuasive, and considering further that government-owned and controlled corporations,
whether performing proprietary or governmental functions are accountable to the people, the Court is convinced that
transactions entered into by the GSIS, a government-controlled corporation created by special legislation are within
the ambit of the people's right to be informed pursuant to the constitutional policy of transparency in government
dealings. Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to
official records," the Constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists,
abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on matters of public concern.

Reyes vs. Bagatsing G.R. No L-65366. November 9, 1983

FACTS: Petitioner, retired Justice JB L. Reyes, on behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition sought a permit from the City of
Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on October 26, 1983 from 2:00 to 5:00 in the afternoon, starting from the
Luneta, a public park, to the gates of the United States Embassy, hardly two blocks away. Once there, and in an open
space of public property, a short program would be held. There was likewise an assurance in the petition that in the
exercise of the constitutional rights to free speech and assembly, all the necessary steps would be taken by it “to
ensure a peaceful march and rally.” Petitioner filed suit for mandamus unaware that permit was denied, because it
was sent by ordinary mail. The reason for refusal of permit was due to police intelligence reports which strongly
militate against the advisability of issuing such permit at this time and at the place applied for.

ISSUE: Whether or not the denial of permit for the conduct peaceable assembly to the gates of U.S. Embassy may be
validly enforced.

HELD: NO. Mandatory injunction prayed was granted.

RATIO: [T]he Court is called upon to protect the exercise of the cognate rights to free speech and peaceful assembly,
arising from the denial of a permit. The Constitution is quite explicit: “No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of
grievances.”. There can be no legal objection, absent the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil,
on the choice of Luneta as the place where the peace rally would start. Neither can there be any valid objection to the
use of the streets, to the gates of the US Embassy, hardly two block-away at the Roxas Boulevard.

pg. 21
There is merit to the observation that except as to the novel aspects of a litigation, the judgment must be confined
within the limits of previous decisions. The law declared on past occasions is, on the whole, a safe guide, So it has been
here. While the General rule is that a permit should recognize the right of the applicants to hold their assembly at a
public place of their choice, another place may be designated by the licensing authority if it be shown that there is a
clear and present danger of a substantive evil if no such change were made.

By way of a summary The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the
date, the public place where and the time when it will take place. If it were a private place, only the consent of the
owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required. Such application should be filed well ahead in time to
enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to
its grant but at another public place.

VICTORIANO V. ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS’ UNION 59 SCRA 54

FACTS:

Victoriano was an employee of the Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. As such employee, he was a member of the Elizalde
Rope Workers’ Union which had a closed shop agreement with the Company that membership in the Union shall be
required as a condition of employment for all its permanent employees.

Prior to its amendment, Section 4(a)(4) of Republic Act No. 875 allows the employer to require as a condition of
employment membership in a labor organization, if such organization is the representative of the employees.
However, the provision was later amended by the enactment of Republic Act No. 3350, which reads: … “but such
agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor
organization”.

Being a member of a religious sect that prohibits the affiliation of its members with any labor organization, Victoriano
presented his resignation to the Union. In turn, the Union asked the Company to dismiss Victoriano from the service
in view of the fact that he was resigning from the Union as a member. This prompted Victoriano to file an action to
enjoin the Company and the Union from dismissing him. The Union assails the constitutionality of RA No. 3350,
contending that it infringes on the fundamental right to form lawful associations guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA No. 3550 is unconstitutional for infringing on the fundamental freedom to form
associations.

RULING: No. As ruled by the Supreme Court:

“RA No. 3350 merely excludes ipso jure from the application and coverage of the closed shop agreement the
employees belonging to any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members with any labor organization.
What the exception provides, therefore, is that members of said religious sects cannot be compelled or coerced to join
labor unions even when said unions have closed shop agreements with the employers; that in spite of any closed shop
agreement, members of said religious sects cannot be refused employment or dismissed from their jobs on the sole
ground that they are not members of the collective bargaining union. It is clear, therefore, that the assailed Act, far
from infringing the constitutional provision on freedom of association, upholds and reinforces it. It does not prohibit
the members of said religious sects from affiliating with labor unions. It still leaves to said members the liberty and the
power to affiliate, or not to affiliate, with labor unions. If, notwithstanding their religious beliefs, the members of said
religious sects prefer to sign up with the labor union, they can do so. If in deference and fealty to their religious faith,
they refuse to sign up, they can do so; the law does not coerce them to join; neither does the law prohibit them from

pg. 22
joining; and neither may the employer or labor union compel them to join. Republic Act No. 3350, therefore, does not
violate the constitutional provision on freedom of association.”

pg. 23