How to beat the first line of the 4-4-2 block

One key aspect of the 4-4-2 is that it contains two strikers which are able to both press the
opposition centre-backs and block off central passing lanes, allowing the wide midfielders to
stay deep and support the fullbacks. For a team looking to build-up from the back against a
4-4-2, the obvious solution is to use a three at the back system. What the three central
defenders provide is 3v2 numerical superiority over the opposition’s two strikers. This is
important defensively, as it provides sufficient cover on defensive transition, allowing the rest
of the team to play in more advanced areas as their first thought doesn’t need to be to
provide defensive cover. But, more importantly within the context of breaking down the
block, a three-at-the-back system is ideal for creating chances against a two-striker system.

Firstly, the three centre-backs can naturally line-up in the gaps between the vertical lines of
the 4-4-2 structure. As a consequence, the strikers are forced to press each centre-back at
an angle, rather than straight on. This is less effective at blocking central passing lanes
since the forwards are pressing at a diagonal and are therefore leaving open the vertical
passing lane.
Here, we see one of the midfielders being forced to step out of the rigid structure in order to
block the central passing lane from the number six to the number 10, creating space in the
vacated area. This is an example of how using a back three can immediately create space
without any use of rotations.

The key benefit, however, of the 3v2 superiority in the first phase of build-up is that, at any
given time, one of the centre-backs will always be free.
Let’s say that the central centre-back is in possession of the ball. To free up one of the wide
centre-backs, the central centre-back must carry the ball forwards until either of the two
strikers is forced to press. This simple concept, engaging a player to leave space elsewhere,
is one of the fundamentals in the process of creating the ‘free man’. The striker will naturally
press from the centre in order to block central passing lanes and prevent the central centre-
back from carrying the ball further up the pitch. As we can see in the graphic above, the
centre-back on the side of the striker that pressed is now free to receive the pass. This
pattern can be repeated every time we begin building up from the back in order to find the
free centre-back.

Now, let’s look at some real examples of this in action.

Here we see Liverpool building up with a back four against Simeone’s 4-4-2. The two
Atlético Madrid strikers are able to press both centre-backs man-for-man whilst blocking
central passing options, forcing Virgil van Dijk to go long.
However, in this example we see that Liverpool’s tactics involve Wijnaldum dropping to form
a back three. Atlético’s right-sided striker steps across to press the centre-back while
blocking the central passing lanes, freeing up Wijnaldum on the side of the striker who
moved to the centre.
How to create wide overloads against the 4-4-2
As mentioned earlier in this piece of tactical theory, the 4-4-2’s main advantage is that it can
block central progression by maintaining numerical superiority in this area. This is due to its
box that it creates formed of the two central midfielders and two strikers, with the two wide
midfielders also able to tuck in for additional lateral compactness. However, structurally
speaking, the 4-4-2 has no horizontal line of five, unlike the majority of formations that can
be used to create a compact mid/low block. The result of this is that the 4-4-2 is particularly
vulnerable to being overloaded in wide areas, since, strictly speaking, it only contains one
wide midfielder and one fullback to cover each flank.

To exploit this as effectively as possible, we want to prevent both the ball-near central
midfielder and centre-back from being able to shift over and support the fullback and wide
midfielder when they are defending the wide zones.

How can we do this? Let’s return to the scenario where we have managed to get one of the
wide centre-backs free on the ball.
This time, the number nine has stepped across to press the central centre-back, leaving
number four open to receive the pass in space from number six.

We have already played around the outside of the first line of the block by getting the ball out
to the wide centre-back who is the ‘free man’. So, to isolate the opposition left-back and left
midfielder to enable us to create an overload, we need to prevent both the ball-near centre-
back and central midfielder from shifting over to support them. To do so, we can ‘pin’ the
centre-back and central midfielder, bearing in mind to use as few players as possible to
achieve this.

Let’s begin by pinning the centre-back. To pin the ball-near centre-back, the logical choice is
to place a striker next to them, but how does this stop the ball-near centre-back from shifting
across?
As demonstrated above, we can see that by placing a striker on the centre-back, the centre-
back can no longer leave this position to support the opposition in the wide area without
leaving a large space right in front of their goal for the striker to exploit.

In fact, we only need one striker to pin both centre-backs, going back to the idea of using as
few players as possible. The above graphic shows the result of this tactical decision.
Finally, we must pin the ball-near central midfielder, number six.

To pin number six, the best option is to place a midfielder of our own on them. Using the
same concept of ‘pinning’, number six is now also not able to come across to support the
fullback and wide midfielder, as doing so would leave space for a pass into our number ten
in the centre of the pitch. The graphic above displays how the fullback and wide midfielder
are now isolated as a result of the two tactical decisions that we have just made. What we
have achieved by doing this is that we have given the opposition no opportunity to try and
bring over extra players from the centre of the pitch to compensate for their formation’s
weakness in the wide areas.
If we mirror this onto the other half of the pitch, as shown above, we have now used up six of
our possible 10 outfield players: a back three, a midfield two, and a striker. This leaves us
with four players; two for each flank.

Since a back three isn’t enough to cover the width of the pitch when set up in our defensive
structure, we will need a pair of wingbacks to make it a back five out of possession. These
wingbacks are ideal for creating our width in our attacking structure, so we want them to be
placed as wide as possible. For our last two players we will want to use two wide forwards
that sit in their respective inside channels, as we currently have no one occupying these
areas further up the pitch.
What we can now see is that we have created a 3-4-3 system, as exhibited above, with the
four new additions all highlighted.

Now that we have the opposition’s central players pinned and our players are in their
general attacking structure, we need to refocus our attention towards the wide areas, which
we are looking to exploit.

Let’s once again return to our scenario with the wide centre-back in possession.
The graphic above displays that we have managed to create a wide overload using the
centre-back who is free, as we now have a 3v2 against the opposition wide midfielder and
fullback. Furthermore, thanks to our ‘pinning’ technique that we used earlier, none of the
opposition’s central players can shift across to balance the numbers.

Now we must think about how we can take advantage of this favourable 3v2 position.

How to exploit the wide overloads

We have discussed how we have managed to construct a situation using tactics that exploit
a significant weakness in the opposition’s defensive structure, so now we must talk about
how we can take advantage of this position and actually manufacture goalscoring chances.
The first method of getting in behind the opposition backline is as follows.

The above graphic demonstrates how we want our wing-back and wide forward to be
positioned in this pattern of play. The wing-back should be high, almost level with the
opposition fullback. The reason for this is that we want the fullback to be pinned in position.
This action pins the fullback since, if they step forward, the centre-back can easily play a
pass over the top of the fullback into the space behind the defensive line. What pinning the
fullback allows us to do is to have the wide forward drop between the lines without being
followed. Therefore, the opposition wide midfielder has no choice but to block the passing
lane to the wide forward to prevent them from receiving in space.
If the centre-back plays a pass from his current deep position, the wide midfielder will be
able to stay tight on the wide forward and a pass to the wing-back would result in a 2v2
situation as shown above. The wide forward’s run in behind the fullback would then be able
to be tracked by the wide midfielder since the wide midfielder is focussed on staying tight to
the wide forward, so likely wouldn’t lead to a real opportunity.

To avoid this, the centre-back must carry the ball forward in order to engage the wide
midfielder, forcing them to step forward, leaving number 11 free. As we can see in the
graphic above, if the centre-back waits to play the pass once the wide midfielder is engaged,
we will have a 2v1 on the fullback.
Above is an example of how we could take advantage of this mini 2v1 overload. Here, our
wide forward makes a run in behind the fullback in the inside channel, with support in central
areas to get on the end of a cross or a cut-back.

An additional pattern that could be played to exploit the wide overload could be performed
with the players positioned as shown above. The opposition fullback is unlikely to step out to
our wing-back, again to prevent a ball being played by our centre-back directly into the
space in behind. To create space in the inside channel for the wide forward to drop into and
create a 2v1 overload on the wide midfielder, our number 10 could drag the opponent’s
number six centrally. From here, the number 11 would be able to run at the defence to either
shoot or play a through-pass into either the wing-back or striker.

An example of this pattern being used against a 4-4-2 is from the first leg between
Tottenham Hotspur and RB Leipzig in the last 16 of the UEFA Champions League. Leipzig
have managed to free the centre-back on the ball who has carried the ball forward to
increase the passing angles between his two passing options, thus decreasing the chance of
interception. Tottenham’s left-back is pinned by the wing-back, while Leipzig’s wide forward
has dropped into the inside channel on the inside of Tottenham’s wide midfielder. The wide
midfielder can’t cut out both options on his own, so Leipzig are comfortably able to progress
the ball into Tottenham’s final third.

The final method that I will discuss of progressing the ball once a wide centre-back is free on
the ball is using up-back-through combinations.
Above shows the set of passes and movements required to complete this pattern of play.
The first movement that triggers this is the striker dropping slightly to receive a pass from the
centre-back. It is likely the number nine could be followed by a centre-back, so as soon as
they receive the ball a lay-off pass should be played. Immediately after the initial pass from
the centre-back is played, the number 10 here should look to move into the inside channel
where there is space to receive the lay-off pass. This quick movement from the number 10
should allow them to get ahead of their marker, number six, to receive in a pocket of space.
Meanwhile, both the wide forward and the wing-back should be making direct runs in behind
the opposition backline. This is to take advantage of the 2v1 against the fullback in this
position, meaning at least one of the two runners will be open to receive a pass from the
number 10.
Above is an example of Leipzig using an up-back-through combination in the same pattern
as was just explained. Here, the striker drops to receive a direct ball from the outside centre-
back. This triggers the ball-near central midfielder to make a lateral movement to receive the
lay-off in space in the inside channel. He then has two passing options: the wide forward
running inside the fullback, and the wing-back running outside the fullback. In this instance,
they created a good opportunity from the edge of the box which forced a save from the
goalkeeper.

Conclusion
To conclude this tactical analysis, we can see that the initial step that needs to be taken
when forming the attacking structure against a 4-4-2 block should be to use a back three. It
is then vital to maximise this overload by using it to free up either of the outside centre-
backs. What this then allows the team in possession to do is to create wide overloads that
exploit the key weakness of the 4-4-2 structure, the lack of a horizontal line of five players,
with the assistance of the concept of ‘pinning’ which we examined in detail. These wide
overloads can then be used in a variety of ways, as discussed, to get in behind the
defensive line and create clear opportunities.
Atalanta 2019/20: Their defensive principles in
action – scout report
Following on from my analysis last week of Atalanta’s attacking ideals,
specifically their rotations to create overloads and attacking chances, I wanted to
look at their defensive work too.
When looking at their defensive statistics there are some key areas which make
Atalanta worth focusing on. Firstly, in Serie A this season, only Bologna and
Torino have a higher PPDA, but Atalanta’s is still just 8.31. This ranks them 11th
overall in the “Top Five” European leagues for PPDA. They also have the best
defensive duel win percentage in Serie A, with a highly impressive 60.9%. In the
top five leagues, only Bayer Leverkusen, Bayern Munich, and Paris Saint-
Germain rank above them for both PPDA and for having a better defensive duel
win percentage.
Of course, with data, context is key, so to see how Atalanta measure up against the
best in the top five leagues for both of these metrics, I took the data of the 25 best
teams for each metric, and then cut out any teams with a lower defensive duel win
percentage of 57, and a higher PPDA than 12, which left us with the following
graph below.
There are some expected names, but also some less so. RB Leipzig have the highest
defensive duel win percentage out of anyone in Europe’s top five, and it’s
unsurprising to see the defensive duel win percentages generally increase the higher
a team’s PPDA is, however, if we look at those with similar PPDA’s to Atalanta –
let’s say nine or lower, it is clear to see that along with Bayern Munich, PSG, and
Leverkusen, Atalanta are one of Europe’s elite pressing sides, and that to have such
a high defensive duel win percentage alongside these PPDA numbers is somewhat
of an anomaly.
They also have the lowest xGA of any team in Serie A and the sixth lowest in
Europe’s top five with an xGA of 25.35. They are allowing 9.92 shots against per
game, with only Roma recording less domestically, yet their 97.26 ball losses per
game, the fifth-highest in the league, belies a team that beat their opponents
through suffocating them with possession, even if their 55.9% average possession
is the third-highest in the league. Napoli and Sassuolo both
average 58.8% and 56.2%, respectively, whilst Roma just 0.1% less than Atalanta
with 55.8%, yet those three teams all record more than 10 fewer ball losses per
game, well under the league average of 91.99, and all average in the bottom five in
the league for ball losses, along with Inter Milan and Juventus.
This, along with their ability to prevent a great number of shots on target, once
again would suggest they are strong defensively across the field particularly in their
pressing, and with their ball losses so high would suggest their counter-pressing,
and overall defensive transitioning, is of a very high standard too.
Throughout the course of this tactical analysis and scout report, I will break down
how Atalanta set up when out of possession, as well as highlighting their key
defensive principles and how these are applied across the pitch when without
possession.
Overview
Atalanta are pretty loyal to the 3-4-1-2 formation, although they sometimes field a
3-4-2-1. Either way, a back three is what Head Coach Gian Piero Gasperini
favours, only using a back four on two occasions this season (in a 2-2 draw with
Genoa in February, and a 4-0 loss away to Dinamo Zagreb in the Champions
League back in September). In the 3-4-1-2 he operates with three centre-backs, two
orthodox wing-backs, two central midfielders, and two forwards. The number 10
role is filled by the instrumental Papu Gómez and just as he is a key component in
linking the midfield and the forward line when in possession, Gómez also has an
important role between both of these lines when out of possession too. 
He is the bridge between midfield and the frontline, and in what is already a pretty
flexible defensive shape, he has to be the most flexible of all. Throughout this
analysis you will see images of him dropping deep into central-midfield, pressing
past the forward line, or dropping in as a left-sided forward when pressing high.
However, even though there are plenty of intriguing intricacies within Atalanta’s
shape, much of what they do can be seen in plenty of back three formations across
Europe and beyond
For example, in deeper areas, we will see them drop into a back five, with both
wing-backs joining the three centre-backs (or should a wing-back be caught too far
forward, a central midfielder will join the back three to comprise this back five).
Preventing the opposition from building from the back
One of the key themes we see throughout Atalanta’s pressing is the importance of
stopping the opposition having time to play forward. This is the case across the
pitch and with the ball deep inside Atalanta’s half, you will still see their
midfielders and defenders prioritise preventing forward play and pushing the
opposition backwards. I will come onto that in more detail later on, but in this
section, we will look at how it’s applied when the opposition is looking to build
from the back. An outcome of this is encouraging teams to play long too,
something which Atalanta are comfortable dealing with.
Long passes are invariably hit forward to the forward line, and with Atalanta
having three centre-backs they are at an advantage to win these aerial duels.
Atalanta have won 50.7% of their aerial duels in Serie A this season, the fifth-
highest in the league, with left-sided centre-back Berat Djimsiti their leader in this
metric with an outstanding 67.24% win rate. The likes of Robin Gosens, José Luis
Palomino, and Rafael Tolói are all excellent in this department too and join
Djimsiti in ranking in the top 30 in the league for aerial duel win percentages.
With the ball hit long, you will often see these centre-backs look to head to either a
wing-back or a central-midfielder, depending on who is in space, the flight of the
ball, and the positioning of opponents, which allows Atalanta to begin their own
attack immediately.
In the image below as the opposition play long from the back, Atalanta have three
centre-backs against one forward, whilst they have a pivot ready to receive the
header.

With the opposition keeper in possession Atalanta will, as mentioned above, look
to prevent the opposition from playing out and will encourage the goalkeeper to
play long immediately.  With the goalkeeper in possession we will see something
similar to the image below in the way in which Atalanta will line up.
The centre-forwards’ positioning can vary, however, against a back four with two
wide centre-backs looking to split, stretch the press, and potentially create space for
the pivot, whilst the full-backs push on, we will generally see the Atalanta forwards
operate in a space-oriented press, where they are close enough to the centre-backs
to prevent the keeper from playing to them. However, they are directly in line with
the keeper’s passing lane to the full-backs, and should the keeper play the ball over
the top to the full-backs, they are not far forward enough where they can’t press the
full-back either.

We can see this in practice below as Duván Zapata and Josip Iličić are able to block
two passing lanes through their positioning to the Roma centre-backs and full-
backs.
When centre-backs split they leave space centrally for a pivot to drop into. The
pivot can help them break the press and aid ball-circulation. We can see there is
space between the two forwards in the image above for such an
opportunity. Gómez will follow the pivot as they drop in to prevent them receiving
possession, whilst the two central-midfielders behind him, in this case,
Mario Pašalić and Marten de Roon, man-mark their midfield counter-parts to
prevent the opposition from being able to play through the press centrally. We can
see Gómez close to the pivot in the image below.

Atalanta are generally pretty aggressive with marking the opposition pivot,
however, they won’t follow him too deep if it leaves space behind centrally and
will instead join the forward line in a front three shield. Torino, another high-
pressing side who operate in a 3-4-1-2, are less concerned about this and will have
their number 10 follow the pivot no matter how deep they go, perhaps making it
easier to bypass, whereas Gómez will stop short of passing his centre-forwards in
this instance.
With the pivot receiving so deep, there is no real benefit to them being in
possession in this area compared to the goalkeeper other than that they are likely a
better passer. But even then, with Atalanta engaging in such an aggressive press,
and with the wing-backs positioned just behind this front five ready to press either
centrally or on the flanks, any forward passes, specifically centrally in this scenario,
are incredibly dangerous.

Atalanta are adaptable and as they are with most things, are pretty fluid in their
approach to their press, with it based more upon a set of principles, rather than any
rigid instruction of “if they do this, then you must do this…”. So what they do may
vary from situation-to-situation, but nevertheless when pressing it will be based
around the principle of preventing forward play, and forcing the opposition into
making a bad decision, in this case playing the ball long.
The examples shown so far have been against a back four. When they play against
a back three, which is frequently used in Italian football, their pressing principles
remain the same, again looking to block off easy forward passing lanes and
encourage the long ball, albeit there will be a change in their overall structure. 
Below we can see Iličić and Gómez each side of the 18 yard-box ready to press the
centre-backs or the full-backs depending on whom the goalkeeper passes to (the
left-sided full-back is just out of the frame). At first, it seems a little odd in this
instance to have Gómez in the position you would expect Iličić’s forward partner,
Zapata, to operate. However, Zapata’s closeness to Iličić in this example (he is to
the left of the forward on the edge of the 18-yard-box), would suggest Gasperini
uses the presence of these two forwards on this side to discourage the opposition
from playing this way.

Inter have used a double pivot in this case with one of their three centre-backs,
Stefan de Vrij, pushing up to operate as one of the pivots. Again we see similar
ideas despite the different formation. The centre-backs and full-backs are pressed in
a space-oriented press, whilst the central players are man-marked, and in this case,
they push players forward to ensure the double pivot cannot receive possession.
It’s interesting to look at Inter’s losses just from the first half in comparison to
Atalanta’s.
 
 Inter Milan’s
first-half ball losses against Atalanta
There is an obvious juxtaposition between the two in where the ball has been lost,
with Inter heavily inside their own half, and Atalanta inside Inter’s. This points
towards not only how aggressive Atalanta’s press is, but how successful it was in
this game in not allowing Inter to play out from the back.

Atalanta’s
first-half ball losses against Inter Milan
This brings us on nicely to the next defensive tactic we see Atalanta use. If we
revisit the earlier image of Inter looking to play out from their goalkeeper, with
Atalanta pressing with a front four, the goalkeeper’s decision to pass to one of his
centre-backs inside his 18-yard box gives us a perfect example of this.
At the beginning of this analysis, we saw how the forward’s positioning when the
keeper was in possession, blocked the passing lane to the full-back. Atalanta
continue with this theme as they press.
As the ball is played to one of the centre-backs, the forward, Ilicic in this case,
curves his run to block the pass to the full-back and with no other option, the
centre-back is forced to go long.

When using a back three, one of its great advantages comes in building from the
back where the back three can stretch the press, and the two wide centre-backs are
able to operate in the half-spaces, increasing their options when playing forward,
and importantly increasing their chances of playing through the press. If you can
remove this strength, it nullifies much of the way a team sets up when playing out
and disrupts the rhythm.
As much as Atalanta use this tactic to block a passing lane, it’s reflected by an
overall defensive principle that we see in much of their defending and we will see
more of in the preventing central play section.
They want to make the opposition’s pitch smaller and therefore decrease their
passing options, whilst making everything more crowded and therefore increasing
the likelihood of disrupting the opposition in possession and winning the ball back. 
The forwards don’t force the curved runs to make the pitch smaller, however, if the
opportunity presents itself it is something you will see Atalanta do, notably when
the keeper or defenders are in possession. Yet there is plenty of lateral pressing
when the opposition have the ball in their midfield or forward line that shares this
principle.
It doesn’t necessarily need to be one of their two forwards either, and this
highlights Atalanta’s commitment to pushing players forward in the press. Below,
against Lecce, as right wing-back Hans Hateboer, originally pressing the left-back,
he continues his run as the left-back plays back to the keeper, allowing his forwards
to stay on the centre-backs, whilst closing off the keeper’s entire left side.

Overall pressing shape

Moving on from the forward line, the rest of the team obviously has a part to play
in preventing the opposition from successfully playing out from the back and
making the pitch smaller. We have seen examples already where the wing-backs,
number 10, and central midfielders have all pushed forward into high areas to close
down the opposition defence, pivot, and further forward midfielders.
The image below is an example of what we might see from Atalanta should the
goalkeeper play to one of his centre-backs. At this point I must put in a disclaimer
saying that this is just an example and most definitely isn’t something they do
every single time, in fact, the next section will explore Atalanta using pressing traps
to force the opposition to play wide.
However, in this example, we can see that there is a mixture of space-oriented
pressing and man-oriented pressing. The two forwards look to prevent the lateral
pass to the left-sided centre-back, as well as the inside pass to the pivot. Gómez is
close enough to the pivot where he can press should they receive the ball, yet deep
enough to drop quickly and provide support centrally should the opposition play
long. One constant we will see throughout all of the example is that Atalanta are
man-marking the oppositions eight and 10, whilst Hateboer in the right-wing back
position is occupying space where he can prevent the diagonal to the number 11,
whilst press the left-back should the centre-back look to play that risky pass.

This is just an example of the mixture we might see and below, as Lecce’s
goalkeeper plays long, we can see the central-midfield pair are man-marking
whilst Gómez and the left-wing back are operating in a space-oriented press.
Preventing central play
Atalanta want to avoid having the opposition play through the middle. From these
areas the opposition has more passing options, can specifically get the ball into the
centre-forwards in better positions to set up attacks, and in more advanced areas
central shots have a higher xG value.
As much as it is to prevent these potential outcomes of playing centrally from
occurring, there is more space to escape the press centrally, and if they prevent
them from playing in these areas, then the only place to play is on either flank. The
advantage of pushing a side out wide is that there is less space, and by making the
pitch smaller it is easier to close off any forward, or even lateral, passing lanes and
once again win the ball back.
To facilitate this process we will see the pivot marked tightly, not just when the
opposition keeper or centre-backs have possession in deep areas, but during the
majority of build-up play. This is to stop the pivot being used to break the first line
of press. As mentioned earlier if they drop deep in line with their centre-backs that
is less of an issue, as although they could potentially break the lines with a pass,
they are much less dangerous having the ball in line with their centre-backs than
they are between the first and second line of press.
We saw earlier how Gómez occupies the pivot when the keeper has the ball. In a
more developed build up phase, albeit still within the opposition half, one of the
central-midfield pair will sit tight on the pivot to allow Gómez to press higher.
As mentioned earlier, if the keeper goes ahead with playing a lofted pass to the full-
back then the forward line can press the opposition full-back along with the help of
their wing-back (in this example Hateboer), and Gómez from the 10 position, as
well as the central-midfielder (in this case de Roon). The image below
demonstrates that further passes from this position are difficult to come by for the
opposition, and increases the likelihood of Atalanta winning the ball back in a high
area.

This is just one example of how they look to prevent the opposition playing
centrally and how they benefit from pushing them wide. This isn’t going to always
work, nor be the case every time, and they use pressing traps to force the same
outcome.
The subsequent images will demonstrate a pressing trap which involves nullifying
the threat of the pivot and capitalizing on a team playing wide.
Inter have possession, and we can see their pivot, Marcelo Brozović, being tightly
marked by Pašalić, whilst de Roon pushes high to engage the ball-carrier,
ensuring Pašalić can stay tight on Brozović. To the left of these two we can see
Gómez balancing this press in a slightly deeper position, however, he is ready to
mirror de Roon’s movement should the ball be squared to the other side, again
allowing Pašalić to stay on Brozović.
Also in the picture, Zapata occupies Inter’s centre-backs, yet he is close enough to
the pivot that it would be dangerous for Brozović to even receive this ball goal-
side, whilst the centre-back is also a dangerous option for the ball-carrier. 
This is another example of Atalanta applying a mixture of man-oriented and space-
oriented presses, with the space-oriented press being used to take two passing
options out of the question. Iličić has also dropped and is preventing the left-sided
centre-back, operating in a left-back position, being an option too.
Therefore with no other option, Inter switch the ball to the centre-back deliberately
left open and Gómez instantly moves to pressure the new ball-carrier closing off
any central passing options, whilst Zapata and Pašalić once more ensure that both
the centre-back and pivot are removed from the equation. Therefore the ball-
carrier’s only option is to play to the right wing-back.
As the pass is played this triggers Atalanta’s left wing-back, Robin Gosens, to push
forward and support both Gómez and Pašalić and ensure the Inter defender has to
make a swift decision, whilst also preventing any easy forward passing option,
whilst Gómez and Pašalić have now closed off any easy backwards or lateral
options. His only possible passes or to go long, or to play a difficult lateral pass to
the central-midfielder highlighted. He does go for the inside pass, and Inter lose
possession.

It should be noted that the wing-backs aren’t completely cavalier in their attitude to
bombing forward in the press. Their first priority is to block any forward passes
before they pressure the ball-carrier into making a decision.
We can see an example of this below from the same game where Inter’s goalkeeper
plays the ball to the right wing-back. Gosens is in a position where he could press
the wing-back, however, he doesn’t want to open a forward passing option in doing
so, aware of the Inter midfielder behind him. We can see him checking his shoulder
to see if support is coming.

Once the support arrives he is then able to press the wing-back.

Aggression, intensity, and defending in deeper areas

We see aggression and intensity in almost everything that Atalanta do defensively
and there’s always a desire to win the ball back as soon as possible. They do not
want the opponent to have time to relax on the ball and make decisions, but instead,
they want to rush these decisions and force errors. To do this effectively they have
to close off easy passing options, which I have gone through in detail, and
secondly, they have to press the ball-carrier at the right angle and speed to force
them into a decision they don’t want to make.
We see this in their counter-pressing too. It’s rare to see Atalanta players isolated in
possession, and as much as this is to ensure there are always passing options, it
makes it easier to counter-press effectively too.
The image below shows the Lecce centre-back intercepting an inside pass. All three
central midfielders Remo Freuler, Pašalić and Gómez recognise this and instantly
push forward, closing the space, and removing the central passing options.

They are in his face in a matter of seconds and the centre-back is rushed into
making a hopefully long pass which Atalanta recover and begin their attack once
more.
In deeper areas Atalanta still have similar principles to when defending from the
front. They want to make the pitch smaller, which we can see from the image
below where they are particularly narrow against Juventus, whilst positioning
themselves to block any easy passes, particularly going forward.

If the opposition bypasses the press and gets prolonged possession inside Atalanta’s
own half you are going to see certain tactics that are pretty commonplace within
most back three formations, as I alluded to earlier. However, still the principle of
intense defending to force the opposition into making rushed decisions on the ball
can be seen throughout also.
Atalanta are quick to press the ball-carrier almost anywhere, let alone when in
possession near or inside the Atalanta half. They work in tandem with one another,
ensuring there is a balance as one presses, with teammates dropping into positions
behind to protect that space from passes or dribbles. With them operating with a
back five in deeper areas it means Atalanta’s defenders can be more aggressive in
coming forward, as they still leave a solid back four behind them when doing so.
We can see that in the image below as the Atalanta centre-back pushes forward to
press the Fiorentina midfielder who has just received possession.

Atalanta play a relatively high line and will use it to prevent counter-attacks or at
least delay the opposition in order to allow their midfield and wing-backs to arrive
back to defend should there be a loss of possession and a counter.
We can see below how Fiorentina’s ball-carrier is unable to play forward due to
Atalanta’s high line, with Atalanta’s left-sided centre-back Djimsiti engaging him
and looking to push him backwards.
As he does this successfully we can see from the image below that Atalanta now
have plenty of players back in support and the counter-attack has been successfully
thwarted whilst they are now pushing the opposition backwards as well.

When defending particularly deep we can see Atalanta’s back five very closely
supported by their midfield three in the image below from the game against
Juventus. They are narrow and importantly leave no space between the two lines.
For good quality possession in this situation, Juventus will have to look to slip the
ball behind the defence, operate on the wings and look to cross, or take the ball
centrally but in a position where there will be eight defenders behind the ball.
As mentioned above, due to the numbers in the backline, Atalanta can afford to be
particularly aggressive from the back when coming out of the back line, far more so
than if they were playing a back four, where if a defender were to do this it would
leave a sizeable hole in the defence. When a member of Atlanta’s defence does this
it still leaves a back four and importantly a centre-back pair to ensure any central
spaces aren’t exploited.
Being able to come forward, as Palomino does in the image below, closes the space
which the onrushing attacker has and importantly forces them into making a
decision quicker than they would if they were just receiving pressure from the
midfield behind tracking them.
The example above is with the opposition breaking forward at speed and from a
central position. However, when Atalanta are set defensively we will see a 5-3-2 or
a 5-4-1 formation, yet even within this set-up we will see the defenders look to
push up aggressively.
Atalanta’s central defenders are constantly looking for the opposition aiming to
play passes between the midfield and defensive lines, and will seek to push up into
these spaces in order to push the opposition backwards.
We can see a perfect example of this in the image above, and subsequently in the
image below, where Juventus are frustrated in the forward approach and are forced
to play backwards once again.

As they are with most things, again Atalanta are pretty fluid with these actions and
the defence is very much in tune with one another as to when to push forward and
when to balance the press.
If the opposition leaves one forward up, then three or even just two defenders will
be needed to remain close to the forward, if they leave two then three of four
defenders will be needed, and so on. This is whilst the others have more freedom to
engage with attackers in areas further away from goal. 
Below we can see how aggressive Palomino is again in ensuring Juventus are
forced to play backwards, rushing far out of the backline to a point where he is in
line with Atalanta’s midfield, creating a midfield four. Atalanta have two defenders
occupying Juventus’s sole forward at the time, Gonzalo Higuaín, whilst both
Djimsiti and Gosens drop back in to provide cover for Palomino in case Juventus
push players forward into the space left by the centre-back.
Conclusion
Atalanta have rightly received plenty of plaudits for their performances this season,
with much attention being given to their easy-on-the-eye possession based football.
However, their defensive efforts deserve as much credit and are a big contributing
factor to their success domestically and in the Champions League.
With a back five and a narrow central three sat in front of them, they are always
going to be difficult to break down, providing such little space between the
defensive and midfield lines and even less between the defenders themselves for
any through balls. With teams forced into taking shots from further out or from
more difficult angles, with Atalanta players behind the ball, it would go some way
to explaining their incredibly low xGA and why the expected points table for Serie
A has Atalanta sitting at the top.
When discussing defending it is obviously so easy to immediately think of the
defenders, yet Atalanta’s attackers and the supporting group of midfielders that are
part of a very robust pressing system deserve their share of the plaudits too, as they
make it so difficult for teams to play out against them, and often leave sides either
resulting to the long ball or losing plenty of possession in their own half, as the ball
loss images from the Inter Milan game testify.
Throughout this analysis, there have been examples of Atalanta’s defensive ideas
prevalent through different phases of defending.
Firstly they look to prevent building from the back and force the opposition to play
long. They do this through a mixture of man-oriented and space-oriented pressing
and stopping the pivot from receiving between the lines. They want to make it
difficult for teams to play in general and make it easier for the press to win the ball
back so close off areas of the pitch through angled pressing, as well as defending in
deeper areas with a narrow shape.
They look to win the ball back in high areas. They do this by committing numbers
forward to the press, blocking forward passing lanes, and setting pressing traps to
force the opposition into wide areas with nowhere to play.
Finally, we see an eagerness and intensity in their defensive work, as well as their
counter-pressing, showing a desire to win the ball back as soon as possible and
importantly pressure the ball-carrier into making a decision before they are ready,
as they look to force errors in possession and win the ball-back.
If the season resumes, it will be interesting to see how Atalanta fair towards the end
of the season, especially in the Champions League, as if their 8-4 aggregate win
over Valencia is anything to go by, there could be some fascinating high-stakes
European encounters that involve Gasperini’s side as the competition progresses.