Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Carolyn duPont
cmdupont@mit.edu
carolyn_dupont@hks16.harvard.edu
The research for this paper was conducted as part of an independent study at the MIT Sloan
School of Management under the guidance of Prof. Gita Rao. Carolyn duPont is a 2016
graduate of a dual MBA/MPA program at MIT Sloan and the Harvard Kennedy School.
The City has the opportunity to frame this period of growth as a period of opportunity
for preventative investments to protect the future of our City and our real estate. This
paper intends to contribute to the conversation about how Boston will pay for these
investments. In particular, the paper focuses on how Boston can engage and incentivize
developers and property owners to invest in climate resilience measures on privately-
owned land and buildings.
Key barriers to investment for private property owners include evolving regulatory
requirements, lack of a business case for making the investments, uncertainty as to the
possible extent of climate effects and the economic value of resilience investments, and a
short time horizon for development and ownership.
Given these barriers, the paper outlines possible financial and non-financial incentives.
For financial incentives, the paper explores 11 potential new revenue streams to finance
these investments, as outlined in the table below. The paper also discusses ways to
leverage these revenue streams with outside capital through a green bond or
environmental impact bond, as well as mechanisms for deploying financing to
developers and property owners, such as a revolving loan fund.
Finally, the paper outlines next steps for developing these incentive programs, including
1) developing better estimates of the cost of climate impacts if resilience investments do
not occur, 2) assessing the viability of tapping these revenue streams and establishing
these programs, and 3) engaging relevant stakeholders in the City and beyond.
3
Introduction: Boston’s Need for Climate Resilience Investments
Boston faces significant challenges in coping with the effects of climate change in the
decades to come. This paper focuses on how Boston will deal with water: the most
recent projections show that Boston may experience sea levels rising by one to two
meters feet by 2100, and the city is also already experiencing increased precipitation.1
The Green Ribbon Commission has led a process of understanding what Boston will
need to do to cope with these increases in water. The Commission will be releasing a
report in mid-2016 outlining a unified set of sea level rise and precipitation projections
that can be used for planning purposes, and will also highlight the most critical projects
that Boston must conduct in order to harden against these climate change effects.
Further, A Better City has released several reports on what resiliency investments will
be required on individual buildings, such as their 2015 “Enhancing Resilience” report
which outlines resilience measures and costs for large building owners.2
However, there has not been a coordinated effort to date to focus on how Boston will
make these necessary investments – that is, who will pay for the climate resilience
measures and how. The approach cannot come solely from existing City and State
budgets – for instance, the City’s 5-year capital budget of $1.9B currently only mentions
climate once in relation to potential cost savings from LEED-certified buildings.3 As a
result, the City must consider how to look beyond existing resources into creative ways
to raise and deploy capital for climate resilience.
This paper aims to build on the work of the Green Ribbon Commission and A Better City
to provide an initial set of ideas for the City and relevant stakeholders to consider in
terms of finding a way to pay for these investments. In particular, this paper focuses on
how the City and other public sector stakeholders can incentivize developers and
private property owners to invest in preventative climate resilience measures on their
property, in order to avoid more significant “clean-up” costs down the road in the event
of a catastrophic event or significant climate-related property damage. This paper is
aimed to be a starting point for a conversation about approaches to financing climate
resilience. Next steps are outlined at the end of the paper.
The research for this paper draws primarily on interviews with 22 experts and
practitioners in the field, as well as a review of existing literature on climate and
resiliency efforts in Boston and beyond.
1 For instance, the City has already experienced a 21% increase in precipitation in the last 60 years. Bud Ris, “Climate
Ready Boston - Boston Green Ribbon Commission.”
2 A Better City, “Enhancing Resilience in Boston: A Guide for Large Buildings and Institutions.”
3 “City of Boston - FY2015 Adopted Budget.”
4
4) This paper focuses on solutions to three key barriers to investment: a) lack of
regulatory incentive, b) cost/lack of resources, and c) short-term time horizons.
5) The paper outlines next steps for the City and its partners in determining how to
encourage resilience investments on private property.
4“Massport - Resiliency and Climate Change”; John P. Sullivan, “Climate Adaptation Challenges for Boston’s Water and
Sewer Systems.”
5
Exhibit 1:
Exhibit 1: Framework
Framework forfor
Necessary Climate
Necessary Resilience
Climate Investments
Resilience in Boston in Boston
Investments
Solutions for
Absorption and
Rising Seas
Public Land/
Private Land/
Property
Property
(Government)
6
Barriers to Investing in Resilience: Stakeholder Mapping
Understanding the case for preventative resilience investments requires understanding
which stakeholders are incentivized to make those investments –broadly, those
stakeholders who would be obligated to pay for clean-up costs in a “do-nothing”
scenario in which those measures were not taken. These clean-up costs could relate to
repairing damage to buildings and infrastructure from gradual sea-level rise or from a
catastrophic weather event such as Hurricane Sandy in 2012. They could also entail
costs related to the disruption of business and the City’s economy.
To this end, the stakeholder maps in Exhibits 2 and 3 provide a high-level, generalized
overview of some of the most salient barriers to investment for stakeholders in the
public sector as well as the private sector. A report by the Urban Land Institute further
details these barriers to investment.5
5 Urban Land Institute, “Developing Resilience: Living with Water Strategies for Greater Boston.”
7
Exhibit 3: Stakeholder Map: Private Stakeholders
A handful of stakeholders stand to lose significantly in the event that Boston’s buildings
are not properly hardened. The City could experience significant direct costs – of
cleaning up destruction due to weather, and on infrastructure failures – as well as
indirect costs of the economic impact on Boston companies and, by extension, the tax
base. The State may also have to pitch in to support storm clean up or hardening, and
FEMA would have to step in an extreme weather event. Finally, insurance and
reinsurance companies stand to lose money if the properties they insure are harmed.
These costs have not been recently quantified with updated climate impact projections.
Notably, developers and property owners – the ones who have the power to decide
whether to invest in hardening their buildings and property against climate change
effects – are not among those who stand to lose significantly in a “do-nothing” scenario,
as their losses would likely be insured.
Focusing on the private stakeholders set, a few themes emerge from this stakeholder
map, highlighting key barriers to investment:
There are no resilience retrofit requirements for buildings that are already constructed.
Therefore, there is little regulatory incentive for resilience retrofits. There may be
possibility for revising regulations for when a property changes ownership.
2. The cost of climate resilience measures – and the lack of expected return from those
investments – leads property owners not to invest.
In many cases for new development or large Class-A commercial space, it is not a lack of
access to capital that is the problem: it is the lack of a business case for investing in
resilience. Developers also express a concern that margins are already thin, so adding in
additional costs around climate resilience investments is not compelling to them in the
absence of strong and clear regulatory requirements.
For smaller building owners, lack of capital might be more of a direct concern. Resiliency
retrofits compete for investment among other more immediate capital expenditure and
maintenance requirements.
9
For existing buildings, many owners have a similar holding timeline of 10 years or
under, and would plan to exit the market should their investment start to lose value.
Finally, insurance companies – despite being responsible for covering some percentage
of losses due to weather and flooding – operate by renewing their policies generally
every 12-18 months with building owners.7,8 As a result, these companies say they will
also exit the market if it becomes too costly and risky to provide insurance in the Boston
market, similar to what happened in California with Earthquake insurance after the
1989 Loma Prieta earthquake. This effect has already started to occur along the Florida
Gulf Coast line as some insurance companies are becoming unwilling to cover coastal
properties.9 Reinsurance companies have a slightly longer time horizon and their
business is built around providing coverage for catastrophic events where significant
damage is incurred. However, reinsurance companies may over time choose to limit
their exposure to particular geographies should climate effects make coverage in those
areas increasingly risky.
7 PWC, R!SE, Boston Green Ribbon Commission, “Climate Finance Series - Insurance Roundtable Executive Summary.”
8 “Climate Finance Series - Insurance Climate Change Roundtable Dialogue.”
9 Solovitch, “How Miami Beach Is Keeping the Florida Dream Alive—And Dry.”
10
From Barriers to Solutions: Incentive Ideas
These four barriers in turn point to potential solutions – and, indeed, a narrative of
opportunity around investing now in resilience versus paying for more costly retrofits
or clean-up later as climate effects escalate. As noted above, this paper focuses not on
the “stick” side of the equation (regulation and enforcement), but rather the “carrot” –
providing financial and non-financial incentives for investment. Exhibit 4 provides an
overview of these barriers and potential solutions.
11
In terms of existing pools of capital, A Better City’s 2015 report outlined potential
financing options, incentives and rebates that could be employed for various resilience
investments.10 These options are listed in Exhibit 5. Further work will be required to
determine how each of these public capital sources could be leveraged for particular
City-led resilience financing programs.
In addition to those listed above, several experts consulted for this project suggested
that the City could consider drawing on proceeds from the Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative (RGGI), thereby linking mitigation efforts with adaptation measures.
The City can also consider facilitating the creation of new revenue streams to create
financial incentive programs. Exhibit 6 provides a non-exhaustive list of 11 possible
approaches to generating these revenue streams, along with a short description. Again,
further work will be required to determine how each of these options complies with
existing zoning and regulation requirements, as well as how palatable these solutions
would be to key stakeholders in the Boston area.
It should be noted that a number of the revenue streams suggested below involve the
creation of a “resilience zone” – a concept that has been explored by Ceres, The Next
Practice, and the University of Cambridge.22 Designating resilience zones in the City may
have several benefits. First, these approaches could create a pool of capital that would
allow for investment in neighborhood-level interventions rather than just building level.
10 A Better City, “Enhancing Resilience in Boston: A Guide for Large Buildings and Institutions.”
11 US EPA, “319 Grant Program for States and Territories.”
12 DEP, “Grants & Financial Assistance.”
13 “Hazard Mitigation Grant Program | FEMA.gov.”
14 “9526.1 Hazard Mitigation Funding Under Section 406 (Stafford Act) | FEMA.gov.”
15 “Business Physical Disaster Loans | The U.S. Small Business Administration | SBA.gov.”
16 “Rebuild by Design.”
17 DEP, “Clean Water State Revolving Fund | MassDEP.”
18 Mass.gov, “Coastal Pollutant Remediation (CPR) Grant Program.”
19 Mass.gov, “Drinking Water Supply Protection Grant Program.”
20 “Energy Incentive Programs, Massachusetts | Department of Energy.”
21 “Stormwater Management.”
22 A Better City, “Enhancing Resilience in Boston: A Guide for Large Buildings and Institutions.”
12
Further, this approach allows the City to acknowledge that private property in
particularly flood-prone areas such as the Seaport may be more at risk for climate
impacts, and therefore can create district-specific financial and tax approaches. The
options below include scenarios in which these resilience zones would be City-
administered (similar to a Business Improvement District), and others where it would
be property-owner-led (parallel to the model of the MASCO neighborhood entity in the
Longwood Medical Area).23
13
infrastructure if the cost could be offset through sale of stormwater retention
credits.
7. Community Assuming CPA is passed by the City of Boston (expected to be on the ballot in
Preservation 2016), 10%+ of an estimated $13M raised per year can be made available for
Act environmental and open space projects, including green infrastructure
projects.24
8. PACE + Property Assessed Clean Energy Financing and Resiliency, or PACE, is currently
Resiliency pending legislation in the Massachusetts House.25 If passed, PACE could provide
off-balance sheet, low-cost capital for energy efficiency and resiliency
improvements in existing buildings via a betterment lien on the property.26
9. Establish a The City could establish an insurance authority to provide low-cost insurance
City Insurance coverage to property owners in the event of a catastrophic weather event. This
Pool approach may be more appropriate in the event that insurance companies start
to withdraw from the Boston real estate market if climate-related weather risks
increase. This insurance authority could be based on the California Earthquake
Authority model.27 The challenge with this approach would be figuring out the
appropriate amount of risk for the City to take on, and also how it could work
collaboratively with insurance providers in Boston and not undermine the
existing insurance market.
10. Work with The City could work in partnership with insurance companies or reinsurance
Insurers and companies to capitalize a fund to be deployed for resilience investments, given
Reinsurers to that both could share responsibility for costs in the event of a catastrophic
Generate weather event. Given the short time horizon of insurance companies and the
Capital Pool frequent turnover of policies, it is currently unlikely that this approach would be
appealing to them.
11. Tolls / User The City could identify ways to assess tolls or user fees on services in the Boston
Fees (Roads, area that could finance climate resilience, such as toll roads, the MBTA, or
Parks, MBTA) parks. However, given the current budgetary environment particularly for the
MBTA, this approach may not be politically viable.
These ideas are preliminary and intended to provide a starting point for conversation.
Next steps include assessing these options in terms of feasibility, as well as how much
revenue each approach could generate.
24 “The Community Preservation Act in Boston - Fact Sheet Provided to Mayor Walsh by Trust for Public Land.”
25 “PACE & Resiliency.”
26 “Bill S.1774.”
27 “CA Earthquake Authority.”
14
Exhibit 7: Leveraging Revenue Streams
Mechanism Description
Green Bond The City or State could issue a green bond backed by the full faith and credit of
the issuer, or backed by one or multiple of the revenue streams listed above. A
bond issuance could allow the City to access large amounts of capital for up-
front investments, to be paid back over time. The State of Massachusetts has
already completed several green bond issuances so there is precedence for this
approach.28,29
Environmental Parallel to a Social Impact Bond, an Environmental Impact Bond allows the City
Impact Bond to share the risk of a given project with private investors. The investment could
be backed or financed by public revenue streams. This approach makes the
most sense for a pilot project where investors are uncertain about the
outcomes of the intervention (such as the efficacy of green infrastructure
investments in stormwater retention). The EIB could be backed by philanthropic
or public capital in the event that the expected outcomes are not achieved.
In addition to these ideas, the City can also explore Public Private Partnerships to pass
some costs and operational requirements to private sector partners, such as to build and
maintain green infrastructure in the City. The City could also explore raising funds
through Catastrophe Bonds to provide additional insurance against the impacts of a
severe climate weather event.
Revolving Loan The City could capitalize a revolving loan fund that provides low or no-cost
Fund financing for climate resilience investments. This would be a similar structure
to the City’s Renew Boston Trust, which provides financing for energy
efficiency investments.30
The City would need to determine how these loans would be repaid. There are
several options. First, the grants could be repaid as a part of the owner’s
property taxes – either part of the current amount or an additional fee
assessed. Second, if insurance companies were willing to give an insurance
premium break for these investments, it might be possible that a portion of
this premium break could be redirected toward the City until the loan was fully
repaid. Finally, if the Boston Water and Sewer Commission were seeking to
fund projects on private property, they may be willing to repay the loans to
these properties from stormwater fees or their own funds. Other alternatives
15
for repayment likely exist, and the City would need to engage relevant
stakeholders to find an arrangement that was compelling to all parties.
Grant Pool Rather than expecting repayment, the City could elect to channel these
revenues to property owners as a grant. The City would need to articulate how
the projects being deployed in buildings or in neighborhoods would benefit the
whole city so as to avoid the appearance that particular developers or
property owners were being favored in the process. It’s likely that this
approach makes the most sense for residential buildings, and possibly in
lower-income areas where these funds could be packaged with investments in
affordable housing.
Fund a City Another way to deploy the capital gathered from these projects is to earmark
Insurance Pool the funds for capitalizing a public City-controlled insurance pool. This
approach could be an alternative to setting up a City-run insurance pool selling
policies to building owners. Instead, this pool of resources would be funded
from other sources and could be tapped in the event that the city suffers a
catastrophic event or damage that requires funds to be deployed. In this
sense, resources from this pool would provide a buffer against the City bearing
the brunt of clean-up and repair costs. This “last resort” fund approach could
be paired with other efforts aimed at preventative resilience investments.
Looking at the possible mechanisms for deploying capital to developers and private
property owners, the City would need to evaluate which of these approaches is most
appropriate given the existing regulatory environment and the relative ease of
implementation of these approaches. It’s possible that multiple approaches could be
employed in order to target different end users - such as a program for small residential
owners versus another program for larger commercial building owners.
16
To address the lack of regulatory requirements, the City could consider providing zoning
incentives to developers, such as density / Floor Area Ratio (FAR) bonuses to
developers who incorporate resilience measures into their development plans. The
additional income possible from increased density could offset the costs of designing
and building resilience measures.
The City could also consider tax-based measures, such as providing an accelerated
depreciation schedule for buildings that incorporate climate resilience measures. In
this case, the City would need to evaluate trade-offs in terms of lost tax revenue to the
City.
17
Conclusion & Next Steps
This paper serves as an initial step in the process of determining the best way forward
for the City to support private property owners in accelerating the deployment of
climate resilience investments. Next steps for this process are outlined below.
This study could also build on the A Better City report on Enhancing Resilience to help
developers understand the cost of making resilience investments during the design
phase rather than pursuing retrofits later on.32
31 A Better City, “Enhancing Resilience in Boston: A Guide for Large Buildings and Institutions.”
32 Ibid.
18
channeling funds to private developers and owners? Who are winners and losers
of each option?
Political viability: What support would each option require from political
stakeholders in the City? How much alignment is there between the option and
current political priorities in the City? Will the option have to compete with
other priorities?
The City may be able to work with these stakeholders who also will bear some of the
cost burden in the event of significant climate impacts on Boston’s buildings. These
stakeholders may also have the ability to work with and exercise influence upon
developers and property owners more directly as projects are designed, developed, and
executed.
Conclusion
There is clearly more work to be done as Boston determines its priorities for hardening
the City against climate impacts in the coming years and decades. This paper serves as a
an early step in the process of understanding not just what the City and its partners need
to do, but how they are going to do it from a financing perspective. Beginning this
conversation early will ensure that the City is able to move forward as quickly as
possible on preparing the City and its property owners to thrive in the face of increasing
climate effects.
19
Appendix: Experts Consulted
The following individuals graciously offered their time, expertise, and guidance in this
research process. Gita Rao, Professor of Finance at MIT Sloan School of Management,
provided research oversight and thought partnership. Bud Ris of the Barr Foundation
provided guidance over the course of the research on outreach and current climate
planning efforts in Boston.
Name Organization
Andrea Chegut MIT Center for Real Estate
Andrew Grace MassPort
Brad Swing City of Boston
Brian Swett Arup
Bud Ris Barr Foundation
Chris Dempsey Masabi
Chris Osgood City of Boston
Doug Criscitello MIT Sloan
Ed Marchant Harvard Kennedy School
Jane Silfen Encourage Capital
Joel Sklar Samuels & Associates
John Dalzell Boston Redevelopment Authority
John Fitzgerald Boston Redevelopment Authority
John Sullivan Boston Water & Sewer Commission
Laura O'Connor MassPort
Maeve Bartlett AECOM
Michael Alperin MIT Sloan
Ned Codd WSP | Parsons Brinckerhoff
Robbin Peach MassPort
Roger Grenier Liberty Mutual
Rowan Spivey Ceres
Tom Nally A Better City
Travis Sheehan Boston Redevelopment Authority
Yve Torrie A Better City
20
Appendix 1: Building Resilience Toolkit (A Better City, 2015)33
33 Ibid.
21
Appendix 2: Resiliency Measure Cost Estimates (A Better City)34
Note: Only measures addressing water and stormwater management are included in the
below table, though the A Better City report outlines costs for measures that mitigate
urban heat islands as well.
34 Ibid.
22
Fuel Tank Anchoring $300–$500 to anchor a 1,000 gallon tank to a concrete base.
Cost will be lower for smaller tanks and for tanks anchored to
the ground
Green Roofing Extensive: $5–25 per sq. ft.; Intensive: $25–$40
per sq. ft. Annual maintenance costs range from
$0.75–$1.50 per sq. ft.
Permanent Flood Levees/berms: 2 feet: $60/linear foot; 4 feet: $106/linear
Barriers: Levees and foot; 6 feet: $170/linear foot
Floodwalls Floodwalls: 2 feet: $92/linear foot; 4 feet: $140/linear foot; 6
feet: $195/linear foot
Permeable Clay Brick $10.00–$12.00 per sq. ft.
Pavers
Permeable $2.50-$10.00 per sq. ft.
Interlocking Concrete
Pavers
Pervious Concrete $2.00–$6.50 per sq. ft., typically 15% more expensive than
conventional concrete and four times more expensive than
porous asphalt
Plastic Grid $1.50-$5.75 per sq. ft
Dry Floodproofing: $3.00-7.00 per sq. ft.
Polished Concrete
Floor
Porous Asphalt $0.50–$2.50 per sq. ft. (EPA), typically 10%–15% more expensive
than conventional asphalt (FHWA)
Raingarden / Rain gardens: $3.00–$40.00 per sq. ft.
Bioretention Cell Bioretention: $2.22–$30.00 per sq. ft.
Rainwater Dependent on size and material
Harvesting Galvanized steel: $950 for 2,000 gal.
Polyethylene: $1,100 for 1,800 gal.
Fiberglass: $10,000 for 10,000 gal.
Fiberglass/steel composite: $10,000 for 5,000 gal.
Resin-bound / $3.00–$12.00 per sq. ft.
Bonded Paving
Permanent Flood Project dependent
Barrier: Retractable
Barriers
Dry Floodproofing: Sealants: $2.50 per linear ft.; Membranes: $3.50 per sq. ft.; $5.70
Sealants and per linear ft. (Estimates based on floodproofing for floods of
Impermeable approx. 3 feet)
Membranes
Sump Pump / Wide range depending on quality and pumping rate.
Internal Drainage Pump cost ranges from $282.50 for 75 gallons/min to $2,970 for
System 160 gallons/min
Temporary Flood Tigerdam (inflatable)—$80/linear ft. for 50 ft.-long and 19-
Barrier inch-diameter tube. Replaces 500 sandbags at a fraction of
setup time and similar cost and can be interconnected
indefinitely. One tube can be filled in 90 seconds with a
hydrant and 3 minutes with a standard pump. 17-year
23
service life.
Eco-Dam (inflatable)—Price varies by size (for 10m sections:
$133/linear ft. for 5 ft. high, $63/linear ft. for 2 ft. high,
cheaper for longer sections). 1 tube can be deployed in
under 10 minutes. 15-year service life.
Rapidam (membrane)—$145/linear ft. for 1m high x120m
long barrier (significant cost reductions for larger orders).
Multiple sections can be joined together. Each 120m section
can be deployed by 3 people in 30 minutes. 15-year service
life.
Aquafence (modular)—~$300/ft. for 4 ft. high, ~$750/ft. for
8 ft. high. 8–10 people can assemble 150 linear ft. of 4ft-high
panels in <1 hour. 50 year service life, can be reused over a
dozen times.
Wet Floodproofing Dependent on building size and site requirements, modifications
that reduce flood insurance premiums should be considered
Cost estimates for wet floodproofing retrofits range from
approx. $100,000 for a detached 1–2 family house to $1.5
million for a high-rise residential or commercial building.
Costs of elevating a building’s mechanical and electrical
systems above BFE range from approx. $85,000 for a
detached 1–2 family house to anywhere from $1 million to
$20 million for a high rise commercial building, depending on
whether additional retrofits are needed to reinforce floors or
roofs for additional weight or meeting fire codes.
24
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