The Role of CMO from Past to Present

Major General J. Strom Thurmond of the US Army Reserve once said in a

lecture that, “There is more to war than hardware and tactics. War is a struggle for
control of the people. Other services primarily conduct their operations in the air and
on and under the sea. The Army operates on the land and among the people. This is
the army’s environment, which it must master as completely as the sailor masters
the sea and the flyer the air.” It is on these lines that he implies the importance of
knowing the people as part of the operational environment of the Army. In the past,
Civil-Military Operations concepts, in its raw form, has played significant and crucial
roles that were instrumental in winning wars and battles which paved the way in
attaining and maintaining national peace, progress, and development. Likewise,
CMO is becoming more and more significant in this future age.

During the Spanish colonization and even before, unrefined concepts of Public
Affairs and PsyOps were already applied in order to sway the peoples’ minds and
gain support against the colonizers. Propaganda was widely exploited by notable
figures in Philippine history such as Jose Rizal, Juan Luna, Mariano Ponce,
Graciano Lopez Jaena, and Jose Maria Basa wherein they founded a newspaper
called “La Solidaridad” that criticized Spanish maltreatment and injustices against the
Filipinos. This effort was helpful in inspiring many Filipinos to join the “Katipunan”.
Members of the “Katipunan” also regularly received publications as guides for their
cause. These include, among others, the “Kartilla,” which was wrote by Emilio
Jacinto. “Kalayaan,” the movement’s newspaper, to which the editor was also Emilio
Jacinto, was very important as it served as a medium in transmitting the ideas and
enlisting of the Katipuneros. Although Rizal was part of the movement, he was a
proponent of “reforms through non-violent concessions” but was still charged by the
military court because forthrightness about reforms. Likewise, under the Japanese
occupation, “Voice of Freedom” was broadcast by allied forces under Gen McArthur,
together with President Manuel Quezon which highlighted the “Courage and Heroism
of soldiers in the battlefield.”

After World War II, in 15 December 1950, the Economic Development Corps
(EDCOR) under the AFP was created by Secretary Magsaysay of the Department of
National Defence as a support to the psychological warfare of the government. The
corps was visualized to “look into the economic rehabilitation, spiritual rejuvenation
and return to normalcy of dissidents (HUKS) who had chosen to take anew the path
of peace.” In 01 March 1951, the Civil Affairs Office (CAO) was then created by
Secretary Magsaysay with the task to “conduct civic action programs with the
objective of winning the hearts and minds of the people.” Thus, civic action was
continued to be used by Presidents Garcia and Macapagal as “a form of anti-
dissident operation, and to improve the conditions in the countryside.” This led to the
birth of the present Civil Relations Service.

With the rise of the Communist Party of the Philippines under Jose Maria Sison
and its armed component, the New Peoples’ Army, CMO was highly used to counter
subversive propaganda from the emergence of active anti-government student
organizations. PsyOps efforts were strengthened to regain popular support for the
government.
 In the south, CMO was also vital to the governments’ effort of “reorienting” the
populace’s perception of the “new society.” Creation of programs helped stabilize
political processes and structures. To neutralize violence in Mindanao, CEMCOM
(Central Mindanao Command) was organized. The succeeding years proved to be a
tough time in Mindanao. From the “Jabida Incident”, to the formation of the Moro
National Liberation Front (MNLF) which called for separation and independence of
Mindanao, from which broke out the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), to the
establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) which both
MNLF and MILF did not recognize at the time, to the formation of the Abu Sayyaf
Group, to the 1996 Final Peace Agreement wherein MNLF Chairman Nur Misuari
becomes Governor of ARMM, to start of armed conflicts between the Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP) and MILF wherein repetition of armed clashes and peace
negotiations continued, to President Estrada’s declaration of an “all out war” against
the MILF wherein thousands of people were internally displaced, to the 2009
“Maguindanao Massacre”, to the “Zamboanga Seige” of 2013, and the “Marawi
Seige” of 2017. Several CMO efforts were concocted, tested, applied, and evaluated
to address these conflicts and Mindanao. Psychological operations that targeted the
enemy were used, stakeholder engagement with different Muslim Leaders and other
civilian stakeholders were conducted, campaigns such as “Support our Troops” and
“Partners for Peace” were implemented to cement a just and lasting peace in
Mindanao. Likewise, the AFP also managed the support towards internally displaced
persons (IDPs) in areas where conflicts erupt. The CMO effort in Mindanao
highlights the importance of inter-agency cooperation and support that brought the
Mindanao conflict to a “manageable” status today.

In other efforts such as HADR operations, the AFP also showed that it is capable
and ready to conduct such operations. Despite the lack of equipment of some units,
the AFP was able to give the necessary manpower support to those people affected
by calamities. This shows the AFP’s commitment to serve the people - a CMO goal
that is vital to the AFP’s image-building efforts.

To summarize, the AFP is building on the trust and confidence of the people in
order to pursue nationalistic goals. CMO is a vital tool in addressing the challenges
brought about by conflict and war, as well as in preserving peace in support to
national progress and development.

___________________________________________________________________

References:

 An excerpt: Chapter 1 CRS Manual. Retrieved from

https://scmoooclms.afpcmos.com/pluginfile.php/133/mod_folder/content/0/Excer
pt-CRS-Manual-CMO-History.pdf
 CMO History (A Glimpse). Retrieved from
https://scmoooclms.afpcmos.com/pluginfile.php/133/mod_folder/content/0/CMO-
History-2019.pdf
 Thurmond, J. (1960). The Future Role of Civil Affairs. Retrieved from
https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3074&context=strom
 Ishii, M. (2015). Brief chronology of the conflict in the Southern Philippines.
Retrieved from http://peacebuilding.asia/brief-chronology-of-the-conflict-in-the-
southern-philippines/

Gaps in Performing CMO

In the past, little effort was given in winning the hearts and minds of the people
while addressing security issues in country. The armed forces was all about
warfighting. It is when the armed forces realized that it should also care about the
support of the people to its cause, that it conceptualized the doctrines for Civil-
Military Operations (CMO). From there one can see that CMO was conceptualized to
“fill a gap” in the AFP’s operations - the civilian side. CMO is now an essential part of
the AFP’s roles in addressing security issues in the country in support to national
development. Over the years, the AFP has been able to reap the rewards of CMO. It
has brought about many victories for the country’s ongoing insurgencies. It has
made the AFP closer to the Filipino people by performing non-traditional roles. But
performing these non-traditional roles through CMO has some risks that makes AFP
units lose focus or worse, bring the whole organization to a bad light.

Per observation, some AFP units conduct CMO operations in some “generally
peaceful” areas. In the field, there is a trend - that there some units that would prefer
to conduct MedCap, gift giving, stakeholder engagement, among others, in places
where one could consider that it has already been “won and ready for development”.
Although a person can see this as a way of maintaining the peace, it must be known
that there are still other places where these services, that the AFP provides, are
needed more - places the have not yet been won nor are ready for development.
Note that CMO must be applied together with intelligence and combat operations, in
synergy, to attain a tactical or operational objective in a specific theater of
operations; if not, then it is basically taking away from the AFP’s already limited
resources and is harmful to its capacity to properly address security issues of the
country.

There is a misconception about the conduct of CMO. When a soldier is able to

get from a civilian something, like a chicken, a piece of fish, some vegetables, etc.,
more often than not, the phrase, “Na-CMO ko ‘to!” can be heard. This puts CMO,
and the AFP in general, in a bad light. The phrase means that the soldier takes
things from the populace through CMO, which undermines the legitimacy of the
AFP’s effort to win the hearts and minds of the people. This mindset also reminds
the people of the past where soldiers were seen as pillagers and looters which could
be used by the enemies to fuel dissent against the national government thus
endangering national security.

Ultimately, in addressing the country’s security issues the AFP must CMO,
together with combat and intelligence operations, without compromising its
resources nor sabotage its effort in maintaining the peace. To address these gaps,
the AFP must continuously remind every soldier that conducting CMO is an
“operation” - it must be well-planned and deliberate in order to achieve the specific
tactical and operational goals of the unit and it must also be conducted in a
responsible way through promoting goodwill and proper communication. Each unit
must be reminded that when performing CMO, the conduct of each soldier during the
activity is a “show window” to the capabilities and professionalism of the AFP.
Likewise, aside from continuous reminders, a proper feedback system from
stakeholders, as well as other AFP units, with regards to the performance of a CMO
activity must be established, or reinforced, if there is already one existing. This is to
properly monitor these gaps, including others, that would compromise how the AFP
addresses national security issues.

___________________________________________________________________

References:

 An excerpt: Chapter 1 CRS Manual. Retrieved from

https://scmoooclms.afpcmos.com/pluginfile.php/133/mod_folder/content/0/Excer
pt-CRS-Manual-CMO-History.pdf
 CMO History (A Glimpse). Retrieved from
https://scmoooclms.afpcmos.com/pluginfile.php/133/mod_folder/content/0/CMO-
History-2019.pdf
 Acop, D. The Expanded Nontraditional Role of the AFP: A Reassessment.
Retrieved from https://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/prism/prism_3-
2/prism99-114_acop.pdf