Consti 2 related topic:

To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this Court must necessarily turn to the
Constitution itself, which employs the well-settled principles of constitutional construction.

First, verba legis that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given
their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. It is to be assumed that the words in
which constitutional provisions are couched expressed the objective sought to be attained. They are to be
given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in which case the significance
thus attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer’s document, it being essential
for the rule of law to be obtain that it should ever be present in the people’s consciousness, its language as
much as possible should be understood in the sense they have in common use.
Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution should be
interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers. A foolproof yardstick in constitutional
construction is the intention underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held that the
Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its
adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined
in the light of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances under which the Constitution
was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason, which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact
the particular provision, and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the
whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose
Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The words of the Constitution should be interpreted as a
whole. The members of the Constitutional Convention could not have dedicated a provision of our
Constitution merely for the benefit of one person without considering that it could also affect others.
When they adopted [provisions of the Constitution], they permitted, if not willed, that said provision
should function to the full extent of its substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with
all other provisions of that great document. (Francisco vs. House of Representatives, GR No. 160261,
Nov. 10, 2003)
Francisco v House of Representatives
G.R. No. 160261. November 10, 2003
Carpio- Morales, J
Facts:
On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved
the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules
approved by the 11th Congress. On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution,
which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner
of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary
Development Fund (JDF). On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment
complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and
other high crimes."
The complaint was endorsed by House Representatives, and was referred to the House
Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.
The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was
"sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October 2003 for being insufficient in substance.
Four months and three weeks since the filing of the first complaint or on 23 October 2003, a day
after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed
with the Secretary General of the House by House Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. It was founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned
House Resolution. Moreover, the second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of Representatives.
Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court against the
House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second
impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the
Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than
once within a period of one year."
Issue/s:
1. Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the
12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI
of the Constitution.
2. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI
of the Constitution.
Held:

Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules, impeachment

proceedings are deemed initiated; (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the
verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance; or (2) once the House itself a affirms or
overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not
sufficient in substance; or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of
Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of
the House. These rules clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI since the rules give the term
"initiate" a meaning different meaning from filing and referral.
 It is basic that no rules must contravene the Constitution, which is the fundamental law. If as
alleged Congress had absolute rule making power, then it would, by necessary implication, have the
power to alter or amend the meaning of the Constitution without need of referendum.

In Arroyo v. De Venecia, quoting United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co., Justice Vicente
Mendoza, speaking for this Court, held that while the Constitution empowers each house to determine its
rules of proceedings, it may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights,
and furthered that there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding
established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. It is only within these limitations that
all matters of method are open to the determination of the Legislature.

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment
complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning
of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the
foregoing manner, another may not be led against the same official within a one-year period following
Article XI, Section 3 (5) of the Constitution.
In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2,
2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, and the second impeachment
complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the
Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of
impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.