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7. Chan vs.

Chan: PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION

Facts:
Petitioner wife (Josielene Lara) filed against respondent husband (Johnny) a petition for the declaration
of nullity of marriage, with the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, and the be award of
custody over their children, claiming that respondent failed to care for and support his family and that a
psychiatrist diagnosed him as mentally deficient due to excessive drinking and prohibited drugs abuse.

On the other hand, the husband claims that it was the wife who failed in her marital duties. And that
initially the husband agreed to marriage counseling to save their marriage, however upon arriving at the
hospital, two men forcibly subdued him.

During the pre-trial conference, petitioner pre-marked the Phil health Claim Form that Johnny attached to
his answer as proof that he was forcibly confined at the rehabilitation unit of a hospital. In which the same
form carried a physician’s handwritten note that the husband suffered from drug and alcohol abuse.

Based on the physician’s handwritten statement, petitioner wife requested for the issuance of a subpoena
duces tecum, for the production of the husband’s medical records.

The husband opposed, arguing that the medical records were covered by physician-patient privilege. The
request of petitioner wife was denied and her subsequent motion for reconsideration on the matter was
also denied. She then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals but this was also dismissed.
Her subsequent motion for reconsideration with the CA was also denied. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether CA erred in ruling that the trial court correctly denied the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum
covering Johnny’s hospital records on the ground that these are covered by the privileged character of the
physician-patient communication?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court sustained the previous ruling. It stated that the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum is
premature.

The court stated that she should have wait for trial to begin before making such. Emphasizing that it is not
just mode for the admission in evidence. It cannot be treated as a motion for production of documents as a
mode of discovery because Rule 27, Section 1 of the Rules of Court is only limited to disclosure of
documents which are “not privileged”.

The Petitioner claim that the documents are not privileged is untenable.

Section 24(c) of Rule 130 states that the physician ― cannot in a civil case, without the consent of
the patient, be examined regarding their (physician-patient) professional conversation.
To allow the disclosure would, in effect, be tantamount to allowing access to evidence that is inadmissible
without the patient’s consent. In which case if disclosed would be the equivalent of compelling the
physician to testify on privileged matters he gained while dealing with the patient, without the latter’s
prior consent.

Lastly, Petitioner wife argues that her husband already admitted in his answer that he had been confined
in a hospital. However, as already mentioned above, trial in the case had not yet begun. Since trial had not
yet begun, it cannot be said the Husband had already presented said Phil health claim form as evidence.
The husband was not yet bound to adduce evidence in the case when he filed his answer. Any request for
disclosure of his hospital records would again be premature.

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