Lovro Milvanović 2.

The Fratres Gracchi – The First ‘Death Throes’ of the Republic?

SHOTTER states ‘…the growth of the Roman empire has been held as the
main cause of the breakdown of the old respublica.’ (The Fall of the Roman
Republic Routledge, 1994)
To what extent can this be accepted, and to what extent was it the
underlying cause of the other events which ultimately led to the Principate
and subsequent Imperial periods?
The Romans themselves had an idealised interpretation of the situation until
146:
‘…before the destruction of Carthage the people and senate of Rome
together governed the republic peacefully and with moderation. Livy tells us
that in 188:
‘When four tribunes of the plebs vetoed this bill [which was to grant
citizenship to the people of Arpinum, Formiae and Fundi] on the ground that
it was not proposed with the sanction of the senate, they were informed that
it was the prerogative of the assembly, not the senate, to bestow the
franchise.’ (Livy, 38.36.8-9)
Thus we can conclude that the acceptance of a generalised enfranchisement
of extraneous territories into the body of the Quirites remained the
prerogative of the assembly alone and that the senate continued simply to
have the authority to recommend such an action rather than bestowing this
ad hoc.
The impending struggle which is recorded here, pitting the libertās of the
populus against the auctoritās of the senate, although most remembered
perhaps through the times of the Gracchi brothers, was to be a constant
battle of the last centuries of the Republic.
Cicero stated that it was:
‘…fitting that all powers, all commands, all commissions are granted by the
Roman people.’ (De Lege Agrariae, 2.17)
So, even at the time that the Republic was entering what was arguably its
terminal decline, one of the protagonists on the political stage viewed the
people as being the ultimate authority in all decisions of major importance.
Sempronius Gracchus and what can be interpreted as the first direct
challenge to senatorial power in the name of the people – whilst SPQR was
the watchword of Roman government, the power of the senate had swollen
at an almost exponential rate during the acquisition of the Empire, though ‘…
not by constitutional enactment but simply through its own initiative:
custom, not law, enabled it to govern.’ (Scullard, The Gracchi to Nero
Routledge, 2010, 5) The corpus of the senate consisted of 300 senators at
this time, drawn from the landed aristocracy with an income of 1.000.000
sestercii per annum from non-mercantile earnings. Foreign policy (eg the
receiving of foreign ambassadors) had rested in the hands of the senate, as
had the ultimate say in state fiscal policy. The senate was controlled by
those families who constituted the nobiles – the dominant small group of
families; Novi homines – new men in the senate who were not from the
traditional noble families – were most certainly not a common occurrence,
though where one did achieve ranking positions of power, the gloria, fās,
dignitās and auctoritās of his descendants grew enormously. Despite this,
the families which composed the nobiles were the absolute dominant force,
both in the fact that, whilst a small number of the lower magisterial offices
may have been occupied by individuals outside of the ‘club’, both the curule
magisterial positions and, perhaps more importantly, the business of the
curia were totally dominated by the insiders due to the required order of
speaking in senatorial debate combined with the fact that often the most
powerful families would act as patrons to the less influential families, hence
ensuring their political loyalty. These led to power blocks (factiones) in the
senate and amongst the curule magistrates, though they never resembled
the political parties associated with modern day politics, and it was far from
rare that amicitiae collapsed and resentments almost resembling modern
day vendette arose. Power was also wielded by the nobiles through control
of the few hereditary state priesthoods and dominance of the Colleges of
Augurs and Pontiffs above all as practically every official act of the state had
to be accompanied by a reading of the omens or a sacrifice – the highest
state priesthood, that of Pontifex Maximus was to be used by Caesar to
great effect in the 1st Century. groups which were based upon the census
classes which were ratified and / or altered as required by the censors,
senior magistrates appointed on a quinquennial basis, to verify the financial
and moral state of the individual citizens to remain in the class in which they
had been recorded previously or move them up or down the social scale –
these classes were, however, stratified according to wealth, and ergo were
subject to a certain level of change depending upon the fortunes and
misfortunes of an individual family and the members.
There were five principle grades in the fiscally based classes – Latin for
‘gradations’ – excluding the equites and the enormous capite censi subclass
– those whose combined property and income did not entitle them to a place
in the social hierarchy of classes, even though they did count amongst the
voting citizen body in the comitia centuriata as explained above. As Scullard
has pointed out (op cit, 7), it is all too easy to categorise these as two
competing parties on the political stage – the optimates as the Party of the
Senate and the populares as the Reformist Popular Party. The optimates did
win control of the senate and used their influence to block the arguments
and proposals of the populares who were left with the option of giving up
their political sway, or turning to demagoguery through the office of tribune
to counter the senatorial domination by the optimates through appealing to
the Tribal Assembly which was the only way to counter the senate. Rather it
was a recognized political weapon, which in recent years had been used
rarely, but was nevertheless a necessary sanction, should law and its
associated physical power prove inadequate.’), the stability of the
governmental system had meant, as Beard and Crawford (Rome in the Late
Republic, Duckworth, 1989, 2) have pointed out, the limited prize of
reaching the top echelon of political life – a military leadership and one,
possibly two consulships – a working continuation of the consular diarchy
and the magisterial system. By the start of the 2nd century, the factionalism
in the senate, as far as this can be classed as an accurate term, was
gathered around the two leading senatorial families of the era – the Gens
Scipiones and the Gens Claudii.
He died without heir, and bequeathed his city to Rome in order to avoid a
civil war – an ironic motivation in that it set Rome on her way to the
subsequent series of bella civilis which would ultimately lead to the collapse
of the Republican government into which secure hands Attalus was leaving
his kingdom and people. Gracchus are highly disputed – was he an altruist
who truly did wish to ease the plight of the poor, or was he simply preparing
to turn to the Assemblies, bypass senatorial power and use that popularity
to work his way up the cursus honorum? equally, however, it can be
interpreted that his motives rested more on a fear of the spreading of the
slave revolt in Sicily to the rural areas of Italia, now mainly occupied by the
slave work forces on the senatorially owned latifundia and growing into an
almost uncontrollable situation for the already overstretched military –
something which he had seen at first hand during his return through
provincial Italia. Gracchus actually saw the need for land reform in favour of
the landless poor as the key to the economic problems facing Rome at the
time, or whether it simply provided him with a both acceptable and credible
tool to use to challenge the authority of the oligarchs in the senate is a
question which must remain unanswered. The law itself was arguably very
fair to the senatorial owners of these immense estates – they were not even
required to return all of the ager publicus which they had gradually occupied
– up to 500 iugera – 320 acres – could still be held, and the area of
Campania was not to be subject to this. cit, 9, IV, Loeb 1921)
If the sentiments of such a speech are to be trusted, there is little doubt
that, whatever his personal motives, a strongly demagogic approach to
addressing the populace from the rostra was most certainly a weapon in
Gracchus’ arsenal, and one which he wielded to its utmost extent.
It only required one of the ten annual tribunes to veto an appeal to the
Assembly in order to remove that proposal, and this is exactly what
happened – a tribune called Octavius, a major beneficiary of the land
seizures from the ager publicus, did veto Ti. Gracchus more or less managed
to stop the daily business of Rome through constant use of the veto whilst
appealing to Octavius to withdraw his veto and even going so far as to
accept an appeal that the case be put to the senate. The election of Mucius
(Appian names the replacement as Mummius), a client to Tiberius, as the
replacement tribune meant that the land reform bill was passed, despite the
vocal attacks by the aristocrats in the senate on Gracchus, led, Plutarch tells
us, by Publius Nasica, one of Rome’s largest land owners, cousin of Tiberius,
and Pontifex Maximus. The morality of this move by Tiberius is highly
questionable, but the person of the tribune was sacrosanct and inviolable
during his tenure of office, protected by the plebeian oath and it was in no
way an illegal move.
When the news arrived that the wealth of Pergamum had been bequeathed
to Rome, Tiberius moved to take command of the riches and use this to
support those who had been granted the parcels of the ager publicus, then,
according to Plutarch:
‘And as regarded the cities which were included in the kingdom of Attalus,
he said it did not belong to the senate to deliberate about them, but he
himself would submit a pertinent resolution to the people. cit, 14.2)
The senate evidently did not take this lying down – it was a direct challenge
to their authority, even though that authority was based upon tradition
rather than constitutional right, Pompeius going so far as to accuse Tiberius
of having accepted a purple robe and diadem from Attalus – every Roman
would have realised this was an indirect accusation of regnum – the desire
to be king – the greatest insult for any Roman politician. The Constitution of
Tradition worked on a state of consuetudio – consensus – existing between
the two groups, hence Senatus Populusque. Gracch, 20.3-7) tell of how the
senate used this as an excuse to arrest, try and put to death many of those
who were accused of ‘conspiring’ with Tiberius by setting up a special court
to bring to trial his supporters (Sallust, BJ, 31.7 ‘After the murder of Ti.
Gracchus, who they said was aiming to make himself king, a special court
was set up against the Roman commons.’) – as Konrad has put it (in A
Companion to the Roman Republic Blackwell 2012 Kindle edition)
, ‘the unspoken agreement not to take political disputes to the point of lethal
violence – was thus swept away.’
Gracchus, and already before the whole political tenor of his tribunate,
divided a single populace into two factions.’ (Cicero, Rep, 1.19.31 ‘mors
Tiberii Gracchi, et iam ante tota illius ratio tribunatus, divisit populum unum
in duas partes.’)
Scipio Nasica’s subsequent acquittal on all charges of murder was later used
to justify his actions as a defender of the res publica from the machinations
of a megalomaniacal demagogue whose sole intention was to shatter the
position of the boni and remove them from their ‘rightful place’ in the social
hierarchy. He persuaded the senate that the allies’ cases should not be
heard by the triumvires, led by the younger Gracchus, but rather by the
Consul for the year, Tuditanus. Fulvius Flaccus proposed as both consul and
land commissioner that the allies who were deserving of it should be granted
full citizenship, hence the problem could disappear overnight – those who
were not seen as being deserving of the civitas would be allowed provocatio
and hence could appeal to the populus Romanus if they believed the
magistrates’ decision an unfair one (Appian, ibid 1.21; Unlike his elder
brother, however, Gaius was a much more radical reformer, intending on a
programme which would cover a plethora of issues – he did not put all his
ambition behind one single piece of legislation (For a somewhat negative
judgment on C. Gaius therefore settled on solving this problem through the
lex frumentaria, which demanded that the state purchase and store massive
grain stocks which could be sold at a subsidised price once per month at a
rate below that charged on the open market, thus driving any price rises
back down (Appian, Bell. There was the fear that this law would simply
encourage indolence amongst the poor:
‘…and last, the law on grain proposed by C. whereas good citizens were
against it, because they thought it would draw the plebeians away from
work, throwing them into the arms of sloth, and they were aware that it
would exhaust the public finances.’ (Cicero, In Defence of Sextius, 103
‘frumentarium legem C. Gracchus also wished to persuade the newly arising
ordo equester, the ‘nouveau riche’ amongst the propertied classes who were
not senatorial families as such (On his oratorical prowess, cf Cicero, Brutus,
125-6). This he did by making the division between these two upper orders
even further blurred by appointing equestrian jurymen to the quaestio de
repetundis, Rome’s first permanent court for the prosecution of provincial
governors on charges of corruption through the lex repetundarum,
sponsored by the tribune Marcus Acilius Glabro, removing senators from the
position of being the jury on a crime on which they were the only echelon of
society that could be charged. This meant that a magistrate had to allow
recourse to provocatio ad populum on capital charges (Cicero, pro C.
Further, on a social niveau, they gave a certain level of legality to the
widening chasm between the senatorial families centred on the nobiles who
controlled the elected public offices and the nouveau riche of the ordo
equester who were classified by their wealth rather than their ‘masks in the
cupboard’ (A reference to the wax death masks of former holders of the
consulship and high magisterial office amongst the noble and senatorial
families – and integral part of their right to their social rank and a part of the
reminder of mos maiorum. Gracchus in pitting them openly against each
other, particularly in the quaestio de repetundis.
It will hardly come as a surprise that C. Gracchus’ legislation regarding the
grain laws and the judicial reforms made him many enemies in the senate
(Lintott points out these led the optimates to ‘conceive Gracchus’ legislation
as an elaborate plot against the authority of the Senate.’ Political History,
78), though, as all his laws went through, they were evidently wary enough
not to attempt a veto on any of his bills. Gracchus now turned his attention
to the settlement of the colonia of Iunonia, again to alleviate the problems of
feeding the urban populace as well as the ever present call upon the grain
supply from the army, and on a much more insecure footing, improving the
lot of the disgruntled Italian allies. Livius Drusus, who had full senatorial
backing as well as that of the consul Gaius Fannius (For his speech against
C. Drusus now turned to his own demagoguery, accusing Gaius of
cheapening the citizenship and pointing out that all rights would be shared
out – in modern parlance, with C. After one of Opimius’ attendants was killed
by a group of pro-Gracchan thugs, the following day saw major
demonstrations, enough for the Senate to use senatus ultimum consultum,
the first example of its use (videat consul, ne quid res publica detrementi
capiat – the consul should ensure that no harm befall the Republic – Cicero,
In Catalinam 1.4, Philippics 8.14), to permit the consul to take whatever
measures required for the safety of the state. in the meantime, Flaccus’
supporters gathered at his house, whilst Gracchus apparently returned home
totally despondent at Flaccus’ readiness to lead an armed insurrection.
The following day, as had been done in the ‘Conflict of the Orders’, the
Gracchan supporters seized the Aventine, C. Gracchus occupied the Aventine
with an armed mob, so the consul, L. Gracchus was defeated and killed, and
with him Fulvius Flaccus, the former consul, who was his partner in this
madness.’ cf also Vell. Many of these men had also been cut down, though
without even the slightest semblance of a trial, or had been dragged before
he consul and condemned to death without any right of defence or appeal,
thus totally ignoring the laws passed by Gracchus for the protection of the
people against a magistrate’s abuse or misuse of his imperium (ne quis
iniussu populi Romani capite damnetur). Opimius was cleared of the charges
of murder the following year under the backing of the former Gracchan and
consul for 120, C. Gaius had attempted to unite the disparate factions by
appealing in some way to all the groups, but simply succeeded in alienating
most groups and even in openly pitting them against one another (Lintott, A,
Political History, 78 C. cit, 38) Whilst there was never any intention to set up
an Athenian style democracy, as Kennedy points out, ‘…it can be said that
the reforms proposed by the populares had a detrimental impact on
senatorial control over republican institutions.’ (The Politics of Natural Law in
Cicero’s De Legibus, 6)
From this point on, however, until the death of the Republic, one major
legacy of Gaius’ period of influence lived on – the unchallenged hegemony of
the Senate had found a counter balance in the form of the Assembly and the
Tribune, and above all the potential resorting to violence to counteract and
countermand the will of the Senate (Heftner, Von den Gracchen bis Sulla,
Pustet, 2006, 83 ‘Von nun an würden Volkstribunat und
Plebsversammlungen ein potenziell wirksames Gegengewicht gegen die
Vorherrschaftsanprüche der Nobilität darstellen und mussten die Nobiles
damit rechnen, dass ihnen ungebärdige Volkstribune in der Nachfolge des
Gaius Gracchus entgegentreten und gegen den Willen des Senats die
gesetzgebende Gewalt ausüben würden’). Whilst the tales of the great early
heroes such as Horatius Cocles and Brutus were to be taught for centuries to
come, they would become little more than fairy tales rather than tales to
inculcate the values of the mos maiorum in young Romans. The next wave
of problems was to ride in on the wings of military difficulties, caused by
what was in reality a small, but dragged out colonial war in North Africa
against King Jugurtha of Numidia – a war which was to have immense
consequent problems for Rome for the next eight decades.