Risk Analysis DOI: 10.1111/j.1539-6924.2012.01790.

A Bayesian Method to Mine Spatial Data Sets to Evaluate

the Vulnerability of Human Beings to Catastrophic Risk

Lianfa Li,1,2,∗ Jinfeng Wang,1 Hareton Leung,2 and Sisi Zhao1

Vulnerability of human beings exposed to a catastrophic disaster is affected by multiple fac-

tors that include hazard intensity, environment, and individual characteristics. The traditional
approach to vulnerability assessment, based on the aggregate-area method and unsupervised
learning, cannot incorporate spatial information; thus, vulnerability can be only roughly as-
sessed. In this article, we propose Bayesian network (BN) and spatial analysis techniques to
mine spatial data sets to evaluate the vulnerability of human beings. In our approach, spatial
analysis is leveraged to preprocess the data; for example, kernel density analysis (KDA) and
accumulative road cost surface modeling (ARCSM) are employed to quantify the influence
of geofeatures on vulnerability and relate such influence to spatial distance. The knowledge-
and data-based BN provides a consistent platform to integrate a variety of factors, including
those extracted by KDA and ARCSM to model vulnerability uncertainty. We also consider
the model’s uncertainty and use the Bayesian model average and Occam’s Window to av-
erage the multiple models obtained by our approach to robust prediction of the risk and
vulnerability. We compare our approach with other probabilistic models in the case study of
seismic risk and conclude that our approach is a good means to mining spatial data sets for
evaluating vulnerability.

KEY WORDS: Bayesian network; data mining; spatial analysis; vulnerability

1. INTRODUCTION that resulted in casualties of about 300,000 people

Vulnerability of human beings to catastrophic
risk denotes the degree of an individual subject to
the damage arising from a catastrophic disaster. A
great degree of vulnerability will result in consid-
erable damage to the individuals exposed to catas-
trophic hazards. In China, the last record event was
the Wenchuan earthquake of 8 Mw on May 12, 2008,
1 LREIS, Institute of Geographical Sciences and Natural Re-
sources Research, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China.
2 Department of Computing, The Hong Kong Polytechnic Univer-
(more than 90,000 were dead or missing) and prop-
erty loss of U.S. $20 billion.(1,2) Another catastrophic
event was the tsunami occurring on December 26,
2004, beneath the Indian Ocean west of Sumatra,
Indonesia, with the loss of more than 300,000 lives
and the displacement of over 1,000,000 people.(3)
These two catastrophic events, which caused a huge
loss of lives and properties, resulted from the emer-
gency nature of such catastrophic hazards; vulnera-
bility from unpredictable natural disasters is the pri-
mary reason for such huge casualties and loss. It is
undeniable that it is difficult to monitor and pre-

sity, Hong Kong.

dict natural hazards precisely because of our lim-
∗ Address correspondence to Lianfa Li, LREIS, Institute of Ge- ited knowledge of their mechanisms and underlying
ographical Sciences and Natural Resources Research, Chinese causes. However, given historical patterns of natu-
Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China; lspatial@gmail.com. ral hazards, we can obtain useful information about

1 0272-4332/12/0100-0001$22.00/1 
C 2012 Society for Risk Analysis
2 Li et al.

vulnerability to catastrophic disasters using adaptive attributes.(13,14) Techniques of spatial analy-

evaluation methods and increasing spatiotemporal sis such as kernel density analysis (KDA)
data sets. But in the case of the two disasters de- and accumulative road cost surface modeling
tailed earlier, vulnerability was so poorly evaluated (ARCSM) can quantify such spatial patterns
that people had no time to prepare for the sud- that are used with other quantitative factors in
den occurrence of these catastrophic disasters, which vulnerability assessment. This extends the set
in turn caused huge casualties. If we had a precise of predictive factors that can improve vulnera-
evaluation of vulnerability to catastrophic risk, even bility prediction.
given the occurrence of such disaster, more loss could
In this article, we propose a spatial data mining
have been avoided and more lives could have been
approach to modeling the vulnerability of human be-
saved.
ings exposed to catastrophic hazards. Data mining
Conversely, vulnerability is affected by multiple
is the process of extracting patterns from data. It is
uncertain factors that include hazard intensity, envi-
an important tool for transforming the data into use-
ronment, and individual characteristics;(4) thus, eval-
ful information. In terms of vulnerability assessment,
uation of vulnerability presents ongoing challenges.
spatial data mining processes geospatial data to ob-
Many existing approaches to vulnerability assess-
tain the prediction models (structure and parame-
ment are based on the aggregate-area method and
ters) that relate predictive factors to risk and vul-
unsupervised learning, that is, observations with as-
nerability. Technically, we use a Bayesian network
sumed latent variables,(5−9) making these approaches
(BN) to make the uncertainty analysis and compu-
unable to fully use spatial information. Vulnerability,
tation of vulnerability. Our approach is based on
therefore, is evaluated only roughly, for the following
a grid data set supported by a geographical infor-
reasons:
mation system (GIS). Using the GIS-supported grid
data set, spatial analysis such as KDA and ARCSM
• First, in the aggregate-area-based method,
can be applied to derive new predictive factors from
related factors are aggregated into census-
the related geofeatures, obtain a table of all the cells
designated statistical areas. The size of the ag-
in the grid data set (with each as a sample for un-
gregated area has a significant influence on the
certainty inference), amass knowledge from the BN
result of statistical analysis (different conclu-
to predict new cases, and, as well, visualize the re-
sions might be obtained where there are ag-
sults in GIS. In this article, we make the following
gregated areas of different sizes).(10) Conse-
contributions:
quently, approaches based on the aggregate
area cannot satisfy the requirement of specific • Use spatial analysis techniques such as KDA
location of vulnerability, such as rescue of hu- and ARCSM to derive new predictive fac-
man beings, accurate assessment, and planning tors from related geofeatures that are used
for the disaster. with other factors to predict vulnerability.
• Second, some existing approaches to vulnera- The aggregate-area method does not con-
bility assessment, such as fuzzy comprehensive sider the differences among individuals. Our
evaluation,(11,12) are based primarily on do- method can preserve the original number of
main knowledge and anecdotal evidence gath- observations without the need to either ag-
ered by local experts in which the empirical gregate or average them. Thus, it is less bi-
data used in the model are difficult to validate. ased than the aggregate-area-based methods.
The result obtained thereby indicates simply Given derivation of additional predictive fac-
where the vulnerability is high or low at the tors, the set of predictors can be strength-
census-based statistical area but does not show ened and the model’s performance can be
the vulnerability of the landscape at a fine improved.
resolution. • Propose a data mining approach to vulnera-
• In these approaches, such techniques of spatial bility assessment. A BN is the major frame-
analysis have seldom been used, and this has work for integrating spatiotemporal data and
made it difficult to incorporate spatial infor- domain knowledge from different sources. We
mation. Spatial analysis can detect patterns of generalize the generic framework of the BN
geofeatures or events occurring in geographic and spatial modeling techniques for vulner-
space according to their spatial or nonspatial ability assessment. Our approach may target
Mining Spatial Data Sets for Evaluating Vulnerability
a more specific location of vulnerability since
it is based on a fine scale. Also, our ap-
proach is able to distinguish among the differ-
ent environmental and individual characteris-
tics that contribute to the vulnerability of the
exposed objects. In this term, our approach
should perform better than many existing
approaches.
• Consider the uncertainties of predictive mod-
els in vulnerability assessment. We employ
heuristic-learning algorithms to study local
topologies based on the BN framework and
then use a Bayesian model average (BMA) to
get a robust prediction. We use several typical
predictive models to assess vulnerability and
examine their applicability.
The following outlines the structure of this
article. Section 2 briefly describes the Bayesian
framework for vulnerability assessment. Section 3
presents our modeling methods for vulnerability as-
sessment. Section 4 gives an introduction to our study
case and then presents the results. Section 5 discusses
the implications of our approach. Section 6 presents
our conclusions.
2. BAYESIAN FRAMEWORK FOR
VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT
This section mainly describes the factors in-
volved (Section 2.1) and our Bayesian framework for
vulnerability assessment (Section 2.2).
2.1. Factors Involved
There are two sets of factors involved in vulner-
ability analysis:
1. Factors related to exposure are directly re-
lated to occurrence of natural disasters. For
instance, movements of the earth’s crusts
may cause earthquakes; extremely intense
wind may cause typhoons; heavy rainfalls may
cause floods or/and landslides.
2. Factors related to vulnerability refer to envi-
ronmental and system-resistance factors. En-
vironmental factors characterize the environ-
ment that breeds the disasters. They are able
to mitigate or amplify the destructive power
of a hazard. For instance, a good water-soil
conservation capability can mitigate the de-
structive effect of mudslide. System-resistance
factors are the characteristics of an individual
3
or system that mitigate against the damage of
a natural disaster. For example, a house with
a lightweight steel structure may better with-
stand the destructive power of an earthquake
than one constructed of wood or brick; people
living closer to a shelter may reduce their vul-
nerability to damage from a disaster; educa-
tion about the causes and nature of tsunamis
can increase citizens’ vigilance against this
type of disaster.
In our previous article’s(15) table 1, we reported
on exposure-related and vulnerability-related factors
and the empirical modeling methods for five natural
disasters: earthquake, flood, typhoon, mudslide, and
avalanche.
2.2. BN of Vulnerability Assessment
A BN is a kind of directed acyclic graph with con-
ditional probabilistic dependence:
BS = G(V, E), (1)
where BS is network structure; V is the set of random
variables (r.v.); E ∈ V × V is the set of directed edges
that indicate the probabilistically conditional depen-
dency relationships between r.v. nodes and satisfy the
Markov property;(16) and
BP = {γu : u × πu → [0 . . . 1]|u ∈ V} (2)
is a set of assessment functions, where the state space,
u , is the finite set of values of u; πu is the set of par-
ent nodes of u; if X is a set of variables, X is the
Cartesian product of the state spaces of all the vari-
ables in X; and γu uniquely defines the joint prob-
ability distribution P(u|πu ) of u conditional on its
parent set, πu .
BN is based on the Bayesian inference princi-
ple of the a posteriori probability (that is, belief )
of a hypothesis from the evidence. For vulnera-
bility assessment, evidence derives from exposure-
or vulnerability-related factors, and the hypothesis
refers to the state of risk, expressed as damage
states from low to high levels. Let t be such a
hypothesis variable of damage risk and its state
space r would have, say, seven states, r = {none,
slight, light, moderate, heavy, major, destroyed}. In
a specified BN, if some factors are known, a pos-
teriori probability or belief of the target variable
t being in a certain state can be estimated by
4 Li et al.

MP: modeling
R: release scenario
parameters of exposure

E: exposure intensity and derived hazards

Exposure

System resistence
HC: human characteristics such
as sex, income, age, residential ARCS: accumulated road
environment and health state etc. cost surface

Vulnerability
HD: human damage

V: vulnerability

States of the target variable, HD: none, slight, light, moderate, major, destroyed

set of random nodes utility node link of a single variable link of (possible) multiple variables

Fig. 1. Generic Bayesian modeling framework for vulnerability assessment.

calculating the marginal probability:
 italicized letters to represent a univariate and capital-
Belief (x, t) = p(u1 , u2 , . . . , r, . . . , un ), (3)
ui ∈V,ui =r
where x is an entity, namely, a cell of the grid surface
that represents the persons exposed to the disaster; t
the value of a certain state of the damage; and t∈r ,

p(u1 , . . . , un ) = ui ∈V p(ui |πui ) is the joint probabil-
ity over V.
To construct a BN, we suggest the following four
steps: (1) identification of the factors to quantify the
problem framework; (2) establishment of the inter-
dependencies between the r.v. nodes; (3) assignment
of the states or quantities to nodes; and (4) assess-
ment of the conditional probabilities.
Fig. 1 describes the BN framework for risk
assessment of human beings. In this framework,
R denotes release scenario, MP the set of exposure-
related factors, E the exposure intensity and its
derived hazards (random nodes), HC human char-
acteristics related to the vulnerability of human be-
ings (random nodes), ARCS the accumulative road
cost surface (a random node), HD the casualty dam-
age caused to human beings (a random node), and
V the vulnerability index (a utility node) that will be
defined in Equation (13) of Section 3.6. HD is the
target variable; we aim to estimate its probabilities in
various states. In this framework, we use capitalized
ized roman-type letters to represent the set of multi-
variates. So in this framework, R, ARCS, and HD de-
note a univariate but MP, E, and HC denote a set of
multiple variables. Also in this figure, the double line
with an arrow represents the link from multiple ran-
dom nodes to the arrowed node or the set of nodes,
whereas the single line represents the link from a sin-
gle random node to the arrowed node or the set of
nodes.
We construct the framework according to do-
main knowledge,(5,9,11,17,18) that is, an extension of
our previous framework in risk assessment for build-
ings.(15) In this framework, it is assumed that release
scenarios (R) and related parameters (MP) of ex-
posure have deterministic influences on the expo-
sure intensity or derived hazards (E); human dam-
age (HD) is assumed to be determined by exposure
(E), accumulated road cost surface (ARCS), and hu-
man characteristics (HC). For the set of multivari-
ates (MP, E, HC), there may be interdependencies
between these variables in addition to their depen-
dencies described in Fig. 1. Similarly, we can con-
struct their interdependencies according to domain
knowledge or learning from the training data. Once
an initial BN framework is constructed, we can
Mining Spatial Data Sets for Evaluating Vulnerability
Fig. 2. Data mining procedure for vulnerability assessment.
refine the interdependencies between local r.v.s in
MP, E, and HC and estimate the conditional assess-
ment parameters.
3. MINING TECHNIQUES FOR
VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT
3.1. Data Set Format and Mining Procedure
Fig. 2 shows the procedure for vulnerability as-
sessment. Our techniques are based on the grid data
set. To obtain the grid data set from multiple hetero-
geneous sources, we apply preprocessing steps, e.g.,
converting the vector data and resampling the grid
into the target grid at the standardized resolution and
projection. We perform these steps in a GIS environ-
ment (Fig. 2a), such as ARCGIS or SuperMap. The
following sections describe major techniques of the
procedure.
In our approach, spatial analysis and BNs are
used to make the vulnerability assessment. In the grid
data set (Fig. 2b), each cell corresponds to an inde-
pendent sample for training or a new unit that has
predictive factors and the target variable. We can ex-
tract the table of multiple attributes (Fig. 2c) from
the data set. The grid-based format enables us to col-
5
lect a variety of data from different sources and to
integrate it within a data mining system using geospa-
tial techniques such as rasterization, resampling, re-
projection, KDA, and ARCSM. Rasterization, re-
sampling, and reprojection are traditional techniques
and relatively mature, but KDA and ARCSM have
only recently been used in modeling as new quantifi-
cation techniques of spatial analysis. Thus, our de-
scription of methodology is focused on KDA and
ARCSM techniques of spatial analysis and Bayesian
modeling.
In the spatial data mining environment, we use
not only GIS to manage and visualize spatial data
but also employ spatial analysis techniques that may
be loaded on GIS, such as KDA and ARCSM, to
extract predictive factors from relevant geofeatures.
Although KDA and ARCSM may be loaded on GIS,
they are distinct from GIS basic functionality. As the
first law of geography states: “Everything is related to
everything else, but near things are more related than
distant things.”(19) Natural disasters, as geospatial
events, occur in geographical areas, and they should
also have such spatial characteristics; thus, Tobler’s
first law of geography is applicable for them. We
use KDA and ARCSM in vulnerability assessment
6 Li et al.

that considers influence of points such as pollution from the geofeature. The z’s density estimate using
sources or polylines, such as an earthquake’s active KD function is:
faults on the surroundings; the influence gradually
1
n
decreases with the increase of the distance from the
Density(z) = Zi · Kλ (z, Zi ), (4)
sources. KDA models such influences and derives in- n
i=1
fluence factors from the geofeatures.(20,21) ARCSM
calculates the accumulative cost for each cell to its
where n is number of sample units, z is any unit in the
neighbor shelters and the cost, determined by rele-
geographical area, Zi is the value of the sample unit,
vant geographical factors, has an important influence
and Kλ (z, Zi ) is the kernel density (KD) function. To
on the vulnerability of the individuals exposed to the
get the KD function, we can use the normal function
hazards.(22−24)
to simulate it.(15)
The bandwidth or search radius, λ, is affected
3.2. Spatial Analysis Techniques by empirical knowledge and the goal. A large λ is
more generalized over the entire study area whereas
Spatial analysis is used to deal with spatial or
a small λ means more localization over the area.
nonspatial attributes of geographic features to iden-
Since our goal is to reflect the influence of relevant
tify generic spatial patterns. These techniques in-
factors on damage caused to individuals exposed to
clude but are not limited to local/global spatial
a disaster, in practice, λ can be set according to the
autocorrelation, G-statistics, KDA, ARCSM, and
biggest influence range of the relevant factors.
the like. In vulnerability analysis, spatial analysis
As a smoothing technique, KDA can derive the
can be used to quantify the discrete or qualita-
continuous surface data from geofeatures. This facil-
tive factors for use in combination with other quan-
itates integration of quantitative factors in combina-
titative factors. For example, spatial autocorrela-
tion with the qualitative factors deriving from some
tion is employed to detect similarity or dissimilar-
geofeatures, such as points (e.g., pollution sources)
ity of the damage or loss from the disaster, and
and polylines (e.g., rivers or faults). Another advan-
G-statistics is used to detect hot spots of high risk. In
tage of KDA is that it avoids the drawback of that
our approach, KDA and ARCSM are especially ap-
“aggregate” approach within which the estimated av-
plicable for processing those qualitative spatial fea-
erage exposure in a particular region may serve as a
tures such as rivers or faults and quantifying them to
reasonable surrogate for the actual exposure of indi-
be used in combination with other analytic factors.
viduals. Individual exposure levels cannot accurately
Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 mainly describe these two
be inferred from aggregated data; KDA helps to pre-
techniques. Spatial autocorrelation and G-statistics
serve the original number and intensity of observa-
may be useful, but the factors derived from them
tions without the need either to aggregate or average
cannot be used directly in vulnerability assessment.
them.(15,26)
Thus, our methodology primarily uses KDA and
Conversely, although in general KDA is appli-
ARCSM as quantification techniques.
cable for smoothing geofeatures, given certain geo-
graphical features such as gorges and chasms (which
3.2.1. Kernel Density Analysis might result in noncontiguous geofeatures), it is pru-
dent for us to use a continuity-based method, such
As a technique of spatial analysis, KDA
as KDA. This problem is common, especially in the
transforms a sample of observations recorded as
case of floods. Thus, if there are considerable unique
geographically referenced points or polylines into a
features such as gorges, we need to identify them on
continuous surface, quantifying the intensity of indi-
the grid and assign the corresponding cells values dif-
vidual observations over space.(10,25) Points or poly-
ferent from other continuous surfaces.
lines closer to the center of the target entity are
weighted more heavily than those away from the en-
tity, which embodies Tobler’s first law of geography.
3.2.2. Accumulative Road Cost Surface Modeling
The kernel weights vary within its “sphere of influ-
ence” according to their distance from the central ARCSM is used to estimate the cost, i.e., the
point or polyline as the intensity is estimated: the sur- “difficulty” to reach a shelter from a living place
face value is highest at the location of the central when a catastrophic event happens. The lower
target geofeature and diminishes over the distance the cost, the more likely individuals vulnerable to
Mining Spatial Data Sets for Evaluating Vulnerability
damage can escape and avoid it, thus reducing their
vulnerability. ARCSM consists of two models:
• Road cost surface model. This model evalu-
ates the road cost of each cell of the grid based
on given factors:
c(x) = e(x) · we + d(x) · wd + a(x) · wa

k
+ s(x) · ws + oi (x) · woi ,
i=1
where x denotes the cell, e(·) denotes the ob-
stacle factor directly related to the exposure,
d(·) the road surface density (e.g., the road
area/the region area), a(·) road accessibility
determined by distance to the roads, s(·) the
slope, and oi other factors related to the road
cost. we , wd , wa , ws , and woi , respectively, de-
note the weights of relevant factors. If a factor
presents a more difficult obstacle for traffic, it
is weighted more heavily.
• Accumulated cost surface model. Given the
cost surface from Equation (5) and the op-
tional serviceable shelters, the accumulated
cost surface model estimates the least accumu-
lated cost with which the neighborhood shel-
ters of each cell could be reached:

NS(x)
Ac (x) = min c( j),
j=x
where x denotes the cell, Ac (·) the accumu-
lated cost, NS(x) the neighborhood shelters
around x, and c(j) the road cost of the cell, j.
We can calculate Ac (·) by optimal operational
algorithms.
Accumulated road cost surface modeling is espe-
cially useful for evaluating the damage that may re-
sult to human lives: less accumulated road cost means
that vulnerable persons can more easily reach shel-
ters and thus avoid potential harm. The indicator
extracted using ARCSM can also be used with the
factors extracted by KDA and other quantitative fac-
tors for assessing the vulnerability of human beings.
3.3. Discretization
Discretization is employed to transfer the con-
tinuous variables to discrete variables to be used in
BN since BN contains only qualitative or discrete
7
variables for modeling and inference. We obtain the
discrete intervals according to domain knowledge or
use a discretization algorithm to discretize continu-
ous factors such as elevation, slope, and KD of faults
or rivers. Discretization is significant since it enables
us to use quantitative factors along with qualitative
or discrete factors to strengthen the model’s pre-
dictability of vulnerability in BN.
If the domain knowledge for discrete intervals
is unclear, the discretization algorithm can be used
(5) to make an automatic division. The algorithm is de-
signed according to the “recursion” idea by Fulton
et al. (1995)(27) and the minimal description length
(MDL) stopping criteria in Fayyad and Irani’s algo-
rithm.(28) This discretization method was reported in
our 2010 article;(15) readers can refer to the article for
technical details.
3.4. Probabilistic Mining Models
This section briefly introduces the probabilistic
models compared in this article.
3.4.1. Bayesian Network
BN involves different search algorithms for con-
structing the network topology. Table I lists major
methods for construction, inference, and prediction
of BN.
(6)
3.4.1.1. Learning the network topology. Learn-
ing the BN topology requires establishing a score to
measure the network’s quality. There are three kinds
of score measures that bear a close resemblance: the
Bayesian approach, the information criterion, and
the minimum description length. In this study, we
used the Bayesian approach, which uses the a pos-
teriori probability of the learned structure given the
training instances as a quality measure. The Bayesian
approach can achieve a good result as it is unaffected
by the specific structure, unlike other measures.(29)
Once a Bayesian quality measure is selected, we
apply an algorithm to search the space of the net-
work structures to find the network topology with
a high-quality score, Q(BS , D). We can apply dif-
ferent heuristic or general-purpose search strategies,
as listed in Table I. The heuristic algorithms include
K2, hill climbing (HC), and TAN (tree augmented
naı̈ve (Bayes)); the general-purpose algorithms in-
clude Tabu, simulated annealing (SA), and genetic
8 Li et al.

Table I. Methods for Construction, Inference and Prediction of BN

Steps Type Methods

Structure Domain-knowledge-based Construct BN according to domain

Dependency-analysis-based
Search scoring based(29) Quality measure
Parameter learning Domain-knowledge-based
Distribution-based
With missing data(16)
Inference Exact inference
Approximate inference
Prediction Three types of reasoning
or empirical knowledge
Conditional independence (CI)(16)
Bayesian approach, information
criterion approach, and
minimum description length
approach
Learning methods Heuristic search strategies: K2, hill
climbing (HC), and TAN, etc.
General-purpose search
strategies: Tabu, simulated
annealing (SA), and genetic
algorithm (GA), etc.
Reports, statistics, and
experienced models
Dirichlet-based parameter
estimator
Expectation maximization, Gibbs
sampling
Joint probability, naı̈ve Bayesian,
graph reduction, and
polytree(54)
Forward simulation, random
simulation(54)
Causal, diagnostic, and
intercausal(16)

algorithm (GA).(29) Six search strategies used in our Markov blanket of the classifier node while the
study are briefly described below: optimal network is acquired.
• SA(29) randomly generates a candidate net-
work BS close to the current network BS . It
• K2(30) adds arcs with a fixed topological order- accepts the network if it is better than the cur-
ing of variables. In our implementation of K2, rent one. Otherwise, it accepts the candidate
the ordering in the data set is initially set as with the probability:
a naı̈ve Bayes (NB) network in which the tar-
get class variable (loss or damage risk) is made 
eti ·(Q(BS ,D)−Q(BS ,D)) , (7)
the first in the ordering(29) since we know little
about the relationship between local variables where ti is the temperature at iteration i. The
of the training data set. temperature starts at t0 and is slowly decreased
• HC(31) adds and deletes arcs with no fixed or- with each iteration.
dering of variables. This procedure is iterated • GA.(34) With D as the set of BN structures for
until the highest value of the local Bayes score a fixed domain with n variables, and the alpha-
is obtained. bet S being {0,1}, a BN structure can be repre-
• In TAN Bayes,(32) the tree is formed by calcu- sented by an n x n connectivity matrix C, where
lating the maximum-weight spanning tree us- its elements, cij
ing Chow and Liu’s algorithm.(33)
• Tabu(29) search is an optimal algorithm of 
1, if i is a parent j,
HC. This search algorithm applies a Markov ci j =
0, otherwise.
blanket correction to the network structure af-
ter a network structure is learned. This ensures In GA, we represent an individual
that all nodes in the network are part of the of the population by character string:
Mining Spatial Data Sets for Evaluating Vulnerability
{c11 c21 . . . cn1 c12 c22 . . . cn2 . . . c1n c2n . . . cnn } (also
known as chromosomes). GA will search the
structure space to find the individual with
the best “genetic material” by cross-over and
mutation operators.
3.4.1.2. Learning the parameters. Once the op-
timal structure has been found, the parameters of
the BN (conditional probability table (CPT) for each
node, BP ) can be determined according to domain
knowledge or can be learned from the database of
instances. We used the simple Bayesian estimator,
which assumes that the conditional probability of
each r.v. node corresponding to its parent instan-
tiation conforms to the Dirichlet distribution with
local parameter independence: D(α1 , . . . , αi , . . . , ατ )
with αi being the hyperparameter for state i. This
Bayesian estimator directly produces estimates of
conditional probability from the data set, and it can
be used directly in the data-driven learning. The
Bayesian estimator rather than BMA is used in the
analysis because BMA is not yet part of the standard
data analysis tool kit as its implementation presents
several difficulties.(35)
For the estimation method, the assumption of
local parameter independence may not be realistic.
This can result in slow and biased parameter learn-
ing. We use the classification tree to improve the
analysis while avoiding this assumption.(16)
3.4.2. Other Probabilistic Models
3.4.2.1. Logistic regression (LR). LR is a tech-
nique of probability estimation based on maximum
likelihood estimation. In this model, let Y be the risk
level as the target/dependent variable (e.g., Y = 1 in-
dicating “high risk” and Y = 0 “low risk”), and Xi
(i = 1, 2, . . ., n) be the predictive factors. LR assumes
that Y follows a Bernoulli distribution, and the link
function relating Xi and Y is the logit or log-odds:
1 3.5.1. Evaluation Measures
p(Y = 1|X, β) = μ = , (8)
1 + e−Xβ
where X = (1, X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n ), β = (β 0 , β 1 , β 2 , . . . ,
β n )T and β can be estimated by the maximum like-
lihood estimator that would make the observed data
most likely.(36)
3.4.2.2. Naı̈ve Bayes. NB assumes that the pre-
dictive factors are conditionally independent given
9
the target/dependent variable (Y = risk level):
p(Y) 
P(Y|X1 , . . . , Xn ) = P(Xi |Y). (9)
P(X) i
NB assumes that within each class, the numeric
predictors are normally distributed. One can repre-
sent such a distribution in terms of its mean (μ)
and standard deviation (σ ) and thus can estimate
the probability of an observed value from such
estimates.
3.4.2.3. Normalized Gaussian radial basis
function (RBF) network. Normalized Gaussian RBF
network uses the k-means clustering algorithm to
provide the basis functions and learns either an
LR (discrete class problems) or linear regression
(numeric class problems) on top of that. Symmetric
multivariate Gaussians are fit to the data from each
cluster. If the class is nominal, it uses the given
number of clusters per class. It standardizes all
numeric attributes to zero mean and unit variance.
3.4.2.4. Multiple perception (MPer). MPer is a
computational model that tries to simulate the struc-
ture and/or functional aspects of biological neural
networks. It consists of an interconnected group of
artificial neurons and processes information using
a connectionist approach to computation. In most
cases, an artificial neural network (ANN) is an adap-
tive system that changes its structure based on ex-
ternal or internal information that flows through the
network during the learning phase. In more practical
terms, neural networks are nonlinear statistical data-
modeling tools. They can be used to model complex
relationships between inputs and outputs or to find
patterns in data.
3.5. Evaluation and Modeling Uncertainty
We use four scalar measures, i.e., pd, balance,
precision, and ROC area.
• Pd refers to the detection probability of high
risk: it measures the proportion of correctly
predicted positive instances among the actually
positive ones. If a method achieves a higher pd,
it can detect more positive instances (more cell
units of high risk detected).
10
• Balance between pd and pf (pf refers to the
probability of false alarms; a good method
should have a low pf ):
 another model with maximum posterior probability,
balance = 1 − ( pf ∗ pf + (1 − pd)∗ (1 − pd))/2.
(10)
• Precision refers to the proportion of true pos-
itives among the instances predicted as posi-
tive, but it cannot measure how the method
detects the proportion of correctly predicted
positive instances among the actually positive
ones. Good precision does not always mean
a good pd. A method with high precision but
a low pd is less useful since it cannot detect
more significant positive instances (less units of
“high loss” risk detected).
• ROC area is the area between the horizontal
axis and the receiver operating characteristic
(ROC) curve; it gives a comprehensive scalar
value representing the model’s expected per-
formance. The ROC area is between 0.5 and 1,
where a value close to 0.5 is less precise, while
a value close to 1.0 is more precise.
3.5.2. Uncertainty of Models
To mitigate the sampling bias and model uncer-
tainties (also avoiding the overfitting problem), we
use BMA and Occam’s Window(35,37,38,39) to produce
a robust prediction of the seismic risk.
Assume r to be the target variable of risk, D to
be the training data set, and Mi to be the ith model
of BN. We can then obtain the averaged value of the
probability of the target variable being in a certain
state using BMA:

K
pr (r |D) = p(r |Mk, D) p(Mk|D), (11)
k=1
where K is the number of models selected and
p(D|Mk) p(Mk)
p(Mk|D) =  (12)
K Table II. Different States of the Target Variable, Damage
k=1 p(D|Ml ) p(Ml )
is the weight of Bayes factor that is ratios of marginal
likelihoods or of posterior odds to prior odds for dif-
ferent models. We use the BN’s inference algorithms
(Table I to obtain p(D|Mk) and assume that the prior
probability of each model ( p(Mk)) is the same.
While BMA can average the predictions of the
learning algorithms (models) (Table I), we can also
use Occam’s Window to select the qualified mod-
els and remove those poorly qualified models,
Li et al.
thus improving the computation efficiency. Occam’s
Window(35) has two principles: (1) if a model re-
ceives much less support (e.g., the ratio of 20:1) than
then it should be dropped; (2) complex models that
receive less support than their simpler counterparts
should be dropped.
We use six search algorithms, shown in Table I
(bold typeface), to get the local structures of qual-
itative factors and use BMA and Occam’s Window
to average the qualified models, thus decreasing the
models’ bias and improving their robustness.
3.6. Vulnerability Assessment
Vulnerability assessment estimates the suscep-
tibility of individuals exposed to natural hazards(9)
and corresponds it with the potential degree of dam-
age to individuals exposed to natural hazards. The
higher the vulnerability, the more damage the indi-
vidual may experience.
There is no precise definition for vulnerability.
In this study, we regard vulnerability as the com-
prehensive damage index. In the BN framework
(Fig. 1), the target variable is the damage state of hu-
man beings that are affected by multiple factors such
as exposure intensity, physical or ecological environ-
ment, accumulative road cost, and individual char-
acteristics. Using BN, we can integrate a variety of
exposure- and vulnerability-related factors from dif-
ferent sources to estimate the probabilities that the
human being is in a certain damage state. Each state
(none, slight, light, moderate, major or destroyed) of
the target variable, HD, has a corresponding dam-
age factor range, a central damage factor, and cost
coefficients (Table II). Damage factor is the fraction
or percentage of the damage caused to an individual
exposed to a natural disaster. The cost coefficients
are used for calculating the vulnerability index.
We assume that the cost coefficient is nonnegative,
Factors, and Cost Coefficients
Damage Factor Central Damage
Damage State Range (%) Factor (%) Cost Efficient
None 0 0 0.1
Slight 0–1 0.5 0.2
Light 1–10 5 0.3
Moderate 10–30 20 0.5
Major 60–100 80 0.75
Destroyed 100 90 >0.9
Mining Spatial Data Sets for Evaluating Vulnerability 11

ranging from 0 to 1; a condition with a larger dam- 4. THE STUDY CASE OF SEISMIC RISK
age factor has a larger cost coefficient. Table II gives
The 2008 Wenchuan earthquake is selected as
a general definition of the cost coefficient; users can
our study case. In Section 4.1, we introduce the study
adjust it according to the study goal and empirical
region and goal. Section 4.2 describes the simula-
knowledge.
tion of the peak ground acceleration (PGA) distribu-
Integrating the multiplication of the probability
tion under different scenarios. We then use different
of the vulnerable individual being in a certain dam-
probability models to compute the risk probability
age state, and the corresponding cost coefficients, we
and compare them in Section 4.3. Section 4.4 presents
can obtain the vulnerability index of the individual as
the vulnerability index produced with our robust ap-
a utility node of BN (the node of diamond in Fig. 1):
proach. In Section 4.5, we perform uncertainty and
 t=Max
sensitivity analysis.
Vul(x) = Cost (t)Belief (x, t)dt
t=Min

t=destr oyed
≈ Cost (t)Belief (x, t), (13) 4.1. Study Region and Goal
t=none
The study region of interest (ROI; Fig. 3a)
where x denotes a unit to be estimated, e.g., a cell is a rectangular region, located at Du Jiangyan,
in a grid data that represents the exposed persons, t Sichuan province of China, between North Latitude
the damage state of the target variable, HD (t∈r = 30◦ 57 57.318 and 31◦ 1 12.768 and between East
{none, slight, light, moderate, major, destroyed}), Cost Longitude 103◦ 35 19.657 and 103◦ 41 7.6 . The study
the cost coefficients, and Belie f (x, l) the likelihood region is close to the catastrophic disaster of the May
or posterior probability of x being in a damage state. 12, 2008, Wenchuan earthquake.

Fig. 3. (a) The study region of interest (ROI) and (b) the ROI’s background of seismicity.

Fig. 4. Steps of probabilistic seismic hazard analysis (PSHA).

12
The 2008 Wenchuan earthquake, also known as
the Great Sichuan Earthquake, was a deadly earth-
quake that measured at 8.0 Ms and 7.9 Mw , occurring
at 14:28:01.42 CST (02:28:01.42 EDT) on May 12,
2008 in Sichuan province of China. The earthquake
killed at least 68,000 people. This earthquake
resulted from the interactive movements of the
Indian and Eurasian plates in opposite directions.
The seismicity of central and eastern Asia is the re-
sult of the northward movement of the Indian plate
at a rate of 5 cm/year and its collision with Eurasia,
resulting in the uplift of the Himalaya and Tibetan
plateaus, and associated earthquake activity. The
earthquake occurred along the Longmenshan fault,
a thrust structure along the border of the Indo-
Australian and Eurasian plates. Seismic activities
were concentrated on its mid-fracture (known as the
Yingxiu-Beichuan fracture). The rupture lasted close
to 120 seconds, with the majority of energy released
in the first 80 seconds. Starting from Wenchuan, the
rupture propagated at an average speed of 3.1 km/sec
49◦ towards the northeast, rupturing a total area of
about 300 km. Maximum displacement amounted
to 9 m.
Fig. 3(b) represents the seismicity context of the
2008 Wenchuan earthquake as described in the ear-
lier paragraph, where the ROI is close to the active
faults that have a history of seismic activities. The
specific goal of our study case is to use the historic
seismic catalog to simulate under the seismicity con-
text (Fig. 3b) the probabilistic seismic hazard risk,
i.e., PGA (the traditional peak ground acceleration)
values in ROI at two levels of exceedance probabil-
ity, then use the two release scenarios to conduct vul-
nerability analysis of human beings in the ROI. In
this study case, besides the simulation of release sce-
nario, we use critical covariates such as distances to
rivers and the active faults, accumulative road cost
surface, and so on, to estimate the potential vulner-
ability of human beings exposed to such scenarios.
The assessment output of vulnerability is informa-
tive for the relevant agencies or insurance companies
to make suitable plans and preparedness measures
against possible damage from future earthquakes.
4.2. Data Set
The data set is based on the grid format. Each
cell of the grid corresponds to a certain number of
human beings and their vulnerability. The factors in-
volved were initially selected according to domain
knowledge(40−43) and obtained from the National
Li et al.
Geomatics Center of China, using the resampling
technique. The data are acquired as follows:
• Factors related to exposure include release
scenario (rs ), magnitude (m), distance (d),
landslide risk (lsr ), liquefaction risk (lfr ), and
ground motion risk (pga ). We obtained rs ,
m, d, and pga by exposure modeling accord-
ing to the catalog of historical earthquakes
and seismicity around this region (Fig. 3b).
Also, lsr was quantified using the appropriate
method(44,45) and relevant environmental fac-
tors that included slope, soil type, PGA, and
KDs of rivers and active faults. Due to the lack
of specific spatial data for this region, lfr and
its relevant factors were not included in the
data set.
• Factors related to system resistance include en-
vironmental variables and human character-
istics.(42) Environmental variables include soil
type (st ), proximity to faults (kdf ), proximity
to rivers (kdr ), accumulative road cost surface
(cost ), and slope (sl ). We used the KD func-
tion described in Section 3.2.1 to quantify kdf
and kdr and made a suitable classification of
them (Table III). Human presence (hpr ) is the
primary characteristic included for human be-
ings. Due to lack of relevant data, we didn’t in-
clude other variables of human characteristics,
such as average age and disaster knowledge.
But if such factors are available, they should be
employed.
• The data set is based on the grid format. Each
cell of the grid has two sides of 5 m × 5 m, giv-
ing an area of 25 m2 . This affords our data set a
fine resolution for simulating the practical situ-
ation. The values of each cell’s relevant factors
are assigned this way: Spatial data of vectors
such as faults and rivers are converted into the
grid surface using the KD method, and all the
grids are resampled to the target grid of 5 m ×
5 m. Such a high resolution means more spe-
cific and precise location of vulnerability fac-
tors that are beneficial in the decision-making
process for early warning, mitigation, and pre-
vention of disasters.
4.3. Hazard Analysis
Probabilistic seismic hazard analysis
(PSHA)(42,46,47) was used in conducting the haz-
ard analysis. The goal of PSHA is to quantify the
Mining Spatial Data Sets for Evaluating Vulnerability 13

Table III. Classification of Variables and Their Descriptions in BN of Vulnerability of Human Beings to Seismic Risk

Number of States or Intervals Source of Prior

Variable States (unit) Probability Distribution

Release scenario (rs ) 2 10% in 50 years; 10% in Set according to the PGA
100 years exceedance probability
in T years
Magnitude (m) 6 0–5.0–5.5–6.5–7.0–7.5 –∞ The annual probabilities
calculated using the
Gutenberg-Richter
magnitude recurrence
relationship(55)
Distance (d) 5 0–10–20–40–80–∞ (km) Distance is that from the
seismic sources to the
site of interest
Ground motions (PGA) 11 0–30–50–150–250–350 Deterministic relations,
risk (pga ) –450–550–650–750–850 –∞ calculated as a function
(gal) of magnitude, distance,
soil type by PSHA(42)
Soil type (st ) 5 Unknown; hard rock; soft Amplification factor for
rock; medium soil; soft soil PGA and landslide risk:
1.0 (unknown, medium
soil), 0.55 (hard rock),
0.7 (soft rock), 1.3 (soft
rock)(40,43)
Close to faults? (kdf ) 6 0–1–2–3–4–5– Quantified using kernel
density function (Section
3.2); assume that closer
to active faults, more risk
of damages(20)
Close to rivers? (kdr ) 11 0–100–200–300–400– Quantified using kernel
500–600–700–800–900 density function (Section
–1000– 3.2.1); assume that closer
to rivers, more risk of
damages(20)
Slope (sl ) 9 0–5–10–15–20–25–30 Slopes are assumed to
–35–40–90 cause mudslides that
cause damages to
buildings
Landslide risk (lsr ) 3 Safe or slightly risk; moderate Five factors, i.e., rivers,
risk; highly risk faults, soil, slope, and
PGA are responsible for
landslides; modeled
using the fuzzy
method(44)
Liquefaction risk (lfr ) 2 Ground amplification; Modeled using the method
liquefaction of earthquake
engineering(40,43)
Human presence (hpr ) 2 Yes/ no Assume that the prior
probability p = the
population within the
cell/the area of each cell

probability of exceeding various ground-motion is used to define lateral forces and shear stresses
levels at a site, e.g., a cell in a grid data set, given in the equivalent-static-force procedures of some
all possible earthquakes. In our analysis, we used building codes and in liquefaction analyses. It is a
PGA to simulate the ground motion in PSHA. PGA good indicator of ground motions.
14
Fig. 5. The surfaces of 10% chance of exceedance of PGA (a) within 50 years and 10% chance of exceedance PGA (b) within 100 years.
Our 2010 article(15) described the techniques of
PSHA (Fig. 4) in hazard analysis of earthquakes in
detail. Readers can refer to this article and related
documents for technical details.
In the study case, we obtained the PGA maps
of two levels of exceedance probability, i.e., a 10%
chance of PGA exceedance within 50 years (Fig. 5a)
and a 10% chance of PGA exceedance within
100 years (Fig. 5b). These translate, effectively, to re-
currence probabilities of 475 and 950 years.
Li et al.
4.4. Bayesian Modeling
This section mainly describes the specification of
BN that includes construction of the BN topology
and extraction of the CPT parameters.
We constructed the BN according to domain
knowledge of earthquake engineering(40,43,48,49,50)
and the generic framework of Fig. 1. Fig. 6 presents
the initial network topology.
As shown in Fig. 6, exposure-related factors in-
clude rs , m, d, pga , lfr , and lsr . Among these factors, m
Mining Spatial Data Sets for Evaluating Vulnerability
Release scenario (rs)
Soil profile Magnitude (m)
Liquid limit
Soil type (st)
Clay content
Liquefaction Liquefaction
susceptibility risk (lfr )
Human presence (hpr)
target variable indicators relevant to system resistance
Fig. 6. Bayesian network topology of seismic vulnerability.
and d are modeling parameters of exposure, pga is the
intensity indicator, and pga, lfr , and lsr are three risk
factors responsible for vulnerability of human beings,
hd . Thus, we have three causal links from three risk
factors, pga, lfr , and lsr to the target variable, hd . Due
to lack of some soil data such as soil profile and clay
content, modeling of liquefaction risk was discarded.
But these factors should be considered if such data
are available. Therefore, the soil variables are given
in Fig. 6 but are shown in dotted lines to indicate that
they were not used in our case. Thus, in the test, by
modeling pga and lsr , we simulated the different vul-
nerabilities of ROI under two scenarios of different
PGA.
In Fig. 6, the factors relevant to system resistance
include environmental variables and characteristics
of human beings. Environmental variables include
st , kdf , kdr , sl , and cost . We used KD function (1) to
quantify kdf and kdr and made a suitable classifica-
tion of them (Table III). Characteristics of human
beings include human presence (hpr ), which was ap-
proximated with the map of human density.
The target variable of the Bayesian model is
damage to human beings (hd ), with a typology of six
states, as described in Table III. Its corresponding
damage factors are established according to earth-
quake engineering experience.(43,51)
Table III gives a brief description of the variables
(factors) involved in our BN (Fig. 6) and the sources
of the distributions of their prior probabilities.
15
Distance (d ) Close to faults? (k df)
Ground motions
Close to rivers? (k dr)
(PGA) risk ( pga)
Landslide Slope (sl)
risk (lsr)
Human Accumulative road
damage (hd) cost surface (cost )
Vulnerability
indicators related to exposure Not modeled in the study case
Fig. 7(a) presents the surface of KD values of the
roads in ROI, and Fig. 7(b) presents the accumu-
lative road cost surface, with selected hospitals and
public parks as the shelter services (the “plus” in
Fig. 7).
4.5. Evaluation of Models and Vulnerability
Using the models presented in Section 3.4 to pre-
dict damage probabilities, we compared the models
(Tables IV and V) with the practical situation in the
simulation of the return period of 950 years and used
Equation (13) to compute the vulnerability index for
each cell of the grid for the two simulations in ROI
(Fig. 8).
In total, we used 11 algorithms to predict the
ROI’s damage under two scenarios and compared
them with the practical situation under a scenario
similar to the actual 2008 situation. Among the
11 algorithms there were six BNs, respectively, re-
sponding to the six search algorithms described in
Section 3.4.1—K2, HC, TAN, Tabu, SA, and GA.
We also used BMA that integrated the predictive
values from the six BN algorithms and other four
algorithms, including LR, NB, RBF network, and
MPer. (The four methods have been described in
Section 3.4.2.) The predictors used in these mod-
els included the exposed-related factors (i.e., rs , m,
d, pga , and lsr ) and system-resistance factors (i.e., st ,
kdf , kdr , sl , cost , and hpr ). Table IV shows the specific
16 Li et al.

0 .0025 .005 .01

km

(a)

±
E
E E

E
E

E
E
E

0 .0025 .005 .01

km

(b)

Fig. 7. The graduated categories of the kernel density values of the rivers within ROI (a) and the graduated categories of accumulative
road cost surface corresponding to shelter services within ROI (the plus corresponding to the shelter service)(b).
Mining Spatial Data Sets for Evaluating Vulnerability 17

Table IV. Comparison of the Models for Prediction of the 950 Years with the Practical Damage Survey as the Training Data
in Pd and Balance
Model Pd Balance
No. of
State 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6

BN (BMA) 0.88 0.79 0.84 0.91 0.82 0.91 0.88 0.85 0.88 0.93 0.85 0.87
BN (K2) 0.95 0.69 0.75 0.84 0.73 0.79 0.96 0.77 0.82 0.87 0.79 0.84
BN (HC) 0.82 0.68 0.74 0.83 0.74 0.80 0.87 0.77 0.81 0.87 0.81 0.85
BN (TAN) 0.52 0.87 0.89 0.89 0.83 0.83 0.68 0.90 0.92 0.92 0.86 0.87
BN (Tabu) 0.78 0.67 0.76 0.83 0.73 0.81 0.84 0.77 0.83 0.87 0.80 0.85
BN (SA) 0.21 0.84 0.82 0.91 0.90 0.84 0.45 0.88 0.87 0.93 0.91 0.88
BN(GA) 0.82 0.68 0.73 0.82 0.73 0.80 0.87 0.77 0.80 0.87 0.80 0.85
LR 0.69 0.51 0.30 0.69 0.79 0.77 0.78 0.65 0.50 0.78 0.79 0.82
NB 0.83 0.63 0.65 0.80 0.44 0.68 0.87 0.73 0.74 0.83 0.60 0.75
RBF 0.73 0.67 0.74 0.79 0.68 0.74 0.81 0.77 0.82 0.84 0.75 0.78
MPer 0.13 0.67 0.70 0.82 0.82 0.90 0.38 0.76 0.84 0.88 0.88 0.89

Note: In the No. of State row, 1: destroyed; 2: major; 3: moderate; 4: light; 5: slight; 6: none.

Table V. Comparison of the Models for Prediction of the 950 Years with the Practical Damage Survey as the Training Data in Precision
and ROC Area
Model Precision ROC Area
No. of
State 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6

BN (BMA) 0.62 0.75 0.78 0.76 0.88 0.90 1.00 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.96 0.94
BN (K2) 0.31 0.66 0.63 0.61 0.81 0.85 0.99 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.91 0.91
BN (HC) 0.26 0.66 0.63 0.60 0.83 0.86 0.99 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.91 0.90
BN (TAN) 0.52 0.69 0.77 0.74 0.87 0.90 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.96 0.94
BN (Tabu) 0.33 0.65 0.66 0.60 0.81 0.85 0.99 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.91 0.91
BN (SA) 0.62 0.79 0.82 0.81 0.86 0.91 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.96 0.95
BN (GA) 0.27 0.66 0.63 0.60 0.82 0.85 0.99 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.91 0.91
LR 0.47 0.70 0.57 0.57 0.69 0.81 0.99 0.92 0.91 0.93 0.90 0.91
NB 0.24 0.65 0.27 0.39 0.78 0.74 0.98 0.93 0.91 0.39 0.77 0.74
RBF 0.54 0.70 0.68 0.61 0.72 0.75 0.99 0.95 0.94 0.92 0.90 0.90
MPer 0.37 0.71 0.74 0.83 0.86 0.90 0.95 0.85 0.93 0.91 0.95 0.90

Note: In the No. of State row, 1: destroyed; 2: major; 3: moderate; 4: light; 5: slight; 6: none.

classification of these factors acquired by the dis-
cretization algorithm in Section 3.3 and relevant
methods used to determine their prior probability
distributions. Our exploratory data analysis showed
that the linear correlations between these factors
ranged from 0.0032 to 0.379. The slight linear cor-
relations show that the multiple-collinearity prob-
lem in the prediction models could be decreased
or avoided, even using all the factors as predictors.
About the conditional probabilities or relevant pa-
rameters of each predictor, given their prior prob-
abilities known according to Table IV, they could
be learned from the training data sets by the mod-
els according to the principle of maximum likelihood
and minimum error. We developed these algorithms
based on WEKA(52) and MatLab.(53)
In the simulation of the return period of
950 years, we compared the result with the ROI’s
damage situation estimated by aerial photos and
practical surveys(1) of the Wenchuan earthquake
of May 12, 2008. It is found that our simulation
had a total prediction accuracy of 0.846, with the
Kappa statistic being 0.735—acceptable for practi-
cal monitoring and forecast. Table IV lists pd and
balance for each damage levels; Table V presents
precision and ROC areas for each damage level.
As shown in Tables IV and V, the BMA pre-
diction of BN achieved a nice pd with good bal-
ance and a moderately good precision and ROC
area for each damage level, unlike other proba-
bilistic models that achieved only a “good” perfor-
mance for partial damage levels. Although the other
18 Li et al.

0 .00375 .0075
km
(a) Prediction of the vulnerability for the scenario of the recurrence period of 475 years

0 .00375 .0075
km
(b) Prediction of the vulnerability for the scenario of the recurrence period of 950 years

Fig. 8. Vulnerability index estimated by the Bayesian method: (a) 10% chance of exceedance of PGA probability within 50 years; (b) 10%
within 100 years.
Mining Spatial Data Sets for Evaluating Vulnerability 19

Table VI. Shannon Mutual Information with Vulnerability sl , kdr , and st . As the epistemic uncertainty sources
Index, Vul, as the Target Variable, and Other Predictive Factors of the four factors (kdf , pga , hpr , and cost ), this result
Influencing Vul
suggests that decisionmakers should prioritize local
Shannon Mutual data-collection efforts on these factors rather than on
Predictive Factors Information other factors listed in the BN.
Close to faults (kdf ) 0.189
PGA risk (pga ) 0.135 5. DISCUSSION
Density of people (hpr ) 0.131
Accumulative road cost surface (cost ) 0.115 Probabilistic data mining models are a good
Slope (sl ) 0.102 means for estimating vulnerability since their prob-
Close to river? (kdr ) 0.080 ability outputs can be multiplied with the cost coeffi-
Soil type (st ) 0.021
cients of the damage states (Table III) to obtain a vul-
nerability index. The performance of these models
in predicting the probabilities of the damage states
models can have a slightly better value in some
is significant for estimation of the vulnerability in-
performance measures for certain levels of damage
dex. In our study case, we compared the probabilis-
(e.g., BN(SA)’s pd for level 4 in Table V), they per-
tic models, such as BNs, NB, LR, RBF network, and
form no better than our BMA prediction for other
neural network. As shown in Tables V and VI, these
levels. In total, the BMA prediction has an accept-
models were effective for prediction of certain lev-
able range for pd (0.79–0.91), balance (0.85–0.88),
els of damage but performed poorly for other lev-
precision (0.62–0.90), and ROC area (0.94–1.0) for ei-
els of damage. But by using the BMA to average the
ther level of damage. Thus, our BMA prediction has
predictions of BN, the uncertainty of the models was
achieved a stable performance compared with other
decreased, and the prediction performed stably and
single probabilistic models.
moderately well. This validation illustrates that the
Due to BMA’s robust prediction, we used it to
averaged prediction of BN is an acceptable method
do the vulnerability assessment. Fig. 8(a) presents the
for modeling and estimating the vulnerability of hu-
vulnerability index of human beings in ROI under
man beings to catastrophic risk.
the scenario of a 10% chance of exceedance prob-
As a means to probability inference, BN offers
ability of PGA within 50 years; Fig. 8(b) presents
several specific advantages over other probabilistic
the vulnerability index under the scenario of a 10%
models. BN supports a good platform for integrat-
chance of exceedance probability of PGA within
ing information sources from multidisciplinary spe-
100 years. The former corresponds to a recurrence
cialist fields and using them to make uncertainty
period of 475 years and the latter to a recurrence
inference. We propose a generic Bayesian frame-
period of 950 years, similar to the Wenchuan earth-
work for modeling catastrophic risk (Fig. 1). As il-
quake on May 20, 2008. Comparing the vulnerability
lustrated in our study of seismic risk, BN integrates
indices of the 475- and 950-year recurrence periods,
the output from the probability seismic hazard model
we found that the vulnerability for the 950-year pe-
designed by seismic experts, assessment of the en-
riod is considerably larger than that for the 475-year
vironment, and system resistance by architects and
period, reflecting its higher vulnerability. The spatial
engineers within a consistent modeling system. Also,
distribution of vulnerability for the 950-year period
BN can update the predictive values of risk given par-
is slightly different from that of the 475-year period
tial evidence, even with missing data. This offers de-
(see Fig. 5a compared with Fig. 5b). This can be ex-
cisionmakers good knowledge of the practical situa-
plained by the difference in PGA: the 950-year PGA
tion or some potential scenarios in the future before
is stronger than that for 475 years.
taking action or making the emergency plans.
Another advantage of our method is to use spa-
4.6. Sensitivity Analysis
tial analysis and GIS to assess, visualize, and locate
Table VI presents the results of the sensitivity the vulnerability. We used spatial analysis techniques
analysis: Shannon mutual information for eight vari- of KDA and ARCSM to quantify the influence of
ables with vulnerability, with Vul as the target vari- geofeatures such as faults, rivers, and roads. It is
able. From this table, we can see that kdf and pga have assumed that the closer the individuals exposed are
the largest values, indicating the greatest influence on to the active faults or rivers, the higher is the vulner-
the vulnerability index. Following these are hpr , cost , ability; the closer the individuals exposed are to the
20
rescue roads or/and shelter services, the lower is the
vulnerability (because they have more opportunity to
escape, thus decreasing vulnerability). This assump-
tion is generally acceptable. With spatial-analysis
techniques such as KDA and ARCSM, potential in-
fluences from many risk-related, critical geofeatures
or indicators can be quantified and used in model-
ing in combination with other quantitative variables.
Further, use of GIS facilitates location of geograph-
ical variations of the vulnerability and their uncer-
tainties. Use of both spatial analysis and GIS in our
grid-based approach has significant implication: the
important risk-related factors are quantified for risk
prediction, and the risk-prone sites at a fine scale
can be spatially located. This enables decisionmak-
ers to plan more precisely for shelter services be-
fore the disaster more effectively allocate resources
during the disaster, and make more informative risk
maps after the disaster for future precaution and
preparedness.
Further, our method can combine domain
knowledge and learning from spatial data to im-
prove the performance of risk and vulnerability
assessment. Given enough representative training
samples, we can understand the interdependency re-
lationships between variables in MP, E, and HC of
the framework and use domain knowledge to adap-
tively refine the relationships revealed.
6. CONCLUSION
Given the uncertain nature of natural disaster
events, we develop a generic Bayesian data mining
approach to vulnerability assessment of human be-
ings to catastrophic risk. This method is applicable
for most natural disasters. In our method, BN pro-
vides an integrative platform combining a variety of
information sources from different specialist fields
and facilitates communications between different do-
main specialists—for example, experts in natural dis-
asters, architects, engineers, and economists. BN also
serves a means of uncertainty analysis that imple-
ments propagations of uncertainties from different
sources. Therefore, it is suitable for vulnerability as-
sessment of natural disasters influenced by complex
multiple factors.
Use of spatial analysis and GIS makes possi-
ble derivation of key risk-related quantitative predic-
tive factors such as influences from active faults and
rivers, and visualizes uncertainties in a spatial man-
ner. Our study case of seismic risk illustrates that
different ground motion, environmental conditions
(e.g., slope and soil), and characteristics of human
Li et al.
beings’ behavior produce different vulnerability find-
ings (Fig. 8). The estimated vulnerability is more ob-
jective and spatially located.
Our Bayesian mining approach is generic
(Section 3), and it can be applied to other types of
catastrophic risk, such as flood, typhoon, mudslides,
and avalanches, among other catastrophes, by incor-
porating relevant domain knowledge and research
findings for specification of BN, as illustrated in our
study case.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This research is partially supported by grants
41171344/D010703 from the Natural Science Foun-
dation of China, grant 2011AA120305–1 from the Hi-
tech Research and Development Program of China’s
Ministry of Science and Technology (863), and grant
2012CB955503 (Research of Identification of Suscep-
tible Population and Risk Regionalization for Cli-
mate Changes and Health) from the National Ba-
sic Research Program of China’s Ministry of Science
and Technology (973). We also thank the reviewers
for their constructive suggestions and the editors for
their careful check and revisions, which further im-
proved this article.
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