Magi Starski 4599 Reliability

Reliability Assessment of Complex Power Systems
and
the Use of NEPLAN Tool
Master Thesis
by:
Shima Mousavi Gargari
Master thesis written at the School of Electrical Engineering, Royal Institute of

Technology, KTH, 2005/2006.
Supervisors:
Dr. Lina Bertling, KTH, School of Electrical Engineering
Dr. Gabriel Olguin, ABB Corporate Research
Examiner:
Dr. Lina Bertling, KTH, School of Electrical Engineering
XR-EE-ETK 2006:011
Abstract
Consumers of electrical energy expect a network to support their apparatuses with
continuous and reliable supply. That is the supply should be continuously available on
demands. Such an expectation from the power systems makes planners to consider the
reliability studies as an important task besides all the other analyses required for
assessing the system performance. Results from such kind of studies equip the planners
with an appropriate knowledge over a system performance at different load points and
consequently help them to identify weak points of the system and decide on possible
available solutions for improving the system reliability e.g. more investments at the weak
points. Until fairly recent, the inherent reliability of a power system was specified in term
of N-1 criterion known as deterministic approach which says that the system must
withstand a simple contingency or loss of equipment. As it is clear, such evaluation
approach is based on determined system behaviors, however the power system behaviors
are stochastic and the failures may occur randomly. Therefore, it is of necessity to
consider the possible random behavior of the systems to perform an accurate and precise
reliability assessment. New techniques and consequently new computer software
packages have been recently developed in which, in contrast to deterministic approach,
the idea of using historical performance of the power system components and modeling
the stochastic behavior of faults have been considered.
As mentioned previously, from customers’ point of views the supply should be always
available i.e. no interruption is expected, while practically, due to such stochastic
behaviors of the system, supplying the load centers with 100% reliable power source is
somehow impossible, however, the probability of the supply interruptions to the load
centers can be reduced with more investment at the planning phase. Blackouts events in
North America and Europe are good examples for showing that not always the system
can guarantee the continuous supply to its customers. It is evident that there is a
confliction between reliability and economical constraints which in case may lead to
difficult managerial decisions. Therefore, it is important to find out if a certain load point
or a specific part of the system deserves more investment or not. Such information can be
provided by reliability studies.
The power system comprises several complex subsystems. Each subsystem has its own
relevant impact on the reliability of the overall system. Transmission systems reliability
is not an exception in this category. Busbars, transmission lines and switches
functioning may have an extreme influence on the overall system performance.
Researches indicate that stations configurations and their fundamental components are
important factors which should not be ignored in reliability studies. Failures of station
components lead to temporary removal of the failed components and consequently
temporary modification of the station configuration. Creating such changes in the
protection system configuration can make the system more vulnerable to the disturbances
that may occur. Besides tripping of one circuit breaker may result in multiple switch
functioning and consequently multiple line outages. Therefore, the relevant load centers
i
will experience supply interruption at least for a certain time required for removing the
failed breakers and re-closing the affected ones.
This thesis work presents a research conducted on evaluating the system reliability as a
result of a bulk power system performance. This research work was accomplished by
using the university version of commercial software designated as NEPLAN. The
quantitative analyses illustrated in this work provide information on how the
contributions of sub systems impact the reliability of the overall system. Also, it indicates
that, how the contribution of the station components may cause different results. One of
the important aspects of this work is to illustrate the application of the computer software
package, NEPLAN, in reliability analyses. Three different test systems have been taken
under consideration in this work. Due to some restriction in using the university version
of the software some simplifications have been applied for the two of the test systems. A
simple distribution system has been implemented in NEPLAN, and the results have been
validated by comparing the results to the ones obtained from another reliability solver
known as RADPOW, developed in KTH, for reliability evaluation of distribution system.
ii
Acknowledgment
This thesis work is a part of a long term research cooperation within EKC (Swedish
Center of Excellence in Electric Power System) between KTH and ABB Corporate
Research. This work has been performed within RCAM (Reliability Centered Asset
Management) group in the School of Electrical Engineering, KTH and has been financed
by EKC and ABB Corporate Research. The financial support is acknowledged.
I would like to express my deep appreciation to Dr. Lina Bertling, my supervisor and
examiner from KTH, for all her supports, advices and encouragements.
Hereby, I also gratefully acknowledge Dr. Gabriel Olguin, my supervisor from ABB, for
sharing his opinions with me, giving me valuable comments to improve my work and
supporting me during the course of this work.
Also I am really grateful to professor Math Bollen, from STRI, for allocating his valuable
time to help me in my work and sharing his ideas with me to give me a deep insight over
my work.
It is also deserved to thank the people in the School of Electrical Engineering for
providing me the opportunity to study and learn more.
Besides, I would like to thank the persons in the BCP group for providing me an access to
the NEPLAN tool.
Appreciation also goes for friends and colleagues in RCAM group in the School of
Electrical Engineering, KTH, and other friends inside and outside Sweden.
And Finally I would like to express my sincere gratitude and deepest appreciation to my
parents and my brothers for their consistent supports and encouragements.
Shima Mousavi Gargari

Stockholm,
June, 2006
iii
Definitions
Definition 1: Any events that cause a violation in system characteristics e.g. buses
voltages, circuits currents, active and reactive power are defined as fault.
Definition 2: Outage refers to any system state in which the component is not available
to perform its intended function. Outages can be categorizes as Forced outages and
Scheduled outage.
Definition 3: Forced outage is the outage which results from emergency conditions [1]
and requires the components disconnection either manually or automatically.
Definition 4: Scheduled outages are usually performed foe construction, maintenance or

repair purposes [1].
Definition 5: Failure refers to any outage events that prevent the system from supplying
the load centers.
Failures are divided to two main categories based on the restoration time.
1- Permanent failure
2- Temporary failure
Definition 6: Credible events are defined as the failure mode which has the most
significant impact on the system.
Definition 7: Curtailable load refers to the load category which has not a significant
importance in the system and they can be disconnected from the system during remedial
action for a certain period.
Definition 8: Firm load refers to the load that can not be remained unsupplied in the
system. Thus not be disconnected during a remedial action.
Definition 9: Availability is the probability of the component to be available or in service

[2].
Definition 10: Unavailability is the probability of component being out of service [3].
Definition 11: Failure rate is the probability that the component will fail [3].
Definition 12: Repair rate is the probability that the out of service component will return
in service mode [3].
iv
Table of Contents
Table of contents
Abstract............................................................................................................................... i
Acknowledgment.............................................................................................................. iii
Definitions......................................................................................................................... iv
Table of contents ............................................................................................................... v
1. Introduction................................................................................................................... 1
1.1. Background ............................................................................................................ 1
12. Power system reliability evaluation....................................................................... 2
1.3. Research objective ................................................................................................. 4
1.4. Thesis scope and outline ........................................................................................ 4
2. Composite system adequacy assessment by applying analytical approach............. 6
2.1. Introduction............................................................................................................ 6
2.2. Analytical approach............................................................................................... 7
3. Overview of NEPLAN software................................................................................. 17
3.1. Introduction.......................................................................................................... 17
3.2. Application study ................................................................................................. 21
3.3. Validation of the results....................................................................................... 26
4. System Studies............................................................................................................. 28
4.1. Background .......................................................................................................... 28
4.2. Overview of test systems RBTS, IEEE RTS and Birka system ....................... 29
4.3. RBTS Studies........................................................................................................ 32
4.4. IEEE-RTS test system ......................................................................................... 46
4.5. Birka system study............................................................................................... 51
5. Alternative Reliability Tools ...................................................................................... 54
5.1. Introduction.......................................................................................................... 54
5.2. Composite power reliability tools ....................................................................... 55
5.3. Transmission/distribution reliability tools ........................................................ 60
6. Closure ......................................................................................................................... 66
6.1. Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 66
6.2. Future work.......................................................................................................... 67
References........................................................................................................................ 68
Appendix........................................................................................................................... A
A. Sample test system .................................................................................................. A
B. IEEE-RTS .................................................................................................................B
C. RBTS ......................................................................................................................... E
D: Birka Nät .................................................................................................................. F
v
Chapter 1. Introduction
1. Introduction
1.1. Background
Electric power system is one of the most complexes and complicated man-made systems
exist in this world. The basic function of the power system is to supply its customers with
electrical energy as economically and reliably as possible. The power systems are
subjected to many changes in order to fulfill this basic function. For instance, nowadays
interconnecting the neighboring systems to enhance the efficiency of the overall system
and support deficit power regions with the excessive power in surplus areas, is a common
practice. Modifying the system does not necessarily imply that the system is capable of
supporting the load centers with 100% reliable source. The blackout events happened in
Europe and North America showed that the power systems are not as reliable as they are
expected [4]. However, identifying the weak points of the system and reinforcing those
areas in an appropriate way may result in achieving the higher reliability and lower
probability of interruption.
1
Nowadays, due to increases in load demands, interconnecting the neighboring power

systems is a common practice in order to increase the stability, reliability and cost
efficiency. The role of transmission system which refers to transfer the bulk power from
power station to load centers is highly significant in interconnected systems.
Transmission lines outages may result a significant abnormality in system performance
and may possibly result in supply interruptions in the load centers. Statistics indicates that
transmission systems are less subjected to outages comparing to the distribution systems,
however, their outages may result in longer interruptions in the load centers.
Due to inherent stochastic characteristics of the power systems, not always the system
can guarantee the continuous supply to the load centers i.e. facing supply interruptions in
a practical system is unavoidable, however, the probability of its occurrence can be
reduced by more investment during planning stage. It is evident that there is a confliction
between reliability and economical constraints which in case may lead to difficult
managerial decisions. Results for reliability studies may provide the planners an
appropriate benchmark to decide if a certain part of the system deserves more preliminary
investment during planning phase or not.
12. Power system reliability evaluation

Generally, the term of reliability refers to the ability of a component or a system to
perform its intended function. In field of power system, such evaluation can be defined as
analyzing the ability of the system to satisfy the load demands. Therefore, power system
reliability assessment is performed in two main domains; system adequacy and system
security. The term of system adequacy relates to existence of sufficient facilities within a
system to meet the consumers demand, whereas system security refers to the ability of
the system to respond to disturbances arising within a system [5], [6]. Although these
concepts are not independent of each other, the reliability evaluation is conducted only in
one of the mentioned domains, either adequacy or security, and mostly in adequacy one.
The research described in this work is focused on adequacy analysis.
System reliability
System adequacy System security
Figure 1.1. Reliability evaluation domains [5], [6]
A power system can be divided into three main functional regions [1], [5], [6] designated
as generation, transmission and distribution systems. Reliability evaluation of the power
systems can be performed in either each individual functional zone or at the hierarchical
levels obtained from combining the functional regions.
2
Generation System
HLI
HLII
Transmission system
HLIII
Distribution System
Figure 1.2. Hierarchical levels for reliability evaluation [5], [6]
HLI analyses refer to evaluating the generation systems and its ability to supply the load
points. In this level, the transmission systems and their associated influences on the
reliability of the overall system are disregarded. The adequacy indices in this level are
loss of load expectation (LOLE), loss of energy expectation (LOEE), failure frequency
and its relevant duration (FF and FD).
HLII studies can be used to assess the adequacy of an existing or proposed system
including the impact of various reinforcement alternatives at both the generation and
transmission levels [6]. The adequacy evaluation in this level, results in achieving two
different set of indices related to the system load points (individual bus) and the overall
system. The most important indices in this level are failure frequency and its duration (FF
and FD).
Finally the level associated to the overall power system analysis including all the
functional zones, starting from generation units and terminating at costumers load points
[6] is known as HLIII evaluation. Generally, due to complexity of a practical power
system, assessment in this level is not performed by considering all three functional
zones; instead, the distribution system which receives its reliability data from the load
point indices of HLII is evaluated. The common reliability indices in this level are system
average interruption frequency index (SAIFI), the system average interruption duration
index (SAIDI) and the customers average interruption duration index (CAIDI).
The reliability evaluation of power system can be performed based on either deterministic
or probabilistic techniques. Deterministic methods have been used considerably in
practical applications. The main drawback of such techniques is their disability to
respond to a stochastic behavior of the practical system, such as random failure
3
occurrence. Such impediments have led to utilizing the application of stochastic method
for reliability evaluation which results in more accurate and precise prediction on the
system reliability.
The result of performing the reliability study is illustrated by reliability indices. The
reliability indices, which are the numerical parameters, reflect the capability of the
system to provide the customers by acceptable level of supply. Two fundamental
methodologies are applied to calculate such indices. These methods can be categorized as
an analytical approach and a simulation approach. In the analytical approach the system
is represented by its mathematical equivalent model. The reliability indices are calculated
by applying the direct numerical solution on the equivalent model. On the other hand, the
simulation approach deals with analyzing random behaviors of the system in order to
estimate the reliability indices. Even though the results of the analytical approach are not
as precise as the one for simulation approach, applying this method consumes a
comparatively shorter computational time which is an important factor in reliability
studies.
Reliability assessment in this thesis work has been conducted in adequacy domain with
main focus on transmission system, by applying the analytical approach.
1.3. Research objective

The main aim of this research work is to perform a reliability study of power system with
main focus on the transmission system, by applying analytical approach and utilizing the
NEPLAN tool. This research work is a part of a long term project in which the main goal
is to develop the new techniques and their computer implementations suitable not only
for reliability evaluation of a traditional power system (AC system), but also convenient
for reliability assessment of a complex power systems where new technologies such as
HVDC are employed in transmission systems in order to enhance the efficiency of the
overall power system [7].
1.4. Thesis scope and outline

This thesis work is organized in 6 chapters.
Chapter 1 introduces the basic reliability concepts and different approaches available for
assessing the reliability of power system.
In Chapter 2, the main concern is with describing the reliability evaluation of composite
power system by applying the analytical approach and introducing the relevant reliability
indices.
In Chapter 3, a detail explanation and description about NEPLAN software which is used
as an analytical solver has been presented.
4
Chapter 4 illustrates the application of the mentioned analytical solver for practical
systems. In this chapter, three different test systems; modified RBTS test system,
modified IEEE-RTS and Birka system have been presented and implemented in
NEPLAN. The results of reliability evaluations have been introduced in this chapter.
In Chapter 5, some commercial and non commercial tools used for reliability assessment
of power systems convenient for evaluating comparatively large systems are introduced.
In Chapter 6 very short conclusions and discussions on possible future work have been
presented.
5
Chapter 2. Composite system adequacy assessment by applying analytical approach
2. Composite system adequacy assessment

by applying analytical approach
2.1. Introduction
The basic function of a composite power system is to generate and deliver a required
electrical energy to the load centers. From consumers’ point of view, the interruption in
supply is not ideal, that is the customers prefer not to encounter any disconnection from
network. Besides sometimes such interruptions are not desired from the supplier point of
view, especially when the cost of compensation that should be paid to the customers of
the network in case of interruption in supply is comparatively high. Therefore, in order to
evaluate the system performance and reduce the probability of supply interruption and
consequently reducing the possible social and economical disasters, it is an important
task to study how often the system may encounter outages and how such outages
influence the loads of the network,. Performing such studies require an appropriate
knowledge over a system. That is, it is necessary to verify what kind of outages may
occur in a practical system.
6
Generally, inadequacy of the individual load points is caused by the distribution system
[6], however, the outages in bulk power systems affect a larger section of the system.
Considering the severity of the outages in the load centers caused by unreliability of the
composite power systems, predicting the possible weaknesses within these regions is an
important task in planning criteria. A considerable role of transmission system and its
fundamental components in such studies is evident. The reliability assessment by
focusing on the transmission system can be performed either on HLII level or on the
transmission system individually.
Due to the complexity of power system, its stochastic nature and its extremely large
number of component, performing an adequacy assessment and analyzing the system
performance for a practical system, is a very sophisticated work and requires a long
computational time. Such analyses include many aspects such as load flow analysis,
contingency assessment, generation rescheduling, transmission overload alleviation, load
curtailment and etc [6]. In this thesis work it has been tried to cover all the procedures
required in analytical approach. The load flow analyses have not been explained here,
however, readers are referred to references on power systems analysis for detailed
information regarding different load flow analyses. Application of load flow has been
also explained in reference [8] and [9].
In following section analytical approach applied for reliability analysis of the bulk power
system has been presented.
2.2. Analytical approach

As explained in previous chapter, the analytical approach is one of the most common
methods applied for reliability assessment of power systems. Results obtained from
applying this approach provide an appropriate benchmark for evaluating the system
performance and its reliability. In this section it has been tried to describe analytical
approach briefly.
In analytical approach the system is represented by its mathematical equivalent model.

Direct numerical solutions are applied to provide the reliability indices.
Generally, there are five main procedures in analytical approach.
- State space diagram generation

- System state enumeration
- System state analysis
- Remedial action
- Reliability indices
Each of the mentioned procedure has been explained in following parts.
7
2.1.1. State space diagram generation
An important and basic stage in performing the reliability investigation is to generate the
appropriate reliability model. In this level the physical system is transferred to the simple
model which is convenient for reliability studies. The system model can be generated by
applying the Markov process.
Markov process is a stochastic and memory less process in which the present state of the
system is independent of all former states except the immediately proceeding one [8],
[10]. In Markov process the transition rates are assumed to be constant. Figure 2.1 shows
the state space model for a single component which can have either in service or out of
service modes.
S1 S2
λ1
Up
μ1 Down
Figure 2.1. Markov model for one component
Practically, systems include more than a component. Generally, each component can be
repaired in case of any outages and will be return back to the operating status after the
certain time required for reparation.
Figure 2.2 shows the Markov model for a system consists of two repairable independent
components is shown in.
S1
Up
Up
λ1 λ2
μ1 μ2
Down Up
S2 Up Down
S3
λ2 λ1
μ2 μ1
Down
Down
S i is a state of the system
S4
Figure 2.2. Markov model for 2-repair able-independent-component [5], [6]
where, λi and μ i are the failure rate and repair rate of component i respectively.
The given model in Figure 2.2 is represented by IEEE committee for the independent
events.
8
The transitional probability matrix for the model shown in Figure 2.2 is given in
Eequation 2.1.
⎡− (λ1 + λ 2 ) λ1 λ2 0 ⎤
⎢ μ1 − ( μ1 + λ 2 ) 0 λ2 ⎥
α1 = ⎢ ⎥ 2.1
⎢ μ2 0 − ( μ 2 +λ 1 ) λ2 ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎣ 0 μ2 μ1 − ( μ1 + μ 2 ) ⎦
General approach in order to obtain the state probably is to solve the Equation set 2.2.a.
This approach is applicable for the system consists of either independent or dependent
component. More explanation can be found in [8], [10].
[PS −1 PS − 2 PS − 3 PS − 4 ] ⋅ [α1 ] = 0
2.2.a
PS −1 + PS − 2 + PS − 3 + PS − 4 = 1
For a system with “ n ” component the probability of each state can be calculated through
Equation set 2.2.b.
[PS −1 PS − 2 . . . PS − n ] ⋅ [α ] = 0
2.2.b
PS −1 + PS − 2 + ... + PS − n = 1
where, [α ] is general transitional probability matrix for the model and PS −i is a probability
of state i .
Figure 2.3 shows the Markov model proposed for dependent outages. The probability of
existence of each state can be calculated by applying the Equation set 2.2.b.
Up
Up
λ1 λ2
μ1 μ2
Down Up
S2 S3
Up
λC μC Down
λ2 λ1
μ2 μ1
Down
Down
S i is a state of the system
S4
Figure 2.3. Markov model for 2-repair able-dependent-outages [5], [6]
Practically, the number of possible system state in the composite power system
evaluation is extremely large when both dependency and independency of outages
9
considered in evaluation. Therefore, applying Equation set 2.2.b to calculate the system
state probability is complicated. Generally, to simplify the calculation the assumption of
independency may consider in reliability evaluation of the composite power system. By
such assumption Equation set 2.2.b will be simplified to the one presented in Equation
2.3. Note that to calculate the state probability for dependent outages such as station
originated outages equation 2.2.b should be used. The probability of encountering state i
and its associated failure rate and repair rate for independent events can simply be
obtained through Equation set 2.3. [5], [8], [11].
Ps − i = ∏ Pk ⋅ ∏ Qm
k ∈U m∈D
μs −i = ∑μ
m∈D
m 2.3
λs − i = ∑λ
k ∈U
k
where
Pk and λ k = Availability and failure rate of the component k respectively
Qm and μ m = unavailability and repair rate of the component m respectively
μ si and λ si = Repair rate and failure rate of the state i respectively
U = Set of in-service components in state i
D = Set of out of service components in state i
μk
Pk =
μk + λk
2.4
λk
Qki =
μ k + λk
The result from Equation sets 2.2.b and 2.3 can be used to calculate the frequency of
encountering each state. The frequency of each state is the probability of being in that
specific state multiple by the departure rate from that state [5]. Such indices can be
calculated by applying Equation 2.5.
f si = Psi ( μ si + λsi )
P si [8] 2.5
d si =
f si .8760
Applying the equations presented in 2.3 to 2.5, for the 2-component- repairable system
shown in Figure 2.2 yields:
Ps1 = P1 ⋅ P2
where;
10
μ1
P1 =
μ1 + λ1
μ2
P2 =
μ 2 + λ2
μ si = ∑ μi = 0 System state repair rate

λsi = ∑ λi = λ1 + λ2 System state failure rate
f s1 = P1.P2 (λ1 + λ2 )
The same calculation can be done for the other states. Table 2.1 presents the results of
this calculation.
Table 2.1. System state data for 2-repairable-componet system
State Probability Repair Failure Frequency
rate rate
S1 P1.P2 0 λ1 + λ2 P1.P2 (λ1 + λ2 )
S2 P1.Q2 μ1 λ2 P1.Q2 ( μ1 + λ2 )
S3 Q1.P2 μ2 λ1 Q1.P2 (λ1 + μ 2 )
S3 Q1.Q2 μ1 + μ2 0 Q1.Q2 ( μ1 + μ 2 )
Now these results can be used to calculate the availability and unavailability of the both
series and parallel systems. For a system with series components it is of necessity that all
the components operate simultaneously in order to be in operating mode. For instance a
system with two series components shown in Figure 2.4.a requires functioning of both
components in order to be available.
Com. 1
Com. 1 Comp.2
Com. 2
(a)
(b)
Figure2.4. System with 2 repairable components (a) Series system, (b) Parallel system
Considering the Markov process for this case yield that only the state 1 is the success
mode and the other three states are the outages modes. Therefore, the availability of this
system is equal to the probability of being in state 1 and the unavailability of this system
is equal to the summation of the probability of being states 2, 3 and 4.
11
When the system is a parallel system, functioning of one of the components is enough to
keep the system in operation or success mode. Figure 2.4.b shows a simple parallel
system. Applying the Markov process for this system yield that only state 4 is the state in
which the system encounters outage, and states 1, 2 and 3 are the states in which the
system operates successfully. That is the availability of such system is equal to the
summation of the probability of being in states 1, 2 and 3 and unavailability of the system
is equal to probability of being in state 4.
2.1.2. System state enumeration
One of the significant drawbacks of applying the Markov technique to achieve the
reliability model is the extremely large number of generated states which assigns a large
computational effort for reliability evaluation. Assume a system contains n components,
by applying Markov process the total number of the states which should be evaluated for
reliability studies will be 2 n .This leads to consume long computing time, which is not
desired in reliability analysis. Therefore, some techniques should be applied in order to
reduce the size of state space diagram.
Several techniques such as enumerating the states in form of a tree graph, truncation of
the states and contingency and ranking can be applied to reduce the number of the states
for the system under study.
The tree graph enumeration technique used in adequacy analysis is depth-first [8], in
which the enumeration starts from level zero and continue from up to down and left to
right direction. In Figure 2.3 it has been tried to illustrate this approach for system which
consists of three components.
12
⎡U1 ⎤
⎢U ⎥
⎢ 2⎥
⎢⎣U 3 ⎥⎦
⎡ D1 ⎤ ⎡U 1 ⎤ ⎡U 1 ⎤
⎢U ⎥ ⎢D ⎥ ⎢U ⎥
⎢ 2⎥ ⎢ 2⎥ ⎢ 2⎥
⎣⎢U 3 ⎦⎥ ⎣⎢U 3 ⎦⎥ ⎣⎢ D3 ⎦⎥
⎡ D1 ⎤ ⎡ D1 ⎤ ⎡U 1 ⎤
⎢D ⎥ ⎢U ⎥ ⎢D ⎥
⎢ 2⎥ ⎢ 2⎥ ⎢ 2⎥
⎢⎣U 3 ⎥⎦ ⎢⎣ D3 ⎥⎦ ⎢⎣ D3 ⎥⎦
U i : In service operation mode for component i

⎡ D1 ⎤
⎢D ⎥ Di : Out of service mode for component i
⎢ 2⎥
⎢⎣ D3 ⎥⎦
Figure 2.3. Depth-first enumeration techniques for 3-component system
In another method known as truncation of the state space, the size of the space can be
reduced by eliminating the states which has the lower probability of occurrence. System
state probability decrease when the system level increased [8]. This can be done by
performing the analysis up to certain level of probability.
Another method for reducing the number of states is contingency and ranking. In this
approach only the credible events are considered. As defined previously the credible
events are the failure events which have the most significant impact on the system
performance. In order to choose the appropriate contingencies, it is necessary to obtain a
deep understanding over the system under study and the factors that may cause a failure.
Various solution techniques and their associated software packages depending upon the
adequacy criteria employed and the intention behind the studies are developed and made
available in order to analyze the adequacy of a power system [6]. Each software packages
has a special predefined failure modes based on the intention behind its development.
Such tools are mostly dealing with reliability assessment of either the transmission
system or the composite power system and known as network based programs. Generally,
in network-based programs failure is defined in terms of line overloads and unacceptable
bus voltage level [12]. Network solution [8] which applied in network-based program can
13
be a network flow, AC load flow, fast decoupled load flow and DC load flow depends on
the purpose of the study. AC load flow and fast decoupled one are the most popular
programs while they provide the complete information on system characteristics. When
the main concern is the reactive power balance then the DC load flow is the most
appropriate program. Reader refers to [6] and [8] for detailed explanation.
By applying the mentioned techniques a suitable model for reliability studies will be
obtained. The next stage is to study how the possible outages influence the system
performance.
2.1.3. System state analysis
One of the main parts in reliability assessment is to analyze the impact of the possible
failures that may occur in a practical system on the performance of the overall system.
For instance how the overloaded transmission lines influence the overall power systems,
is an important issue in reliability study of the bulk power systems. Network solutions
can be applied to perform such analyses. In case of any violation in system characteristics
the system state is defined as an abnormal state and requires the remedial action in form
of corrective action or load curtailment to clear the abnormality.
2.1.4. Remedial action
After identifying the violation in the system, remedial actions are applied. Remedial
action is applied to alleviate the system abnormal conditions [8]. Therefore the main
emphasis is on clearing the abnormality of the system due to the special contingency.
This can be performed by applying corrective action such as removing the failed
component or rescheduling the generation unit and re-supplying the loads. After
performing the corrective action to re-supply the load if the violation still exists, then
load curtailment will be required. The contingency which led to load curtailment
contributes to provide the reliability indices.
2.1.5. Reliability indices
Reliability indices are numerical parameters that reflect the capability of the system to
provide its customers by an acceptable level of supply. They estimate the system
reliability by providing the quantitative measures at each individual load point or for the
whole system. In composite power evaluation, as described before, two sets of indices
which indicate the performance of the whole system or the performance at each
individual load buses within a system may obtain. The main reliability indices in the
composite power system evaluation are frequency of interruption and the associated
duration. These two indices are important as they indicate the expected frequency and
duration of load supply interruption [11].
The load point indices are represented in Equations 2.6 to 2.11. [5], [8].
The main reliability indices in HLII are given in following:
14
- Failure Probability ( FP ):
FP = ∑p
si∈F
si 2.6
- Failure Frequency(FF) [occ yr ] :
FF = ∑f
si∈F
si 2.7
- Failure duration(FD) [hour distrubance] :
FP
FD = ⋅ 8760 2.8
FF
- Expected energy not supplied(EENS) [MWh yr ] :
EENS = ∑p
si∈F
si Lc.si 8760 2.9
- Expected power not supplied(EPNS) [MW yr ] :
EEPS = ∑p
si∈F
si Lc.si 2.10
- Expected load curtailed(ELC) [MW yr ] :
ELC = ∑f
si∈F
si Lc.si 2.11
F is a specific system failure state.

p si and f si are the probability and frequency of each failure state respectively.
Lc , si is a load curtailed at a specific bus or for overall system in system state si .
For reliability evaluation with main focus on the transmission system or distribution
system the overall system results obtained from HLII can be replaced by indices obtained
from HLIII. The software employed for this thesis work has been developed for
reliability evaluation of transmission and/or distribution systems and has the capability of
providing indices results from HLIII. The indices obtained from HLIII are presented in
the following.
Reliability indices for HLIII [5], [13]:
System Average Interruption Frequency Index (SAIFI) [int yr , cust ] :
15
SAIFI =
Total Number of Customers Interruption
=
∑ λ ⋅N i i
2.12
Total Number of Customers Served ∑N i
System Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI) [h yr , cust ] :
SAIDI =
Sum of Customers Duration Interruption
=
∑U ⋅ N i i
2.13
Total Number of Customer Service ∑N i
Customers Average Interruption Index (CAIDI) [h int .] :
CAIDI =
Sum of Customers Duration Interruption
=
∑U ⋅ N i i
2.14
Total Number of Customer Interruption ∑λ ⋅ N i i
Average Service Availability Index (ASAI) [%]:
ASAI =
Customer hours of available Service
=
∑ N ⋅ 8760 −U ⋅N
i i i
2.15
Customers hours service Demands. ∑ N ⋅ 8760i
where, N i represents the number of customers at load point i , λi [1 yr ] is a expected

failure rate per year at load point i , U i is the unavailability of load point i
16
Chapter 3. Overview of NEPLAN software
3. Overview of NEPLAN software
3.1. Introduction
NEPLAN is an electric power analyzer which has been developed by the BCP group in
Switzerland. This software package is used mainly for transmission and distribution
systems analyses. It includes optimal power flow, transient stability and reliability
analyses [14]. NEPLAN reliability software can be used to provide not only the reliability
indices for both the individual load points and the overall power system, but also it can be
used to provide the cost of unreliability. NEPLAN is based on Markov process and
enumeration techniques. This implies that the approach in NEPLAN follows the same
procedure that has been explained in the pervious chapter. Figure 3.1 shows the
evaluation approach taken in NEPLAN to achieve the reliability indices for both load
point ant the overall system.
17
Processing of
network data
Creating possible outage

events combination
First order outage events Second order outage events
Single stochastic Single deterministic Two Single stochastic and

outage outage stochastic outages deterministic outages
Effect analysis of each outages mode on system performance
Normal System
performance
Abnormal
Alleviating the abnormality of

the system
Normal System
performance
Abnormal
Load curtailment
Registering the failure rate

∑
Load point indices, failure
frequency, duration, etc.
Overall system indices
Figure.3.1. Flowchart for reliability evaluation in NEPLAN
18
The first step is to analyze all the input data required for load flow analysis and data
required for reliability evaluation. After processing the data and solving the load flow
program for the system in order to obtain the system characteristics in normal condition,
the system will be modeled by applying the Markov process. The achieved model will be
reduced to the reasonably small model by applying the contingency and ranking or the
truncation of states techniques. But as noted before, applying such techniques require a
deep understanding over practical systems i.e. it is necessary to know what kind of
outages may occur in practical system. In NEPLAN the predefined outages events in are
categorized in two groups i.e. first order contingencies and second order contingencies.
The second step is to create a first order and second order outage combinations. First
order contingencies deal with single stochastic outages and single deterministic outages.
Generally the single deterministic group does not contribute in interruption frequency
while it causes no supply interruption to the loads of the system. Single stochastic
outages group includes several modes such as independent single outage, common mode
outage, ground fault and unintended switch opening. The reliability input data for these
categories are failure rate and repair time and the output data are failure frequency and its
relevant duration.
Second order contingencies can be considered either as two stochastic outages or

stochastic and deterministic outages. In the case of overlapping of two stochastic outages
the failure frequency is calculated by applying equation 3.1 or 3.2. The failure frequency
for overlapping of stochastic and deterministic outages is obtained through equation 3.3.
For independent outages [15],
FF = λ A ⋅ λB (rA + rB ) 3.1.
where λ A and λ B are the failure rate and ri is their relevant repair time.
For dependent outages where the second outage may occur with the probability of Pr as a
consequent of the first outage, like a second short circuit due to delay in clearing the first
short circuit in network, the failure frequency is calculated by applying 3.2 [15].
FF = λ A ⋅ PrB 3.2.
As cited previously the deterministic outage itself may not cause supply interruption in
load, but simultaneous occurrence of deterministic and stochastic outages may result in
forced outage, which leads to load failure. In such case the failure frequency at load
points obtained by applying 3.3 [15].
FF = λ A ⋅ λB ⋅ rB 3.3.
where λ A and λ B are the failure rate for stochastic and deterministic outages respectively
and ri is the relevant repair time for maintenance (deterministic outage).
19
After reaching the appropriate reliability model, all the possible outages combinations
which have been contributed to provide the reliability model will be analyzed
individually to verify their impacts on the system performance. If the created outages
result in any variation in system characteristic such as fluctuation in bus voltages, the
corrective action such as disconnecting the faulty line and supplying the load in an
appropriate way is performed. After performing the corrective action, if the abnormality
still exists, the remedial action i.e. load curtailment will be required. The failure
frequency of that specific state which results in load curtailment will be calculated. For
second order combinations the failure frequency in NEPLAN is calculated by applying
Equations 3.1 to 3.3. The calculated failure frequency will be registered in order to
contribute for final reliability calculation. This procedure will be continued to analyze all
the possible outage events that may occur within a practical system.
The last step after studying all the possible outage events is to sum up the registered
failure frequency relevant to a specific load bus and calculated the relevant indices at
each individual load point and overall system. Table 3.1 and 3.2 shows the indices for
each individual load points and overall power system provided by NEPLAN.
Table 3.1. Load point indices [15], [16]
Index Unit Description
Interruption Frequency [1 yr ] Expected frequency of supply interruption per year
Interruption Duration [min yr ] Expected probability of interruption in minute or hours per year
[hrs yr ]
Mean Time of interruption min, hrs Average duration of customer interruption
Power not supplied [kW yr ] Product of interrupted power and its interruption frequency
[MW yr ]
Energy not supplied [kWh yr ] Product of interrupted power and its interruption probability
[MWh yr ]
Interrupted cost [ $ yr ] Cost of supply interruption
Table 3.2. Overall system indices [15], [16]

Index Unit Description
N - Total number of customers not served
SAIFI [1 yr ] System average interruption frequency index
SAIDI [min yr ] System average interruption index
CAIDI h Customer average interruption duration index
ASAI % System average availability
F [1 yr ] System load interruption frequency
T h System load interruption frequency
Pr [min yr ] System load interruption probability
P [MW yr ] Total interrupted load power
W [MWh yr ] Total load energy not supplied
C [CU yr ] Total load interruption cost
20
3.2. Application study

Figure 3.2 shows a small test system implemented in NEPLAN in three different modes
in order to clarify a reliability calculation approach. The hand calculation for southern
part of the system has been illustrated in the following part, to demonstrate how the
software calculates the indices.
LP-5
CB TR DISC LP-6
Figure 3.2. Test system [13]
Mode 1:
In this mode there is no connection between bus 5 and 6. Therefore neither disconnect
switch nor connection link exist. The model has been shown in Figure 3.3.
LP-5
LP-6
CB TR DISC
Figure 3.3. Test system without disconnect switches [13]
21
Hand calculation of Load point indices for LP6:
As noted previously in this part reliability indices for southern part of the sample system
which supplies the load point 6 will be calculates by hand.
Equations 3.4 and 3.5 can be applied to calculate the failure frequency and associated
duration for the series and parallel components.
For series components:

λS = ∑i λi
RS =
∑ λ ⋅r
i i i
[13] 3.4
λS
For parallel components or second order failure combination:

λ ⋅ λ ⋅ (r + r )
λ12 = 1 2 1 2
1 + λ1 ⋅ r1 + λ2 ⋅ r2
[13] 3.5
r ⋅r
r12 = 1 2
r1 + r2
Figure 3.4 shows the southern part of the sample test system.
BB4 CB6 BB5 CB7 TB3 CB8
BB6 LP-6
Figure 3.4. The circuit which feeds load point 6
FF = λBB 4 + λCB 6 + λBB 5 + λCB 7 + λTR 3 + λCB 8 + λBB 6

FF = 0.001 + 0.02 + 0.001 + 0.02 + 0.015 + 0.02 + 0.001
FF = 0.078 1
yr
Failure duration calculation for load point 6:
RS =
∑ λi ri
λs
0.001 ∗ 2 + 0.02 ∗ 24 + 0.001 ∗ 2 + 0.02 ∗ 24 + 0.015 ∗ 15 + 0.02 ∗ 24 + 0.001 ∗ 2
RS =
0.078
RS = 21.42 [h yr ]
22
System Indices:
System indices can be calculated by applying equations 2.12-2.15
Applying equation these equations yield:
0.103 ∗ 80 + 0.078 ∗ 100

SAIFI = = 0.09 [int yr.cust ]
80 + 100
0.103 ∗ 21.42 ∗ 60 ∗ 100 + 0.078 ∗ 23.362 ∗ 60 ∗ 80

SAIDI = = 124.78 [min yr.cust ]
100 + 80
0.103 ∗ 23.362 ∗ 100 + 0.078 ∗ 21.42 ∗ 80

CAIDI = = 22.63 [h]
0.103 ∗ 100 + 0.078 ∗ 80
(100 + 80) ∗ 8760 − (0.103 ∗ 23.362 ∗ 100 + 0.078 ∗ 21.42 ∗ 80)

ASAI = ∗ 10 = 99.976 [%]
180 ∗ 8760
Results obtained from NEPLAN:
Load point indices:
Table.3.3. Load point indices for system illustrated in 3.2 obtained from NEPLAN
Load Point Failure Frequency [1 yr ] Failure Duration [h ]
L-5 0.103 5.362
L-6 0.078 21.425
Overall system indices:
Table 3.4. Overall system indices for system illustrated in figure 3.2
Index Unit
N - 180
SAIFI [1 yr ] 0.092
SAIDI [min yr ] 124.748
CAIDI [h] 22.631
ASAI % 99.976
23
Mode 2:
In this mode the disconnect switch has been incorporated for reliability calculation. It is
worth to note that, this switch has been considered to be in open mode at the begining.
The single line diagram of the circuit is illustrated in Figure 3.5.
LP-5
LP-6
Figure 3.5. Single line diagram of the test system, open disconnect switch [13]
Load point indices:

Table.3.5. Load point indices for test system when DICS switch is open
L-5 0.103 1.011
L-6 0.078 1.014
Table 3.6. Overall system indices for test system, DISC switch is open
Index Unit
N - 180
SAIFI [1 yr ] 0.091
CAIDI [h] 1.012
ASIA % 99.999
In this part, the failure frequency is the same while the disconnect switch is open and it
has no influence on the interruption frequency in the load points. However, the duration
has been influenced. That means, whenever there is any interruption occurred in each part
of the system, the disconnect switch can be closed and the affected load point has the
possibility to partially supply from the other part of the system. That is, re-supplying at
least a part of the interrupted load in the shorter period is possible by closing this switch.
24
Mode 3:
Disconnect switch is closed in this evaluation:
LP-5
LP-6
Figure 3.7. Single line diagram of the test system, Closed disconnect switch [13]
Load point indices:
Table.3.7. Load point indices for test when DICS switch is close.
L-5 0.063 1.049
L-6 0.063 1.049
Table 3.8. Overall system indices for test system, DISC switch is close.
Index Unit
N - 180
SAIFI [1 yr ] 0.063
CAIDI [h] 1.049
ASIA % 99.991
In this mode, since the disconnect switch was closed from the beginning it has been
contributed in reliability calculation. The results show that the failure frequencies in both
load points have been decreased.
25
3.3. Validation of the results

A comparison has been made between the results from NEPLAN and another reliability
tool known as RADPOW to validate the obtained results.
RADPOW is a reliability tool developed in KTH School of Electrical Engineering for

reliability assessment of distribution system. This tool was developed based on analytical
approach [13]. A new version of RADPOW which has been recently developed, includes
simulation approach [25]. This software package has been explained more in detail in
Chapter 5. It is worth mentioning that in this work the term of RADPOW refers to
analytical approach of this solver, and term of Simulation refers to Simulation approach
of RADPOW.
Comparisons of the results obtained from NEPLAN and RADPOW for the test system in
three different modes have been shown in following tables.
Mode 1:
Table.3.9. Failure frequency index obtained from different software for Mode 1.
Failure Neplan RADPOW Simulation Δ( NEP − RAD) Δ( NEP − Sim)
Frequency [1 yr ] [1 yr ] [1 yr ]
LP-5 0.103 0.103 0.103 0.000 0.000
LP-6 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.000 0.000
Table.3.10. Unavailability index obtained from different software for Mode 1.
Unavailability NEPLAN RADPOW Simulation Δ( NEP − RAD) Δ( NEP − Sim)
[h yr ] [h yr ] [h yr ]
LP-5 0.0964 0.097 0.0006
LP-6 0.470 0.471 0.001
Mode 2:
Failure NEPLAN RADPOW Simulation Δ( NEP − RAD) Δ( NEP − Sim)
LP-5 0.103 0.103 0.103 0.000 0.000
LP-6 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.000 0.000
[h yr ] [h yr ] [h yr ]
LP-5 0.104 0.104 0.104 0.000 0.000
LP-6 0.079 0.079 0.079 0.000 0.000
26
Mode 3:
LP-5 0.063 0.064 0.064 0.001 0.001
LP-6 0.063 0.064 0.064 0.001 0.001

[h yr ] [h yr ] [h yr ]
LP-5 0.066 0.065 0.065 0.001 0.001
LP-6 0.066 0.065 0.065 0.001 0.001
The small differences between the results obtained from these tools can be justified by
considering the possible different assumption defined for each tool. However, these
differences are small enough to be neglected.
27
Chapter 4. System studies
4. System Studies
4.1. Background
Three test systems, two composite power systems and one distribution system are utilized
in this thesis work. Roy Billinton reliability test system designated as RBTS [17] and
IEEE-RTS [18] have been used in wide range in reliability studies. These test systems
have been developed for educational purposes and are used enormously for composite
power reliability evaluations. These test systems as well as a small part of the distribution
system in Stockholm city, so-called as Birka system, have been implemented in the
NEPLAN the results have been presented in the following sections.
28
4.2. Overview of test systems RBTS, IEEE RTS and Birka

system
The reliability test system designated as RBTS was developed in university of
Saskatchewan for educational and research purposes. The small size of this test system
makes it a suitable test system to conduct large number of reliability studies in reasonable
time. The RBTS comprises of 6 buses; 2 generator buses and 5 load buses. The 2
generator buses consist of 11 generators. The buses are connected via 9 transmission
lines. The total installed capacity is 240 MW and the system peak load is 185MW . The
voltage level on transmission line is 230kV .
The second test system designated as IEEE-RTS was developed by the Subcommittee on
the Application Methods in the IEEE Power Engineering Society to provide a common
test system for reliability studies. This test system is a 24-bus system comprises 10
generator buses, 10 load buses and 4 intermediate buses. The total number of generation
units available in generator buses is 32 units. The buses are connected through 33
transmission lines. The system has divided two Northern and Southern part. In northern
part the voltage level is 230kV and in southern part is 138kV . The total installed capacity
in generation units is 3405MW and the total peak load is 2850 MW . The southern part is
power deficit area while the northern part is surplus power area.
Birka system is a practical distribution system in Stockholm city.
Figures 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 show the single line diagram of these test systems respectively.
The data for the systems required for load flow and reliability studies, including
generation units’ data, transmission lines and load model data are given in Appendix A.
29
1 × 40 MW
2 × 40 MW G
4 × 20 MW
1 × 20 MW G 2 × 5MW
1 × 10 MW 3
Bus 2
Bus 1
20 MW
2 7
1 6
4
Bus 4
Bus 3
40 MW
85MW 5 8
Bus 5
9 20 MW
Bus 6
20 MW
Figure 4.1. Single line diagram of the RBTS [17]
30
G
G G
B.18
B.21 B.22
B.17
B.23
G
B.16 B.19 B.20
B.14
G
B.15
G B.13
B.24 B.11 B.12
B.9 B.10
B.3 B.6
B.4
B.5
B.8
B.1
B.2 B.7
G G G
Figure 4.2. Single Line diagram of the IEEE-RTS [18]
31
BÄ
220 kV c1
c2 c8
c3 c9
c4 c10
110 kV bus transformer breaker fuse
c5 c11
cable supply load

point point
c6 c12
c7 c13
33 kV
c14
c49 c15 c19 c23 c36

c50 c53 c37 c40 c43
c16 c20 c24
c51 c54 c38 c11 c41 c44
c52 c55 c39 c42 c45

c17 c21 c25
c56 c46
c57 c18 c22 c26 c47
c58 c27 11 kV c28 c48

SL HD
c29
c30 c31
c32
c33
c34
c35
LH11
Figure4.3. Single line diagram for Birka system [13]
4.3. RBTS Studies
4.3.1. The base case studies for the Modified RBTS test system
Base case studies provide appropriate information in reliability study to obtain the affects
of the system modifications. In the base case studies the sub stations’ elements are
considered to be ideal and also the common mode failures are disregarded.
It is noteworthy to mention that in this work the substations for RBTS and IEEE-RTS
systems have been simplified due to limited number of nodes in university version of the
tool. That is the implemented test systems in NEPLAN are the modified ones and are not
the same as the practical ones. Figure 4.4 shows the modified RBTS test system. The
substation in generation sides has been simplified due to restriction in number of possible
nodes. For IEEE-RTS, the station configuration is simplified to only 1 circuit breaker.
32
G
G
G G
N22 N23
G 1 2
LINE3
G N11 G N23 N21
N14 5 20 MW 3
Bus 2
2 1 4
N24
Bus 1 N12 N25

3 4 G G
G LINE2
N13 LINE7
LINE1 LINE6
N33
N43
N36 LINE4 N42
N32 N44
N35 N45
3 2 1 3 2 1
Bus 3
Bus 4
LINE5 LINE8
4 5 4 5
N51
N31 1 2 N41
85MW 40 MW
N52
20 MW
Bus 5
3 4
LINE9 N62 i : is Circiut breakers
G : is generator
Bus 6 1 2
N : is node
N61 LIN : is transmission Line
20 MW
Figure 4.4. Schematic of the implemented model
The load point indices can be calculated by assuming either a constant load level (a peak
load) or a load duration curve. The results obtained from the former one is called as the
33
annualized indices and the ones for latter one called as annual indices. Since in the
second calculation the load variation versus time is considered, the calculated indices are
more accurate and close to reality compared to the ones obtained from the first
calculation. However, the first approach consumes less computational time. In NEPLAN
it is possible to define the load duration curve up to 4 steps. In this evaluation the
reliability of the power system has been studied under the peak load of the system.
Therefore the obtained results are the annualized indices.
The curtailment of the load at the appropriate system buses in the event of capacity
deficiency [6] is an important consideration in reliability evaluation. Normally, load can
be assumed as firm load and curtailable load [6], [8]. This implies that practically it is not
possible to curtail more than a specific part of the load in case of deficit power. In this
study 20% of the load is allowed to be curtailed. Besides, it is necessary to mention the
load priority to assign a load curtailment order in case of deficit power in network. There
are several issues which are used in order to classify the load and to determine the load
curtailment philosophy. Some features such as economic priority can be used to assign a
load curtailment sequence.
Basically, some loads are more important than the other load within a system. Therefore
each load buses could be classified regarding its importance within a system. NEPLAN
has the capability of performing the load shedding regarding the defined priority of load
buses. The priority order can be arranged based on economic factor. The cost of energy
not supplied can be an appropriate index to allocate the priority of load curtailment for
each load buses.
The cost of energy not supplied and the priority of load curtailment for RBTS are given
in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 respectively.
Table 4.1. Cost of energy not supplied for RBTS [2]

Bus Cost of energy not supplied
[$ kWh]
2 7.41
3 2.69
4 6.78
5 4.87
6 3.63
Table 4.2. Priority of load for RBTS [2]
Priority order Bus
1 2
2 4
3 5
4 6
5 3
34
For the base case study as mentioned previously the station originated outages and
common mode outage have not been considered. The evaluation has been performed by
considering the peak load values. The results are presented in following tables.
Table 4.3. Load point annualized indices for RBTS for base case study.
Failure Duration Probability Power not Energy not
Frequency [h] [min yr ] supplied supplied
[1 yr ] [MW yr ] [MWh yr ]
L-2 0.01 1.000 0.600 0.200 0.200
L-3 0.038 1.000 2.280 3.229 3.229
L-4 0.123 2.849 21.107 4.939 14.071
L-5 0.002 5.000 0.685 0.046 0.228
L-6 0.002 5.000 0.685 0.046 0.228
Figure 4.5. Load point annualized indices for RBTS for base case study.
Results shown in Table 4.3 and Figure 4.5 imply that the load point 4 is the weakest point
in the system for the base case study. The failure frequency and the interruption duration
at this load point is higher than the ones for other load points. Since the dependent
outages (station originated and common mode outages) have been disregarded in this
study, the provided indices are not an appropriate benchmark to evaluate the adequacy of
the system or each load point. But as mentioned before, they can be used to compare the
contribution of the different kind of dependent outages on the adequacy.
Table 4.4 shows the annualized indices for the overall power system. Although these
indices are mainly used for distribution system, they can be used to indicate the reliability
of the overall system when the focus is on transmission system. As it is already evident
35
from the results, the system performance is considerably high and the probability of
encountering load interruption is quite low.
Table 4.4.Overall system annualized indices for RBTS

System indices
SAIFI [1 yr ] 0.035
CAIDI [h] 2.401
ASAI (%) 99.99
F [1 yr ] 0.174
T (h) 2.367
Pr [min yr ] 24.671
P [MW yr ] 8.46
W [MWh yr ] 17.957
One of the interesting features of NEPLAN is its ability to register the different outage
combinations and demonstrate their relevant effect analysis. Such kind of information
may help the planners to identify that how the mal operation of the components may lead
to unreliability of the system. Table 4.5 indicates one of the created outage combinations
for the presented system under given assumption. For the base case study under the peak
load, 138 outage combinations have been created in NEPLAN. In this section only two of
the possible failures are shown.
Table 4.5. Sample outage combination for RBTS under peak load and base case study
Outage Combination Type of Element Element name
Outage Combination 1
Failed Element Generator GEN11
Protection tripping Circuit Breaker CB-11*
Circuit breaker CB-13*
Influenced feeders/generation Generation unit GEN11
units
Generation unit GEN12
*CB-11 is the circuit breaker number 1 in bus 1.
*CB-13 is the circuit breaker number 3 in bus 1.
36
As shown in Table 4.5, when generator 1 in bus section 1 encounters any failures, the
circuit breakers 1 and 3 in bus section 1 are tripping in order to isolate the fault. As a
result of circuit breakers operation, the mentioned generation unit will be disconnected
from the system. Consequently, the available generated power with in a system will be
less than the normal operation mode. As a result of deficit power within the system, due
to loss of the generation unit, the other generation units should increase their production
in order to compensate for the lack of power in the area. In case if the other generation
unit hit their maximum capacity before compensating for the deficiency, the load
curtailment which is assigned by load curtailment philosophy should be applied. In this
case the available capacity of the generation units have the possibility to cover the
deficiency. That is, there is no need to curtail the load when this outage occurs. Table 4.7
shows another sample of the evaluation which results in load curtailment.
Table 4.6. Sample outage combination for RBTS under peak load and base case study
Outage Combination 5
Failed Element Generator GEN22
Protection tripping Circuit Breaker CB-21*
Circuit breaker CB-22*
units
Opening switch after an hour
01:00:00
Involved elements Disconnect switch GEN22
Closing switch after an hour
01:00:00
Involved elements Circuit breaker CB-22
Circuit breaker CB-21
Influenced load Load L-2
Influenced generation unit Generation Unit GEN11
Generation Unit GEN13
37
As a result of failure in generator 2 in bus section 2, the circuit breakers 1 and 2 in bus
section 2 are tripping to isolate the fault. But by their tripping operation not only the fault
is isolated but also the load which is connected at the mid point of these breakers will be
isolated from the rest of the system and will face interruption for a certain period. It will
take an hour to remove the failed generator and re-closed the circuit breakers. Therefore,
in such case re-supplying the interrupted load will take 1 hour. Besides, due to failure of
the generation unit other generators in the system have been affected too. That is they
should increase their capacity in order to compensate for the lost generation unit.
4.3.2 System studies incorporating station originated and common cause

outages
In previous section the station configurations and its fundamental components’ outage
were not incorporated in the reliability evaluation. Practically, station related outages can
have considerable impact on the reliability of a composite generation and transmission
system [19]. When one of the breakers encounters failure, the other breakers might be
switching. As a result of breakers tripping, the relevant lines will be disconnected and
consequently the loads fed through these lines will be interrupted. The probabilities
associated with station originated and multiple common-cause outages can be quite high
compared to the corresponding event probabilities associated with independent outages
[6]. Therefore, it is not practical to disregard the impact of these outages.
4.3.2.1. Reliability assessment incorporating station originated outages.
The representation of stations as a simple node [20] or disregarding the station originated
outages which could cause a significant impact on the reliability of the system is one of
the simplifications applied in reliability evaluation. As the station originated outages
have a large influence on the reliability of the overall power system, it is not a right
assumption to disregard the stations configurations and their associated outages. The
failure of station component may result in multiple outages of generators and/or
transmission lines [6] and consequently supply interruption to the load points. In
previous case study, it has been assumed that the stations’ elements are fully reliable,
whilst in this section the unreliable stations’ elements have been incorporated. Tables 4.7,
4.8 and Figure 4.6 indicate the result for the implemented RBTS test system in NEPLAN.
Table 4.7. Load point annualized indices incorporating station originated outages.
L-2 0.243 12.996 189.607 4.863 63.202
L-3 0.372 8.859 197.871 31.643 280.317
L-4 0.478 7.959 228.131 19.110 152.087
L-5 0.283 11.736 198.949 5.650 66.316
L-6 0.735 11.783 519.794 14.705 173.265
38
Figure 4.6. Load point annualized indices incorporating station originated outages.
As it is evident from the obtained results, when the dependent outages are incorporated,
the scenario of adequacy and inadequacy of the load is changed. In this case, the load
point 6 which was the most adequate load in the system is happened to be an inadequate
one. As it is obvious from the single line diagram of RBTS shown in Figure 4.1, this load
bus is connected to the rest of the system through the single transmission line. Therefore,
any outage combination in which the transmission line 6 is contributed will result in
isolating this bus from the rest of the system. As there is no individual generation unit
available in this bus section, the outage of transmission line results in overall load
interruption connected to this bus. Therefore, it can be concluded that this load bus is the
one which requires more concern during planning phase. Since in such analyses the
dependent outage events have been regarded, the achieved results can provide a sufficient
data regarding the supply adequacy and inadequacy. But note that in this case study only
one kind of dependent outages has been considered. Common mode outages will be dealt
with in next section.
Table 4.8 indicates the annualized indices for the overall power system. As the results
show, the availability of the system when the station components outages are contributed
in evaluation is 99.94. The total load curtailment for the system is 75.972 [MW yr ] and
consequently energy not supplied is 735.88 [MWh yr ] . Such results imply that, even
though there are multiple outages happened in load point, but the supply availability in
the overall system is quite high.
39
Table 4.8. Overall system annualized indices incorporating station originated outages
System indices
SAIFI [1 yr ] 0.422
CAIDI [h] 10.535
ASAI (%) 99.94
F [1 yr ] 2.055
T (h) 10.735
Pr [min yr ] 1323.755
P [MW yr ] 75.972
W [MWh yr ] 735.88
Table 4.9 indicates one of the outage combinations has for the implemented system.
Table 4.9. Sample outage combination under peak load + Station relevant outages
Event1: Outage Combination 60
Failed Element Circuit Breaker CB21
Protection tripping Circuit Breaker CB-35
Influenced load Load point 2 L-2
Influenced feeders/generation units Generation unit GEN11
Event 2: Opening switch Disconnect switch Disc-LIN3
After 01:00:00 hour
Disconnect switch Disc-LIN2
Disconnect switch Disc-GEN 22
40
Event 3: closing switch after Circuit breaker CB-14

01:00:00
As mentioned previously, the outage of the circuit breakers may result in multiple
outages. In this case as a result of a fault occurrence in circuit breaker 21 (circuit breaker
1 in bus 2), the other breakers given in Table 4.9 have been influenced. Load point 2
which is connected to the mid point of the two tripped breakers (circuit breakers 1 and 2
in bus 2) has been disconnected from the rest of the system. Besides, as a result of the
operation of the mentioned breakers in Table 4.9, some of the generators will be
disconnected from the system and consequently the amount of power within a network
has been decreased while the load demand is still the same as before, therefore, the other
available generation unit should increase their generating capacity till the disconnected
generators returned back to the system. If the available generators can not produce a
required energy for satisfying the load demands, load curtailment according to the load
priority should be applied. The affected generation units due to the fault in breaker 21 are
also introduced in Table 4.9. Note that the affected components will be return back to
their operation mode, after removal of the breaker 21, and re-closing the influenced
breakers. This process will take one hour in this case study. A duration which the failed
component requires to return back to the operating mode is its relevant repair time plus
the switching time.
In this outage event the load center 2, is the load point which encounters interruption.
This load will be re-supplied after removal of the failed breakers and re-closing the other
switches. That is re-supplying the load requires an hour which is the switching time of the
breakers.
Although the load point 2, is the most adequate one, when it encounters outages, its
relevant duration is longer than the other load point indices. The reason is due to
interruption duration of the components contributing in the outages combination.
4.3.2.2 Incorporating common mode outages.
In previous case the dependent outages in form of station originated ones, has been
studied. Another kind of dependent outages can be presented in form of common mode
outages. In RBTS reliability test system the transmission lines which are vulnerable to
common mode outages are the lines in common right of way. These circuits are the lines
1, 6, 2 and 7. As shown in single line diagram of RBTS, two transmission lines leave bus
1 and go to busbar 3, and also two lines leave bus 2 and go to busbar 4. There is a
possibility that simultaneous outages occur due to outages in common right of way e.g.
fault in the tower which carries these lines. Table 4.10, 4.11 and Figure 4.7 show the
reliability indices when common mode outages are incorporated.
41
Table 4.10. Load point annualized indices incorporating common mode outages.
L-2 0.010 1.000 0.600 0.200 0.200
L-3 0.190 1.010 11.533 16.176 16.339
L-4 0.656 13.022 512.888 26.258 341.925
L-5 0.009 2.219 1.207 0.181 0.402
L-6 0.009 2.219 1.207 0.181 0.402
Figure 4.7. Load point annualized indices incorporating common mode outages.
Table 4.11. Overall system annualized indices incorporating common mode outages
System indices
SAIFI [1 yr ] 0.175
CAIDI [h] 10.048
ASAI (%) 99.98
F [1 yr ] 0.854
T (h) 10.250
Pr [min yr ] 525.298
P [MW yr ] 42.997
W [MWh yr ] 359.269
42
Comparing the obtained results to the ones when station outages are incorporated, it is
evident that the effect of station components and its configuration on the reliability of
power system is more pronounced [6].
As it is clear from the results, the weakest point in this system is the load center 4 due to
its higher failure frequency and higher unavailability duration. Note that due to load
curtailment philosophy assigned by load priority and the permitted percentage of load
curtailment, the load 3 and 4 are happened to be affected more than the other loads in the
system. The worst case is when lines 1, 6, 2 and 7 are disconnected simultaneously,
which result in isolating the bus sections 3, 4, 5 and 6. Anyhow this case does not occur
in NEPLAN due to restriction in number of simultaneous outages (2 simultaneous
outages).
The results show that the load not supplied in bus 4 is higher than the other buses due to
higher number of failure frequency in this bus. Definitely, this case is not desirable, due
to the cost of compensation given in Table 4.1 for energy not supplied. Therefore, this
load bus is the weakest point in the system, not only from frequency of interruption point
of view but also from cost of energy not supplied standpoint i.e. this bus section is weak
both from customers and suppliers stand points and required more investment during
planning and operating phases.
4.3.2.3 Incorporating the station originated and common mode failures.
In this study case both the station originated and common mode failure are considered in
the assessment. The results are introduced in Tables 4.12, 4.13 and Figure 4.8.
Table 4.12. Load point annualized indices for RBTS incorporating the station originated + common
mode outages.
L-2 0.243 12.996 189.607 4.863 63.202
L-3 0.537 6.449 207.903 45.673 294.530
L-4 1.020 11.826 723.418 40.782 482.278
L-5 0.291 11.422 199.620 5.825 66.540
L-6 0.744 11.659 520.465 14.880 173.488
43
Figure 4.8. Load point annualized indices for RBTS incorporating the station originated + common
mode outages.
Table 4.13. Overall system annualized indices for RBTS incorporating the station originated +
common mode outage
System indices
SAIFI [1 yr ] 0.567
CAIDI [h] 10.822
ASAI (%) 99.93
F [1 yr ] 2.753
T (h) 11.063
Pr [min yr ] 1827.608
P [MW yr ] 112.025
W [MWh yr ] 1080.057
As stated before, comparison of the results presented in Tables 4.7 and 4.10 shows that
the station elements reliability effects are more dominant compare to the common mode
outages of the transmission lines, therefore, the results when both outages are considered
must not vary that much from the case when only the station originated outages are
considered. Results in Table 4.12 confirm that idea, while the given results do not differ
that much from the results in Table 4.7.
In the case when only the station originated outages has been considered, the inadequate
load bus was the load connected to bus 6, while in this case the most inadequate load is
44
the one connected to bus 4. As it has been mentioned previously, due to contribution of
dependent outages the reliability results may varied extremely from the base case results.
This is even valid for contribution of different kind of dependent outages. Comparing the
results of common mode outages and the one for station originated, one can say that
depend on the focus of the study different judgment over a system adequacy can be
performed. So it is important to know what kind of analyses one prefers to run. Thus
mentioning a priority for the contribution of the different outages is an important issue in
reliability studies which may result in different judgments.
In this case 762 failure combinations have been created and contributed in calculation of
reliability indices. Table 4.14 presents a sample of the outage combination for this case
study.
Table 4.14. Sample outage combination for RBTS under peak load + Station outages
Event1: Outage Combination
60
Failed Element Busbar N36
Circuit Breaker CB-44
Protection tripping Circuit Breaker CB-13
Influenced load Load point 3 L-3
Load point 4 L-4
units
Event 2: Opening switch Disconnect switch Disc-LIN2
After 01:00:00 hour
Disconnect switch Disc-LIN6
45

Event 3: closing switch after Circuit breaker CB-14
01:00:00
Involved elements Circuit breaker CB-25
Influenced loads Load point 3 L-3
Influenced feeders/generation Generation unit GEN 11
units
Generation unit GEN 13
In case of simultaneous outage in node 36 and circuit breaker 4 in bus section 4, the
mentioned circuit breaker in Table 4.14 are operating. Consequently the load points 3 and
4 and the mentioned generation units are affected. After these failures the corrective
action is applied in order to alleviate the abnormality of the system. After an hour of
delay in switching time, some of the components influenced by occurred faults will be
restored. Load point 4, is the load center which is restored after the switching time, while
load point 3, is the load which is restored after the repairing time of the failed component.
Also, some of the generation units which have been influenced due to these faults can be
return back to their normal operation just after the repairing time of the failed node and
bus bar.
4.4. IEEE-RTS test system

In this part, the simplified IEEE-RTS test system has been taken under consideration. The
station configuration of this test system has been simplified to only one circuit breaker.
Such simplification is not correct, while, as mentioned before, the station configuration
are one of the most dominant contributor in reliability assessment of the power system.
However, this test system was implemented in NEPLAN by considering the mentioned
simplification i.e. the bus configuration has been disregarded and only one circuit breaker
was considered. The results obtained from evaluation are shown in following sections.
The priority order is arranged based on economical issues. The costs of energy not
supplied are presented in Table 4.15 and the corresponding load priority is given in 4.16.
46
Table 4.15. Cost of energy not supplied for IEEE-RTS [2]

Bus Cost of energy not supplied
$
kWh
1 6.20
2 4.89
3 5.30
4 5.62
5 6.11
6 5.50
7 5.41
8 5.40
9 2.30
10 4.14
13 5.39
14 3.41
15 3.01
16 3.54
18 3.75
19 2.29
20 3.60
Table 4.16. Priority of load curtailment for IEEE-RTS [2]

Priority order Bus
1 1
2 5
3 4
4 6
5 7
6 8
7 13
8 3
9 2
10 10
11 18
12 20
13 16
14 14
15 15
16 9
17 19
In NEPLAN it is possible to mention the priority up to level 10. Therefore, another

simplification, regarding the priority of load curtailment is required. Load buses 10 to 17
mentioned in Table 4.16 are assumed to have the same priority in this analysis.
47
For this system, the bus configurations have been disregarded. Therefore, it has been
preferred to not go for the base case analysis and analyze the system for two modes.
These modes are explained in following sections.
4.4.1. System studies incorporating station originated and common cause

outages
4.4.1.1. Incorporating station originated and common mode outages.
In this study case both the station originated and common mode failure are considered in
the assessment. The results are introduced in Tables 4.17 and 4.18.
Table 4.17. Load point annualized indices for Modified-IEEE RTS incorporating the station
originated + common mode outages.
L-1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
L-2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
L-3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
L-4 0.000321 5.000 0.09616 0.026093 0.1304
L-5 0.000256 5.000 0.07684 0.020006 0.100032
L-6 0.000814 7.78 0.3797 0.1217 0.9468
L-7 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
L-8 0.000082 1.38 0.0068 0.015 0.02125
L-9 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
L-10 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
L-13 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
L-14 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
L-15 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
L-16 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
L-18 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
L-19 0.000081 3.1181 0.015216 0.016193 0.05049
L-20 0.000039 3.3143 0.007788 0.0055 0.01827
48
Table 4.18. Overall system annualized indices for Modified-IEEE RTS

System indices
SAIFI [1 yr ] 0.000094
CAIDI [h] 6.096221
ASAI (%) 99.9993
F [1 yr ] 0.001558
T (h) 6.154671
Pr [min yr ] 0.575339
P [MW yr ] 0.204889
W [MWh yr ] 1.267304
As it can be seen from the results presented in Table 4.17 the weakest points of the
system are the load points 4, 5, 6, 8, 19 and 20. Load point 4, 5, 6 and 8 are the innermost
bus sections, which are located in the southern region of the test system where there is a
problem of deficit power. Also, there is no local generation unit available in these buses.
Therefore, due to any outages in which the connections of these buses to the generation
units are affected, the supply of the mentioned loads will be interrupted. Somehow, these
bus sections are the most delicate buses within a system under study. On the other hand,
there are two more weak load buses, which are located in the northern part of the system.
Load buses 19 and 20 which are the innermost buses in the northern part are also exposed
to interruptions. The main reason that these loads might be encountered any interruption
can be described as a result of common mode outages of the transmission lines. These
buses are connected to the generation buses via a transmission line on common right of
way.
4.4.1.2. Incorporating station originated outages.
In this study case only station originated outages are considered i.e. the circuit breakers
assumed to be not reliable. Tables 4.19 and 4.20 show the results for this case study.
Table 4.19. Load point annualized indices for Modified-IEEE RTS incorporating the station
originated outages.
L-1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
L-2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
L-3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
L-4 0.000321 5.000 0.09616 0.026093 0.1304
L-5 0.000256 5.000 0.07684 0.020006 0.100032
L-6 0.000814 7.78 0.3797 0.1217 0.9468
L-7 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
L-8 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
49
L-9 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000

L-10 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
L-13 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
L-14 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
L-15 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
L-16 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
L-18 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
L-19 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
L-20 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Table 4.20. Overall system annualized indices for Modified IEEE-RTS+ station originated outages
System indices
SAIFI [1 yr ] 0.000082
CAIDI [h] 6.6256
ASAI (%) 99.99994
F [1 yr ] 0.001390
T (h) 6.6256
Pr [min yr ] 0.5527
P [MW yr ] 0.1678
W [MWh yr ] 1.1772
As the results shown in Table 4.19 imply, when the common mode outages are
disregarded in analysis, the load interruptions in buses 8, 19 and 20 are eliminated. These
results confirm the explanation given in previous part for outages in buses 19 and 20.
This also works for load bus 8. This bus is connected to the rest of the system through a
single transmission lines and 2 transmission lines on common right of way.
A comparatively large number of the components in this system disabled us to perform a

right analysis over this system. However, there are several program, commercial and non-
commercial, available which has the capability of evaluating such a large system. Some
of these programs are introduced in Chapter 5. Consider that the commercial version of
NEPLAN has the ability to perform assessment of such a large system.
Due to several simplification applied to the presented composite power systems,

validation of the approach was impossible, since the obtained results are completely
different from the results presented in others research works by applying the same test
systems. Therefore, a small test system, known as Birka system has been implemented in
NEPLAN and the results has been compared to the results from RADPOW, in order to
validate the approach. This test system is presented in up coming section.
50
4.5. Birka system study

Another test system which has been considered in this thesis work is a part of the
Stockholm city distribution system, so-called as Birka system. In this work a part of the
system has been chosen and implemented in NEPLAN. The result of the implementation
has been validated by the results available from RADPOW.
4.5.1. Case study Birka system:

Figure 4.6 shows the single line diagram of this system. Three main load points are fed
from this system. Two 33-kV load points referred to Högalid station (HD) and Statens
Järnvägar railway (SJ) and the station referred to Liljeholmen station (LHII). The more
data regarding the system can be found in Appendix.
Table 4.21. Load point annualized indices for Birka system.

L-SJ 0.056 1.727 5.762 0.044 0.200
L-LH 0.278 1.691 28.207 0.214 0.362
L-HD 0.057 1.704 5.867 0.044 0.077
Figure.4.9. Load point indices for Birka system.
As the results in Table 4.21 and Figure 4.7 show, the weakest point in the system is the
load point belongs to Liljeholmen station. This is apparently logical. Considering the
single line diagram of the system, it is obvious that the number of components which
connect the Bredäng station to this station is more than the ones for other stations.
Consequently the relevant failure rate will be increased. The unavailability of this load
51
point is 28.207 [min yr ] which is not a large value, however, comparing to the
unavailability of the other two stations within the system it is.
Table 4.22. Overall system annualized indices for Birka system

System indices
SAIFI [1 yr ] 0.062
CAIDI [h] 1.703
ASAI (%) 99.999
F [1 yr ] 0.308
T (h) 1.757
Pr [min yr ] 32.463
P [MW yr ] 1.578
W [MWh yr ] 2.687
Table 4.22 shows the indices for the overall system. As the results show the availability
of the system is high and almost near to 100% (ASAI= 99.999%). This implies that the
system is almost fully reliable. The system average interruption duration index is
6.286 [min yr ] which itself demonstrate the high reliability of the system.
The comparison of the results to the one obtained from RADPOW has been made in
order to be validated. Note that in this comparison, the term of “RADPOW” refers to
analytical approach of this software and the term of “Simulation” refers to Simulation
approach of this software.
Anyhow, the results obtained from the mentioned programs, NEPLAN and RADPOW
have been compared, and as the following table show, the results are almost the same.
The differences are almost negligible.
Table.4.23. Failure frequency index obtained from different approach.
L-SJ 0.056 0.057 0.057 0.001 0.001
L-LH 0.278 0.279 0.279 0.001 0.001
L-HD 0.057 0.058 0.058 0.001 0.001
Table.4.24. Unavailability index obtained from different approach
Unavailability NEPLAN RADPOW Simulation Δ( NEP − RAD) Δ ( NEP − Sim)
[h yr ] [h yr ] [h yr ]
L-SJ 0.0964 0.097 0.097 0.0006 0.0006
L-LH 0.470 0.471 0.471 0.001 0.001
L-HD 0.0977 0.098 0.098 0.0003 0.0003
52
Obtaining almost the same results from different approaches shows the correctness of the
approach and consequently the validity of the results. Even though, the implementation of
the composite power systems have not been performed completely and the results
obtained from the analyses were extremely different from the reality, but the approach
has been validated by implementing the comparatively small system. And this is a
valuable result to know that the approach is correct and it can be used to provide the
precise results regardless of various assumptions that have been assigned for its
development.
53
Chapter 5. Alternative reliability tools
5. Alternative Reliability Tools
5.1. Introduction
Various software packages applied for composite power systems and/or transmission
systems reliability evaluation are available. These programs have the capability of
evaluating the system either from adequacy point of view or security standpoint. The
software used for reliability evaluation of generation unit often developed as production
models using Monte Carlo techniques, whilst transmission software developed mainly
using Markov process [18]. In this section it has been tried to introduce and describe
some of these software tools.
54
5.2. Composite power reliability tools
5.2.1. MECORE
The MECORE software is the Monte Carlo based program used for composite power
system reliability evaluation developed by power research group in university of
Saskatchewan and enhanced at BC hydro.
The result of the evaluation is presented in form of reliability indices both for individual
load point and the overall system. This software also has the capability of providing the
unreliability cost. MECORE is base on a combination of state sampling (Monte Carlo
simulation) and enumeration techniques (analytical approach). The state sampling
techniques is used to simulate system component states and to calculate annualized
indices at the system peak load level. A hybrid method utilizing an enumeration approach
for aggregated load studies is used to calculate annual indices using an annual load curve
[4], [21], [22], [23]. This software has the capability to handle up to 1000 buses and 2000
branches.
Brief description of the system capabilities are given in this section.
1) Failure modes:
- Independent failures of generators, lines and transformers
- Common cause outages of transmission lines
- Generating unit derating states
2) Failure criteria:
- capacity deficiency
- Line overload
- System separation- load loss
- Bus isolation- load loss
3) Load model:
- Annual, seasonal and monthly load curve
- Multi-step models
- Bus load proportional scaling and flat level model
4) Probability indices:
- System and bus indices
- Annualized and monthly/ seasonal/ annual indices
- Basic and IEEE proposed indices
Basic indices:
¾ Probability of load curtailment (PLC):
PLC = ∑ Pi
i∈s
55
where Pi is the probability of the system state i and S is the set of all system states
associated with load curtailment.
¾ Expected number of load curtailment (ENLC) [ occ. / yr ]:
ENLC = ∑ Fi
i∈S
where Fi is the system state frequency.
¾ Expected duration of load curtailment (EDLC) [ hrs / yr ]:
EDLC = PLC ∗ 8760

¾ Average duration of load curtailment (ADLC) [ hrs / disturbance ]:
ADLC = EDLC EFLC
¾ Expected load curtailment (ELC) [ MW / yr ]:
ELC = ∑ C i Fi
i∈S
where Ci is the load curtailment of system state i .
¾ Expected demand not supplied (EDNS) [ MW ]:
EDNS = ∑ C i Pi
i∈S
¾ Expected energy not supplied (EENS) [ MWh / yr ]:
EENS = ∑ C i Fi Di
i∈S
where Di is the duration of system state i .
¾ Expected damage cost (EDC) [ k $ / yr ]:
EDCL = ∑ C i Fi DiW
i∈S
IEEE proposed indices:
¾ Bulk power interruption index (BPII)[ MW MW − yr ]:
BPII =
∑ C ⋅Fi i i
L
where L is the system peak load in MW.
56
¾ Bulk power/energy curtailment index (BPECI)[ MWh MW − yr ]:
EENS
EPECI =
L
¾ Bulk power supply average MW curtailment index (BPACI)
[ MW Disturbance ]:
ELC
BPACI =
EFLC
where EFLC is expected frequency of load curtailment and can be obtained from
equation :
EFLC = ∑ ( Fi − f i ) [occ yr ]
i∈S
¾ Modified bulk power curtailment (MBECI) [ MW MW − yr ]:
EDNS
MBECI =
L
¾ Severity index (SI) [ system. min yr ]:
SI = BPECI × 60
5) Linear programming optimization model.
MECORE program utilizes a linear programming Optimal Power Flow model to

reschedule generation, alleviate line overloads and avoid load curtailment if possible or
minimize total load curtailments if unavoidable
5.2.2. COMREL
As it has been mentioned previously, two different approaches, Enumeration approach
(Analytical) and State sampling (Monte Carlo simulation), are applied for reliability
evaluation and consequently development of relevant computer software packages. A
computer program, COMREL which is the abbreviation of Composite system Reliability,
is the analytical based techniques propagated by power system research group in
university of Saskatchewan.
This program uses the contingency enumeration techniques for the evaluation of
composite systems. This program has the capability of evaluating the system considering
independent outages, common mode outages and station originated outages.
As it has been cited before network solutions are important feature in reliability
evaluation. COMREL is equipped with network solution technique such as AC load flow,
DC load flow.
57
Figure 5.1 shows the basic structure of COMREL program.
Base Case system

Analysis
Select contingency
State
Evaluate
Contingency
Problem
Yes
NO
Remedial Action
Problem
Yes
NO
Accumulate
adequecy indices
Figure 5.1.Structure of COMREL program
Brief description of the program capabilities are given in this section:
1) Failure modes:
- Independent failures
- Common cause outages
- Station originated failures
- Lack of sufficient generation in the system to meet load demands
- Interruption of continuity of power supply to a load point
- Overload of transmission facilities
- Violation of bus voltage
- Generating unit MVAR violation
3) Network analysis
- Network flow
- AC load flow
- DC load flow
58
4) Contingency and ranking

- Predetermined contingency level (4 simultaneous generation outages, 3 simultaneous
transmission, and 3 transmission and generation outages)
- Ranking (Credible events)
- Frequency cut off (Neglecting the contingency with frequency of occurrence)
5) Remedial action
- Generation rescheduling
- Handling the bus isolation
- Line overload alleviation
- Correction generation unit MVAR unit
- Correction of bus voltage limit
- Load curtailment
6) Load curtailment policies

- Firm load
- Curtailable load
7) Load model:
- Annual, seasonal and monthly load curve
- Multi-step models
8) Reliability indices:
- Load point indices
- System indices
Load point indices:
¾ Probability of failure
¾ Frequency of failure
¾ Expected number of load curtailment
¾ Expected load curtailed
¾ Expected energy not supplied
¾ Expected duration of load curtailment
¾ Bulk power supply average MW curtailment index (BPSACI)

¾ Bulk power interruption index (BPII)
¾ Bulk power energy curtailment index (BPECI)
¾ Modified bulk power energy curtailment index (MBPECI)
The calculations of these indices are indicated in [24].
59
5.3. Transmission/distribution reliability tools
5.3.1. RADPOW [13], [25]

RADPOW which is the abbreviation of Reliability Assessment of Distribution Power
System has been developed at the school of electrical engineering, KTH for reliability
evaluation of distribution systems. The first version of this tool developed based on
analytical approach. Recently the module based on simulation approach has been added
to this software package. Figure 5.2 illustrates the overall methodology used in this tool.
System data
Network model
Assign each LPs the events that lead

to failure for that LP
Analytical method Simulation method
Calculate the reliability indices Make a large number of random

for each LP based on pre- experiments to see how these
defined formulas affect the load point
Calculate the reliability for

the system
Figure.5.2. Flowchart for the analytical and simulation methods used in RADPOW [25]
Figure 5.3 shows the algorithm used in analytical approach of this software.
60
Intput data
For each load point
For each failure mode
Evaluate basic reliability indices

λi , U i , ri , LOEi
Evaluate load point indices

λLP = ∑ λi , U LP = ∑U i ,
rLP = U LP λLP , LOE LP = ∑ LOEi
Evaluating the systme indices
SAIFI =
∑λ ⋅ N LP LP
, SAIDI =
∑U ⋅ NLP LP
∑N LP ∑N LP
CAIDI =
∑U ⋅ N LP LP
, AENS =
∑ LOE LP
∑λ ⋅ N LP LP ∑N LP
Output data
Figure. 5.3. Algorithm for the evaluation of the reliability indices in RADPOW [13]
Note that λ [occ yr ] represents the expected failure rate, r [h f ] represents the average
outage duration, U [h yr ] illustrates annual expected outage time and LOE [kWh yr ]
shows the average loss of energy.
Detailed explanation on simulation approach of this tool can be found in [25].
61
5.3.2. VERA and PROCOSE

VERA (Value-Based Evaluation and System Reliability Assessment) and PROCOSE
(Probabilistic Composite System Evaluation) programs are used in Ontario hydro. VERA
was designed to calculate customer interruption costs and delivery point reliability
indices. PROCOSE was developed to examine the impact of other generating resources
that are available on a system, in mitigating any load cuts required when transmission
elements are out –of-service. But it does not consider the impact of transmission grid
configuration, nor does it examine every possible contingency condition [21].
5.3.3. PSS/TPLAN
PSS/TPLAN is a commercial software package designed for reliability evaluation of
transmission system which has been developed by SIEMENS PTI (power transmission
and distribution). The reliability evaluation criteria in this program is completely
different from the ones introduces previously. The previous software packages provide
the adequacy indices, while PSS/TPLAN is analyzing the system from security point of
view, in which the capability of the system to respond to the disturbances is assessed.
Figure 5.4 shows the algorithm of this tool.
Base Case System Analysis
Select Contingency State
Evaluate Contingency
Classifying the Results
NO
Problem
Yes
Local Trouble System Trouble
Remedial Action
NO
Problem
Yes
Reliability Indices
Figure 5.4.Structure of PSS/TPLAN program [26]
62
Brief description of the program capabilities are given in this section:
- Local trouble
¾ Overload
¾ Low voltage
¾ High voltage
¾ Islanding
¾ Load shed
- System trouble
¾ Voltage collapse
¾ Cascading outages
2) Network analysis
- AC load flow
- DC load flow
3) Contingency ranking
- Overload ranking
- Voltage trouble ranking
- Voltage collapse ranking
4) Remedial action
- Preventive action for base case
¾ Adjusting the generators’ real power

¾ Phase shifter angle
¾ Load shedding
- Security constrained preventive action
¾ Adjusting the generators’ real power

¾ Phase shifter angle
¾ Load shedding
5) Load curtailment policies

- Firm load
- Curtailable load
6) Load model:
- Peak load
- Multi-step models
63
7) Reliability indices:
- Probabilistic system trouble indices
¾ Frequency and duration of load shed, overload, low and high voltage and
voltage collapse
¾ Bulk power interruption index, [occ yr ]
BPII =
∑F ⋅L i i
Lt
Where
Fi is event frequency , Li is load lost and Lt is total load of the system
¾ Bulk energy curtailment index [h yr ]
Energy Curtailed
BECI =
No min al Load
- Costumer impact indices
¾ Un-served energy
8) Cost of unreliability for individual buses [$ yr ] :
N
$
Cost = ∑ Fi ⋅ ⋅ Li ⋅ 8760
i MWh
Where,
Fi is the frequency of loss of load caused by i th contingency.
[$ MWh] is the cost point corresponding to the duration of the loss of load
Li is the load curtailed on special bus due to i th contingency
5.3.4. CREAM
The program CREAM is the abbreviation of Composite Reliability Assessment by Monte
Carlo. This program has been developed by Electric power research institute (EPRI). The
program utilizes Monte Carlo sampling methodology to randomly select system
conditions from the conditions probability distribution [27].
5.4. Tools applied for HVDC system evaluation

Nowadays, due deregulation of the power systems by employing new techniques such as
FACTS and HVDC system, many software tools which has the capability of evaluating
such systems are developed. Some of these programs which are used in BC hydro in
Canada for HVDC evaluation are presented in this section. This part is taken from [21].
64
1) SPARE: This program has the capability of not only calculating the common
reliability indices but also unavailability due to aging failures for each component.
Input data for this case is the mean life and deviation of each component. The
aging failures can be modeled using Weibull or Normal distribution.
2) NETREL: This tool was developed to calculate availability/unavailability of a

network consisting of components in parallel and/or series. This program also
provides the average capacity for a given HVDC configuration. The results from
NETREL take into account both aging related and repairable failure modes
producing a comprehensive reliability picture of HVDC poles that are in the end-
of-life stage.
3) MCGSR: which is the abbreviation of Monte Carlo Generation System Reliability

is used by means of generating unit reliability evaluation tools.
The presented software packages are not the commercial one and they are patented by
British Columbia Hydro (BC Hydro), therefore the detailed information about the
structure of the programs is not available.
65
6.Closure
6. Closure
6.1. Conclusion
The results obtained from reliability studies, provide an appropriate benchmark for
assessing the system performance and identifying the weak point of the system. Verifying
the weak point of the system may make the planners to increase the investment at a
certain load point during the planning phase and consequently reduce the further costs
due to supply interruption in operation stage.
The results illustrated in chapter 4, not only showed the weak points of the system, but
also indicated that depends on the assumptions of the studies the adequacy of the system
at each individual load points may vary. An important result from evaluating the system
in different modes is that the station configuration and its components have a significant
impact on the final results. Therefore, it is not rational to ignore them in reliability
66
6.Closure
evaluation and simplify the stations to the single bus bars which are generally used in the
conventional load flow analysis.
The principal aim of this work was to study the reliability evaluation of the power system
with the main focus on the transmission system and utilization of the NEPLAN tool for
such evaluation. The university version of NEPLAN is not proper software for studying a
comparatively large transmission system including many nodes such as IEEE-RTS.
However, it can be more appropriate tool for distribution systems. The commercial
version of this software as well as the other tools introduced in Chapter 5 could be proper
software for assessing a comparatively large system.
6.2. Future work

As mentioned before, the main focus in the long term research work is to investigate the
transmission system reliability, where new technologies such as HVDC and FACTS are
employed in the system to enhance the efficiency of the overall power system. In this
work the traditional (AC) power system has been taken under consideration in order to
build up knowledge over the reliability of such system. Now as a next stage in this work,
it is of interest to modify the test systems and include the complementary link e.g. a
HVDC link and examine the reliability of a DC system. Comparison of the results for the
modified system to the one illustrated in this assessment can provide a basic knowledge
over the performances of these special AC and DC systems, but still can not provide a
general idea for general power systems i.e. results of such comparison may not work for
all kind of AC and DC systems.
In this work the failure rates and repair time have been considered to be constant during
the evaluation, but this is not a right assumption while an environmental impact has been
disregarded. Environmental conditions have significant impacts on the reliability of a
transmission system; especially overhead lines are more exposed to be damaged due to
fluctuation in weather condition. Therefore, such evaluation can come as a follow up
work of this thesis. So, developing new techniques in which the realistic environmental
conditions can be modeled are required.
One of the basic ideas in this work was to study the possible approaches that can be
applied for reliability assessment of the power systems. In Chapters 2 and 3 the analytical
approach and the applicable commercial software which is based on enumeration
techniques (Analytical approach) were explained. Although the analytical approach is a
fast and an appropriate technique in reliability evaluation, yet the simulation approach
can provide more accurate results. However, such evaluation requires a comparatively
longer computational time. Therefore, as a continuation of this thesis it might be of
interest to study the approach based on simulation and state sampling (Monte Carlo
simulation).
67
References
References
1. Electric power transmission engineering, Turan Gönen, Wiley-Interscience
Publication, 1988.
2. Xiaosu Tang, Consideration in bulk system reliability assessment, Master thesis,
University of Saskatchewan, 2000.
3. Efficient operation and planning of Power systems, Lenart Söder, Mikael Amelin,
Royal institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden, 2006.
4. Ran Mo, Deterministic/Probabilistic evaluation in composite systems, Master
thesis, University of Saskatchewan, October 2003.
5. Reliability Evaluation of Power system, Roy Billinton, Ronald N. Allan.
6. Reliability Assessment of Large Electric Power System, Roy Billinton, Ronald N.
Allan, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988.
7. Lina Bertling, Pre-study on reliability modeling and assessment for complex
power system with special focus on HVDC, KTH School of Electrical
Engineering, 2005.
8. Wei Zhang, Reliability Evaluation of Bulk Power Systems using analytical and
equivalent approaches, Doctoral Dissertation, University of Saskatchewan, 1998.
9. Fang Yang, Sun Wook Kang, George Stefopoulos, Comprehensive power system
reliability assessment, Final project, Georgia Institute of Technology, April 2005.
10. Reliability evaluation of engineering system, Roy Billinton, Ronald N. Allan
11. Roy Billinton, W. Zhang, Algorithm for failure frequency and duration
assessment of composite power systems, March 1998.
12. R. Billinton, N.D.Reppen, M.P. Phavaraju, Requirements for composite system
reliability evaluation models, IEEE. 1998.
13. Lina Bertling, Reliability Centered Maintenance for Electric Power Distribution
Systems, Doctoral Dissertation, Royal Institute of Technology, 2002.
14. www.neplan.ch
15. Neplan reliability, Math Bollen, STRI AB, Ludvika, Sweden, March, 2006.
16. Neplan User’s guide.
17. A reliability test system for educational purposes- Basic data, Power system
research group in university of Saskatchewan, IEEE transactions on power
systems, Vol. 4, No 3, August 1989.
18. The IEEE reliability test system-1996, IEEE transactions on power systems, Vol.
14, No 3, August 1999.
19. R. Nighot, R. Billinton, Reliability evaluation of the IEEE-RTS incorporating
station related outages, Power system research group, University of
Saskatchewan.
20. D.S. Arentz, M.Th. Schilling, M. B. Coutto Folho, J.C.Souza, Nodal Reliability,
June 2002.
21. Michael Emmerton, Don Somatilake, Probabilistic Transmission Planning,
Document reference: p:\pba\150251, prepared for Electricity Commission, August
2004.
22. Yi Gao, Adequacy assessment of electric power systems incorporating wind and
solar energy, Master Thesis, University of Saskatchewan, January 2006.
68
References
23. Yifeng Li, Bulk system reliability evaluation in a deregulated power industry,
Master thesis, university of Saskatchewan, December 2003.
24. Steve Kwaku Adzanu, Reliability assessment of non-utility generation and
demand-side management in composite power system, PhD Thesis, University of
Saskatchewan, Fall 1998.
25. Johan Setréus, Development of a simulation module for the reliability computer
program RADPOW, Master thesis, KTH School of Electrical Engineering,
Stockholm, Sweden, 2006.
26. www.pti-us.net
27. M. J. Bashir, T. C. Cheng, A.S. A. Farag, Comparison of Monte Carlo Simulation
and State Enumeration Bases Adequacy Programs: CREAM and COMREL, IEEE
transaction, 1996.
28. Janak Raj Acharya, Weather effect considerations in reliability evaluation of
electrical transmission and distribution systems, Master thesis, University of
Saskatchewan, August 2005.
29. R. Billinton, A. Sankarakrishnan, Adequacy assessment of composite power
systems with HVDC link using Monte Carlo simulation, IEEE transactions on
power systems, August 1994
30. Hua Yang, Incorporating station related maintenance and aging outages in
composite system reliability evaluation, Master thesis, University of
Saskatchewan, September 2005.
31. Sastry Kuruganty, HVDC transmission system models for power system
reliability evaluation, IEEE CAT, 1995.
69
Appendix
Appendix
A. Sample test system
Load data:
Load point no. Total no. of Customers

customers
System 180 Industrial Commercial Residential
5 100 0.0 0.2 0.8
6 80 0.0 0.2 0.8
Load point no. Total active Customers

power per
customer
Industrial Commercial Residential
5 4.00 0.0 0.3 0.7
6 5.00 0.0 0.3 0.7
Load point no. Total reactive Customers

power per
customer
5 2.00 0.0 0.3 0.7
6 2.50 0.0 0.3 0.7
Elements reliability data:
Element Failure rate Duration

Permanent Active Permanent Maintenance Switching
Busbar 0.001 0.001 2.0 1.0 0.0
Cir.Breaker 0.02 0.02 24 1.0 0.0
Transformer 0.015 0.015 15 1.0 0.0
Disc.Switch 0.002 0.002 4.0 1.0 0.0
A
Appendix
B. IEEE-RTS
Bus load data
Bus Number Bus Load Load If Peak load 10% higher
% of system MW MVar MW MVar
load
101 3.8 108 22 118.8 24.2
102 3.4 97 20 106.7 22
103 6.3 180 37 198 40.7
104 2.6 74 15 81.4 16.5
105 2.5 71 14 78.1 15.4
106 4.8 136 28 149.6 30.8
107 4.4 125 25 137.5 27.5
108 6.0 171 35 188.1 38.5
109 6.1 175 36 192.5 39.6
110 6.8 195 40 214.5 44
113 9.3 265 54 291.5 59.4
114 6.8 194 39 213.4 42.9
115 11.1 317 64 348.7 70.4
116 3.5 100 20 110 22
118 11.7 333 68 366.3 74.8
119 6.4 181 37 199.1 40.7
120 4.5 128 26 140.8 28.6
Total: 100,0 2850 580 3135 638
IEEE-RTS-96 Bus data, area A

Bus 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112
no
Bus PU PU PQ PQ PQ PQ PU PQ PQ PQ PQ PQ
type
Bus 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124
no
Bus Slack PU PU PU PQ PU PQ PQ PU PU PU PQ
type
B
Appendix
Data for generators at each bus

Bus ID Unit type PG QG Q max Q min
MW MVAR MVAR MVAR
101 U20 10 0 10 0
101 U20 10 0 10 0
101 U76 76 14.1 30 -25
101 U76 76 14.1 30 -25
102 U20 10 0 10 0
102 U20 10 0 10 0
102 U76 76 14.1 30 -25
102 U76 76 14.1 30 -25
107 U100 80 17.2 60 0
107 U100 80 17.2 60 0
107 U100 80 17.2 60 0
113 U197 95.1 40.7 80 0
113 U197 95.1 40.7 80 0
113 U197 95.1 40.7 80 0
114 Sync Cond 0 13.7 200 -50
115 U12 12 0 6 0
115 U12 12 0 6 0
115 U12 12 0 6 0
115 U12 12 0 6 0
115 U12 12 0 6 0
115 U155 155 0.05 80 -50
116 U155 155 0.05 80 -50
118 U400 400 137.4 200 -50
121 U400 400 137.4 200 -50
122 U50 50 -4.96 16 -10
122 U50 50 -4.96 16 -10
122 U50 50 -4.96 16 -10
122 U50 50 -4.96 16 -10
122 U50 50 -4.96 16 -10
122 U50 50 -4.96 16 -10
123 U155 155 31.79 80 -50
123 U155 155 31.79 80 -50
123 U350 350 71.78 150 -25
C
Appendix
Data for Transmission system

From To L Per outage Tran R X B Continuous
rate outage rate rating
BUS BUS km λP Dur. λt Dur. PU PU PU MVA
1 102 4.827 0.24 16 0.0 0.003 0.014 0.461 175
101 103 88.495 0.51 10 2.9 0.055 0.211 0.057 175
101 105 35.4 0.33 10 1.2 0.022 0.085 0.023 175
102 104 53.097 0.39 10 1.7 0.033 0.127 0.034 175
102 106 80.45 0.48 10 2.6 0.050 0.192 0.052 175
103 109 49.879 0.38 10 1.6 0.031 0.119 0.032 175
103 124 0.0 0.02 768 0.0 0.002 0.084 0.0 400
104 109 43.443 0.36 10 1.4 0.027 0.104 0.028 175
105 110 37.007 0.34 10 1.2 0.023 0.088 0.024 175
106 110 25.744 0.33 35 0.0 0.014 0.061 2.459 175
107 108 25.744 0.03 10 0.8 0.016 0.061 20.017 175
107 203 67.578 0.44 10 202 0.042 0.161 1.044 175
108 109 69.187 0.44 10 2.3 0.043 0.165 0.045 175
108 110 69.187 0.44 10 2.3 0.043 0.165 0.045 175
109 111 0.0 0.02 768 0.0 0.002 0.084 0.0 400
109 112 0.0 0.02 768 0.0 0.002 0.084 0.0 400
110 111 0.0 0.02 768 0.0 0.002 0.084 0.0 400
110 112 0.0 0.02 768 0.0 0.002 0.084 0.0 400
111 113 53.097 0.40 11 0.8 0.006 0.048 0.100 500
111 114 46.661 0.39 11 0.7 0.005 0.042 0.088 500
112 113 53.097 0.4 11 0.8 0.006 0.048 0.100 500
112 123 107.803 0.52 11 1.6 0.012 0.097 0.203 500
113 123 96.54 0.49 11 1.5 0.011 0.087 0.182 500
113 215 83.668 0.47 11 1.3 0.010 0.075 0.158 500
114 116 43.443 0.38 11 0.7 0.005 0.059 0.02 500
115 116 19.308 0.33 11 0.3 0.002 0.017 0.036 500
115 121 54.706 0.41 11 0.8 0.006 0.049 0.103 500
115 121 54.706 0.41 11 0.8 0.006 0.049 0.103 500
115 124 57.924 0.41 111 0.9 0.007 0.052 0.109 500
116 117 28.962 0.35 11 0.4 0.003 0.026 0.055 500
116 119 25.744 0.34 11 0.4 0.003 0.023 0.049 500
117 118 16.09 0.32 11 0.2 0.002 0.014 0.030 500
117 122 117.457 0.54 11 1.8 0.014 0.105 0.221 500
118 121 28.962 0.35 11 0.4 0.003 0.026 0.055 500
118 121 28.962 0.35 11 0.4 0.003 0.026 0.055 500
119 120 44.2475 0.38 11 0.7 0.005 0.040 0.083 500
119 120 44.2475 0.38 11 0.7 0.005 0.040 0.083 500
120 123 24.13 0.34 11 0.4 0.003 0.022 0.046 500
120 123 24.13 0.34 11 0.4 0.003 0.022 0.046 500
121 122 75.623 0.45 11 1.2 0.009 0.068 0.142 500
D
Appendix
Generator Data
Unit Unit size Unit type Forced MTTF MTTR Scheduled
group Outage (Hour) (Hour) Maintenance
( wks )
year
U12 12 Oil/Steam 0.02 2940 60 2
U20 20 Oil/CT 0.10 450 50 2
U50 50 Hydro 0.01 1960 20 2
U76 76 Coal/Steam 0.02 1960 40 3
U100 100 Oil/Steam 0.04 1200 50 3
U155 155 Coal/Steam 0.04 960 40 4
U197 197 Oil/Steam 0.05 950 50 4
U350 350 Coal/Steam 0.08 1150 100 5
U400 400 Nuclear 0.12 1100 150 6
C. RBTS
Bus data for RBTS
Bus no. Load PG Q V
Active Reactive Qmax Qmin Vmax Vmin
1 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 -0.40 1.05 0.97
2 0.020 0.00 1.20 0.75 -0.40 1.05 0.97
3 0.85 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.05 0.97
4 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.05 0.97
5 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.05 0.97
6 0.020 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.05 0.97
Line data for RBTS

From Bus To bus R X Current Failure per Repair
rating year time
1 3 0.0342 0.18 0.85 1.50 10.0
2 4 0.1140 0.60 0.71 5.00 10.0
1 2 0.0912 0.48 0.71 4.00 10.0
3 4 0.0228 0.12 0.71 1.00 10.0
3 5 0.0228 0.12 0.71 1.00 10.0
1 3 0.0342 0.18 0.85 1.50 10.0
2 4 0.1140 0.60 0.71 5.00 10.0
4 5 0.0228 0.12 0.71 1.00 10.0
5 6 0.0228 0.12 0.71 1.00 10.0
E
Appendix
Generator data for RBTS

Bus no. Rating (MW) Failure per year Repair time (hours)
1 40.0 6.00 45.0
1 40.0 6.00 45.0
1 10.0 4.00 45.0
1 20.0 5.00 45.0
2 5.00 2.00 45.0
2 5.00 2.00 45.0
2 40.0 3.00 60.0
2 20.0 2.40 55.0
2 20.0 2.40 55.0
2 20.0 2.40 55.0
2 20.0 2.40 55.0
D: Birka Nät
Load data:
Load point no. Total no. of Customers

customers
System 180 Industrial Commercial Residential
LHII (35) 447 0.25 0.25 0.5
HD (48) 23400 0.1 0.1 0.8
SJ (35) 1 0 1 0
Load point no. Total active Customers

power per
customer
LHII (35) 1.7203.00 0.4 0.2 0.4
HD (48) 0.9829 0.2 0.1 0.7
SJ (35) 0.8 0 1 0
Load point no. Total reactive Customers

power per
customer
LHII (35) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
HD (48) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
SJ (35) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
F
Appendix
Elements’ ID number and Type:
ID 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
no
Type BU BR TR BR CA TR BR BR TR BR
220 110 220 110 110a 110 33 110 220 110
ID 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
no
Type CA TR BR BU BR CALH TR BR BR CALH
110b 110 33 220 33 33 33 11 33 33
ID 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
no
Type TR BR BR CALH TR BR BU BR BUS CALH
33 11 33 33 33 11 11 11 D 11
ID 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40
no
Type CALH BUS TR FUSE BU BUS BR CAHDa BR BR
11 D 11 04 D 33 33 33
ID 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50
no
Type CAHD BR BR CAHD BR BUS BR BU BUS BR
b 33 33 c 33 D 33 220 D 33
ID 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58
no
Type CA BR BR CA BR BUS BR BU
Sja 33 33 SJb 33 D 33 220
Elements reliability data:
Element Failure rate Duration

Permanent Active Permanent Maintenance Switching
Bus D 0.000 0.000 0.0 0.0 1.0
BU220 0.00964 0.00964 1.0 0.0 1.0
BU11 0.00867 0.00867 1.0 0.0 1.0
BU04 0.000 0.000 0.0 0.0 1.0
BR110 0.00870 0.00870 24 0.0 1.0
BR33 0.00089 0.00089 24 0.0 1.0
BR11 0.00243 0.00243 24 0.0 1.0
CA110a 0.07012 0.07012 168 0.0 1.0
CA110b 0.07031 0.07031 168 0.0 1.0
CALH33 0.00028 0.00028 48 0.0 1.0
G
Appendix
CAHDa 0.02291 0.02291 48 0.0 1.0

CAHDb 0.02285 0.02285 48 0.0 1.0
CAHDc 0.02265 0.02265 48 0.0 1.0
CASJa 0.00863 0.00863 48 0.0 1.0
CASJb 0.00837 0.00837 48 0.0 1.0
CALH11 0.10069 0.10069 6 0.0 1.0
FUSE 0.01340 0.01340 4 0.0 1.0
TR220 0.02610 0.02610 24 0.0 1.0
TR110 0.02050 0.02050 24 0.0 1.0
TR33 0.01989 0.01989 24 0.0 1.0
TR11 0.00331 0.00331 24 0.0 1.0

Magi Starski 4599 Reliability

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Magi Starski 4599 Reliability

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Reliability Assessment of Complex Power Systems

Shima Mousavi Gargari

Master thesis written at the School of Electrical Engineering, Royal Institute of

Shima Mousavi Gargari

Definition 4: Scheduled outages are usually performed foe construction, maintenance or

Definition 9: Availability is the probability of the component to be available or in service

Nowadays, due to increases in load demands, interconnecting the neighboring power

12. Power system reliability evaluation

System adequacy System security

Figure 1.1. Reliability evaluation domains [5], [6]

Figure 1.2. Hierarchical levels for reliability evaluation [5], [6]

1.3. Research objective

1.4. Thesis scope and outline

2. Composite system adequacy assessment

2.2. Analytical approach

In analytical approach the system is represented by its mathematical equivalent model.

Generally, there are five main procedures in analytical approach.

- State space diagram generation

Each of the mentioned procedure has been explained in following parts.

2.1.1. State space diagram generation

Figure 2.1. Markov model for one component

Figure 2.2. Markov model for 2-repair able-independent-component [5], [6]

μ si = ∑ μi = 0 System state repair rate

2.1.2. System state enumeration

U i : In service operation mode for component i

Figure 2.3. Depth-first enumeration techniques for 3-component system

2.1.3. System state analysis

2.1.4. Remedial action

2.1.5. Reliability indices

- Failure Frequency(FF) [occ yr ] :

- Failure duration(FD) [hour distrubance] :

- Expected energy not supplied(EENS) [MWh yr ] :

- Expected power not supplied(EPNS) [MW yr ] :

- Expected load curtailed(ELC) [MW yr ] :

F is a specific system failure state.

Reliability indices for HLIII [5], [13]:

System Average Interruption Frequency Index (SAIFI) [int yr , cust ] :

System Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI) [h yr , cust ] :

Customers Average Interruption Index (CAIDI) [h int .] :

Average Service Availability Index (ASAI) [%]:

where, N i represents the number of customers at load point i , λi [1 yr ] is a expected

3. Overview of NEPLAN software

Creating possible outage

First order outage events Second order outage events

Single stochastic Single deterministic Two Single stochastic and

Effect analysis of each outages mode on system performance

Alleviating the abnormality of

Registering the failure rate

Overall system indices

Figure.3.1. Flowchart for reliability evaluation in NEPLAN

Second order contingencies can be considered either as two stochastic outages or

For independent outages [15],

Table 3.2. Overall system indices [15], [16]

3.2. Application study

Figure 3.2. Test system [13]

Figure 3.3. Test system without disconnect switches [13]

Hand calculation of Load point indices for LP6:

For series components:

For parallel components or second order failure combination:

BB4 CB6 BB5 CB7 TB3 CB8

Figure 3.4. The circuit which feeds load point 6

FF = λBB 4 + λCB 6 + λBB 5 + λCB 7 + λTR 3 + λCB 8 + λBB 6

Failure duration calculation for load point 6:

System indices can be calculated by applying equations 2.12-2.15