PROPERTY REGIMES OF UNION W/O MARRIAGE Art.
Art. 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
[G.R. No. 116668. July 28, 1997.]
ERLINDA A. AGAPAY, petitioner, vs. CARLINA (CORNELIA) V. PALANG and
HERMINIA P. DELA CRUZ, respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Miguel Palang married on July 16, 1949. It was his first marriage. Their only child,
Herminia, was born on May 12, 1950.
On July 15, 1973, Miguel, then 63 years old, contracted his second marriage with Erlinda
Agapay, 19, herein petitioner. Two months earlier, Miguel and Erlinda purchased a piece
of riceland. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 101736 was issued in their names.
On September 23, 1975, a house and lot was purchased allegedly by Erlinda as the sole
vendee. TCT No. 143120 was later issued in her name.
Miguel and Erlinda's cohabitation produced a son, Kristoper A. Palang, born on December
6, 1977. In 1979, Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of concubinage upon Carlina' s
complaint. Two years later, Miguel died.
On July 11, 1981, Carlina Palang and her daughter Herminia Palang de la Cruz, herein
private respondents, instituted an action for recovery of ownership and possession with
damages against petitioner. Private respondents sought to get back the riceland and the
house and lot allegedly purchased by Miguel during his cohabitation with petitioner.
After trial on the merits, the lower court dismissed the complaint declaring that there was
little evidence to prove that the subject properties pertained to the conjugal property of
Carlina and Miguel Palang.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision. Hence, this petition.
The sale of the riceland was made in favor of Miguel and Erlinda. The application law is
Art. 148 of the Family Code on the cohabitation of a man and a woman under a void
marriage or without the benefit of marriage. The marriage of Miguel and Erlinda was
patently void because the earlier marriage of Miguel and Carlina was still subsisting. Under
contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. Actual contribution is required by this
provision, in contrast to Art. 147. If the actual contribution of the party is not proved, there
will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares. Since petitioner failed to
prove that she contributed money to the purchase price ,of the riceland, we find no basis to
justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the same. Consequently, the riceland should
revert to the conjugal partnership property of the deceased Miguel and private respondent
Carlina Palang.
As regards Kristopher Palang's heirship and filiation, the same should be ventilated in the
proper probate court or in a special proceeding instituted for the purpose, and cannot be
adjudicated in an ordinary civil action for recovery of ownership and possession.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; PROPERTY REGIME OF UNIONS WITHOUT
MARRIAGE; PROOF OF ACTUAL CONTRIBUTION BY BOTH PARTIES,
REQUIRED; ABSENCE THEREOF IN CASE AT BAR. — The provision of law
applicable here is Article 148 of the Family Code providing for cases of cohabitation when
a man and a woman who are not capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each
other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage. While
Miguel and Erlinda contracted marriage on July 15, 1973, said union was patently void
because the earlier marriage of Miguel and Carlina was still subsisting and unaffected by
the latter's de facto separation. Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of
the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be
owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. It must be
stressed that actual contribution is required by this provision, in contrast to Article 147
which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household, are
regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no salary
or income or work or industry. If the actual contribution of the party is not proved, there
will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares. Even assuming that the
subject property was bought before cohabitation, the rules of co-ownership would still
apply and proof of actual contribution would still be essential. Since petitioner failed to
prove that she contributed money to the purchase price of the riceland in Binalonan,
Pangasinan, we find no basis to justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the same.
Consequently, the riceland should, as correctly held by the Court of Appeals, revert to the
conjugal partnership property of the deceased Miguel and private respondent Carlina
Palang.
2. ID.; ID.; SEPARATION OF PROPERTY OF THE SPOUSES DURING
MARRIAGE; JUDICIAL ORDER, REQUIRED. — Separation of property between
spouses during the marriage shall not take place except by judicial order or without judicial
conferment when there is an express stipulation in the marriage settlements. [Article 134 of
the Family Code] The judgment which resulted from the parties' compromise was not
specifically and expressly for separation of property and should not be so inferred.
3. ID.; ID.; DONATION; BETWEEN PERSONS GUILTY OF ADULTERY OR
CONCUBINAGE; VOID; RATIONALE; CASE AT BAR. — With respect to the house
and lot, Erlinda allegedly bought the same for P20,000.00 on September 23, 1975 when she
was only 22 years old. The testimony of the notary public who prepared the deed of
conveyance for the property reveals the falsehood of this claim. Atty. Constantino Sagun
testified that Miguel Palang provided the money for the purchase price and directed that
Erlinda's name alone be placed as the vendee. The transaction was properly a donation
made by Miguel to Erlinda, but one which was clearly void and inexistent by express
provision of law because it was made between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at
the time of the donation, under Article 739 of the Civil Code. Moreover, Article 87 of the
Family Code expressly provides that the prohibition against donations between spouses
now applies to donations between persons living together as husband and wife without a
valid marriage, for otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to
be better than those in legal union.
4. ID.; ID.; HEIRSHIP AND FILIATION; CANNOT BE ADJUDICATED IN AN
ORDINARY CIVIL ACTION FOR RECOVERY OF OWNERSHIP; CASE AT BAR. —
The issue concerning Kristopher Palang's status and claim as an illegitimate son and heir to
Miguel's estate is here resolved in favor of respondent court's correct assessment that the
trial court erred in making pronouncements regarding Kristopher's heirship and filiation
"inasmuch as questions as to who are the heirs of the decedent, proof of filiation of
illegitimate children and the determination of the estate of the latter and claims thereto
should be ventilated in the proper probate court or in a special proceeding instituted for the
purpose and cannot be adjudicated in the instant ordinary civil action which is for recovery
of ownership and possession." Kristopher, not having been impleaded, was not a party to
the case at bar. His mother, Erlinda, cannot be called his guardian ad litem for he was not
involved in the case at bar.
DECISION
ROMERO, J p:
Before us is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 24199 entitled "Erlinda Agapay v. Carlina (Cornelia) Palang and Herminia P. Dela
Cruz" dated June 22, 1994 involving the ownership of two parcels of land acquired during
the cohabitation of petitioner and private respondent's legitimate spouse.
Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage on July 16, 1949 when he took private
respondent Carlina (or Cornelia) Vallesterol as a wife at the Pozorrubio Roman Catholic
Church in Pangasinan. A few months after the wedding, in October 1949, he left to work in
Hawaii. Miguel and Carlina's only child, Herminia Palang, was born on May 12, 1950.
Miguel returned in 1954 for a year. His next visit to the Philippines was in 1964 and during
the entire duration of his year-long sojourn he stayed in Zambales with his brother, not in
Pangasinan with his wife and child. The trial court found evidence that as early as 1957,
Miguel had attempted to divorced Carlina in Hawaii. 1 When he returned for good in 1972,
he refused to live with private respondents, but stayed alone in a house in Pozorrubio,
Pangasinan.
On July 15, 1973, the then sixty-three-year-old Miguel contracted his second marriage with
nineteen-year-old Erlinda Agapay, herein petitioner. 2 Two months earlier, on May 17,
1973, Miguel and Erlinda, as evidenced by the Deed of Sale, jointly purchased a parcel of
agricultural land located at San Felipe, Binalonan, Pangasinan with an area of 10,080
square meters. Consequently, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 101736 covering said rice
land was issued in their names.
A house and lot in Binalonan, Pangasinan was likewise purchased on September 23, 1975,
allegedly by Erlinda as the sole vendee. TCT No. 143120 covering said property was later
issued in her name.
On October 30, 1975, Miguel and Cornelia Palang executed a Deed of Donation as a form
of compromise agreement to settle and end a case filed by the latter. 3 The parties therein
agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of six parcels of land to their only child,
Herminia Palang. 4
Miguel and Erlinda's cohabitation produced a son, Kristopher A. Palang, born on
December 6, 1977. In 1979, Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of concubinage upon
Carlina's complaint. 5 Two years later, on February 15, 1981, Miguel died.

On July 11, 1981, Carlina Palang and her daughter Herminia Palang de la Cruz, herein
private respondents, instituted the case at bar, an action for recovery of ownership and
possession with damages against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court in Urdaneta,
Pangasinan (Civil Case No. U-4265). Private respondents sought to get back the riceland
and the house and lot both located at Binalonan, Pangasinan allegedly purchased by Miguel
during his cohabitation with petitioner.
Petitioner, as defendant below, contented that while the riceland covered by TCT No.
101736 is registered in their names (Miguel and Erlinda), she had already given her half of
the property to their son Kristopher Palang. She added that the house and lot covered by
TCT No. 143120 is her sole property, having bought the same with her own money.
Erlinda added that Carlina is precluded from claiming aforesaid properties since the latter
had already donated their conjugal estate to Herminia.
After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered its decision on June 30, 1989 dismissing
the complaint after declaring that there was little evidence to prove that the subject
properties pertained to the conjugal property of Carlina and Miguel Palang. The lower
court went on to provide for the intestate shares of the parties, particularly of Kristopher
Palang, Miguel's illegitimate son. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered —
1) Dismissing the complaint, with cost against plaintiffs;
2) Confirming the ownership of defendant Erlinda Agapay of the residential lot located at
Poblacion, Binalonan, Pangasinan, as evidenced by TCT No. 143120, Lot 290-B including
the old house standing therein;
3) Confirming the ownership of one half (1/2) portion of that piece of agricultural land
situated at Balisa, San Felipe, Binalonan, Pangasinan, consisting of 10,080 square meters
and as evidenced by TCT No. 101736, Lot 1123-A to Erlinda Agapay;
4) Adjudicating to Kristopher Palang as his inheritance from his deceased father, Miguel
Palang, the one-half (1/2) of the Agricultural land situated at Balisa, San Felipe, Binalonan,
Pangasinan, under TCT No. 101736 in the name of Miguel Palang, provided that the
former (Kristopher) executes, within 15 days after this decision becomes final and
executory, a quit-claim forever renouncing any claims to annul/reduce the donation to
Herminia Palang de la Cruz of all conjugal properties of her parents, Miguel Palang and
Carlina Vallesterol Palang, dated October 30, 1975, otherwise, the state of deceased
Miguel Palang will have to be settled in another separate action;
5) No pronouncement as to damages and attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED." 6
On appeal, respondent court reversed the trial court's decision. The Court of Appeals
rendered its decision on July 22, 1994 within the following dispositive portion:
"WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the appealed decision is hereby
REVERSED and another one entered:
1. Declaring plaintiffs-appellants the owner of the properties in question;
2. Ordering defendant-appellee to vacate and deliver the properties in question to herein
plaintiffs-appellants;
3. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title Nos.
143120 and 101736 and to issue in lieu thereof another certificate of title in the name of the
plaintiffs-appellants.
No pronouncement as to costs." 7
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals erred in not sustaining the validity of two deeds
of absolute sale covering the riceland and the house and lot, the first in favor of Miguel
Palang and Erlinda Agapay and the second, in favor of Erlinda Agapay alone. Second,
petitioner contends that respondent appellate court erred in not declaring Kristopher A.
Palang as Miguel Palang's illegitimate son and thus entitled to inherit from Miguel's estate.
Third, respondent court erred, according to petitioner, "in not finding that there is a
sufficient pleading and evidence that Kristoffer A. Palang or Christopher A. Palang should
be considered as party defendant in Civil Case No. U-4625 before the trial court and in
CA-G.R. No. 24199. 8
After studying the merits of the instant case, as well as the pertinent provision of law and
jurisprudence, the Court denies the petition and affirms the questioned decision of the
Court of Appeals.

The first and principal issue is the ownership of the two pieces of property subject of this
action. Petitioner assails the validity of the deeds of conveyance over the same parcels of
land. There is no dispute that the transfer of ownership from the original owners of the
riceland and the house and lot, Corazon Ilomin and the spouses Cespedes, respectively,
were valid.
The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made in favor of Miguel and Erlinda. The
provision of law applicable here is Article 148 of the Family Code providing for cases of
cohabitation when a man or woman who are not capacitated to marry each other live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a
void marriage. While Miguel and Erlinda contracted marriage on July 15, 1973, said union
was patently void because the earlier marriage of Miguel and Carlina was still subsisting
and unaffected by the latter's de facto separation.
Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual
joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. It must be stressed that actual contribution is
required by this provision, in contrast to Article 147 which states that efforts in the care and
maintenance of the family and household, are regarded as contributions to the acquisition
of common property by one who has no salary or income or work or industry. If the actual
contribution of the party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption
of equal shares. 9 cda
In the case at bar, Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is engaged in the
business of buy and sell and had a sari-sari store 10 but failed to persuade to us that she
actually contributed money to buy the subject riceland. Worth noting is the fact that on the
date of the conveyance, May 17, 1973, petitioner was only around twenty years of age and
Miguel Palang was already sixty-four and a pensioner of the U.S. Government.
Considering her youthfulness, it is unrealistic to conclude that in 1973 she contributed
P3,750.00 as her share in the purchase price of subject property, 11 there being no proof of
the same.
Petitioner now claims that the riceland was bought two months before Miguel and Erlinda
actually cohabited. In the nature of an afterthought, said added assertion was intended to
exclude their case from operation of Article 148 of the Family Code. Proof of the precise
date when they commenced their adulterous cohabitation not having been adduced, we
cannot state definitively that the riceland was purchased even before they started living
together. In any case, even assuming that the subject property was bought before
cohabitation, the rules of co-ownership would still apply and proof of actual contribution
would still be essential.
Since petitioner failed to prove that she contributed money to the purchase price of the
riceland in Binalonan, Pangasinan, we find no basis to justify her co-ownership with
Miguel over the same. Consequently, the riceland should, as correctly held by the Court of
Appeals, revert to the conjugal partnership property of the deceased Miguel and private
respondent Carlina Palang.
Furthermore, it is immaterial that Miguel and Carlina previously agreed to donate their
conjugal property in favor of their daughter Herminia in 1975. The trial court erred in
holding that the decision adopting their compromise agreement "in effect partakes the
nature of judicial confirmation of the separation of property between spouses and the
termination of the conjugal partnership." 12 Separation of property between spouse during
the marriage shall not take place except by judicial order or without judicial conferment
when there is an express stipulation in the marriage settlements. 13 The judgment which
resulted from the parties' compromise was not specifically and expressly for separation of
property and should not be so inferred.
With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda allegedly bought the same for P20,000.00 on
September 23, 1975 when she was only 22 years old. The testimony of the notary public
who prepared the deed of conveyance for the property reveals the falsehood of this claim.
Atty. Constantino Sagun testified that Miguel Palang provided the money for the purchase
price and directed that Erlinda's name alone be placed as the vendee. 14
The transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda, but one which was
clearly void and inexistent by express provision of law because it was made between
persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation, under Article 739 of
the Civil Code. Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code expressly provides that the
prohibition against donation between spouses now applies to donations between persons
living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, 15 for otherwise, the
condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union.
16
The second issue concerning Kristopher Palang's status and claim as an illegitimate son
and heir to Miguel's estate is here resolved in favor of respondent court's correct
assessment that the trial court erred in making pronouncements regarding Kristopher's
heirship and filiation "inasmuch as questions as to who are the heirs of the decedent, proof
of filiation of illegitimate children and the determination of the estate of the latter and
claims thereto should be ventilated in the proper probate court or in a special proceeding
instituted for the purpose and cannot be adjudicated in the instant ordinary civil action
which is for recovery of ownership and possession." 17

As regards the third issue, petitioner contends that Kristopher Palang should be considered
as party-defendant in the case at bar following the trial court's decision which expressly
found that Kristopher had not been impleaded as party defendant but theorized that he had
submitted to the court's jurisdiction through his mother/guardian ad litem. 18 The trial
court erred gravely. Kristopher, not having been impleaded, was therefore, not a party to
the case at bar. His mother, Erlinda, cannot be called his guardian ad litem for he was not
involved in the case at bar. Petitioner adds that there is no need for Kristopher to file
another action to prove that he is the illegitimate son of Miguel, in order to avoid
multiplicity of suits. 19 Petitioner's grave error has been discussed in the preceding
paragraph where the need for probate proceedings to resolve the settlement of Miguel's
estate and Kristopher's successional rights has been pointed out.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The questioned decision of the
Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

||| (Agapay v. Palang, G.R. No. 116668, [July 28, 1997], 342 PHIL 302-314)
[G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001.]
SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO, petitioner, vs. SUSAN YEE CARIÑO, respondent.
SYNOPSIS
SPO4 Santiago S. Carino contracted two marriages. The first was with petitioner with
whom he begot two (2) children, while the second, during the subsistence of the first, was
with respondent with whom he had no issue. When he died in 1988 petitioner and
respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance from various
government agencies. Petitioner collected P146,000 from MBAI, PCCUI, commutation,
NAPOLCOM and Pag-Ibig, while respondent collected P21,000 from GSIS and SSS.
Respondent, in an action for collection, sought to recover half the amount collected by
petitioner. She claimed that she had no knowledge of the previous marriage with petitioner
and presented evidence that the same was contracted without the necessary marriage
license. Judgment was rendered by the trial court in favor of respondent which was
affirmed on appeal by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this recourse.
The absence of a marriage license, as a general rule, renders the marriage void ab initio.
However, for purposes of remarriage, a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the previous
marriage must be obtained. For other purposes no such judicial action is required.
Otherwise, the second marriage would also be void.
Article 148 of the Civil Code governs the property regime of bigamous marriages. Only the
properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions. While union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any
impediment to contract marriage is governed by co-ownership under Article 147 of the
Civil Code.Thus, the P146,000 from MBAI, PCCUI, commutation, NAPOLCOM and Pag-
Ibig earned by the deceased, in the absence of evidence that respondent contributed money,
property or industry in the acquisition of these monetary benefits, is owned by the deceased
alone and respondent has no right whatsoever to claim the same. However, petitioner is
entitled to one-half of the subject "death benefits" as her share in the property regime and
the other half shall pass by to petitioner's children as the decedent's legal heirs.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; MARRIAGE; FINAL JUDGMENT DECLARING
PREVIOUS MARRIAGE VOID, NECESSARY FOR PURPOSES OF SECOND
MARRIAGE. — Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole
basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final
judgment declaring the previous marriage void. However, for purposes other than
remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For
other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal
case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death
of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of
said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. In such instances,
evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds
rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to
an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void.
2. ID.; PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS; MARRIAGE; LICENSE,
REQUIRED; CASE AT BAR. — Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when
the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid
marriage license is a requisite of marriage, and the absence thereof, subject to certain
exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio. In the case at bar, there is no question that
the marriage of petitioner and the deceased does not fall within the marriages exempt from
the license requirement. A marriage license, therefore, was indispensable to the validity of
their marriage. This notwithstanding, the records reveal that the marriage contract of
petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the Local
Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such marriage
license. It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao
and the deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not
being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly
void ab initio.
3. ID.; FAMILY CODE; FINAL JUDGMENT DECLARING PREVIOUS MARRIAGE
VOID, NECESSARY FOR PURPOSES OF SECOND MARRIAGE; WITHOUT SUCH
DECLARATION, SECOND MARRIAGE IS ALSO VOID. — Accordingly, the
declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the deceased and
petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of the deceased with
respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized without first
obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased void. Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise,
void ab initio. SCaITA
4. ID.; ID.; BIGAMOUS MARRIAGE; WAGES AND SALARIES EARNED BY
EACH PARTY BELONG TO HIM OR HER EXCLUSIVELY. — Under Article 148
of the Family Code, which refers to the property regime of bigamous marriages, adulterous
relationships, relationships in a state of concubine, relationships where both man and
woman are married to other persons, multiple alliances of the same married man, the
properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution shall belong to the
co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him or her exclusively.
Then too, contributions in the form of care of the home, children and household, or
spiritual or moral inspiration, are excluded in this regime.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — Considering that the marriage of respondent
Susan Yee and the deceased is a bigamous marriage, having been solemnized during the
subsistence of a previous marriage then presumed to be valid (between petitioner and the
deceased), the application of Article 148 is therefore in order. The disputed P146,000.00
from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc.], NAPOLCOM, Commutation, Pag-
ibig, and PCCUI, are clearly remunerations, incentives and benefits from governmental
agencies earned by the deceased as a police officer. Unless respondent Susan Yee presents
proof to the contrary, it could not be said that she contributed money, property or industry
in the acquisition of these monetary benefits. Hence, they are not owned in common by
respondent and the deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and respondent has no right
whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate succession, the said "death benefits" of the
deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And, respondent, not being the legal wife of the
deceased is not one of them.
6. ID.; ID.; VOID MARRIAGES OF PARTIES LEGALLY CAPACITATED AND NOT
BARRED BY ANY IMPEDIMENT; PROPERTY RELATIONSHIP GOVERNED BY
CO-OWNERSHIP; CASE AT BAR. — As to the property regime of petitioner Susan
Nicdao and the deceased, Article 147 of the Family Code governs. This article applies to
unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract
marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like the absence of a
marriage license. In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, wages and salaries
earned by either party during the cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal shares
and will be divided equally between them, even if only one party earned the wages and the
other did not contribute thereto. Conformably, even if the disputed "death benefits" were
earned by the deceased alone as a government employee, Article 147 creates a co-
ownership in respect thereto, entitling the petitioner to share one-half thereof. As there is
no allegation of bad faith in the present case, both parties of the first marriage are presumed
to be in good faith. Thus, one-half of the subject "death benefits" under scrutiny shall go to
the petitioner as her share in the property regime, and the other half pertaining to the
deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his children with
Susan Nicdao.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:
The issue for resolution in the case at bar hinges on the validity of the two marriages
contracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, whose "death benefits" is now the
subject of the controversy between the two Susans whom he married.
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the decision 1 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263, which affirmed in toto the decision 2 of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632.
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, he contracted two marriages, the
first was on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cariño (hereafter referred to as
Susan Nicdao), with whom he had two offsprings, namely, Sahlee and Sandee Cariño; and
the second was on November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee Cariño (hereafter
referred to as Susan Yee), with whom he had no children in their almost ten year
cohabitation starting way back in 1982.
In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño became ill and bedridden due to diabetes complicated by
pulmonary tuberculosis. He passed away on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan
Yee, who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed
claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from
various government agencies. Petitioner Susan Nicdao was able to collect a total of
P146,000.00 from "MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig," 3 while
respondent Susan Yee received a total of P21,000.00 from "GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and
burial (SSS)." 4
On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case for collection of sum
of money against petitioner Susan Nicdao praying, inter alia, that petitioner be ordered to
return to her at least one-half of the one hundred forty-six thousand pesos (P146,000.00)
collectively denominated as "death benefits" which she (petitioner) received from "MBAI,
PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig." Despite service of summons,
petitioner failed to file her answer, prompting the trial court to declare her in default.
Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the
subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage
between petitioner and the deceased. She, however, claimed that she had no knowledge of
the previous marriage and that she became aware of it only at the funeral of the deceased,
where she met petitioner who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. To bolster her
action for collection of sum of money, respondent contended that the marriage of petitioner
and the deceased is void ab initio because the same was solemnized without the required
marriage license. In support thereof, respondent presented: 1) the marriage certificate of the
deceased and the petitioner which bears no marriage license number; 5 and 2) a
certification dated March 9, 1994, from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro
Manila, which reads —
This is to certify that this Office has no record of marriage license of the spouses
SANTIAGO CARINO (sic) and SUSAN NICDAO, who are married in this municipality
on June 20, 1969. Hence, we cannot issue as requested a true copy or transcription of
Marriage License number from the records of this archives.
This certification is issued upon the request of Mrs. Susan Yee Cariño for whatever legal
purpose it may serve. 6
On August 28, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent, Susan Yee, holding as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of P73,000.00,
half of the amount which was paid to her in the form of death benefits arising from the
death of SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, plus attorney 's fees in the amount of P5,000.00, and
costs of suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED. 7
On appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed in toto the decision of
the trial court. Hence, the instant petition, contending that:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT THAT VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS. GSIS IS
APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING
EQUITY IN THE INSTANT CASE INSTEAD OF THE CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL
MANDATE OF THE FAMILY CODE.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING
THE CASE OF VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS GSIS TO HAVE BEEN MODIFIED,
AMENDED AND EVEN ABANDONED BY THE ENACTMENT OF THE FAMILY
CODE. 8
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is
sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final
judgment declaring the previous marriage void. 9 However, for purposes other than
remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For
other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal
case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death
of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of
said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. 10 In such
instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of
grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited
solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void. 11
aDCIHE
It is clear therefore that the Court is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the
validity of the two marriages in this case, as the same is essential to the determination of
who is rightfully entitled to the subject "death benefits" of the deceased.
Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner Susan
Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of
marriage, 12 and the absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions, 13 renders the marriage
void ab initio. 14
In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased does
not fall within the marriages exempt from the license requirement. A marriage license,
therefore, was indispensable to the validity of their marriage. This notwithstanding, the
records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage
license number and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila,
their office has no record of such marriage license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, 15 the
Court held that such a certification is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage
license. Absent any circumstance of suspicion, as in the present case, the certification
issued by the local civil registrar enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under
the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the deceased
has been sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden of petitioner to prove that their
marriage is valid and that they secured the required marriage license. Although she was
declared in default before the trial court, petitioner could have squarely met the issue and
explained the absence of a marriage license in her pleadings before the Court of Appeals
and this Court. But petitioner conveniently avoided the issue and chose to refrain from
pursuing an argument that will put her case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of
their marriage cannot stand.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being
one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab
initio.
It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that since the marriage of
petitioner and the deceased is declared void ab initio, the "death benefits" under scrutiny
would now be awarded to respondent Susan Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the
Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial declaration of
the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second
marriage, otherwise, the second marriage would also be void.
Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the
deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of the
deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized
without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao
and the deceased void. Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is,
likewise, void ab initio.
One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property
of the spouses according to the applicable property regime. 16 Considering that the two
marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime would not be absolute
community or conjugal partnership of property, but rather, be governed by the provisions
of Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code on "Property Regime of Unions Without
Marriage."
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property regime of bigamous
marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubine, relationships
where both man and woman are married to other persons, multiple alliances of the same
married man, 17 —
". . . [O]nly the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions . . ."
In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint
contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party
belong to him or her exclusively. Then too, contributions in the form of care of the home,
children and household, or spiritual or moral inspiration, are excluded in this regime. 18
Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is a bigamous
marriage, having been solemnized during the subsistence of a previous marriage then
presumed to be valid (between petitioner and the deceased), the application of Article 148
is therefore in order.
The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc.],
NAPOLCOM, Commutation, Pag-ibig, and PCCUI, are clearly renumerations, incentives
and benefits from governmental agencies earned by the deceased as a police officer. Unless
respondent Susan Yee presents proof to the contrary, it could not be said that she
contributed money, property or industry in the acquisition of these monetary benefits.
Hence, they are not owned in common by respondent and the deceased, but belong to the
deceased alone and respondent has no right whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate
succession, the said "death benefits" of the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And,
respondent, not being the legal wife of the deceased is not one of them.
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, Article 147 of the
Family Code governs. This article applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated
and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless
void for other reasons, like the absence of a marriage license. Article 147 of the Family
Code reads —
ARTICLE 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a
void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the
property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the
rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall
be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be
owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate
in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed
jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family and of the household.
xxx xxx xxx
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in
bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case
of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each
vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of
descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall
take place upon termination of the cohabitation.
In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, wages and salaries earned by either
party during the cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and will be
divided equally between them, even if only one party earned the wages and the other did
not contribute thereto. 19 Conformably, even if the disputed "death benefits" were earned
by the deceased alone as a government employee, Article 147 creates a co-ownership in
respect thereto, entitling the petitioner to share one-half thereof. As there is no allegation of
bad faith in the present case, both parties of the first marriage are presumed to be in good
faith. Thus, one-half of the subject "death benefits" under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner
as her share in the property regime, and the other half pertaining to the deceased shall pass
by, intestate succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his children with Susan Nicdao.
In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals relied on the case of Vda.
de Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance System, 20 where the Court awarded one-
half of the retirement benefits of the deceased to the first wife and the other half, to the
second wife, holding that:
". . . [S]ince the defendant's first marriage has not been dissolved or declared void the
conjugal partnership established by that marriage has not ceased. Nor has the first wife lost
or relinquished her status as putative heir of her husband under the new Civil Code, entitled
to share in his estate upon his death should she survive him. Consequently, whether as
conjugal partner in a still subsisting marriage or as such putative heir she has an interest in
the husband's share in the property here in dispute . . ." And with respect to the right of the
second wife, this Court observed that although the second marriage can be presumed to be
void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is
need for judicial declaration of such nullity. And inasmuch as the conjugal partnership
formed by the second marriage was dissolved before judicial declaration of its nullity,
"[t]he only just and equitable solution in this case would be to recognize the right of the
second wife to her share of one-half in the property acquired by her and her husband, and
consider the other half as pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage." 21
It should be stressed, however, that the aforecited decision is premised on the rule which
requires a prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity of marriage. This is the reason
why in the said case, the Court determined the rights of the parties in accordance with their
existing property regime.
In Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 22 however, the Court, construing Article 40 of the
Family Code, clarified that a prior and separate declaration of nullity of a marriage is an all
important condition precedent only for purposes of remarriage. That is, if a party who is
previously married wishes to contract a second marriage, he or she has to obtain first a
judicial decree declaring the first marriage void, before he or she could contract said
second marriage, otherwise the second marriage would be void. The same rule applies even
if the first marriage is patently void because the parties are not free to determine for
themselves the validity or invalidity or their marriage. However, for purposes other than to
remarry, like for filing a case for collection of sum of money anchored on a marriage
claimed to be valid, no prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity is necessary. All
that a party has to do is to present evidence, testimonial or documentary, that would prove
that the marriage from which his or her rights flow is in fact valid. Thereupon, the court, if
material to the determination of the issues before it, will rule on the status of the marriage
involved and proceed to determine the rights of the parties in accordance with the
applicable laws and jurisprudence. Thus, in Niñal v. Bayadog, 23 the Court explained:

[T]he court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to
question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without
prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment
of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The
clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void " in Article
40 of the Family Code connoted that such final judgment need not be obtained only for
purpose of remarriage.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 51263 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City ordering petitioner to pay respondent the sum of P73,000.00 plus attorney's
fees in the amount of P5,000.00, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint in Civil
Case No. Q-93-18632, is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

||| (Cariño v. Cariño, G.R. No. 132529, [February 2, 2001], 403 PHIL 861-875)
G.R. No. 176492. October 20, 2014.]
MARIETTA N. BARRIDO, petitioner, vs. LEONARDO V. NONATO, respondent.
Civil Law; Property Regimes of Void Marriages; Under this property regime, property
acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on
equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to
have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the
acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed to the same jointly if
said party’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household.—The
records reveal that Nonato and Barrido’s marriage had been declared void for
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. During their marriage,
however, the conjugal partnership regime governed their property relations. Although
Article 129 provides for the procedure in case of dissolution of the conjugal partnership
regime, Article 147 specifically covers the effects of void marriages on the spouses’
property relations. x x x This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a
woman, suffering no illegal impediment to marry each other, exclusively live together as
husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. It is clear,
therefore, that for Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be capacitated
to marry each other; (2) live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and (3) their
union is without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is void. Here, all these elements
are present. The term “capacitated” in the first paragraph of the provision pertains to the
legal capacity of a party to contract marriage. Any impediment to marry has not been
shown to have existed on the part of either Nonato or Barrido. They lived exclusively with
each other as husband and wife. However, their marriage was found to be void under
Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity. Under this
property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall
be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is
prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not
participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed to
the same jointly if said party’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family
household. Efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household are regarded as
contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no salary or income or
work or industry
DECISION
PERALTA * J p:
For the Court's resolution is a Petition for Review filed by petitioner Marietta N. Barrido
questioning the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated November 16, 2006, and
its Resolution 2 dated January 24, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 00235. The CA affirmed the
Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 53, dated July 21,
2004, in Civil Case No. 03-12123, which ordered the partition of the subject property.
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
In the course of the marriage of respondent Leonardo V. Nonato and petitioner Marietta N.
Barrido, they were able to acquire a property situated in Eroreco, Bacolod City, consisting
of a house and lot, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-140361. On March
15, 1996, their marriage was declared void on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Since there was no more reason to maintain their co-ownership over the property, Nonato
asked Barrido for partition, but the latter refused. Thus, on January 29, 2003, Nonato filed
a Complaint for partition before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Bacolod
City, Branch 3.
Barrido claimed, by way of affirmative defense, that the subject property had already been
sold to their children, Joseph Raymund and Joseph Leo. She likewise moved for the
dismissal of the complaint because the MTCC lacked jurisdiction, the partition case being
an action incapable of pecuniary estimation.
The Bacolod MTCC rendered a Decision dated September 17, 2003, applying Article 129
of the Family Code. It ruled in this wise: EISCaD
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering the
conjugal property of the former Spouses Leonardo and Marietta Nonato, a house and lot
covered by TCT No. T-140361 located at Eroreco, Bacolod City, which was their conjugal
dwelling, adjudicated to the defendant Marietta Nonato, the spouse with whom the
majority of the common children choose to remain.
Furthermore, defendant's counterclaim is hereby granted, ordering plaintiff to pay
defendant P10,000.00 as moral damages for the mental anguish and unnecessary
inconvenience brought about by this suit; and an additional P10,000.00 as exemplary
damages to deter others from following suit; and attorney's fees of P2,000.00 and litigation
expenses of P575.00.
SO ORDERED. 4
Nonato appealed the MTCC Decision before the RTC. On July 21, 2004, the Bacolod RTC
reversed the ruling of the MTCC. It found that even though the MTCC aptly applied
Article 129 of the Family Code, it nevertheless made a reversible error in adjudicating the
subject property to Barrido. Its dispositive portion reads: EHACcT
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated September 17, 2003 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new judgment is hereby rendered ordering the parties:
(1) to equitably partition the house and lot covered by TCT No. T-140361;
(2) to reimburse Joseph Raymund and Joseph Leo Nonato of the amount advanced by them
in payment of the debts and obligation of TCT No. T-140361 with Philippine National
Bank;
(3) to deliver the presumptive legitimes of Joseph Raymund and Joseph Leo Nonato
pursuant to Article 51 of the Family Code.
SO ORDERED.
Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision on November 16, 2006. It held that since
the property's assessed value was only P8,080.00, it clearly fell within the MTCC's
jurisdiction. Also, although the RTC erred in relying on Article 129 of the Family Code,
instead of Article 147, the dispositive portion of its decision still correctly ordered the
equitable partition of the property. Barrido filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was,
however, denied for lack of merit.
Hence, Barrido brought the case to the Court via a Petition for Review. She assigned the
following errors in the CA Decision:
I.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE MTCC
HAD JURISDICTION TO TRY THE PRESENT CASE.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE LOT
COVERED BY TCT NO. T-140361 IS CONJUGAL AFTER BEING SOLD TO THE
CHILDREN, JOSEPH LEO NONATO AND JOSEPH RAYMUND NONATO.
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ARTICLE
129 OF THE FAMILY CODE HAS NO APPLICATION IN THE PRESENT CASE, ON
THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE
CASE. 6
The petition lacks merit.
Contrary to Barrido's contention, the MTCC has jurisdiction to take cognizance of real
actions or those affecting title to real property, or for the recovery of possession, or for the
partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of a mortgage on real property. 7 Section 33 of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 8 provides:
Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases. — Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession
of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest
therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro
Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00)
exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and
costs: Provided, That value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of
the adjacent lots. (as amended by R.A. No. 7691) 9
Here, the subject property's assessed value was merely P8,080.00, an amount which
certainly does not exceed the required limit of P20,000.00 for civil actions outside Metro
Manila to fall within the jurisdiction of the MTCC. Therefore, the lower court correctly
took cognizance of the instant case.
The records reveal that Nonato and Barrido's marriage had been declared void for
psychological incapacity under Article 36 10 of the Family Code. During their marriage,
however, the conjugal partnership regime governed their property relations. Although
Article 129 11 provides for the procedure in case of dissolution of the conjugal partnership
regime, Article 147 specifically covers he effects of void marriages on the spouses'
property relations. Article 147 reads:
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a
void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the
property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the
rules on co-ownership. aSITDC
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall
be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be
owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate
in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed
jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property
acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until
after the termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in
bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case
of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each
vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of
descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall
take place upon termination of the cohabitation.
This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal
impediment to marry each other, exclusively live together as husband and wife under a
void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. 12 It is clear, therefore, that for Article
147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be capacitated to marry each other; (2)
live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and (3) their union is without the
benefit of marriage or their marriage is void. Here, all these elements are present. 13 The
term "capacitated" in the first paragraph of the provision pertains to the legal capacity of a
party to contract marriage. 14 Any impediment to marry has not been shown to have
existed on the part of either Nonato or Barrido. They lived exclusively with each other as
husband and wife. However, their marriage was found to be void under Article 36 of the
Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity. 15
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and
industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired
during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts.
A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as
having contributed to the same jointly if said party's efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family household. 16 Efforts in the care and maintenance of the family
and household are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common property by one
who has no salary or income or work or industry. 17
In the analogous case of Valdez, 18 it was likewise averred that the trial court failed to
apply the correct law that should govern the disposition of a family dwelling in a situation
where a marriage is declared void ab initio because of psychological incapacity on the part
of either or both parties in the contract of marriage. The Court held that the court a quo did
not commit a reversible error in utilizing Article 147 of the Family Code and in ruling that
the former spouses own the family home and all their common property in equal shares, as
well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the property that they owned
in common, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code should aptly prevail. 19
The rules which are set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the
conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable
marriages, are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between
common-law spouses or spouses of void marriages. 20
Here, the former spouses both agree that they acquired the subject property during the
subsistence of their marriage. Thus, it shall be presumed to have been obtained by their
joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be jointly owned by them in equal shares. Barrido,
however, claims that the ownership over the property in question is already vested on their
children, by virtue of a Deed of Sale. But aside from the title to the property still being
registered in the names of the former spouses, said document of sale does not bear a
notarization of a notary public. It must be noted that without the notarial seal, a document
remains to be private and cannot be converted into a public document, 21 making it
inadmissible in evidence unless properly authenticated. 22 Unfortunately, Barrido failed to
prove its due execution and authenticity. In fact, she merely annexed said Deed of Sale to
her position paper. Therefore, the subject property remains to be owned in common by
Nonato and Barrido, which should be divided in accordance with the rules on co-
ownership. TSHIDa
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated November 16, 2006, as well as its Resolution dated January 24, 2007 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 00235, are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
THE FAMILY HOME
(Eulogio v. Bell, Sr., G.R. No. 186322, [July 8, 2015], 763 PHIL 266-289)
Civil Law; Family Home; The family home cannot be seized by creditors except in
special cases.—It has been said that the family home is a real right that is gratuitous,
inalienable and free from attachment. The great controlling purpose and policy of the
Constitution is the protection or the preservation of the homestead — the dwelling place. A
houseless, homeless population is a burden upon the energy, industry, and morals of the
community to which it belongs. No greater calamity, not tainted with crime, can befall a
family than to be expelled from the roof under which it has been gathered and sheltered.
The family home cannot be seized by creditors except in special cases.
 Same; Same; The nature and character of the property that debtors may claim to be
exempt are determined by the exemption statute.— The exemption is limited to the
particular kind of property or the specific articles prescribed by the statute; the exemption
cannot exceed the statutory limit. Articles 155 and 160 of the Family Code specify the
exceptions mentioned in Article 153, to wit: ARTICLE 155. The family home shall be
exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except: (1) For nonpayment of taxes; (2)
For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home; (3) For debts secured by
mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution; and (4) For debts due to
laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen and others who have rendered
service or furnished material for the construction of the building.
Same; Same; Execution of Judgments; The exemption of the family home from
execution, forced sale or attachment is limited to P300,000 in urban areas and
P200,000 in rural areas, unless those maximum values are adjusted by law.—The
exemption of the family home from execution, forced sale or attachment is limited to
P300,000 in urban areas and P200,000 in rural areas, unless those maximum values are
adjusted by law. If it is shown, though, that those amounts do not match the present value
of the peso because of currency fluctuations, the amount of exemption shall be based on
the value that is most favorable to the constitution of a family home. Any amount in excess
of those limits can be applied to the payment of any of the obligations specified in Articles
155 and 160.
Same; Same; The family home can be the subject of a forced sale, and any amount
above the statutory limit is applicable to the obligations under Articles 155 and 160.—
Any subsequent improvement or enlargement of the family home by the persons
constituting it, its owners, or any of its beneficiaries will still be exempt from execution,
forced sale or attachment provided the following conditions obtain: (a) the actual value of
the property at the time of its constitution has been determined to fall below the statutory
limit; and (b) the improvement or enlargement does not result in an increase in its value
exceeding the statutory limit. Otherwise, the family home can be the subject of a forced
sale, and any amount above the statutory limit is applicable to the obligations under
Articles 155 and 160. Certainly, the humane considerations for which the law surrounds the
family home with immunities from levy do not include the intent to enable debtors to
thwart the just claims of their creditors.
Same; Same; Execution Sale; To warrant the execution sale of respondents’ family
home under Article 160, petitioners needed to establish these facts: (1) there was an
increase in its actual value; (2) the increase resulted from voluntary improvements on
the property introduced by the persons constituting the family home, its owners or
any of its beneficiaries; and (3) the increased actual value exceeded the maximum
allowed under Article 157- During the execution proceedings, none of those facts was
alleged — much less proven — by petitioners. The sole evidence presented was the Deed
of Sale, but the trial court had already determined with finality that the contract was null,
and that the actual transaction was an equitable mortgage. Evidently, when petitioners and
Spouses Bell executed the Deed of Sale in 1990, the price stated therein was not the actual
value of the property in dispute.
DECISION
ANTECEDENT FACTS
Respondents Paterno William Bell, Jr., Florence Felicia Victoria Bell, Paterno Ferdinand
Bell III, and Paterno Beneraño IV (the Bell siblings) are the unmarried children of
respondent Spouses Paterno C. Bell and Rogelia Calingasan-Bell (Spouses Bell). In 1995,
the Bell siblings lodged a Complaint for annulment of documents, reconveyance, quieting
of title and damages against petitioners Enrico S. Eulogio and Natividad Eulogio (the
Eulogios). It was docketed as Civil Case No. 4581 at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Batangas City, Branch 84. The Complaint sought the annulment of the contract of sale
executed by Spouses Bell over their 329-square-meter residential house and lot, as well as
the cancellation of the title obtained by petitioners by virtue of the Deed.
The RTC granted respondents' prayers, but declared Spouses Bell liable to petitioners in
the amount of P1 million plus 12% interest per annum. The dispositive portion of the
Decision dated 15 July 1998 reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, prescinding from all the foregoing, the Court hereby declares:
1. That the sale of the subject house and lot under Deed of Sale marked as Exhibit "F" is
only an equitable mortgage in favor of the defendants Enrico Eulogio and Natividad
Eulogio. However, the mortgage cannot bind the property in question for being violative of
Chapter 2, Title 4 of the Family Code, its encumbrance not having been consented to in
writing by a majority of the beneficiaries who are the plaintiffs herein;
2. The said equitable mortgage is deemed to be an unsecured mortgage [sic] for which the
Spouses Paterno C. Bell, Sr. and Rogelia Calingasan Bell as mortgagors are liable to the
defendants-spouses Enrico Eulogio and Natividad Eulogio in the amount of P1,000,000
plus interest of 12% per annum. However, under the Fourth Party Complaint Sps. Paterno
C. Bell, Sr. and Rogelia Calingasan Bell have the right of reimbursement from fourth party
defendants Nicolas Moraña and Julieta Moraña for whom their loan of P1,000,000 was
secured by Sps. Paterno C. Bell, Sr. and Rogelia Calingasan Bell. Accordingly, the fourth
party defendants Nicolas Moraña and Julieta Moraña are hereby ordered to reimburse
Paterno C. Bell, Sr. and Rogelia Calingasan Bell the loan of P1,000,000 plus interest of
12% per annum to be paid by the latter to defendants Enrico and Natividad Eulogio;
3. The house and lot in question is free from any and all encumbrances by virtue of said
equitable mortgage or the purported sale; and
4. The Deed of Sale (Exhibit "F") is null and void for being contrary to law and public
policy.
Accordingly, (1) the Register of Deeds of Batangas City is hereby ordered to cancel
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-131472 in the name of defendants Enrico S. Eulogio and
Natividad Eulogio and to reconstitute (sic) Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-680-(5997)
as "family home" of the plaintiffs Florence Felicia Victoria C. Bell, Paterno William C.
Bell Jr., Paterno Ferdinand C. Bell III, Paterno Beneraño C. Bell IV and fourth party
plaintiffs Paterno C. Bell Sr. and Rogelia Calingasan Bell; or in the alternative to issue a
new Transfer Certificate of Title under the same tenor;
2. The City Assessor of Batangas City is hereby directed to issue a tax declaration covering
the said subject property as family home for the said plaintiffs and fourth party plaintiffs
Paterno C. Bell and Rogelia Calingasan Bell; and aScITE
3. Defendants Enrico Eulogio and Natividad Eulogio are ordered to pay the plaintiffs
attorney's fees and litigation expenses of P35,000.00, as the plaintiffs have been compelled
to litigate to protect their property rights, and costs. 3
Both petitioners and respondents appealed to the CA, but the trial court's Decision was
affirmed en toto. Spouses Bell later brought the case to this Court to question their liability
to petitioners in the amount of P1 million plus interest. The Court, however, dismissed their
Petition for failure to show any reversible error committed by the CA. 4 Thereafter, entry
of judgment was made. 5
On 9 June 2004 the RTC issued a Writ of Execution, as a result of which respondents'
property covered by the newly reconstituted Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 54208
[formerly RT-680 (5997)] was levied on execution. Upon motion by respondents, the trial
court, on 31 August 2004, ordered the lifting of the writ of execution on the ground that the
property was a family home. 6
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the lifting of the writ of execution.
Invoking Article 160 of the Family Code, they posited that the current market value of the
property exceeded the statutory limit of P300,000 considering that it was located in a
commercial area, and that Spouses Bell had even sold it to them for P1 million. 7
The RTC, on 13 October 2004, set the case for hearing to determine the present value of
the family home of respondents. It also appointed a Board of Appraisers to conduct a study
on the prevailing market value of their house and lot. 8
Respondents sought reconsideration of the above directives and asked the RTC to cite
petitioners for contempt because of forum-shopping. 9 They argued that petitioners' bid to
determine the present value of the subject property was just a ploy to re-litigate an issue
that had long been settled with finality.
The RTC, however, denied the Motion for Reconsideration 10 of respondents and directed
the commissioners to canvass prospective buyers of their house and lot. 11
On 23 November 2004, respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari and Injunction before the
CA, 12 where it was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 87531.
Subsequently, the RTC issued on 25 November 2004 an Order 13 dispensing with the
valuation report of the commissioners and directing the issuance of a writ of execution.
Consequently, respondents filed before the CA a Supplemental Petition with an urgent
prayer for a temporary restraining order. 14
The CA eventually enjoined 15 the execution sale set on 22 December 2004 16 by the
RTC.
On 31 July 2008, the CA rendered its Decision granting respondents' Petition for
Certiorari, but it rejected their theory that res judicata had already set in.
The appellate court ruled that the RTC Decision, which had become final and executory,
only declared respondents' house and lot as a family home. Since the issue of whether it
may be sold in execution was incidental to the execution of the aforesaid Decision, there
was as yet no res judicata. DETACa
Still, the CA found that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the
execution sale of the subject family home after finding that its present value exceeded the
statutory limit. The basis for the valuation of a family home under Article 160, according to
the appellate court, is its actual value at the time of its constitution and not the
market/present value; therefore, the trial court's order was contrary to law. 17
On 09 February 2009, 18 the CA denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration. Hence,
this Petition.
ISSUES
The issues to be resolved are: (1) whether petitioners are guilty of forum-shopping; (2)
whether a hearing to determine the value of respondents' family home for purposes of
execution under Article 160 of the Family Code is barred under the principle of res
judicata; and (3) whether respondents' family home may be sold on execution under Article
160 of the Family Code.
THE COURT'S RULING
The Court denies the Petition for lack of merit.
Petitioners are not guilty of forum- shopping.
Forum shopping can be committed in three ways: (1) by filing multiple cases based on the
same cause of action and with the same prayer, the previous case not having been resolved
yet (where the ground for dismissal is litis pendentia); (2) by filing multiple cases based on
the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the previous case having been finally
resolved (where the ground for dismissal is res judicata); and (3) by filing multiple cases
based on the same cause of action but with different prayers, or by splitting of causes of
action (where the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res judicata). 19
The essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for
the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of
obtaining a favorable judgment through means other than by appeal or certiorari. 20 Forum
shopping does not apply to cases that arise from an initiatory or original action that has
been elevated by way of appeal or certiorari to higher or appellate courts or authorities.
This is so because the issues in the appellate courts necessarily differ from those in the
lower court, and the appealed cases are but a continuation of the original case and treated
as only one case. 21
Respondents contend that the Decision in Civil Case No. 4581, which declared that
property in dispute was a family home, had long attained finality. Accordingly, respondents
maintain that petitioners' bid to re-litigate the present value of the property in the course of
the execution proceedings is barred by res judicata, and that petitioners should be cited for
contempt of court because of forum-shopping. 22
Recall that although the trial court had nullified the Deed of Sale over respondents' family
home in Civil Case No. 4581 for lack of a written consent from its beneficiaries as required
under Article 158 of the Family Code, 23 the court still recognized the validity of the
transaction as an unsecured loan. Hence, it declared Spouses Bell liable to petitioners in the
amount of P1 million plus 12% interest per annum.
Petitioners' bid to satisfy the above judgment cannot be considered an act of forum
shopping. Simply, the execution of a decision is just the fruit and end of a suit and is very
aptly called the life of the law. 24 It is not separate from the main case. Similarly, the filing
of the instant Petition as a continuation of the execution proceedings does not constitute
forum shopping. Seeking a reversal of an adverse judgment or order by appeal or certiorari
does not constitute forum shopping. Such remedies are sanctioned and provided for by the
rules. 25
Indeed, as will be presently discussed, the causes of action in the main proceedings in Civil
Case No. 4581 and the consequent execution proceedings are identical. Suffice it to say,
however, that the danger of a multiplicity of suits upon one and the same cause of action,
which the judicial policy against forum shopping seeks to prevent, does not exist in this
case.
Re-litigating the issue of the value of respondents' family home is barredby res judicata.
Res judicata (meaning, a "matter adjudged") is a fundamental principle of law that
precludes parties from re-litigating issues actually litigated and determined by a prior and
final judgment. 26 Under the 1997 Rules of Court, there are two aspects of res judicata,
namely: bar by prior judgment 27 and conclusiveness of judgment. 28
There is "bar by prior judgment" when, as between the first case in which the judgment has
been rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred, there is an identity of parties,
subject matter, and causes of action. In this instance, the judgment in the first case
constitutes an absolute bar to the second action. The judgment or decree on the merits of
the court of competent jurisdiction concludes the litigation between the parties, as well as
their privies, and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause of
action before the same or any other tribunal. 29
On the other hand, there is "conclusiveness of judgment" where there is an identity of
parties in the first and second cases, but no identity of causes of action. Under this rule, the
first judgment is conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and
determined and not as to matters merely involved therein. Stated differently, any right, fact,
or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an
action before a competent court in which judgment is rendered on the merits is
conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the
parties and their privies whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the
two actions is the same. 30
In this case, the trial court's final decision in Civil Case No. 4581 bars petitioners' move to
have the property in dispute levied on execution.
There is no question that the main proceedings in Civil Case No. 4581 and the subsequent
execution proceedings involved the same parties 31 and subject matter. 32 For these
reasons, respondents argue that the execution sale of the property in dispute under Article
160 of the Family Code is barred by res judicata, since the trial court has already
determined that the value of the property fell within the statutory limit.
The CA held that the trial court's Decision, which is indisputably final, only settled the
issue of whether the property in dispute was a family home. The CA ruled thus:
We rule that there is no res judicata.
At the outset, let it be emphasized that the decision of the trial court dated July 15, 1998,
which has become final and executory, only declares the subject property as a family
home. As a matter of fact, private respondents never questioned that such property is a
family home, and consequently, the issue as to whether or not the property is family home
is settled and res judicata lies only with respect to this issue. aDSIHc
But the issue as to whether or not a family home could be the subject of an execution sale
was not resolved by the trial court. This issue[was] raised only when the writ of execution
was issued and hence, [was not] resolved with finality. Thus, the issue before this Court is
whether or not the [f]amily [h]ome of petitioners under the facts and circumstances of the
case could be the subject of a writ of execution and sold at public auction. 33
The Court disagrees with the CA.
"Cause of action" is the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another. 34 It
may be argued that the cause of action in the main proceedings was the sale of the property
in dispute, while in the execution proceedings it was the indebtedness of Spouses Bell to
petitioners.
The settled rule, however, is that identity of causes of action does not mean absolute
identity. Otherwise, a party could easily escape the operation of res judicata by changing
the form of the action or the relief sought. 35 The test to determine whether the causes of
action are identical is to ascertain whether the same evidence will sustain both actions, or
whether there is an identity of the facts essential to the maintenance of the two actions. If
the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two actions are considered the same, and
a judgment in the first case would be a bar to the subsequent action. Hence, a party cannot,
by varying the form of action or adopting a different method of presenting the case, escape
the operation of the principle that one and the same cause of action shall not be twice
litigated between the same parties or their privies. 36
Among several tests resorted to in ascertaining whether two suits relate to a single or
common cause of action are: (1) whether the same evidence would support and sustain
both the first and the second causes of action; and (2) whether the defenses in one case may
be used to substantiate the complaint in the other. Also fundamental is the test for
determining whether the cause of action in the second case existed at the time of the filing
of the first complaint. 37
Applying the above guidelines, the Court finds that the entirety of Civil Case No. 4581 —
including the bid of petitioners to execute the money judgment awarded to them by the trial
court — is founded on a common cause of action. Records show that the sole evidence
submitted by petitioners during the execution proceedings was the Deed of Sale, which the
trial court had nullified in the main proceedings. Concomitantly, the very same defense
raised by petitioners in the main proceedings, i.e., that they had bought the property from
Spouses Bell for P1 million — was utilized to substantiate the claim that the current value
of respondents' family home was actually P1 million. In fact, the trial court's order for
respondents' family home to be levied on execution was solely based on the price stated in
the nullified Deed of Sale.
Res judicata applies, considering that the parties are litigating over the same property.
Moreover, the same contentions and evidence advanced by the petitioners to substantiate
their claim over respondents' family home have already been used to support their
arguments in the main proceedings.
Any lingering doubt on the application of res judicata to this case should be put to rest by
the trial court's discussion of the nature and alienability of the property in dispute, to wit:
The second issue is about the allegation of the plaintiffs that the family home which has
been constituted on the house and lot in question is exempt from alienation and that its
value does not exceed P300,000. Paterno Bell, Sr. testified that the two-storey house was
built in 1947 and was made of wood and hollow blocks. He inherited it in 1976 from his
parents and has been living there with his family. In 1976, when an extra-judicial
settlement was made of the estate of his parents, the fair market value of the house was
P70,000.
City Assessor Rodezinda Pargas testified and presented Tax Declaration and others,
(Exhibit "J", Tax Declaration No. 005-047) beginning 1985 showing that the subject lot
with an area of 329 sq. m. had a fair market value of P76,000.00 and the residential house
located thereon of P50,000.00, for a total value of P126,000.00. She testified that during
the prior years the assessed values were lower. This shows that the limit of the value of
P300,000.00 under Article 157, Title 5 of the Family Code has not been exceeded. The
testimonies of the plaintiffs who are children of Sps. Paterno Bell, Sr. and Rogelia
Calingasan Bell show that they had lived in that house together with their said parents. The
Court therefore concludes that the said house is a family home under Chapter 2, Title 5 of
the Family Code. Its alienation by the said Spouses without the written consent of the
majority of the children/plaintiffs is null and void for being contrary to law and public
policy as enunciated in Art. 158 of the Family Code. 38 [Underscoring supplied]
The foregoing points plainly show that the issue of whether the property in dispute
exceeded the statutory limit of P300,000 has already been determined with finality by the
trial court. Its finding necessarily meant that the property is exempt from execution.
Assuming for the sake of argument that causes of action in the main proceedings and in the
execution proceedings are different, the parties are still barred from litigating the issue of
whether respondents' family home may be sold on execution sale under the principle of
conclusiveness of judgment.
Respondents' family home cannot be sold on execution under Article 160 of the Family
Code.
Unquestionably, the family home is exempt from execution as expressly provided for in
Article 153 of the Family Code.
It has been said that the family home is a real right that is gratuitous, inalienable and free
from attachment. 40 The great controlling purpose and policy of the Constitution is the
protection or the preservation of the homestead — the dwelling place. A houseless,
homeless population is a burden upon the energy, industry, and morals of the community to
which it belongs. No greater calamity, not tainted with crime, can befall a family than to be
expelled from the roof under which it has been gathered and sheltered. 41 The family home
cannot be seized by creditors except in special cases.
The nature and character of the property that debtors may claim to be exempt, however, are
determined by the exemption statute. The exemption is limited to the particular kind of
property or the specific articles prescribed by the statute; the exemption cannot exceed the
statutory limit.
Articles 155 and 160 of the Family Code specify the exceptions mentioned in Article 153,
to wit:
ARTICLE 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment except:
(1) For nonpayment of taxes;
(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;
(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution; and

(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen and others who
have rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building.
ARTICLE 160. When a creditor whose claims is not among those mentioned in Article 155
obtains a judgment in his favor, and he has reasonable grounds to believe that the family
home is actually worth more than the maximum amount fixed in Article 157, he may apply
to the court which rendered the judgment for an order directing the sale of the property
under execution. The court shall so order if it finds that the actual value of the family home
exceeds the maximum amount allowed by law as of the time of its constitution. If the
increased actual value exceeds the maximum allowed in Article 157 and results from
subsequent voluntary improvements introduced by the person or persons constituting the
family home, by the owner or owners of the property, or by any of the beneficiaries, the
same rule and procedure shall apply.
At the execution sale, no bid below the value allowed for a family home shall be
considered. The proceeds shall be applied first to the amount mentioned in Article 157, and
then to the liabilities under the judgment and the costs. The excess, if any, shall be
delivered to the judgment debtor.
Related to the foregoing is Article 157 of the Family Code, which provides:
ARTICLE 157. The actual value of the family home shall not exceed, at the time of its
constitution, the amount of three hundred thousand pesos in urban areas, and two hundred
thousand pesos in rural areas, or such amounts as may hereafter be fixed by law. ETHIDa
In any event, if the value of the currency changes after the adoption of this Code, the value
most favorable for the constitution of a family home shall be the basis of evaluation.
For purposes of this Article, urban areas are deemed to include chartered cities and
municipalities whose annual income at least equals that legally required for chartered
cities. All others are deemed to be rural areas. [Underscoring supplied]
The minutes of the deliberation by the drafters of Family Code on Article 160 are
enlightening, to wit:
Justice Puno inquired if the above Article [160] is still necessary. In reply, Judge Diy
opined that the above Article is intended to cover a situation where the family home is
already worth P500,000 or P1M. Justice Reyes stated that it is possible that a family home,
originally valued at P300,000, later appreciated to almost P1M because of improvements
made, like roads and plazas. Justice Caguioa, however, made a distinction between
voluntary and involuntary improvements in the sense that if the value of the family home
exceeded the maximum amount because of voluntary improvements by the one
establishing the family home, the Article will apply; but if it is through an involuntary
improvement, like the conversion into a residential area or the establishment of roads and
other facilities, the one establishing the family home should not be punished by making his
home liable to creditors. He suggested that the matter be clarified in the provision.
xxx xxx xxx
Prof. Bautista objected to the phrase "is worth" since if they will specify that the family
home is worth more than the maximum amount at the time it was constituted, they will
avoid the suit because the creditor will be given proper warning. Justice Puno opined that
this is a question of fact. Justice Caguioa added that, under the second sentence, there will
be a preliminary determination as to whether the family home exceeds the maximum
amount allowed by law.
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Caguioa accordingly modified the last sentence as follows:
If the excess in actual value over that allowed in Article 157 is due to subsequent voluntary
improvements by the person or persons constituting the family home or by the owner or
owners of the property, the same rules and procedure shall apply.
Prof. Bautista objected to the above provision, because it will in effect penalize the owner
for improving the family home. On the other hand, Justice Puno opined that the provision
covers only the excess in actual value over that allowed by law. Judge Diy added that the
owner may improve the family home up to P300,000. Justice Caguioa stated that without
the above provision, one can borrow money, put it all on improvement of the family home
even beyond the maximum value of a family home and, thereby, exempt it from levy on
the part of the creditor. He added that anyway, if one voluntarily improves his family home
out of his money, nobody can complain because there are no creditors.
Justice Puno posed the question: What is "due to the subsequent improvement?" Is it the
"excess" or is it the "increase", or is it the "increase", which constitutes the "excess"? In
reply, Justice Reyes opined that it is the "increase" which constituted the "excess". Justice
Puno, Justice Reyes and Justice Caguioa modified the last sentence as follows:

If the increase in actual value exceeds that maximum allowed in Article 157 and results
from subsequent voluntary improvements introduced by the person or persons constituting
the family home or by the owner or owners of the property, the same rule and procedure
shall apply.
Prof. Bautista commented that the phrase "increase in actual value" does not include the
original value. Justice Puno suggested that they just say "increased actual value", which the
Committee approved. 44 [Underscoring supplied]
To summarize, the exemption of the family home from execution, forced sale or
attachment is limited to P300,000 in urban areas and P200,000 in rural areas, unless those
maximum values are adjusted by law. If it is shown, though, that those amounts do not
match the present value of the peso because of currency fluctuations, the amount of
exemption shall be based on the value that is most favorable to the constitution of a family
home. Any amount in excess of those limits can be applied to the payment of any of the
obligations specified in Articles 155 and 160.
Any subsequent improvement or enlargement of the family home by the persons
constituting it, its owners, or any of its beneficiaries will still be exempt from execution,
forced sale or attachment provided the following conditions obtain: (a) the actual value of
the property at the time of its constitution has been determined to fall below the statutory
limit; and (b) the improvement or enlargement does not result in an increase in its value
exceeding the statutory limit. 45 Otherwise, the family home can be the subject of a forced
sale, and any amount above the statutory limit is applicable to the obligations under
Articles 155 and 160.
Certainly, the humane considerations for which the law surrounds the family home with
immunities from levy do not include the intent to enable debtors to thwart the just claims of
their creditors.
Petitioners maintain that this case falls under the exceptions to the exemption of the family
home from execution or forced sale. They claim that the actual value of respondents'
family home exceeds the P300,000 limit in urban areas. This fact is supposedly shown by
the Deed of Sale whereby private respondents agreed to sell the property for P1 million
way back in 1995. Therefore, the RTC only properly ordered the execution sale of the
property under Article 160 to satisfy the money judgment awarded to them in Civil Case
No. 4581.
As earlier discussed, it has been judicially determined with finality that the property in
dispute is a family home, and that its value at the time of its constitution was within the
statutory limit. Moreover, respondents have timely claimed the exemption of the property
from execution. 48 On the other hand, there is no question that the money judgment
awarded to petitioners falls under the ambit of Article 160.
Notwithstanding petitioners' right to enforce the trial court's money judgment, however,
they cannot obtain its satisfaction at the expense of respondents' rights over their family
home. It is axiomatic that those asserting the protection of an exception from an exemption
must bring themselves clearly within the terms of the exception and satisfy any statutory
requirement for its enforcement. 49
To warrant the execution sale of respondents' family home under Article 160, petitioners
needed to establish these facts: (1) there was an increase in its actual value; (2) the increase
resulted from voluntary improvements on the property introduced by the persons
constituting the family home, its owners or any of its beneficiaries; and (3) the increased
actual value exceeded the maximum allowed under Article 157.
During the execution proceedings, none of those facts was alleged — much less proven —
by petitioners. The sole evidence presented was the Deed of Sale, but the trial court had
already determined with finality that the contract was null, and that the actual transaction
was an equitable mortgage. Evidently, when petitioners and Spouses Bell executed the
Deed of Sale in 1990, the price stated therein was not the actual value of the property in
dispute.
The Court thus agrees with the CA's conclusion that the trial court committed grave abuse
of discretion in ordering the sale on execution of the property in dispute under Article 160.
The trial court had already determined with finality that the property was a family home,
and there was no proof that its value had increased beyond the statutory limit due to
voluntary improvements by respondents. Yet, it ordered the execution sale of the property.
There is grave abuse of discretion when one acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or
despotic manner in the exercise of one's judgment, as in this case in which the assailed
order is bereft of any factual or legal justification. 50
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
Accordingly, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87531, enjoining the
trial court from proceeding with the sale of the family home of respondents, is
AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
(Patricio v. Dario III, G.R. No. 170829, [November 20, 2006], 537 PHIL 595-610)
Civil Law; Family Home; The family home is deemed constituted from the time it is
occupied as a family residence.—The family home is a sacred symbol of family love and
is the repository of cherished memories that last during one’s lifetime. It is the dwelling
house where husband and wife, or by an unmarried head of a family, reside, including the
land on which it is situated. It is constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an
unmarried head of a family. The family home is deemed constituted from the time it is
occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its
beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt
from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent
of the value allowed by law.
Same; Same; Occupancy of the family home either by the owner thereof or by “any of
its beneficiaries” must be actual.—The law explicitly provides that occupancy of the
family home either by the owner thereof or by “any of its beneficiaries” must be actual.
That which is “actual” is something real, or actually existing, as opposed to something
merely possible, or to something which is presumptive or constructive. Actual occupancy,
however, need not be by the owner of the house specifically. Rather, the property may be
occupied by the “beneficiaries” enumerated in Article 154 of the Family Code, which may
include the in-laws where the family home is constituted jointly by the husband and wife.
But the law definitely excludes maids and overseers. They are not the beneficiaries
contemplated by the Code.
Same; Same; Beneficiaries of a family home enumerated in Article 154 of the Family
Code; Requisites to be a beneficiary of the family home.—Article 154 of the Family
Code enumerates who are the beneficiaries of a family home: (1) The husband and wife, or
an unmarried person who is the head of a family; and (2) Their parents, ascendants,
descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate,
who are living in the family home and who depend upon the head of the family for legal
support. To be a beneficiary of the family home, three requisites must concur: (1) they
must be among the relationships enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live
in the family home; and (3) they are dependent for legal support upon the head of the
family.
Same; Same; The family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of
the unmarried head of the family for a period of 10 years or for as long as there is a minor
beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling
reasons therefor; Rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted
the family home.—Moreover, Article 159 of the Family Code provides that the family
home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of
the family for a period of 10 years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the
heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule
shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family home.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Legal Support; Characteristics of legal support.—
Legal support, also known as family support, is that which is provided by law, comprising
everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education
and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family. Legal support has
the following characteristics: (1) It is personal, based on family ties which bind the obligor
and the obligee; (2) It is intransmissible; (3) It cannot be renounced; (4) It cannot be
compromised; (5) It is free from attachment or execution; (6) It is reciprocal; (7) It is
variable in amount.
Same; Property; Co-ownership; Partition; No co-owner ought to be compelled to stay
in a co-ownership indefinitely, and may insist on partition on the common property at
any time; An action to demand partition is imprescriptible or cannot be barred by
laches.—The law does not encourage co-ownerships among individuals as oftentimes it
results in inequitable situations such as in the instant case. Coowners should be afforded
every available opportunity to divide their co-owned property to prevent these situations
from arising. As we ruled in Santos v. Santos, 342 SCRA 753 (2000), no co-owner ought
to be compelled to stay in a co-ownership indefinitely, and may insist on partition on the
common property at any time. An action to demand partition is imprescriptible or cannot
be barred by laches. Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the common
property.
Same; Same; Same; Same; An action for partition is at once an action for declaration
of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the
properties involved.—In Vda. de Daffon v. Court of Appeals, 387 SCRA 427 (2002), we
held that an action for partition is at once an action for declaration of coownership and for
segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the properties involved. If the court
after trial should find the existence of co-ownership among the parties, the court may and
should order the partition of the properties in the same action.
DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to annul
and set aside the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated December 9, 2005 1 in CA-G.R.
CV No. 80680, which dismissed the complaint for partition filed by petitioner for being
contrary to law and evidence.
On July 5, 1987, Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. He was survived by his wife, petitioner
Perla G. Patricio and their two sons, Marcelino Marc Dario and private respondent
Marcelino G. Dario III. Among the properties he left was a parcel of land with a residential
house and a pre-school building built thereon situated at 91 Oxford corner Ermin Garcia
Streets in Cubao, Quezon City, as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
RT-30731 (175992) of the Quezon City Registry of Deeds, covering an area of seven
hundred fifty five (755) square meters, more or less. 2
On August 10, 1987, petitioner, Marcelino Marc and private respondent, extrajudicially
settled the estate of Marcelino V. Dario. Accordingly, TCT No. RT-30731 (175992) was
cancelled and TCT No. R-213963 was issued in the names of petitioner, private respondent
and Marcelino Marc.
Thereafter, petitioner and Marcelino Marc formally advised private respondent of their
intention to partition the subject property and terminate the co-ownership. Private
respondent refused to partition the property hence petitioner and Marcelino Marc instituted
an action for partition before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which was docketed
as Civil Case No. Q-01-44038 and raffled to Branch 78.
On October 3, 2002, 3 the trial court ordered the partition of the subject property in the
following manner: Perla G. Patricio, 4/6; Marcelino Marc G. Dario, 1/6; and Marcelino G.
Dario III, 1/6. The trial court also ordered the sale of the property by public auction
wherein all parties concerned may put up their bids. In case of failure, the subject property
should be distributed accordingly in the aforestated manner. 4
Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the trial court
on August 11, 2003, 5 hence he appealed before the Court of Appeals, which denied the
same on October 19, 2005. However, upon a motion for reconsideration filed by private
respondent on December 9, 2005, the appellate court partially reconsidered the October 19,
2005 Decision. In the now assailed Resolution, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
complaint for partition filed by petitioner and Marcelino Marc for lack of merit. It held that
the family home should continue despite the death of one or both spouses as long as there
is a minor beneficiary thereof. The heirs could not partition the property unless the court
found compelling reasons to rule otherwise. The appellate court also held that the minor
son of private respondent, who is a grandson of spouses Marcelino V. Dario and Perla G.
Patricio, was a minor beneficiary of the family home. 6
Hence, the instant petition on the following issues:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN REVERSING
ITS EARLIER DECISION OF OCTOBER 19, 2005 WHICH AFFIRMED IN TOTO THE
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT DATED 03 OCTOBER 2002 GRANTING THE
PARTITION AND SALE BY PUBLIC AUCTION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.
aScIAC
II.
COROLLARILY, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN
APPLYING ARTICLE 159 IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 154 OF THE FAMILY CODE
ON FAMILY HOME INSTEAD OF ARTICLE 494 IN RELATION TO ARTICLES 495
AND 498 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE ON CO-OWNERSHIP. 7
The sole issue is whether partition of the family home is proper where one of the co-
owners refuse to accede to such partition on the ground that a minor beneficiary still
resides in the said home.
Private respondent claims that the subject property which is the family home duly
constituted by spouses Marcelino and Perla Dario cannot be partitioned while a minor
beneficiary is still living therein namely, his 12-year-old son, who is the grandson of the
decedent. He argues that as long as the minor is living in the family home, the same
continues as such until the beneficiary becomes of age. Private respondent insists that even
after the expiration of ten years from the date of death of Marcelino on July 5, 1987, i.e.,
even after July 1997, the subject property continues to be considered as the family home
considering that his minor son, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, who is a beneficiary of the
said family home, still resides in the premises.
On the other hand, petitioner alleges that the subject property remained as a family home of
the surviving heirs of the late Marcelino V. Dario only up to July 5, 1997, which was the
10th year from the date of death of the decedent. Petitioner argues that the brothers
Marcelino Marc and private respondent Marcelino III were already of age at the time of the
death of their father, 8 hence there is no more minor beneficiary to speak of.
The family home is a sacred symbol of family love and is the repository of cherished
memories that last during one's lifetime. 9 It is the dwelling house where husband and wife,
or by an unmarried head of a family, reside, including the land on which it is situated. 10 It
is constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of a family. 11
The family home is deemed constituted from the time it is occupied as a family residence.
From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides
therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law. 12
The law explicitly provides that occupancy of the family home either by the owner thereof
or by "any of its beneficiaries" must be actual. That which is "actual" is something real, or
actually existing, as opposed to something merely possible, or to something which is
presumptive or constructive. Actual occupancy, however, need not be by the owner of the
house specifically. Rather, the property may be occupied by the "beneficiaries" enumerated
in Article 154 of the Family Code, which may include the in-laws where the family home
is constituted jointly by the husband and wife. But the law definitely excludes maids and
overseers. They are not the beneficiaries contemplated by the Code. 13
Article 154 of the Family Code enumerates who are the beneficiaries of a family home: (1)
The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family; and (2) Their
parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be
legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in the family home and who depend upon the head
of the family for legal support. ADHcTE
To be a beneficiary of the family home, three requisites must concur: (1) they must be
among the relationships enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the
family home; and (3) they are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family.
Moreover, Article 159 of the Family Code provides that the family home shall continue
despite the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period
of 10 years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the
same unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of
whoever owns the property or constituted the family home.
Article 159 of the Family Code applies in situations where death occurs to persons who
constituted the family home. Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino comments on the effect of death of
one or both spouses or the unmarried head of a family on the continuing existence of the
family home:
Upon the death of the spouses or the unmarried family head who constituted the family
home, or of the spouse who consented to the constitution of his or her separate property as
family home, the property will remain as family home for ten years or for as long as there
is a minor beneficiary living in it. If there is no more beneficiary left at the time of death,
we believe the family home will be dissolved or cease, because there is no more reason for
its existence. If there are beneficiaries who survive living in the family home, it will
continue for ten years, unless at the expiration of the ten years, there is still a minor
beneficiary, in which case the family home continues until that beneficiary becomes of age.
After these periods lapse, the property may be partitioned by the heirs. May the heirs who
are beneficiaries of the family home keep it intact by not partitioning the property after the
period provided by this article? We believe that although the heirs will continue in
ownership by not partitioning the property, it will cease to be a family home. 14 (Emphasis
supplied)
Prof. Ernesto L. Pineda further explains the import of Art. 159 in this manner:
The family home shall continue to exist despite the death of one or both spouses or of the
unmarried head of the family. Thereafter, the length of its continued existence is dependent
upon whether there is still a minor-beneficiary residing therein. For as long as there is one
beneficiary even if the head of the family or both spouses are already dead, the family
home will continue to exist (Arts. 153, 159). If there is no minor-beneficiary, it will subsist
until 10 years and within this period, the heirs cannot partition the same except when there
are compelling reasons which will justify the partition. This rule applies regardless of
whoever owns the property or who constituted the family home. 15 (Emphasis supplied)
The rule in Article 159 of the Family Code may thus be expressed in this wise: If there are
beneficiaries who survive and are living in the family home, it will continue for 10 years,
unless at the expiration of 10 years, there is still a minor beneficiary, in which case the
family home continues until that beneficiary becomes of age.
It may be deduced from the view of Dr. Tolentino that as a general rule, the family home
may be preserved for a minimum of 10 years following the death of the spouses or the
unmarried family head who constituted the family home, or of the spouse who consented to
the constitution of his or her separate property as family home. After 10 years and a minor
beneficiary still lives therein, the family home shall be preserved only until that minor
beneficiary reaches the age of majority. The intention of the law is to safeguard and protect
the interests of the minor beneficiary until he reaches legal age and would now be capable
of supporting himself. However, three requisites must concur before a minor beneficiary is
entitled to the benefits of Art. 159: (1) the relationship enumerated in Art. 154 of the
Family Code; (2) they live in the family home, and (3) they are dependent for legal support
upon the head of the family. CIcTAE
Thus, the issue for resolution now is whether Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, the minor
son of private respondent, can be considered as a beneficiary under Article 154 of the
Family Code.
As to the first requisite, the beneficiaries of the family home are: (1) The husband and wife,
or an unmarried person who is the head of a family; and (2) Their parents, ascendants,
descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate. The
term "descendants" contemplates all descendants of the person or persons who constituted
the family home without distinction; hence, it must necessarily include the grandchildren
and great grandchildren of the spouses who constitute a family home. Ubi lex non
distinguit nec nos distinguire debemos. Where the law does not distinguish, we should not
distinguish. Thus, private respondent's minor son, who is also the grandchild of deceased
Marcelino V. Dario satisfies the first requisite.
As to the second requisite, minor beneficiaries must be actually living in the family home
to avail of the benefits derived from Art. 159. Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, also known
as Ino, the son of private respondent and grandson of the decedent Marcelino V. Dario, has
been living in the family home since 1994, or within 10 years from the death of the
decedent, hence, he satisfies the second requisite.
However, as to the third requisite, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot demand support
from his paternal grandmother if he has parents who are capable of supporting him. The
liability for legal support falls primarily on Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV's parents,
especially his father, herein private respondent who is the head of his immediate family.
The law first imposes the obligation of legal support upon the shoulders of the parents,
especially the father, and only in their default is the obligation imposed on the
grandparents.
Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV is dependent on legal support not from his grandmother,
but from his father. Thus, despite residing in the family home and his being a descendant of
Marcelino V. Dario, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot be considered as beneficiary
contemplated under Article 154 because he did not fulfill the third requisite of being
dependent on his grandmother for legal support. It is his father whom he is dependent on
legal support, and who must now establish his own family home separate and distinct from
that of his parents, being of legal age.
Legal support, also known as family support, is that which is provided by law, comprising
everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education
and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family. 16 Legal support
has the following characteristics: (1) It is personal, based on family ties which bind the
obligor and the obligee; (2) It is intransmissible; (3) It cannot be renounced; (4) It cannot
be compromised; (5) It is free from attachment or execution; (6) It is reciprocal; (7) It is
variable in amount. 17
Professor Pineda is of the view that grandchildren cannot demand support directly from
their grandparents if they have parents (ascendants of nearest degree) who are capable of
supporting them. This is so because we have to follow the order of support under Art. 199.
18 We agree with this view.
The reasons behind Art. 199 as explained by Pineda and Tolentino: the closer the
relationship of the relatives, the stronger the tie that binds them. Thus, the obligation to
support under Art. 199 which outlines the order of liability for support is imposed first
upon the shoulders of the closer relatives and only in their default is the obligation moved
to the next nearer relatives and so on. EHTIDA
There is no showing that private respondent is without means to support his son; neither is
there any evidence to prove that petitioner, as the paternal grandmother, was willing to
voluntarily provide for her grandson's legal support. On the contrary, herein petitioner filed
for the partition of the property which shows an intention to dissolve the family home,
since there is no more reason for its existence after the 10-year period ended in 1997.
With this finding, there is no legal impediment to partition the subject property.
The law does not encourage co-ownerships among individuals as oftentimes it results in
inequitable situations such as in the instant case. Co-owners should be afforded every
available opportunity to divide their co-owned property to prevent these situations from
arising.
As we ruled in Santos v. Santos, 19 no co-owner ought to be compelled to stay in a co-
ownership indefinitely, and may insist on partition on the common property at any time.
An action to demand partition is imprescriptible or cannot be barred by laches. Each co-
owner may demand at any time the partition of the common property. 20
Since the parties were unable to agree on a partition, the court a quo should have ordered a
partition by commissioners pursuant to Section 3, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court. Not more
than three competent and disinterested persons should be appointed as commissioners to
make the partition, commanding them to set off to the plaintiff and to each party in interest
such part and proportion of the property as the court shall direct.
When it is made to appear to the commissioners that the real estate, or a portion thereof,
cannot be divided without great prejudice to the interest of the parties, the court may order
it assigned to one of the parties willing to take the same, provided he pays to the other
parties such sum or sums of money as the commissioners deem equitable, unless one of the
parties interested ask that the property be sold instead of being so assigned, in which case
the court shall order the commissioners to sell the real estate at public sale, and the
commissioners shall sell the same accordingly. 21
trial court is DIRECTED to appoint not more than three (3) competent and disinterested
persons, who should determine the technical metes and bounds of the property and the
proper share appertaining to each heir, including the improvements, in accordance with
Rule 69 of the Rules of Court. When it is made to the commissioners that the real estate, or
a portion thereof, cannot be divided without great prejudice to the interest of the parties, the
court a quo may order it assigned to one of the parties willing to take the same, provided he
pays to the other parties such sum or sums of money as the commissioners deem equitable,
unless one of the parties interested ask that the property be sold instead of being so
assigned, in which case the court shall order the commissioners to sell the real estate at
public sale, and the commissioners shall sell the same accordingly, and thereafter distribute
the proceeds of the sale appertaining to the just share of each heir. No pronouncement as to
costs. S
SO ORDERED.

The partition of the subject property should be made in accordance with the rule embodied
in Art. 996 of the Civil Code.22 Under the law of intestate succession, if the widow and
legitimate children survive, the widow has the same share as that of each of the children.
However, since only one-half of the conjugal property which is owned by the decedent is
to be allocated to the legal and compulsory heirs (the other half to be given exclusively to
the surviving spouse as her conjugal share of the property), the widow will have the same
share as each of her two surviving children. Hence, the respective shares of the subject
property, based on the law on intestate succession are: (1) Perla Generosa Dario, 4/6; (2)
Marcelino Marc G. Dario II, 1/6 and (3) Marcelino G. Dario III, 1/6.

In Vda. de Daffon v. Court of Appeals, 23 we held that an action for partition is at once an
action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a
determinate portion of the properties involved. If the court after trial should find the
existence of co-ownership among the parties, the court may and should order the partition
of the properties in the same action. 24

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 80680 dated December 9, 2005, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is
REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 78, who is directed to
conduct a PARTITION BY COMMISSIONERS and effect the actual physical partition of
the subject property, as well as the improvements that lie therein, in the following manner:
Perla G. Dario, 4/6; Marcelino Marc G. Dario, 1/6 and Marcelino G. Dario III, 1/6. The