The Regional Order in

the Gulf Region and

the Middle East
Regional Rivalries and Security
Alliances

Edited by
Philipp O. Amour
The Regional Order in the Gulf Region
and the Middle East
 Philipp O. Amour
Editor

The Regional Order

in the Gulf Region
and the Middle East
Regional Rivalries and Security Alliances
Editor
Philipp O. Amour
Department of International Relations
Sakarya University
Sakarya, Turkey

ISBN 978-3-030-45464-7 ISBN 978-3-030-45465-4  (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45465-4

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To my beloved children Adam and Ilias. Your growth provides
me a constant source of fulfillment, joy, and pride.
I love you to the moon and back.
 Preface

The contemporary politics of the Gulf Region and the Middle East has been
one of uprisings and counter-uprisings; of civil wars and proxy wars; and of
deliberate and destabilizing ideational and strategic crises. This ever-growing
and complex set of regional dynamics since the first Arab Spring movement
is not routine politics; rather, it is a formative condition for an altered or a
novel regional order.
This book thematically provides a detailed analysis of this ­unfolding
regional order. The analysis takes place in relation to the regional level
of analysis at the interplay of a combination of a cluster of factors that
include the distribution of power dynamics, ideational factors, and
domestic influences. This cluster of factors involves internal and e­ xternal
dimensions that have shaped and continue to shape current regional
responsive dynamics. The book explores the following topics:

• Major security alliances in the Gulf Region and the broader Middle
East
• Regional great powers such as the KSA, the UAE, Iran, Turkey,
Qatar, and Israel
• The most vigorous non-state militant players on the ground, such
as the Islamic State, Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces, Hezbollah,
and the Houthi movement
• Global powers, such as Russia
• National narratives and transnational causes that shape regional
polarization

vii
viii   PREFACE

• Ecological factors (climate, water, etc.) and their roles in regional

dynamics
• Power rivalry in the Gulf Region and the broader Middle East
• Ideational polarization across the Gulf Region and the broader
Middle East
• Middle East competition in the Horn of Africa
• Sunni-Shi’ security and competition

The aim of the book is to contribute to a fuller and more encom-

passing understanding of regional dynamics and interactive politics in
the Gulf Region and the broader Middle East. The book is intended
to serve as a text for university-level classes on Middle East Studies and
International Relations in the Middle East; and as a general reference text
for practitioners interested in the Gulf Region and the broader Middle
East. It highlights recent developments in regional context.

Sakarya, Turkey Philipp O. Amour

 Contents

1 Introduction: The Regional Order in the Gulf

Region and the Middle East 1
Philipp O. Amour

Part I Security Alliances in the Gulf Region

and the Middle East

2 Political Islam as an Ordering Factor?

The Reconfiguration of the Regional Order
in the Middle East Since the “Arab Spring” 29
Julius Dihstelhoff and Alexander Lohse

3 Gulfization of the Middle East Security Complex:

The Arab Spring’s Systemic Change 61
Amr Yossef

4 The Conservative-Resistance Camp: The Axis

of Resistance 95
Ana Belén Soage

ix
x  CONTENTS

5 Emergence of the Turkish/Qatari Alliance

in the Middle East: Making of the Moderate
Resistance Bloc 131
Nuri Yeşilyurt and Mustafa Yetim

Part II State Actors and Non–state Militant Actors 

in the Regional System

6 Expanding the Turkish Bid for Regional Control

in the Somali Regional Security Complexes 167
Stephanie Carver

7 Qatar’s Calculated Gamble on the Syrian Muslim

Brotherhood 195
Hanlie Booysen

8 (Un)Limited Force: Regional Realignments,

Israeli Operations, and the Security of Gaza 217
Colter Louwerse

9 The Evolution of Iraq’s Hashd al-Sha’abi

(Popular Mobilization Forces) 259
Zana Gulmohamad

10 Between the PYD and the Islamic State:

The Complex Role of Non-state Actors in Syria 303
Naomí Ramírez Díaz

Part III External Actors and Ecological Factors 

in the Regional System

11 Domestic and External Factors in the Syrian

Conflict: Toward a Multi-causal Explanation 331
Efe Can Gürcan
 CONTENTS   xi

12 Lending an “Old Friend” a Hand: Why Does

Russia Back Syria? 351
Umut Bekcan and Pınar Uz Hançarlı

13 Contribution of Water Scarcity and Sustainability

Failures to Disintegration and Conflict in the Arab
Region—The Case of Syria and Yemen 375
Mohammad Al-Saidi

14 Regional Rivalries and Security Alliances

in the Gulf Region and the Middle East 407
Philipp O. Amour

Index 435
 Notes on Contributors

Mohammad Al-Saidi is a Research Assistant Professor for Natural

Resources Governance at Qatar University, Qatar. He holds two Master’s
degrees and a Ph.D. in Economics from Heidelberg University, Germany.
His research focuses on international development and environmental
policies, particularly in the context of the Middle East.
Philipp O. Amour is an Associate Professor of International Relations at
Sakarya University and a frequent Visiting Professor at Boğaziçi University,
Turkey. Dr. Amour’s theoretically driven yet empirically rich research is sit-
uated in the intersection of the International Relations and Middle East
Studies fields and focuses on foreign policy analysis, security, and alliance
studies of the Gulf Region and the broader Middle East, including the Arab
States, Iran, Israel, Palestine, and Turkey. Dr. Amour’s scholarly articles
and book chapters have appeared in international peer-reviewed journals
(e.g., International Journal of Middle East Studies, British Journal of Middle
Eastern Studies) and with highly regarded press. Dr. Amour also serves as
an analyst and independent consultant of international affairs, political con-
sulting, as well as academic research and publishing.
Umut Bekcan graduated from the Department of International
Relations, Gazi University in 2002. He studied the Russian language
at the Moscow State Pedagogical University between 2009 and 2010.
In 2012, Dr. Bekcan received his Ph.D. degree in Diplomatic History
from Ankara University, and his thesis was on Russia–China relations in

xiii
xiv   NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

the post-Cold War era. His major fields of study include Foreign Policy
in the Soviet Union and Russia. He has been published in various jour-
nals and edited books and teaches Diplomatic History, International
Relations, and Turkish Foreign Policy in the Department of Political
Science, Pamukkale University.
Hanlie Booysen  is a Lecturer in Religious Studies at Victoria University
of Wellington, New Zealand. Dr. Booysen’s main research interest is the
relationship between Islam and politics. Her Ph.D. thesis explained the
moderate platform of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood (SMB). In her
former career, Dr. Booysen served as a diplomat to Jordan (1993–1997),
acted as Chargé d’affaires to Palestine (2000–2003), and was Deputy
Head of Mission in Syria (2009–2012).
Stephanie Carver is a Ph.D. candidate and researcher at Monash
University, Australia. She is researching armed non-state actors in the
Horn of Africa. Her Ph.D. topic considers the role of maritime pirates in
state formation within Somalia. Ms. Carver has worked with the United
Nations in Nairobi and Kenya. She holds a B.A. (Hons) and a Master of
International Relations from Monash University.
Julius Dihstelhoff (Dr. des.) is a Research Fellow in the Department
of Near and Middle Eastern Politics at the Center for Near and Middle
Eastern Studies (CNMS) at Philipps-University Marburg, Germany.
He is an Academic Coordinator for the international joint project
“Merian Centre for Advanced Studies in the Maghreb (MECAM)”,
funded by the German Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF),
based in Tunis (Tunisia). His research consisted of projects supported by
the German Foreign Ministry between 2012 and 2015 that analyzed the
role of various Islamist parties in the ongoing transformation processes
in the MENA region. His areas of research interest include the interre-
lated transformational processes in the MENA region since 2010/2011
(especially Tunisia), the role of Political Islam in these processes, and
German–Arab relations.
Zana Gulmohamad has a Ph.D. in International Politics from the
University of Sheffield, UK. He is a Teaching Associate in the Politics
and International Relations Department at the University of Sheffield.
Dr. Zana has published in think tank and research institute journals, such
as Combating Terrorism Center/CTC Sentinel at West Point. Dr. Zana’s
 NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS   xv

forthcoming monograph, which will be published in January 2021 by

I.B. Tauris (an imprint of Bloomsbury), is titled “The Making of Foreign
Policy in Iraq: Political Factions and the Ruling Elite since 2003”.
Efe Can Gürcan is Associate Dean of Research and Development
for the Faculty of Economics, Administrative and Social Sciences at
İstinye University. He is also a faculty member in the Department of
International Relations, İstinye University and Research Associate at the
University of Manitoba’s Geopolitical Economy Research Group. He
completed his undergraduate education in International Relations at
Koç University. He received his Master’s degree in International Studies
from the University of Montréal and earned his Ph.D. in Sociology
from Simon Fraser University. He speaks English, French, Spanish, and
Turkish. His publications include three books as well as more than 30
articles and book chapters on international development, international
conflict, and international institutions, with a geographical focus on
Latin America and the Middle East. His latest book is Multipolarization,
South–South Cooperation, and the Rise of Post-Hegemonic Governance.
Alexander Lohse is a research fellow in the Department of Near and
Middle Eastern Studies at the Center for Near and Middle Eastern
Studies (CNMS) at Philipps-University Marburg, Germany. Between
2012 and 2015, he was a research assistant at the CNMS as part of the
German Foreign Ministry’s “Transformation partnerships with the Arab
world,” for which he analyzed the role of moderate Islamist parties in
the regional transformation processes. He is currently working on his
Ph.D. project, which deals with status-seeking strategies of the United
Arab Emirates. His research interests include Political Islam and Islamist
movements in the Arab world and their role in regional politics, as well
as the foreign policies of the Arab Gulf states.
Colter Louwerse is a Ph.D. Researcher in Palestine Studies at the
University of Exeter, United Kingdom. His current work focuses on
self-determination, the United Nations, and the Palestine Question.
Naomí Ramírez Díaz  holds a Ph.D. in Arabic and Islamic Studies from
the Autónoma University of Madrid. Her research focuses on political
Islam in Syria in particular and the Middle East in general, and she has
published various articles, papers, and reports in addition to her book,
The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria: The Democratic Option of Islamism
xvi   NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

(Routledge, 2017). She has translated articles and books related to Syria
from Arabic to Spanish, the most recent of which is Yassin Al-Haj Saleh’s
The Impossible Revolution.
Ana Belén Soage holds a Ph.D. in Middle Eastern Studies. She has
studied and worked in several Western European and Arab countries and
is fluent in Spanish, English, Arabic, and French. She is currently based
in Madrid, where she teaches at the EAE Business School. Dr. Soage has
published articles, book reviews, and book chapters on issues related to
Political Islam, both in the Muslim world and in the West, and to inter-
national relations with a focus on the Middle East. In addition, she is a
member of the editorial board of the academic journals Politics, Religion
& Ideology, and Religion Compass.
Pınar Uz Hançarlı  received her Ph.D. from the Department of Political
Science, Pamukkale University, where she works as a Research Assistant.
She graduated from the Middle East Technical University in the
Department of International Relations. She was awarded a Jean Monnet
Scholarship for 2009–2010 term at the University of Nottingham, where
she completed her M.A. degree in the School of Politics.
Nuri Yeşilyurt  is an Assistant Professor at the Department of
International Relations of Ankara University, Faculty of Political Science.
He received his B.A. degree from Ankara University in 2004 and M.Phil.
degree from the University of Cambridge in 2005. He completed
his Ph.D. in 2013 at Ankara University with the thesis titled “Regime
Security and Small State in the Middle East: The Case of Jordan.” Dr.
Yeşilyurt’s publications are mainly focused on Turkish–Arab relations,
and Middle Eastern politics.
Mustafa Yetim is an Assistant Professor at Eskişehir Osmangazi
University. He finished his undergraduate studies in 2009 at Karadeniz
Technical University and then received his Master’s degree in 2011 from
Sakarya University. His Master’s thesis was about “Turkey’s Middle East
Policy between 2002 and 2010: Turkey’s changing perception in the
Middle East”. He completed his Ph.D. in 2016 at Ankara University
with the thesis entitled “Hezbollah Within the Middle East and
Lebanon: Neo-Weberian Perspective”. He has published book chapters,
articles, commentaries, and analysis on topics related to Turkish foreign
policy in the Middle East.
 NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS   xvii

Amr Yossef is an independent scholar based in Cairo, Egypt. His

research focuses on Middle East politics and security. He coauthored
the book The Arab Spring and the Geopolitics of the Middle East, wrote
contributions in the edited volumes of Egypt’s Tahrir Revolution
(Lynne Rienner, 2013) and Military Exercises (NATO Defense College,
2018) and published articles that appeared in Foreign Affairs, Journal
of Strategic Studies, and Digest of Middle East Studies. Amr Yossef holds
a Ph.D. in International Studies from the University of Trento and has
taught at NYU and the American University in Cairo.
 Abbreviations

AAH Asaib Ahl al-Haq

AFAD Turkish Disaster and Emergency Management Authority
AKP Turkish Justice and Development Party
AMISOM African Union Mission in Somalia
AQAP Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
Arab League League of Arab States
AU African Union
Daesh The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
EAC East African Community
EMB Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood
FAQ Al-Abbas Fighting Division (Furqat al-Abbaas al-Qitaliya)
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
FI Fadaiyun Islam
FJP Freedom and Justice Party in Egypt
FSA Free Syrian Army
FV Fighting Vanguard
GCC Gulf Cooperation Council
HAF Haftar Armed Forces
Hamas Islamic Resistance Movement
HBJ Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber al-Thani
HDI Human Development Index
Houthi movement Supporters of God (Ansar Allah)
IA Iraqi Army
ICR Iraqi Council of Representatives
IDF Israeli Defense Force
IGAD Intergovernmental Authority on Development

xix
xx   ABBREVIATIONS

IGOs Intergovernmental Organizations

IIP The Iraqi Islamic Party
IR International Relations
IRGC Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
IRGC-QF Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-Quds Force
IRP Islamic Republic Party
IS Islamic State
ISCI The Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq
ISF Iraqi Security Forces
ISIL Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham
Islah Party The Yemeni Congregation for Reform
IWRM Integrated Water Resources Management
JAM Army of the Mahdi (Jaish al-Mahdi)
JCP Justice and Construction Party in Libya
JCPOA Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
KH Kata’ib Hezbollah in Iraq
KNC Kurdish National Council
KSA Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
LNA Libyan National Army
LNG Liquefied Natural Gas
MB Muslim Brotherhood
MbS KSA Crown Prince Mohamed Bin Salman
MbZ Abu Dhabi’s Crown Prince and de facto Ruler
MENA Middle East and North Africa
MNF Multinational Force in Lebanon
n.a. Not Available
NC National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition
Forces
NCB National Coordination Body for Democratic Change
NGOs Non-Governmental Organizations
NSMA Non-State Militant Actors
NTC National Transitional Council in Libya
OIC Organization of Islamic Cooperation
OPCW Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PIJ Palestinian Islamic Jihad
PJD Moroccan Party of Justice and Development
PKK Kurdistan Worker Party
PLO Palestine Liberation Organization
PM Prime Minister
 ABBREVIATIONS   xxi

PMB Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood

PMC People’s Mobilization Committee
PMF Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces
PNA Palestinian National Authority
PYD Kurdish Democratic Union Party
QIA Qatar Investment Authority
QMB Qatari Muslim Brotherhood
RSC Regional Security Complex
SA State Actors
SCIRI Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq
SDF Syrian Democratic Forces
SMB Syrian Muslim Brotherhood
SNA Somali National Army
SNC Syrian National Council
SS Saraya al-Salam
TIKA Turkish Corporation and Development Agency
TSR Tacit Security Regime
UAE United Arab Emirates
UK United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
UN United Nations
UNGA United Nations General Assembly
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNITAF Unified Task Force
UNLU United National Leadership of the Uprising
UNOSOM United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNSC United Nations Security Council
USA United States of America
USSR The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, commonly known
as the Soviet Union
WSI Water Stress Index
YPG People’s Protection Units
 List of Tables

Table 1.1 Statistical data on sources of power for countries

in the Gulf Region and broader Middle East 13
Table 8.1 Palestinian casualties and destruction during Pillar
of Defense versus Protective Edge 223
Table 14.1 Regional subsystems in the Gulf Region and broader
Middle East 408
Table 14.2 Military expenditure in the Gulf Region
and the broader Middle East in US$ billion 417

xxiii
 CHAPTER 1

Introduction: The Regional Order

in the Gulf Region and the Middle East

Philipp O. Amour  

Contemporaries face a daunting task when trying to understand the

complex and fluid dynamics in the Gulf Region and the broader Middle
East, which has been witnessing turbulences since 2010. This period has
been one of uprisings and counter-uprisings, of civil wars and proxy wars,
and of deliberate and destabilizing ideological and strategic crises. This
ever-growing and complex set of regional dynamics since the first Arab
Spring movement is not routine politics; rather, it is a formative condi-
tion for an altered or a novel regional system across the broader Middle
East.
While these formative regional dynamics evolved during the t­ wenty-first
century, they are actually a prolongation of long-standing issues, affairs,
and narratives across the region, as well as domestic and foreign leanings
and behaviors of state actors and non-state militant actors dating back to
the early stages of the formation of the interstate system in the twentieth
century. Different authors in this book take account of this continuation
of regional dynamics in their respective chapters.

P. O. Amour (*) 
Department of International Relations, Sakarya University, Sakarya, Turkey
e-mail: dr@philipp-amour.ch
URL: http://www.philipp-amour.ch

© The Author(s) 2020 1

P. O. Amour (ed.), The Regional Order in the Gulf Region
and the Middle East, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45465-4_1
2  P. O. AMOUR

This book thematically explores this unfolding regional system, which is

also referred to as a regional order, make-up, or security complex. Written
by scholars from diverse disciplines, it addresses the major security alliances
(i.e., subsystems) and the most vigorous regional great powers and non-
state militant actors in the Gulf Region and the broader Middle East, in
addition to the role of external actors and ecological factors in regional
dynamics. The analysis takes place at the regional level and considers the
interplay of a combination of a cluster of factors, including the distribution
of material power dynamics, ideational factors, and domestic influences.1
The intent of the book is to contribute to a greater understanding
of interactive politics in the Gulf Region and the broader Middle East
from the interrelated vantage points of different systemic units and clus-
ters of factors at the regional level of analysis. At the risk of oversim-
plifying a vastly varied and rich body of literature on the Gulf Region
and the broader Middle East, I argue that major studies typically have
used material power-based explanations and political explanations with a
major focus on the foreign policy of states in the region or the deter-
minant role of global great powers in regional dynamics. This line of
inquiries draws, openly or indirectly, on insights from the realist theories
of International Relations (IR) and, to a lesser degree, is informed by lib-
eral- or c­ onstructivist-inspired approaches.
However, this research design also has shortcomings once a certain
level of knowledge and a disciplinary canon of literature have been estab-
lished, as it hinders a fuller and wide-ranging explanation of the topic
under exploration, and has a tendency to produce repetitive or unimagi-
native outputs.
The literature on regional interactive politics in the broader Middle
East reveals an apparent focus largely on the state level and/or the inter-
national level of analysis. The region, in itself and by itself, as a level
of analysis on its own has attracted the attention of fewer scholars.2

1 This outline draws on Elias Götz and Neil MacFarlane, “Russia’s Role in World Politics:

Power, Ideas, and Domestic Influences,” International Politics 56, no. 6 (December
2019): 713–25, https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-018-0162-0.
2 To mention some exceptions: Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, Security:

A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2013); Barry Buzan and
Ole Waever, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2003). However, the theoretical framework used in this book
is (aside from one exception, Chapter 6) independent from these references.
 1  INTRODUCTION: THE REGIONAL ORDER …  3

Moreover, few scholars have examined the regional system in terms of the
interplay between material power dynamics, immaterial power dynamics
(ideas, narratives, and causes), and domestic influences.
Indeed, the state level and the international level are interconnected
with one another and with the regional dynamics, so they deliver valu-
able insights for understanding regional dynamics. Regional powers and
global powers still have a dominant say in the broader Middle East, as
different chapters in this book demonstrate. Yet, a major aim of the book
is to demonstrate that combining different clusters of factors in rela-
tion to the regional level of analysis delivers a more encompassing and
comprehensive explanation for regional politics and dynamics. These are
intertwined, and so their separation into one or a subset of clusters/fac-
tors does not deliver an adequate and reasonable explanation.
As a contribution to the profusion of excellent scholarship on the
Gulf Region and the broader Middle East, a factorial approach is
taken that includes material clusters and immaterial clusters of factors,
while paying attention to the region as a level of analysis in itself and by
itself. Note that this approach engages internal and external dynamics,
as illustrated below. As the final section in this chapter will demonstrate,
the respective authors accord distinct weights to the various systemic
units and clusters of factors and combine them in different ways in their
chapters.
The book is intended to serve as a text for university-level classes on
Middle East Studies and IR in the broader Middle East and as a general ref-
erence text for practitioners interested in the Gulf Region and the broader
Middle East. It highlights recent developments in a regional context.
Notably, regional dynamics across the broader Middle East provide
students of IR and Middle East Studies, as well as practitioners, with
cases and topics covering fascinating lines of inquiry of regional dynamics
and international politics in both their empirical and theoretical dimen-
sions. These lines of inquiry include regional combinations of state and
non-state actors, and forms of regional relations; regional powers and the
scope and extent of foreign and security policy behavior; the increasing
significance of non-state militant actors and ecological factors; and the
involvement of global great powers; in addition to what the author calls
“ideational balancing” (ideological jostling for power). The various chap-
ters of the book are also useful for social scientists who are interested in
hypotheses and gathering knowledge for theory building of regional sys-
tems, as well as alliance formation and deformation. The objective of this
4  P. O. AMOUR

book is not, however, to deliver a definitive account of the regional sys-

tem in the Gulf Region and broader Middle East or to serve as an ency-
clopedia of all state actors and non-state militant actors (i.e., systemic
units) considered part of the regional system.
The rest of this introduction is divided into three main sections.
The first section deals with the terminology of the Gulf Region and the
broader Middle East. Because this book focuses on related geographic
entities, it is appropriate to define them and to explain why there are so
many conflicting understandings of what exactly the region is. The sec-
ond section is a broad overview of the concept of the regional system
and the relationship between the different systemic units. In relation
to the first, the second section theoretically demonstrates how the Gulf
Region and the broader Middle East encompasses a distinct regional sys-
tem. These insights are demonstrated in more depth throughout the var-
ious chapters. The final section delivers an outline of, and a reflection on,
the different chapters included in the book.

Terminology of the Region

In order to understand material and immaterial regional interactions
between and among systemic units (state actors and non-state mili-
tant actors), it is essential to define the commonly used terms, such as
“Middle East.” The term Middle East is used in this book to include
all member countries of the League of Arab States, founded in 1945,
in addition to the non-Arab countries of Iran, Israel, and Turkey (all of
which have Arab minorities). Thus, the Middle East does not represent
a geographical entity with static borders; rather, it is a transcontinen-
tal entity encompassing three different subregions, which are described
below.3
The first subregion is the Fertile Crescent, also called the Levant,
which spans Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Syria, and Turkey. The
Levant had been the power center (where the intensity of interactive
dynamics is at the highest level) of the regional system in the broader
Middle East from its inception to the first Arab Spring movement. The
second subregion is the Gulf Region and Arabian Peninsula and includes
countries that border the Arabian/Persian Gulf, namely Bahrain, Iraq,

3 Jillian Schwedler and Deborah J. Gerner, Understanding the Contemporary Middle East

(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2008), 2.

 1  INTRODUCTION: THE REGIONAL ORDER …  5

the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, the United
Arab Emirates (UAE), Yemen, and Iran (a non-Arab country). Six of
these countries (excluding Iran, Iraq, and Yemen) form the Cooperation
Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC). Since 2014/2015, the
Gulf Region has become the power center of regional dynamics, as
explored in different parts of this book. The third subregion is North
Africa (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia) and the Horn of
Africa countries of Comoros Islands, Djibouti, Mauritania, Somalia, and
the republic of Sudan, also known as sub-Saharan countries.4
While this list contains exclusively countries, the book explicitly
acknowledges the significance (for regional dynamics) of non-state mili-
tant actors that operate within and across national boundaries.
While bearing in mind that the term is contested, in this book, we
consider the term Middle East to contain the part of the world in which
Islam emerged (Gulf Region) and spread to neighboring subregions in
which the great Islamic empires came to the fore. Contemporary regional
events have proven once more the connectivity of the different subregions
in the broader Middle East. I include North Africa and the sub-Saharan
countries listed above in the Middle East, due to their impact within the
region, despite their geographic distance from its initial power center.
During the first Arab Spring movement (2010–2013) the Jasmine revolu-
tion in Tunisia spread to other subregions and initiated a redistribution of
power on the broader regional level. This movement demonstrates how
a national demand for revolutionary change in Tunisia spread to other
countries to become a transnational cause with region-wide implications.
The second Arab Spring movement (2018–2020) in Sudan and Algeria
demonstrated how changes in domestic leaderships can affect regional
alliances and rivalry in the Horn of Africa (see Chapters 6 and 14).
It is worth mentioning that the revolutionary drive currently brewing in
Iraq and Lebanon is part of the second Arab Spring movement. The rev-
olutionary spread of ideas is also evident in this second wave of the Arab
Spring.
While we employ this definition of the Middle East in the various
chapters in this book, the authors of the respective chapters are aware that
not all countries are involved at the same level and to the same extent in

4 Schwedler and Gerner, 2. At the time of writing this chapter, South Sudan was not

among the member states of the Arab League.

6  P. O. AMOUR

the regional system across the broader Middle East. The authors are also
aware of the different existing definitions of the term Middle East.
Definitions of the term Middle East vary depending on the political,
strategic, and geographic standpoint of the scholars and politicians con-
cerned. For instance, not all scholars include North Africa or all of the
sub-Saharan countries mentioned above in their definition of “Middle
East.”5 This geographic ambiguity leads some scholars to use the term
Middle East and North Africa (MENA), to mark North Africa as a
distinct area.6
Middle East scholars tend to agree on the inclusion of most Arab
countries as part of the broader Middle East due to their sociocultural
and political commonalities; they also include Iran, Israel, and Turkey in
their definition, for particular reasons. Iran and Turkey, states linked by
trade and regional events, are politically and economically interdepend-
ent with other states in the region.7 Most of the states mentioned are
included in a regional system with Israel, with various forms of mutual
cooperation (e.g., specific Arab States having peace treaties with Israel,
Iran–Israel relations before 1979, or Israeli–Turkish relations); growing
rapprochement of Arab states toward Israel since the first Arab Spring
movement; or mutual rivalry, enmity, and violent conflict, bearing in
mind the Arab–Israeli wars.
The term Middle East is a relic of the colonial period. It was origi-
nally used in elite circles, by military planners, scholars, and the media
in the early twentieth century, before it circulated and spread from the
West (i.e., it is a term conjuring up part of the world in which the ­culture
of western Europe is outweighed) to the rest of the world, including
the Gulf Region and the broader Middle East itself.8 The term became
widely circulated after WWI, and conjures up a strategic region; a part

5 Michele Penner Angrist, ed., Politics & Society in the Contemporary Middle East

(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2010), 1, for instance, includes North Africa in his defini-
tion but not all Sub-Saharan countries.
6 For instance: David E. Long, Bernard Reich, and Mark J. Gasiorowski, eds., The

Government and Politics of the Middle East and North Africa, 6th ed. (Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, 2011).
7 Bruce M. Russett, International Regions and the International System (Chicago: Rand

McNally, 1967), https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR05652.v1.

8 Nikki Keddie, “Is There a Middle East?” International Journal of Middle East Studies 4,

no. 3 (July 1973): 255–71.

 1  INTRODUCTION: THE REGIONAL ORDER …  7

of the world with a distinctly different culture from western Europe.

But the name posed the questions: middle and east of where? For those
living in western Europe, the Middle East is situated between the Near
East and Far East, so the term makes sense. This geographic proximity
is, however, distinctive to western Europe; hence, the so-called Middle
East has different proximity to other states, e.g., it is the Middle West for
China or the South of Russia.9 In this sense, the term is Eurocentric.
Unlike other terms with an imperialist derivation the term “Middle
East” persists in common use, despite its imperialist connotations. For
instance, the term “Far East” was substituted by “East Asia.” However,
since its introduction the term has taken root in various languages and is
widely used among various peoples in the region and beyond.10
Since the creation of the regional system in the broader Middle East,
the Levant subregion has constituted the power center of the regional
system because of the seriousness and wider implications of some of the
conflicts that have taken place there (e.g., Arab–Israeli wars) and the
concentration of transnational causes (e.g., Palestine Cause, Arabism,
and Pan-Arabism). The center of gravity of regional dynamics has shifted
to the Gulf Region since the second decade of this twenty-first century,
because of the increase in conflicts there (as illustrated in Chapters 3
and 14). What does it mean, then, to study the regional system in the
Gulf Region and the broader Middle East?

Theoretical Framework of the Regional System

The aim of this section is to define the regional system so this definition
can be used as a theoretical tool to explore the design and dynamics in
the broader Middle East. Later, the section provides reflections on power
projection capabilities.
A regional system is defined as a frequent and intense configura-
tion resulting from the existence of, and interactions between and
among, state actors and non-state actors. This type of security and ide-
ational configuration is typically acknowledged inwardly from within
the regional system itself and outwardly by global great powers,

9 Eliezer Chammou, “Near or Middle East? Choice of Name,” MELA Notes, no. 37

(Winter 1986): 6–8.

10 Bruce Borthwick, Comparative Politics of the Middle East: An Introduction

(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1980), 14–16.

8  P. O. AMOUR

intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and multinational corporations

(MNCs), as a distinctive regional system of international politics.11
A regional system is a theoretical construct used as an analytical tool to
help observers and practitioners investigate regional dynamics and exter-
nal behavior in and of themselves.12 So, what variables designate a regional
system? Geographic proximity among the interactive systemic units of the
regional system is one major variable. This geography proximity can be
divided into three subcategories: the power center of the regional system,
with implications for the conduct of regional affairs; the fringe areas (or
periphery) of the regional system, where the significance of regional dynam-
ics appears to be lower than elsewhere in the region; and the third category
originated from the international system: an external category.13 Global
great powers are actively involved in the power centers and less so in the
fringe areas. The subregion with the assumed highest level of strategic grav-
ity is the power center of the regional system. Regional shake-ups appear to
reallocate these power centers and the regional dynamics then grow assertive
and bellicose in nature.
Further variables to describe a regional system involve points of
commonality and divergence. Systemic state actors and non-state mil-
itant actors usually share a resemblance in terms of ideas and national
narratives, in addition to domestic political and ecological attitudes and
economic-politico interrelation, so they influence each other in their
external ideational and foreign behavior.14 Together, these variables
demonstrate the distinctive character of a regional system in terms of the
regularities and irregularities of interactive relations.
Empirically, the following question emerges regarding the broader
Middle East: Do we recognize a regional system in the Gulf Region and
the broader Middle East? The answer to this question is yes. Witnessing
regional dynamics across the broader region, it becomes apparent that the

11 This definition draws on William R. Thompson, “Delineating Regional Subsystems:

Visit Networks and the Middle Eastern Case,” International Journal of Middle East Studies
13, no. 2 (May 1981): 213–35, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020743800055306.
12 See e.g., F. Gregory Gause, “Systemic Approaches to Middle East International

Relations,” International Studies Review 1, no. 1 (June 1999): 11–31, https://doi.

org/10.1111/1521-9488.00139.
13 Louise J. Cantore and Steven L. Spiegel, The International Politics of Regions: A

Comparative Approach (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1970).

14 Russett, International Regions and the International System.
 1  INTRODUCTION: THE REGIONAL ORDER …  9

patterns of interstate and non-state militant actors form a regional system

in and of itself. Events such as the Jasmine Spring in Tunisia, the Syrian
and Yemeni civil wars, and the uprisings in Sudan and Algeria show com-
monalities between countries from different subregions of the Middle
East and have wider implications not just for domestic politics but also for
the wider region beyond the individual countries directly involved.
How can we analyze a regional system? A regional system can be
studied (1) in term of its order (i.e., its distribution of power), which
contains a set of systemic alliances (i.e., subsystems); (2) in terms of its
patterns of regional dynamics and political processes (its security and
foreign response options and behaviors); and (3) in terms of its trans-
national causes.15 Note that ideas, ideologies, and normative beliefs, as
well as national narratives, are foundational for transnational causes. As
suggested above, these clusters of factors reflect an explanation of the
regional system that combines the interplay between material power
and the immaterial power of ideas and causes, in addition to domestic
influences. These clusters of factors also inform the internal/external
dynamics of the regional system. The following paragraphs attempt to
explain these three mentioned dimensions.
The first dimension is the regional order (structure) that may corre-
spond to the whole region (unipolar/hegemon), to two alliance subsys-
tems (bipolar), to three power blocs (tripolar), or to four and more power
subsystems (multipolar). The regional order of a regional system is made
up of its systemic units: state and non-state militant actors, and the inter-
active relations they conduct within and between each other (e.g., secu-
rity cooperation and engagement, alienation, polarization, rivalry, conflict,
and war, as well as ideational balancing) in the context of alignments,
arrangements, or webs of partnerships. These types of regional relations
include both collaborative and non-collaborative interactions, and irregu-
larities as well as regularities in interactive patterns between actors.16
The second explanatory dimension of the regional level of anal-
ysis tackles the patterns of regional dynamics and political processes in

15 Tareq Y. Ismael, International Relations of the Contemporary Middle East: A Study in

World Politics, Contemporary Issues in the Middle East (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University
Press, 1986), 41–42.
16 James Piscatori and R. K. Ramazani, “The Middle East,” in Comparative Regional

Systems: West and East Europe, North America, the Middle East, and Developing Countries,
ed. Werner J. Feld (New York; Oxford: Pergamon, 1980), 296.
10  P. O. AMOUR

a regional system. These depend largely on the characteristics of the

regional order (e.g., the dominant political cultures, the set of ideas
and narratives in the region, and the degree of its regionalization),
the regime type of the principal state actors (e.g., authoritarian politi-
cal structures likely result in proactive and assertive actions), the ideas
and normative beliefs of the decision-makers, and the policy attitudes
and responses of international great powers toward regional dynamics.
A regional system can be impermanent and deceptive in outward appear-
ance; it changes either through regional integration or due to regional
eruption.
The third explanatory dimension of the regional level of analysis
includes ideas, ideologies, national narratives, and transnational causes.
By ideas, I refer to the abstract concepts (e.g., identity, anarchy) or
mental imagery of how things stand (e.g., Iran or the KSA as a regional
hegemon). By ideology, I mean a set of ideas (e.g., democracy, com-
munism) and normative beliefs (e.g., preferences, in the form of looked-
for and good or objectionable and bad). By narratives, I refer to a state’s
distinctive perception, understanding, and representation of the national
self and of other states, domestically as well as externally. By causes, I
refer to affairs of transnational importance with mobilization effects
internally and across borders. Transnational causes with r­egion-wide
implications influence and shape regional events and, as a result, the for-
mation or deformation of alliances and power centers, as well as shifts
across the regional system as a whole. Transnational causes, such as the
Arab–Israeli conflict, the Arab–Arab Cold War, the KSA–Iran rivalry,
the Sunni–Shi’ polarization, and the first and second Arab Spring move-
ments, have impacted the formation of regional subsystems and altered
the regional system in the Gulf Region and the broader Middle East in
the aftermath of regional developments.
Power dynamics in the form of alliances, regional rivalry, and politi-
cal processes, as well as the ideas and ideologies of involved individuals,
deeply influence and shape national narratives and transnational causes.
Relatedly, the three-dimensional relationships present in the regional sys-
tem engage both internal and external aspects in their wake.
As mentioned above, systemic units include state actors and ­non-state
militant actors. A regional system consists of at least two or more
 1  INTRODUCTION: THE REGIONAL ORDER …  11

systemic units.17 State actors and non-state militant actors create and
form a regional system or a subsystem; however, this creation oscillates
back and forth and molds systemic units as well.
There are costs and benefits to having bigness (i.e., power in its natu-
ral, tangible, and intangible forms described in the next subsection) and
there is a strong temptation to gather still more power. In an author-
itarian regional system, such as the broader Middle East, even with
power one cannot be completely secure; therefore, regional great pow-
ers attempt to build alliances (i.e., subsystems) with other states and
­non-state militant actors in order to balance other regional great powers.
Regional great powers learn to manage their authority within their pole,
and they expect less powerful actors to submit across their subsystem.
Less powerful states and non-state militant actors are usually bullied into
submission in one way or another. The distribution of power within a
subsystem encourages a less powerful systemic actor to follow the more
powerful actor or to balance vis-à-vis (e.g., to get on the bandwagon
with) a regional great power, to protect itself from the arbitrariness of a
higher power.
The next section reflects on the concept of power projection capabil-
ities that shape the way state and non-state militant actors can translate
their influence in and across the regional system.

Power Projection Capabilities

As suggested above, the regional system involves state and non-state
militant actors, which exist and interact (or not) with one another in dif-
ferent forms. The structure of the regional system may show ­different
forms of polarity: a hegemon or a number of regional great powers in
a power alliance. In an authoritarian regional system, among other sys-
tems, the value of power prevails; hence, the might of a state or n ­ on-
state militant actor is basic to its endurance, survival, and consolidation
of power or bid for further power, as well as in providing assurances to
its allies. In their different forms, as described below, power projection
capabilities enable a systemic unit to influence and shape the regional sys-
tem, to tackle other coexisting rival subsystems within the same regional

17 Ismael, International Relations of the Contemporary Middle East, 41–42.

12  P. O. AMOUR

system, and to impose national narratives and similar-minded causes in

and across the regional system.
There are distinctive aspects to the awareness and measurement of
power: the natural, tangible, and intangible aspects.18 The natural source
of power arises from a country’s location, its geography, and its popula-
tion size. Large population and territorial sizes are generally translated
into a larger army and a many-sided economy in times of peace and war.
These resources empower related state and non-state militant actors to
counter, assert, or exercise real or potential force with respect to other
systemic actors.19 The sources of power for the Middle East countries are
listed in Table 1.1, which shows the wide variations in sources of both
natural and tangible power among the countries. These variations and
their implications are discussed further in Chapter 14.
The notion of the tangible source of power pays more attention to
human agency than to population size, and to military technology and
arsenal advancements rather than to the size of military sector. It also
emphasizes industrial progress and economic strength as crucial elements
of this power measurement. Hence, the stronger a state or ­non-state
actor’s economy and the more developed its industry, the more the
state or non-state actor can sustain and expand its domestic progress
and regional position vis-à-vis its rivals in times of peace and conflict.
According to this approach, power comes from the knowhow to translate
a power source into capability to control strategic events and outcomes.
If the natural source of power is largely predetermined (e.g., the geo-
graphical location) the tangible source of power needs work to acquire
and thus it can take a long time to do so.
To understand the scope of power, we need to consider the intangi-
ble source of power, which captures further forms of power, such as soft
power and public diplomacy.20 While the former two sources of power
(natural and tangible power) involve material aspects (e.g., troops, tanks,
aircraft, missiles, and nuclear weapons), intangible sources of power
underline immaterial capabilities, such as ideas, ideologies, information,

18 Karen A. Mingst and Ivan M. Arreguín-Toft, Essentials of International Relations, 6th

ed. (New York: W. W. Norton, 2014), 140–46.

19 Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, International Relations Theory, 5th ed. (Boston:

Longman, 2012).
20 Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public

Affairs, 2004).
Table 1.1  Statistical data on sources of power for countries in the Gulf Region and broader Middle East

Country Land area Total population Urban popula- GDP per capita Literacy rate, Armed forces Military
(km2) 2018 2018 tion (% of total) current US$ adult total (% personnel, total expenditure
2018 2018 of people ages 15 2017 (current USD)
and above)

Algeria 2,381,740.0 42,228,429 73 4278.9 75 317,000 9,583,724.29

Bahrain 778.0 1,569,439 89 24,050.8 95 19,000 1,396,808.51
Egypt 995,450.0 98,423,595 43 2549.1 75 836,000 3,109,997.89
Iran 1,628,760.0 81,800,269 75 5627.7 86 563,000 13,194,151.14
Iraq 434,128.0 38,433,600 70 5878.0 44 209,000 6,317,977.15
Israel 21,640.0 8,883,800 92 41,614.0 92 178,000 15,946,788.60
Kuwait 17,820.0 4,137,309 100 34,244.0 96 25,000 7,296,266.53
KSA 2,149,690.0 33,699,947 84 23,219.1 94 252,000 67,554,666.67
Qatar 11,610.0 2,781,677 99 69,026.5 93 22,000 1,876,758.24
Libya 1,759,540.0 6,678,567 80 7235.0 86 n.a. 3,755,658.60
Morocco 446,300.0 36,029,138 62 3237.9 69 246,000 3,696,856.94
Syria 183,630.0 16,906,283 54 2032.6 81 239,000 2,494,887.48
Turkey 769,630.0 82,319,724 75 9311.4 96 512,000 18,967,113.03
UAE 71,020.0 9,630,959 87 43,004.9 90 63,000 22,755,071.48
Yemen 527,970.0 28,498,687 37 944.4 54 40,000 1,714,830.84

Source World Bank.org; World Development Indicators. Data for literacy rate and military expenditure are from different years
1  INTRODUCTION: THE REGIONAL ORDER … 
13
14  P. O. AMOUR

images, intellectual property, entertainment, and media. One major aim

of soft power is to polish the state actor’s or non-state actor’s brand
(i.e., reputation) abroad, as well as to place the nation/community in a
good position politically, diplomatically, economically, and ecologically.
Therefore, other systemic actors will cooperate, engage, and eventually
enter alliances, or refrain from confrontation, with the actor, while for-
eign constituencies and elites will show understanding or even support
for the actor’s regional course.
Systemic actors with power projection capabilities promote their com-
munications technology and informational infrastructure in order to
reach and target foreign audiences, including elites. A systemic actor with
immaterial projection capabilities could translate its communications and
information infrastructure into political and ideational power across the
region in order to support its normative principles (i.e., national narra-
tives and causes) and foreign policies. It could do this, for example, by
transforming national narratives and like-minded pan-causes across the
region, by manipulating existing ones, or by altering the importance
of competitive and rival narratives and regional causes. Regional great
powers in the Gulf Region and the broad Middle East dominate infor-
mation and communications infrastructure; they target their foreign con-
stituencies intentionally.
The tangible source of power is much easier to quantify and meas-
ure than the other two sources of power. It is better suited to present,
defend, and guarantee a state’s national objectives across the regional sys-
tem. Intangible power has been gaining importance and growing in use
by state and non-state actors since the turn of the twenty-first century.
Natural source of power has lost importance since WWII; hence, states
with little natural source power have demonstrated the ability and kno-
whow to develop power capabilities beyond or despite their modest nat-
ural resources. Israel is the classical example, in the broader Middle East.
When soft and material power approaches are married, a “smart
power” strategy develops through the connection of military force (or
the threat of it) with the soft power of persuasion, seduction, attrac-
tion, or manipulation. The level and scope of employment of a specific
source of power or a mix of them depends on domestic influences, the
 1  INTRODUCTION: THE REGIONAL ORDER …  15

leadership in charge, and the set of ideas and ideologies concerned, as

well as the given balance of power.21
Power projection capabilities are understood in this book to repre-
sent the ability of a state or non-state actor to exercise all or some of its
sources of power (e.g., military, economic, diplomatic, and ideational/
informational) across the regional system in order to keep its regional
influence in its material and immaterial forms, to retain the confidence of
allies, to contribute to the prevention and containment of rivals, and to
have the might to react to regional dynamics. Chapter 14 gives further
theoretical and empirical insights into the concept of the regional system
and power projection capabilities.

The Organization of the Book

The aim of this book is to explain the regional system in the Gulf Region
and broader Middle East in terms of its order (the major interstate alli-
ances involved, the proactive state actors and non-state militant actors);
its political processes (e.g., security cooperation and engagement, rivalry,
and conflict) in the form of alliance building, persistence, and disinte-
gration; and the underlying ideas and transnational causes. While several
chapters focus on the aftermath of the Arab Spring movement, some
chapters go back in history to the twentieth century to reflect on earlier
stages in order to clarify their focus.
My objective as the editor of this book was not to solicit contribu-
tions according to a circumscribed conceptual design. Instead, I asked
the contributors to consider a combination of the above-mentioned clus-
ters of factors in relation to the regional level of analysis, while still giv-
ing them flexibility regarding the conceptual structure of their chapter.
In doing this my aim was to encourage thematic coherency, while still
allowing innovative analysis. The outcome is a collection of conceptually
similar chapters, rich in empirical inclusion, that visualize the regional
system, which is otherwise a theoretical construct of a complicated real-
ity. The respective chapters offer supplementary and complementary
analyses of the regional system across the broader Middle East from
different perspectives.

21 Joseph S. Nye, The Future of Power (New York: Public Affairs, 2012).
16  P. O. AMOUR

The following outline shows that not all contributors deliver the same
level of intertwined interpretation of the interrelation of material power
factors, ideational factors, and domestic influences. Thus, this book is
best seen as a contribution to the interplay of a combination of a clus-
ter of factors on the regional system in the Gulf Region and the broader
Middle East rather than a definitive analysis. We hope it will kindle fruit-
ful research into the interplay of factorial clusters at the regional level of
analysis that shape and form regional dynamics.
Part I of this book deals with the regional system in general; it exam-
ines the evolution and policies of the major subsystems in the broader
Middle East, in addition to their ideational set and transnational affairs.
It starts with Dihstelhoff and Lohse’s chapter (Political Islam as an
Ordering Factor? The Reconfiguration of the Regional Order in the
Middle East Since the Arab Spring). The authors analyze two oppos-
ing regional alliances in terms of their ideational positions and norma-
tive beliefs toward the movements of Political Islam since 2010. They
demonstrate that regional great powers in the Gulf Region and the
broader Middle East have colliding normative beliefs regarding the rise
of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) as either a systemic opportunity (e.g.,
Turkey and Qatar) or a security threat (e.g., the KSA and the UAE).
The pro-Muslim-Brotherhood bloc is ideationally similar to the Arab
Spring revolutionary forces and thus regarded the first Arab Spring
movement and the rise of the MB to states’ leadership as a systemic
opportunity. Qatar understood the emergence of Political Islam as a stra-
tegic possibility to gain different allies in the region in order to become
independent from neighboring powers. Turkey, too, saw in the regional
dynamics an opportunity to ally itself with Tunisia, Egypt, and other
revolutionary leaderships promoted by the first Arab Spring movement.
Neither Turkey nor Qatar regard the MB as a threat. The MB branch in
Qatar officially dissolved itself in the 1990s and still lacks a branch there
despite the political mobilization of the Arab Spring. Turkey, a ­non-Arab
state with a long tradition of political activism, saw no threat in the
emergence of the MB. Surviving under authoritarian rule, the MB across
the broader region felt ideologically and empirically somewhat attracted
to the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) that had won legis-
lative elections and was regarded as a ruling model for good governance
and for the conformity of Islam and democracy in the region.
This pro-Muslim-Brotherhood bloc has stood in opposition to the
anti-Muslim-Brotherhood bloc led by the KSA and UAE, as well as
 1  INTRODUCTION: THE REGIONAL ORDER …  17

Egypt, since the 2013 Egyptian coup d’état. The KSA/UAE-led power
bloc regards the MB and its ideological affiliates as a threat to their
domestic hold on power and to their regional might. They were likely
also concerned that the new unfolding subsystem (i.e., the pro-MB bloc)
in the region would result in an integration of Iran or a closer connec-
tion with the Iran-led conservative-resistance subsystem (explored in
Chapter 4). For the anti-Muslim-Brotherhood bloc, the similar ideologi-
cal roots of Sunni Political Islam represented in the MB and Shi’ Political
Islam in the Islamic revolution would make alliance building of both
power blocs more likely.
Besides ideological explanations, the authors in Chapter 2 point to
geopolitical pressures and domestic influences regarding threat percep-
tions within the anti-MB bloc. Dihstelhoff and Lohse argue that not
all principal states have the same threat perception urgency toward the
MB, Iran, and the Islamic State (IS). According to the authors, the KSA
appears to prioritize the threat of Iran and IS, while UAE and Egypt
seem to have set their security priorities on the MB. The authors explain
that this difference in prioritization is due to the geostrategic threats
of Iran and IS against the KSA, while domestic influences appear to be
more prevalent in the case of Egypt and UAE. The pro-MB bloc wit-
nessed setbacks after the military coup in Egypt in July 2013 and in
Sudan in April 2019. Tunisia also reestablished its ties with the anti-MB
bloc. So far, Turkey and Qatar have stuck to their commitment to back
up movements of Political Islam.
Chapter 3 (Gulfization of the Middle East Security Complex) is written
by Amr Yossef, who underlines the distribution of power dynamics, inter-
nal/external pressures, and subregional ideational preferences. Amr Yossef
marks in his chapter a systemic shift of the regional system in terms of its
power center. The Levant had been the heart of the regional system in the
broader Middle East due to its politicizing and mobilizing transnational
cross-border causes; however, subregional concerns and actions in and ema-
nating from the Gulf Region outward since 2014 have shifted the center of
the regional system to the Gulf. While the Arab–Israeli conflict dominated
regional affairs after 1948, Gulf affairs have gained increasing importance
since 2011. Moreover, a perceived US abandonment of Gulf affairs during
the Obama administration has pushed the KSA/UAE-led subsystem to pur-
sue a proactive and assertive foreign policy and project its power capabilities
through the region (e.g., in Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon, among others).
18  P. O. AMOUR

This new policy approach has been underlined by volatile security and
ideational threats from the IS, MB, and Iran. The rise of the novel power
bloc led by Turkey and Qatar (discussed in Chapter 5) has most likely
contributed to a shift in the policy attitudes and actions of the KSA and
UAE. The ascension of King Salman to the throne of Saudi Arabia, as
an example of domestic influences, along with his current crown prince,
have most likely contributed to this alteration in regional policy.
Chapter 4 (The Conservative-Resistance Camp: The Axis of
Resistance) by Ana Belén Soage pays attention to the Iran-led subsys-
tem encompassing Syria, Hezbollah, and non-state militant actors (such
as the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement [Hamas], the Palestinian
Islamic Jihad [PIJ], the pro-Iranian militias in Iraq, and, likely, the
Houthi movement in Yemen). Like the authors of previous chapters
in this book, Soage argues that strategic calculations (e.g., a common
enemy), and specific ideational/ideological underpinnings bind these
state and non-state militant actors together. The Iran–Iraq Gulf War, civil
war in Lebanon, and the Palestinian Intifadas are examples of binding
and unifying events among principal actors in this subsystem. Note that
these regional events correspond to transnational causes, so they increase
the public support and legitimacy of these subsystemic actors among
foreign audiences and elites across the Gulf Region and broader Middle
East. Soage demonstrates how the Syrian Civil War has altered this trans-
national brand of the long-seated regional subsystems and how it has
provided different systemic actors with opportunities to improve their
guerrilla and militant capabilities. Moreover, the chapter delivers com-
plementary insights to previous chapters regarding ideological/doctrinal
roots of Shiite Political Islam and Sunni Political Islam.
Chapter 5 (Emergence of the Turkish/Qatari Alliance in the Middle
East: Making of the Moderate-Resistance Bloc) introduces the rise of
the most recent regional subsystem led by Turkey and Qatar, including
transition countries that are or have been run by political parties with
Islamist inheritance that entered government because of the changes
brought about by the first Arab Spring movement.22 Nuri Yeşilyurt

22 See more in this regard Philipp O. Amour, “Revolutionary Changes, Power Dynamics,

and Regional Rivalries since the Arab Spring: An Introduction,” in The Middle East
Reloaded: Revolutionary Changes, Power Dynamics, and Regional Rivalries since the Arab
Spring, ed. Philipp O. Amour, St. James’s Studies in World Affairs (Washington, DC:
Academica Press, 2018), 1–21.
 1  INTRODUCTION: THE REGIONAL ORDER …  19

and Mustafa Yetim argue that while this Turkish–Qatari alliance has
suffered setbacks since 2013/2014, it still stands and conducts dif-
ferent regional policies in comparison to the other long-established
KSA/UAE-led and Iran-led subsystems. Yeşilyurt and Yetim call the
third subsystem a “moderate-resistance” bloc; hence, they believe it fea-
tures a set of ideas and normative beliefs, as well as foreign policy orien-
tations and behaviors that intersect both these ­long-settled subsystems
at various points. This is likely one reason, among others, why the long-
established subsystems are cautious toward the new Turkey/Qatar led
alliance. The various security alliances in the broader Middle East are
listed in Table 14.1 in Chapter 14.
Part II of this book covers specific state actors (Turkey, Qatar, and
Israel) and non-state militant actors (Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces
[PMF], Syria’s Democratic Union Party [PYD], and the Islamic State).
The respective chapters illuminate how these state and non-state actors
have attempted to assert their regional position and to counter rivals
with the help of hard power and soft power strategies that included
military actions, military base expansion, developmental and organiza-
tional actions, and ideological projection. The cases here are illustrative
for state and non-state militant actors in the region, but are not exhaus-
tive. While the ideational position, policy attitudes, and systemic place
of important countries (e.g., the KSA) and non-state militant actors
(e.g., Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthi movement) are explored in
Part I of this book, some countries, like Egypt and UAE, require further
attention.23
Chapters 6 and 7 deal with Turkey and Qatar, respectively. Both
chapters demonstrate how complex regional dynamics since 2011 have
moved both countries to abandon their foreign policies of zero problems
with neighbors and strategic policy hedging.
Chapter 6 (Expanding the Turkish Bid for Regional Control in the
Somali Regional Security Complexes) explores Turkey’s humanitarian

23 The role of Egypt in the interstate system in the Middle East is largely explored. See

e.g., Mustafa El-Labbad, “Egypt: A ‘Regional Reference’ in the Middle East,” in Regional
Powers in the Middle East: New Constellations after the Arab Revolts, ed. Henner Fürtig,
2014, 81–99; For UAE see e.g., Rosa Vane, “Employing Militarization as a Means of
Maintaining the ‘Ruling Bargain’: The Case of the United Arab Emirates,” in The Middle
East Reloaded: Revolutionary Changes, Power Dynamics, and Regional Rivalries since the
Arab Spring, ed. Philipp O. Amour, St. James’s Studies in World Affairs (Washington, DC:
Academica Press, 2018), 225–83.
20  P. O. AMOUR

and soft power engagement with the Federal Republic of Somalia.

Stephanie Carver demonstrates how soft power empowered Ankara to
brand a transnational humanist identity for Turkey across the broader
Middle East. One rationale of this foreign policy was the diversifica-
tion of Turkey’s economy, the ability to project power and influence in
the Horn of Africa (i.e., with a military base), and the extension of its
security terrain on the edge of the broader Middle East. The chapter
explicitly or implicitly underlines domestic influences and ideational pref-
erences of the leadership, in addition to status ambitions as explanations
for Turkish foreign policy in the Horn of Africa.
Chapter 7 (Qatar’s Calculated Gamble on the Syrian Muslim
Brotherhood) examines Qatar’s regional policy and its positioning
toward the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria (SMB). Hanlie Booysen con-
cludes that Doha’s support of the MB in Syria and Egypt is not rooted
solely in doctrinal/ideological motivations, but also has the strategic
aim of enhancing Qatar’s regional position across the broader Middle
East through alliance building. By doing so, Qatar can leverage its type
of power and gain foreign policy independence vis-à-vis neighboring
higher powers in the Gulf Region. Chapter 7 also gives hints regarding
the roots of suspicion and points of conflict between Qatar ­vis-à-vis the
KSA and Bahrain.
In Chapter 8 ((Un)Limited Force: Regional Realignments, Israeli
Operations, and the Security of Gaza), Colter Louwerse exam-
ines Tel Aviv’s policy and its use of force against Gaza in the context
of Operation Pillar of Defense (2012) and Operation Protective Edge
(2014). Louwerse demonstrates that regional dynamics since 2013 have
brought about strategic advantages for Israel vis-à-vis the Palestinians
in both the regional and international contexts. He demonstrates how
the most important constraints on Israel’s overuse of power against the
Palestinians have declined since then. The conservative-resistance bloc,
known for its support of non-state militant actors (Hamas and Islamic
Jihad, among others) and for the Palestinian cause, has been busy with
domestic uprisings, civil/proxy wars, and national crises. Israel’s rap-
prochement with the conservative-moderate bloc, in addition to having
the unprecedented support of the Trump administration, have decreased
deterrence of Israel’s over-actions. The author uses developments since
the first Arab Spring movements to explain the extent and scope of the
Israeli military operations against Gaza. While the international system
matters, it becomes apparent in this chapter that it is the regional shift
 1  INTRODUCTION: THE REGIONAL ORDER …  21

in transnational affairs and overhauls of priorities that have enabled Tel

Aviv’s excessive use of force against Gaza.
Part II of this book includes two chapters dealing with non-state
militant actors—Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), Syria’s
Democratic Union Party (PYD), and the Islamic State. To fully under-
stand the range of regional politics unfolding across the Gulf Region
and broader Middle East since 2011, an examination of non-state mil-
itant actors is essential. Non-state militant actors are not a novelty in
the region. However, these systemic units have recently become major
players in regional politics operating across state boundaries and are now
challenging the foundations of the regional system in the Gulf Region
and the broader Middle East. These non-state militant actors (in addi-
tion to Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthi movement, which are
explored in Part I of this book) are the most vigorous players on the
ground and their regional importance is increasing.
Chapter 9 (The Evolution of Iraq’s Hashd al-Sha’abi) surveys Iraq’s
PMF, a Shi’ militia supported by Iran and primarily operating in Iraq
and Syria. Zana Gulmohamad divides groups within the PMF accord-
ing to their ideational affiliation and benefactors. Like Hezbollah, the
PMF is part of the conservative-resistance subsystem (see Table 14.1 in
Chapter 14). The PMF is an umbrella of different (Shi’) groups, so Zana
Gulmohamad examines the group’s ideological roots and their domes-
tic and regional objectives. He demonstrates how the pro-Iranian militias
within the PMF contributed to the power projection capabilities of Iran,
not just in Iraq but in other areas of the region.
Chapter 10 (Between the PYD and the Islamic State: The Complex
Role of Non-state Actors in Syria) explores the Kurdish Democratic
Union Party and IS as non-state violent actors that had ambitions for
autonomy at different levels. The Islamic State attempted to set up an
actual state, while the PYD was allegedly pursuing an autonomous
region. Both examples indicate the increasing role of non-state militant
actors in Syria and in the broader Middle East, whose actions in consol-
idating territories under their control and establishing quasi-state enti-
ties with a considerable organizational capacity go beyond the scope and
extent of a conventional non-state militant actor.
Part I and Part II of this book demonstrate, collectively, that the
regional system in the Gulf Region and broader Middle East rests on
the interrelation of power dynamics and ideational and transnational
cause-based aspects, in addition to domestic influences. All of these
­
22  P. O. AMOUR

factors interweave to influence and form the policies of the relevant sys-
temic state actors and non-state militant actors.
Part III of the book deals with Russia and ecological factors. Great
powers (e.g., France, the UK, Soviet Union/Russia, and the USA) have
intimately influenced and continue to influence the development of the
regional system and its actors’ sets of ideas, ideologies, and normative
beliefs, as well as policy choices and strategic behaviors for factors relat-
ing to their dependence on natural resources (e.g., gas, oil), interests in
geopolitics (of the Middle East as a major junction of trade routes such
as the Bab Al-Mandeb, Gulf of Aqaba, the Gulf, the Straits of Hormuz,
and Suez Canal) and balance of power politics. As industrial states con-
tinue their development (and preeminence in related affairs), energy
resources are one of their most crucial assets.
Controlling the supply of energy resources and guaranteeing this sup-
ply at affordable prices are elementary for the continuity of these states’
supreme power and wealth. The external presence of major global pow-
ers in the Gulf Region and broader Middle East finds its articulation in
the form of soft power projective programs and cooperative monetary
relief, security, intelligence, economic cooperation, and engagement, in
addition to military intervention.
This part of the book includes chapters on Russia and on environ-
mental factors. Various chapters in this book address the impact of the
USA on regional politics; however, no chapter focuses exclusively on the
USA’s role in the region.24
Efe Can Gürcan’s analysis in Chapter 11 (Domestic and External
Factors in the Syrian Conflict: Toward a Multicausal Explanation)
explores the underlying issues of the Syrian uprising and the subsequent
civil war. Gürcan demonstrates how failed political-economic policies and
inadequate environmental policies contributed to the Syrian uprising and
how these domestic factors made the Syrian regime more vulnerable to
external interference motivated by geopolitical energy security and the

24 For the USA see e.g., Shahram Akbarzadeh and Kylie Baxter, Middle East Politics and

International Relations: Crisis Zone (London; New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis
Group, 2018), 117–64; Raymond Hinnebusch, The International Politics of the Middle
East, 2nd ed. (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2015), 225–71; and Flynt
Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett, “The United States, Iran and the Middle East’s New
‘Cold War,’” The International Spectator 45, no. 1 (March 2010): 75–87, https://doi.
org/10.1080/03932721003661624.
 1  INTRODUCTION: THE REGIONAL ORDER …  23

politics of balance of power. The author examines energy policies of spe-

cific (regional) great powers to explain their foreign policies in Syria.
Chapter 12 (Lending an “Old Friend” a Hand: Why Does Russia
Back Syria?) attempts to explain Russia’s involvement in Syria as arising
power from a combination of different factors. Umut Bekcan and Pınar
Uz Hançarli conclude that Russia’s policy behavior in the Syrian conflict
and its backing of the Syrian regime overlaps with its self-perception as
a reemerging global superpower. With this perception, Russia has been
unwilling to watch US/Western interventionism in the region in silence.
Moreover, Russia’s involvement in the Syrian conflict harmonized with
domestic influences, including the mindset and normative beliefs of
Vladimir Putin, as well as Russia’s economic and political objectives
of upholding a long-established ally and maintaining its naval base in
Tartus, which gives Russia access to the Mediterranean for commercial
and strategic purposes.
In Chapter 13 (Contribution of Water Scarcity and Sustainability
Failures to Disintegration and Conflict in the Arab Region) Mohammad
Al-Saidi looks at of the issues of water scarcity and sustainability failures
(in Syria and Yemen) and shows how these environmental factors con-
tribute to domestic disintegration and regional conflicts.
The chapters in Part III deliver two particular insights: one is that
regional powers are also driven by energy and natural resources motives
while pursuing their security and foreign policy in Syria and across the
region. The second is that ecological factors and natural resources con-
tribute to explain regional politics and interstate affairs. While the effects
appear at the state level, their implications extend beyond state borders
and are thus relevant to neighboring countries. Readers may wonder
if, and to what level, political leaderships are fully aware of the eco-
logical factors and their importance for domestic stability and regime
survival.
The final chapter (Regional Rivalries and Security Alliances in the
Gulf Region and the Middle East) by Philipp O. Amour synthesizes
the major arguments in this book, while delivering further theoretical
and empirical insights. Chapter 14 also discusses potential future devel-
opments in the regional system in the Gulf Region and the broader
Middle East.
24  P. O. AMOUR

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 PART I

Security Alliances in the Gulf Region

and the Middle East
 CHAPTER 2

Political Islam as an Ordering Factor?

The Reconfiguration of the Regional Order
in the Middle East Since the “Arab Spring”

Julius Dihstelhoff and Alexander Lohse

Introduction
The upheavals of 2010/11, which are known as the Arab Spring, caused
far-reaching reconfigurations not only on a national level, but also on a
regional level, in the Gulf Region and the broader Middle East. State
and non-state militant actors alike had to review their logic of action, as
they were confronted with new national and regional challenges. The
Gulf War of 2003 had already removed Iraq from the regional balance of
power equation, giving Iran, in particular, new opportunities to spread
its influence in neighboring Arab countries. In 2011, Syria’s and Egypt’s
roles in the Middle East were diminished because of national upheavals.
Today, Syria remains weakened regionally. Egypt still has an ability to
project both hard and soft power across the region; however, since 2013,

J. Dihstelhoff (*) · A. Lohse 
Department of Near and Middle Eastern Politics, Centre for Near
and Middle Eastern Studies (CNMS), Marburg, Germany
e-mail: julius.dihstelhoff@uni-marburg.de
J. Dihstelhoff · A. Lohse 
Institute of Political Science, Philipps University Marburg, Marburg, Germany

© The Author(s) 2020 29

P. O. Amour (ed.), The Regional Order in the Gulf Region
and the Middle East, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45465-4_2
30  J. DIHSTELHOFF AND A. LOHSE

the regime is largely occupied with domestic challenges of stability and

economic transition. In addition, new non-state militant actors, such as
ISIS, have further eroded the established post-colonial Sykes-Picot order
by negating the existing borders.
In regional processes since 2010, the actors of Political Islam not
only had to review their own political conceptions, but they were also
a point of reference for regional powers, such as the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia (KSA), the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Turkey, and Qatar.
Therefore, Political Islam has become a major factor in the reconfigura-
tion of the regional system since 2011. The growing influence of move-
ments of Political Islam, which began well before 2010 but gained new
momentum through the Arab spring movement, continued to polar-
ize the societies and states in the Gulf Region and the broader Middle
East. By serving as a shared perceived threat or a shared perceived
power option, Political Islam strongly influenced the formation and
strengthening of new alliances at the regional level. It played an impor-
tant role in the domestic power negotiations in several Arab countries
(e.g., Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, and Tunisia), as well as in the civil wars
in Libya, Syria, and Yemen. The actors of Political Islam—and espe-
cially the national Muslim Brotherhood (MB) branches (e.g., in Egypt
and Syria), as well as ideologically associated organizations that share
common ideological references but are not formally linked to the MB
network (e.g., the Tunisian Ennahda or the Moroccan Party for Justice
and Development)—have a role as subjects and objects of international
politics with a wide conflictive reach. On the one hand, these actors are
involved in the restructuring of the region. On the other hand, they are
made into a political issue by the interest policies of the abovementioned
regional powers.
The aim of this chapter is to examine the transnational phenom-
enon of Political Islam as an influencing factor for the foreign policies
of selected regional powers, specifically the KSA, the UAE, Turkey, and
Qatar, as well as for the power relations in the region. Two key questions
will be the focus of this chapter. First, to what extent are the foreign pol-
icies of these countries determined by their orientation toward Political
Islam? Second, what effects does this orientation toward Political Islam
have on regional processes of alliance formation and lines of conflict that
shape the regional order?
We therefore start by introducing the phenomenon of Political Islam
and its relevance for the Gulf Region and the broader Middle East.
 2  POLITICAL ISLAM AS AN ORDERING FACTOR …  31

On this basis, we analyze the role of Political Islam for the formation of
new regional axes and compare the strategies deployed by the four men-
tioned states facing Political Islam. Depending on the developments in
the region, these different strategies contribute to processes of alliance
formation that have continued to shape the regional order since 2010.
The empirical basis for our analysis lies in an evaluation of
various written documents, such as scientific analyses related to the chap-
ter’s topic and statements by foreign policy decision-makers of the four
regional powers, as well as interviews conducted with German foreign
policy officials and representatives of the MB during field research in
Germany, other European states, and several Arab countries since 2012.

Development of Political Islam and Its Relevance

for the Region

In public debate, as well as in academia, the appellation Political Islam

is often used interchangeably with Islamism.1 However, as we define it
in this chapter, the term Political Islam refers to Islamic movements that
seek to reorganize political power relations and orders, whether through
reforms and gradual integration into the political system or through rev-
olutionary upheavals. The term Islamism, by contrast, is broader and
encompasses all socio-political ideologies that advocate social, economic,
political, and/or cultural change referring to Islam.2
Related references range from literal interpretations of religious texts
to the so-called aims and purposes of Sharia (Arab.: maqasid al-shari`a)
and individual core values of Islam—such as justice (`adala), charity
(ihsan), freedom (hurriya), the principle of mutual counseling (shura),
and mutual social responsibility (takaful)—up to general references to
Islam as a universal civilization.3 Sharia interpretations (and applications)
are also very diverse. While some actors are oriented toward traditional

1 John L. Esposito, ed., Political Islam: Revolution, Radicalism, or Reform? (Boulder,

CO: Rienner, 1997); Graham E. Fuller, The Future of Political Islam (New York: Palgrave
MacMillan, 2003); and Olivier Roy, The Failure of Political Islam (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1994).
2 Asef Bayat, Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn

(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), 7–9.

3 Joel Beinin and Joe Stork, eds., Political Islam: Essays from Middle East Report

(London: Tauris, 1997), 73–75.

32  J. DIHSTELHOFF AND A. LOHSE

schools of law, others demand a reinterpretation of Islamic law in the

context of modernity. Although most Islamist ideologists claim a con-
nection between religion and state (din wa daula), not all Islamic
movements seek power participation.4
The spectrum of Political Islam shows a variety of currents. Apart
from political Salafists,5 who are strictly oriented toward religious sources
and the model of the ancestors (Salaf), their most prominent repre-
sentatives include the MB and the so-called Wasatiyya parties (transl.:
middle way/centered). As the oldest movement of Political Islam, the
national MB branches have founded political parties in many countries
of the Arab world.6 The Wasatiyya parties see themselves as parties of
the conservative, liberal center; they also have their ideological origin
in the MB.7 These parties include the Moroccan Party of Justice and
Development (PJD) and the Tunisian Ennahda.8
The movements of Political Islam have emerged in very different
historical, national, political, and cultural contexts. Above all, their for-
mation was a defensive reaction against the monopolization of power
by authoritarian postcolonial elites of the Arab states, which were and
are primarily nationalist and secular. Despite different national contexts,
their strength in the region results from the multitude of grievances
that accompanied the crises of postcolonial development models. These
continue to include high unemployment, a lack of social and political

4 John L. Esposito, Islam and Politics, 4th ed. (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press,

1998); Frédéric Volpi and Ewan Stein, “Islamism and the State after the Arab Uprisings:
Between People Power and State Power,” Democratization 22, no. 2 (2015): 276–93,
https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2015.1010811.
5 Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Anatomy of the Salafi Movement,” Studies in Conflict &

Terrorism 29, no. 3 (2006): 207–39, https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100500497004.

6 In Egypt the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), in Libya the Justice and Construction

Party (JCP), in Algeria the Mouvement de la Société pur la Paix (MSP), in Jordan the
Islamic Action Front Party (IAFP), in Syria the National Party for Justice and the
Constitutions (Waad), in Iraq the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP), in Iraqi-Kurdistan the
Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU), and in Kuwait the Constitutional Movement. In Yemen,
the Muslim Brotherhood participated in the creation of the Islah Party. In Palestine, the
local Muslim Brotherhood founded HAMAS as its arm of resistance.
7 Carrie R. Wickham, “The Path to Moderation: Strategy and Learning in the

Formation of Egypt’s Wasat Party,” Comparative Politics 36, no. 2 (2004), https://doi.
org/10.2307/4150143.
8 Carrie R. Wickham, The Muslim Brotherhood: Evolution of an Islamist Movement

(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013).

 2  POLITICAL ISLAM AS AN ORDERING FACTOR …  33

participation opportunities, and state corruption.9 Therefore, the move-

ments of Political Islam represent a diverse social clientele and have con-
siderable support and influence in Arab societies, often representing the
main force in national oppositions.10
In order to implement their regional and international agendas, the
movements of Political Islam also rely on international networks. This
is not only shown by transnational networks, which are composed of
various national organizations within specific currents of Political Islam
(e.g., the International Organization of the MB, based in London, or the
Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe, located in Brussels).11
International networking also occurs through informal alliance-building
processes with international actors. This includes informal networks with
supportive states, like Qatar and Turkey, with ideologically associated
organizations, such as the European Council for Fatwa and Research
(which was headed by Yusuf ­ al-Qaradawi until November 2018 and
included members such as Rachid Ghannouchi),12 and other figures of
similar disposition and purposes.13
Political Islam is not a new phenomenon, but is instead the result of
step-by-step transformations, both within its actors and due to exog-
enous factors of the different political systems of the Gulf Region and
the broader Middle East. As early as the 1980s, after the failure of rent-
seeking development models of secular-nationalist regimes, the actors of

9 Bayat, Making Islam Democratic, 6–9.

10 Isabelle Werenfels, “Vom Umgang mit Islamisten im Maghreb: Zwischen Einbindung
und Unterdrückung,” 39, SWP Studie (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft undPolitikGerman
Institute for International and Security Affairs, December 2005), https://www.swp-berlin.
org/fileadmin/contents/products/studien/2005_S39_wrf_ks.pdf.
11 Werenfels; Bérengère Massignon, “Islam in the European Commission’s System of

Regulation of Religion,” in Islam in Europe: Diversity, Identity and Influence, ed. Effie
Fokas and Aziz Al-Azmeh (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 125–48;
Johannes Grundmann, Islamische Internationalisten: Strukturen und Aktivitäten der
Muslimbruderschaft und der islamischen Weltliga. Aktuelle Debatte, vol. 2 (Wiesbaden:
Reichert, 2005).
12 Lorenzo Vidino, The New Muslim Brotherhood in the West (New York: Columbia

University Press, 2010), 72.

13 Lorenzo Vidino, “The European Organisation of the Muslim Brotherhood: Myth or

Reality?,” in The Muslim Brotherhood in Europe, ed. Bakker Baker and Roel Meijer (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 59.
34  J. DIHSTELHOFF AND A. LOHSE

Political Islam were able to mobilize a broader social stratum.14 In the

context of the Arab Spring movement, several political parties repre-
senting Political Islam, such as the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) in
Egypt, Ennahda in Tunisia, and the PJD in Morocco, obtained excel-
lent scores in elections in 2011. Recently, however, these actors have
faced significant setbacks, including the ouster of Egyptian President
Mohamed Morsi in July 2013 and the persecution of the MB as a ter-
rorist organization in Egypt (December 2013), the KSA (March 2014),
and the UAE (November 2014).15 Nevertheless, Political Islam still has
an impact on regional developments, as will be outlined in the following
sections.

Opposing Axes of Action Based on Political Islam

(2010–2013)
The political rise of actors of Political Islam since 2010 has furthered
competing foreign policies of regional powers. This section will show
that the competition between the regional powers resulted in two dif-
ferent reactions and strategies facing Political Islam, which in turn led
to the formation of two opposing axes. Strong ideologizations played a
role in the affiliation of the regional powers to these axes, in that Islamic
discourses were used both to justify rational interests in foreign policies
and to bring forward strategic considerations to weaken the opponent’s
axis.16
In the early stage of the first Arab Spring movement, an axis of actors
of Political Islam and its political allies was formed. This loose association

14 Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, “Islamic Mobilization and Political Change: The Islamist

Trend in Egypt’s Professional Associations,” in Political Islam: Essays from Middle East
Report, ed. Joel Beinin and Joe Stork (London: Tauris, 1997), 120–35.
15 May Darwich, “Creating the Enemy, Constructing the Threat: The Diffusion of

Repression against the Muslim Brotherhood in the Middle East,” Democratization 24,
no. 7 (2017): 1289–306, https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2017.1307824; Philipp O.
Amour, “Revolutionary Changes, Power Dynamics, and Regional Rivalries since the Arab
Spring: An Introduction,” in The Middle East Reloaded: Revolutionary Changes, Power
Dynamics, and Regional Rivalries since the Arab Spring, ed. Philipp O. Amour, St. James’s
Studies in World Affairs (Washington: Academica Press, 2018), 1–21.
16 Alexey Khlebnikov, “The New Ideological Threat to the GCC: Implications for the

Qatari-Saudi Rivalry,” Strategic Assessment 17, no. 4 (2015), http://www.inss.org.il/

wp-content/uploads/systemfiles/adkan17_4ENG_7_Khlebnikov.pdf.
 2  POLITICAL ISLAM AS AN ORDERING FACTOR …  35

consisted primarily of national MB movements and ideologically associ-

ated organizations, as well as their supporting states, namely Qatar and
Turkey. Neither Qatar nor Turkey understood the initial electoral suc-
cesses of the actors of Political Islam in the region as a threat, but they
instead viewed them as an opportunity to enhance their power positions
in the region.
Regarding Qatar, the Qatari MB was dissolved in the 1990s; there-
fore, a spread of Islamist activities within the country presented no
threat. Even before 2011, Qatar had been maintaining good relations
with different actors of Political Islam, which has always been an inte-
gral part of Qatar’s overall foreign policy strategy (see Chapter 7).17 In
the course of the Arab Spring movement, Qatar was concerned with the
historic opportunity to influence the reconfiguration of the region and
to further diversify its foreign policy (hedging), in order to expand its
position of power within the Middle East.18 In this context, Qatar relied
on Islamic-based political and economic cooperation with the successful
actors of Political Islam at the beginning of the Arab Spring movement.19
With Political Islam on the rise, Turkey also saw new opportunities
to expand its influence in regional politics.20 Turkey’s own interests
focused on strengthening relations with Egypt. This began after the fall
of Mubarak, as political and economic cooperation intensified, so that,
for example, a strategic cooperation council at the highest political level
was set up in September 2011.
In the context of this cooperation, government representatives rhetor-
ically referred to the joint moderate Islamist framework of the Turkish
Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Egyptian FJP as the basis

17 Khlebnikov; Linda Berger, “The Gulf Cooperation Council between Unity and

Discord towards the Arab Uprisings,” Sicherheit Und Frieden (S + F)/Security and Peace 32,
no. 4 (2014): 260–64.
18 Mehran Kamrava, Qatar: Small State, Big Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,

2013), https://doi.org/10.7591/j.ctt32b4qs.
19 Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, “Qatar and the Arab Spring: Policy Drivers and Regional

Implications” (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September

2014), https://carnegieendowment.org/files/qatar_arab_spring.pdf.
20 Joshua W. Walker, “Turkey’s Global Strategy: Introduction: The Sources of Turkish

Grand Strategy—‘Strategic Depth’ and ‘Zero- Problems’ in Context,” LSE IDEAS

(London: London School of Economics and Political Science, 2011), http://eprints.lse.
ac.uk/43495/1/Turkey%27s%20Global%20Strategy_introduction%28lsero%29.pdf.
36  J. DIHSTELHOFF AND A. LOHSE

for their cooperation.21 Turkey’s then-Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip

Erdoğan, wanted to make the Egyptian MB his strategic partner in the
Middle East, furthering Turkey’s regional interests and profile. The
Palestinian–Israeli conflict, in which Turkey had been very involved at
that time (e.g., with its Gaza flotilla in 2009), was one of the main for-
eign policy areas in which Egypt, and in particular the Egyptian MB,
were supposed to be useful for Turkey.22 In order to secure the political
success of the Egyptian MB, the AKP even sent its election campaign
experts and advisors to support the Egyptian MB in the parliamentary
and presidential elections. When Mohamed Morsi was elected Egyptian
President in 2012, the AKP saw this as their own foreign policy
success.23
On an ideologically opposing front, a regional alliance of opponents
to Political Islam in general, and the MB in particular, was formed. It
included the KSA and the UAE, as well as some Arab nationalist groups,
such as Nidaa Tounes (Tunisia), and networks of influential individuals,
such as General Haftar (Libya) and the Palestinian Mohammed Dahlan,
who lives in the UAE.24 The essential common motivation to form this
alliance was the perception of a threat originating from the aforemen-
tioned actors.25
Among these perceived threats, the first was that the political success
of the actors of Political Islam was seen as a threat to regime stability in
the respective states. Rulers in the KSA and the UAE were afraid of a

21 Ahmed Hanafy, Interview in Doha by Julius Dihstelhoff, January 14, 2015; Birol

Usculan, Interview by Julius Dihstelhoff in Doha, January 18, 2018.

22 For further insights see: Philipp O. Amour, “Hamas-PLO/Fatah Reconciliation

and Rapprochement within the Unfolding Regional Order in the Middle East since
2010: Neorealist and Neoclassical Realist Perspectives,” Journal of Social Sciences of Mus
Alparslan University 6, no. 5 (April 13, 2018): 621–31, https://doi.org/10.18506/
anemon.384773.
23 Senem Aydın-Düzgit, “The Seesaw Friendship between Turkey’s AKP and

Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July

24, 2014, http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/07/24/seesaw-friendship-between-
turkey-s-akp-and-egypt-s-muslim-brotherhood-pub-56243.
24 Gregory Aftandilian, The New Arab Regional Order: Opportunities and Challenges for

U.S. Policy (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute and United States Army War
College Press, 2015), 12–22, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1000185.pdf.
25 Aydın-Düzgit, “The Seesaw Friendship between Turkey’s AKP and Egypt’s Muslim

Brotherhood.”
 2  POLITICAL ISLAM AS AN ORDERING FACTOR …  37

transfer of the MB’s political activism, which combined a push for reform
and democratic means with an Islamic imperative, to their national
Islamic opposition movements.26 This was especially threatening to the
Wahhabi KSA, since the MB’s promotion of ­ Wasatiyya-Islam in the
region could undermine the alleged religious supremacy of the Saudi
royal house over all Sunni Muslims.27 In addition, the political approach
of the MB of religiously based pluralistic republics challenged the state
concept of the hereditary monarchy from the Saudi point of view.28
Secondly, the KSA and the UAE feared a reorientation of Egyptian–
Iranian relations under President Mohamed Morsi, whereas they wanted
to continue isolating Iran.29 Morsi pursued a pragmatic foreign policy
approach with the stated goal of establishing diplomatic relations with
countries worldwide. As part of this, Morsi also improved diplomatic
relations with Iran and visited the country during a summit of the
­Non-Aligned Movement in August 2012.30
Thirdly, the economic concepts of the MB posed a threat to the
architecture of rent-based authoritarian systems. This is due to the basic
attitude of the MB toward a participatory and productive economy of
a Keynesian nature that rejects state centrism. After all, questioning the
squandering of a rentier state’s rent-based income is closely linked to the
question of the legitimacy of authoritarian regimes in the Gulf Region.31
For these reasons, the KSA and the UAE, in particular, have pur-
sued a foreign policy directed strictly against the MB since 2010. In
view of these aspects, this alliance can be understood as an anti-Muslim

26 Lawrence Rubin, Islam in the Balance: Ideational Threats in Arab Politics (Stanford,

CA: Stanford University Press, 2014), 121–22.

27 May Darwich, “The Ontological (in)Security of Similarity Wahhabism Versus Islamism

in Saudi Foreign Policy,” Foreign Policy Analysis 12, no. 3 (2016): 469–88, https://doi.
org/10.1093/fpa/orw032.
28 Henner Fürtig and Annette Ranko, “Durch Die Arabische Welt Ein Riss: Im Nahen

Und Mittleren Osten Verschieben Sich Die Gravitationszentren.,” Internationale Politik,

no. 2 (2014): 8–14.
29 Henner Fürtig, “Iran and the Arab Spring: Between Expectations and Disillusion,”

GIGA Working Papers (Hamburg: German Institute for Global and Area Studies,
November 2013), 11–12, https://www.giga-hamburg.de/de/system/files/publications/
wp241_fuertig.pdf.
30 Dina Esfandiyari, “Iran and Egypt: A Complicated Tango?,” ISS, October 18, 2012,

https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/iran-and-egypt-complicated-tango.
31 Abdallah Djaballah, Shar’iyyat al-Amal as-Siyasi (Beirut: Dar Al-Maarifa, 2002).
38  J. DIHSTELHOFF AND A. LOHSE

Brotherhood axis, whose guiding theme seems to be above all the extinc-
tion of the transnational political presence of the MB and other move-
ments of Political Islam.
All in all, Political Islam has been a significant factor influencing
the formation of alliances in the Middle East during the Arab Spring.
Between 2010 and 2013, opposing regional axes that either supported
or fought Political Islam formed transnationally. In this context, regional
powers have ambivalent perceptions of Political Islam, either as a power
option or a threat.

Regional Changes in the Context of Political

Islam (2013–2016)
In the course of 2013, a far-reaching shift in the power constellation in
the broader Middle East took place, as the ouster of President Mohamed
Morsi by the Egyptian military in July 2013 restored Egypt as an ally
of the KSA and the UAE.32 While the orientation of Egyptian foreign
policy changed drastically under the new administration, Qatar’s and
Turkey’s ambitions with regards to regional policy suffered severe set-
backs. As will be shown in this section, the shifting balance of power
between these two axes profoundly changed the Saudi threat perception
and led to an overlapping of the regional axes, which temporarily lost
their importance. This development can be attributed in particular to
three regional developments.
The first was a severe weakening of the structures of the actors of
Political Islam by the removal of Mohamed Morsi and the subsequent
suppression and dismantling of the Egyptian MB. The KSA and the UAE
had provided financial and logistical support for the preparations of the
Egyptian military coup against President Morsi.33 Since then, the three
countries have temporarily coordinated their regional security policies.34
32 Philipp O. Amour, “Editor’s Note: The End of the Arab Spring?,” ed. Philipp O.
Amour, The Arab Spring: Comparative Perspectives and Regional Implications, Special issue,
Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations 12, no. 3 (Fall 2013): I–IV.
33 Andrey Korotayev, Leonid Issaev, and Alisa Shishkina, “Egyptian Coup of 2013: An

‘Econometric’ Analysis,” The Journal of North African Studies 21, no. 3 (2015): 354–55,
https://doi.org/10.1080/13629387.2015.1124238.
34 Abdulmajeed Al-Buluwi, “Saudi, UAE Coordination Signals Differences with

Qatar,” May 26, 2014, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/05/sau-

di-uae-joint-committee-regional-policy-libya-egypt.html.
 2  POLITICAL ISLAM AS AN ORDERING FACTOR …  39

The climax of this cooperation was the publication of terrorist lists,

first in Egypt (2013), then in the KSA (March 2014), and finally in the
UAE (November 2014), whereby several actors of Political Islam were
classified as terrorists.35 While the UAE mainly coordinated the secret
services and disseminated anti-MB propaganda through the media and
international lobbying, the KSA acted against the MB primarily through
international diplomatic channels.36
As such, this strategy of outlawing Political Islam was international-
ized, mainly under the guise of the fight against terrorism.37 Pressure was
exerted, for example, on Great Britain to ban various actors of Political
Islam, and above all the MB, as terrorist organizations, since London is
regarded as an important center for the activities of the MB.38 In March
2014, David Cameron, the British Prime Minister at that time, declared
that he had commissioned the British Ambassador to the KSA, John
Jenkins, to launch an investigation into the classification of the MB as
a terrorist organization and into possible links between representatives
of Political Islam and terrorist organizations. In the summer of 2014,
Jenkins concluded that the MB could not be labeled a terrorist organi-
zation, but the results of the report were initially withheld for months,
under pressure from the KSA and the UAE. Only in March 2015 were
some results published in a highly edited form.39 Against the background

35 “UAE Lists Muslim Brotherhood as Terrorist Group,” Reuters, November 15, 2014,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-emirates-politics-brotherhood/uae-lists-mus-
lim-brotherhood-as-terrorist-group-idUSKCN0IZ0OM20141115; Heidi Reichinnek,
Julius Lübben, and Julius Dihstelhoff, “Die Terrorliste der Emirate: Zusammensetzung
und Ziele,” MENA direct (Marburg: Centrum für Nah- und ­Mittelost-Studien, Oktober
2015), https://archiv.ub.uni-marburg.de/es/2015/0018/pdf/MENAdirekt10.pdf.
36 Dania Koleilat Khatib, “Arab Gulf States Lobbying in the US in the Wake of the Arab

Uprisings,” in The Arab Gulf States and the West: Perception and Realities—Opportunities
and Perils, ed. Marwa M. Maziad and Dania K. Khatib (New York: Routledge, 2018),
27–46.
37 Reichinnek, Lübben, and Dihstelhoff, “Die Terrorliste der Emirate.”

38 David Rose, “Cameron and the Arab Sheiks’ Web of Influence That Infiltrated

Britain: The Shadowy Nexus of PM’s Cronies That Secretively Lobbied for Middle East
Paymasters,” Daily Mail, October 18, 2015, https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/arti-
cle-3277345/Cameron-Arab-Sheiks-web-influence-infiltrated-Britain-shadowy-nexus-PM-
s-cronies-secretively-lobbied-Middle-East-paymasters.html.
39 Nigel Morris and Ian Johnston, “Muslim Brotherhood: Government Report

Concludes They Should Not Be Classified as a Terrorist Organisation,” Independent,

March 15, 2015, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/muslim-
40  J. DIHSTELHOFF AND A. LOHSE

of this international and regional outlawing campaign, the pressure

on Political Islam in the Gulf Region and the broader Middle East
increased to such an extent that the MB’s potential impact on regional
developments rapidly decreased.40
The second development was that the self-proclaimed Islamic State of
Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) spread exponentially in Iraq and Syria, as well as
in Egypt (northern Sinai), Libya, and Yemen. In June 2014, the leader of
ISIS, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, proclaimed the Islamic Caliphate in Mossul.
Iraq’s second largest city had recently been overrun by ISIS, so the states
of the region saw themselves increasingly threatened by the terrorist
organization.41 The Saudi border with Iraq came under attack by a small
group of ISIS fighters, who killed two Saudi border guards, making the
threat highly visible.42 However, even more threatening was the internal
menace that the terrorist group posed to the KSA in terms of regime
stability. Starting in November 2014, ISIS conducted a series of sui-
cide bombing attacks in the KSA’s oil-rich Eastern provinces, where the
majority of the three million Saudi Shiites live. Through this, ISIS tried
to exploit ­anti-Shiite sentiments in Saudi society in order to build up its
influence in the KSA. As Saudi rulers have always been highly suspicious
of any kind of cooperation between their Shiite population and Iran,
the Eastern provinces have seen decades of anti-government protest and
state repression. ISIS terrorist attacks in 2014 and 2015 brought even
more instability to this volatile region. As Al-Baghdadi called for the
downfall of the House of Saud and for the spread of ISIS’s fight against

brotherhood-government-report-concludes-they-should-not-be-classified-as-a-terrorist-or-
ganisation-10109730.html.
40 Philipp O. Amour, “Israel, the Arab Spring, and the Unfolding Regional Order in the

Middle East: A Strategic Assessment,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 44, no. 3
(July 3, 2017): 293–309, https://doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2016.1185696; Amour,
“Revolutionary Changes, Power Dynamics,” 1–21.
41 Charles Lister, “Profiling the Islamic State,” 2014, https://www.brookings.edu/

wp-content/uploads/2014/12/en_web_lister.pdf; Julius Dihstelhoff and Alexander

Lohse, “Dynamiken regionaler (Neu)Ordnung - Die Rolle des moderaten Islamismus”
(Marburg: Centrum für Nah- und Mittelost-Studien, June 2015), https://archiv.
ub.uni-marburg.de/es/2015/0011/pdf/MENAdirekt04.pdf.
42 “Two Saudi Guards Killed in Suicide Attack on Iraq Border,” The Guardian,

January 5, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/05/saudi-guards-

killed-suicide-attack-iraq-border-isis.
 2  POLITICAL ISLAM AS AN ORDERING FACTOR …  41

Shiism to Bahrain and Kuwait, the Saudi perception of an internal and

external threat posed by ISIS grew rapidly.43
The third development was the advance of the Houthis in Yemen.
Between 2004 and 2010, the Houthis and the Yemeni government
under President Ali Abdullah Saleh waged several wars against each
other. During the first Arab Spring movement, which also led to the
fall of the long-term ruler in Yemen, the Houthis were able, in 2011,
to extend their control to the provinces of Saada and Al-Jawf in north-
ern Yemen. In September 2014, the Houthis finally controlled large
parts of the capital, Sanaa. This enabled them to dissolve the previ-
ous parliament at the beginning of 2015 and to set up a Supreme
Revolutionary Committee to act as a new legislative body.44 Iranian
exertion of influence through local proxies—Hezbollah in Lebanon and
Syria, the Syrian Assad regime, Shiite militias in Iraq, and, allegedly, the
Houthis in Yemen—fueled fears of encirclement by the predominantly
Shiite arch-enemy in Saudi Arabia.45 However, in view of the primarily
national background of the ongoing conflict between Houthis and the
Yemeni central government, this can be seen as a self-fulfilling proph-
ecy: The more Saudi Arabia accused the Houthis of being an Iranian
proxy, the closer the Houthis came into the Iranian sphere of influ-
ence. Correspondingly, it was not until the war in Yemen waged by the
KSA and the UAE that the Houthis increasingly turned to Iran in the
hope of support. This gave the conflict an explicitly regional dimen-
sion. Previously, only a loose form of cooperation had existed between
the Houthis and Iran, and that was far from reaching the status and
intensity of the Iranian alliance with the Lebanese Hezbollah.46 These
developments in Yemen were aggravated by the fact that the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), known commonly as the

43 Bruce Riedel, “Why Saudi Arabia Is Vulnerable to Islamic State,” Al-Monitor, accessed

November 30, 2018, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/05/islam-

ic-state-targets-saudi-arabia.html.
44 “Yemen: Is Peace Possible?,” Middle East Report (International Crisis Group,

February 9, 2016), 1–8, https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/167-yemen-is-peace-

possible.pdf.
45 “Yemen: Is Peace Possible?,” 10–12, 22–23.

46 “Yemen: Is Peace Possible?”; Jens Heibach, “Saudi Arabia‘s War in Yemen: No Exit

Strategy,” GIGA Focus Middle East, May 2017, https://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/

publication/saudi-arabias-war-in-yemen-no-exit-strategy.
42  J. DIHSTELHOFF AND A. LOHSE

Iran nuclear deal, which was approved in July 2015, showed clearly to
the KSA that the USA was not a reliable partner in the Saudi’s strug-
gle with Iran. As Iran was going to further abandon its status as pariah
state in international politics, the perceived Iranian threat was growing
significantly.47 Against the background of these three developments, the
KSA perceived the MBs as less threatening compared to ISIS and Iran.
The change in Saudi perceptions of threat was further reinforced by
the death of King Abdullah in January 2015 and the subsequent ascen-
sion to the throne by his half-brother Salman. King Salman modified the
assessment of foreign policy objectives and the strategies for achieving
them. In addition to a gradual rapprochement with the MB, this also
included the unrestricted priority of combating the Iranian threat.48
The Saudi-led war in Yemen, which is part of the containment strategy
against Iran’s increasing influence in the region, is the clearest sign of
this change in the KSA strategy and a demonstration of the allocation of
the power center of the Middle East to the Gulf Region. In the context
of the growing threats by ISIS and Iran, the KSA lacks possible allies on
the ground. For this reason, selected MB movements and related organ-
izations in the broader Middle East, such as the Syrian MB, the Yemeni
Congregation for Reform (Islah Party), and the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP),
have become a strategic factor for the KSA in the fight against ISIS and
against Iran and Iranian allies in Iraq, Yemen, and Syria. Under these
premises, the KSA depends on cooperation with regional MB organiza-
tions, which have become the lesser of the three evils in the Saudis’ view.
Especially in Syria and Yemen, the KSA and the national MB branches
share common interests.49 This policy shift under the reign of King
Salman became clear as early as February 2015, when then-foreign min-
ister Saud al-Faisal said that Saudi rulers “don’t have any problem with
the Muslim Brotherhood” and only opposed a “small segment affiliated

47 Abdulmajeed AlSaud, “The Iran-Saudi Conflict: The Saudi Perspective,” February

18, 2016, 134, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/iran-saudi-conflict-

saudi-perspective.
48 Matthew Hedges and Giorgio Cafiero, “The GCC and the Muslim Brotherhood:

What Does the Future Hold?,” Middle East Policy 24, no. 1 (2017): 134, https://doi.
org/10.1111/mepo.12256.
49 Matthias Sailer, “Changed Priorities in the Gulf: Saudi Arabia and the Emirates

Rethink Their Relationship with Egypt,” SWP Comments (Stiftung Wissenschaft undPoli-
tikGerman Institute for International and Security Affairs, January 2016), https://www.
swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2016C08_sil.pdf.
 2  POLITICAL ISLAM AS AN ORDERING FACTOR …  43

with the group.”50 During the first months of his rule, King Salman
was visited by three leaders of Political Islam: Rachid al-Ghannouchi
(Ennahda, Tunisia), Abdul Majeed al-Zindani (Islah Party, Yemen), and
Hammam Saeed (Islamic Action Front Party, Jordan).51
This selective rapprochement to the MB, however, questioned the
close cooperation with the UAE and Egypt, especially as the KSA needed
the support of Qatar and Turkey—despite their support for actors of
Political Islam—in the KSA’s fight against current threats for strate-
gic networking. An example of this was the temporary Saudi–Turkish–
Qatari cooperation in the Syrian conflict, which encompassed mainly
logistical and financial support for groups of Syrian militias in anti-Syrian
regime coalitions.52 The common ground for the three countries was the
shared enmity toward Assad’s regime and/or the Lebanese Hezbollah.53
Table 14.1 lists the major actors among the different security alliances.
In contrast to the Saudi strategic shifts, the Egyptian Sissi regime and
the UAE continued to cooperate, based on a common anti-terror policy
with the aim of combating Political Islam transnationally. In this context,
the international promotion of threat perceptions (for example, through
the aforementioned terror lists) played a central role.54 Unlike the KSA,
the UAE and Egypt continued to center their strategic priorities around
Political Islam as a central threat.55 While for the Egyptian regime this is
simply a matter of eliminating the greatest domestic threat to regime sur-
vival, the UAE’s case is more complex. For one, the UAE is composed
of seven emirates, each with their own ruling families who often pursue
different interests. Even though Abu Dhabi clearly dominates the UAE’s
foreign and security policies, the Emirates’ ruling families are divided on

50 Cited in: Hedges and Cafiero, “The GCC and the Muslim Brotherhood,” 134–35.
51 Hussein Ibish, “Saudi Arabia’s New Sunni Alliance,” New York Times, July 31, 2015,
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/01/opinion/hussein-ibish-saudi-arabias-new-sun-
ni-alliance.html.
52 Sebastian Sons and Inken Wiese, “The Engagement of Arab Gulf States in Egypt and

Tunisia since 2011: Rationale and Impact,” DGAP Analyse (German Council on Foreign
Relations, October 2015), 29, https://dgap.org/en/article/getFullPDF/27232.
53 Christopher Phillips, “Eyes Bigger Than Stomachs: Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar

in Syria,” Middle East Policy 24, no. 1 (2017): 36–47, https://doi.org/10.1111/

mepo.12250.
54 Darwich, “Creating the Enemy, Constructing the Threat,” 1296–97.

55 Neil Patrick, “The UAE’s War Aims in Yemen,” October 24, 2017, http://carneg-

ieendowment.org/sada/73524.
44  J. DIHSTELHOFF AND A. LOHSE

the question of the Muslim Brotherhood. Whereas Abu Dhabi’s Crown

Prince and de facto ruler Muhammad bin Zayed (MbZ) has been push-
ing the oppression of al-Islah, the UAE’s MB branch, since the early
1990s, the rulers of the Emirate Sharjah had been rather supportive of
al-Islah and have opposed MbZ’s anti-MB-policies.56 The diverse ide-
ological backgrounds and interests of the Emirates’ ruling families are
therefore one factor that makes the perceived threat to regime stability
posed by al-Islah more immediate than it is in other countries of the
region.57
Looking at the threat posed by ISIS, this is of lesser importance to the
UAE, not only due to their geographically less exposed location, but also
because of the minor importance for regime stability compared to the
KSA. Whereas the KSA was threatened by repeated terrorist attacks and
ISIS challenges to the Saudi King’s status as Custodian of the two Holy
Mosques, the UAE was not hit by large-scale attacks and does not derive
its legitimacy from religious positions or rhetoric. Therefore, ISIS posed
a lesser threat to the UAE than to the KSA.58 Additionally, regarding
Iran, the UAE does not share the same level of threat perception as the
KSA does.59 Even though the UAE and Iran certainly have a conflictual
relationship, the UAE pursues a more flexible foreign policy toward Iran
than does the KSA.60 This can be seen, for example, in their differing
strategies in Yemen, where the containment of the Islah Party was more
important to the UAE than was joining forces with the KSA in their
common struggle against the Houthis.
The KSA wanted to push back the allegedly Iran-backed Houthis in
Yemen and bring the pro-Saudi President, Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi,
back to power. In order to reach this goal, they were even willing to

56 “UAE and the Muslim Brotherhood: A Story of Rivalry and Hatred,” Middle

East Monitor, June 15, 2017, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20170615-

uae-and-the-muslim-brotherhood-a-story-of-rivalry-and-hatred.
57 Courtney Freer, Rentier Islamism: The Influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in Gulf

Monarchies (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2018).

58 Eman Ragab, “Beyond Money and Diplomacy: Regional Policies of Saudi Arabia

and UAE after the Arab Spring,” The International Spectator 52, no. 2 (2017): 37–53,
https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2017.1309101.
59 Samuel Ramani, “The Saudi-UAE Alliance Could Be Weaker Than It Appears,”

National Interest, December 11, 2017, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/

the-saudi-uae-alliance-could-be-weaker-it-appears-23606.
60 Sons and Wiese, “The Engagement of Arab Gulf States in Egypt and Tunisia,” 12.
 2  POLITICAL ISLAM AS AN ORDERING FACTOR …  45

support the Islah Party, which belongs to the spectrum of party founda-
tions close to the MB. Even before 2010, the Saudis partially supported
the Islah Party in its fight against the central government. By contrast,
until late 2017, the UAE, first and foremost, wanted to prevent the Islah
Party from using the fight against the Houthis to its own advantage.61
Only after the killing of former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh in
December 2017, did the UAE realize that the Islah Party was the sole
potential ally left in Yemen. Therefore, even the UAE agreed to coop-
erate with the Islah Party, but only after forcing them to officially disen-
gage from the transnational MB movement.62
Furthermore, in the Syrian civil war, Saudi Arabia deviated from the
line of its allies. As one of the strongest opponents of the Iran-backed
Assad regime, the Saudi royal house found itself on the same side of
the conflict as the Syrian MB. Egypt, however, has taken a more neu-
tral approach toward the Syrian regime since 2016 at the latest, voting
in favor of both a French resolution condemning the regime’s attacks on
Aleppo as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council and a
much toned-down Russian resolution. This vote was heavily criticized by
the Saudi ambassador to the UN. Thus, while the KSA had a more prag-
matic attitude toward the actors of Political Islam as long as they were
useful allies facing Iran, the UAE and Egypt continue to prioritize the
suppression of Political Islam in the region.63
To the representatives of Political Islam and their allies, by contrast,
the effects of the formation of axes as they pertain to the phenomenon of
Political Islam continued to be central. Meanwhile, political pressures on
the actors of this axis increased significantly during this phase. Qatar and
Turkey continued to support actors of Political Islam—for example, by
condemning the Egyptian military coup and giving refuge to persecuted
Muslim Brothers and other representatives of Political Islam from Egypt,
Saudi Arabia, or the UAE.

61 Patrick,
“The UAE’s War Aims in Yemen.”
62 David B. Roberts, “UAE Embrace of Islah Marks Major Shift in Yemen,” AGSIW,
January 2, 2018, http://www.agsiw.org/uae-embrace-islah-marks-major-shift-yemen/.
63 “Egypt Votes for Rival UNSC Resolutions on Syria from Russia and France,”

Madamasr, October 9, 2016, https://madamasr.com/en/2016/10/09/news/u/

egypt-votes-for-rival-unsc-resolutions-on-syria-from-russia-and-france.
46  J. DIHSTELHOFF AND A. LOHSE

As a result, Qatar, in particular, was increasingly politically and eco-

nomically intimidated by the KSA, the UAE, and Egypt.64 The climax
of this development was a diplomatic crisis, which entailed the recall of
the Bahraini, Emirati, and Saudi ambassadors by their respective govern-
ments in March 2014.65 Apart from that, the KSA and the UAE gener-
ally tried to persuade Qatar to change its foreign policy line by stopping
its support of actors of Political Islam, who allegedly represent a risk
to the internal security of the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC).
The KSA and the UAE also demanded that Qatar should support the
Sissi regime in Egypt and refrain from interfering in the internal affairs
of the other GCC states. For this reason, Qatar was asked to restrict
Al-Jazeera’s broadcasting and to expel the members of the MB from
Qatar. As late as November 2014, after numerous meetings of the GCC,
the dispute was settled based on the so-called first and second treaties
of Riyadh (2013/2014) and a secret additional agreement (2014).66 In
these agreements, Qatar agreed to the terms of its GCC allies on paper
and made minor concessions. In addition to the expulsion of about
300 Muslim Brothers, Qatar closed the Egyptian branch of Al-Jazeera,
Mubashir Masr, which had its headquarters in Doha. In exchange, dip-
lomatic relations were normalized and the ambassadors who had been
withdrawn were able to return to Doha.67
At the same time as the political debate, an economic dispute also
arose between the two regional camps. Mohamed Morsi had planned to
establish a new economic zone in the Sharq al-Tafria-area on the Suez

64 Prasanta K. Pradhan, “Qatar Crisis and the Deepening Regional Faultlines,” Strategic

Analysis 42, no. 4 (2018): 437–42, https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2018.1482620.

65 Angus McDowall and Amena Bakr, “Three Gulf Arab States Recall Envoys

in Rift with Qatar,” Reuters, March 5, 2014, https://www.reuters.com/article/

us-gulf-qatar-ambassadors-idUSBREA2413N20140305.
66 Both the 2013 and 2014 Riyadh agreements were leaked in July 2017 in the con-

text of the second Qatar crisis. CNN, which originally obtained the documents, has pro-
vided copies of the original Arabic documents. “English Translation of the Agreements,”
accessed July 1, 2019, http://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2017/images/07/10/translation.
of.agreementsupdated.pdf.
67 “Saudi Arabia, UAE and Bahrain End Rift with Qatar, Return Ambassadors,”

Reuters, November 16, 2014, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gulf-summit-ambas-

sadors/saudi-arabia-uae-and-bahrain-end-rift-with-qatar-return-ambassadors-idUSKCN-
0J00Y420141116.
 2  POLITICAL ISLAM AS AN ORDERING FACTOR …  47

Canal by expanding the harbor of Port Said and by developing an exten-

sive industrial zone. Morsi had hoped, above all, to attract investors from
Turkey and Qatar. Upon completion of this project, the Suez Canal
would have hosted the largest container port and the largest industrial
free trade zone in the broader Middle East.68 This would have jeop-
ardized the importance of the port of Jebel Ali in the Emirates, which
has, so far, been one of the major harbors in the region. After the fall
of Morsi, the Egyptian military, which already controlled large parts of
the Egyptian economy at this time, was able to take full control of the
project. It decided in October 2014 that the UAE would be awarded
the contract for its implementation. The Egyptian MB saw this as the
Emirates’ attempt to influence Egyptian politics in order to ensure that
the shipping lines in Jebel Ali were not affected by the expansion of
the Suez Canal.69 As this example shows, the competition between the
two regional axes, which formed inter alia around the phenomenon of
Political Islam, expanded also into the economic sphere, creating even
larger drivers for conflict and competition.
Compared to Qatar, Turkey is less under pressure from the KSA
and the UAE. The main factor here is that Turkey is not a member of
the GCC. Therefore, Turkey’s support of Political Islam constitutes an
exogenous threat, whereas Qatar’s policy is an endogenous threat, to
regime stability within the GCC. Nevertheless, it should also be noted
that the rift between Turkey on the one hand and the KSA and the
UAE on the other deepened after the military coup in Egypt. A prom-
inent example of this was a campaign by the KSA and the UAE to pre-
vent Turkey from becoming a non-permanent member of the United
Nations Security Council in 2014.70 By doing so, the KSA actively
undermined Turkey’s ambitions on an international level. After all, only
60 of the 193 member states of the UN General Assembly voted for

68 Abdel Rahman Youssef, “Egypt: Qatar’s Suez Canal Bid,” Al-Akhbar, accessed

November 30, 2018, https://english.al-akhbar.com/node/15207.

69 Ayah Aman, “UAE Replaces Qatar as Egypt’s Partner on Suez Project,” Al-Monitor,

accessed November 30, 2018, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/11/

egypt-suez-canal-uae-Katar.html.
70 Ömer Taşpınar, “Turkey and the Arab Gulf States: A Dance with Uncertain

Expectations” (Washington: The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, 2015), 6,

https://agsiw.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Turkey-and-the-Arab-Gulf-States.pdf.
48  J. DIHSTELHOFF AND A. LOHSE

Turkey, which corresponds to a decrease of 91 votes compared to the

successful bid of 2008.71 However, after the death of King Abdullah
in early 2015, both sides worked for a Turkish–Saudi rapprochement.
Immediately after the King’s death, Erdoğan cut short his trip to
Africa to visit Riyadh and offer his condolences, ordering a period of
mourning in Turkey.72 In December of the same year, Erdoğan visited
the KSA again, and both countries established a high level of cooper-
ation and a dialogue mechanism to expand their bilateral relations. In
the same context, King Salman also made a return visit to Turkey
in April 2016, where he signed a Memorandum of Understanding
(MoU) implementing the mechanism of a Turkish–Saudi Coordination
Council.73
In light of these developments, one can remark that a shift in the
regional power constellation has occurred since 2013. This is due to
three main reasons: the ouster of Egyptian President Morsi and the
subsequent oppression of the Egyptian MB, the rise of ISIS, and Iran’s
growing influence in the region. All these developments have con-
tributed to an overlapping of the axis formation, especially by shift-
ing threat perceptions. As the influence of several MB branches in
the Middle East diminished, especially the KSA started to reassess the
possible usefulness of actors of Political Islam in confronting Iran and
its proxies. And even the UAE allows for more pragmatism in its rela-
tions with actors of Political Islam, as the example of al-Islah in Yemen
shows. However, despite such differentiations in foreign policy strat-
egies and changes in the respective bilateral relations, in general terms
both the UAE and Egypt have maintained their struggle against
Political Islam, while Turkey and Qatar have continued their support for
Political Islam.

71 Harut Sassounian, “Why the UN Rejected Turkey’s Bid for a Security Council Seat?,”

Huffington Post, October 28, 2014, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/harut-sassounian/

why-the-un-rejected-turke_b_6036878.html.
72 Taşpınar, “Turkey and the Arab Gulf States: A Dance with Uncertain Expectations,” 6.

73 “Bilateral Political Relations between Turkey and Saudi Arabia,” Republic of Turkey

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed November 30, 2018, www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-sau-

di-arabia-relations.en.mfa.
 2  POLITICAL ISLAM AS AN ORDERING FACTOR …  49

Regional Axes Resurfacing During the Qatar

Crisis (Since 2017)
The diplomatic crisis with Qatar—which had already led to the recall of
the Bahraini, Emirati, and Saudi ambassadors in March 2014 and took
eight months for resolution—re-escalated to an even greater extent in
2017. This crisis has brought the former conflict lines and alliance con-
stellations from 2010 to 2013 back to the fore: the KSA, the UAE,
Bahrain, and Egypt broke off their diplomatic contacts with Qatar;
imposed a complete blockade on land, sea, and air; and expelled all
Qatari citizens from their countries. The four countries justified their
blockade by blaming the escalation on Qatar’s violations of old promises,
referring to the Riyadh treaties and the secret additional agreement of
2013/14.74 At that time, Qatar had already been requested to join the
foreign policy strategy of its neighboring states and to stop supporting
actors who supposedly posed a risk to the internal security of the GCC
states.
In 2017, the blockade states articulated thirteen demands, which
Qatar had to agree to if the blockade was to be lifted. A direct com-
parison between the thirteen demands and the agreements of 2013/14
shows that the content of these documents is extremely similar and
therefore mostly refers to Political Islam and the alliances based around
Political Islam.75 Correspondingly, only one demand refers to Iran (1st
demand) and two further demands refer to administrative issues (12th
and 13th demands), whereas the remaining ten demands (2nd to
11th) refer directly or indirectly to Political Islam. The list of demands
included calls on Qatar to cease its military cooperation with Turkey
(2nd demand). It was also to abandon any connection to terrorist, sec-
tarian, and ideological organizations, including the MB,76 which are
mentioned in addition to actors like ISIS, Al-Qaeda, Fatah Al-Sham

74 Prasanta K. Pradhan, “Qatar Crisis and Challenges to GCC Unity,” Liberal Studies 2,

no. 2 (December 2017): 244–45.

75 Julius Dihstelhoff and Alexander Lohse, “Angst am Golf: Politischer Islam in der

Katar-Krise,” Zenith Magazin, July 28, 2017, https://magazin.zenith.me/de/politik/

politischer-islam-der-katar-krise.
76 “Arab States Issue 13 Demands to End Qatar-Gulf Crisis,” Al-Jazeera, July 12,

2017, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/06/arab-states-issue-list-demands-qatar-
crisis-170623022133024.html.
50  J. DIHSTELHOFF AND A. LOHSE

(the former Nusra Front), and Hezbollah (3rd demand). Qatar was
also expected to stop any kind of funding for individuals, groups, or
organizations that were designated as terrorists by the KSA, the UAE,
Egypt, Bahrain, the USA, or other countries; this list included the MB
(4th demand). In addition, Qatar had to repatriate all alleged terror-
ists to their countries of origin and to freeze their assets (5th demand);
to shut down Al Jazeera and its partner stations, which are seen as an
important voice of Political Islam (6th demand); to stop interfering in
the internal affairs of the other GCC states; and to cease granting Qatari
citizenship to wanted Saudi, Emirati, Bahraini, or Egyptian nation-
als; this primarily applied to members of the MB (7th demand). Qatar
was also expected to compensate for the loss of human lives and other
financial losses caused by the Qatari support of individuals, groups, and
organizations such as the MBs (8th demand); to reconcile Qatar’s mil-
itary, political, social, and economic policies with the other GCC states
and Arab countries; to suspend its support for the MB (9th demand); to
stop all contacts with political opposition in the KSA, the UAE, Egypt,
and Bahrain, including, in particular, the MB and to disclose all data on
prior contacts with those groups (10th demand); and, finally, to close all
news agencies funded directly or indirectly by Qatar, including Arabi21,
Rassd, Al Araby Al Jadeed, Mekameleen, and Middle East Eye, who were
accused either of complicity or providing too positive a coverage of the
MB (11th demand).77
Turkey tried to maintain a neutral profile during the first few days of
the crisis and to serve as a mediator between the factions. For example,
it called for a diplomatic agreement between the opponents and rhetori-
cally emphasized the Sunni connections among all participating states.78
However, Turkey began very soon to take a clear pro-Qatari position in
the dispute. To this end, the Turkish government sent urgently needed
food and other products to help Qatar through the boycott. Instead of
complying with the demand to withdraw the Turkish armed forces from

77 “Arab States Issue 13 Demands.”

78 PatrickKingsley, “Turkey Throws Support behind Qatar in Rift among Arab Nations,”
New York Times, June 7, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/07/world/europe/
turkey-qatar-support.html.
 2  POLITICAL ISLAM AS AN ORDERING FACTOR …  51

Qatar, Turkey even sent more military personnel to its Qatari base. The
establishment of a military base in Qatar had previously been agreed
upon in a 2014 agreement between Qatar and Turkey.79
Turkey’s relation with the KSA and the UAE had already been
strained after the coup attempt against the AKP government in 2016,
due to mixed reactions from both states. Referring to the UAE,
Erdoğan said: “We know very well who in the Gulf was happy when
the coup attempt took place in Turkey.”80 Against this background,
the Turkish President stressed on June 25 2017 that Turkey “will con-
tinue to provide every support in our power to Qatar.”81 Besides
Turkey, Iran was the only country located close to Qatar that had the
capability to help Qatar through the crisis by providing transporta-
tion links, food, and goods. All three countries signed agreements in
November 2017 to foster trade between them.82 This caused further
suspicion on behalf of the KSA and the UAE, resulting in public state-
ments by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman that described Turkey
as part of a “triangle of evil,” together with Iran and Islamic extremist
groups.83
Overall, the Qatar crisis of 2017 has led to the resurfacing of the
regional axes described in the previous sections. Political Islam—as it
already did at the beginning of the Arab Spring—lies at the center of
the Qatar crisis and still has a high potential for mobilization. With
their thirteen demands to Qatar, the KSA and the UAE have again pos-
ited Political Islam as a main concern besides Iran in the formation of
regional axes. Consequently, Political Islam has been an important point
of reference for the foreign policies of the KSA, the UAE, Qatar, and
Turkey since 2017.

79 Paul Cochrane, “Revealed: Secret Details of Turkey’s New Military Pact with

Qatar,” Middle East Eye, January 27, 2016, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/

turkey-qatar-military-agreement-940298365.
80 Quoted in: Özden Zeynep Oktav, “Quo Vadis Turkey-GCC States Relations? A

Turkish Perspective,” Insight Turkey 20, no. 2 (2018): 115.

81 Quoted in: Bulent Aliriza and Mehmet Uyanik, “The Qatar crisis and Turkey: Trump

and Erdogan diverge,” CSIS, accessed November 30, 2018, https://www.csis.org/

analysis/qatar-crisis-and-turkey-trump-and-erdogan-diverge.
82 Oktav, “Quo Vadis Turkey-GCC States Relations? A Turkish Perspective,” 117–18.

83 Oktav, 117–18.
52  J. DIHSTELHOFF AND A. LOHSE

Conclusions
The foreign policies of the four analyzed states (the KSA, the UAE,
Turkey, and Qatar), since the Arab Spring, have been influenced by their
positions toward Political Islam to varying degrees. The transnational
phenomenon of Political Islam affects the narratives of foreign policy
decision-makers and their decisions. The common goal of the various
foreign policy strategies of the four states continues to be securing and
expanding their own power on the national and regional levels. Qatar
and Turkey have been united by their perceptions of Political Islam as
a strategically important factor that is seen as a power option rather
than as a threat, based on its transnational leverage. Therefore, since the
Arab Spring movement, both states have allied with actors of Political
Islam in the Middle East. Although the KSA and the UAE undertook
­wide-ranging attempts to defeat the Qatar–Turkey–MB axis (as seen, for
instance, in the Qatar crises of 2014 and since 2017), Political Islam still
forms a uniting scheme for the perception of regional conflict lines for
both states during the last few years.
By contrast, the influence of Political Islam on Emirati and Saudi
foreign policies must be seen separately. The analysis has shown that
although both states have been trying to do away with the threat posed
by Political Islam since the Arab Spring, the priority given to the fight
against Political Islam is constantly high only in the foreign policy of
the UAE. By comparison, the existing conflicts at the regional level—
such as the Saudi–Iranian conflict for hegemony in the Gulf Region,
the fight against ISIS, and the involvement in the civil wars in Yemen
and Syria—have overlapped Political Islam as a major threat in the KSA.
These differences in perceptions have led to temporary conflicts of inter-
est between the KSA und the UAE and have occasionally weakened their
regional course of action. However, even for the UAE pragmatic coop-
eration with Political Islam has become an option, at least in Yemen. All
in all, regional alliance-building processes are determined by, and are
chiefly causes of, the externalization of national conflicts. This implies
that Political Islam also impacts the reconfiguration of the regional order.
Since 2010, Political Islam has had different effects on
­alliance-building processes and conflicts. This has affected the regional
balance of power and continues to do so. As a result, three phases can
be identified, based on how the individual powers interact with Political
Islam: Between 2010 and 2013, the four analyzed states formed two
 2  POLITICAL ISLAM AS AN ORDERING FACTOR …  53

opposing regional axes, largely based on opposition or support for

Political Islam. While Turkey and Qatar supported the actors of Political
Islam and saw them as power options in a moment of regional reconfigu-
ration, the KSA and the UAE created an anti-MB axis that saw the actors
of Political Islam as a growing threat to their own national and regional
security (Phase 1).
Since 2013, the regional axes were weakened as a result of shifts in
power constellations in the Middle East. The decisive factors were the
dismantling of the Egyptian MB, the rise of ISIS, and Iran’s increasing
influence in the region. Due to these factors, the threat perceptions asso-
ciated with Political Islam were overlapped, especially regarding the KSA.
However, on the part of the UAE, the containment of Political Islam
remained a major foreign policy objective, and Turkey and Qatar main-
tained their excellent relationship with each other and with actors of
Political Islam (Phase 2).
The Qatar crisis of 2017 has shown that Political Islam has remained
a major point of contention in the foreign policies of the four states
and continues to have the potential to mobilize throughout the region.
On one front, the fight against Political Islam has once again gained
importance for the KSA and has remained a priority for the UAE. On
an opposing front, the Qatar–Turkey–MB axis has proven to be resilient
even under high external pressure (Phase 3).
Consequently, the opposing regional axes, which formed during the
beginning of the Arab Spring movement, continue to influence the
regional order in the Middle East. As the transformation processes in the
Gulf Region and the broader Middle East are far from over, and since
Political Islam continues to play a role in political processes and conflicts
all over the region, it is highly likely that Political Islam will continue to
be a significant factor in the regional reconfigurations.

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 CHAPTER 3

Gulfization of the Middle East

Security Complex: The Arab Spring’s
Systemic Change

Amr Yossef

Introduction
In public and academic debates, the post-Arab Spring Middle East is
being portrayed as a Hobbesian world of war of all against all—or, at
minimum, as a region of fluid coalitions characterized by constant
change and fragility.1 One author put it succinctly: “any version of the
region finding a workable balance of power is a mirage: the new order
is fundamentally one of disorder.”2 The resultant befuddlement as to
who is allied with whom in the region (e.g., Sunni vs. Shiite, Arabs vs.
Iranians, or autocrats vs. reformers), and on which issues, prompted the

1 Eduard Soler i Lecha, “Liquid Alliances in the Middle East,” Notes Internacionals
CIDOB (Barcelona Centre for International Affairs [CIDOB], March 2017), https://
www.cidob.org/en/publications/publication_series/notes_internacionals/n1_169/
liquid_alliances_in_the_middle_east.
2 Marc Lynch, “The New Arab Order: Power and Violence in Today’s Middle East,”

Foreign Affairs 97, no. 1 (October 2018): 116–26.

A. Yossef (*) 
Cairo, Egypt
e-mail: amr.yossef@aucegypt.edu

© The Author(s) 2020 61

P. O. Amour (ed.), The Regional Order in the Gulf Region
and the Middle East, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45465-4_3
62  A. YOSSEF

occasional appearance in the web of guides to the complicated Middle

Eastern relationships.3 Moreover, this befuddlement, especially at a time
when the post-Arab Spring Middle East is a source of inwardly and out-
wardly directed security threats, impacts important policy choices by
international actors. The confusion of the US policy in the Middle East
in recent years for identifying allies and the extent to which the USA
would be committed to their support is one part of this befuddlement.
This view of a Middle East disorder is, of course, not without rea-
son, given the shocking regional eruptions in the Gulf Region and the
broader Middle East since 2011: overthrowing authoritarian leaderships,
the proliferation of devastating (proxy) wars, and the multiplication of
the actors involved. Nevertheless, in every chaos there is an order, and
the goal of this chapter is to reconstruct this order, to provide a stra-
tegic situational awareness of the current regional dynamics in the Gulf
Region and the broader Middle East, and to clarify its implications for
theory and policy. Building on several scholarly contributions on the
Middle East’s security complex and alliances, I argue that since the mid-
1950s, a region-wide, bipolar security system has primarily existed in the
region. Competing in this system are two alignments, the status quo and
the revisionist, each of which is composed of state and non-state actors.
The revisionist alignment has two camps, Arab nationalist and Islamist,
and the Islamist camp is composed of two strands, Sunni and Shiite.4
Regional conflict dynamics before, during, and since the Arab Spring first
movement have continued to follow the lines of this constellation.
Continuity, however, did not prevent changes from occurring,
although still within the system. The most significant shift since the first
Arab Spring movement is the supremacy of the Gulf parties—or what I
call Gulfization—in the Middle East security system. This Gulfization has
been the result of a drastic redistribution of power in the broader Middle
East following the Arab Spring first movement as it weakened the sta-
tus quo alignment and empowered the revisionist. The implications of

3 See for e.g., “Enemies, Alliances and Animosity in the Middle East,” The Economist, January

7, 2016, https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2016/01/07/enemies-alliances-and-
animosity-in-the-middle-east.
4 This is by no means to say that Sunni and Shiite are just different labels for the same

phenomenon of Islamism international. It does imply, however, that despite their fierce
theological differences, Sunni and Shiite Islamists share the same values, establishing a
Sharia-based government, and the same foes, the West and its allies in the region.
 3  GULFIZATION OF THE MIDDLE EAST SECURITY COMPLEX …  63

Gulfization are far-reaching. They range from having the Gulf issues gain
primacy in the region (over the Arab–Israeli conflict), endangering the
survival of the status quo alignment under the fragile leadership in the
Gulf, and particularly the Saudi leadership, to dictating the future strug-
gle in the Middle East as between two versions of Islamism.
My argument will proceed in five sections. Section one briefly dis-
cusses the understanding of the Arabian Gulf region as a distinct,
sub-regional security complex in the Middle East’s modern history.
­
Section two introduces a framework of analysis in the form of a bipolar
system—the status quo and revisionist alignments—and surveys its inter-
actions throughout. Section three demonstrates the fundamental shift in
the redistribution of power in the Middle East to the Gulf States follow-
ing the Arab Spring first movement, and how this shift has turned the
Gulf, in its internal dynamics, into the region’s center of gravity. Section
four draws comparatively on the European Revolutions of 1848. Section
five concludes the chapter.

The Gulf Security Subcomplex

The definition of the Gulf as a sub-regional complex is already well
established in the literature.5 This definition includes all states border-
ing the Arabian Gulf waterway—Iran, Iraq, the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia (the KSA), Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab
Emirates (the UAE). Due to the region’s unique security interdepend-
ency, F. Gregory Gause goes as far as to consider it a security complex
on its own.6 Of course, while the Gulf Region has its distinct charac-
teristics within the Middle East complex, there has always been a
strong multi-issue interdependence between the Gulf complex and the
two other sub-regional complexes in the broader Middle East alluded
to below.7 The Gulf is interdependent with the Levant in questions of

5 Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International

Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 191–93; Keith Smith, “Realist
Foreign Policy Analysis with a Twist: The Persian Gulf Security Complex and the Rise and
Fall of Dual Containment,” Foreign Policy Analysis 12, no. 3 (July 2016): 320, https://
doi.org/10.1111/fpa.12084.
6 F. Gregory Gause, The International Relations of the Persian Gulf (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 2010), 3–6.

7 Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers, 192–93.
64  A. YOSSEF

the Arab–Israeli conflict, the Iranian–Syrian alliance (particularly in

Lebanon, where Hezbollah has, since the early 1980s, been an ­integral
part of this alliance), and the regional position of Egypt, which has,
since the late 1970s, been “a major power component and a stabilizer
of the regional system against Iran.”8 Similarly, the Gulf has been con-
nected to the Maghreb, especially ever since Muammar Qaddafi took
over power in Libya and started exporting his revolution by interven-
tions in domestic affairs of countries in the region, not only in Lebanon,
but also in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, particularly
the KSA.9
Traditionally, the Gulf complex has been centered on a triangular
rivalry among Iran, Iraq, and the KSA. Primarily, this was an outcome
of the mutuality of threat perceived among these three regional powers,
each of which feared the other’s advancing transnational identities that
threaten its domestic security, as part of their competition over leadership
in the Gulf Region. It was also an outcome of the region’s security inter-
dependency, particularly oil—which has dominated the world’s energy
supply for decades—and the frequent competition over controlling its
prices at OPEC.10 This dual competition, over regional leadership and
oil, has been well manifest in the three Gulf Wars fought between 1980
and 2003.
The conventional wisdom held the Arab monarchies in the Gulf
as status quo powers facing challenges from the revolutionary powers.
Pioneering this view, Malcolm Kerr demonstrated in his 1965 semi-
nal Arab Cold War the power struggle between two camps in the Arab
world, conservative monarchies and socialist republics.11 This wisdom
continued after the Arab Spring. Three scholarly works—all paraphras-
ing Kerr by bearing the title Arab Cold War—are notable in analyzing

8 Philipp O. Amour, “Revolutionary Changes, Power Dynamics, and Regional

Rivalries since the Arab Spring: An Introduction,” in The Middle East Reloaded:
Revolutionary Changes, Power Dynamics, and Regional Rivalries since the Arab Spring, ed.
Philipp O. Amour, St. James’s Studies in World Affairs (Washington: Academica Press,
2018), 7–8.
9 Patrick E. Tyler, “Two Said to Tell of Libyan Plot against Saudi,” New York Times, June

10, 2004, https://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/10/world/two-said-to-tell-of-libyan-

plot-against-saudi.html.
10 Smith, “Realist Foreign Policy Analysis with a Twist,” 320–21.

11 Malcolm H. Kerr, The Arab Cold War: Gamal Abd al-Nasir and His Rivals, 1958–

1970, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971).

 3  GULFIZATION OF THE MIDDLE EAST SECURITY COMPLEX …  65

the broader Middle East as a region divided between polarized alliances.

Morten Valbjørn and André Bank saw to it that, contrary to the old Arab
cold war, which was between states that revolved around pan-Arabism
and the use of coup d’états, the new one is on a regime/society dimen-
sion, where the essential challenge comes from n ­ on-statist societal actors
advocating an Arab-Islamic order.12 Likewise, in Curtis Ryan’s view, the
new Arab cold war “does not emphasize redrawing borders and revamp-
ing governments through unification schemes. Rather, the new struggle
more often involves conflicts within domestic politics, sometimes with a
dimension of external intercession.”13 In a similar vein, Nabeel Khoury,
writing in 2013, argued that Islamist parties are an independent force of
their own, manifested in what he called the transitional republics (Egypt,
Tunisia, and Libya), aligned with Turkey, vis-à-vis two other blocs: the
Club of Monarchs (the GCC, Jordan, and Morocco) and non-state
Islamist actors (Hamas and Hezbollah), aligned with Iran.14
These fine works, however, have fallen short of capturing the com-
plexity of the various interactions among and between the regional par-
ties involved. In this chapter, I argue that, ever since the mid-1950s, a
region-wide, bipolar security system has existed in the broader Middle
East. Competing in this system are two alignments, the status quo and
the revisionist, each of which is composed of state and non-state actors.

Status Quo vs. Revisionist Alignments

Building on Gause’s work, I define an alignment as a group of parties
with shared values on what they have to balance against, not necessar-
ily on what their domestic politics should be. In this concept, an align-
ment’s parties do not balance against the strongest regional state, in
terms of political/military capabilities, but rather against the power
that presents the clearest threat to their domestic security in terms of

12 Morten Valbjørn and André Bank, “The New Arab Cold War: Rediscovering the Arab

Dimension of Middle East Regional Politics,” Review of International Studies 38, no. 1
(January 2012): 3–24, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210511000283.
13 Curtis Ryan, “The New Arab Cold War and the Struggle for Syria,” Middle East

Report 262 (Spring 2012): 29.

14 Nabeel A. Khoury, “The Arab Cold War Revisited: The Regional Impact of the

Arab Uprising,” Middle East Policy 20, no. 2 (2013): 73–87, https://doi.org/10.1111/
mepo.12021.
66  A. YOSSEF

transnational ideational identities.15 At the same time, I extend the appli-

cation of Gause’s thesis—which is confined to the Gulf States, Syria, and
Jordan—to involve the Middle East regional security complex including
its three subcomplexes. My concept corresponds to Buzan’s understand-
ing that “[in the Middle East security complex] the insecurity of the
ruling elites within their domestic sphere plays a significant role in
shaping the dynamics of (in)security overall.”16
An alignment can be divided into camps. Drawing on Aharon
Klieman’s work, I define a camp as a tacit security regime (TSR) that is a
non-contractual and a non-institutionalized agreement, where the main-
tenance of national security is the prime goal of such a regime but does
not preclude continued competition in a different realm.17 Clive Jones
and Joel Guzansky have applied Klieman’s TSR concept—which is con-
fined to Israel–Jordan relations—to multi-lateral ties, particularly Israel’s
relations with the Arab Gulf states.18 I take the concept of TSR—or what
I call here a camp—one step further by including cooperation that is
based not only on shared perception of threat, but also on shared val-
ues and agreement on what the parties are for and what their domestic
politics should be.19
Status quo powers aim at preserving the established order—“rules of
the game” and distribution of goods—and stand to benefit from it.20
In this, the policy of the status quo “aims at the maintenance of the

15 F. Gregory Gause, “Balancing What? Threat Perception and Alliance Choice in

the Gulf,” Security Studies 13, no. 2 (2004): 273–305, https://doi.org/10.1080/

09636410490521271.
16 Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers, 187.

17 Aharon Klieman, “The Israel-Jordan Tacit Security Regime,” in Regional Security

Regimes: Israel and Its Neighbors, ed. Efraim Inbar (New York: State University of New
York Press, 1995), 129–30.
18 Clive Jones and Yoel Guzansky, “Israel’s Relations with the Gulf States: Toward the

Emergence of a Tacit Security Regime?” Contemporary Security Policy 38, no. 3 (2017):
398–419, https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2017.1292375.
19 The term “camp” is preferred here to the terms “regime” and “alliance” for it typifies

(1) the informal, non-contractual nature of relations within the group of states; and (2) the
incoherent nature, including competition and cooperation, of their dealings between each
other and vis-a-vis the other group of states.
20 Arnold Wolfers, “The Balance of Power in Theory and Practice,” Naval War College

Review 11, no. 5 (1959): 11–13; A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1980), 19–20.
 3  GULFIZATION OF THE MIDDLE EAST SECURITY COMPLEX …  67

distribution of power as it exists at a particular moment in history.”21

Revisionist powers, dissatisfied as they “value what they covet more than
what they currently possess,”22 seek to change the established order to
improve their position within it or may even attempt to reorder it in
their favor.23
For the purposes of this chapter, the status quo in the broader Middle
East refers here to a specific order that evolved in the mid-1950s and
entailed an alliance with the United States and the containment of the
Soviet Union and its allies in the region. This order was renewed in the
geopolitical settlement that followed the Cold War to entail the domi-
nance of the powers that were allied with the United States in the region
and the double containment of Iran, and other forces of Islamism, and
Iraq (until 2003) and other forces of nationalism.24
I trace the emergence of the Middle East status quo alignment
back to 1957, with the Eisenhower Doctrine. It is through this doc-
trine that the United States committed itself to defend the broader
Middle East against the aggression of any state controlled by interna-
tional Communism.25 Iran, Turkey, the KSA, Jordan, and Lebanon (and
monarchical Iraq, until the 1958 revolution) endorsed this doctrine,
forming the first members of the status quo alignment.26 The broad
parameters of the status quo alignment are: alliance/accommodation
with the West as the guarantor of the region’s security and the stability of
its regimes, acceptance of peaceful settlement of the Arab–Israeli conflict

21 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th ed.

(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), 46.

22 Randall L. Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State

Back In,” International Security 19, no. 1 (Summer 1994): 105, https://doi.org/10.
2307/2539149.
23 David Zionts, “Revisionism and Its Variants: Understanding State Reactions to

Foreign Policy Failure,” Security Studies 15, no. 4 (October 2006): 633, https://doi.
org/10.1080/09636410601184611.
24 Walter Russell Mead, “The Return of Geopolitics: The Revenge of the Revisionist

Powers,” Foreign Affairs 93, no. 3 (June 2014): 69–79.

25 As such, this constellation predates the formation of the Gulf subcomplex after

Britain’s withdrawal from the region in 1971, as in: Buzan and Waever, Regions and
Powers, 191.
26 The most committed to this alliance, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey, along with the

United Kingdom, jointly established the Middle East Treaty Organization (METO), or
Baghdad Pact, in 1955.
68  A. YOSSEF

and coexistence with Israel, and assertion of sovereignty and non-

interference norms.
The status quo alignment has faced, and continues to face, challenges
from its revisionist rival, which seeks to mobilize publics in the status
quo parties against their regimes, with the aim of replacing the estab-
lished order with its own. Back in the 1950s, Egypt and Syria, domi-
nated by the then rising revolutionary Arab nationalism/socialism,
rejected the Eisenhower Doctrine, constituting the first members of the
revolutionary alignment. The latter’s broad parameters, usually advocat-
ing a populist line, are hostility toward the West, which is perceived as
seeking to dominate the region, adoption of armed conflict to confront
Israel, and pursuit of exporting the revolution (to the status quo powers)
as a core foreign policy goal.
Two revisionist camps stand out—Arab Nationalism and Islamism—
which share the common denominator of being transnational ideologi-
cal identities that attempt to take advantage of the Arab/Muslim public
yearning for the restoration of their lost historic great civilization.
Though the terms “status quo” and “revisionist” carry strong nor-
mative connotations, they are used in this chapter only analytically and
with no intention to pass judgment on the morality of a given policy of
either orientation. Status quo and revisionist goals are only preferences
over outcomes; “they say little themselves about specific actions or strat-
egies that should or will be pursued to achieve them.”27 Therefore, the
tendency to link status quo policy with defensiveness and a revision-
ist policy with aggressiveness is mistaken; status quo powers can behave
aggressively and revisionist powers can ally with the existing “rules of the
game.”28

Arab Nationalist Camp

For its advocates, Arab nationalism rose against colonialism and
Western influence to which Arab monarchies had surrendered. These
monarchies “were held to be ‘reactionaries’—hereditary monarchs,
oligarchic politicians and wealthy landowners and businessmen—who

27 Jason W. Davidson, “The Roots of Revisionism: Fascist Italy, 1922–39,” Security

Studies 11, no. 4 (June 2002): 126, https://doi.org/10.1080/714005356.

28 Ka Po Ng, Interpreting China’s Military Power: Doctrine Makes Readiness (Abingdon,

UK: Taylor & Francis, 2005), 10–11, https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203325902.

 3  GULFIZATION OF THE MIDDLE EAST SECURITY COMPLEX …  69

found it easier to obstruct reforms by keeping the Arab world divided.”29

The latter division, combined with the corruption that characterized the
monarchies, resulted in the social and economic deprivation of the Arab
peoples. The alternative order offered by Arab nationalism has encom-
passed, internally, establishing socialist republics (e.g., Egypt and Iraq)
and restoring the rights of the masses and, externally, an Arab unity con-
fronting Western influence, including an alliance for military liberation of
Palestine from Zionism.
Dubbed the progressives, Arab nationalists found leadership in the
charismatic Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, who led the over-
throw of the Egyptian monarchy in 1952 and scored a political triumph
against the West in the 1956 Suez crisis. The late 1950s and most of the
1960s witnessed the heyday of Arab nationalism—using propaganda, like
Sawt al-Arab (Voice of the Arabs) radio, to invoke popular protest in the
status quo countries. By doing so, forces of Arab Nationalism succeeded
in achieving the creation of the Egyptian–Syrian United Arab Republic
(1958–1961), the overthrow of the monarchies, and the turning of Iraq
(1958), Yemen (1962), and Libya (1970) into socialist republics. Several
Nasserist coups were also attempted in Jordan, the KSA, and Morocco
(which was concerned about revolutionary Algeria after independence in
1962). A non-state member of this camp was the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO), following its establishment under Nasser’s sponsor-
ship in 1964.30
These successes in spreading Arab nationalism were followed by set-
backs due to Arab nationalists’ internal conflicts and failures, as well as
to the resistance by the status quo parties: the Egyptian–Syrian union
was dissolved; socialists in Syria and Iraq turned into another strand,
Ba’athism, competing with Nasserism and among themselves; and the
Yemeni revolution turned into a proxy war between Egypt, supporting
the republicans, and the KSA (along with Jordan) supporting the mon-
archists. The greatest setback, which set the stage for the decline of Arab
nationalism, was the June 1967 catastrophic defeat at the hands of Israel.
In the 1970s, Egypt, under President Anwar Sadat, shifted sides to the
status quo alignment, but the Ba’athist regimes in Hafez Assad’s Syria

29 Kerr,
The Arab Cold War, 6–7.
30 Philipp
O. Amour, “Palestinian Politics in Transition: The Case of the October War,”
in The Yom Kippur War: Politics, Legacy, Diplomacy, ed. Asaf Siniver (Oxford; New York:
Oxford University Press, 2013), 137–54.
70  A. YOSSEF

and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, along with Qaddafi’s Libya, continued with
the Arab Nationalist Camp. However, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in
1990, on unionist grounds, had severely undermined the credibility of
Arab nationalism advocates.

Islamist Camp
For its advocates, Islamism rose against colonialism and foreign influ-
ence. It upholds the following values: a sense that modernization in Arab
society has meant a drifting away from Islamic moral values and a sense
that there has been surrender to foreign forces—atheist communism, the
Christian West, and Jewish Zionism—and that corruption and economic
injustice prevail in societies.31 The motto Islam is the Solution encom-
passes, internally, the establishment of Islamic states to restore the rule
of the Sharia, and, externally, Islamic unity that will contain Western
influence.
Historically, the first strand of the Islamist camp has been Sunni,
in the Arab world, manifested in the emergence of the Muslim
Brotherhood (MB) movement in Egypt in 1928. Involved in coexistence
and struggle with the Egyptian monarchy, the MB initially supported the
Free Officers’ 1952 revolution before turning against it, culminating in
the 1954 and 1965 crises, which were met with Nasser’s iron fist pol-
icy. Following the adage of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend,” the
KSA gave shelter in the late 1950s to the MB activists from Egypt, Syria,
Iraq, and elsewhere, as a tool to push against the Arab nationalists. Many
other Gulf states, upon gaining independence in 1971, followed suit, so
that MB became entrenched both in Arab Gulf societies and states and
were known as al-Sahwa in the KSA and al-Islah in Kuwait, the UAE,
and Bahrain.32 MB branches were also tolerated to a certain extent in
Jordan and Morocco. Even though it was strictly banned in the repub-
lics, the MB managed to maintain a socio-economic network, widening
its activities that were later to bear fruit in the Arab Spring events.

31 Saad Eddin Ibrahim, “Anatomy of Egypt’s Militant Islamic Groups: Methodological

Note and Preliminary Findings,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 12, no. 4
(December 1980): 430.
32 James A. Bill, “Resurgent Islam in the Persian Gulf,” Foreign Affairs 63, no. 1 (1984):

110–11, https://doi.org/10.2307/20042088.
 3  GULFIZATION OF THE MIDDLE EAST SECURITY COMPLEX …  71

In parallel, the KSA and other Arab Gulf states cultivated Wahhabi
Salafism that represents a radical interpretation of Islamic texts. For
Wahhabi scholars, though, faith is about order and a dread of anarchy,
where obedience to the rulers is given a religious sanction.33 The KSA
also pioneered the use of Wahhabism as a major tool to advance its
regional foreign policy interests—promoting its image as the center and
leader of Islam.34 This mobilization of religion started in the 1960s to
confront Arab nationalism/socialism and was then significantly expanded
to confront communism in the Mujahedeen struggle against the 1979
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, in an alliance with the USA and its
regional allies: Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco. This policy reached its peak
in the 1980s onwards, by championing this extremist ideology world-
wide to outbid Khomeini’s Iran call for theocracy.35
This policy soon exploded for its inherent contradiction—that is, a
status-quo power sponsoring one revisionist camp, Islamism, to under-
mine another, Arab nationalism and its allies. It proved that the Arab
ruling elites, by supporting extremists, were strengthening the very
forces that are committed to their destruction.36 Under Sadat’s Egypt,
the short-lived tolerance of the MB and Salafism led to the emergence
of more extremist groups—whose members assassinated Sadat himself in
1981—all drawing on the teachings of the MB thinker Sayyid Qutb and
his disciple Abd al-Salam Faraj, who advocated violence against Muslim
rulers and governments viewed as un-abided by the Quran.37 As for the
KSA, the Mujahedeen veterans formed Al-Qaeda in 1988, establishing
the base for the proliferation of several branches, including the one tar-
geting Saudi rule, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, which presented

33 Fouad Ajami, “America and the Arabs,” Foreign Affairs 80, no. 6 (November 2001):

6–7.
34 F. Gregory Gause, “Saudi Arabia’s Regional Security Strategy,” in International

Politics of the Persian Gulf, ed. Mehran Kamrava (New York: Syracuse University Press,
2011), 169–83.
35 David Goldfischer, “The United States and Its Key Gulf Allies: A New Foundation for

a Troubled Partnership,” in The Small Gulf States: Foreign and Security Policies before and
after the Arab Spring, ed. Jean-Marc Rickli and Khalid S. Almezaini (London: Routledge,
2017), 69.
36 Bill, “Resurgent Islam in the Persian Gulf,” 123–24.

37 Danny Orbach, “Tyrannicide in Radical Islam: The Case of Sayyid Qutb and Abd

al-Salam Faraj,” Middle Eastern Studies 48, no. 6 (2012): 961–72, https://doi.org/10.10
80/00263206.2012.723629.
72  A. YOSSEF

“the most potent ideological threat to Saudi rule, as it questioned the

sincerity of the Saudis’ adherence to their own Wahhabist interpretation
of Islam.”38
The second strand of Islamism has been Shiite, basically in Iran.
Though it was initiated by the emergence in 1946 of the Fadaiyun Islam
(FI) party, the FI suppression by the Shah regime, as well as the rise in
the early 1960s of Ayatollah Khomeini, made the latter and his move-
ment the leader of the 1979 Islamic revolution.39 Revolutionary Iran
explicitly applied the direct rule of the clergy, Vilayat-i Faqih, and the
export of the revolution to the region’s countries, especially the mon-
archies that were deemed un-Islamic, as well as the republics, espe-
cially Saddam’s Iraq, which resulted in their long war (1980–1988).40
Co-opting Shiite minorities in the Arab world, Iran has established,
throughout the last three decades, strongholds in Lebanon (Hezbollah),
Yemen (Houthi movement), and Iraq, which turned into Iran’s backyard
following the fall of Saddam.
The Shiite Islamist strand has a conceptual link to its Sunni coun-
terpart. In essence, the ideas of the MB founder, Hassan al-Banna, are
not any different from those of Khomeini—with Islamic fundamental-
ists viewing the only remedy for Muslim society’s ills (i.e., corruption
and foreign domination) is making the government fully Islamic with
the Quran as its constitution.41 This is a relationship that dates back
to the 1950s, when the FI identified itself along the lines of the MB.42
Revolutionary Iran has also been in support of Sunni Islamists, (i.e., the
MB), including its Palestinian branch, Hamas, and local Jihadist groups
in Egypt, Libya, and Algeria, with links to Al-Qaeda as well.
Relations between the Sunni and Shiite Islamists are complex, as
each attempts to restrain its own hegemonic ambition over the world of

38 Gause, “Saudi Arabia’s Regional Security Strategy,” 172.

39 Mohsen M. Milani, The Making of Iran’s Islamic Revolution (Boulder: Westview Press,
1994), 39.
40 Shaharam Akbarzadeh, “Iran and the Gulf Cooperation Council Sheikhdoms,” in The

Small Gulf States: Foreign and Security Policies before and after the Arab Spring, ed. Jean-
Marc Rickli and Khalid S. Almezaini (London: Routledge, 2017), 90–96.
41 Elie Kedouri, Politics in the Middle East (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 330.

42 Mehdi Khalaji, “Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood and Iran,” The Washington Institute,

February 12, 2009, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/egypts-

muslim-brotherhood-and-iran.
 3  GULFIZATION OF THE MIDDLE EAST SECURITY COMPLEX …  73

Islamism and overcome their fierce theological differences, for cooper-

ation with the other in face of the common enemy. These attempts are
not always successful, but that does not take their solid common ground
away. They share the same values and the same foes: the West and its
allies in the region. This is precisely how KSA Crown Prince Mohamed
bin Salman (MBS) came to perceive the Islamists as a triangle of evil—
the Iranian regime, the MB, and the terrorists Al-Qaeda and ISIL—that
is trying “to promote the idea that our duty as Muslims is to reestablish
the caliphate, to reestablish the mindset of the caliphate –that the glory
of Islam is in building an empire by force.”43

Rivalry in the 1990s and Afterwards

Arab nationalism’s credibility was undermined by the Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait in 1990 and the monarchies vs. republics bipolarity also declined.
In replacement came the so-called “Arab regional order,” consolidating
the status quo alignment, including the GCC countries, Egypt, Jordan,
Tunisia, Morocco, and the PLO-led Palestinian National Authority
(PNA). This order gradually succeeded in pushing forward its agenda vis-
a-vis the nationalist republics (Syria, Libya, Sudan, Yemen and Algeria) in
the endorsement of peace with Israel as the strategic option in the Arab
League summit of 1996 and the Arab Peace Initiative in 2002.44
It should be noted that Israel has been an established member of the
status quo alignment. Ever since the 1950s, in what became known as
the Periphery Doctrine, Israel extended ties to Kemalist Turkey and
Imperial Iran to weaken a potential Arab nationalist alliance against it.
As Iran in 1979 and Turkey in 2009 turned revisionist, Israel’s Arab sta-
tus quo partners increased, either openly following formal peace treaties
(Egypt in 1979 and Jordan in 1994), or tacitly, as with the pre-1994
Jordan and the Gulf states since the 1990s.45 Status quo parties (excluding

43 Jeffrey Goldberg, “Saudi Crown Prince: Iran’s Supreme Leader ‘Makes Hitler Look

Good’,” The Atlantic, April 2, 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/

archive/2018/04/mohammed-bin-salman-iran-israel/557036/.
44 Gamal Abul Hassan, “Defending the Regional Order Is a Political Must (in Arabic),”

Asharq Al-Awsat, February 27, 2016, https://aawsat.com/home/writer/Gamal%20

Abu%20Alhasan.
45 See Klieman, “The ­Israel-Jordan Tacit Security Regime”; Jones and Guzansky, “Israel’s

Relations with the Gulf States.”

74  A. YOSSEF

Israel) and revisionist ones back ending Israeli occupation of the Palestinian
and Syrian territories, though they differ significantly over which means,
peaceful or violent, to achieve that, as well as the legitimacy of Israel
per se.
As the status quo alignment was consolidating, the challenge to it
from the revisionist Islamist camp heightened. Three Islamist rises took
place since the mid-1990s and were reinforced in the next decade and
half, culminating in the key role the Islamists played since the Arab
Spring first movement.
The first rise was that of Iran. Following Iraq’s defeat in 1991 and
the crippling sanctions it suffered, Iran emerged as the most powerful
state in the Gulf.46 Moreover, the American-led invasion in 2003 not
only destroyed Iraq’s role as a regional power for long time to come, but
it also turned Iraq itself into a playing field for rivalries among regional
powers, including Iran, the KSA, Turkey, and Syria.47 Iran, however,
has been singled out as the main beneficiary. It gained a strategic ally
in the post-Saddam Iraq, thanks to the rise to power in Baghdad of
Shiite Islamist parties, many of whose leaders were in exile in Iran during
Saddam’s era.48 This alliance enabled Iran to establish a direct territorial
connection to supply its allies in Syria and Lebanon, escape international
sanctions, and support its economy by vast trade volumes with Iraq.49
The second rise was that of Islamist Turkey, following the electoral
victory of the Refah party in 1995, which was later replaced by the
empowered Justice and Development Party (AKP) under the leadership
of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in 2002. Shifting from the principle established
by Kemal Ataturk—that Turkey should limit its involvement in Middle
Eastern affairs—the AKP-led government has moved to spend Turkey’s
foreign policy energies, as well as its security focus, in this region.
Aspiring to a return to the centuries-long Ottoman rule of the Arab
world, the AKP “has promoted solidarity with Islamist, a­nti-Western

46 Gause, The International Relations of the Persian Gulf, 129.

47 Gause, 7.
48 Suzanne Maloney, “How the Iraq War Has Empowered Iran,” Brookings

Institution, March 21, 2008, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/how-the-iraq-war-

has-empowered-iran/.
49 Nima Khorrami Assl, “Iraq Makes Sanctions against Iran Ineffective,” The Guardian,

January 27, 2012, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/jan/27/

iraq-sanctions-iran-ineffective.
 3  GULFIZATION OF THE MIDDLE EAST SECURITY COMPLEX …  75

regimes (Qatar and Sudan, for example) while dismissing secular,

pro-Western Muslim governments (Egypt, Jordan, and Tunisia), aligning
with Hamas against the Palestinian Authority.”50
The third rise, though only with an impact in league with Turkey,
was that of Islamist-aligned Qatar, following the 1995 palace coup in
Doha that brought to power a new emir, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa
al-Thani. There was a dissent within the GCC against Hamad for having
ousted his own father. The KSA, the UAE, and Bahrain backed the for-
mer emir, Sheikh Khalifa. Dissent developed into enmity following the
aborted counter-coup in 1996, which Emir Hamad was convinced, was
supported by the KSA, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt.51 Combined with
the ambition of Emir Hamad for his small, wealthy country to become
also an important regional player, this enmity led Emir Hamad to make
a shift in Qatari foreign policy. This shift involved an allegiance with the
Islamist spectrum, ranging from the MB and Hezbollah to the Afghan
Taliban, with no fear of retaliation at home for their strong alliance with
the regime.52 As a starter, Doha initiated the Al-Jazeera satellite news
channel, which heavily engaged in criticizing the status quo govern-
ments’ domestic and foreign policies.
A telling demonstration of how these developments have matured
into the reality of who’s who in the rival alignments is the 2006 Lebanon
war fought between Israel and the Shiite Hezbollah militia in Lebanon.
Despite the rhetoric denouncing the Israeli aggression, the status
quo parties (i.e., Egypt, the KSA, the UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain, Jordan,
Morocco, and Tunisia), as well as the PNA and the Lebanese govern-
ment itself (then led by the March 14 coalition, a close ally of the KSA),
condemned Hezbollah’s actions as unwise and responsible for the mas-
sive destruction that Israel caused in Lebanon. The revisionist align-
ment, in its Islamist camp (i.e., Iran, Turkey, Sudan, Qatar, and Hamas)
or in its Arab nationalist one (i.e., Syria, Libya, and Algeria), were on
the other side and supported Hezbollah as it continued armed conflict
against Israel.

50 Soner Cagaptay, “Is Turkey Leaving the West,” Foreign Affairs, October 26, 2009,

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2009-10-26/turkey-leaving-west.
51 Andrew Rathmell and Kirsten Schulze, “Political Reform in the Gulf: The Case of

Qatar,” Middle Eastern Studies 36, no. 4 (October 2000): 54.

52 David B. Roberts, “Qatar and the UAE: Exploring Divergent Responses to the Arab

Spring,” Middle East Journal 71, no. 4 (Autumn 2017): 560.

76  A. YOSSEF

On the eve of the Arab Spring, the Islamist camp received a boost
from the administration of President Barack Obama, who denied support
to the status quo governments. Obama was convinced that the USA was
overstretched in the Middle East. In this view, “rightsizing the United
States’ footprint in the region meant not only reducing its material pres-
ence but also exercising restraint diplomatically, stepping back and chal-
lenging allies to take greater responsibility for their own security.”53 At
the same time, Obama apparently adopted the so-called engagement
leads to moderation theory. In this view, the inclusion of Islamists in
the political process would transform them from radical groups into
moderate forces, since their attempt to get the votes of large sectors of
society would necessarily mean the Islamists’ adoption of compromises
and ideas that are consistent with what the majority believes in.54 Here,
the Turkish experience was considered to be a crucial reference for suc-
cess. In essence, “Obama looked to Turkey, with its liberal, successful
economic model, to fill any power vacuum and serve as an example to
neighboring Muslim countries.”55

The Arab Spring’s Systemic Change: Gulfization

The Arab Spring first movement, and the developments that accompa-
nied it, have caused a drastic redistribution of power in the Gulf Region
and the broader Middle East security complex, as it weakened the
status quo alignment and empowered the revisionist. This r­edistribution
of power, in turn, is manifest in the supremacy of the Gulf parties—
or Gulfization—in the broader Middle East. Before discussing the
manifestations, I briefly review in the next few lines the causes of the
redistribution of power.
First, the Arab Spring first movement presented the Gulf status quo
powers with an unprecedented challenge, by introducing a fundamental
change in the ways in which leaderships could be ousted in the Middle

53 Marc Lynch, “Obama and the Middle East: Rightsizing the U.S. Role,” Foreign

Affairs 94, no. 5 (September 2015): 18.

54 Mohamed Kamal, “Obama Wearing a Turban (in Arabic),” Al-Masry Al-Youm, August

25, 2013, https://ww.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/199659.

55 Fawaz A. Gerges, “The Obama Approach to the Middle East: The End of America’s

Moment?” International Affairs 89 (March 2013): 316–17, https://doi.org/10.1111/

1468-2346.12019.
 3  GULFIZATION OF THE MIDDLE EAST SECURITY COMPLEX …  77

East. Traditionally, despite Arab nationalists having targeted the domestic

populations of their rivals, the act of ousting a leadership was done by a
core group of military officers undertaking a coup. For this reason, Arab
regimes—republics and monarchies alike—have excelled in coup-proof-
ing strategies that deprive their militaries of the ability to challenge their
rule.56 The sole exception was Iran’s 1979 Islamic revolution, but that
was considered precisely an exception because it occurred in a non-Arab
state. In 2011, coup-proofing strategies proved irrelevant since the Arab
regimes were challenged, at least initially, by civilian, leaderless massive
demonstrations. Also, unlike in the past, when the feared domino effect
of exporting the revolution could take months or years to materialize, the
two Arab Spring movements took a much faster pace of days to months,
which intensified the anxiety of a revolutionary wave threat.57
This unprecedented challenge opened a strategic window of oppor-
tunity for the revisionist alignment that the three rises did not miss. Iran
celebrated the Arab Spring first movement as an Islamic Awakening,
a belated imitation of the Islamic revolution in Iran; it attempted to take
advantage of it by supporting the Shiite minority protest in Bahrain and
providing weapons to the Houthi movement in Yemen.58 Qatar made a
strategic decision to support the Islamists, partly to support the “even-
tual winners in order to magnify its influence and reach” and partly to ally
with Turkey “for fear of being too small against the sweeping regional tur-
moil.”59 Returning the favor, Iran and Turkey were the first to support
Doha in facing the boycott imposed on it by the KSA, the UAE, Bahrain
(Gulf trio), and Egypt. Apparently to counter the similar risks, Turkey
went as far as to deploy forces in its military base in Qatar in 2017.60

56 James T. Quinlivan, “Coup-Proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle

East,” International Security 24, no. 2 (Fall 1999): 131–65.
57 Uzi Rabi, Back to the Future, the Middle East in the Shadow of the Arab Spring (Tel-

Aviv: Resling, 2016), 15–17, 41–45.

58 Akbarzadeh, “Iran and the Gulf Cooperation Council Sheikhdoms,” 96; remarkably

Sunni Islamists had earlier celebrated the triumph of Khomeini’s overthrow of the Shah.
59 Marwa Maziad, “The Turkish Burden: The Cost of the Turkey-Qatar Alliance and

Hard Power Projection into Qatar’s Foreign Policy,” in The Arab Gulf States and The West:
Perceptions and Realities—Opportunities and Perils, ed. Dania Koleilat Khatib and Marwa
Maziad (London: Routledge, 2019), 114.
60 Md Muddassir Quamar, “The Turkish Military Base in Doha: A Step towards

Gaining ‘Strategic Depth’ in the Middle East?” Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses
Comment, September 26, 2017, https://idsa.in/idsacomments/the-turkish-military-base-
in-doha_mmquamar_260917.
78  A. YOSSEF

Second, the revolutionary wave came at a time when the Arab Gulf
status quo could not count on traditional allies’ support, as mentioned
above. In the pre-Arab Spring struggle against the revisionists, the Arab
Gulf could count on the support from other status quo regional powers
(Iran in the 1960s and Egypt from the 1980s onwards), but essentially
from the USA. Since the Arab Spring first movement, neither support
has been available. Iran has turned, since 1979, into the main rival, while
the revolution in Egypt itself caused a severe instability of the country.
Egypt’s instability caused an abrupt disturbance of the aforementioned
Arab regional order, which was based on the Egyptian–Saudi axis. Unlike
in the pre-Arab Spring times, the Egyptian government “is having diffi-
culty putting its own house in order, which prevents it from playing its
traditional regional and inter-Arab role.”61 Despite the declared Egyptian
commitment to the security of the Arab Gulf states as a “red line,” Egypt
proved ready only for limited military engagement outside its borders.
In the Arab coalition war in Yemen, Egypt participates only with naval
assets, with no boots on the ground.
Moreover, the KSA found the USA in retreat from engagement in the
Middle East: abandoning traditional allies, Mubarak and Ben-Ali, hesi-
tant to confront foes (leading from behind against the Qaddafi regime),
refrained from intervention against the Bashar al-Assad regime (even
after crossing the USA-defined red line of using chemical weapons), and
appeased the traditional enemy, Iran, with whom the Obama admin-
istration reached the nuclear deal in 2015. The USA–GCC summit at
Camp David that President Obama convened in May 2015 appears to
have had little effect. In short, the Saudi fear—understandable under
expanding Iranian influence in Syria and Iraq and the chaotic regional
situation—is that the House of Saud potentially might have to face a
similar fate, involving popular protests and evolving into a civil war with
­Iranian-backed militias, all with USA reluctance to intervene for its allies.
Finally, the GCC, established in 1981 primarily to counter Iran’s
export of revolution and traditionally under Saudi dominance, is now

61 Gabriel Ben-Dor, “Overview: Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Face a Region in Flux,” in

Saudi Arabia, the Gulf and the New Regional Landscape, ed. Joshua Teitelbaum (Ramat
Gan: The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, 2017), 22, https://besacenter.org/
wp-content/uploads/2017/06/MSPS133.pdf.
 3  GULFIZATION OF THE MIDDLE EAST SECURITY COMPLEX …  79

divided. Unlike the unitary “Club of Monarchs” depicted by Khouri,62

the GCC has been divided into three factions: the belligerent status quo
Gulf trio mentioned above, the revisionist Qatar, and the almost neutral
Kuwait and Oman. Kuwait had been suffering from Iranian attempts on
its stability ever since the 1980s, and it vehemently opposed the ouster
of leaderships in the Arab Spring. However, it welcomed Iran’s nuclear
deal in 2015, deliberately choosing not to fully cut ties with Iran when
the KSA and Bahrain did so in 2016, and opting to mediate between
Qatar and the KSA, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt. Oman similarly wel-
comed the nuclear deal, as it had earlier hosted secret meetings between
American and Iranian negotiators, and it also had chosen not to sever
diplomatic relations with Iran. Oman rejected joining the KSA-led
coalition in Yemen and mediated between the two Yemeni warring
parties. The causes for these choices of Kuwait and Oman are a balancing
between Iran and the KSA and a greater focus on trade than on one-sided
alignment.63
This redistribution of power is manifest in the Gulfization of the
Middle East security complex or the supremacy of the Gulf parties in the
two alignments. Traditional Arab powers in the Levant, Egypt, and Syria
are consumed by their domestic conflicts, whereas the Gulf states, via
abundant finance, media empires, and a central position in transnational
networks, are well qualified to project power capabilities abroad.64
For the status quo alignment, and well beyond the security interde-
pendence within the broader Middle East complex, as Buzan and Waever
argue, there is now greater dependence of the Levant and the Maghreb
on the Gulf. Post-2013 Egypt, as well as the rest of the status quo align-
ment members (i.e., Tunisia, Jordan, Lebanon, and the PNA) all have
been depending to a considerable extent on the Gulf trio’s support. This
support existed before, but the difference here is that it provided rapid,

62 Khoury, “The Arab Cold War Revisited.”

63 See Hamad H. Albloshi, “Kuwait’s Careful Balancing Act with Iran, Saudi Arabia,”
Al-Monitor, May 24, 2018, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/05/
iran-jcpoa-nuclear-deal-gcc-saudi-kuwait-reaction-division.html; Dina Esfandiary and
Ariane M. Tabatabai, “Scent of an Oman: The Sultanate Moves toward the Saudis,” Foreign
Affairs, January 17, 2017, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/persian-gulf/2017-
01-17/scent-oman.
64 Lynch, “The New Arab Order.”
80  A. YOSSEF

unconditional credit lines precisely at a time when foreign investment was

low and international donors exerted pressures.65 Currently, eight years
after the Arab Spring, the Arab Gulf emerged as an island of stability in
the midst of regional chaos, and the KSA “positioned itself as the chief
architect of a counterrevolution to contain, and perhaps to even reverse,
the Arab Spring as much as possible.”66 It is no wonder then, for example,
that in the Arab–Israeli conflict (dealing with which has been tradition-
ally the prerogative of states in the Levant subcomplex), the KSA and the
UAE turned, albeit quietly, into the leading interlocutors. In an interview
in April 2018, MBS only fell short of a Sadat-like speech when he voiced
recognition of Israel’s right to exist.67
Recognizing the revolutionary wave threat and assuming lead-
ership, the KSA decided to abandon its soft tools of influence and
moved to the direct use of force in Bahrain (with a Saudi-led GCC
forces) and in Yemen (with an Arab coalition under its command). In
2015, the Kingdom established the Islamic Military Alliance to Fight
Terrorism, with 34 countries, all members of the Organization of Islamic
Cooperation (excluding Syria, Iraq, and Iran) and particularly those with
military power, in troop numbers and battle experience that could con-
tribute significantly to the defense of the Gulf in time of need, such as
Egypt and Pakistan. The UAE participated militarily in the NATO-led
campaign to topple the Qaddafi’s regime, and it cooperates with Egypt
in supporting the military effort of General Khalifa Haftar’s Operation
Dignity. In Syria, the KSA has been heavily engaged in political and mili-
tary support of the Sunni Islamist forces fighting the Assad regime.
For the revisionist alignment, Iran, which has already been on the lead
in Shiite Islamist strand, sought to fill the regional vacuum by expand-
ing its influence; military intervention in Syria, directly (through the

65 For the PLO, and Hamas, see e.g., Lisa Watanabe, “Gulf States’ Engagement in North

Africa: The Role of Foreign Aid,” in The Small Gulf States: Foreign and Security Policies
before and after the Arab Spring, ed. Jean-Marc Rickli and Khalid S. Almezaini (London:
Routledge, 2017), 175–77; Philipp O. Amour, “Hamas-PLO/Fatah Reconciliation and
Rapprochement within the Unfolding Regional Order in the Middle East since 2010:
Neorealist and Neoclassical Realist Perspectives,” Journal of Social Sciences of Mus Alparslan
University 6, no. 5 (April 13, 2018): 621–31, https://doi.org/10.18506/anemon.384773.
66 Mehran Kamrava, “The Arab Spring and the Saudi-Led Counterrevolution,” Orbis 56,

no. 1 (2012): 96, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2011.10.011.

67 Goldberg, “Saudi Crown Prince.”
 3  GULFIZATION OF THE MIDDLE EAST SECURITY COMPLEX …  81

Revolutionary Guard Corps) and by proxy (through a Shiite foreign

legion consisting of fighters from Hezbollah, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan,
and Pakistan) to fight on Assad’s side.68 Iran is the major supplier of the
Houthi movement in Yemen, and as the KSA reached out to Morocco
(as well as Jordan, that both were invited to join the GCC) to strengthen
the status quo, Iran started supporting the Polisario Front—an Algerian
proxy militia claiming Morocco’s southern provinces—by delivering to
it, through Hezbollah, anti-aircraft missiles.69 Qatar has supported the
short-lived government of the MB in Egypt in 2012–2013 and provided
money and weapons to MB-affiliated and other Islamist militias in Libya
and Syria; Qatar was also accused by the Gulf trio of working against the
Arab coalition in Yemen from within by aiding the Iran-aligned Houthi
movement.70 The point of interest here, in all the above issues, is that
the Gulf states are not merely players among others but they are the lead-
ing force.
What are the implications of Gulfization? At least three seem to
stand out, demanding special emphasis. First, and most visible, is the
primacy of the Gulf issues (the KSA vs. Iran, the Arab-trio plus Egypt
vs. Qatar, the war in Yemen) over others in the Middle East (e.g., the
Palestine Cause). Writing in 2003, Buzan and Waever stated: “although
the Gulf added a second core to the Middle Eastern Regional Security
Complex (RSC), the nature of its internal security dynamics did not gen-
erate anything like the same symbolic intensity that enabled the Arab–
Israeli one to tie together a wide geographical spread of Arab and Islamic
states.”71 At this post-Arab Spring first movement writing (2019), this
situation seems to have turned upside down. The Arab–Israeli conflict—
which is in effect confined to the Palestinian–Israeli arena given the
situation in Syria and Lebanon—has been relegated to a second-grade

68 Michael Eisenstadt, “Iran after Sanctions: Military Procurement and Force-Structure

Decisions” (The International Institute for Strategic Studies [IISS], December 2017), 1–7,
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/opeds/Eisenstadt20171219-
IISS-chapter.pdf.
69 Michael Rubin, “Why Is Iran Trying to Sabotage Morocco?” Washington Examiner,

May 2, 2018, https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/israel-isnt-the-only-country-

iran-is-meddling-with.
70 “Qatar Admits That It Is against the Arab Coalition in Yemen,” Al Arabiya, July 19,

2017, http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/gulf/2017/07/19/Qatar-admits-that-it-is-
against-the-Arab-coalition-in-Yemen.html.
71 Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers, 192–93.
82  A. YOSSEF

issue because the state and non-state actors in the region are preoccupied
with more urgent business; in turn, this provided Israel an opportunity
to improve its ties with the Arab members in the status quo alignment.72
Under the current circumstances, “no one wants to hear about this con-
flict, no one really believes it is solvable.”73
Second, the status quo alignment, being currently led by the KSA
and the UAE, is undergoing a critical stage. As noted earlier, the sta-
tus quo alignment in the Gulf subcomplex is not on the majority (three
of the GCC countries are either revisionist or neutral) and the rest of
the Arab status quo alignment members depend, to various degrees, on
political and financial support from the Gulf trio. As the support from
this thin body—the Gulf trio—is so vital for the survival of the status
quo as an alignment, its leadership is fragile. MBS has had to face inter-
nal challenges to his premature, rule-breaking rise to the Crown Prince
position. More importantly, he has thus far made a record of high-risk
policy choices (including the sudden initiation of deep socio-economic
changes and the arbitrary arrests of princes of the royal family, and most
recently the suspected murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi) that
raise doubts about his leadership’s responsibility and reliability, two char-
acteristics that are crucial for any alliance’s stability.
Finally, Gulfization could bring more violent religious extremism than
before in the Gulf Region and the broader Middle East. At a time when
the appeal of secular Arab nationalism has declined, the Gulf subcom-
plex states and non-state actors—status quo and revisionist alike—appeal
to religion for legitimacy. Moreover, the Gulf’s dominant actors (Iran,
Qatar, the KSA, and the UAE) resort to the employment of Islamist
groups, peaceful and armed alike, to serve their interests. While the
employment of these groups has long been a tradition for the revisionist
Islamist camp, the status quo parties are now committing the same (most
likely) mistake they did in the past when they employed Wahhabism to
defeat Arab nationalism and its allies, socialism and communism—only to
the detriment of the status quo alignment. This might fulfill James Bill’s
prophecy, made back in 1984, that the struggle in the Middle East has

72 Philipp O. Amour, “Israel, the Arab Spring, and the Unfolding Regional Order in the

Middle East: A Strategic Assessment,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 44, no. 3
(July 3, 2017): 293–309, https://doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2016.1185696.
73 Gamal Abul Hassan, “After 25 Years of Oslo (in Arabic),” Almasry Alyoum, September

16, 2018, https://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/1323041.

 3  GULFIZATION OF THE MIDDLE EAST SECURITY COMPLEX …  83

passed republics vs. monarchies or secular vs. Islamists divisions, and is

now between Establishment Islam vs. Populist Islam.74
Has the Gulf Region and broader Middle East been exceptional in
this complex reality portrayed above, during and after the revolutions?
Could history be of guidance to better understand these developments
in the region and perhaps provide an insight to the future? The following
section seeks to answer these questions by drawing comparatively on the
European Revolutions of 1848.

Historical Analogies and the Arab Spring Movements

Historical analogies are a risky business, but they cannot be ignored
because they influence perceptions of politicians in charge, which, in
turn, influence decisions and actions of states and non-state actors.
For the Arab Spring movements, the use of analogies by politicians has
reflected conflicting views and consequently impacted policy decisions.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel took the lead in comparing
the 2011 uprisings to Iran’s 1979 Islamic revolution,75 whereas the USA
President Obama compared the Arab Spring first movement to the 1989
European revolutions’ overthrow of communism.76 In 2011, intellectu-
als and the general public in several Arab countries analogized Tunisia’s
overthrow of Ben Ali and therefore “jumped to the conclusion that they
could successfully challenge their own autocrats”—and then serious
problems aroused.77
A comparison between the 1848 European springtime of the peoples
and the Arab Spring movements is helpful for a couple of reasons. It puts
the Arab Spring movements into historical perspective; it highlights the
Middle East’s distinctiveness rather than its exceptionalism, especially
with regards to the dynamics of competing regional alliances. Moreover,

74 Bill,
“Resurgent Islam in the Persian Gulf.”
75 Amr Yossef, “Israel and Post-Mubarak Egypt: Perils of Historical Analogy,” Digest of
Middle East Studies 21, no. 1 (March 2012): 49–68.
76 Mark Lander, “Obama Cites Poland and Model for Arab Shift,” New York Times, May

28, 2011, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/29/world/europe/29prexy.html.

77 Kurt Weyland, “The Arab Spring: Why the Surprising Similarities with the

Revolutionary Wave of 1848,” Perspectives on Politics 10, no. 4 (2012): 917–34, https://
doi.org/10.1017/S1537592712002873.
84  A. YOSSEF

a reasonable review of observed parallels offers a tool to read past events

differently, as well as a range of potential future developments.
Notwithstanding the differences between the two cases, they share
some strong similarities. Both political phenomena were region-wide
popular uprisings that emerged largely in the states whose populations
were suffering most in socio-economic conditions, where the eruption
of uprising in one country (France in 1848 and Tunisia in 2010) was the
signal for similar events almost everywhere. Both came against the back-
ground of a major revolution (the French revolution in 1789 and Iran’s
Islamic revolution in 1979), whose repetition was much aspired by the
neo-revolutionaries and feared by the status quo powers. Both revolu-
tionaries of 1848 and 2011 were ultimately unable to hold state power,
yielding positions after a short interval to representatives of previously
established regimes; it was not long before events moved from the ongo-
ing revolution to the post-revolution phase. These similarities between
the two episodes combine to make what Henry Hale has aptly called
“regime change cascades.”78
Another central similarity is that each revolutionary wave has
sharpened, though not created, the division of the region into two
­
alignments—“party of order” and “party of movement.”79 The f­ormer
encompassed conservative regimes whose aim is to preserve the sta-
tus quo and prevent the spread of revolution into their own territories,
while the latter encompassed the revolutionary revisionist governments
and their supporters of transnational movements. To a great extent, the
position of the KSA since 2011 is reminiscent of that of 1848 Russia,
which represented not only the largest monarchy that had not witnessed a
revolution, but also the one that suddenly found itself in the central posi-
tion against the revolutionaries in Europe, that had the greatest stake in
the prevention of revolutionary spread, and that had taken active steps,
diplomatically and militarily, to that end.
Tsarist Russia used military force to prevent the spread of the revo-
lutionary wave close to its territory. In two occasions, Russia did take
actions: in 1848 against Romanian nationalists in the Principalities of

78 Henry E. Hale, “Regime Change Cascades: What We Have Learned from the 1848

Revolutions to the 2011 Arab Uprisings,” Annual Review of Political Science 16, no. 1
(May 2013): 331–53, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-032211-212204.
79 Jonathan Sperber, The European Revolutions, 1848–1851 (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1994).

 3  GULFIZATION OF THE MIDDLE EAST SECURITY COMPLEX …  85

Moldavia and Wallachia and in 1849 against the revolutionary govern-

ment of Hungary. The resultant impression of many observers in 1849
that “the tsar was the arbiter of the destinies of Europe,” was reinforced
in 1850, when the threat of the use of force by Russia was sufficient to
prevent Prussia and other German states from taking over Schleswig-
Holstein and to prevent the radicals from taking Berlin.80 Domestically,
unlike the West, Russian opposition was lacking any type of political par-
ties who found support in the liberal bourgeoisie or frustrated national
movements elsewhere in Europe, a fact that enabled the tsarist regime,
with relative ease, to take measures to prevent the revolutionary funk
from infecting the Empire, canceling agrarian reforms, tightening cen-
sorship, and conducting massive arrests.81
This is not much different from the position of the KSA since 2011.
Domestically, and also unlike most of the Arab republics, which had at
least some sort of political organizations or frustrated national move-
ments, the lack of these elements in the KSA enabled the regime to take
severe measures against the opposition, including the execution of Shiite
opposition leader Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr in 2016. Externally, the KSA
has thus far intervened militarily twice, in 2011 against the protests in
Bahrain and since 2015 in Yemen. On other occasions, it threatened to
use force and/or engaged in proxy war in Libya and Syria, supporting
the revolutionary forces against the revisionist governments there—this
support makes a difference from 1848 Russia, which was completely
counterrevolutionary. Nevertheless, these interventions by Russia in
1848–49 and the KSA in 2011–present show that being a status quo, or
“party of order,” does not prevent its parties from behaving aggressively
or from attempting a regime change in the rival revisionist, or “part of
movement” states.
Perhaps the second difference between 1848 Russia and the KSA is
that the latter not only has the financial resources to support its allies,
but it also engaged itself domestically in a sort of social and economic
reform, though without endangering the interests of the ruling elite. Of
course, it remains to be seen whether these unsuccessful uprisings in the
Gulf Region and the broader Middle East would constitute major social

80 I. W. Roberts, “Russia in 1848 and 1849,” in Encyclopedia of Revolutions of 1848,

accessed August 29, 2019, https://www.ohio.edu/chastain/rz/russia.htm.

81 Isaiah Berlin, “Russia and 1848,” The Slavonic and East European Review 26, no. 67

(April 1948): 341–60.

86  A. YOSSEF

and political mass movements shaping developments in the next decades,

as they did in Europe until 1914.82 The suppression of the 1848 revo-
lutions notwithstanding, it was their political and socio-economic foun-
dations, as well as the rivalries they produced, that laid the basis for the
articulated ideologies of liberalism and social democracy in the late nine-
teenth century. Politically, moreover, the upheavals that took Europe in
the 1860s and the 1870s, resulting in the formation of new republics in
Germany and Italy, are reminders that the suppression of the 1848 revo-
lutions, although successful, may not last for long.

Conclusion
The goals of this chapter have been to reconstruct the security complex,
to provide a strategic situational awareness of the current dynamics in the
Gulf Region and the broader Middle East, and to clarify its implications
for theory and policy. The chapter started by providing a framework of
analysis, which views that the regional security complex’s rivalries revolve
around transnational identities that threaten the domestic regime secu-
rity of the parties involved. The transnational identities in the Gulf
Region and the broader Middle East constitute a bipolar system: status
quo alignment and the revisionist alignment, with its two camps, Arab
nationalist and Islamist, with the latter composed of two strands: Sunni
and Shiite.
Employing the framework suggested here has several advantages. It
puts the regional alliances/rivalries into context, linking continuity with
change. As for continuity, some basic tendencies simply endured in the
old and new Arab cold wars. Unlike Valbjørn and Bank’s argument,
that the “new societal Islamic Political Arabism is less about challeng-
ing the existing state system,”83 the forgoing analysis has shown that
in both cases Islamist parties have been a player within the alignments,
and domestic politics have been the battling ground, with the aim of
challenging the existing state system. Also, in both cases, unlike Ryan’s

82 Philipp O. Amour, “The Arab Spring Movement: The Failed Revolution. Preliminary

Theoretical and Empirical Deliberation,” in The Middle East Reloaded: Revolutionary

Changes, Power Dynamics, and Regional Rivalries since the Arab Spring, ed. Philipp
O. Amour, St. James’s Studies in World Affairs (Washington: Academica Press, 2018),
199–224.
83 Valbjørn and Bank, “The New Arab Cold War,” 13–15.
 3  GULFIZATION OF THE MIDDLE EAST SECURITY COMPLEX …  87

argument, the struggle has always been about regime security, by seeking
to influence the rival’s domestic politics. The position of the parties in
this bipolar system shifted and the ideology of the revisionist alignment
changed, but the constellation survived.
As for change, this framework’s adoption of transnational identi-
ties as threats allows a more flexible delineation of alliance member-
ship than that portrayed in the previous literature; specifically, it shows
that the regional cold war portrayed in the previous literature has not
in fact been confined to the Arab world. Rather, it has always included
the region’s non-Arab actors as well. The AKP-led government’s turn to
spend Turkey’s foreign policy energies, as well as its security focus, in this
region, signaled its inclusion in the Middle East security complex (that
was omitted in Buzan’s analysis). From this perspective, Israel is not an
outlier in the system, but rather an established and active member in the
status quo alignment. This supports Gause’s definition of the Middle
East system as one based on “sustained, durable interest and involve-
ment, expressed in tangible commitment of resources, to a common
agenda of issues among the states concerned.”84
Moreover, this framework enhances the validity of Klieman’s TSR
concept and its application by Jones and Guzansky. By showing that
shared values and perception of threats do not preclude competition
within the alliance or cooperation with members of the rival alliance in
other areas, this framework does an important service to our understand-
ing of the regional dynamics. It solves the puzzle of the ostensibly par-
adoxical policies by regional actors. For example, Khouri has described
Iran and Turkey as leading two distinct alliances, although they in fact
belong to the revisionist alignment/Islamist camp. Despite their compe-
tition—Shiite Iran actively supports the Assad regime and Sunni Turkey
opposes it—both share the motive of having a Syrian government that
should, at a minimum, remain outside the USA’s sphere of influence and
continue supporting armed conflict against Israel85; and, at maximum,
turn Islamist domestically as well. This explains why Tehran and Ankara
have been, more often than not, in a cooperative dynamic, along with

84 F. Gregory Gause, “Systemic Approaches to Middle East International Relations,”

International Studies Review 1, no. 1 (Spring 1999): 25.

85 Arshin Adib-Moghaddam, “After the ‘Middle East’: Turkey and Iran in a New

Region,” JETRO-IDE ME-Review 6, no. 3 (2019 [2018]): 2–7.

88  A. YOSSEF

Russia, in Syria.86 In the same vein, this explains why the Sunni monar-
chy of Qatar joined the revolutionary alignment/Islamist camp in dest-
abilizing the status quo powers, monarchies, republics, and non-state
actors alike.
The chapter then moved to explain how, within this framework, the
Gulfization emerged in the regional security complex, or the suprem-
acy of the Gulf parties in the two alignments. The Arab Spring events
have caused a drastic redistribution of power in region as it weakened
the status quo alignment and empowered the revisionist. It introduced
a revolutionary wave threat to the status quo, at a time when the Gulf
cannot rely on its traditional allies, the USA and Egypt, the GCC itself is
divided; this offered a strategic window of opportunity for the revisionist
alignment.
Gulfization is a manifest in the greater dependence of the Levant and
Maghreb subcomplexes on the security dynamics of the Gulf subcom-
plex. The KSA and the UAE on the one hand and Iran on the other
are not merely supporting their allies across the region, but they are
the leading force behind in dynamics in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine,
Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia, among others. The 2019 uprisings in Sudan
and Algeria—within the Arab Spring second movement—ousting the
leaderships of two revisionist regimes, turned these two countries, and
especially Sudan, into another area of competition between the two
alignments.
The implications of Gulfization are three-fold. First, the Gulf issues
gain the primacy over other issues in the Middle East, including the
iconic Arab–Israeli conflict. Second, the status quo alignment under the
leadership of the KSA and the UAE is passing a critical stage, given the
fragility and unpredictability of the leadership in the KSA and particularly
the MBS style, which is considered by regional and international observ-
ers to be unpredictable and unreliable. Third, Gulfization could bring
more violent religious extremism, given that governments of the Gulf
parties—status quo and revisionist alike—not only appeal to religion for
legitimacy, but they also employ Islamist armed groups to enforce their
agendas. This might indicate that the future struggle in the Middle East
would be between two versions of Islamism.

86 Hossein Aghaie Joobani and Mostafa Mousavipour, “Russia, Turkey, and Iran: Moving

towards Strategic Synergy in the Middle East?” Strategic Analysis 39, no. 2 (2015):
148–51, https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2014.1000658.
 3  GULFIZATION OF THE MIDDLE EAST SECURITY COMPLEX …  89

In this complex reality, the Gulf Region and the broader Middle
East has not been an exception in history. Despite differences, the Arab
Spring first movement shares strong similarities with the 1848 European
springtime of the peoples. Both constituted a revolutionary wave of
region-wide popular uprisings, where the eruption of uprising in one
country caused a domino effect in the neighborhood. Both revolution-
aries of 1848 and 2011 were also ultimately unable to hold state power,
eventually yielding positions to representatives of previously established
regimes. Moreover, the current position of Saudi Arabia is reminiscent,
to a great extent, of that of 1848 Russia in that both had to fight for the
survival of the status quo. The latter’s effort has successfully survived for
decades, while the former’s success is yet to be seen.
Even with the success of counterrevolutions, the status quo align-
ment would not probably succeed in the long term if it does not present
an alternative that provides solutions to the root causes that led to the
Arab Spring uprisings in the first place. Otherwise, and regardless of how
much support the Saudi-led Gulf trio gives to its status quo allies or sub-
dues opposition at home, it could eventually find itself in an uprising like
the one that took tsarist Russia in 1905 and again in 1917. The positive
side of MBS’s policies, gradually liberalizing the kingdom from the strict
interpretation of Wahhabism, could be a step in the right direction—a
genuinely tolerant interpretation of Islam. Similarly, the UAE, having
distanced itself from religious legitimacy, might have a better chance in
providing an example of moving closer toward secular liberalism.87

Acknowledgements   The author would like to thank Ian Fletcher, F. Gregory

Gause, Marwa Maziad, Gamal Rushdi, as well as the anonymous reviewers for
their helpful input and advice.

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 CHAPTER 4

The Conservative-Resistance Camp:

The Axis of Resistance

Ana Belén Soage

Introduction
The term Axis of resistance appeared in the aftermath of George W.
Bush’s 2002 State of the Union address, in which he described Iraq, Iran,
and North Korea as “an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the
world.”1 It is credited to the Libyan daily newspaper Al-Zahf al-Akhdar
(The Green March), which, in response to Bush’s speech, wrote that “the
only common denominator between Iran, Iraq, and North Korea is their
resistance to American hegemony.”2 The term soon became popular in the
Iranian and certain Arab media, but it was only picked up in the West in the
second half of the 2000s, during the Israeli wars in Lebanon and the Gaza

1 See “Text of President Bush’s 2002 State of the Union Address,” The Washington Post,

January 29, 2002, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/onpolitics/transcripts/sou012902.

htm.
2 Sa‘id Al-Shihabi, “‘Ta‘addud al-tahalufat yakshif ghiyab al-mashru‘ al-jami‘ li-l-Umma’

(The multiplicity of alliances reveals the absence of a joint project for the Umma),” Alquds Al-
Arabi, December 3, 2017.

A. B. Soage (*) 
EAE Business School, Calle del Príncipe de Vergara, 156,
Madrid 28002, Spain

© The Author(s) 2020 95

P. O. Amour (ed.), The Regional Order in the Gulf Region
and the Middle East, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45465-4_4
96  A. B. SOAGE

Strip. Critics of the alliance often use the term in quotation marks to express
their skepticism at its stated aims, and a second term, the axis of moderation,
has been coined to designate state and non-state actors in the Gulf Region
and the broader Middle East who are aligned with the West.3
The axis of resistance is made up of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the
Syrian regime, and Hezbollah in Lebanon, in addition to Hamas and the
Islamic Jihad in Palestine. More recently, journalists and analysts have fre-
quently added to the list some Iraqi Shia militias and the Yemeni Houthis
(see Table 14.1).4 Members of the alliance denounce what is perceived as
Western interference in the Gulf Region and the broader Middle East—
especially that of the United States—and identify resistance to impe-
rialism as their main foreign policy driver. Israel is singled out for vitriol,

3 The Axis of Moderation consists primarily of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan,

and Egypt. See e.g., “Mihwar al-i‘tidal’ yatamaddid bi-ri‘aya misriyya li-muharabat ‘al-irhab
(The Axis of Moderation Extends under the Auspices of Egypt in Order to Fight Terrorism),”
Al-Khaleej Online, July 21, 2014, https://alkhaleejonline.net/%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%
D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B9
%D8%AA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%8A%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%AF%D8%AF-%D8%A-
8%D8%B1%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-
%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A
5%D8%B1%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%A8; Abdul Rahman Al-Tariri, “Mihwar al-i‘tidal wa-mint-
aqat al-fawdha (The Axis of Moderation and the Area of Chaos),” February 6, 2017, www.
alarabiya.net/ar/saudi-today/2017/02/06/%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%
A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%
88%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B7%D9%82%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%
81%D9%88%D8%B6%D9%89.html; and Philipp O. Amour, “Israel, the Arab Spring, and the
Unfolding Regional Order in the Middle East: A Strategic Assessment,” British Journal of Middle
Eastern Studies 44, no. 3 (July 3, 2017): 296–301, 307–9, https://doi.org/10.1080/1353019
4.2016.1185696; Philipp O. Amour, “Revolutionary Changes, Power Dynamics, and Regional
Rivalries since the Arab Spring: An Introduction,” in The Middle East Reloaded: Revolutionary
Changes, Power Dynamics, and Regional Rivalries since the Arab Spring, ed. Philipp O. Amour,
St. James’s Studies in World Affairs (Washington: Academica Press, 2018), 1–21.
4 See e.g., Joseph Puder, “Iran and the Houthis of Yemen. Shiite Revivalism and Its

Challenge to Middle East Order,” Frontpage Magazine, November 29, 2016, https://
www.frontpagemag.com/fpm/264974/iran-and-houthis-yemen-joseph-puder; Rafke
Risseeuw, “Stirring Up the Region for Survival: Iran’s Role in the Middle East Proxy
Wars” (Brussels International Center, May 16, 2018), www.bic-rhr.com/research/stirring-
region-survival-irans-role-middle-east-proxy-wars.
 4  THE CONSERVATIVE-RESISTANCE CAMP: THE AXIS OF RESISTANCE  97

as it is considered the illegal product of British colonialism and is referred

to as al-kiyan al-sahyuni (the Zionist entity).5 In fact, the alliance is also
known as the axis of refusal, because its members refuse to recognize the
legitimacy of the Zionist state.
The present chapter looks at the ideology and politics of the axis of
resistance. It starts off by exploring the ideological sources of its discourse,
both religious and secular. It then looks at its emergence as a Syrian–Iranian
alliance brought together by a shared enemy, Baathist Iraq, and its evolu-
tion, marked by the civil war in Lebanon and the Palestinian Intifada. Those
events tested but eventually strengthened the alliance, which expanded to
include the non-state actors Hezbollah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and
Hamas. Furthermore, as Syria and Iran were forced to move away from
some of their core ideological tenets, especially on the economic front,
their anti-Zionist, anti-imperialist foreign policy became a major legitimiz-
ing instrument in domestic and regional politics. The chapter also examines
events that have affected the alliance, notably the Arab Spring, the civil war
in Syria, and the crises in Iraq and Yemen.

Ideological Underpinnings of the Axis of Resistance

Anti-western sentiment is a central theme for the axis of resistance,
and its sources are both secular and religious. A frequently men-
tioned example of the former is Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad
Mosaddegh, who was deposed in 1953 in a British- and US-engineered
coup after he nationalized his country’s oil industry and, as a result, is
still remembered as a national hero.6 In 1962, Iranian intellectual Jalal
Al-e Ahmad—a former member of the (communist) Tudeh Party who

5 The term “Zionist entity” was rather common in the Arab media until the 1980s, but it

is now associated with the axis of resistance. Its intention would be to emphasize that at the
root of the Middle East conflict is a political ideology, Zionism, and not Judaism as a religion
or the Jews as a people. Anti-Zionist Jews are often featured in media outlets to drive that
point home, e.g., “Yahud dhidd al-Sahyuniyya (Jews against Zionism),” Al-Manar, October 5,
2017, www.almanar.com.lb/2713291; “Judaism Forbids Creation of a Jewish State,” Iranian
Students’ News Agency (ISNA), May 20, 2018, https://en.isna.ir/news/97023016609/
Judaism-forbids-creation-of-a-Jewish-state.
6 Dan De Luce, “50 Years Later, Iranians Remember US-UK Coup,” The Christian Science

Monitor, August 22, 2003, https://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0822/p08s01-wome.html;

Firouzeh Mirrazavi, “Iran Celebrates 65th Anniversary of Oil Nationalization,” Iran Review,
March 18, 2016, http://www.iranreview.org/content/Documents/Iran-Celebrates-62nd-
Anniversary-of-Oil-Nationalization.htm.
98  A. B. SOAGE

was ambiguous about religion and despised the clergy—published a widely

circulated pamphlet entitled Gharbzadegi (“westoxification” or “occiden-
tosis”), in which he decried Iran’s cultural and economic dependency on
the West. But the most influential figure of the period was Ali Shariati, a
devout Muslim who read Sartre and Frantz Fanon while studying at the
Sorbonne and whose radical interpretation of Shia Islam—which included
harsh criticism of the conservative clergy—was heavily influenced by
Marxist sociology.7 Ayatollah Khomeini’s post-1970 depiction of soci-
ety as divided into two classes (tabaqat)—oppressors (mostakberin) and
oppressed (mostazafin)—reflects the pervasiveness of Shariati’s ideas in
­pre-revolutionary Iran.8
The axis of resistance draws on another source of a­nti-imperialist
thought that originated in the Sunni Arab world. In the late 1920s, Hasan
al-Banna established the Muslim Brotherhood in an Egypt nominally
independent but effectively still under British occupation. Al-Banna con-
demned the West’s cultural influence, as well as its military presence, and
he preached moral regeneration through Islam in order to eradicate both.
Moreover, he admired the totalitarian leaders who had risen to power in
Italy and Germany and challenged British and French hegemony, and he
adopted their discourse and parties as rhetorical and organizational mod-
els, respectively. In his writings, Islam became a “comprehensive system”
(nizam shamil) governing “[all] the affairs of this life and the next.”9
The Muslim Brotherhood was banned in Egypt in 1949 following a series
of bombings and murders, including that of Prime Minister Mahmoud
al-Nuqrashi, and al-Banna himself was assassinated, probably by the secret
police. Nevertheless, his organization survived and found a new ideologue
in disenchanted former liberal intellectual Sayyid Qutb.10

7 However, Shariati rejected historical determinism and institutionalized Marxism. For a

brief introduction to his life and thought, see Ervand Abrahamian, “‘Ali Shari‘ati: Ideologue
of the Iranian Revolution,” Middle East Report 102 (February 1982): 24–28.
8 Ervand Abrahamian, Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic (London: University of

California Press, 1993).

9 For more on the impact of such ideologies on Hassan al-Banna’s thought, see Ana Belén

Soage, “Hasan Al-Banna or the Politicisation of Islam,” Totalitarian Movements and Political
Religions 9, no. 1 (2008): 21–42, https://doi.org/10.1080/14690760701856374.
10 For more on Qutb’s evolution from liberal intellectual to Islamist firebrand, see

Ana Belén Soage, “Islamism and Modernity: The Political Thought of Sayyid Qutb,”
Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions 10, no. 2 (2009): 189–203, https://doi.
org/10.1080/14690760903119092.
 4  THE CONSERVATIVE-RESISTANCE CAMP: THE AXIS OF RESISTANCE  99

Qutb had a strong effect on a low-ranking Iranian cleric known as

Navvab-e Safavi (Prince of the Safavids). The cleric’s real name was
Mojtaba Mir-Louhi, and he was the founder and leader of a small group of
radical Muslim activists who called themselves Fada’iyan-e Islam (Devotees
of Islam). Safavi met Qutb at the launch of the MB-sponsored General
Islamic Conference on the Holy City, held in Jerusalem in 1953,11 and
the following year he visited Qutb in Cairo. Some alleged that Safavi
had a close relationship with Khomeini,12 and remarkable similarities
exist between the literature of Fada’iyan-e Islam and Khomeini’s own
writings.13 Safavi was executed in 1955 for his part in the attempted mur-
der of Prime Minister Hossein Ala’, but in June 1963, his followers partici-
pated in the 15th Khordad uprising against the Shah’s “White Revolution”
alongside Khomeini’s supporters.14 In addition, Khomeini’s successor as
Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, Ali Khamenei, was one of the
translators of Qutb’s works into Farsi and credits his political ­awakening
to Safavi.15 Both Safavi and Qutb are now considered “martyrs” and
precursors of the Islamic Revolution.16

11 See Martin S. Kramer, An Introduction to World Islamic Conferences (Tel Aviv: Shiloah

Center, Tel Aviv University, 1978), 21–22.

12 Amir Taheri claims that Safavi and Khomeini met in 1937 and spent much time

together, and that in 1943–1944 Safavi was a regular guest at Khomeini’s house in Qom.
See Amir Taheri, The Spirit of Allah: Khomeini and the Islamic Revolution (Adler & Adler
Pub, 1986), 98ff.
13 For instance, the system of government they advocated. See Amir H. Ferdows,

“Khomaini and Fadayan’s society and politics,” International Journal of Middle East Studies
15, no. 2 (1983): 241–57, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020743800052302.
14 Sohrab Behdad, “Islamic Utopia in Pre-Revolutionary Iran: Navvab Safavi and the

Fada’ian-e Eslam,” Middle Eastern Studies 33, no. 1 (1997): 40–65.

15 Khamenei Ali Khamenei recalls that Safavi visited his school in Mashhad in 1952 and

gave a speech that kindled in him “the very first sparks of consciousness concerning Islamic,
revolutionary ideas and the duty to fight [the Shah’s regime],” see “Biography of Ayatollah
Khamenei the Leader of the Islamic Revolution,” Khamenei.IR, accessed August 30, 2019,
http://english.khamenei.ir/news/2130/Biography-of-Ayatollah-Khamenei-the-Leader-of-
the-Islamic-Revolution. Another founding father of the Islamic Republic, Akbar Hashemi
Rafsanjani, is also said to have had links to Safavi and Fada’iyan-e Islam during his youth;
see Eskandar Sadegui-Boroujerdi and Siavush Randjbar-Daemi, “Serving the Leviathan,”
Jacobin Magazine, January 18, 2017.
16 A Tehran metro station is named after the Shahid [martyr] Navvab Safavi, and in 1984

the Islamic Republic issued a stamp commemorating Qutb’s “martyrdom”.

100  A. B. SOAGE

On the face of it, the long-running alliance between Islamist Iran and
Baathist Syria seems counterintuitive: Baathism is a secular ideology that
seeks the rebirth of the Arab nation, and Syria was aligned with the “athe-
ist” Soviet Union. However, president Hafez al-Assad was internally chal-
lenged by forces that emphasized his regime’s heretical Alawi character and
externally isolated among Western-aligned conservative monarchies and
rival Arab nationalist republics. In response, he sought religious endorse-
ment from Shiite clerics and a regional ally in Iran. Aware of Syria’s geo-
political importance and itself as an international pariah, Iran was willing
to overlook ideological differences and focus on the shared rejection of
Zionism and Western imperialism. As the two regimes gave up their populist
economic policies and faced mounting demands for political freedoms, the
axis of resistance became a central pillar of their ideological legitimacy.

Members of the Axis of Resistance

What would later become known as the axis of resistance emerged in the
1990s and initially included Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, and the Palestinian
Islamist groups Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Over the last decade, some
Shiite militias in Iraq and the Houthis in Yemen have often been added to
the alliance. In the next sections, we will turn to the different members in
the axis and examine the internal dynamics affecting their foreign policy,
their role within the alliance, and their interaction with other actors.

The Islamic Republic of Iran

The 1978–1979 Iranian Revolution mobilized a wide range of groups
opposed to the Shah, including liberals and communists, as well as
Islamists. The victory of the latter should be attributed to Ayatollah
Ruhollah Khomeini’s charisma rather than to the appeal of his ideas, for
few Iranians at the time had even heard of his doctrine of Vilayat-i Faqih,
the Guardianship of the Jurist.17 That doctrine constituted a departure
from the traditional Twelver Shiism—which avoided questioning the
power of the secular ruler—by claiming that religious scholars should

17 For more on perceptions of ordinary Iranians who lived through the revolutionary

period, see Sepideh Parsapajouh, “Les valeurs en cause. Crise de l’idéologie et crise de la
transmission dans la société iranienne depuis la Révolution de 1979,” Archives de sciences
sociales des religions, Les valeurs en cause, 59, no. 166 (Avril-juin 2014): 243–68.
 4  THE CONSERVATIVE-RESISTANCE CAMP: THE AXIS OF RESISTANCE  101

have political authority over the people until the return of the Hidden
Imam.18 The Guardianship of the Jurist is enshrined in the constitution
of the Islamic Republic, which is a hybrid of theocracy and democracy but
gives clerics the final say.19
The early period of the Islamic Republic was marked by the desire to
export the Revolution. Khomeini’s appeals in that regard were relatively
successful among the discontented Shiites in the Gulf region—who were
frequently marginalized, when not derided as heretics—and serious dis-
turbances erupted in Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain. They con-
tributed to Saddam Hussein’s decision to attack Iran in 1980, and to the
Gulf states’ willingness to bankroll Iraq in the ensuing 1980–1988 Iran–
Iraq War.20 But rather than weaken the new regime, the conflict rallied
Iranians around it and facilitated its consolidation. It also boosted the
influence of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), originally
created to protect the Revolution, and led to the establishment of two bod-
ies subordinated to it: a paramilitary volunteer militia, the Basij (Niruyeh
Moghavemat Basij, Mobilization Resistance Force) and a special unit
responsible for extraterritorial operations, the Quds Force.21 The first task
of the Quds Force was to support the Kurds fighting the Iraqi government.
It would soon be drawn into the Lebanese Civil War, as we will see below.

18 For a discussion on the topic of Velayat-e Faqih (in Arabic, Wilayat al-Faqih), see
Shahrough Akhavi, “Contending Discourses in Shi’i Law on the Doctrine of Wilāyat
Al-Faqīh,” Iranian Studies 29, no. 3/4 (Summer–Autumn 1996): 229–68.
19 The Iranian people choose by direct vote their president and their representatives in the

parliament (Majlis), the Assembly of Experts (which elects the Supreme Leader), and local
councils. However, members of the Assembly of Experts must be high-ranking clerics, and
all candidates for public office are vetted by the Guardian Council. The Supreme Leader has
wide-ranging powers, including the appointment of the six clerics that sit in the twelve-mem-
ber Guardian Council; its remaining six members are jurists nominated by the Head of the
Judiciary, himself an appointee of the Supreme Leader. Furthermore, the Guardian Council
can veto any Majlis legislation it considers contrary to the Constitution or un-Islamic.
20 For more on the impact of the Islamic Revolution on the Gulf region see Ana Belén

Soage, “The Gulf Cooperation Council, Iran, and the Limits to Integration,” Orient 59,
no. 2 (2018): 47–54.
21 For an account of the early years of the Islamic Revolution and the IRGC’s o ­ rigins
see Roozbeh Safshekan and Farzan Sabet, “The Ayatollah’s Praetorians: The Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps and the 2009 Election Crisis,” The Middle East Journal 64,
no. 4 (Autumn 2010): 543–58, https://doi.org/10.3751/64.4.12; Frederic M. Wehrey,
ed., The Rise of the Pasdaran: Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary
Guards Corps, Rand Corporation Monograph Series (Santa Monica, CA: RAND National
Defense Research Institute, 2009), Chapter 3.
102  A. B. SOAGE

For nearly a decade after the Revolution, Iran was ruled by the Islamic
Republic Party (IRP), set up in 1979; no other parties were allowed. The
IRP comprised two main factions: The right, organized as the Society of
Militant Clerics, was deeply conservative in social issues and advocated
a free-market economy, reflecting its ties to the pious merchant class of
the bazaar. The left, which formed the Association of Militant Clergy,
championed a statist approach to the economy, put greater emphasis on
social justice, and advocated a radical foreign policy. Khomeini was the
arbiter between these two factions, but he leaned toward the left, whose
policies were also better suited to the war effort. Tensions within the IRP
resulted in its dissolution in 1987, but those two trends continued to
compete for domination of Iranian politics until the death of Khomeini
in 1989, when the conservative Ali Khamenei became Supreme Leader.22
That same year, Khamenei’s then-ally Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani was
elected president. A pragmatist, he followed a moderate foreign policy in
order to improve Iran’s relations with its neighbors. With a caveat: Tehran
remained inflexible in its attitude to Israel and became gradually more
involved in the Arab–Israeli conflict on the side of the forces. These forces
do not accept Israel’s right to exist and were against the peace process.
At home, Rafsanjani advocated an economy-first policy, which included
privatizations and free market reforms, in an effort to raise living stand-
ards and quell mounting social unrest. In addition, Rafsanjani tried to
deradicalize the IRGC by letting it enter the economy. The now margin-
alized Islamist left, not immune to the s­oul-searching that characterized
left-wing politics after the collapse of the Soviet Union, rebranded itself as
reformist and proposed varying degrees of economic and political liberali-
zation, as well as a renewal of ties with the West. Right-wingers reacted by
calling themselves Principalists to indicate their attachment to the princi-
ples of the Islamic Revolution.23
Growing dissatisfaction with the system—even among leaders of the
Islamic Revolution, like Grand Ayatollah Hussein-Ali Montazeri24—led

22 Safshekan and Sabet, “The Ayatollah’s Praetorians.”

23 Ibid.

24 Montazeri was Khomeini’s designated successor until he was pushed aside in the late

1980s due to his condemnation of authoritarianism and repression in the Islamic Republic.
In 1997, he was put under house arrest for openly criticizing Ali Khamenei, and he later
attacked Ahmadinejad’s policies. He died in 2009, and he is regarded as the spiritual leader
of the Green Movement (see below).
 4  THE CONSERVATIVE-RESISTANCE CAMP: THE AXIS OF RESISTANCE  103

to the sweeping victory of Mohammad Khatami in the 1997 elections.

However, resistance by the conservative apparatus curtailed what he was
able to achieve, and his reformist agenda triggered a backlash. This did
not come from the Principalists, whose ideas were perceived as dated and
irrelevant by increasing numbers of Iranians; it came from the IRGC.
They entered politics as allies of the conservative clerics, but eventually
emerged as their rivals and became known as the N ­ eo-Principalists.25
The Neo-Principalists threw their weight behind former Basij vol-
unteer Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, whose rousing speeches appealed to
the disgruntled lower classes. He was elected mayor of Tehran in 2003
and president of Iran in 2005, helped by voter apathy. Supporters of
the Reformists stayed away from the polls, frustrated by Khatami’s ina-
bility to achieve far-reaching reforms and by the systematic disquali-
fication of reformist candidates wishing to run for office. Ahmadinejad
was re-elected in 2009, most likely fraudulently, and the IRGC and the
Basij were instrumental in the suppression of the mass demonstrations
that followed, dubbed the Green Movement. During Ahmadinejad’s
presidency, Iran found itself internationally isolated once again, due
to his fiery rhetoric, his reckless ambiguity over the country’s nuclear
program, and a more aggressive foreign policy spearheaded by Quds
Force commander, Major General Qasem Soleimani.26 Furthermore,
Ahmadinejad’s populist economic policies aggravated the effects of the
sanctions imposed on Iran, while the IRGC benefited vastly from an
acceleration in the privatization of state industries.
In 2013, the Reformists threw their support behind centrist cleric
Hasan Rouhani—at the time also favored by Supreme Leader Khamenei,
who wished to clinch power back from the Neo-Principalists—and
Rouhani won the presidential elections in the first round. He then success-
fully negotiated the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)
over Iran’s nuclear program, thereby ending international sanctions and
allowing the country to return to the fold of the international community.
The deal was opposed by the IRGC out of ideological zeal but also less

25 Safshekan and Sabet, “The Ayatollah’s Praetorians.”

26 David Ignatius, “At the Tip of Iran’s Spear,” Washington Post, June 8, 2008, https://
advance-lexis-com.ezproxysuf.flo.org/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentIte
m:4SPK-H5K0-TW87-N0KY-00000-00&context=1516831.
104  A. B. SOAGE

admissible economic interests: the sanctions had eliminated international

competition and weakened former elites, such as the bazaar merchants.27
Rouhani was decisively re-elected in 2017 over Ebrahim Raisi—the con-
servative establishment’s bid to recover control—and tried to rein in the
IRGC.28 Nonetheless, the war in Syria and the emergence of the so-called
Islamic State have given the Quds Force unprecedented international pro-
jection, while the USA’s withdrawal from and sabotaging of JCPOA have
significantly undermined the position of the Iranian president.

Syria
The alliance between the Shiite Islamic Republic and the ­Alawi-dominated
Syrian regime is often assumed to be based on religious affinity. In reality,
Alawism is markedly different from Shiite Islam, and throughout history
it has been considered a heresy by Sunni and Shiite Muslims alike.29 Its
followers’ acceptance into the Muslim community in the early twentieth
century was due to political, rather than religious, considerations. While
some Alawis were hoping to establish their own state after the end of
the French Mandate for Syria, others deemed it more prudent to throw
in their lot with the Arab nationalists fighting the colonial powers, and
they took steps to be recognized as Muslims. In 1936, their efforts were
validated by a fatwa issued by Jerusalem Mufti Hajj Amin al-Husseini,

27 See Ali Alfoneh, “All the Guard’s Men: Iran’s Silent Revolution,” World Affairs 173,

no. 3 (September 2010): 73–79.

28 Cyrus Namjoo Moghadam, “Conflict between Rouhani and Iran’s Revolutionary

Guards Intensifies,” Gulf News, July 31, 2017, https://gulfnews.com/opinion/op-eds/

conflict-between-rouhani-and-irans-revolutionary-guards-intensifies-1.2066878.
29 The Shiites accuse the Alawis of being ghulat (extremists) because they deify Ali

bin Abi Talib, cousin and son-in-law of prophet Muhammad, who is venerated in Shiism
but only as an imam (political and spiritual leader). Among the heterodox beliefs of
Alawism is the worship of a divine triad made up of Ali, Muhammad, and Salman
the Persian (one of the prophet’s Companions); the transmigration of souls; and that
Alawis used to be stars and will return to the world of light after death if they are virtu-
ous. However, esoteric wisdom is only revealed to a small group of carefully selected
male initiates, and ordinary Alawis know little about their religion. For more on the
Alawis and their faith see Mahmud A. Faksh, “The Alawi Community of Syria: A New
Dominant Political Force,” Middle Eastern Studies 20, no. 2 (1984): 133–53, https://doi.
org/10.1080/00263208408700577.
 4  THE CONSERVATIVE-RESISTANCE CAMP: THE AXIS OF RESISTANCE  105

who wished to form the largest possible coalition against the Western
occupation of the Levant and the Zionist project in Palestine.30
In Syria, where most Alawis live, a handful of Sunni families from
Aleppo and Damascus had traditionally monopolized political and eco-
nomic power. Muslim minorities (Alawis, but also Ismaelis and Druze)
concentrated in poor rural areas and were looked down upon by the Sunni
majority. During the French Mandate, the children of the relatively pros-
perous small and middle landowners among those minorities found oppor-
tunities for social advancement in the military, and later many of them were
attracted to the egalitarian ethos of Baathism. The combined force of the
Army and the Baathist Party enabled the largest minority, the Alawis, to
become the rulers of the country, consolidating power through successive
coups in 1963, 1966, and 1970.31 The latter, known as the Corrective
Movement, overthrew the more radical wing of the Baathist Party and
allowed Hafez al-Assad to become the first non-Sunni president of Syria.
Assad endeavored to obtain the acquiescence of the Sunni majority:
He sought to expand the social base of his regime by tempering the pop-
ulist statism of the most uncompromising Baathists and by lifting some
of the economic restrictions that had hurt Sunni merchants and indus-
trialists. He watered down the secular principles of Baathism, relaxed
restrictions on Sunni religious institutions, and exhibited his personal
piety by attending public prayers at the mosque on Fridays and Muslim
holidays. He tried to avert accusations of heresy with the support of
Shiite clerics, who reiterated that Alawism is a branch of Shia Islam.32 In
addition, he took steps to minimize the differences between Alawism and
mainstream Islam, banning specifically Alawi religious organizations and
festivities and imposing a unified religious curriculum based on Sunni
Islam for all Muslim children.33

30 The Shia seats of learning in Najaf and Qom remained conspicuously silent on the issue.

See Martin Kramer, “Syria’s Alawis and Shi’ism,” in Shi’ism, Resistance, and Revolution, ed.
Martin Kramer (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987), 237–54.
31 Faksh, “The Alawi Community of Syria.”

32 Specifically, two Lebanon-based clerics eager for the support of a powerful patron in

the highly charged pre-Civil War atmosphere: Imam Musa al-Sadr and Ayatollah Hasan
al-Shirazi. See Kramer, “Syria’s Alawis and Shi’ism” We will encounter Musa al-Sadr again
in the section about Hezbullah. Iraqi-born al-Shirazi was assassinated in Lebanon in 1980,
allegedly on orders of the Iraqi Baathist regime.
33 Information based on direct observation and field interviews conducted by the author

during months-long stays in Syria in 1999–2000 and 2004–2005.

106  A. B. SOAGE

Assad was rather successful at co-opting certain segments of the for-

mer elite, particularly the old Damascene bourgeoisie, but many Sunnis
resented the newfound political power and economic dominance of the
despised Alawi minority. The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood (SMB), which
started operating in the country in the 1940s, presented themselves as
the defenders of Islamic orthodoxy vis-à-vis the heretical Baathist regime.
The SMB organized protests, planted car bombs, and tried to assassinate
Assad, thereby eliciting brutal repression. The cycle of violence reached its
climax in February 1982, when an uprising in the city of Hama was ruth-
lessly and indiscriminately crushed. However, the regime had to deal with
the gradual Islamization of Syrian society, analogous to that taking place
throughout the region. It responded by building thousands of mosques,
founding hundreds of religious institutions, and promoting a moderate
and apolitical form of Islam through state media.34 From the late 1990s,
it also allowed the proliferation of Islamic charitable associations, which
helped mitigate the destabilizing effects of rising poverty.35
Baathist Syria did not have friendly relations with its neighbors. It fell
out with Nasserist Egypt and Baathist Iraq over (often minor) doctrinal
issues and petty personal rivalries; it also denounced conservative mon-
archies like Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the Shah’s Iran as stooges of the
West. Assad moderated the rhetoric of his more radical Baathist prede-
cessors, but when Egyptian president Anwar al-Sadat sought peace with
Israel, the Syrian president seized the occasion to portray himself as the
new pan-Arab leader in the fight against the Zionist state. After the 1979
Islamic Revolution and Iran’s dramatic realignment, Syria became the
Islamic Republic’s only Arab ally and its sole regional backer during the

34 In the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, 8000 new mosques were built and 600 religious insti-

tutions were established. Pro-regime Sunni sheikhs—derided by many as “Mashaykh al-Sul-

tan,” the Sultan’s clergy—became prominent public figures, particularly Sheikh Ahmad
Kaftaru, Grand Mufti of Syria from 1964 until his death in 2004, and Sheikh Said al-Bouti,
who hosted a popular TV program. See Line Khatib, Islamic Revivalism in Syria: The Rise
and Fall of Ba’thist Secularism (London; New York: Routledge, 2011), Chapters 5, 6;
Al-Bouti was assassinated in 2013 in a suicide attack which gave rise to conspiracy theories.
See Jim Muir, “Syria ‘Death Video’ of Sheikh al-Bouti Poses Questions,” BBC News, April
9, 2013.
35 Thomas Pierret and Kjetil Selvik, “Limits of ‘Authoritarian Upgrading’ in Syria: Private

Welfare, Islamic Charities, and the Rise of the Zayd Movement,” International Journal of
Middle East Studies 41, no. 4 (2009): 595–614.
 4  THE CONSERVATIVE-RESISTANCE CAMP: THE AXIS OF RESISTANCE  107

Iran–Iraq War. For its part, Iran appreciated an alliance that called into
question the propaganda depicting the Persians as the eternal enemy of
the Arabs36 and afforded access to the first line of the struggle against
Israel.
Syria plays a crucial role in the axis of resistance, as a conduit for funds
and weapons from Iran to Lebanon and as a safe haven for training and
weapons storage. In return, the alliance provides the Syrian regime with
an ideological legitimization which became ever more important as Syria
progressively abandoned the tenets of Baathism. In effect, confronted
with rapid population growth and inefficient economic structures, the
regime ditched its populist socialism and embraced liberal economic pol-
icies—a process that started under Hafez al-Assad and accelerated under
his son and heir, Bashar. Already frustrated by decades of repression,
nepotism, and corruption, Syrians had to contend with high rates of
unemployment, the loss of subsidies for staple goods, and growing social
inequalities. Opposition to the regime finally exploded in the context
of the Arab Spring, in the form of the 2011 popular mobilizations that
degenerated into the ongoing Civil War.

Palestinian Islamist Groups

The Palestinian cause is central to the anti-imperialist discourse of move-
ments and parties in the Gulf Region and the broader Middle East,
whether nationalist, leftist, or Islamist—although for the latter it holds
special significance owing to the status of Jerusalem as the third holiest
site of Islam. Muslim Brotherhood founder Hasan al-Banna, who was a
friend of Palestinian religious and political leader Hajj Amin al-Husseini,
sent his son-in-law and close collaborator, Said Ramadan, to Jerusalem
in the mid-1940s to establish a presence there. By 1947, the Muslim
Brotherhood had two dozen branches and between 12,000 and 20,000
members throughout Palestine.37 In 1948, its volunteers fought alongside

36 Iraqi propaganda during the Iran–Iraq War characterized the conflict as Qadisiyyat

Saddam (Saddam’s Qadisiya), in reference to the historic battle in which the (Arab) Muslim
armies defeated the (Persian) Sassanid Empire in 636.
37 Robert Dreyfuss, “Cold War, Holy Warrior,” Mother Jones, February 2006, www.

motherjones.com/politics/2006/01/cold-war-holy-warrior.
108  A. B. SOAGE

the regular armies of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in the first Arab–Israeli
War, and their literature makes much of their heroic role in the conflict.38
However, from the mid-1950s the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood
(henceforth PMB) shunned activism and focused on religious and social
activities, for ideological as well as practical reasons. Firstly, it felt that the
liberation of Palestine required the moral regeneration of its people as a
precondition. Secondly, given the unfavorable balance of forces, it deemed
it wise to prioritize its own survival. Consequently, the PMB chose not to
join the alliance of nationalist and leftist groups that fought a guerrilla war
against Israel after the occupation of the Gaza Strip in 1967. These forces
were crushed, while the PMB was able to develop a network of religious,
health, and education charities to proselytize while helping the poor. It
was tolerated, even encouraged, by the Israeli authorities, which hoped to
weaken support for the nationalists, at the time perceived as more dan-
gerous for the Israeli state. The organization’s leader, frail but charismatic
Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, even obtained official Israeli recognition for his
Islamic Centre in 1979. This no doubt contributed to the PMB’s public
appeal being rather limited at the time.39
The situation began to change in the late 1970s in a context of wide-
spread disillusionment with pan-Arabism, which had failed to achieve
Arab unity or liberate Palestine. Inspired by the proliferation of radical
Islamist groups in Egyptian campuses and by the Islamic Revolution in
Iran, some PMB students in Egypt decided to react to what they con-
sidered their organization’s neglect of the nationalist question, and they
set up Islamic Jihad—commonly known as PIJ to differentiate it from
other groups with similar names. Their intellectual references were the
usual Sunni authors (e.g., Rashid Rida, Hasan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb,
and Abu-l-A‘la Maududi), but also Shiite scholars, such as Muhammad
Baqir al-Sadr, Ayatollah Khomeini, Ali Shariati, and Muhammad Hussein

38 For instance, Muslim Brotherhood ideologue Yusuf al-Qaradawi wrote in his autobi-

ography that the heroism of the Muslim Brothers in Palestine prompted the British to
put pressure on the Egyptian authorities to ban the organization. See Yusuf al-Qaradawi,
“Al-Qaradhawi sira wa-masira (Al-Qaradawi: Autobiography),” Archive Islam Online,
Chapter 18, accessed August 30, 2019, https://archive.islamonline.net/.
39 Ann M. Lesch, “Prelude to the Uprising in the Gaza Strip,” Journal of Palestine

Studies 20, no. 1 (Autumn 1990): 1–23; J­ean-Pierre Filiu, “The Origins of Hamas:
Militant Legacy or Israeli Tool?,” Journal of Palestine Studies 41, no. 3 (Spring 2012):
54–70, https://doi.org/10.1525/jps.2012.XLI.3.54.
 4  THE CONSERVATIVE-RESISTANCE CAMP: THE AXIS OF RESISTANCE  109

Fadlallah.40 They launched their first military operations in Gaza in the

mid-1980s, just as the Lebanese Shiite militia Hezbollah was achieving
huge prestige by forcing the hitherto unbeaten Israeli army into retreat.
The PMB did not appreciate competition from within the Islamist camp
and denounced the new group’s enthusiasm for the Iranian Revolution,
even accusing its members of having converted to Shiism.41 Moreover, the
PIJ’s daring actions—including attacks against Israeli soldiers and escapes
from prison—galvanized the population and contributed to the outburst
of the Intifada in December 1987.42 This forced the hand of Sheikh Yassin
and his followers, who within a week had founded Hamas—both “zeal”
and an acronym for Harakat ­al-Muqawama al-Islamiya (Islamic Resistance
Movement)—as ostensibly separate from the PMB to avoid Israeli retal-
iation. Only in August 1988, when Hamas published its Charter, was it
announced that the group was a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood.43

40 According to Abdallah Shallah, who became PIJ leader in 1995 after Israel assassi-

nated its founder, Fathi Shiqaqi. See Ramadan ‘Abdallah Shallah and Khalid Al-‘Ayid, “The
Movement of Islamic Jihad and the Oslo Process,” Journal of Palestine Studies 28, no. 4
(Summer 1999): 61–73.
41 ‘Abdallah Shallah and Al-‘Ayid, 62. For its part, the PIJ criticized the PMB for its close

relationship with countries aligned with the West, such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan.
42 Tensions had been escalating owing to deteriorating economic conditions and acceler-

ating Israeli expropriations of land in Gaza. Furthermore, the Arab Summit held in Amman
in November 1987 had focused on the Iran–Iraq War and all but ignored the plight of the
Palestinians. Still, the role of PIJ militants in the eruption of the Intifada should not be over-
looked. See Lesch, “Prelude to the Uprising in the Gaza Strip,” 54–70.
43 For years, the Hamas Charter was nowhere to be found in Hamas’s website, possibly

because it was an embarrassment due to its outdated rhetoric and politically incorrect refer-
ences. Nevertheless, the organization refused to revise it until May 2017, when it issued “A
Document of General Principles and Policies” which manifested a desire to abide by the rules
set by the international community in exchange for recognition. The original Hamas Charter is
available in “The charter of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas)- Palestine (in Arabic),”
Palestine Net, 1988, http://palestine.paldf.net/Uploads/pdf/%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%AB%
D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%AD%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%82
%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7-
%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B3.pdf; English translation
available in “The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement (18 August 1988),” Yale Law
School, accessed August 30, 2019, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hamas.asp;
The new Document is available on Hamas’s website, both in Arabic “A Document of General
Principles and Policies (in Arabic),” 2017, http://hamas.ps/ar/uploads/documents/599ab-
f9aafa1b76837c1242eb229e87b.pdf; and in English “A Document of General Principles
and Policies,” The Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), 2017, https://hamas.ps/en/
post/678/a-document-of-general-principles-and-policies.
110  A. B. SOAGE

While the PIJ coordinated its activities with the United National Leadership
of the Uprising (UNLU), set up by nationalist and leftist forces, Hamas
opted to go it alone. However, the two Islamist organizations coincided in
their rejection of any compromise with Israel.
Iran first established contacts with the Palestinian Islamists in the late
1980s, after the end of the Iran–Iraq War. This probably happened in
Lebanon, where the Israeli authorities routinely expelled Palestinian
activists. In 1988, around twenty PIJ members were exiled there
and started receiving funds from Iran and training from Hezbollah.
Revealingly, in 1990, the PIJ moved its headquarters to Damascus,
already the main base of far-left Palestinian groups, such as the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Democratic Front for the
Liberation of Palestine. Nonetheless, and unlike Hamas, the PIJ was
never able to attract a wide following among the Palestinians.
Conversely, Hamas was reluctant to be associated with Iran. Like much
of the Muslim Brotherhood, it distrusted the Islamic Republic due to its
Shiite character, and it did not wish to jeopardize the support of its Arab
benefactors in the Gulf Region. The situation changed with the launch of
the Israeli–Palestinian peace process, which the Islamists opposed. Hamas
attended the first International Conference in Support of the Palestinian
Intifada held in Tehran in October 1991—concurrently with the Madrid
peace conference—alongside the PIJ, Hezbollah, and the Syrian regime.
The following year, 400 members of the movement—among them, many
of its leaders—were deported to Lebanon, where they became closer
to Hezbollah. Hamas chose Damascus for its headquarters in 1999,
after it was expelled from Amman.44 For much of the 1990s and 2000s,
it obtained funds, weapons, and training from Iran and its allies, which
allowed it to run its operations—including charitable activities, but also sui-
cide attacks against Israeli soldiers and civilians during the Second Intifada.
Those attacks contributed to Israel’s decision to withdraw from Gaza in
2005 and to Hamas’s 2006 electoral victory against a Fatah undermined
by the stalling of the peace process and pervasive corruption within the
Palestinian National Authority. However, the Civil War in Syria since 2011
gave rise to tensions between Hamas and its backers, as we will see below.

44 King Hussein had a long history of conflict with PLO leader Yasser Arafat and saw

Hamas as a potential ally. His son and successor, King Abdullah, was less keen to pursue that
relationship and came under pressure from the West due to Hamas’s suicide attacks in Israel.
In August 1999, he decided to expel the Hamas leadership from Jordan.
 4  THE CONSERVATIVE-RESISTANCE CAMP: THE AXIS OF RESISTANCE  111

Hezbollah
The emergence of Hezbollah must be contextualized within the process
of awakening and mobilization of Lebanon’s Shiite community, which
had traditionally been economically disadvantaged and politically dom-
inated by a handful of feudal-style landowning families. That process is
often credited to Imam Musa al-Sadr, who founded the Amal Movement
in the mid-1970s.45 Amal was not Islamist; it advocated individual free-
doms, downplayed its sectarian identity, and borrowed leftist jargon to
denounce feudalism in Lebanon and imperialist interference in the region.
As Islamism became an ascendant political force, and especially after the
1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, some of Amal’s members grew disgrun-
tled with its secular character. Then, in 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon for
the second time in four years, and Iran sent a contingent of 1500 Quds
Force advisers to the Beqaa Valley to train Shiite troops, provoking a wave
of defections from Amal. This was the origin of Hezbollah.46
The new militia soon came into action. Between 1982 and 1986,
there were dozens of suicide bombings in Lebanon against  US,
French, and Israeli targets; these attacks have since been ­ attributed
to Hezbollah.47 However, the group did not make itself known until
the publication of the “Open Letter from Hezbollah to the

45 Born in Iran to a Lebanese family of Islamic scholars, Musa al-Sadr arrived in Lebanon

in the mid-1950s on an invitation by Shiite clerics from the southern city of Tyre. In 1974,
he established Harakat al-Mahrumin (Movement of the Dispossessed). The following year,
among the rising communal tensions that would trigger the Lebanese Civil War, he added a
military wing, Amal (Afwaj a­ l-Muqawama al-Lubnaniyya, or Lebanese Resistance Brigades;
the acronym means “hope”). Sadr mysteriously disappeared during a trip to Libya in 1978,
probably murdered on orders from Gaddafi, but his movement survived thanks to a great
extent to the support of Hafez al-Assad, who had been an ally of Sadr’s (see Footnote 32).
46 Hezbollah means “party of God” and is a reference to the Qur’an (58:22). The name

has been adopted by a number of groups and movements, but the most prominent among
them is undoubtedly the Lebanese one. For more on Amal and Hezbollah in the 1970s and
1980s see Marius Deeb, “Shia Movements in Lebanon: Their Formation, Ideology, Social
Basis, and Links with Iran and Syria,” Third World Quarterly 10, no. 2 (1988): 683–98,
https://doi.org/10.1080/01436598808420077.
47 At the time, the group would have been operating under the name Islamic Jihad. Its

bloodiest attack, in October 1983, targeted the barracks of the Multinational Force in
Lebanon (MNF)—perceived as biased toward Maronite Christians—and left 241 US marines
and 58 French paratroopers dead. The withdrawal of the MNF within months of the attack
was depicted as a humiliating defeat for the United States.
112  A. B. SOAGE

downtrodden, in Lebanon and around the world,” printed in the

leftist daily newspaper As-Safir on February 16, 1985.48 In the Open
Letter, Hezbollah identified Ayatollah Khomeini as its leader and the
Guardianship of the Jurist as its political model, while conceding that the
Lebanese people should be able to decide for themselves how they wish
to be governed. It stressed its bond to the Islamic Umma (community of
believers) and its solidarity to the oppressed in Lebanon and elsewhere,
and it stated as its first goal the expulsion of foreign military forces (i.e.,
the Americans, the French, and their allies) from Lebanon.
Despite the Syrian–Iranian alliance, relations between Hezbollah and
Syria have not always been good. President Assad entered the Lebanese
Civil War with his own agenda: expanding Syria’s influence over its small
neighbor and making sure that he would have a place at the table in any
future Middle East peace negotiations. He initially backed the Maronite
Christians, only to turn against them when they sought Israeli help to
impose their rule. Later, his hostility to Yasser Arafat led him to use Amal
and anti-PLO Palestinian groups to crack down on the PLO and its allies
during the so-called War of the Camps. When Hezbollah came on the
scene, Assad became increasingly exasperated at its suicide bombings and
kidnappings of Westerners, which undermined his attempts to appear in
control. In early 1987, he found the opportunity to reassert his author-
ity when Hezbollah and the Druze assisted the Palestinians against Amal
in a new round of the War of the Camps. He deployed 7000 Syrian
troops in West Beirut, and clashes ensued. In the worst incident, nearly
two dozen Hezbollah members were killed at their Fathallah barracks in
Beirut in February 1987, apparently in cold blood. The Hezbollah lead-
ership denounced the massacre but urged restraint, and an escalation was
prevented.49 After the war, Hezbollah relied on the Syrian presence in
Lebanon to keep its weapons, whereas other militias had to give them up.50

48 English translation available in “An Open Letter: The Hizballah Program,” 1985,

https://web.archive.org/web/20060821215729/www.ict.org.il/Articles/Hiz_letter.htm.
Revealingly, the Open Letter does not appear in any H­ ezbollah-affiliated website. It has been
superseded by other texts, especially Hezbollah’s 2009 Political Manifesto (see Footnote 51).
49 Asad Abukhalil, “Syria and the Shiites: Al‐Asad’s Policy in Lebanon,” Third World
Quarterly 12, no. 2 (1990): 1–20, https://doi.org/10.1080/01436599008420231;
Christopher Dickey, “Assad and His Allies: Irreconcilable Differences?,” Foreign Affairs 66,
no. 1 (Fall 1987): 58–76.
50 This situation contravened the 1989 Taif Agreement, which put an end to the Civil War.

The accord contemplated the disarmament of all militias within six months and the with-
drawal of Syrian troops within two years.
 4  THE CONSERVATIVE-RESISTANCE CAMP: THE AXIS OF RESISTANCE  113

Iran has been a major source of funding and support for Hezbollah
since its creation, allowing it not only to maintain its military wing, but
also to offer a wide range of social welfare services to its Shiite constit-
uency. Despite this, it would be incorrect to characterize the group as
merely an Iranian proxy, especially after the end of the Lebanese Civil
War in 1989. In effect, Hezbollah has undergone a process often
described as Lebanonization, which has entailed toning down its reli-
gious rhetoric and emphasizing its Lebanese nationalism and its defense
of the Lebanese people as a whole.51 In addition, it has entered the
political process, participating in elections since they resumed in 1992—
although it remains critical of the sectarian nature of the Lebanese polit-
ical system.52 Furthermore, Hezbollah’s resistance to Israel’s occupation
of southern Lebanon and subsequent Israeli withdrawal in 2000 earned it
supporters far beyond the Shiite community.
However, the Israeli withdrawal was also seized upon by those
who resented Hezbollah’s (and Syria’s) supremacy in Lebanon and
who started publicly questioning the militia’s role.53 They demanded
Hezbollah’s disarmament, accused it being a state within a state, and
criticized the continued presence of Syrian troops since the end of the
Civil War. Frictions were exacerbated by the assassination of the former
prime minister Rafiq al-Hariri in February 2005, widely blamed on Syria.
The ensuing Cedar Revolution polarized the country into the pro-Syrian

51 As part of this process, in 2009 Hezbollah published a Political Manifesto mark-

edly less Islamist in tone than its 1985 Open Letter. See “Hezbolla’s 2009 Political
Manifesto (in Arabic),” Moqawama, 2009, https://www.moqawama.org/essaydetailsf.
php?eid=16245&fid=47; English translation available in “The New Hezbollah Manifesto,”
November 2009, www.lebanonrenaissance.org/assets/Uploads/15-The-New-Hezbollah-
Manifesto-Nov09.pdf.
52 Since independence in 1943, political power has been distributed on a sectarian basis

favoring Maronite Christians and Sunni Muslims. The 1989 Taif Agreement went some
way toward a more representative system, equalizing the ratio of seats allocated to Muslims
and Christians (although the latter are now only around 40% of the population, owing to a
lower birth rate and high emigration), and distributing Muslim seats evenly between Sunnis
and Shiites (the Shiite population is probably larger).
53 Hezbollah insists resistance must continue due to Israel’s occupation of the Shebaa

Farms, the Lebanese prisoners still held in Israeli jails, and the inability of the Lebanese
National Army to protect the country from a potential Israeli attack. For its part, Israel
considers the Shebaa Farms part of the Syrian Golan Heights, captured in the 1967 Six-Day
War.
114  A. B. SOAGE

March 8 Alliance and the anti-Syrian March 14 Alliance, and the latter
succeeded in forcing the departure of the Syrian army. In the summer of
2006, the Lebanese rallied around Hezbollah when the usual ­tit-for-tat
attacks across the border with Israel unexpectedly degenerated into a
full-blown Israeli onslaught. Tensions resumed after the conflict, how-
ever, and culminated in Hezbollah’s invasion of Sunni West Beirut in
May 2008. An agreement brokered by Qatar later that month gave the
Hezbollah-led opposition a blocking third in the Lebanese cabinet, effec-
tively precluding attempts to force the Shiite militia to disarm.
The Civil War in Syria had a direct and profound impact on Lebanon,
which not only received over a million refugees—in a middle-income
country of six million people—but also experienced sectarian polariza-
tion, acts of violence, and terrorist attacks. In June 2012, the March 8
and March 14 alliances signed the Ba‘abda Declaration, aimed at pre-
serving peace in the country by keeping it out of the Syrian conflict.
Nonetheless, persistent information of Hezbollah’s involvement in the
Civil War, which the group initially denied, was confirmed by Secretary
General Hasan Nasrallah on May 25, 2013, during his speech at the
annual celebration of “Liberation Day” (which commemorates the 2000
Israeli withdrawal). Lebanese attitudes to Hezbollah, which had been
positive overall before the conflict, are now split along sectarian lines.

Iraq and Yemen
Recently, two new forces have often been added to the axis of resistance:
the Shiite militias in Iraq and the Yemeni Houthis. Nevertheless, the two
cases are quite different. While it is clear that Iran has invested heavily in
its presence in Iraq, its efforts in Yemen appear more limited.54

Iraq
The toppling of Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003 and the instauration
of a system of government based on proportional representation opened
the way for increased Iranian influence in Iraq. Over 60% of the Iraqi
population is Twelver Shiite, and much of the post-2003 Iraqi political

54 For more on this topic see Ana Belén Soage, “Iraq and Yemen: The New Iranian

Proxies?,” Documento de Opinión (Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, 2018).

 4  THE CONSERVATIVE-RESISTANCE CAMP: THE AXIS OF RESISTANCE  115

leadership spent years of exile in Iran, where they were welcomed after
fleeing the Baathist regime in the 1980s and 1990s. One of the main
political parties of the post-Saddam era, the Supreme Council for the
Islamic Revolution in Iraq (now known as the Islamic Supreme Council
of Iraq, or ISCI), was established in Iran in 1982, and its former mili-
tary wing, the Badr Brigade, fought in the Iran–Iraq War on the Iranian
side. However, the advent of an Iranian-style government is not in the
cards. It is opposed by the highly respected religious leadership in Najaf,
led by Iranian-born Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani. Among the major polit-
ical parties, ISCI was the only one to advocate the Guardianship of the
Jurist system and it changed track in 2007 when, in a bid to boost its
popularity, it announced that it would follow Sistani’s guidance instead
of Khamenei’s, prompting the split of the Badr Brigade from the party.
After decades of hostility from its western neighbor, Iran was glad to
see Iraq become a Shia-dominated, federal country keen to cultivate
friendly links, unlikely to re-emerge as a threat or a competitor for regional
hegemony, and presenting a large market for Iranian products. Eager to
expedite the departure of the US-led coalition, Iran supported Shiite mili-
tias targeting foreign troops—prominent among them, Muqtada al-Sadr’s
Jaysh al-Mahdi (the Mahdi Army, or JAM), although the young cleric’s
fervent Iraqi nationalism and reckless unpredictability did not make him a
natural or desirable ally. Consequently, Tehran encouraged splinter groups
from JAM, such as ‘Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq (League of the Righteous). It also
supported other Shiite militias accused of sectarian atrocities, such as the
Badr Brigade and a split thereof, the Hizbullah Brigades.
The rise of the self-proclaimed Islamic State among the disaffected
Sunni minority and its dramatic capture of large swathes of Syria and
Iraq offered Tehran the opportunity to scale up its involvement. In
June 2014, Mosul fell to IS and Sistani issued a fatwa calling on all Iraqi
citizens to join the fight against that existential threat, initiating a rush
to volunteer. However, instead of enlisting in the disgraced security
forces, many joined existing or newly created militias, which came to be
collectively known as Wahdat al-Hashd al-Sha‘bi (Popular Mobilization
Forces, or PMF), and they divided their loyalties between Sistani, Sadr,
and Khamenei.55 Iran provided funds and materiel to many of them,

55 Renad Mansour and Faleh A. Jabar, “The Popular Mobilization Forces and Iraq’s

Future” (Carnegie Middle East Center, April 28, 2017), https://carnegie-mec.

org/2017/04/28/popular-mobilization-forces-and-iraq-s-future-pub-68810.
116  A. B. SOAGE

but particularly to the pro-Iran groups. These have tried to capital-

ize politically on the military triumph over IS, and their Fatah alliance
obtained the second largest number of seats in the May 2018 parliamen-
tary elections—crucially, behind Sadr’s nationalist, anti-sectarian coali-
tion, Marching Toward Reform (Sa’irun). Clearly, the Islamic Republic
is cautious about projecting its influence in Iraq too aggressively to avoid
offending Iraqi patriotic sensitivities (see Chapter 9).

Yemen
The Houthi movement appeared in the 1990s in the mountainous and
isolated Saada Governorate, which borders Saudi Arabia, to give expres-
sion to local grievances—notably economic and political marginaliza-
tion and the spread of Saudi-sponsored Salafism, which represented
a challenge to the Zaidi identity.56 Much has been made of the move-
ment adopting a rhetoric usually associated with revolutionary Iran—for
example, referring to the United States as the “Great Satan” and tak-
ing as its slogan: “God is Great. Death to America. Death to Israel.
Curse upon the Jews. Victory for Islam.” However, this type of rheto-
ric is not uncommon among Islamist movements, and the likely inten-
tion of Houthi leaders was to build on widespread anti-US sentiment
and to denounce US allies in the region—first and foremost, Yemen’s
long-running autocrat, Ali Abdullah Saleh (himself a member of
the Zaidi minority).57 Saleh himself found it convenient to characterize

56 Zaidism branched off mainstream Shia Islam in the eighth century and is now almost

exclusive to Yemen, where it is followed by around a third of the population. It differs sig-
nificantly from the Twelver Shiism of Iran and Iraq, and its doctrine and practice are very
close to those of the Sunni Shafi‘i majority in Yemen. As a result, inter-sectarian relations
have customarily been cordial.
57 Barak A. Salmoni, Bryce Loidolt, and Madeleine Wells, Regime and Periphery in

Northern Yemen: The Huthi Phenomenon, Rand Corporation Monograph Series (Santa
Monica: National defense research institute, 2010), https://www.rand.org/content/
dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG962.pdf. The authors point out that the
founder of the movement, Hussein al-Houthi, praised Iran and Hezbollah in his sermons
for their stand against the foes of Islam, not for their Shiite character.
 4  THE CONSERVATIVE-RESISTANCE CAMP: THE AXIS OF RESISTANCE  117

the Houthis as Iranian proxies in order to delegitimize them at home

and obtain foreign support against them.58
Between 2004 and 2010 the Houthis fought half a dozen wars against
Saleh, who was backed by Saudi Arabia. This attracted Tehran’s interest,
and the Iranian regime started sending small shipments of weapons to the
Houthis in 2009. Not uncoincidentally, that same year Saudi troops were
sent into Saada.59 In 2011, the Houthis took part in the Yemeni uprising,
but they were unhappy with the Saudi-brokered deal whereby Saleh was
replaced by his vice president, Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi. They took up
arms again and expanded well beyond their traditional area of influence
with the help of their former enemy, Saleh. The deposed president still
commanded significant loyalty among tribesmen and army commanders
and had access to much of the well-stocked Yemeni arsenal, supplied by
the United States to fight Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). In
September 2014 the Houthis captured Sanaa virtually unopposed, and in
March 2015 Hadi fled to Riyadh, precipitating the continuing Saudi-led
intervention among accusations of Iranian meddling. As for Saleh, he was
killed by the Houthis in late 2017, after reportedly switching sides again.
Ironically, the war aimed at curtailing Iranian influence has done
much to boost it. Confronted by a wealthy enemy with a technologi-
cally advanced military, the Houthis became more dependent on the sup-
port of Iran, which seized the opportunity to importune Saudi Arabia in
its own backyard at little cost to itself.60 There is evidence that Iranian
involvement increased substantially after the Saudi-led attack, such as the
deployment of weapons that could not have come from the Yemeni army’s

58 Implausibly, Saleh also claimed that the Houthis were backed by Libya and by

Al-Qaeda. See Christopher Boucek, “War in Saada. From Local Insurrection to National
Challenge,” Yemen on the Brink (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April
2010), 2, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/war_in_saada.pdf.
59 Thomas Juneau, “Iran’s Policy towards the Houthis in Yemen: A Limited Return

on a Modest Investment,” International Affairs 92, no. 3 (2016): 647–63, https://doi.

org/10.1111/1468-2346.12599.
60 According to Bruce Riedel, by late 2017 Iran was spending a few million dollars a year on

the war in Yemen, whereas it was costing Saudi Arabia at least $5 billion a month, see Bruce
Riedel, “In Yemen, Iran Outsmarts Saudi Arabia Again,” Brookings Institution, December 6,
2017, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/12/06/in-yemen-iran-outsmarts-
saudi-arabia-again/.
118  A. B. SOAGE

arsenal (e.g., Burkan-2H missiles and “kamikaze” drones). Moreover,

the Houthis now blatantly imitate Hezbollah in their discourse and aes-
thetics.61 Nevertheless, Yemen is a low priority for Iran, whose limited
resources are already overstretched. High on its list of more pressing mat-
ters to attend to is the situation in Syria, to which we now turn.

The Current Civil War in Syria and Its Consequences

The Arab Spring shook several regimes aligned with the West—the so
called conservative-moderate camp—and the Islamists emerged as the
political force best placed to take advantage of the revolutionary turmoil,
thanks to their strong organizational structures and decades of grassroots
activism. The Iranian leadership was quick to portray the revolts as an
Islamic Awakening, a continuation of its own Islamic Revolution, and it
set up the World Assembly for the Islamic Awakening in order to dissem-
inate that narrative.62 Its first conference, held in Tehran in September
2011, was reportedly attended by over 700 delegates from 84 countries
and focused on familiar themes: the need for the Muslim Ummah to unite
against the predatory powers led by the United States; the promotion of
an Islamic system of governance, legitimized and supported by the will
of the people but distinct from Western-style democracy; and references
to the valiant struggle of the Palestinians confronting Zionist aggression.
In addition, Khamenei saluted the revolutionaries in on-going uprisings in
countries like Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and Bahrain, “where Muslim masses
are involved in struggles to regain their dignity and honour.” 63

61 Abd al-Ilah Taqi, “Alat al-i‘lam al-huthiyya: ‘Hizbullah’ marra min huna” (The Houthis’

media machine: Hezbollah came this way),” Al-‘Arabi, April 11, 2015, www.alaraby.co.uk/
medianews/2015/4/11/%D8%A2%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B
9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%88%D8%AB%D9%8A%D
8%A9-%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87-%D9%85%D8%B1-
%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%87%D9%86%D8%A7. According to Taqi, Hezbollah provided invalu-
able assistance to the Houthis in the development of their propaganda apparatus.
62 Payam Mohseni, “The Islamic Awakening: Iran’s Grand Narrative of the Arab

Uprisings,” Middle East Brief, no. 71 (April 2013), https://www.brandeis.edu/crown/pub-

lications/meb/MEB71.pdf.
63 Zafar Bangash, “Tehran Conference Puts People’s Uprisings in Proper Islamic

Context,” Crescent International, October 1, 2011, https://crescent.icit-digital.org/

articles/tehran-conference-puts-people-s-uprisings-in-proper-islamic-context.
 4  THE CONSERVATIVE-RESISTANCE CAMP: THE AXIS OF RESISTANCE  119

Conspicuously absent from Khamenei’s list were the Syrian revolu-

tionaries, even though their own struggle was no different from that
of the revolutionaries he praised elsewhere. Conscious of that fact, the
Iranian authorities were not enthusiastic about backing the Syrian regime:
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad spoke of “needed reforms,” while
his foreign minister, Ali Akbar Salehi, called on Bashar al-Assad to “be
accountable to his people’s legitimate demands.”64 However, Iran was well
aware that a post-Assad Syria ruled by the Sunni majority was unlikely to
remain an ally and decided to throw its support behind Assad, claiming
that Syria was the victim of a Western–Zionist conspiracy due to its central
role in the axis of resistance. Furthermore, it denounced extremist groups
such as Islamic State as part of a ploy to stain the name of Islam and divert
attention from the fight against Israel.65
The two main non-state militant actors in the axis of resistance reacted
very differently to the war in Syria. Hezbollah’s leader Hasan Nasrallah
has revealed that he traveled to Tehran early on in the crisis to talk a reluc-
tant Khamenei into getting involved, convinced that otherwise the Assad
regime would fall within weeks.66 In the May 2013 speech in which
Nasrallah admitted Hezbollah’s participation in the conflict, he charac-
terized Syria as pillar of resistance and echoed the discourse of the Syrian
government, asserting that the dominant force within the opposition

64 “Syria Crisis: Iran’s Ahmadinejad Criticises Killings,” BBC News, October 22, 2011,

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15416410.
65 Different articles in Khamenei’s Ali Khamenei website illustrate these points, e.g.,

Khamenei.ir, “Leader’s Speech at Inauguration of Islamic Awakening and Ulama

Conference,” Khamenei.IR, April 29, 2013, http://english.khamenei.ir/news/1772/Leader-
s-Speech-at-Inauguration-of-Islamic-Awakening-and-Ulama; “ISIS Was Created to Divert the
Resistance from Fighting Zionism: Analyst,” Khamenei.IR, May 14, 2017, http://english.
khamenei.ir/news/4805/ISIS-was-created-to-divert-the-Resistance-from-fighting-Zionism.
66 Raialyoum, “‘Nasr Allah yakshif kayfa aqna‘ Khamini’i bi-dukhul al-midan al-suri

wa-yakshif ‘an ‘aradh sa'udi li-l-Asad li-inha’ al-azma fi bidayati-ha’ (Nasrallah reveals
how he convinced Khamenei to enter the Syrian theatre and reveals a Saudi offer to
Assad to put an end to the crisis at its inception),” September 12, 2017, www.raialy-
oum.com/index.php/%D9%86%D8%B5%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87-
%D9%8A%D9%83%D8%B4%D9%81-%D9%83%D9%8A%D9%81-
%D8%A3%D9%82%D9%86%D8%B9-%D8%AE%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%86%D8%A6%D9%8A-
%D8%A8%D8%AF%D8%AE%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85.
120  A. B. SOAGE

were takfiris controlled by the United States and Israel.67 For good measure,
he added that they also posed a threat to Lebanon.68
For its part, Hamas had to balance the advantages of its alliance with
Iran and its gratitude to the Syrian regime with its sympathy toward
the Syrian opposition (which soon came to be dominated by Sunni
Islamists) and the reputational risks of continued association with Assad.
The movement was divided over the issue. In February 2012, its polit-
ical leader, Khaled Mishaal, left Damascus for Qatar, hoping for a rap-
prochement with the Gulf states, but the rift between Riyadh and Doha
over the Muslim Brotherhood thwarted his efforts.69 As the regional bal-
ance of forces turned against Hamas—notably after the 2013 coup that
deposed Egyptian MB president Mohamed Morsi—and it became clear
that the Assad regime was likely to survive, the advocates of mending the
relationship with Iran carried the day.70
At the propaganda level, the cost of involvement has been great.
Despite the protestations of Iran and Hezbollah—which pointed to
their support for Sunni Muslims in places like Palestine and Bosnia—
the Civil War appeared as a sectarian conflict: Just as Islamist and Salafi
Sunni clerics fed the flames of sectarianism by referring to it as a jihad,
Iranian recruitment campaigns focused on the need to protect the Shia

67 The term takfiri designates someone who practices takfir (i.e., excommunication),that is,

declares other Muslims infidels (kuffar, plural of kafir). Extremists like Al-Qaeda and Islamic
State are notorious for their practice of takfir and their hostility toward Shiites.
68 “Al-Sayyid Nasr Allah ­ li-jumhur al-Muqawama: A‘idukum bi-l-nasr mujaddadan” (Sayyed
Nasrallah to the Crowds of the Resistance: I Promise You Victory Again),” Moqawama, May
27, 2013, https://www.moqawama.org/essaydetails.php?eid=27814&cid=141; English trans-
lation of the speech is available in “Hezbollah Leader Hassan Nasrallah’s Speech on Syria,” May
25, 2013, www.voltairenet.org/article178691.html.
69 See Philipp O. Amour, “Hamas-PLO/Fatah Reconciliation and Rapprochement

within the Unfolding Regional Order in the Middle East since 2010: Neorealist and
Neoclassical Realist Perspectives,” Journal of Social Sciences of Mus Alparslan University 6,
no. 5 (April 13, 2018): 621–31, https://doi.org/10.18506/anemon.384773.
70 Ahmad Majidyar, “Iran and Hamas Seeking to Further Boost Relations,” Middle East

Institute, January 25, 2018, https://www.mei.edu/publications/iran-and-hamas-seek-

ing-further-boost-relations; For an analysis of the consequences for Hamas of the shifting
balance of forces in the broader Middle East over the last decade see Amour, “Hamas-
PLO/Fatah within the Regional Order in the Middle East,” 621–31.
 4  THE CONSERVATIVE-RESISTANCE CAMP: THE AXIS OF RESISTANCE  121

sanctuaries in Syria.71 Thousands of underprivileged young men from Iraq,

Afghanistan, and Pakistan answered the call. As a result, perceptions of Iran
have become overwhelmingly negative in most Arab and Muslim coun-
tries,72 and Sunni Islamists who previously praised the Islamic resistance, like
Muslim Brotherhood ideologue Yusuf al-Qaradawi, have felt compelled to
publicly express their contrition.73 In March 2016, the Arab League labeled
Hezbollah a terrorist organization.
Nevertheless, at the military level, the intervention of Iranian forces
and Hezbollah has been a success. It proved crucial for the survival
of the Assad regime at a time when the Syrian army had almost col-
lapsed due to mass desertions.74 Iran’s presence in Syria has never
been so palpable—to Israel’s great displeasure.75 Furthermore, the war
has turned the axis of resistance into a more capable force, success-
fully integrating troops and militias from half a dozen different coun-
tries and allowing Iran to implement and finetune its hybrid warfare

71 Especially Sayyida Zaynab, in the south-eastern suburbs of Damascus. While the rise of

Islamic State facilitated recruitment efforts, there were reports of Shiite foreign fighters in
Syria as early as the autumn of 2012. See Christopher Anzalone, “Zaynab’s Guardians: The
Emergence of Shi`a Militias in Syria,” CTC Sentinel 6, no. 7 (July 2013), https://ctc.usma.
edu/zaynabs-guardians-the-emergence-of-shia-militias-in-syria.
72 “Poll: Sectarianism, Syria Drive Negative Image of Iran,” Arab American Institute, March

5, 2013, https://www.aaiusa.org/poll-sectarianism-syria-drive-negative-image-of-iran-read-
more-http-wwwal.
73 “Al-Qaradhawi: Al-Shi‘a khada‘uni. Wa-Hizbullah kidhba kabira (Al-Qaradawi: The

Shiites Deceived Me, and Hezbollah Is a Big Lie),” Al Arabiya, June 2, 2013, www.alarabiya.
net/ar/arab-and-world/syria/2013/06/02/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%B6
%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%B9%D8%A9-%D8%
AE%D8%AF%D8%B9%D9%88%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%88%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A8-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87-%D9%83%D8%B0%D8%A8%D8%A9-
%D9%83%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A9-.html.
74 The Quds Force and Hezbollah helped to organize the National Defense Force, a

reportedly 100,000-strong pro-government militia modeled on the Iranian Basij. See Chris
Zambelis, “Institutionalized ‘Warlordism’: Syria’s National Defense Force,” Terrorism
Monitor 15, no. 6 (March 24, 2017), https://jamestown.org/program/institutionalized-
warlordism-syrias-national-defense-force.
75 Tom O’Connor, “Can Iran Stop Israel in Syria? New Warnings as Russia Prepares

Missile Defense,” Newsweek, September 27, 2018, https://www.newsweek.com/

can-iran-stop-israel-syria-new-warnings-russia-prepares-missile-defense-1142437.
122  A. B. SOAGE

capabilities.76 By contrast, regional great powers more threatened

by the growth in Iranian power (i.e., Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt,
and Israel) belong to different alliances (see Chapter 14), have dis-
tinct national goals, and support disparate  transnational causes, all
of which hinders the formation of a unitary bloc against the axis of
resistance.77

Conclusion
The alliance known as the axis of resistance is held together not by
religious identity or ideological affinity, but by mutual regional objectives
and a common rejection of (Western) imperialist and Zionist designs in
the Middle East. Iran is its linchpin and offers its allies varying degrees
of material assistance (e.g., money, weapons, oil), logistical support,
and ideological guidance. Syria owes its importance to being the only
Arab country allied to the Islamic Republic with access to the front line
of the Levant—although Syria itself has avoided military action against
Israel since the 1973 Yom Kippur War. The non-state members of the
Axis, which carry the burden of fighting Israel, benefit from having state
backers and provide them with asymmetric deterrence. As a military alli-
ance, the Axis claims credit for forcing Israel’s withdrawal from southern
Lebanon in 2000 and from Gaza in 2005—which made it popular across
the region—and for saving the Assad regime.
The axis of resistance has a second and equally vital function: that of
bolstering the legitimacy of the Syrian and Iranian regimes. Pan-Arabism,
in general, lost credibility after the catastrophic 1967 defeat against
Israel. Baathism called for unity but was riven by divisions and degen-
erated into brutal autocracies based on personality cults. Similarly, since
the 1990s Islamism is increasingly out of favor in Iran, where it is widely
felt that the association of politics and Islam has gravely undermined the

76 See Marcin Andrzej Piotrowski, “‘Mosaic Defence:’ Iran’s Hybrid Warfare in Syria

2011–2016,” Polish Quarterly of International Affairs 26, no. 3 (2017): 18–67.

77 See F. Gregory Gause, “Ideologies, Alignments, and Underbalancing in the New

Middle East Cold War,” PS: Political Science & Politics 50, no. 3 (July 2017): 672–75,
https://doi.org/10.1017/S1049096517000373.
 4  THE CONSERVATIVE-RESISTANCE CAMP: THE AXIS OF RESISTANCE  123

latter.78 Furthermore, both Syria and Iran have moved away from their
initial statist approach to the economy and turned to neoliberal policies
to tackle their mounting economic problems. This has exacerbated social
inequalities and lost them the support of an important constituency: the
lower and lower-middle urban classes. The focus on foreign enemies
shifts the blame for domestic problems—or, at the very least, distracts
from them.
The 2009–2010 Green Movement in Iran and the Civil War in Syria
since 2011 show that this type of strategy has its limits. Both regimes
are unpopular, as they are perceived as self-serving and detached from
the needs of ordinary people, which makes  them insecure and prone to
resorting to repression, conspiracy theories, and rhetorical brinkman-
ship. This undermines the appeal of the axis of resistance narrative even
among those who pay it lip service. For example, the Iranian regime’s
attempt to capitalize on the Arab Spring was  dismissed by Iranian
reformists and Arab leftist revolutionaries, as was to be expected, but
even the Muslim Brothers rejected any comparison with the Islamic
Revolution.79 As a final point, the Civil War in Syria, which has served to
display and boost the military effectiveness of the axis of resistance, has
also exposed its internal strains and the persisting power of sectarian nar-
ratives in the Middle East.

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 CHAPTER 5

Emergence of the Turkish/Qatari Alliance

in the Middle East: Making of the Moderate
Resistance Bloc

Nuri Yeşilyurt and Mustafa Yetim

Introduction
Since the formation of the modern state system in the broader Middle
East, a regional polarization has continued to exist between the sta-
tus quo powers and revisionist powers. Although leaders and members
of both blocs have changed through decades, this bipolar structure
has been a recurrent pattern in the history of the Gulf Region and the
broader Middle East. During the 2000s, and particularly after the inva-
sion of Iraq in 2003, this regional polarization mainly crystallized around

N. Yeşilyurt (*) 
Faculty of Political Science, Department of International Relations,
Ankara University, Ankara, Turkey
e-mail: nyesilyurt@ankara.edu.tr
M. Yetim 
Faculty of Economic and Administrative Sciences,
Department of International Relations, Eskişehir Osmangazi University,
Eskişehir, Turkey

© The Author(s) 2020 131

P. O. Amour (ed.), The Regional Order in the Gulf Region
and the Middle East, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45465-4_5
132  N. YEŞILYURT AND M. YETIM

the Saudi Arabia-led status quo camp, which describes itself as the
moderates, and the Iran-led revisionist camp, which describes itself as the
resistance axis.1
Currently, the status quo bloc includes, among others, the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia (KSA), Egypt, Jordan, and the United Arab Emirates
(UAE). The main features of these states are their pro-US for-
eign policy orientations, their mild attitudes toward Israel, and their
conservative-elitist political structures. The revisionist bloc consists of
­
Iran, Syria, the Lebanese Hezbollah, some Iraqi Shiite factions, and the
Palestinian Islamic resistance movement, Hamas (see Table 14.1). The
main features of these actors are their anti-US foreign policy orienta-
tions, their denial of the existence of Israel, and their populist–authoritar-
ian political structures. The collapse of central authority (i.e., Saddam’s
regime) in Iraq and the growing anger among the Arab public caused by
Israeli atrocities in Palestine considerably increased the revisionist bloc’s
power and credibility throughout the 2000s.
Since the beginning of the 2010s, however, substantial shifts have
occurred in the power structure in the Gulf Region and the broader
Middle East. Political instability, caused by popular uprisings in critical
regional powers, such as Egypt, Syria, and Yemen, created a vast power
vacuum in the region and posed serious challenges to both the status
quo and the revisionist blocs. Meanwhile, a new alliance is in the mak-
ing between Turkey and Qatar, which is attempting to take advantage
of this vacuum to create an autonomous sphere of influence for itself

1 For a reflective and insightful discussion on the preexisting and the emergent camps

in the region and different conceptualizations for current regional polarization see Erik
Mohns and André Bank, “Syrian Revolt Fallout: End of the Resistance Axis?” Middle East
Policy 9, no. 3 (2012): 25–27, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4967.2012.00545.x;
Birol Başkan, Turkey and Qatar in the Tangled Geopolitics of the Middle East (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 1–4; Saud Al Tamamy, “GCC Membership Expansion:
Possibilities and Obstacles,” in Gulf Cooperation Council’s Challenges and Prospects
(Al Jazeera Center for Studies, 2014), 73–75, http://studies.aljazeera.net/mritems/
Documents/2015/3/31/2015331131534662734Gulf%20Cooperation.pdf; Crystal
A. Ennis and Bessma Momani, “Shaping the Middle East in the Midst of the Arab
Uprisings: Turkish and Saudi Foreign Policy Strategies,” Third World Quarterly 34, no.
6 (2013): 1127–30, https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2013.802503; and Flynt
Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett, “The United States, Iran and the Middle East’s
New ‘Cold War,’” The International Spectator 45, no. 1 (2010): 75, https://doi.
org/10.1080/03932721003661624.
 5  EMERGENCE OF THE TURKISH/QATARI ALLIANCE …  133

in the region.2 Moving from this observation, the focus of this chapter
is to make a careful analysis of this emerging alliance between Turkey
and Qatar and its implication for the regional order in the Middle East.
Specifically, the chapter addresses whether Turkey and Qatar are form-
ing a third bloc in the Middle East—one that is positioned between the
Saudi-led status quo bloc and the Iranian-led revisionist bloc.3
The chapter starts with a brief analysis of the regional power struc-
ture in the Gulf Region and the broader Middle East since the 1940s,
and more specifically, the consolidation of the status quo and the revi-
sionist blocs in the region during the 2000s. The second section then
focuses on the critical domestic and foreign policy transformations that
Qatar and Turkey underwent following the change in political power in
both countries in 1995 and 2002, respectively. The remarkable similarity
between soft-power-oriented policies adopted by Ankara and Doha and
their positioning of themselves between the status quo and the revisionist
blocs is particularly emphasized in the second section. The last section
examines the growing rapprochement between Turkey and Qatar since
the 2011 Arab Uprisings. In this sense, it underlines common policy
responses to ongoing uprisings and deepening bilateral ties between both
countries, along with their implications for the current power structure
in the region.
Overall, the argument is presented that, since the 2010s, the Middle
East regional system resembles a tripolar structure. The growing Turkish/
Qatari alliance and its alignment with the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in
various Arab countries have resulted in the formation of a third bloc in

2 There is a growing literature on the analysis of the burgeoning alliance between Turkey

and Qatar. See William Armstrong, “Interview: Birol Başkan on Turkey and Qatar’s
Alliance in the Tangled Middle East,” Hurriyet Daily News, June 24, 2017, http://www.
hurriyetdailynews.com/interview-birol-baskan-on-turkey-and-qatars-alliance-in-the-tan-
gled-middle-east-114696; Ufuk Ulutaş and Burhanettin Duran, “Traditional Rivalry or
Regional Design in the Middle East?” Insight Turkey 20, no. 2 (Spring 2018): 81–105.
3 For a similar discussion see Özgür Pala and Bülent Aras, “Practical Geopolitical

Reasoning in the Turkish and Qatari Foreign Policy on the Arab Spring,” Journal of
Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 17, no. 3 (2015): 287, https://doi.org/10.1080
/19448953.2015.1063274; Phillip O. Amour calls this emergent bloc the “elected
reformist” camp in Philipp O. Amour, “Revolutionary Changes, Power Dynamics, and
Regional Rivalries since the Arab Spring: An Introduction,” in The Middle East Reloaded:
Revolutionary Changes, Power Dynamics, and Regional Rivalries since the Arab Spring, ed.
Philipp O. Amour, St. James’s Studies in World Affairs (Washington, DC: Academica Press,
2018), 9–10.
134  N. YEŞILYURT AND M. YETIM

the Middle East, what we call the moderate resistance bloc. The emer-
gence of this third bloc has substantially affected the regional balance of
powers and now poses certain challenges to the two preexisting regional
blocs. Although their ambitious and revisionist foreign policy agenda wit-
nessed a setback in 2013–2014, Turkey and Qatar still hold their ground
in the middle of the two preexisting blocs and pursue their alternative
regional strategy.

Power Structure in the Middle East

The division between revisionist and status quo powers dates back to
the emergence of the modern Middle East, although the leading actors
within each bloc have changed over time. In the 1940s, for instance, the
Kingdoms of Egypt and the KSA were aligned against the expansionist
aspirations of the Hashemite Kingdoms of Iraq and Jordan.4 After the
Free Officers Revolution in 1952, Egypt, under the rule of Gamal Abdel
Nasser, constituted a serious revisionist threat to Arab monarchies. This
threat culminated when Syria, under the influence of the nationalist
Baath Party, joined Egypt to form the United Arab Republic in 1958.
The Hashemite Kingdoms in Iraq and Jordan responded to this threat
by forming the United Arab Federation, yet this union did not survive
even a year due to the collapse of the Iraqi monarchy with a coup d’état
in July 1958. The United Arab Republic followed suit three years later,
and disagreements arose between the republics of Egypt, Syria, and Iraq;
however, they continued to form a revisionist threat against the remain-
ing Arab monarchies until the late 1960s. The ideological and political
struggle between the nationalist–revolutionary (revisionist) Arab repub-
lics and the conservative (status quo) Arab monarchies throughout
the 1950s and 1960s gave rise to the so-called Arab Cold War.5 This
regional struggle was deeply connected to the global Cold War between
the United States and the Soviet Union, both of which generally sup-
ported competing blocs in the broader Middle East.6

4 Alan Taylor, The Arab Balance of Power (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press,

1982), 24–26.
5 Malcom Kerr, The Arab Cold War 1958–1967: A Study of Ideology in Politics, 2nd ed.

(London: Oxford University Press, 1967).

6 William L. Cleveland and Martin Bunton, A History of the Middle East (Boulder, CO:

Westview Press, 2009), 323.

 5  EMERGENCE OF THE TURKISH/QATARI ALLIANCE …  135

The Arab–Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973 overshadowed inter-

Arab rivalries for a short while. However, when Egypt, under the rule
of Anwar Sadat, signed a separate peace with Israel at Camp David in
1978, this move resulted in Egypt’s isolation from the Arab world and
Iraq’s rise to a leadership role to fill the power vacuum left by Egypt.7
In the post-Camp David order, a new split took place in the Arab world
between the Iraqi–Saudi–Jordanian axis on the one hand, and the Syrian–
Libyan axis on the other.8 The main development that fed this split was
the revolution in Iran and its repercussions in the Arab world. Once
the strongest pillar of the status quo camp, Iran emerged as a new revi-
sionist actor in the Gulf Region and the broader Middle East following
the (Shiite) Islamic Revolution, which overthrew the Pahlavi monarchy
in 1979. The Iranian revolution consolidated the alliance between Iraq
and the Gulf monarchies, most of which were essentially Sunni regimes
with Shia populations. When these tensions eventually led to a long and
bloody war between Iraq and Iran in 1980, all status quo regional actors,
including the Gulf monarchies, Jordan, and Egypt, actively supported
Baghdad, while Syria and Libya openly sided with revisionist Iran.9
During the 1990s, Iraq’s sudden transformation into an aggressive
revisionist actor with its invasion of Kuwait in 1990 led to another split
in the Arab world. From that moment on, neutralization of the immi-
nent threat stemming from Iraq became top priority for the Gulf States.
When the US-led coalition forces initiated a military campaign to oust
Iraqi forces from Kuwait, the remaining Gulf monarchies, along with
Syria and Egypt, actively supported it. Conversely, some Arab actors,
including Jordan, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and
Libya opted for an inter-Arab solution and opposed any foreign inter-
vention to the region.10 Another important development during the
1990s was Israel’s changing regional status in the broader Middle East.
In the aftermath of the Gulf War, the US-led Middle East Peace Process
resulted in the 1993 Oslo Accords (between Israel and the PLO), and
the 1994 Wadi Araba Agreement (between Israel and Jordan). As a

7 Taylor, The Arab Balance of Power, 78–80.

8 Taylor, 81–92.
9 Peter Mansfield and Nicolas Pelham, A History of the Middle East (New York: Penguin

Books, 2013), 93.

10 Cleveland and Bunton, A History of the Middle East, 481; Mansfield and Pelham, A

History of the Middle East, 326.

136  N. YEŞILYURT AND M. YETIM

result, Israel gained more room for political maneuvering in the Middle
East. The mentioned state and non-state actors became affiliated with
the conservative (status quo) bloc.
During the 2000s, after the Baath regime in Iraq was toppled with
the US-led invasion in 2003, Iran took advantage of the political insta-
bility and power vacuum in war-torn Iraq by forging ties with the lead-
ing Shiite groups in the country. As Iran’s influence over political actors
in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine increased substantially after the
Iraq War, Tehran gradually became the backbone of the revisionist
bloc against the US-backed Middle East regional order.11 Iran, Syria,
Hezbollah, and Hamas, among others, are often cited as resistance actors
in the broader Middle East, implying their resistance to the US–Israeli
domination in the region (see Chapters 4 and 9).12
As Iranian revisionism gained more ground following the Iraq War in
2003, the KSA emerged as the leading status quo power in the broader
Middle East. In fact, owing to regime security concerns, Riyadh has
always adopted a firm stance against any kind of revisionist and revolu-
tionary forces in its vicinity and continuously supported other status quo
actors, thanks to its huge oil wealth.13 Similarly, during the 2000s, Saudi
Arabia sought to close the ranks among Sunni states in the Gulf Region
and the broader Middle East against what it perceived as the rising Shiite
Crescent led by Iran.14 Saudi Arabia and its current allies (the UAE,
Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, and the PLO, among others) are often cited as

11 Anoushiravan Ehteshami, “The Foreign Policy of Iran,” in The Foreign Policies of

Middle East States, ed. Raymond A. Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan Ehteshami (Boulder:
Lynne Rienner, 2002), 283–99; F. Gregory Gause, “Revolution and Threat Perception:
Iran and the Middle East,” International Politics 52, no. 5 (2015): 637–45, https://doi.
org/10.1057/ip.2015.27.
12 Philipp O. Amour, “Hamas-PLO/Fatah Reconciliation and Rapprochement Within

the Unfolding Regional Order in the Middle East since 2010: Neorealist and Neoclassical
Realist Perspectives,” Journal of Social Sciences of Mus Alparslan University 6, no. 5 (April
13, 2018): 623, https://doi.org/10.18506/anemon.384773.
13 M. Evren Tok, Jason J. McSparren, and Michael Olender, “The Perpetuation of

Regime Security in Gulf Cooperation Council States: A Multi‐Lens Approach,” Digest of

Middle East Studies 26, no. 1 (2017): 150–69, https://doi.org/10.1111/dome.12105.
14 This term was first used by King Abdullah II of Jordan in 2004. See Robin Wright and

Peter Baker, “Iraq, Jordan See Threat to Election from Iran,” Washington Post, December
8, 2004, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A43980-2004Dec7.html.
 5  EMERGENCE OF THE TURKISH/QATARI ALLIANCE …  137

the moderate actors in the Middle East, mainly due to their pro-Western
policies and benign attitudes toward Israel.15
At this point, it is also important to emphasize that the general dis-
tinctions between resistance and moderate blocs are extensive in regard
to their divergent positions and approaches toward the Western-imposed
and US–Israeli-dominated regional order in the Gulf Region and the
broader Middle East. These blocs launch different strategies in order to
weaken the rival bloc (revisionist strategy) and to eliminate possible chal-
lenges toward themselves (status quo strategy). Therefore, one should
not be confused with Iran’s pro-status quo position (protection of the
Assad regime by all means) and Saudi Arabia’s somewhat pro-revisionist
stance (overthrow of the Assad regime) within Syria, as these policies are
just the reflections of regional bloc calculations.
Current confrontation and polarization in the Gulf Region and the
broader Middle East between revisionist and status quo blocs for the
regional hegemony can also be considered as a rivalry between different
versions of Islamism, since both blocs extensively use Islamism in their
rhetoric (see Chapters 2 and 3). Some scholars and politicians even tend
to identify this rivalry as a sectarian conflict between Shiite and Sunni
forces.16 Yet, this is not entirely true, considering the status quo bloc’s
hostile policies toward the leading non-state Sunni organization, namely
the MB, and the revisionist bloc’s friendly relations with Hamas, which is
an affiliate of MB.17 Consequently, recognition of any actor as an enemy
or a friend by either bloc is not necessarily related to its sectarian identity
but to its position toward the regional order.
Turkey and Qatar’s position in this regional constellation was closer
to the status quo bloc throughout the second half of the twentieth cen-
tury. As a NATO member, Turkey upheld a Middle East policy gener-
ally in accordance with that of the United States. The only exception to
this accord was the 1960–1980 period, when Ankara started to act more

15 Amour, “Hamas-PLO/Fatah Within the Regional Order in the Middle East,” 623.
16 On the resurfacing of sectarianism in the Middle East following the Arab Uprisings see
Raymond Hinnebusch, “The Sectarian Revolution in the Middle East,” Global Trends and
Regional Issues 4, no. 1 (2016): 120–52.
17 Matthew Hedges and Giorgio Cafiero, “The GCC and the Muslim Brotherhood: What

Does Future Hold?” Middle East Policy 24, no. 1 (Spring 2017): 129–53; Rola Al-Husseini,
“Hezbollah and the Axis of Refusal: Hamas, Iran and Syria,” Third World Quarterly 31,
no. 5 (2010): 809–910, https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2010.502695.
138  N. YEŞILYURT AND M. YETIM

autonomously in the region due to changes both in Turkish politics and

in the international system.18 Qatar only gained independence from the
British in 1971. Afterward, its foreign policy was generally in line with
that of Saudi Arabia, at least until the mid-1990s.19 During the 2000s,
however, a serious transformation was observable in the foreign policies
of both countries. Throughout the 2000s, Ankara and Doha invested
extensively in soft power and positioned themselves between the status
quo and revisionist blocs.
In this context, Turkey and Qatar developed trade and investment
relations with the whole region, focused on name branding and public
relations and carried out proactive diplomacy, while acting as mediators
in many regional conflicts. Consequently, in this era, Turkey and Qatar
came to the fore by instituting amicable relations with both the status
quo and revisionist camps, without being a part of either. In order to
understand how this was possible, and why Turkey and Qatar did so, one
must focus on major domestic transformations that both countries had
undergone since the turn of the century.

Domestic and Foreign Policy Transformation

in Qatar and Turkey

Qatar is a small state with a tiny population in the Persian Gulf. Its com-
ing to the forefront of regional politics took place during the reign of
Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani (1995–2013), who deposed his
father, Sheikh Khalifa bin Hamad al-Thani, in a bloodless coup in
1995.20 In fact, following the Gulf War, Hamad had already been the
de facto ruler of the country in many areas.21 Hence, the 1995 coup

18 Melek Fırat and Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, “Orta Doğu’yla İlişkiler (Relations with the

Middle East),” in Türk Dış Politikası, Cilt I: 1919–1980 (Turkish Foreign Policy, Volume I:
1919–1980), ed. Baskın Oran (İstanbul: İletişim, 2009), 784.
19 David B. Roberts, “Understanding Qatar’s Foreign Policy Objectives,” Mediterranean

Politics 17, no. 2 (July 2012): 234, https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2012.695123.

20 A graduate of the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst, Hamad became com-

mander-in-chief of the Qatari Armed Forces in 1975 and was appointed the Defense
Minister and Heir Apparent in 1977. “Sheikh Ḥamad Ibn Khalīfah Āl Thānī,” in
Britannica Academic, May 1, 2018, https://academic.eb.com/levels/collegiate/article/
Sheikh-%E1%B8%A4amad-ibn-Khal%C4%ABfah-%C4%80l-Th%C4%81n%C4%AB/475728.
21 “Sheikh Ḥamad Ibn Khalīfah Āl Thānī.”
 5  EMERGENCE OF THE TURKISH/QATARI ALLIANCE …  139

made him the de jure ruler as well. Under the rule of Sheikh Hamad,
Qatar drew the attention of the region and the world by embarking on
an ambitious program of political reform, economic liberalization, and
development. First, in 1996, in a move to enhance press freedom, the
new Emir established the Al Jazeera news channel, which broadcasts con-
troversial news and discussions on various topics in Arabic. Two years
later, he abolished the Ministry of Information, which hitherto had acted
as an organ of press censorship. More importantly, in 1999, elections for
municipal councils were held for the first time in the history of Qatar,
and women were allowed both to vote and to stand. Furthermore, a new
constitution was adopted in 2003, which stipulates the formation of an
advisory council with two-thirds of its members elected. On the eco-
nomic side, Hamad encouraged privatization of state assets, successfully
returned to the state billions of dollars that were taken out by Sheikh
Khalifa after the coup, and invested in liquefied natural gas (LNG) pro-
duction, which eventually became the main source of Qatar’s wealth.22
Sheikh Hamad also took steps in the educational and cultural develop-
ment of Qatar by establishing the Qatar Foundation in 1995.23 The
main rationale behind these courageous reform efforts of Sheikh Hamad
was to gain support from both the younger generation of Qataris and
the West in his vision for greater autonomy from the KSA, the most
powerful state among the Gulf monarchies.24
Predictably, Hamad’s coup was not well received by the neighbor-
ing Gulf monarchies, especially the KSA, because of his courageous and
contrarian foreign policy style, which contrasted with Sheikh Khalifa’s
Saudi-oriented and passive approach. Following the Gulf War, dur-
­
ing Hamad’s de facto rule of the country, Qatar had mended fences
with Iran and Iraq, and confronted Riyadh in a border dispute.25
Furthermore, Hamad’s relatively young age, brave personality, and

22 Andrew Rathmel and Kirsten Schulze, “Political Reform in the Gulf: The Case of

Qatar,” Middle Eastern Studies 36, no. 4 (October 2000): 53–55; Allen J. Fromherz,
Qatar: A Modern History (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012), 106;
and “Sheikh Ḥamad Ibn Khalīfah Āl Thānī.”
23 “About Qatar Foundation,” Qatar Foundation, May 26, 2018, https://www.qf.org.

qa/about.
24 Rathmel and Schulze, “Political Reform in the Gulf,” 60.

25 “Prince Deposes Father in Qatar Palace Coup,” Deseret News, June 27, 1995, https://

www.deseret.com/1995/6/27/19179334/prince-deposes-father-in-qatar-palace-coup.
140  N. YEŞILYURT AND M. YETIM

reformist tendencies seriously irked other Gulf monarchs, who feared

sharing the same fate as Sheikh Khalifa.26 Largely for these reasons, the
KSA, the UAE, and Bahrain acknowledged Khalifa’s claims to the Qatari
throne and even allegedly supported a number of coup attempts by
him against Hamad in the following years.27 This experience eventually
caused a prolonged tension between Qatar and its Gulf neighbors.
The US approach toward Hamad’s grasp on power was somewhat dif-
ferent, as Washington was quite pleased to see the emergence of a strong
ally in Qatar.28 During the Gulf War, Hamad had won the trust of the
United States and proved his military skills as the commander-in-chief
of the Qatari Armed Forces, which helped the coalition troops defeat an
Iraqi assault on the Saudi town of Khafji. In 1992, Qatar and the United
States signed a cooperative defense agreement, which allowed, among
other things, USA military access to Qatari military facilities and prepo-
sitioning of USA military equipment in Qatar.29 Hence, in 1995, the US
administration quickly recognized Hamad as the new Emir, after receiv-
ing assurances over his ties with Iraq and Iran.30
Unlike Qatar, Turkey can be described as a regional great power in
the broader Middle East.31 At the turn of the century, critical develop-
ments were taking place in Turkish domestic politics, which eventually
transformed Turkey’s policy toward the region in a similar line with
Qatar. A temporary halt of the terror attacks of the Kurdistan Worker
Party (PKK) following the capture of its leader in 199932 and the

26 Douglas Jehl, “Young Turk of the Gulf: Emir of Qatar,” The New York Times, July 10,

1997, https://www.nytimes.com/1997/07/10/world/young-turk-of-the-gulf-emir-of-
qatar.html.
27 Fromherz, Qatar: A Modern History, 117–20; “Life Sentences for Qatari Coup

Plotters,” BBC News, February 29, 2000, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_

east/660887.stm.
28 Fromherz, Qatar: A Modern History, 107.

29 Kenneth Katzman, “Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy,” CRS Report

(Congressional Research Service, 2018), 14–15, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/

R44533.pdf.
30 Patrick Cockburn, “Emir of Qatar Deposed by His Son,” June 8, 1995, https://www.

independent.co.uk/news/world/emir-of-qatar-deposed-by-his-son-1588698.html.
31 William M. Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774 (New York, NY: Routledge, 2013),

1–2.
32 PKK is an armed separatist movement which was formed in 1978, and intensified its

terror attacks against Turkish officials and civilians especially in the 1990s.
 5  EMERGENCE OF THE TURKISH/QATARI ALLIANCE …  141

economic crisis of 2001 prepared the Turkish political scene for crit-
ical transformations that began with the early elections of 2002. The
newly established Justice and Development Party (AKP) was victorious
in the parliamentary elections and formed a single-party government33
Upon taking power, AKP leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan enthusiastically
embraced liberalism, globalization, and capitalism, and he positioned
himself against ­military-bureaucratic elites who were strictly resisting the
transformation of Turkey in accordance with neoliberal globalization.34
During this period, Turkey experienced a visible economic growth and
stability as well, which can be observed in high growth rates, rising GDP
per capita, and reduced poverty.35
Throughout the 2000s, the AKP consolidated its power by winning
consecutive elections and referendums and by curbing the influence of
the military on politics. Gradually, AKP rule was equated with economic
growth and political stability for a large segment of the population. All
these transformations in domestic politics greatly ameliorated Turkey’s
image in the Middle East. In the 2000s, Arab observers often watched
political and economic developments in Turkey with great interest and
admiration.36 AKP officials, in return, often underlined the common
Ottoman past and/or Islamic identity in defense of a rapprochement
with the region.37 Moreover, the AKP saw the Middle East as a fertile
export market and investment source for the growing Turkish economy.
As Qatar and Turkey were experiencing these critical transformations
at the domestic level, their foreign policies also started to change. Along
with Emir Hamad, the other main figure behind the formulation of
the new Qatari foreign policy was Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber

33 AKP leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was an ex-mayor of İstanbul, and former member

of Milli Görüş (National Outlook) movement.

34 İlhan Uzgel, “AKP: Neoliberal Dönüşmün Yeni Aktörü (AKP: The New Actor of

Neoliberal Transformation),” in AKP Kitabı: Bir Dönüşümün Bilançosu (AKP Book:

Balance Sheet of a Transformation), ed. Bülent Duru and İlhan Uzgel (Ankara: Phoenix,
2009), 24–31.
35 Seyfettin Gürsel, “Ekonomi (Economy),” in Türk Dış Politikası, Cilt III: 2001–2012

(Turkish Foreign Policy, Volume III 2001–2012), ed. Baskın Oran (İstanbul: İletişim, 2013),
54–58.
36 Zerrin Torun, “The Debate on ‘Turkey as a Role Model’ (1990–2011),” Avrasya

Etüdleri 49, no. 1 (2016): 16–19.

37 See Ahmet Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye’nin Uluslararası Konumu (Strategic

Depth: Turkey’s International Position) (Istanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2008), 323–53.

142  N. YEŞILYURT AND M. YETIM

al Thani (HBJ), who served as foreign minister (1992–2013) and prime

minister (2007–2013).38 On the Turkish side, the main architect of for-
eign policy was Ahmet Davutoğlu, who served as the chief advisor to the
prime minister (2002–2009), foreign minister (2009–2014), and prime
minister (2014–2016), in sequence.39 Under the guidance of HBJ and
Davutoğlu, remarkably similar changes took place in the foreign policy
orientations and tools adopted by Doha and Ankara, which eventually
positioned the two countries as major soft powers in the Gulf Region
and the broader Middle East. These soft-power-infused transformations
in the two countries’ foreign policies can be summarized as three points:
First, both Turkey and Qatar extensively used economic tools in their
foreign policies during the 2000s. The total volume of Turkey’s foreign
trade increased more than threefold between 2000 and 2010.40 In this
respect, Ankara signed free trade agreements, formed business councils,
and organized business forums with countries in the Gulf Region and the
broader Middle East throughout the 2000s.41 As a result, Turkish exports
to the Gulf Region and the broader Middle East increased substantially,
along with these regions’ shares in total Turkish exports in the same
period.42 The total volume of Turkish construction companies’ projects
abroad exceeded 10 billion USD in 2005 and remained over 20 billion
USD between 2006 and 2016. The Gulf Region and the broader Middle

38 Sam Bollier, “Can Qatar Replace Its Renaissance Man?” Al Jazeera English, June 26,

2013, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/06/201362613431469150.
html.
39 “Portre: Ahmet Davutoğlu.,” Al Jazeera Türk, May 5, 2016, http://www.aljazeera.

com.tr/portre/portre-ahmet-davutoglu.
40 Gürsel, “Ekonomi (Economy),” 66–67.

41 For the full list of countries with which Turkey signed a Free Trade Agreement

see “Yürürlükte Bulunan STA’lar (FTA’s in Force),” Turkish Ministry of Economy,

accessed May 27, 2018, https://www.ekonomi.gov.tr/portal/faces/home/disIliskiler/
SerbestTic/SerbestTic-YururlukteBulunanSTA; For more information about busi-
ness councils and forums between Turkey and Middle Eastern countries, see “Türkiye
– Ortadoğu ve Körfez İş Konseyleri (Turkey—Middle East and Gulf Business Councils),”
Foreign Economic Relations Council, accessed May 27, 2018, https://www.deik.org.tr/
turkiye-ortadogu-ve-korfez-is-konseyleri.
42 Main Turkish export commodities to the region were iron–steel, electrical and mechan-

ical machines, motor vehicles. This information is edited from “Coğrafi Ülke Grubu ve
Fasıllara Göre Dış Ticaret (Foreign Trade with Regards to Geographical Country Groups and
Sections)” (Turkish Statistical Institute), accessed May 27, 2018, https://biruni.tuik.gov.tr/
disticaretapp/disticaret.zul?param1=5&param2=21&sitcrev=0&isicrev=0&sayac=5809.
 5  EMERGENCE OF THE TURKISH/QATARI ALLIANCE …  143

East comprised more than 40% of all the projects that were undertaken by
Turkish construction companies abroad.43 Consequently, Turkey started
to be considered as a trading state in its neighborhood.44
On the Qatari side, the main driver of economic diplomacy was the
country’s huge natural gas reserves, the third largest on earth. As the larg-
est LNG exporter on earth since 2006, Qatar dominates the global LNG
market.45 Furthermore, since 2009, Qatar has been one of the top five nat-
ural gas producing countries in the world.46 Doha operationalized its huge
income from LNG exports by establishing a sovereign wealth fund in 2005
under the presidency of HBJ: Qatar Investment Authority (QIA). Though
still smaller than other Gulf sovereign wealth funds, QIA makes critical
investments across the world and the broader Middle East, and has thus
become one of the main pillars of Qatari soft power in the region.47
Second, both Turkey and Qatar invested heavily in public diplo-
macy and name branding during this period. Humanitarian aid and
development assistance are an important component of public diplo-
macy for both countries. The main Turkish actors in these fields are the
Turkish Corporation and Development Agency (TIKA), the Disaster

43 “Yurtdışı Müteahhitlik Hizmetleri Genel Notu (General Notes on Contracting

Services Abroad),” Turkish Ministry of Economy, accessed May 27, 2018, https://
www.ekonomi.gov.tr/portal/content/conn/UCM/path/Contribution%20Folders/
web/Hizmet%20Ticareti/Sekt%c3%b6rler%20ve%20Destek%20Programlar%c4%b1/02.
Yu r t d % c 4 % b 1 % c 5 % 9 f % c 4 % b 1 % 2 0 M % c 3 % b c t e a h h i t l i k % 2 0 v e % 2 0 Te k n i k % 2 0
M%c3%bc%c5%9favirlik%28YDMH%29/Genel%20M%c3%bcteahhitlik%20Notu%20
02.05.2018.docx?lve.
44 Kemal Kirişçi, “The Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Rise of the Trading

State,” New Perspectives on Turkey 40 (2009): 29–57.

45 Justin Dargin, “Qatar’s Natural Gas: The ­Foreign-Policy Driver,” Middle East Policy 14,

no. 3 (2007): 137–41, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4967.2007.00318.x; “World LNG

Report,” IGU World LNG Report (International Gas Union (IGU), 2017), 9, https://www.
igu.org/sites/default/files/103419-World_IGU_Report_no%20crops.pdf.
46 “Global Energy Statistical Yearbook 2017: Natural Gas Production,” May 27, 2018,

https://yearbook.enerdata.net/natural-gas/world-natural-gas-production-statistics.html.
47 “Top 81 Largest Sovereign Wealth Fund Rankings by Total Assets,” SWFI Institute, May

27, 2018, https://www.swfinstitute.org/fund-rankings/sovereign-wealth-fund; “Revealed:

Qatar Investment Authority’s Investments across the World,” Arabian Business, May 17,
2017, http://www.arabianbusiness.com/revealed-qatar-investment-authority-s-investments-
across-world-674254.html; For more information on Qatari and other Gulf investments
in the Middle East see Adam Hanieh, Capitalism and Class in the Gulf Arab States, 2015,
149–64.
144  N. YEŞILYURT AND M. YETIM

and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD), and the Turkish Red

Crescent. Turkey’s official international aid increased from 85 million
USD in 2003 to 2.5 billion USD in 2012. More than 25% of TIKA’s
spending was directed toward the broader Middle East during the same
period (See Chapter 6).48
In cultural diplomacy, Turkey sought to expand its influence in the
world by establishing the Yunus Emre Institute in 2009, which aims
to promote Turkey, its cultural heritage, language, culture, and art.49
Turkish Airlines has also become an important tool of name branding
and public diplomacy in Turkish foreign policy. It expanded considera-
bly in the 2000s and began flying to almost all major Middle Eastern
countries. As of 2012, it was the world’s largest company in terms of the
number of countries served.50
As for Qatar, the Qatar Fund for Development (est. 2002) and Qatar
Red Crescent are the main agencies for Qatari international aid, which
reached 1.3 billion dollars in 2013. The main recipients were Syria,
Morocco, Palestine, Egypt, and Yemen.51 Similar to Turkey, in the
2000s, Qatar concentrated on branding the country by inviting major
US universities to its Education City, establishing world-class museums
(such as the Museum of Islamic Art), organizing cultural festivals (such
as the Qatar Cultural Festival), hosting international conferences and
sporting events (such as the Organization of Islamic Countries sum-
mit in 2003, World Trade Organization trade negotiations in 2006,
the 2006 Asian Games, and the 2011 Asian Football Cup), expanding
the Al Jazeera news channel network, and developing its national airline

48 Cemalettin Haşimi, “Turkey’s Humanitarian Diplomacy and Development

Cooperation,” Insight Turkey 16, no. 1 (Winter 2014): 135–37.
49 The first Yunus Emre Turkish Cultural Centers in the Middle East were opened in

Cairo and Damascus in 2010. Muharrem Ekşi, Kamu Diplomasisi ve Ak Parti Dönemi Türk
Dış Politikası (Public diplomacy and foreign policy of JDP Period) (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi,
2014).
50 “THY’ye ‘En Çok Ülkeye Uçan Havayolu’ Unvanı (Turkish Airlines Receives ‘Largest

Airline by Number of Countries Served’ Title),” Sabah, October 3, 2012, https://www.

sabah.com.tr/ekonomi/2012/10/03/thyye-en-cok-ulkeye-ucan-havayolu-unvani; and
Orçun Selçuk, “Turkish Airlines as a Soft Power Tool in the Context of Turkish Foreign
Policy” (MA thesis, Boğaziçi University, 2012).
51 “Qatar’s Development Co-Operation,” O.E.C.D., May 27, 2018, http://www.oecd.

org/dac/stats/qatars-development-co-operation.htm.
 5  EMERGENCE OF THE TURKISH/QATARI ALLIANCE …  145

carrier, Qatar Airways.52 Other important Qatari initiatives include host-

ing the latest round of trade negotiations (The Doha Round) among the
members of the World Trade Organization,53 and its successful bid to host
the 2022 FIFA World Cup Finals.54 Due to such initiatives, Qatar has sub-
stantially developed its public recognition at regional and global levels.
Third, both Qatar and Turkey have run a proactive diplomacy policy
in the Gulf Region and the broader Middle East during the 2000s. They
started this process by resolving prolonged disputes with their neighbors.
In this sense, there was a striking similarity between Davutoğlu’s zero
problems with neighbors’ policy and Emir Hamad’s efforts to resolve
territorial disputes with Saudi Arabia over border demarcation and with
Bahrain over the Hawar Islands.55 So, upon resolving the most salient
disputes with their neighbors, both countries concentrated on media-
tion and peace-brokering efforts in order to establish a niche for them-
selves in the contentious political structure in the Gulf Region and the
broader Middle East. Throughout the 2000s, Qatar mediated between
Libya and the West (2003, 2007), Chad and Sudan (2008), Hamas and
Fatah (2006), Lebanese factions (2008), Iran and the UAE (2001), the
Yemeni government and the Houthis (2007), the Sudanese govern-
ment and Darfur rebels (2009), and Morocco and Algeria (2004).56
In the same period, Turkey acted as mediator and/or facilitator in an
effort to end conflicts between Afghanistan and Pakistan (2007), Syria
and the West (2005), Israel and Syria (2007), Syria and Iraq (2009),
Syria and Lebanon (2008), Iran and the West (2009–2010), Lebanese

52 J.E. Peterson, “Qatar and the World: Branding for a Micro-State,” Middle East Journal

60, no. 4 (Autumn 2006): 732–48.

53 “The Doha Round,” World Trade Organization, May 5, 2019, https://www.wto.org/

english/tratop_e/dda_e/dda_e.htm.
54 Jamie Jackson, “Qatar Wins 2022 World Cup Bid,” The Guardian, December 2, 2010,

https://www.theguardian.com/football/2010/dec/02/qatar-win-2022-world-cup-bid.
55 Özgür Pala, “The Evolution of the Turkish–Qatari Relations from 2002 to 2013:

Convergence of Policies, Identities and Interests” (MA thesis, Qatar University, 2012), 60;
Qatar signed border demarcation agreement with Saudi Arabia in 1999, and a 2001 rul-
ing of International Court of Justice finalized dispute over Hawar Islands. See Fromherz,
Qatar: A Modern History, 117–19.
56 Fromherz, Qatar: A Modern History, 112–13; Mehran Kamrava, “Mediation and

Qatari Foreign Policy,” Middle East Journal 65, no. 4 (Autumn 2011): 539–56.
146  N. YEŞILYURT AND M. YETIM

factions (2008), and Iraqi factions (2005–2006).57 Furthermore, the

two countries pursued similar policies toward the Palestinian issue, the
Lebanese quagmire, and the Iranian nuclear crisis, and they mediated
jointly during the presidential crisis in Lebanon (2008).58 As an indicator
of Turkey’s and Qatar’s efforts to be more actively involved in the res-
olution of regional crises, they both assumed non-permanent member-
ship of the UN Security Council during the 2006–2007 and 2009–2010
periods, respectively.
As part of these mediation efforts and proactive diplomacy, Ankara
and Doha sought to keep communication channels open with all state
and non-state actors in the Gulf Region and the broader Middle East
from both the status quo and the revisionist blocs. Thus, on the one
hand, they built friendly relationships with key resistance non-state
and state actors such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran.59 On the other,
they kept alive political and economic relations with the main moderate
actors, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Furthermore, both Turkey and Qatar
continued their strategic alliance with the United States throughout the
2000s. The two countries host probably the most critical US Air Bases
in the Middle East (İncirlik and Al Udeid); these bases play an impor-
tant role in US-led military operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria.60
57 “Uyuşmazlıkların Çözümü ve Arabuluculuk (Conflict Resolution and Mediation),”

Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed May 27, 2018, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/

uyusmazliklarin-cozumu-ve-arabuluculuk.tr.mfa; Bülent Aras, “Turkey’s Mediation and
Friends of Mediation Initiative,” SAM Papers (Ankara: Center for strategic research (SAM),
December 2012), http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/SAM_Papers_No.4-
Dec12.pdf.
58 Pala, “The Evolution of the Turkish–Qatari Relations,” 61–69.

59 Anrew F. Cooper and Besma Momani, “Qatar and Expanded Contours of Small State

Diplomacy,” The International Spectator 46, no. 3 (September 2011): 120–25, https://
doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2011.576181; Nuri Yeşilyurt, “Orta Doğu’yla İlişkiler
(Relations with the Middle East),” in Türk Dış Politikası, Cilt III: 2001–2012 (Turkish
Foreign Policy, Volume III: 2001–2012), ed. Baskın Oran (İstanbul: İletişim, 2013),
416–17, 431–431, 451–60; In addition, Qatar built relationships with important figures
from both moderate and even some extremist Sunni Islamist groups such as the Muslim
Brotherhood and the Libya Islamist Combatant Group. See Lina Khatib, “Qatar’s Foreign
Policy: The Limits of Pragmatism,” International Affairs 89, no. 2 (2013): 145–50,
https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12025; Hedges and Cafiero, “The GCC and the
Muslim Brotherhood,” 145–50.
60 İlhan Uzgel, “ABD’yle İlişkiler (Relations with the USA),” in Türk Dış Politikası, Cilt

III: 2001–2012 (Turkish Foreign Policy, Volume III: 2001–2012), ed. Baskın Oran (İstanbul:
İletişim, 2013), 275; Cooper and Momani, “Qatar and Expanded Contours,” 123.
 5  EMERGENCE OF THE TURKISH/QATARI ALLIANCE …  147

More importantly, at least until 2009, both Ankara and Doha kept their
dialogue channels open with Israel, the key US ally in the region.61 In
sum, as a result of these connections and activities, Turkey and Qatar
established themselves as the most effective peace brokers in the broader
Middle East during the 2000s.
This proactive diplomacy in the Middle East was generally welcomed
by the United States. By the mid-2000s, Washington had begun to
acknowledge that Ankara’s and Doha’s active diplomacy in the Middle
East actually served its interests by contributing to the peace and stability
of the region, by creating a back channel for the US government to com-
municate with extremist/hostile actors inside and outside the revisionist
bloc, and by facilitating these actors’ moderation and articulation to the
global system.62 This diplomacy was also in accordance with the US-led
broader Middle East Initiative, which aimed at fostering economic and
political liberalization in the region.63 Turkish/Qatari relations and
activism in the region entered into a new phase in the wake of the Arab
Spring first movement, which brought about not only prospects but also
new challenges for both countries.

The Rise of the Moderate Resistance Bloc

Since the Arab Uprisings
The burgeoning Turkish/Qatari alliance since the Arab Uprisings does
have a significant impact on the power structure in the Middle East.
Moving from this assumption, this section respectively analyzes the for-
mation of a Turkey- and Qatar-led third bloc (the moderate resistance
bloc) in the Middle East during the initial periods of the Arab Uprisings,
the major setbacks this bloc faced in 2013–2014, its consolidation under

61 Yeşilyurt, “Orta Doğu’yla İlişkiler (Relations with the Middle East),” 438–51; Cooper

and Momani, “Qatar and Expanded Contours,” 118–19.

62 Uzgel, “ABD’yle İlişkiler (Relations with the USA),” 264–69; Nuri Yeşilyurt and Atay

Akdevelioğlu, “AKP Döneminde Türkiye’nin Ortadoğu Politikası (Turkey’s Middle East

Policy during the JDP Period),” in AKP Kitabı: Bir Dönüşümün Bilançosu (JDP Book:
Balance Sheet of a Transformation), ed. İlhan Uzgel and Bülent Duru (Ankara, 2009),
381–409; Fromherz, Qatar: A Modern History, 124, 128, 134.
63 Jeremy M. Sharp, “The Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative: An

Overview,” Washington, DC, February 15, 2005, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/

RS22053.pdf.
148  N. YEŞILYURT AND M. YETIM

external pressure since 2014, and the alternative strategy of this bloc,
along with its regional implications.

Formative Years of the Turkish/Qatari-Led

Bloc (2002–2013)
Turkish/Qatari rapprochement can be traced back to the early 2000s.
As discussed in the previous section, in the wake of US-led invasions of
Afghanistan and Iraq, Qatar and Turkey attempted to fill the regional
power vacuum through the use of soft-power tools (2001–2011).64 In
this context, the advent of the Arab Uprisings in the early 2010s brought
about serious challenges to the soft-power-oriented policies of the two
countries. Ankara and Doha’s regional policies faced the first major
challenge during the initial period of the Arab Uprisings (2011–2013),
during which they had two options. They would either maintain their
previous stance, which mostly prioritized friendly relations with existing
regimes, or they would lend their support to popular demonstrations at
the expense of the ruling regimes. After initial reluctance, Turkey and
Qatar adopted the second strategy and, accordingly, supported popu-
lar uprisings in, among others, Tunisia and Egypt against authoritarian
regimes in the name of democracy and human rights.65
The two countries faced even more serious challenges in Libya and
Syria, where peaceful demonstrations quickly turned into bloody civil wars.
Although Turkey’s initial opposition to any foreign intervention in Libya
created a dissonance with Qatar, which had been very interventionist from

64 Başkan, Turkey and Qatar in the Tangled Geopolitics, 33–81; Pala, “The Evolution of

the Turkish–Qatari Relations.”

65 Even Turkey defined the emergence of new bloc under the leadership of Turkey

and Egypt as “an axis of democracy” which is not against any country: Anthony Shadid,
“Turkey Predicts Alliance with Egypt as Regional Anchors,” The New York Times,
September 18, 2011, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/19/world/middleeast/
turkey-predicts-partnership-with-egypt-as-regional-anchors.html; Mustafa Yetim and
Bilal Hamade, “The Impact of the ‘New’ Zero Problems Policy and the Arab Spring on
the Relations between Turkey and Lebanese Factions,” Insight Turkey 16, no. 2 (2014):
69–72; and Mustafa Yetim, “State-Led Change in Qatar in the Wake of Arab Spring:
Monarchical Country, Democratic Stance?” Contemporary Review of the Middle East 1, no.
4 (2014): 392–400, https://doi.org/10.1177/2347798914564847.
 5  EMERGENCE OF THE TURKISH/QATARI ALLIANCE …  149

the beginning, in the end, both countries became part of the NATO-led
military campaign that toppled Qaddafi.66 In the Syrian crisis, Turkey
used diplomatic channels to encourage the Assad regime to initiate neces-
sary reforms, but once these efforts proved unsuccessful in August 2011,
Ankara became a strong backer of political and military opposition in
Syria.67 Likewise, Doha differed from most Arab regimes by closing its
embassy in Damascus at an earlier stage (July 2011), and by becoming the
first Arab state to call for foreign military intervention in Syria (January
2012).68 Chapter 7 in this book further explores Qatar’s policy regarding
the Syrian crisis.
The newly adopted pro-revolution stance of Ankara and Doha, how-
ever, hardly meant unconditional and unwavering support for all civil
demonstrations in the Arab world. Considering Turkey’s, and especially
Qatar’s, hesitant and silent position toward the Bahraini regime’s vio-
lent repression of Shia-led peaceful demonstrations in 2011, this condi-
tionality becomes only more obvious.69 In this way, during the Bahrain
demonstrations, Ankara and Doha refrained from unsettling the Saudi-
led status quo camp.
Turkey and Qatar’s parallel regional posture in the early phase of
the Arab Uprisings was the first and the most important indication of
the emergence of a Qatari–Turkish bloc in the broader Middle East.
More importantly, during this period, Ankara and Doha distinguished

66 Clifford Krauss, “For Qatar, Libyan Intervention May Be a Turning Point,” New York

Times, April 3, 2011, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/04/world/middleeast/04qatar.

html; “Erdoğan: Türkiye Libya’da arabulucu olabilir (Erdoğan: Turkey Can Act as a Mediator
in Libya),” NTV, accessed March 29, 2011, https://www.ntv.com.tr/dunya/erdogan-turki-
ye-libyada-arabulucu-olabilir; and “Nato Operations in Libya: Data Journalism Breaks Down
Which Country Does What,” The Guardian, May 22, 2011, https://www.theguardian.com/
news/datablog/2011/may/22/nato-libya-data-journalism-operations-country.
67 “6 Saatlik Kritik Görüşmeden Ilk Detaylar (First Details of the 6 Hours-Long Critical

Meting),” Hürriyet, August 9, 2011, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/6-saat-

lik-kritik-gorusmeden-ilk-detaylar-18446872; Liam Stack, “In Slap at Syria, Turkey
Shelters Anti-Assad Fighters,” New York Times, October 27, 2011, https://www.nytimes.
com/2011/10/28/world/europe/turkey-is-sheltering-antigovernment-syrian-militia.html.
68 Ian Black, “Qatar breaks Arab Ranks over Syria,” The Guardian, July 21, 2011,

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jul/21/qatar-syria-ian-black; Kristian Coates

Ulrichsen, “Qatar and the Arab Spring: Policy Drivers and Regional Implications,” Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, September 24, 2014, https://carnegieendowment.
org/2014/09/24/qatar-and-arab-spring-policy-drivers-and-regional-implications-pub-56723.
69 Ennis and Momani, “Shaping the Middle East,” 1135–37.
150  N. YEŞILYURT AND M. YETIM

themselves from the two preexisting regional blocs by becoming the

main sponsors of the leading Islamist opposition movement in the
Arab world: the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). Indeed, both Turkey and
Qatar established intimate relations with Ennahda in Tunisia, the Syrian
National Council (SNC) and the Free Syrian Army (FSA) in Syria, the
Justice and Construction Party (JCP) in Libya, the Freedom and Justice
Party (FJP) in Egypt, and Hamas in Palestine, all of which are MB affil-
iates (see Table 14.1).70 The electoral victories of Ennahda in 2011 and
FJP in 2012 resulted in the formation of MB-led governments in Tunisia
and Egypt, and the rise of Turkish and Qatari influence in these coun-
tries.71 Developing relations among these countries during the initial
period of the Arab Uprisings strengthened the idea that a third bloc was
forming in the Middle East.72

70 F. Gregory Gause, “What the Qatar Crisis Shows about the Middle East,” in The

Qatar Crisis (Washington, DC: The Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS),
2017), 10–12, https://pomeps.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/POMEPS_GCC_
Qatar-Crisis.pdf; HAMAS started to keep the resistance camp at arm’s length first by
moving its headquarters from Syria to Qatar, and second, by declaring a new char-
ter in May 2017. Hamas’s partial shift from revisionist bloc may strengthen the sectar-
ian nature of the revisionist bloc since all the remaining actors in this bloc are Shiite. See
“Hamas Accepts Palestinian State with 1967 Borders,” Al Jazeera English, May 2, 2017,
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/05/hamas-accepts-palestinian-state-1967-bor-
ders-170501114309725.html; Beverley Milton‐Edwards, “Hamas and the Arab Spring:
Strategic Shifts?” Middle East Policy 20, no. 3 (2013): 64–70, https://doi.org/10.1111/
mepo.12033; and Mohns and Bank, “Syrian Revolt Fallout,” 25–35.
71 Turkey’s rising influence in the broader Middle East was recognized both by regional

and international observers. See Mehmet Akif Kireççi, ed., Arap Baharı ve Türkiye Modeli
Tartışmaları (Arab Spring and Turkey: Debates on Turkish Model) (Ankara: ASEM, 2014);
Paul Kubicek, “Debating the Merits of the ‘Turkish Model’ for Democratization in the
Middle East,” in The Middle East Reloaded: Revolutionary Changes, Power Dynamics, and
Regional Rivalries since the Arab Spring, ed. Philipp O. Amour, St. James’s Studies in
World Affairs (Washington, DC: Academica Press, 2018), 145–70.
72 Amour, “Revolutionary Changes, Power Dynamics,” 9; Philipp O. Amour, “Israel,

the Arab Spring, and the Unfolding Regional Order in the Middle East: A Strategic
Assessment,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 44, no. 3 (July 3, 2017): 299–308,
https://doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2016.1185696.
 5  EMERGENCE OF THE TURKISH/QATARI ALLIANCE …  151

Setbacks to the Moderate Resistance Bloc (2013–2014)

The July 2013 military coup of Abdel Fattah al-Sisi against the MB-led
government of Mohamed Morsi in Egypt was the most serious challenge
against consolidation of the moderate resistance bloc.73 By supporting the
Sisi-led coup, the status quo bloc clearly demonstrated that it is not only
against the Iranian-led Shia Crescent, but it is equally against the formation
of an Ikhwan Crescent in the Middle East.74 Thanks to its location, popula-
tion, and military strength, Egypt has always been a principal regional great
power. It is also the center and birthplace of the MB, which is currently
defined by the status quo bloc as the gravest threat to regional stability and
peace.75 Thus, the successful ouster of the MB-led government in Egypt
caused serious restraints on Turkey and Qatar’s MB-oriented regional
policy.
After the fall of Morsi, Egypt’s slide toward the status quo camp under
the Sisi administration constituted an important setback for the moderate
resistance bloc’s MB-oriented regional policy. Meanwhile, the Ennahda-
led government in Tunisia failed to provide stability in the country, and
stepped down in January 2014. Moreover, it lost the following parlia-
mentary elections to its secularist rival.76 Overall, the failure of MB-led
governments to survive in Egypt and Tunisia seriously restrained the
scope and power of the moderate resistance bloc in regional politics.
In other parts of the region, the Arab Uprisings entered into a sec-
ond phase as conflicts in Syria, Libya, Yemen, and Iraq intensified and
resulted in the effective disintegration of these countries. In this cha-
otic atmosphere, extremist armed movements, such as the Islamic State
of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and other Al-Qaeda affiliates, prevailed,
while the power and influence of the MB affiliates considerably declined.

73 See Philipp O. Amour, “Editor’s Note: The End of the Arab Spring?” ed. Philipp O.

Amour, The Arab Spring: Comparative Perspectives and Regional Implications, Special issue,
Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations 12, no. 3 (Fall 2013): I–IV.
74 Jeffrey Goldberg, “The Modern King in the Arab Spring,” The Atlantic, 2013, 13–15,

https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/04/monarch-in-the-middle/309270.
75 Hedges and Cafiero, “The GCC and the Muslim Brotherhood,” 129–53.

76 Carlotta Gall, “Tunisia’s Premier Resigns, Formally Ending His Party’s Rule,” The

New York Times, January 9, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/10/world/

middleeast/tunisias-leader-resigns.html; Eileen Byrne, “Tunisia’s Islamist Party Ennahda
Accepts Defeat in Elections,” The Guardian, October 27, 2014, https://www.theguardian.
com/world/2014/oct/27/tunisia-islamist-ennahda-accept-defeat-elections.
152  N. YEŞILYURT AND M. YETIM

In face of these existential threats, Turkey and Qatar mostly left their
previous soft-power-oriented policies aside (i.e., zero problems with
neighbors, hedging), and became more involved in the Syrian and
Libyan civil wars by lending both political and military support to their
proxies, though with little hope of a supreme outcome.77

The Moderate Resistance Bloc: Consolidation

Under Pressure
Within the context of these setbacks, Qatar’s new Emir, Sheikh Tamim
bin Hamad al-Thani, faced intense pressure from the Saudis and their
allies in March 2014 to change Qatar’s foreign policy orientation.78 Yet,
this pressure did not dissuade Ankara and Doha from intensifying bilat-
eral military, political, and economic relations. In December 2014, the
two countries signed important agreements that formed a High-Level
Strategic Cooperation Council, deepened military cooperation, and
allowed Turkey to build a military base in Qatar.79
As an indication of the mutual trust between the two leaders, Sheikh
Tamim was the first leader to call Turkish president Erdoğan and express
his support during the failed coup attempt on July 15, 2016.80 The
resurgence of Saudi-led pressures against Qatar in June 2017 further
intensified the Turkish/Qatari alliance in many senses. Ankara immedi-
ately backed Doha and relieved the economic and humanitarian costs of
the Saudi-led blockade. Even more importantly, Turkey strengthened its

77 Jonathan Schanzer, “Turkey’s Secret Proxy War in Libya?” Text, The National

Interest, March 17, 2015, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/turkeys-secret-proxy-war-

libya-12430; Giorgio Cafiero and Daniel Wagner, “Turkey and Qatar: Close Allies, Sharing
a Doomed Syria Policy,” The Huffington Post, October 11, 2015, https://www.huffington-
post.com/giorgio-cafiero/turkey-and-qatar-close-al_b_8512336.html.
78 Ian Black, “Arab States Withdraw Ambassadors from Qatar in Protest at Interference,”

The Guardian, March 5, 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/05/

arab-states-qatar-withdraw-ambassadors-protest.
79 Serkan Demirtaş, “İşte Katar Ile Askeri Anlaşmanın Detayları (The Details of the

Military Agreement with Qatar),” Hürriyet, June 9, 2015, www.hurriyet.com.tr/

dunya/29234032.asp; The two countries had signed military cooperation agreement firstly
in 2007. See also Pala, “The Evolution of the Turkish–Qatari Relations,” 48.
80 Mohammed Osman, “Emir Was First Leader to Call Erdogan: Qatar Envoy,”

The Peninsula, July 18, 2016, https://thepeninsulaqatar.com/news/qatar/387615/

emir-was-first-leader-to-call-erdogan-qatar-envoy.
 5  EMERGENCE OF THE TURKISH/QATARI ALLIANCE …  153

military base in Qatar to deter any possible invasion of Qatar. These steps
greatly helped solidification of the alliance between Ankara and Doha.81
Moreover, in 2017, the trade volume between the two countries reached
679 million USD, up from 132 million USD in 2005.82
The 2017 Qatar crisis (explored in Chapter 2) clearly demonstrated
that the Saudi-led status quo bloc is still worried about Ankara and
Doha’s growing alliance and their continuing ties with the MB-affiliated
groups throughout the Gulf Region and the broader Middle East.
Hence, the status quo bloc’s activities remain the major challenge
against the consolidation and expansion of the moderate resistance bloc.
Nevertheless, Turkey and Qatar seem able to hold their ground against
these pressures and pursue their alternative regional strategy. It is now
time to shed some light on this alternative strategy and its implications
for the regional power structure.

Alternative Strategy and Its Implications

for the Moderate Resistance Bloc

The authors of this chapter regard the emerging Turkey–Qatar-led bloc

as a major power constellation in the regional system of the Gulf Region
and the broader Middle East. It was named as the moderate resistance
bloc since it carries both revisionist and status quo preferences at the
same time.83 In contrast to the revisionist bloc, the moderate resist-
ance bloc hardly positions itself as anti-Western and anti-Israel. To the
contrary, it maintains security partnerships with the United States, and,
despite all difficulties, amicable relations with Israel, just like the status

81 Marc Lynch, “The GCC Crisis in Perspective,” in The Qatar Crisis (Washington, DC:

The Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS), 2017), 3–5, https://pomeps.
org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/POMEPS_GCC_Qatar-Crisis.pdf; Marc Lynch,
“Three Big Lessons of the Qatar Crisis,” in The Qatar Crisis (Washington, DC: The
Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS), 2017), 14–17, https://pomeps.org/
wp-content/uploads/2017/10/POMEPS_GCC_Qatar-Crisis.pdf.
82 “Ülkelere Göre Dış Ticaret (Foreign Trade with Regards to Countries),” Turkish

Statistical Institute, accessed May 27, 2018, https://biruni.tuik.gov.tr/disticaretapp/disti-

caret.zul?param1=4&param2=0&sitcrev=0&isicrev=0&sayac=5808.
83 This is also reflected in Turkey’s multilateral engagement policy. This concept was orig-

inally developed to explain Turkey’s regional position during Arab Uprisings, but it can be
also used as a general concept to understand the moderate resistance bloc’s regional activ-
ism. See Ulutaş and Duran, “Traditional Rivalry or Regional Design,” 93–96.
154  N. YEŞILYURT AND M. YETIM

quo bloc. Yet, unlike the status quo bloc, the moderate resistance bloc
does not refrain from criticizing US policies toward regional issues such
as the Syrian civil war or from directly condemning Israeli aggressions
toward the Palestinians and Lebanon. Furthermore, in opposition to the
status quo bloc, Qatar and Turkey never ignored Iran’s critical role in
the region,84 and they built strong relations with emerging global pow-
ers, such as Russia, China, and India. So, in a sense, the moderate resist-
ance bloc seems to be much more pragmatic and flexible in its foreign
policy formulation than are the other two blocs. This was most obvious
when Turkey and Iran were congruent in supporting Qatar against the
Saudi-led blockade in 2017, despite the deep conflicts among them-
selves regarding the future of Syria.85 Turkey’s collaboration with Iran
and Russia during the ongoing Astana process is another indication of
the pragmatic nature and balanced position of the moderate resistance
bloc.86
The Turkey–Qatar-led third bloc’s relations with the Iranian-led revi-
sionist bloc were also fluctuating. The relations between these two blocs
were seriously strained, mainly due to their divergent policies toward the
Syrian crisis. While Iran regarded the possible fall of the Assad regime as
an existential threat to the maintenance of the revisionist bloc/resistance
axis, Ankara and Doha fully supported the opposition groups like SNC

84 Armstrong, “Interview: Birol Başkan”; Mohns and Bank, “Syrian Revolt Fallout,” 33;

and Seth J. Frantzman, “Turkey’s P ­ ower-Play in Qatar Leads to Warmer Relations with
Iran,” The Jerusalem Post, July 1, 2017, https://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/
Turkeys-power-play-in-Qatar-leads-to-warmer-relations-with-Iran-498468.
85 “How Turkey Stood by Qatar amid the Gulf Crisis,” Al Jazeera English, October

14, 2017, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/11/turkey-stood-qatar-gulf-cri-

sis-171114135404142.html; Saeed Al-Haj, “Analysis: The Implications of the Qatar–
Turkey Alliance,” Al Jazeera English, June 18, 2017, https://www.aljazeera.com/
indepth/features/2017/06/implications-qatar-turkey-alliance-170618110726262.html.
86 This collaboration between Turkey and Iran is being severely criticized by status

quo camp members such that Turkey was allegedly described as a “triangle of evil” with
Iran and Islamist groups by KSA’s MbS. See “Saudi Prince Says Turkey Part of ‘Triangle
of Evil’: Egyptian Media,” Reuters, March 7, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/arti-
cle/us-saudi-turkey/saudi-prince-says-turkey-part-of-triangle-of-evil-egyptian-me-
dia-idUSKCN1GJ1WW; W. Robert Pearson, “Saudi–Turkey Ties Take a Turn for the
Worse,” Middle East Institute, March 8, 2018, http://www.mei.edu/content/article/
saudi-turkey-ties-take-turn-worse; and “Iran, Turkey, Qatar Increasing Threat to Arab
Region: Sisi,” Egypt Independent, April 17, 2018, https://www.egyptindependent.com/
iran-turkey-qatar-increasing-threat-to-arab-region-sisi/.
 5  EMERGENCE OF THE TURKISH/QATARI ALLIANCE …  155

and FSA.87 Furthermore, Iran has occasionally leveled severe criticisms

against Turkey’s ongoing military activities and operations in Syria. It
seems that Turkey’s gradual shift to ­hard-power-oriented strategies in the
Middle East and its growing military presence in Iraq and Syria seriously
concerns the Iranian regime as well. In addition, Turkey’s and Qatar’s
growing relations with Hamas and their harsh reactions to Israeli atroc-
ities against the Palestinians pose a challenge to Iran’s image of being the
most prominent champion of the Palestinian cause. In other words, the
emergence of the moderate resistance is not in the best strategic interests
of the status quo bloc nor for the revisionist bloc.
In a nutshell, there seems to be an emergent third bloc in the Middle
East that acts as a balancing player between the other two blocs. In this
sense, both Ankara and Doha declared vocal support for Saudi-led mili-
tary initiatives, such as Operation Decisive Storm in Yemen, and partici-
pated in the Islamic Military Counterterrorism Alliance in 2015 to limit
increasing Iranian influence over the region.88 Yet, at the same time, they
leveled harsh criticisms against the 2013 military coup in Egypt, along
with the revisionist camp,89 and have cooperated with it in the Syrian
crisis under the framework of Astana Process since 2017.

Conclusion
The Middle East is no longer a bipolar regional system. As a result of the
emerging Turkish/Qatari alliance and their sponsorship of MB affiliates
in the region, the regional system in the Gulf Region and the broader
Middle East was transformed into a tripolar regional system during the
initial years of the Arab Uprisings. Despite the setbacks of 2013–2014,
Qatar and Turkey went further in deepening bilateral relations and stick-
ing to their alternative regional strategy mentioned above, which can

87 Galip Dalay, “Is There Really a Turkey–Iran Rapprochement?” Al Jazeera English,

September 13, 2017, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/09/turkey-

iran-rapprochement-170907101356869.html.
88 “Turkey Supports Saudi Mission in Yemen, Says Iran Must Withdraw,” France 24,

March 27, 2015, http://www.france24.com/en/20150326-turkey-support-saudi-yem-

en-erdogan-interview-france-24; Mohammed Al Qalisi, “Qatar Loses Its First Soldier
in Yemen,” The National, November 12, 2015, https://www.thenational.ae/world/
qatar-loses-its-first-soldier-in-yemen-1.47850.
89 “World Reaction to the Ousting of Egypt’s Mohammed Morsi,” BBC News, July 4,

2013, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-23175379.
156  N. YEŞILYURT AND M. YETIM

best be described as moderate resistance. Currently, the moderate resist-

ance bloc adopts a pragmatic approach in its global and regional engage-
ments and attempts to play a balancing act between the revisionist and
status quo blocs in order to prevent domination of either one over the
region. If not inhibited by future domestic and international transforma-
tions, the moderate resistance bloc seems set to continue its institution-
alization and consolidation over time. However, it seems that as long as
MB-affiliated movements remain weak and isolated throughout the Gulf
Region and the broader Middle East, the moderate resistance bloc will
have little chance of expansion beyond the borders of Qatar and Turkey
and other non-state actors.

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 PART II

State Actors and Non–state Militant

Actors in the Regional System
 CHAPTER 6

Expanding the Turkish Bid for Regional

Control in the Somali Regional Security
Complexes

Stephanie Carver

Introduction
The arrival of then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in the Somali
capital in August 2011 signaled a watershed moment in the relation-
ship between Mogadishu and Ankara. Not only did Erdoğan set a new
model for engagement with the Federal Republic of Somalia (hereafter,
Somalia) by becoming the first state leader to venture into the war-torn
country from outside the Horn of Africa region1; it has also been inter-
preted as a sign of Turkey’s intention to become a leading player in the
Horn of Africa region, among other dimensions, through engaging in
areas of security provision, economic support, extensive aid programs,
and emergency humanitarian assistance.

1 The Horn of Africa includes countries of Djibouti, Eretria, Ethiopia, and Somalia;
broader definitions include as well part of or all of Sudan, Uganda and Kenya. The author
of this article follows the later category.

S. Carver (*) 
Monash University, Clayton, VIC, Australia
e-mail: Stephanie.carver@monash.edu

© The Author(s) 2020 167

P. O. Amour (ed.), The Regional Order in the Gulf Region and the Middle
East, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45465-4_6
168  S. CARVER

Turkish engagement with the Somali government provided a new

model of engagement between the two countries. In order to dispel
the criticism leveled against other donor states as overly bureaucratic
and “invisible” to the Somali community by operating from Nairobi or
bunkered in compounds around strategic sites,2 Ankara created its own
Turkish model of engagement in Somalia. Drawing on soft power, the
Turkish model of engagement in Somalia has been intentionally designed
to be the opposite; that is, it is visible and responsive in providing dif-
ferent dimensions of assistance to the East African state. The result has
been a model of engagement that is characterized by what Ankara has
deemed a humanistic approach in responding to humanitarian threats
and includes a much-prized visible, onsite presence in the Somali state.
This framework and language underpin Turkey’s engagement within the
region and colors Turkey’s involvement with numerous regional security
regimes operating within Somalia.
While Turkey has previously held positions within regional secu-
rity regimes, including the African Union (AU), the East African
Community (EAC), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development
(IGAD) and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), Ankara
has increasingly prioritized unilateral engagement within the region to
bypass the bureaucratic red tape that retards speed and efficiency.3
This chapter presents the argument that Ankara’s multifaceted
­engagement within the Horn region security complex could suggest that
Turkey is well-positioned to become a key regional player with impacts
on the configurations of power within the region of the Horn of Africa.
Indeed, Turkey’s Somali agenda has sparked claims from international
analysts of Turkey’s changing status from a Regional Power4 or even

2 Onur Sazak and Auveen Elizabeth Woods, “Thinking Outside the Compound: Turkey’s

Approach to Peacebuilding in Somalia,” in Rising Powers and Peacebuilding: Breaking the

Mold? ed. Charles Nyuykonge and Siphamandla Zondi (Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 167–
89; Mahad Wasuge, “Turkey’s Assistance Model in Somalia: Achieving Much with Little”
(Mogadishu: Heritage Institute for Policy Studies, 2016), http://www.heritageinstitute.
org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Turkeys-Assistance-Model-in-Somalia-Achieving-
Much-With-Little1-1.pdf.
3 Sazak and Woods, “Thinking Outside the Compound,” 174–75.

4 Dimitar Bechev, “Turkey’s Rise as a Regional Power,” European View 10, no. 2 (2011):

173–74, https://doi.org/10.1007/s12290-011-0184-0.
 6  EXPANDING THE TURKISH BID FOR REGIONAL …  169

“aspiring Great Power.”5 While much of the literature gets bogged down
in debating the validity of categorizing Turkish power, what remains
­overlooked is an assessment of Turkish soft power within the confines of
the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) and an assessment of the
ability of the RSCT to adequately address Turkish behavior in the Horn
of Africa regional security complex as a bid for greater regional influence.
Interpreting the shift in power dynamics within the Horn region has,
to date, only received limited attention, while even less research has con-
sidered how the Turkish model of engagement has affected the regional
security complexes. This chapter seeks to address this research deficit by
asking: To what extent has Turkey’s soft power tactics in Somalia enabled
Turkey to cultivate greater power and influence in the Horn of Africa
region? Specifically, this chapter will consider Ankara’s engagement
within Somalia and some of the key strategies used to build influence
within the Horn of Africa regional security complex and the principal
security actors operating within the Somali state, including the African
Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), IGAD, EAC, and the OIC as
a snapshot of Turkish involvement in Somalia and the different meth-
ods that Turkey uses to pursue greater regional influence in the Horn of
Africa.
To this end, the chapter is divided as follows: the subsequent section
will outline the theoretical framing for the chapter, which specifically
draws on Buzan and Waever’s seminal work on RSCT to conceptualize
regional security complexes. From there, the second section provides
a brief background of Turkish involvement in the Somali state, con-
sidering the regional security complexes at work in the Horn of Africa
and specifically Somalia. The third section considers whether and by
what methods Turkey can seek to influence the security complexes that
exist in the Somali region, presenting a snapshot of Turkish engage-
ment with RSC by first considering the soft power strategies of visibil-
ity and a humanitarian framing to Turkish activity within Somalia, before
focusing on the alliances with various security actors. The final section
summarizes the points raised in the chapter and presents some closing
remarks.

5 André Barrinha, “The Ambitious Insulator: Revisiting Turkey’s Position in Regional

Security Complex Theory,” Mediterranean Politics 19, no. 2 (2014): 165, https://doi.org/
10.1080/13629395.2013.799353.
170  S. CARVER

Framing the Argument: Regional Security

Complex Theory
The Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) presents a framework
for interpreting the power distribution within the international system.
The theory draws on themes of regional security and security regimes
to provide a measure for assessing the behavior of a state depending on
its power capabilities. Within this framework, regions are areas where a
“distinct and significant subsystem of security relations exists among a set
of states whose fate is that they have been locked into geographical prox-
imity with each other.”6 Scholars of RSCT contend that these regions
are an important level for analysis within security discourses, as they are
situated between the national and international. Pioneered by the works
of Barry Buzan and Ole Waever in 1983, and then revised in 1998 and
2003, the RSCT is premised on two interrelated points. The first is that
threats to a state’s national security can be transmitted across shorter dis-
tances with greater ease than across longer spaces, leaving the immedi-
ate regional environment at greater risk than those states further afield.
The second is that the patterns of security regimes will likely develop a
regional character, as states cluster together to navigate these threats.
Regional clusters, or Regional Security Complexes (RSC), are considered
by Buzan and Waever to be a “a set of units whose major processes of
securitization, desecuritization, or both are so interlinked that their secu-
rity problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one
another.”7 These complexes address sources of insecurity from across the
spectrum of human interaction, including economic, political, military,
societal, and environmental.8
As noted above, the RSCT provides a means of examining power
distributions within international relations. The benefit afforded by the
RSCT is that, as a theoretical device, it can offer a more detailed analy-
sis of regions than could be afforded by considering just the geographic

6 Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in

the Post-Cold War Era (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), 188.
7 Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International

Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 44.

8 Mesfin Berouk, “The Horn of Africa Security Complex,” in Regional Security in the

­Post-Cold War Horn of Africa, ed. Roba D. Sharamo and Berouk Mesfin, ISS Monograph
Series 178 (Halfway House: Institute for Security Studies, 2011), 3.
 6  EXPANDING THE TURKISH BID FOR REGIONAL …  171

groupings of these regional states. Instead, the theory delves deeper; that
is, it prioritizes groupings of states that can act to influence the security
concerns of fellow member states rather than just focusing on geograph-
ical representations of regionalism.9 It is therefore possible to consider
which actors dominate the security terrain and are positioned over the
other members of the complex.10 Through analysis of these patterns of
interdependence, the RSCT affords the researcher a lens through which
to examine the power distributions within a security environment.
While the RSCT might provide a lens to perceive the power dynamics
at work within the region, it is necessary to consider the varied capac-
ity of the actors, including Super Powers, Great Powers, and Regional
Powers, who operate within the RSC. Especially relevant to this chapter
is the consideration of the actors that are geographically situated beyond
the RSC but still exert some influence over security dynamics within
the RSC. In ending this section, it is worth pointing out that the RSCT
used in this chapter is in harmony with the general theoretical framework
introduced in Chapters 1 and 14 of this book. The following subsection
will seek to unpack the types of actors within an RSC.

The Actors Engaging in the Regional Security

Complex Theory
Within the international system, actors hold various capabilities depend-
ing on their ability to cultivate power. The RSCT introduces the regional
level of analysis between the local and global and differentiates the actors
that operate at each level according to the capabilities and capacity of the
state. Within the literature on RSCT, capacity is still largely understood
in terms of military and economic strength, the former being the foun-
dation of the state’s capacity for power and influence within the region,
while the latter is often a means of power through leverage.11
Power is structured hierarchically. Superpowers occupy the top of the
power chain and tend to possess and exercise an assortment of varied and

9 Derrick Frazier and Robert Stewart-Ingersoll, “Regional Powers and Security:

A Framework for Understanding Order Within Regional Security Complexes,”

European Journal of International Relations 16, no. 4 (2010): 733, https://doi.
org/10.1177/1354066109359847.
10 Frazier and Stewart-Ingersoll, 733.

11 Frazier and Stewart-Ingersoll, 738.

172  S. CARVER

broad-spectrum military, economic, and political capabilities and eco-

nomic resilience to enable the pursuit of these capacities. The reach of
these capabilities (i.e., power projection) extends across the entire inter-
national system and enable superpowers to overcome geographic chal-
lenges.12 In other words, the territorial limits do little to restrict the
reach of these superpowers, which can and do engage in RSC beyond
their geography. Superpowers tend to become “active players in pro-
cesses of securitization and desecuritization in all, or nearly all, of the
regions in the system, whether as threats, guarantors, allies, or interven-
ers.”13 Superpowers are aware of their supreme power capabilities; exter-
nal actors recognize such supreme rank either in oral pronunciations or
behaviors. Of importance here is the idea that superpower status rests on
the recognition of other actors of the superpower’s might.
The projection by the state of its own superiority is a critical tool to
ensure that recognition, and the superpower will reassert and reinforce
its dominance over the international order with this recognition. The
recognition of other actors provides a sense of legitimacy to the super-
power and enables it to shape and direct the production of norms within
the international system. Great Powers, as the second category, hold
many of the same capabilities as the Super Power states, but to a lesser
degree. Actors who hold Great Power status occupy the second tier
and have less material and economic capacity than do superpowers, but
they retain the capacity to operate beyond their regions. The source of
their power, however, resides in the way other actors engage with them.
Buzan and Waever consider Great Powers to be engaged in a matrix of
other relations with other actors on the grounds of strategic considera-
tion about the current and foreseeable balance of power.14
Exercising power in an RSC is vital for Great Powers, because these
regions are where states can refine and hone their projection of power
and influence. At the lowest rung in the international community are
Regional Powers. These actors have the capability to exercise a substan-
tial reach within the region in which they are located, but they lack the
capacity to be a global consideration. Thus, the difference between the
actors is simply the extent to which they hold power capabilities and

12 Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers, 34, 46.

13 Buzan and Waever, 34.
14 Buzan and Waever, 35.
 6  EXPANDING THE TURKISH BID FOR REGIONAL …  173

to which they can exercise that power. Within this structure of Super,
Great, and Regional Powers, it is worth considering how Turkey should
be understood within the RSCT.

Turkey in the Regional Security Complex Theory

Turkey, according to Buzan and Waever, is situated on the periphery of
two RSCs, the Middle East RSC and the European RSC. Pinning down
Turkey within the RSCT is difficult, and, arguably, Buzan and Waever
struggled too. Turkey is noted as a Regional Power in some respects, but
Turkey is also what these authors term an insulator state.15 A state adopts
the role of insulator when that state is in multiple RSCs in a particular
geographical location that effectively back onto one another. However,
although Turkey touches multiple RSCs, Buzan and Waever place it
within the Middle East RSC. An insulator is also perceived as “relatively
passive” within the RSC.16
Its recent ascendancy within the international community indi-
cates that Turkey may be attempting to shed the label of insulator, with
Ankara becoming increasingly active on the international stage.17 Buzan
and Waever suggest that while Turkey may not be resigned to its position
as insulator and is seeking greater power status, it is unlikely to be able
to compel a reordering within the international order.18 The Turkish
position within the RSCT has gathered increasing attention from the
international community, not least as a result of its engagements within
Somalia, Syria, and Iraq. While Turkey is described by former US sec-
retary of state, Hillary Clinton, as an “emerging global power”19 this
­sentiment is not shared by analysts, with Ąžuolas Bagdonas contend-
ing that Turkey is still some way off from achieving great power status.
Bagdonas notes that Turkey is described as a series of positions of power,
ranging from an actual or proposed regional Great Power to an essen-
tial middle power that would possess the capacity to exert considera-
ble influence over the region or to a regional hegemon, or better yet, a
Great Power. While Bagdonas refutes these claims, he concurs that the

15 Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers.

16 Buzan and Waever, 392.
17 Barrinha, “The Ambitious Insulator,” 165.

18 Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers, 394.

19 Barrinha, “The Ambitious Insulator,” 165.

174  S. CARVER

international community has widely accepted Ankara as a rising power

within the region.20 In light of these statements, perhaps Turkey could
be considered, at most, a Regional Power. Yet, Ankara, like other states,
remains active in RSCs beyond its own geographical locale.
As Super Powers and Great Powers demonstrate, actors beyond
the RSC can play a role in influencing the dynamics within the com-
plex. The role of extra-regional actors has sharpened under increas-
ing academic focus. According to Buzan and Weaver’s theory, the role
of extra-regional actors would need to progress from Regional Power
to Great Power and on, in upward ascendency of power capabilities. In
this understanding, the power status of the state is tied to the material
capacity of the state. Yet, Turkey remains an active participant in RSCs
(in their definition) beyond the Middle East RSC. Indeed, Ankara
appears to diversify its interests in other RSCs, like the Horn of Africa,
precisely because it is in the position to obtain both the material and
immaterial capabilities to do so as a way of empowering its role in the
Middle East RSC.
Turkey, it would seem, presents a challenge to the RSCT in its ability
to act beyond the RSC it is situated within. Theorists have questioned
whether the underlying assumption of material capacity determining
power might be problematic. For example, Andre Barrinha suggests that
this theoretical line limits the RSC theory’s assessment of Turkey’s recent
ascendency within the international system: According to RSCT, in order
for Turkey to progress through the power status tiers, it would have to
expand its security relations with the RSCs on its borders, moving from
a peripheral security role in either the European Security Complex or
the Middle East Security Complex that Turkey currently plays.21 Fraizer
and Stewart-Ingersoll also contend that security orders are influenced
by more than just the material capacity of the state, instead adopting a
structure–agency understanding of how extra-regional actors might
operate within the security complex, arguing convincingly that “focus-
ing on the behavior provides a clearer picture of how a security order is
shaped in the context of structure, not simply because of it.”22

20 Ąžuolas Bagdonas, “Turkey as a Great Power? Back to Reality,” Turkish Studies 16, no.

3 (2015): 310, https://doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2015.1069712.

21 Barrinha, “The Ambitious Insulator,” 166.

22 Frazier and Stewart-Ingersoll, “Regional Powers and Security,” 734.

 6  EXPANDING THE TURKISH BID FOR REGIONAL …  175

What this section has sought to illustrate is that Turkey ­ occupies

an ambiguous position within the RSCT. Within this framework,
­extra-regional actors, such as Turkey, might seek to influence the secu-
rity dynamics in the RSC through a variety of means, including through
normative channels such as soft power and the use of security regimes. In
the following section, the RSCT is applied to the Horn of Africa to fur-
ther understand how Turkey can seek to influence the security dynamics
at work around the Horn security complex.

Regional Security Complexes in the Horn of Africa

The Horn of Africa extends from the northeast tip of the African con-
tinent, covering Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Somalia, but the political dis-
cussion of the region often includes Eritrea, Uganda, and Kenya. As a
region, relations with Yemen, Libya, and, increasingly, the UAE and
Qatar connect the region to the Gulf Region and the broader Middle
East region, thereby affecting power balances within the Horn. By con-
trast, Turkey is not directly connected to the Horn of Africa Security
Complex.
The Horn of Africa region is characterized by security threats that
have emerged from weak statehood. Within weak states, domestic fac-
tors for one state very much become regional concerns for other
states. These threats at the domestic level, such as mass refugee move-
ments, famine, or civil conflict, for example, tend to spring over into
the regional level. While Buzan and Waever describe these events as
“chains of discrete events rather than coordinated patterns of alliance and
rivalry,”23 this perspective, as Mesfin Berouk notes, ignores the extent to
which regional actors engage within these conflicts, seeking to disrupt
peace negotiations or support insurgencies, as indeed is the case within
Somalia.24 Weak statehood within the region has afforded space to a vari-
ety of diverse actors, ranging from IGOs and NGOs to regional security
groups, civil society groups, and superpowers, all of whom are also active
and engage with the Horn of Africa to varying degrees in peacekeeping
operations.

23 Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers, 232.

24 Berouk, “The Horn of Africa Security Complex,” 22–23.
176  S. CARVER

Within the Horn region, Somalia represents one of the principal secu-
rity threats. The collapse of the state in 1991 left a complex and con-
voluted legacy and has opened the space up to a multitude of different
threats, actors, and security regimes, all of which contribute to the (in)
security dynamics within the Horn region. The following subsection
considers some of the most pressing threats to security in Somalia and
the Horn of Africa security complex.

Sources of Insecurity in Somalia

Few states have generated more security concerns to the Horn of Africa
than Somalia. Most of these threats take the form of transnational threats
that have resulted from a fragile and precarious political situation in the
aftermath of the breakdown of the Somali government. Transnational
threats of Islamic extremist violence and environmental factors associated
with the combination of state collapse have produce security concerns
that threaten to destabilize the broader Horn region.
Political turmoil had plagued much of the latter stages of Said Barre’s
dictatorial regime, escalating with the outbreak of the civil war in 1988
and the subsequent collapse of the Somali state in 1991. This set in
motion a chain reaction of other impacts that gave rise to new security
dynamics. For nearly two decades, Somalia symbolized a classic case
study of the failed state.25 The state collapse in 1991 saw the continu-
ation of the protracted civil war between warlord factions over territo-
rial control. The weak state power has brought a multitude of sources
of insecurity to the Somali region. Consecutive Somali governments
have been piloted by weak administrations and face nearly two decades
of state collapse to recover from and rebuild. More recently, the lack of
government control over the extended region has become deeply prob-
lematic and impacts on its capacity to operate effectively. The institu-
tionally weak Transitional Federal Government of Somalia suffered from
successive weak leaderships that struggled to control a deeply divided
government.26

25 Robert I. Rotberg, “Failed States in a World of Terror,” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 4

(August 2002): 127–40, https://doi.org/10.2307/20033245.

26 “Somalia: The Transitional Government on Life Support,” Africa (International

Crisis Group, February 21, 2011), https://www.crisisgroup.org/file/1427/

download?token=IoVogvxK.
 6  EXPANDING THE TURKISH BID FOR REGIONAL …  177

Constant discord between Mogadishu and the autonomous and

semi-autonomous regions of Somaliland and Puntland, respectively, has
curtailed the state government’s ability to foster cohesion and to extend
Mogadishu’s reach. Allegations of corruption have been rampant within
the Transitional Federal Government. Poor record-keeping, a nepo-
tistic culture around hiring, and vague internal procedures have pro-
vided a fertile breeding ground for widespread corruption.27 Drought
and famine have caused a widespread humanitarian crisis, which esca-
lated in 2011 with long-lasting ramifications. The United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that more than 2.6
million Somalis are internally displaced throughout Somalia, more than 1
million within the last year alone.28
Political dissolution has continued to challenge the East African state.
The emergence of the group around Al-Shabab (The Youth) has been
the most pressing terror threat to the Horn region since 2006. The
group is the product of the splintering of the Al-Itihaad Al-Islamiyah
group—an Islamist group with ties to Al Qaeda—which emerged pub-
licly in the twilight of the Union of Islamic Courts movement and grew
more powerful after the demise of the Courts. The Union of Islamic
Courts initially held promise of stability and security, particularly around
the southern and central regions of Somalia.29 Peace was short-lived,
as tension with Ethiopia mounted, culminating in the deployment of
Ethiopian troops in 2006–2009. Al-Shabab’s operations within Somali
have been sporadic, with attacks on key sites within Somalia and in
neighboring states. The growing international networks are deeply trou-
bling for the region; for example, Kenya has sustained multiple attacks
from the Somali terror group. More recent attacks have included the
February 2016 plane bombing, moments after take-off, and Al-Shabab,

27 “Somalia:The Transitional Government on Life Support.”

28 “Somalia Humanitarian Situation,” Somalia Humanitarian Situation Report
(UNICEF, July 1, 2018), https://www.unicef.org/appeals/files/UNICEF_Somalia_
Humanitarian_Situation_Report_July_2018.pdf.
29 Andreas Bruvik Westberg, “Bloodshed and Breaking Wave: The First Outbreak of

Somali Piracy,” Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies 43, no. 2
(2015): 24, https://doi.org/10.5787/43-1-1107.
178  S. CARVER

despite not claiming the attack, is likely responsible for the October
2017 Mogadishu attack that claimed more than 300 casualties.30
The recent spate of attacks underscores the ferocity of the group and
the danger the group poses to the region. Regional control by Al-Shabab
has fluctuated in accordance with extra-regional actors’ engagement
with Somalia, in particular Ethiopian and AMISOM troops, and has
ranged from extensive control of the southern regions of Somalia and
Mogadishu to withdrawing to regions further afield.
Threats to security inspired by weak state control, including poverty,
population movement, humanitarian crises, and terrorism, can escape
from the Somali state due to the systemic and extensive shadow econo-
mies, the porous borders, and corruption that threaten the security and
stability of the states in the broader Horn region. State instability, pro-
longed conflict, and regional famines have left a large swathe of the
Somali population vulnerable and have subsequently fed into mass move-
ments of refugees, economic migration, and displaced people through-
out the Horn. Regional dynamics, including the instability in Yemen
and Libya, have seen many Somalis seeking to leave, but many more also
return home to Somalia. According to the monitoring bodies, Somalia
remains a popular area of transit for mixed migration groups but, more
recently, it has also become a popular destination for people returning
from Yemen.31 The uncontrolled movement of people within the region
is cause for concern for regional states, especially as the numbers of people
on the move escalate.
The following section will consider how Turkey has sought to engage
within the Somali state and how the actions that occur within Somalia
benefit the broader Horn of Africa RSC.

30 “Managing the Disruptive Aftermath of Somalia’s Worse Terror Attack,” Crisis Group

Africa Briefing (International Crisis Group, October 20, 2017), 1, https://www.crisis-

group.org/file/5344/download?token=RBb-IYpJ.
31 “Mixed Migration Monthly Summary: January 2018 East Africa and Yemen” (Danish

Refugee Council, January 2018), https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/

RMMS%20Mixed%20Migration%20Monthly%20Summary%20January%202018.pdf.
 6  EXPANDING THE TURKISH BID FOR REGIONAL …  179

Turkish Engagement with Somalia

Ankara’s recent foray into relations with the African continent stemmed
from Turkey’s policy regarding the Africa initiative in 1998, where wide-
spread poverty and food insecurity dominated Ankara’s agenda.32 Seven
years later, in 2005, Turkey again stepped up its focus on Africa under
the governance of the AKP.33 With the AKP at the helm, 2005 was her-
alded as the Year of Africa, which entailed the ramping up of strategic,
economic, and social engagement with the African continent.34 Turkey
sought to deepen its political ties with the African continent more
broadly by opening new embassies and engaging in multilateral regimes,
including partnership status with the African Union. Ankara increased
its diplomatic presence, with embassy numbers growing from 12 in the
mid-2000s to 34 in 2013, and by strategic engagement with the con-
tinent through multilateral dialogue with key regional and international
organizations operating in Africa.35
Ankara–Mogadishu relations take place within the wider context of
Turkey’s strategic and much-publicized humanistic foreign policy.36
This foreign policy outlines a new guiding framework that would enable
Turkey to take a more active role in the international order through a
soft power approach. This humanitarian positioning essentially “reimagi-
nes Turkey as a proactive player that shapes the region.”37 This so-called
reimagining is done from a position of humanitarian values, whereby
Ankara has claimed to promote an ethical foreign policy that prioritizes

32 Mehmet Ozkan and Serhat Orakci, “Viewpoint: Turkey as a ‘Political’ Actor in

Africa—An Assessment of Turkish Involvement in Somalia,” Journal of Eastern African

Studies 9, no. 2 (June 2015): 344, https://doi.org/10.1080/17531055.2015.1042629.
33 Jason Stearns and Gizem Sucuoglu, “Turkey in Somalia: Shifting Paradigm of Aid,”

24, SAIIA Research Report (South African Institute of International Affairs, November 21,
2016), 18, https://saiia.org.za/research/turkey-in-somalia-shifting-paradigms-of-aid/.
34 Pınar Akpınar, “Turkey’s Peacebuilding in Somalia: The Limits of Humanitarian

Diplomacy,” Turkish Studies 14, no. 4 (2013): 739, https://doi.org/10.1080/1468384

9.2013.863448.
35 Akpınar, “Turkey’s Peacebuilding in Somalia.”

36 See in particular Ahmet Davutoğlu, “Turkey’s Humanitarian Diplomacy: Objectives,

Challenges and Prospects,” Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity
41, no. 6 (2013): 865–70, https://doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2013.857299.
37 Soner Cagaptay, “Defining Turkish Power: Turkey as a Rising Power Embedded in the

Western International System,” Turkish Studies 14, no. 4 (2013): 801, https://doi.org/10
.1080/14683849.2013.861110.
180  S. CARVER

humanistic and moral conscience in its engagement in the international

community. Irrespective of whether these aims have transferred into
practice, the framework of humanitarian diplomacy provides Turkey with
a new tool to conduct its relations. The model of diplomacy that results
is a multifaceted model that has, at its core, the strategic attempt by
Ankara to portray itself first and foremost, as a humanitarian actor.38 The
foreign minister Ahmet Davutoğlu contends that, to his mind, Turkey
needs to strike a delicate balance between the need to exercise conscience
and power. In doing so, he neatly articulates Ankara’s goal of greater
state power through growing soft power, noting that “In this equation,
if a state has conscience but no power, it shows weakness. If it has power
but no conscience, it becomes a tyranny. Our idea is for Turkey to be
a compassionate and powerful state.”39 To an extent, Ankara’s actions
have matched this principle of compassion with an increased official aid
to the continent from US$3.8 million in 2004 to approximately $250
million in 2012.40 In addition, Erdoğan’s initial trip to Somalia during
the 2011 famine resulted in state and NGO fundraising that collected
approximately US$300 million for relief work.41
This framework places responsibilities on the Turkish state to oper-
ate as a proactive peace diplomat. Davutoğlu also envisions the Turkish
role as “providing security and stability not only for itself, but also for its
neighboring regions. Turkey should guarantee its own security and sta-
bility by taking on a more active, constructive role to provide order, sta-
bility, and security in its environs.”42 This orientation has enabled Ankara
to generate greater regional and extra-regional engagement with regions
like the Horn of Africa. In a classic example of securitization of develop-
ment, stabilizing the Horn will, in turn, securitize Turkey.
According to Fraizer and Stewart-Ingersoll, power distributions within
an RSC are determined by more than merely the material and economic
capacity of a state, and Turkey appears to provide support for this per-
spective by choosing to deploy an arsenal of soft power tools within the
RSC rather than using economic and military might in Ankara’s engage-
ment with the Horn RSC. Instead, Turkey incorporates ideals such as

38 Cagaptay, 737; Akpınar, “Turkey’s Peacebuilding in Somalia.”

39 Davutoğlu, “Turkey’s Humanitarian Diplomacy,” 866.
40 Ozkan and Orakci, “Viewpoint: Turkey as a ‘Political’ Actor in Africa,” 344.

41 Ozkan and Orakci, 347.

42 Cited in Cagaptay, “Defining Turkish Power,” 801–2.

 6  EXPANDING THE TURKISH BID FOR REGIONAL …  181

norms and humanitarianism to build rapport within Somalia through its

“Humanitarian diplomacy.” These efforts provide Ankara with a method
of exerting an influence on the broader Horn RSC by seeking to address
some of the sources of insecurity in Somalia.
Turkey’s opening up of Somalia has served economically and polit-
ically for Ankara as well. In addition to establishing economic relations
and solid market access and building Turkish hard power and physical
presence in the Horn of Africa, Ankara’s approach and behavior have led
to global recognition that Ankara is a key player in the region. Somalia
might provide a “litmus test” for Ankara to assess its capacity, but it also
presents a platform for Turkey to project its growing power.43
Turkey’s carefully constructed humanitarian approach to engag-
ing with Somalia has seen the flourishing of new entrepreneurial ven-
tures that have benefitted both Turkey and Somalia. The reconstruction
of infrastructure and the expansion of roads and transport, including
Turkish Airline flights, the Mogadishu airport, a new seaport, and the
implementation of the Turkey–Somalia Trade and Investment Forum
serve to make Turkey an attractive partner for Somalia.44 Yet, more
importantly for Ankara’s future designs, this market serves as an entrance
into other African markets.45
The combination of this holistic approach of humanitarianism, exten-
sive aid, and market growth make Turkey an attractive partner within the
region and provide an extended basis for its material and immaterial pro-
jection capabilities. The result of these careful strategies affords Turkey
considerable power within Somalia and the wider Horn region. The fol-
lowing section will build on the framework outlined in this section and
focus on Ankara’s use of soft power as a tool to influence the Horn RSC
and extend Ankara’s projection of power.

Turkey’s Engagement with Somalia and the Horn RSC

The previous section outlined Ankara’s use of humanitarianism as the
guiding principle behind how Turkey has engaged in Somalia. Drawing
on soft power tactics, by engaging with the East African state through

43 Stearns and Sucuoglu, “Turkey in Somalia,” 20; Sazak and Woods, “Thinking Outside

the Compound,” 172.

44 Stearns and Sucuoglu, “Turkey in Somalia,” 19.

45 Sazak and Woods, “Thinking Outside the Compound,” 173.

182  S. CARVER

humanitarian assistance and opening space for entrepreneurial growth

between Somalia and Turkey, Ankara has sought to leverage greater
influence within the region and beyond. The following section delves
into greater detail on how Ankara has developed an identity as a pro-
active actor within Somalia, implementing strategies that underscore the
visibility of the Turkish state within Somalia.
These strategies are designed to build Ankara’s profile within Somalia
and to demonstrate Ankara’s capacity as a regional key player. In addition
to highlighting the visibility of Turkish activity within the state, including
mediation roles and humanitarianism as a means of developing rapport
with the community and Mogadishu government, the following section
also considers how Ankara has sought to build power within Somalia
through collaboration with a variety of different regional security actors.
As a participant with a series of different regional security actors oper-
ating with Somalia, Turkey develops an identity as a security provider
through its agency to direct the focus of the security regime itself. For
this strategy to be successful, Ankara relies on its much-prized speed
and efficacy to drive how Ankara engages with Somalia. In other cases,
Ankara has used spaces where Turkey can already wield reverent power.

Turkey as a Visible Extra-Regional Actor in Somalia

Recent years have witnessed a growth in business and free-trade agree-
ments between Ankara and Mogadishu. While still only accounting for
a small percentage of Turkey’s overall trade, growth is noticeable in for-
eign investment, and Turkish business enterprises of small and medium
size have increased particularly in relation to information and commu-
nications technology.46 Ankara’s capacity for humanitarian assistance has
expanded as well, as more than 20 Turkish agencies now operate within
Somalia, including the key Turkish agencies like the Turkish Cooperation
and Coordination Agency (TIKA), the Turkish Red Crescent, and the
Directorate of Religious Affairs.47 Turkish agencies have been involved
46 David Shinn, “Turkey’s Engagement in ­ Sub-Saharan Africa: Shifting Alliances and
Strategic Diversification,” Africa Programme Research Paper (Chatham House, September
2015), 2, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_docu-
ment/20150909TurkeySubSaharanAfricaShinn.pdf.
47 Serhat Oracki, David Shinn, and Jason Mosley, “Turkey and the Horn of Africa:

Emerging Interests and Relations,” Chatham House, June 28, 2012, 2, https://www.
chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Africa/280612summary.pdf.
 6  EXPANDING THE TURKISH BID FOR REGIONAL …  183

in the managing of health services, with TIKA responsible for m ­ anaging

one of the largest hospitals within Somalia. The Turkish agency, the
Humanitarian Relief Foundation, has also been involved in the develop-
ment of an orphanage complex, to mention some examples.48
Yet, Ankara’s inclusion of commercial and humanitarian assistance
to Somalia is broadcast in a very public manner. The engagement with
Somalia has been visible not only to Somalia—who have seen Turkish
activists and expats working among the Somali community rather than
bunkered down in compounds or in Nairobi—but it is visible to the
international community as well. This strategy has been carefully con-
structed by Ankara as a means of building a very public profile within
Somalia. This visible presence is critical to Ankara’s bids to build power
and influence within the region.
Early examples involve Erdoğan’s 2011 trip to Mogadishu during the
widespread famine. This trip was an exceptionally visible engagement,
involving Erdoğan’s wife and family and capturing international atten-
tion at the very public rebuttal of the safety situation of state leaders trav-
eling to Somalia, but it also redirected attention to the plight of Somalia.
The symbolic nature of the visit was again underscored by Turkish
Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, who noted in a news report that the
visit to Somalia, and to Mogadishu specifically, was to challenge the idea
that travel to Somalia was too dangerous and should hence be avoided.49
What was exceptional about this visit was not only that Erdoğan was the
first non-regional statesman to visit in nearly twenty years, but also the
indication to the rest of the world that Turkey was active within Somalia
and keen to make Ankara’s mark on the East African state. Davutoğlu in
effect challenged the international community in his final statement in
the report, stating, “We came – many others can come.”50
Erdoğan himself used the publicity afforded by his trip to Somalia to
champion the case of Somalia. Addressing the UN General Assembly in
2011, Erdoğan reiterated the severity of Somalia’s systemic insecurity
and famine and chastised the international community’s lack of action

48 Shinn,“Turkey’s Engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa,” 9.

49 “Somalia Famine: Turkish PM Erdogan Visits Mogadishu,” August 19, 2011, https://
www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14588960.
50 Cited in “Somalia Famine.”
184  S. CARVER

and compassion toward the East African state.51 Similarly, Erdoğan

held a joint press conference with then-Somali President Hassan Sheikh
Mohamud and UN Deputy Secretary-General Jan Eliasson, in connec-
tion with 6th High-Level Partnership Forum on Somalia in 2016, and
took the opportunity to underscore the role that Turkey has played in
assisting the Somali state in recovering after the famine in 2011, while
also indicating that Ankara’s model of relief has received credit.52 This
type of statement had a dual benefit: it bolstered domestic support for
Turkey’s Somali involvement and it also served as a reminder of Turkish
power in the region.
A second strategy that Turkey has used to ensure that its involvement
within Somalia remains visible to the wider international community is
its role as a peace mediator. Peacekeeping operations and mediation ven-
tures have sought to cultivate a new role for Turkey as a peace mediator.
This role has seen senior Turkish advisors meet with Al-Shabab opera-
tives in 2012. Initially, the channels of communication between Turkey
and the insurgent group were established to discuss the security of
Turkish humanitarian workers in the Somali state, but the role has devel-
oped into facilitating space for dialogue between the federal government
and Al-Shabab.53
Mediation provides another layer to the carefully constructed identity
as a soft power that Turkey is establishing within Somalia, as mediation
has been vital for Ankara to justify its role in the political landscape of
a region that has been defined by conflict. Moreover, the role of peace
mediator indicates to the rest of the international community that Turkey
has the capacity to act more broadly as leader in conflict resolution and
state reconstruction, and it demonstrates this in a notoriously diffi-
cult political context of Somalia.54 Stepping into the role of diplomatic

51 Recep Tayyip Erdogan, “The Tears of Somalia,” Foreign Policy, October 10, 2011,

https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/10/the-tears-of-somalia/.
52 Sazak and Woods, “Thinking Outside the Compound,” 172.

53 “Turkey Acting as a Go-between with al-Shabaab, Mogadishu,” Hurriyet Daily News,

March 8, 2012, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-acting-as-go-between-with-

al-shabaab-mogadishu-15516; “Turkey Mediating Talks with Al-Shabaab to Bring Peace,”
April 19, 2012, https://hiiraan.com/news4/2012/apr/23700/turkey_mediating_talks_
with_al_shabaab_to_bring_peace.aspx.
54 Stearns and Sucuoglu, “Turkey in Somalia,” 20; See also Akpınar, “Turkey’s

Peacebuilding in Somalia,” 740.

 6  EXPANDING THE TURKISH BID FOR REGIONAL …  185

mediator, Turkey hosted the eighth round of talks between the Federal
Somali government and the Somaliland authorities in March 2015, as the
two authorities tackled issues of maritime security, including piracy and
illegal fishing, among other issues.55
By remaining visible within the region, Ankara engages directly with
the RSC by beginning to address some of the sources of conflict that
destabilize the region. Attempting to mediate between Al-Shabab and
the Mogadishu government provided Ankara the needed opening to
directly impact the security conditions within the RSC through attempts
to mitigate or at least manage the threat to the Horn region by the
insurgents.
Projecting a visible image in Somalia also builds recognition of
Ankara’s influence within the region. Buzan and Waever indicate that an
essential part of the construction of Regional, Great, and Super Power
status is the reflected recognition from the rest of the international
community of that power capacity. Yet, according to their categoriza-
tion, Turkey is neither a Super nor a Great power, and yet it still oper-
ates by exactly adopting these sorts of tactics. According to the RSCT,
this behavior would be unexpected from a Regional Power, who would
be expected to lack the material or economic might to enable these
changes within an external RSC. Regardless, Turkey has managed to
achieve precisely this. Ankara has continued to demonstrate its capacity
in the Somali state through a variety of different engagements, but in its
attempts to become a “voice” for the African state in the UN General
Assembly and other international platforms, Ankara reiterates very
publicly that it is engaging with the beleaguered Somali state and that
Ankara has the capacity to address these problems. Turkish engagement
within Somalia through soft power tactics would appear to run counter
to what the RSCT would predict, and this presents a challenge to this
theory more broadly.

Ankara’s Alliances with Regional Security Actors

In addition to remaining visible within the Somali political landscape,
Ankara has leveraged influence through the strategic involvement with
regional and extra-regional security actors who are operational within

55 Shinn, “Turkey’s Engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa,” 9.

186  S. CARVER

Somalia. Within the Horn RSC, Turkey is just one of many Regional,
Great, and Super Power actors who have varied interests in the secu-
rity complex of the Horn of Africa. Early attempts to resolve the Somali
conflict drew on regional and international actors who sought alliances
with the various regional and local actors in an effort to rebuild and sta-
bilize the Somali state in the early 1990s through the United Nations
Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) I and II and the Unified Task Force
(UNITAF) in an effort to provide humanitarian relief and peacekeep-
ing in the civil conflict that engulfed the state. The practice of building
alliances between external actors with local and regional actors contin-
ues and has proven a useful method for Turkey to bolster its power and
influence within the region. How Turkey exerts this influence and the
extent to which Ankara can gather traction with these regional actors as
an extra-regional actor is unpacked in the following paragraphs regarding
the most prominent regional security actors, including the EAC, IGAD,
the OIC, and the AMISOM.
Ankara’s collaborations with IGAD and EAC engagements have
proved useful in bolstering Turkish visibility and in fostering greater
legitimacy within the region. From within the RSCs, Turkey’s pro-
jection of power has remained relatively constrained by the immobil-
ity of the security complexes, who remain a global entity and are thus
unwieldly within the Horn. Instead, Ankara’s involvement serves to act
as a demonstration of the extensive engagement that Turkey has within
the region. Erdoğan’s regular travel to EAC countries serves to reiterate
this connection.56 The value of visibility within the region is less inform-
ative when considered in isolation. Considered collectively, however,
the engagement with these economic security regimes paints a picture of
Turkish involvement as a “thick” network that spans across a variety of
different security dynamics. Individually, by contrast, these RSCs afford
the Turkish state very limited space to test Ankara’s power and influence
over the RSCs.
Ankara adopted a different strategy within the OIC in an attempt to
indicate the ascendancy of Turkey within the international community
and as a dominant player within the Horn of Africa RSC. Mimicking
the role of Great and Super Powers with RSCs, Ankara demonstrated

56 Mücahid Durmaz, “Turkey Seeks Deeper Relations with Africa,” May 27, 2016, https://

www.trtworld.com/in-depth/turkey-seeks-broad-based-relations-with-africa-114268.
 6  EXPANDING THE TURKISH BID FOR REGIONAL …  187

the capacity to provide a steering role in the organization’s engagement

within the Somali state. As a participant in the OIC, Turkey was able
to focus the attention of the IGO toward Somalia’s plight in the 2011
famine. In response to the worsening drought situation, which threat-
ened to spread throughout the region, Turkey requested an emergency
meeting to address the deteriorating conditions.57 Five days later, Ankara
convened an emergency summit of the OIC Executive Committee and
foreign ministers from more than 40 countries.58 The summit, held in
Istanbul, was a great success for Turkey and the Horn region and gen-
erated two key outcomes. The summit laid the foundations for the
Somali Trust Fund, which was to be created by the 38th Council of
Foreign Ministers in an attempt to remedy the impacts of the famine.59
The fundraising orchestrated by the OIC and member states provided
US$350 million pledged toward famine relief, with the promise from the
representatives to increase this figure to half a billion.60 The other criti-
cal development from the summit was the implementation of a regional
task force, piloted by Kazakhstan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, and
the General Secretariat, with the intent to monitor the humanitarian
conditions in the Horn of Africa region.61 For Turkey, the implementa-
tion of this task force gave the state space to demonstrate its efficacy as a
regional player through its rapid mobilization of funds, which were esti-
mated to be around half of the $350 million committed from the sum-
mit toward the restoration of Somalia.62
The proactive stance of the state vis-à-vis the deterioration of the
humanitarian situation resulting from the 2011 famine within the

57 Mehmet Ozkan, “The Turkish Way of Doing Development Aid? An Analysis from the

Somali Laboratory,” in South-South Cooperation beyond the Myths: Rising Donors New Aid
Practices? ed. Isaline Bergamaschi, Phoebe Moore, and Arlene B. Tickne (London, UK:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 65.
58 Erdogan, “The Tears of Somalia.”

59 “Final Communique: Emergency Ministerial-Level Meeting of the OIC Executive

Committee on Somalia Convened in Istanbul on Wednesday 17/08/2011,” Ministry of

Foreign Affairs, August 2011, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/ENFORMASYON/OIC%20
Final%20Communiqu%C3%A9%20Somalia.PDF.
60 Erdogan, “The Tears of Somalia.”

61 “Final Communique.”

62 Eva Svoboda et  al., “Islamic Humanitarianism?” HGP Working Paper (London:
Humanitarian Policy Group, February 2015), https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/
files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/9457.pdf.
188  S. CARVER

regions and the speed of this delivery enabled the Turkish state to take
an active role in influencing the engagement of the OIC within the Horn
region. By its quick and effective management of the Somali humani-
tarian crisis, Ankara was able to “take the reins” on crisis management.
Turkey was able to exercise its leadership role and to test its ability to
shape the RSC through advocating and making the Horn a priority for
the OIC. Turkey was able to assert itself as a champion of the Horn
region and of Somalia by drawing international focus, but it also built on
this position by mobilizing donors in aid of the state.
By doing so, Ankara has branded Turkey with a transnational identity of
a humanist Regional (Great) Power for segments of people in the broader
Middle East or as a Pan-Islamic State for others; all of which have fostered
the image of Turkey in the Gulf Region and the broader Middle East and
increased its popularity and legitimacy among peoples and political elites
across the different security blocs mentioned in this book.
The Turkey–AMISOM relations present a fascinating Petri dish of the
various influences and impacts that are at work on the security complex.
Financially, Turkey is a contributor to the purses of AMISOM, contribut-
ing more than US$2 million dollars to strengthening the organization.63
In addition to financial aid, Turkey has, in the past, also provided men-
tor support through private security providers and training for Somali
security.64 Overtures had been made by Ankara to take a more proac-
tive and steering role in the training of Somali National Army (SNA).
Those efforts, however, have been met with resistance from other larger
donors to AMISOM, including Ethiopia, the European Union (EU),
and the United States (US).65 The financial backing of these actors to
AMISOM purses dwarfs that of Ankara.66 The rejection of Turkey’s 2013
proposal to implement a training program with the SNA was perhaps to
be expected, since there could be little incentive for these actors to will-
ingly see their influence over the provision of security within the state
eroded by a growing Turkish influence. Instead, the financial backing of

63 Abdurrahim Siradag, “Turkish–Somali Relations: Changing State Identity and Foreign

Policy,” Sarajevo Journal of Social Sciences Inquiry 2, no. 2 (2016): 102, https://doi.
org/10.21533/isjss.v2i2.86.
64 Akpınar, “Turkey’s Peacebuilding in Somalia,” 746–47.

65 Wasuge, “Turkey’s Assistance Model in Somalia,” 19.

66 Ahmet Yukleyen and Mohammed Zulkarnian, “Turkey’s Foreign Policy in Somalia,”

Journal of Caspian Affairs 1, no. 2 (2015): 111.

 6  EXPANDING THE TURKISH BID FOR REGIONAL …  189

the EU and US locked Turkey into a position wherein its power would
be unlikely to present a challenge to Ethiopia or the US. This outcome
suggests that while Turkey has the ability to engage with tools of soft
power, such as a humanitarian aid, and to be a proactive extra-regional
actor within Somalia, there are still limits on the extent to which Ankara
can influence some of the actors within the RSC. By extension, this lim-
its the ability that Ankara has to shape the security dynamics within the
Horn RSC.
Unable to engage in the provision of security directly through
AMISOM by putting its mark on the provision of training of SNA
troops, Ankara opted to engage in the security sector bilaterally. In late
2017, Turkey opened its largest overseas military base, covering about
four square kilometers in Mogadishu, with the intent of using the base
to train 10,000 Somali soldiers.67 Turkey has poured resources into the
state, contributing approximately $50m on the base alone. The base is
a strategic step for Turkey, designed to underscore Turkish long-term
commitment to the security of the Horn region in particular (with the
Turkish chief of General Staff Hulusi Akar’s statements at the opening
ceremony: “The government of Turkey and its army will provide all the
needed support to our brothers in Somalia”) and the broader Middle
East in general.68 The attempt to alter the dynamics within the RSC
has been deemed for Ankara to gain a foothold in the region, alongside
the attempts of the covert US bases (which are largely unacknowledged
by the US government but that include the Balidogle airfield near the
Somali capital), UAE base outside Mogadishu, and plans to add a sec-
ond base outside of Somaliland in the northwest of the state.69 Ankara’s
opening of the base is part of the intra-regional power competition in
Africa’s Horn. While these military bases promote prospects for the

67 “Turkey Sets Up Largest Overseas Army Base in Somalia: Ankara Move Is Part

of Efforts to Increase Foothold in the Horn of Africa,” Al Jazeera, October 1, 2017,

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/10/turkey-sets-largest-overseas-army-base-
somalia-171001073820818.html; Abdirahman Hussein and Orhan Coskun,
“Turkey Opens Military Base in Mogadishu to Train Somali Soldiers,” Reuters,
September 30, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-turkey-military/
turkey-opens-military-base-in-mogadishu-to-train-somali-soldiers-idUSKCN1C50JH.
68 Cited in “Turkey Sets Up Largest Overseas Army Base.”

69 “Turkey Sets Up Largest Overseas Army Base.”

190  S. CARVER

involved actors; they also pit the competition between the rival actors
and create risks for the Horn RSC.
The opening of the military base in Mogadishu in 2017 is not a coin-
cidence. In the same year, Ankara signed the Suakin agreement with
Khartoum to restore and run the port in Sudan’s Suakin Island. These
ports give Turkey direct access to the Red Sea. Ankara’s military base
in Doha is its third military grip approximating Africa and the Gulf
Region. Ankara’s expansion of power comes with the dissatisfaction of
the KSA and the UAE (as well as Egypt) for attempting to expand its
area of influence in the Horn of Africa region by opening military bases
and naval docks. The upset of Sudanese president, Omar al-Bashir in
2019, has changed for the mentioned actors the allies in the subregion
and will most likely have implications in this regard on their expansion of
power.70

Conclusion
This chapter examined the extent to which Turkey’s soft power strate-
gies of visibility and collaborative efforts in Somalia have enabled Ankara
to cultivate a greater degree of power and influence within Somalia and
the Horn RSC. The evidence indicates that Turkey has become an active
participant within Somalia and the Horn RSC. The chapter has also
demonstrated the challenges the case of Turkey presents to Buzan and
Waever’s RSCT. Rather than seek a linear progression from a Regional
Power to a Great Power, as the RSCT would expect, Turkey’s strate-
gies of visibility and humanitarianism provide a challenge to the theory
and demonstrate that Regional Powers can also act in external RSCs.
Ankara’s ability to affect the security terrain in which the RSCs oper-
ate has afforded Turkey the ability to demonstrate its influence on the
region. This engagement forces a reaction from other actors and secu-
rity regimes. For example, Turkey’s decision to operate on the ground
in Somalia rather than from an external neighboring state has enabled
Turkey to disrupt or alter the dominant modus operandi in address-
ing Somalia. Similarly, the widespread and expansive engagement with

70 Merve Şebnem Oruç, “Who Is Disturbed by Turkey’s Presence on Sudan’s Suakin

Island?” Daily Sabah, May 14, 2019, https://www.dailysabah.com/columns/merve-

sebnem-oruc/2019/05/10/who-is-disturbed-by-turkeys-presence-on-sudans-suakin-island.
 6  EXPANDING THE TURKISH BID FOR REGIONAL …  191

Somalia through NGOs, businesses, and markets has also demonstrated

a new shift in the security terrain in terms of how actors engage with
Somali conditions.
Similarly, where Ankara has perhaps lacked the economic and mili-
tary might to exert a direct influence on the security conditions within
Somalia—as the main source of insecurity to the Horn of Africa RSC—
Ankara has been able to leverage greater influence by collaborating with
a series of prominent regional security actors, including AMISOM,
IGAD, and the EAC, as well as through the OIC to increase the latter’s
engagement with Somalia. While Ankara did face resistance from a global
Great Power in its attempts to reshape its role in training the SNA, it
was able to operate unilaterally with the construction of the military base
in Mogadishu, thereby demonstrating that Ankara also has the capacity
to contribute toward stabilizing the security conditions in Somalia—and
the Horn RSC, by extension. These strategies serve to demonstrate that
Ankara could be fostering new behaviors that do, indeed, present a chal-
lenge to the RSCT.
While the focus of this chapter was Ankara’s soft power in Somalia, it
has demonstrated that Ankara’s foreign policy in Somalia (and the Horn
of Africa) has implications in dimensions beyond the economic support,
extensive aid programs, and humanitarian assistance mentioned earlier.
Ankara’s foreign policy in the Horn of Africa has a fourfold rationale:
First, it is meant to place Turkey within a constellation of other compet-
ing powers in the Gulf Region and the broader Middle East (e.g., the
UAE) seeking to influence the Red Sea security sector. Second, it puts
Turkey in the position to leverage its power might in the subregions
of the Gulf Region and Sub-Sahara. Third, Ankara is in the position to
guarantee, if needed, alliance assurance for its allies in the different sub-
regions of the broader Middle East (e.g., in the Gulf Region, and North
Africa). Fourth, Turkey benefits from novel opportunities of economic
growth in Africa, including in the Horn of Africa.
Ankara’s brand is unique in the sense that it can pursue its power pol-
icy objectives in the Horn of Africa within Ankara’s humanitarian diplo-
macy, contrary to other rival actors in the Gulf Region and the broader
Middle East.
192  S. CARVER

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presence-on-sudans-suakin-island.
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 CHAPTER 7

Qatar’s Calculated Gamble on the Syrian

Muslim Brotherhood

Hanlie Booysen

Introduction
In the wake of the Arab uprisings, Qatar took significant foreign
policy risks in supporting Islamists,1 including the moderate Islamist
Syrian Muslim Brotherhood (SMB).2 This position is in contrast with
Doha’s habitual foreign policy stance of hedging its bets, i.e., to pursue
opposing positions in order to reduce risk.3 For example, Qatar hosts

1 Lina Khatib, “Qatar and the Recalibration of Power in the Gulf” (Carnegie Middle East
Center, September 2014), 4–7, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/qatar_recalibra-
tion.pdf; Lina Khatib, “Qatar’s Foreign Policy: The Limits of Pragmatism,” International
Affairs 89, no. 2 (March 1, 2013): 417–31, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-
2346.12025; David B. Roberts, “Qatar and the UAE: Exploring Divergent Responses to
the Arab Spring,” The Middle East Journal 71, no. 4 (Autumn 2017): 558, https://doi.
org/10.3751/71.4.12.
2 For the purposes of this chapter, ‘moderate Islamist’ denotes an ideological commitment

by Islamists to n
­ on-violent political change and parliamentary democracy.
3 See Mehran Kamrava, Qatar: Small State, Big Politics (New York: Cornell University

Press, 2013), 74.

H. Booysen (*) 
Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, New Zealand
e-mail: hanlie.booysen@vuw.ac.nz

© The Author(s) 2020 195

P. O. Amour (ed.), The Regional Order in the Gulf Region
and the Middle East, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45465-4_7
196  H. BOOYSEN

the biggest number of United States (US) military personnel in the Gulf
Region and the broader Middle East,4 while it also maintains cordial rela-
tions with Iran. Qatar further hosted an Israeli trade office for more than
a decade and then hosted the Palestinian resistance movement Hamas.5
In the first two years of the Arab uprisings, however, hedging became
superfluous.
This chapter will argue that Doha’s commitment to the SMB’s strug-
gle against the Syrian Ba’th regime was not precarious, but pragmatic
and based on Qatar’s constructed identity and the political environment.
In doing so, the chapter will show that an individual brand of Qatari
Wahhabism, and a mutually beneficial relationship with the Egyptian
Muslim Brotherhood (EMB), predisposed Qatar to view the 2010/11
Arab uprisings as an opportunity to enhance its influence in the Gulf
Region and the broader Middle East Region. In using the Syrian upris-
ing as a case study, I demonstrate further how and why other actors in
the regional system supported Qatar’s stance on the Syrian conflict and
why countries like the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) changed their
policy notion and behavior over time.
The next two sections will demonstrate that Qatar’s state identity,
rationale of gaining independency in Gulf politics from bigger states, and
geopolitical calculations moved Doha to pursue an independent stance
on the SMB.6

Qatar: Independence from Bigger States

In the formation of the Qatari state, the al-Thani ruling family sought
to balance sovereignty and security in a context in which regional great
powers competed to assert their authority in the Gulf Region. Al-Saud
of Riyadh, the ruling al-Khalifa family in Bahrain, Colonial Britain, and

4 Brad Lendon, “Qatar Hosts Largest US Military Base in Mideast,” CNN, June 6, 2017,

https://edition.cnn.com/2017/06/05/middleeast/qatar-us-largest-base-in-mideast/
index.html.
5 Qatar hosted an Israeli trade office from 1996 to 2009, and Hamas relocated from

Damascus to Doha in response to the Syrian conflict in 2011/12. For more on Qatar and
Israel, see Uzi Rabi, “Qatar’s Relations with Israel: Challenging Arab and Gulf Norms,” The
Middle East Journal 63, no. 3 (Summer 2009): 443–59.
6 See Raymond Hinnebusch, The International Politics of the Middle East, 2nd ed.

(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2015), 108–9.

 7  QATAR’S CALCULATED GAMBLE ON THE SYRIAN …  197

the Ottoman Empire, at different times, all threatened Qatar’s sover-

eignty. In the late 1700s and 1800s, Al-Saud made regular incursions into
Qatar and Bahrain.7 At the time, the ruling al-Khalifa family in Bahrain
exercised de facto control over Qatar. However, Muhammad bin Thani
(1788–1878), the first al-Thani ruler of Qatar, undermined al-Khalifa’s
threat of control by signing an agreement with Britain in 1868.8 Though
the agreement was mainly to secure Britain’s shipping routes between Basra
and Bombay, it ended ­al-Khalifa’s claim by recognizing Qatar as a sovereign
entity.9
The 1868 agreement with Britain also fueled the Ottoman Empire’s
fear that Britain had territorial ambitions in the Gulf. When a split
occurred in al-Thani family between father and son (a trend that has
repeated itself three more times in recent history), the Ottoman Empire
utilized the opportunity to establish a presence in Qatar in 1872.10 As
Muhammad bin Thani did not recognize the Ottoman authority, his
son, Sheikh Jassim bin Muhammad al-Thani (1824–1913), became
the regional governor.11 This division in authority did not create con-
flict between father and son, as might be expected, but it paradoxi-
cally allowed al-Thani to keep the demands of both the British and the
Ottoman Empire in check.12
In the twentieth century, Saudi–Wahhabi expansionism replaced
the Ottoman threat of domination.13 In 1902, Sheikh Jassim, who has

7 Allen James Fromherz, Qatar: A Modern History (Washington, DC: I.B. Tauris, 2012), 58.
8 Cihat Battaloğlu, Political Reforms in Qatar: From Authoritarianism Top Political Grey Zone
(Berlin, Germany: Gerlach Press, 2018), 18.
9 Fromherz, Qatar: A Modern History, 55.

10 Fromherz, 58–59.

11 Qatari tribes shifted from the Maliki to the Hanbali school of law under the influ-

ence of Wahahbism during the rule of Sheikh Jasim. See Andrew Hammond, “Qatar’s
Leadership Transition: Like Father, Like Son,” Policy Brief (European Council on
foreign relations (ecfr.eu), February 11, 2014), 4, https://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/
ECFR95_QATAR_BRIEF_AW.pdf.
12 Fromherz, Qatar: A Modern History, 59.

13 The formation of the Saudi state was based on an alliance in 1744 between the fight-

ing power of Muhammad bin Saud and the religious call of Muhammad bin Abd al-Wah-
hab. See Stephane Lacroix and George Holoch, Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious
Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), 8.
198  H. BOOYSEN

already converted to Wahhabism, countered British hegemony by estab-

lishing a friendship with the Third Saudi State.14 However, a few years
later, in 1916, his son Sheikh Abdullah bin Jassim al-Thani signed a
treaty with the British government, now to protect Qatar against Saudi
expansionism.15 After Britain left in 1971, Qatar again pursued security
through its relationship with the KSA. Although Qatar maintained its ter-
ritorial sovereignty, it followed Saudi Arabia’s lead in international rela-
tions. The relationship with the KSA was not, however, without tension,
as demonstrated by the KSA’s obstruction of Qatar’s plans to export gas
to Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in the
early 1990s. The border skirmishes between the KSA and Qatar in 1992
and 1994 are a second example. The bloodless coup in 1995, in which
Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani replaced his father, signaled a break in the
Qatari–Saudi relationship and the beginning of a different path for Qatar
in domestic and foreign policy.16
At present, the United States acts as the key international guarantor of
Qatar’s security, based on the value of Al-Udeid Air Base that hosts the
headquarters of US central command infrastructure. This alliance with
the United States allows Doha significant leeway to steer its foreign pol-
icy free from the KSA’s influence. However, since March 2014, a diplo-
matic crisis has existed between Qatar, on the one hand, and the Gulf trio
(the KSA, the UAE, and Bahrain) plus Egypt on the other, due to, inter
alia, Doha’s foreign policy behaviors in the wake of the Arab uprisings.
This crisis escalated in June 2017, as the KSA, the UAE, Bahrain, and
Egypt broke off diplomatic relations and banned all flights to and from
Qatar. The KSA further closed the border with Qatar, which is Qatar’s
only land border. When President Trump endorsed the Saudi-led isolation
of Qatar on Twitter, Qatar’s security guarantee seemed to be in danger.17

14 J.E. Peterson, “Britain and Formation of Gulf States: The Case of Qatar and Shaykh

Jassim Bin Muhammad,” in Jassim Bin Mohammed Bin Thani—The Day of Solidarity,
Loyalty and Honor, ed. Jamal Mahmud Hajar et  al. (Qatar: GEM Advertising &
Publications, 2008), 67.
15 Birol Baskan and Steven Wright, “Seeds of Change: Comparing State–Religion

Relations in Qatar and Saudi Arabia,” Arab Studies Quarterly 33, no. 2 (Spring 2011): 107.
16 David B. Roberts, “Understanding Qatar’s Foreign Policy Objectives,” Mediterranean

Politics 17, no. 2 (2012): 234–35, https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2012.695123.

17 Mark Lynch, “How Trump’s Alignment with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab

Emirates Is Inflaming the Middle East” (Project on Middle East Political Science, October
2017), 33, https://pomeps.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/POMEPS_GCC_Qatar-
Crisis.pdf.
 7  QATAR’S CALCULATED GAMBLE ON THE SYRIAN …  199

In the meantime, however, the United States has taken a more nuanced
position and the United States–Qatari alliance endures intra-Gulf con-
flict. The miscalculated blockade has not forced Qatar to capitulate to
the trio’s demands, which include ending any contact with the Muslim
Brotherhood (MB) and closing down the Al Jazeera media network (see
Chapters 1 and 2). By contrast, Qatar has strengthened its bilateral rela-
tions with Turkey18 and Iran,19 while its agricultural sector’s Made in
Qatar brand resonates with a heightened Qatari nationalism.20
Thus, Qatar has historically aimed to pursue a balance between secu-
rity and autonomy from the control of bigger states in the Gulf Region
and the broader Middle East. In managing this challenge, Qatar ini-
tially played the Ottoman Empire and Britain off against each other, and
subsequently Britain and Saudi Arabia. At present, Qatar is pursuing its
foreign policy independent of Saudi Arabia’s political line because of its
alliance with the USA and with Turkey, its regional great power backer.

Qatar and Independence from the KSA: Wahhabism

and the MB

Geopolitically, Qatar is a founding member of the Gulf Cooperation

Council (GCC), established in 1981. The GCC is characterized by two
key features: ideational politics and the leadership of the KSA. The for-
mation of the GCC was based on ideational politics, which was intended
to serve stability rather than integration.21 This section will show
that Qatar constructed a politically weak religious sector to fend off
encroachment by Saudi Arabia.

18 Robert Mogielnicki, “The New Economics of Qatar–Turkey Relations,”

Middle East Institute, August 30, 2018, https://www.mei.edu/publications/new-
economics-qatar-turkey-relations.
19 Mohammed Sergie, “Embattled Qatar Is Rich Enough to Get by for Another 100

Years,” Bloomberg Businessweek, June 6, 2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/

articles/2018-06-06/a-year-later-iran-is-the-big-winner-of-the-qatar-embargo.
20 “A Renewed Sense of Nationalism Takes Root in Qatar Reflections,” Stratfor

Worldview, December 29, 2017, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/renewed-sense-

nationalism-takes-root-qatar.
21 See Linda Berger, “The Gulf Cooperation Council between Unity and Discord

towards the Arab Uprisings,” Sicherheit Und Frieden (S + F)/Security and Peace 32, no. 4
(2014): 260.
200  H. BOOYSEN

Islam has been a key component of popular legitimacy for the

Muslim-majority nation-states in the post-Colonial era.22 This is clear
in the GCC states, where governments invest vast amounts to demon-
strate their Islamic commitment.23 An example is the magnificent Sheikh
Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab Mosque in the Qatari capital Doha,
which can accommodate 30,000 of the faithful for prayer. In the KSA,
Wahhabism, an austere “theological-juridical tradition,”24 was a fun-
damental component in the formation of the Saudi state. Today, the
KSA is still seen as personifying Wahhabi Islam. Most of Qatar’s inhab-
itants follow the same Wahhabi tradition as Saudi Arabia.25 Moreover,
al-Thani family comes from the same tribal group (the Bani Tamim) as
Mohammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab.26 However, as a result of Qatar’s com-
mitment to autonomy from Saudi Arabia, the religious sectors in Qatar
and the KSA differ markedly, as we will see next.
Driven by their commitment to remain free of Saudi Arabia’s con-
trol, the al-Thani rulers steered clear of using Wahhabism to legitimize
their rule. Had they not done so, the much smaller Qatari religious sec-
tor would easily have been consumed by the religious sector in Saudi
Arabia.27 Thus, in order to avoid this scenario, al-Thanis, on the one
hand, contained Qatar’s religious sector, and on the other, they staffed
Qatari religious institutions with members of the MB.
In contrast to Saudi Arabia, the ulama or religious scholars in Qatar
do not have a role in decision-making, nor are they institutionalized.
Qatar does not have a Grand Mufti, as opposed to Saudi Arabia, where
the Grand Mufti heads the Council of Senior Ulama. Qatar’s leading

22 Jocelyne Cesari, “Disciplining Religion: The Role of the State and Its Consequences

on Democracy,” Journal of Religious and Political Practice 2, no. 2 (2016): 139–42,

https://doi.org/10.1080/20566093.2016.1181365.
23 Courtney Freer, “Rentier Islamism in the Absence of Elections: The Political Role

of Muslim Brotherhood Affiliates in Qatar and the United Arab Emirates,” International
Journal of Middle East Studies 49, no. 3 (August 2017): 483, https://doi.org/10.1017/
S0020743817000344.
24 Lacroix and Holoch, Awakening Islam, 10.

25 Ahmed Abdelkareem Saif, “Deconstructing before Building: Perspectives on

Democracy in Qatar,” in Reform in the Middle East Oil Monarchies, ed. Anoushiravan
Ehteshami and Steven Wright (Reading, UK: Ithaca Press, 2012), 18.
26 David B. Roberts, “Qatar and the Brotherhood,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy

56, no. 4 (2014): 25, https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2014.941557.

27 Roberts, 26.
 7  QATAR’S CALCULATED GAMBLE ON THE SYRIAN …  201

‘alim or religious scholar is Egyptian-born Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi,

whose influence on the state is personal rather than formal. In fact, most
of Qatar’s ulama are non-nationals, which implies a certain political vul-
nerability in comparison to an indigenous class of ulama. Moreover,
and in contrast to the KSA, the emerging class of indigenous ulama
consist of a large number of females.28 In comparison to Saudi Arabia,
Qatar’s ulama therefore do not have any significant influence on political
decision-making.
Qatar and the KSA also differ markedly in their respective relation-
ships with the MB. Both countries offered members of the EMB safety
against persecution by Gamal Abdel Nasser in the 1950s and 1960s,
and they hosted members of the SMB who fled Hafez al-Assad’s secu-
rity state in the 1970s and 1980s. Initially, the KSA and the EMB were
united against Nasser’s secular nationalism, and while the Saudi state
offered the EMB safety, members of the EMB gave back to the Saudi
state by staffing various ministries, especially the judiciary and educa-
tion.29 However, the EMB also contributed to the development of the
Islamic Awakening or Sahwa al-Islamiyah, a Saudi Islamist movement.30
At first, the Sahwa, the members of the EMB, and the Saudi state coex-
isted amicably, but this relationship took a turn with Saddam Hussein’s
invasion of Kuwait in 1990. In response to Saudi Arabia’s decision to
allow the United States to deploy its military forces in the Kingdom,
the Sahwa criticized Riyadh’s relations with Washington and initiated
a domestic campaign in support of political reforms in the Kingdom.31
By 1995, the Saudi state had crushed the Sahwa’s uprising. However,
a deep resentment toward the MB has remained,32 as reflected in the
Minister of Interior’s assessment in 2002 that the MB is the “source of
all evils in the Kingdom.”33 The Saudi state’s relations with the Sahwa
improved subsequently, only to reach another crisis when, in the context

28 Roberts, 25; Baskan and Wright, “Seeds of Change,” 97–100.

29 Matthew Hedges and Giorgio Cafiero, “The GCC and the Muslim Brotherhood:
What Does the Future Hold?” Middle East Policy 24, no. 1 (Spring 2017): 131.
30 Stéphane Lacroix, “Saudi Arabia’s Muslim Brotherhood Predicament,” POMEPS

Briefings (Project on Middle East Political Science, October 2017), https://pomeps.org/

wp-content/uploads/2017/10/POMEPS_GCC_Qatar-Crisis.pdf.
31 Hedges and Cafiero, “The GCC and the Muslim Brotherhood,” 132–33.

32 Lacroix, “Saudi Arabia’s Muslim Brotherhood Predicament,” 51.

33 Hedges and Cafiero, “The GCC and the Muslim Brotherhood,” 133.
202  H. BOOYSEN

of the Arab uprisings, the Sahwa once again challenged the monarchy’s
authority.34 Today, the Saudi state views the MB as an existential threat
and a terrorist organization.
Similar to Saudi Arabia, Qatar offered members of the EMB protec-
tion in the 1950s and 1960s to escape persecution by the Nasser govern-
ment.35 A symbiotic relationship developed, which is best represented by
Egyptian born Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi’s relationship with Qatar’s rul-
ers.36 Similar to other members of the EMB in Qatar, Qaradawi has con-
tributed to the education sector, and in the field of media. His first role
was Director of the Education Ministry’s Institute of Islamic Instruction.37
In 1977, he founded the Sharia Faculty at Qatar University, and subse-
quently became its first Dean.38 The pinnacle of Qaradawi’s influence,
however, was in the media and came in the context of Qatar’s soft power,
as projected by the Al Jazeera television channel. Qaradawi’s popular talk
show Sharia and Life (al-shari’a wa al-hayat) had a global audience of up
to 35 million on an almost weekly basis.39 Furthermore, in contrast to the
Sahwa’s challenge to the Saudi government in 1990 and again in 2011,
the MB in Qatar freely disbanded in 1999,40 and therefore posed no threat
to Qatar in the context of the 2010/11 Arab uprisings.
In this section, we have seen that the al-Thani rulers, from early on,
had to trade off a need for security with an ambition for autonomy
from bigger powers in the Gulf Region. A commitment to gain auton-
omy from the KSA in domestic politics and regional affairs resulted in

34 Lacroix, “Saudi Arabia’s Muslim Brotherhood Predicament,” 52.

35 Bernard Haykel, “Saudi Arabia and Qatar in a Time of Revolution” (Center for Strategic
& International Studies, February 19, 2013), https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/
s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/130219_Haykel_SaudiQatar_GulfAnalysis.pdf.
36 Qaradawi accepted Qatari citizenship in 1969.

37 David H. Warren, “Qatari Support for the Muslim Brotherhood Is More Than Just

Realpolitik, It Has a Long, Personal History,” MAYDAN: Politics & Society, July 12,
2017, https://www.themaydan.com/2017/07/qatari-support-muslim-brotherhood-just-
realpolitik-long-personal-history/.
38 David B. Roberts, “Qatar, the Ikhwan, and Transnational Relations in the Gulf,”

POMEPS Briefings (Project on Middle East Political Science, October 2017), https://
pomeps.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/POMEPS_GCC_Qatar-Crisis.pdf.
39 David H. Warren, “The ‘Ulamā’ and the Arab Uprisings 2011–13: Considering Yusuf

al-Qaradawi, the ‘Global Mufti,’ between the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic Legal
Tradition, and Qatari Foreign Policy,” New Middle Eastern Studies 4 (2014): 7.
40 Hedges and Cafiero, “The GCC and the Muslim Brotherhood,” 149.
 7  QATAR’S CALCULATED GAMBLE ON THE SYRIAN …  203

a politically weak religious sector and a strategic relationship with the

EMB. This, in turn, led to an individual brand of Qatari Wahhabism that
is very different from the way Wahhabism finds expression in the KSA.
This predisposed Qatar to view the Syrian uprising as an opportunity to
enhance its regional influence.

The Case of Syria: Qatar’s Policy and the Syrian Uprising

This section will argue that Qatar’s political environment supported its
stance on the Syrian conflict. It will build this argument in three steps.
First, it will show that regime change in Libya prevented the same sce-
nario in Syria. Then, it will demonstrate that Qatar, being oblivious
to the consequences of the Libyan reality until August 2013, pursued
regime change in Syria with the support of many actors in the interna-
tional community. Third, it will show Qatar’s support for the SMB as
pragmatic, based on the SMB’s capacity to mobilize the opposition in
exile and on the Western powers’ acceptance of the SMB, though only
for a limited period.
Qatar viewed the 2010/11 Arab uprisings as a catalyst to replace
autocratic systems with pluralist political systems in the broader Middle
East, but not in the Gulf Region. Then-Prime Minister Hamad bin
Jassim bin Jaber al-Thani articulated Qatar’s expectations by telling
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, in early 2011, that developments in
Tunisia had made political change inevitable.41 The former Qatari Emir,
Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, and the then Crown Prince (Tamim
bin Hamad al-Thani) also counselled Bashar al-Assad, at the time a close
friend, to compromise politically. Thus, Qatar embraced the political
transitions in Tunisia and Egypt in 2011, and saw a role for itself in sup-
porting similar political transitions in Libya and Syria. However, before
we continue our discussion of Qatar’s engagement with the Syrian upris-
ing, we need to consider the implications of regime change in Libya on
political change in Syria, which was unforeseen by both Qatar and other
regional powers and international allies.

41 Hamid bin Jaber al-Thani was Qatar’s Prime Minister and Foreign Minister at the

start of the Arab uprisings. He vacated the two ministerial positions when the former Emir
­abdicated in June 2013.
204  H. BOOYSEN

Regime Change in Libya, but Not in Syria

UNSC Resolution 1973, of March 17, 2011, facilitated regime change
in Libya, but became the Syrian uprising’s Achilles heel. In order to
protect civilians against the Libyan government’s use of force, UNSC
Resolution 1973 authorized “all necessary measures,”42 which in this
instance translated as foreign military intervention. Two days later,
NATO started its air attack against Qaddafi’s forces in Benghazi. The
NATO-led military campaign did not cease after the feared attack against
civilians in Benghazi was foiled, but continued until October 2011,
when Qaddafi was captured and killed.43 In retrospect, resolution 1973
therefore was unprecedented to legalize a foreign military intervention in
Libya, which in turn facilitated the end of the Qaddafi regime.
In Syria, the Russian veto in the UNSC prevented a repeat of the
Libyan scenario. Between October 2011 and October 2019, Russia
vetoed 14 UNSC Resolutions on Syria,44 based on a sentiment that
regime change in Syria, as witnessed in Libya, should be foiled (see
Chapter 12). On October 4, 2011, when Russia vetoed the first draft
resolution on Syria,45 the Russian Ambassador to the UN said: “The
situation in Syria cannot be considered in the Council separately from
the Libyan experience.” In a similar vein, the South African Ambassador
explained that (non-permanent member) South Africa abstained due
to the abuse of UNSC resolutions, the “implementation [of which in
Libya] has gone far beyond the mandate of what was intended.”46 Thus,
in a manner that rendered the UNSC impotent on Syria, Russia vetoed
any resolution with the potential of allowing foreign military interven-
tion in the Syrian conflict.

42 “UN Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011)” (United Nations, March 17,

2011), https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7b65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-
8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7d/Libya%20S%20RES%201973.pdf.
43 Shahram Akbarzadeh and Arif Saba, “UN Paralysis over Syria: The Responsibility to

Protect or Regime Change?” International Politics 56, no. 4 (August 2019): 536–50,
https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-018-0149-x.
44 “Security Council Veto List (in Reverse Chronological Order),” United Nations,

accessed September 3, 2019, http://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick.

45 The draft resolution was sponsored by France, Britain, Germany, Portugal, and

Northern Ireland.
46 “UN Security Council 6627th Meeting” (United Nations, October 4, 2011), http://

www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.6627.
 7  QATAR’S CALCULATED GAMBLE ON THE SYRIAN …  205

Qatar and Regime Change in Syria

In the previous section, we have seen that regime change in Libya,
­paradoxically, halted the domino effect created by the Arab uprisings and
thus prevented the removal of Bashar al-Assad through foreign military
intervention. However, Qatar, an active proponent of regime change in
Libya and a sponsor of the Syrian political opposition, was not consid-
ering this as a probable scenario at the time.47 For the purposes of this
argument, we will accept that Qatar (and many in the Syrian opposition)
expected the United States and its Western allies to effect regime change
in Syria, as had occurred in Libya. This scenario was viewed as possible
up until August 2013, when the Syrian government allegedly used chem-
ical weapons against civilians in the Ghouta neighborhood of Damascus.
When the United States agreed to Russia’s plan to eliminate the Syrian
state’s chemical stockpile, as opposed to punitive action,48 it was clear
that Syria most likely would not follow the Libyan scenario. The UNSC’s
unanimous support for the Russian plan further served to enhance Bashar
al-Assad’s legitimacy.49
The West, or the P3 (France, United Kingdom, and the United
States), needed Arab partners in the military campaign against Libya,
due to the disastrous consequences of the US-led invasion of Iraq.
Qatar and the UAE served this need in a symbolic manner when
the two states joined the NATO-led campaign. However, the role
of the Arab League in legitimizing the NATO campaign was impor-
tant, as evident in an opinion piece penned by the then presidents
of the P3 (Sarkozy, Cameron, and Obama) in the New York Times, in
April 2011. While numb to the African Union’s attempts to reach a
negotiated solution to the Libyan crisis,50 the three presidents wrote

47 Christopher Phillips, “Eyes Bigger Than Stomachs: Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar

in Syria,” Middle East Policy 24, no. 1 (Spring 2017): 38–40, https://doi.org/10.1111/
mepo.12250.
48 Ralf Trapp, “Elimination of the Chemical Weapons Stockpile of Syria,” Journal of

Conflict and Security Law 19, no. 1 (April 2014): 9, https://doi.org/10.1093/jcsl/kru002.

49 See “UN Security Council Resolution 2118 (2013)” (United Nations, September

2013), http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2118(2013).
50 Alex De Waal, “African Roles in the Libyan Conflict of 2011,” International Affairs

89, no. 2 (March 2013): 369, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12022.

206  H. BOOYSEN

that the international community was “obliged to act,” based on the

Arab League’s call for action.51
As president of the Arab League, Qatar was well placed to influence
its regional policy toward the 2010/11 Arab uprisings.52 On February
22, 2011, Qatari Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Sheikh Hamad
bin Jassim bin Jaber al-Thani secured Libya’s suspension from the
Arab League,53 which, on March 12, 2011, called for the establish-
ment of a no-fly zone in Libya to provide civilians safety from aerial
attacks by the Libyan military.54 Both these demands were included in
UNSC Resolution 1973. This decisive action contrasts with the Arab
League’s rather uneventful track record, based on the principle of
non-intervention in member states’ domestic affairs.55
In November 2011, Qatar managed Syria’s suspension from the
Arab League. A month later, the Arab League decided to send a mon-
itoring team to Syria in an attempt to de-escalate the conflict.56 In
January 2012, the Qatari Prime Minister told the Security Council that
the Arab League had been unsuccessful in its efforts to end the vio-
lence, because the Syrian government, under the leadership of Bashar
al-Assad, had no interest in curbing the violence.57 He explained that
the Arab League sought the Security Council’s support for a polit-
ical roadmap that would see Bashar al-Assad handing power to a dep-
uty and the formation of a unity government, after which parliamentary

51 Barack Obama, David Cameron, and Nicolas Sarkozy, “Libya’s Pathway to Peace,”

New York Times, April 14, 2011, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/15/opinion/15i-

ht-edlibya15.html.
52 Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, “Qatar and the Arab Spring: Policy Drivers and Regional

Implications” (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September

2014), 3, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/qatar_arab_spring.pdf.
53 Daniel F. Wajner and Arie M. Kacowicz, “The Quest for Regional Legitimation:

Analyzing the Arab League’s Legitimizing Role in the Arab Spring,” Regional & Federal
Studies 28, no. 4 (2018): 16, https://doi.org/10.1080/13597566.2018.1451846.
54 Waal, “African Roles in the Libyan Conflict of 2011,” 376.

55 Wajner and Kacowicz, “The Quest for Regional Legitimation,” 16.

56 Phillips, “Eyes Bigger Than Stomachs,” 38.

57 “Security Council Debates Situation in Syria,” UN News, January 31, 2012, https://

news.un.org/en/story/2012/01/401882-security-council-debates-situation-syria.
 7  QATAR’S CALCULATED GAMBLE ON THE SYRIAN …  207

and presidential elections would be held.58 A change of the Ba’th regime

was most likely the objective.
Many actors in the international community, including the regional
system, supported the Arab League’s engagement with the Syrian
uprising. On February 4, 2012, 13 members of the UNSC, including
non-permanent members of South Africa and India,59 voted for a draft
resolution that backed the Arab League plan of January 22, 2012.60
India found it necessary to justify its endorsement by saying that the
draft resolution “rules out any measures under Article 42 of the Charter
[that would allow regime change] and calls for a serious political dia-
logue (…) under the auspices of the League of Arab States.” However,
the draft resolution did not pass, because Russia and China vetoed the
resolution as being biased.61
Next, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) adopted the Arab
League’s draft resolution of February 16, 2012 with 137 votes in favor,
12 against, and 17 abstentions.62 Other than condemning the Syrian
authorities’ abuse of human rights, the UNGA Resolution supported the
League of Arab States’ January 22, 2012 decision to facilitate “a Syrian-
led political transition to a democratic, plural political system.”63 Though
the UNGA resolution did not have the ability to sanction the Syrian gov-
ernment, it demonstrated the international community’s overwhelming
support for the Arab League’s position on Syria. In a further show of

58 “Arabs Agree New Syria Plan, Urge U.N. Support,” Reuters, January 22, 2012,

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-initiative/arabs-agree-new-syria-plan-
urge-u-n-support-idUSTRE80L0WL20120122.
59 India and South Africa are members of the Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South

Africa (BRICS) grouping, and both shared in the Russian interpretation that UNSC 1973
was misused in aid of regime change in Libya.
60 “Syria: Ban Voices Deep Regret after Security Council Fails to Agree on Resolution,”

UN News, February 4, 2012, https://news.un.org/en/story/2012/02/402402-syria-

ban-voices-deep-regret-after-security-council-fails-agree-resolution.
61 “UN Security Council 6711th Meeting” (United Nations, February 4, 2012), 9,

http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.6711.
62 “General Assembly Demands Syria Halt Violence Without Delay,” UN
News, February 16, 2012, https://news.un.org/en/story/2012/02/403592-
general-assembly-demands-syria-halt-violence-without-delay.
63 “General Assembly Adopts Resolution Strongly Condemning ‘Widespread and

Systematic’ Human Rights Violations by Syrian Authorities,” United Nations, February 16,
2012, https://www.un.org/press/en/2012/ga11207.doc.htm.
208  H. BOOYSEN

support for the Arab League’s stance on Syria, the UN and the Arab
League appointed a Joint Special Envoy for the Syrian crisis on February
23, 2012.64

Qatar, the SMB, and the SNC

This section will show that Qatar’s support for the SMB in the wake of
the Syrian uprising was pragmatic, based on the SMB’s capacity to mobi-
lize the Syrian opposition in exile, and the West’s support for the Syrian
National Council (SNC).
Like moderate Islamists in Tunisia and Egypt, the SMB showed itself to
be the most capable opposition group to challenge the government in the
wake of the Syrian uprising. Based on its historical opposition to the Ba’th
one-party state,65 the SMB had an organizational capacity in 2011 that
the protest movement and the secularist opposition lacked. For example,
the SMB played a leading role in establishing the Syrian National Council
(SNC) in Istanbul on October 2, 2011, with funding from Qatar.66
The SNC was modelled on the W ­ estern-backed National Transitional
Council (NTC) in Libya, which acted as a transition government in 2011
and steered Libya to elections in ­mid-2012.67 Initially, the SNC’s polit-
ical authority was recognized from within Syria and by the international
community.68 Following France’s lead, seventy countries at the so-called

64 “Kofi Annan Appointed Joint Special Envoy of United Nations, League of Arab

States on Syrian Crisis,” United Nations, February 23, 2012, https://www.un.org/press/

en/2012/sgsm14124.doc.htm.
65 See Umar F. Abd-Allah, The Islamic Struggle in Syria (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1983);

Raphael Lefevre, Ashes of Hama: The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria (London: C. Hurst & Co.
Publishers Ltd., 2013); Joshua Teitelbaum, “The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, 1945–1958:
Founding, Social Origins, Ideology,” Middle East Journal 65, no. 2 (Spring 2011): 213–33,
https://doi.org/10.3751/65.2.12; and Joshua Teitelbaum, “The Muslim Brotherhood
and the ‘Struggle for Syria’, 1947–1958 between Accommodation and Ideology,” Middle
Eastern Studies 40, no. 3 (May 2004): 134–58, https://doi.org/10.1080/002632004200
0213492.
66 Roula Khalaf and Abigail Fielding-Smith, “How Qatar Seized Control of the Syrian

Revolution,” Financial Times Magazine, May 17, 2013.

67 “Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (V): Making Sense of Libya,”

Middle East/North Africa Report (Cairo/Brussels, 6: International Crisis Group, June 6,

2011), 24–26.
68 Adam Baczko, Gilles Dorronsoro, and Arthur Quesnay, Civil War in Syria: Mobilization

and Competing Social Orders (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 135.
 7  QATAR’S CALCULATED GAMBLE ON THE SYRIAN …  209

Friends of Syria Summit in April 2012 endorsed the SNC as “a legitimate

representative” of the Syrian people, and “the main opposition interlocu-
tor with the international community.”69
However, in time, the SMB and, by extension, Qatar’s influence in the
Syrian political opposition was challenged.70 First, the United States and
its allies pressured Qatar to broaden the SNC, based on a proposal from a
respected member of the secularist opposition, Riad Seif.71 In November
2012, the National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces
(NC) replaced the SNC as the international community’s main interloc-
utor in the Syrian opposition. Initially, the SMB succeeded to maintain
significant influence in the NC, based on its relationship with Mustafa
Sabbagh, who enjoyed close relations with the Qatari government, and
was appointed as the NC’s Secretary-General.72 Qatar’s persistent influ-
ence was further marked by its funding of the NC’s budget.73 However,
in mid-2013, the United States had become concerned about some
aspects of the Qatari government’s support for the Syrian opposition. At
the same time, Saudi Arabia took on a more public role in its support for
the secularist armed opposition, namely, the Free Syrian Army (FSA).74
The subsequent restructuring of the NC witnessed the incorporation of
approximately 25 new individuals, the majority of whom were secularists,
and sponsored by Saudi Arabia.75 This restructuring of the political oppo-
sition’s primary institution in favor of Saudi Arabia, curbed both Qatar and
the SMB’s influence in the Syrian conflict. This dynamic between Qatar
and the KSA and their proactive behavior outward is yet another example
for the increasing importance of the Gulf Region for the broader Middle
East.

69 Elizabeth O’Bagy, “Syria’s Political Opposition,” Middle East Security Report

(Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of War (ISW), April 2012), 9, http://www.scpss.
org/libs/spaw/uploads/files/Reports/Syrias_Political_Opposition.pdf.
70 In an interview in June 2015, a member of the SMB executive alleged that the SNC’s

reversal of fortune in 2012 was primarily due to the enduring Western suspicion of Islamists.
71 Khalaf and Fielding-Smith, “How Qatar Seized Control of the Syrian Revolution.”

72 Baczko, Dorronsoro, and Quesnay, Civil War in Syria, 137.

73 Khalaf and Fielding-Smith, “How Qatar Seized Control of the Syrian Revolution.”

74 International Crisis Group, “Anything but Politics: The State of Syria’s Political

Opposition,” Middle East Report (Beirut/Damascus/Brussels: International Crisis Group,

October 17, 2013), 22, https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/146%20Anything%20
But%20Politics%20-%20The%20State%20of%20Syrias%20Political%20Opposition.pdf.
75 Interview conducted with a member of the SMB executive in June 2015.
210  H. BOOYSEN

In this section, we have seen that the Qatari government acted as a

rational political actor, which optimized an opportunity to enhance its
regional influence by supporting a client that had mobilizational capac-
ity, and was at least tolerated, if not supported, by principal actors in the
region and the West. This scenario rests on Qatar’s perspective that the
Arab uprisings were a catalyst to do away with autocratic political systems,
but not monarchies in the Gulf Region. We saw how the Russian veto
in the UNSC prevented regime change in Syria, as it occurred in Libya.
But in 2011 and up until August 2013, this was not a fait accompli, yet,
and Qatar’s support for regime change in Syria enjoyed the support of
many in the broader Middle East and in the international community.
Furthermore, we have seen in Syria that the SMB’s capacity to mobilize
the opposition (in exile) at the onset of the Syrian uprising distinguished
the Brotherhood from the protest movement, and the secularist opposi-
tion. Qatar’s support for the SNC was also initially in line with that of the
West, as represented by the so-called Friends of the Syrian people group
that legitimized the SNC with its recognition thereof. Doha’s foreign pol-
icy with Syria was also primarily in line with Turkey, both of which sup-
ported the regime changes in Tunisia and Egypt and the replacement by
ideationally and ideologically ­similar-minded actors.

Conclusion
This chapter has investigated the notion that Qatar has taken signif-
icant foreign policy risks by supporting the SMB in the wake of the
Arab uprisings. Not so, given the 2011—August 2013 political envi-
ronment and based on its constructed identity and soft power capacity,
Qatar’s support for the SMB was pragmatic. The decision-makers in
Doha regarded the 2010/11 Arab uprisings as a strategic opportunity
to form novel regional alliances in the broader Middle East and, as such,
to balance against regional great powers in the Gulf Region. Qatar also
came closer to Turkey, as both promoted the rise of a novel bloc, which
included the countries-in-transition, toward democracy (see Table 14.1).
The first part demonstrated that Qatar’s rulers have historically pur-
sued a balance between sovereignty and security. At present, the mili-
tary presence of both the United States and Turkey in Qatar ensures the
country’s security and allows al-Thani rulers to pursue a foreign policy
independent from the KSA, the UAE, and Bahrain. The chapter also
demonstrated that, primarily, in order to shield the country from Saudi
 7  QATAR’S CALCULATED GAMBLE ON THE SYRIAN …  211

Arabia’s domination, Qatar has developed a politically weak religious

sector and a strategic relationship with the EMB, which in turn has led
to an individual brand of Qatari Wahhabism. This constructed identity
and these geopolitical calculations predisposed Qatar to view the Arab
uprisings as an opportunity to enhance its regional influence.
In the second part, the chapter shows that Qatar reasonably sup-
ported a political transition in Syria due to regional and international
support for Qatar’s stance on the Syrian conflict. Doha’s position toward
a shift in the leadership was in harmony with that of the Arab League
(including the KSA), Turkey, and the wider international community.
Qatar’s support for the SMB was warranted by the SMB’s capacity to
mobilize the Syrian opposition in exile and the so-called Friends of the
Syrian People’s legitimization of the SNC.
The Arab uprisings have failed as a regional phenomenon.76 Apart
from Tunisia, the uprisings, including the uprising in Syria, have not
delivered the much-anticipated political transitions. Though this has
checked Qatar’s regional influence, Doha (along with Turkey) has suc-
ceeded in maintaining a foreign policy in support of moderate Islamism
and against the assault thereon by the KSA, the UAE, and Egypt.

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qatar-embargo.
Stratfor Worldview. “A Renewed Sense of Nationalism Takes Root in Qatar
Reflections,” December 29, 2017. https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/
renewed-sense-nationalism-takes-root-qatar.
Teitelbaum, Joshua. “The Muslim Brotherhood and the ‘Struggle for Syria’,
1947–1958 between Accommodation and Ideology.” Middle Eastern Studies
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213492.
———. “The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, 1945–1958: Founding, Social
Origins, Ideology.” Middle East Journal 65, no. 2 (Spring 2011): 213–33.
https://doi.org/10.3751/65.2.12.
Trapp, Ralf. “Elimination of the Chemical Weapons Stockpile of Syria.” Journal
of Conflict and Security Law 19, no. 1 (April 2014): 7–23. https://doi.
org/10.1093/jcsl/kru002.
 7  QATAR’S CALCULATED GAMBLE ON THE SYRIAN …  215

Ulrichsen, Kristian Coates. “Qatar and the Arab Spring: Policy Drivers and Regional
Implications.” Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
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‘Widespread and Systematic’ Human Rights Violations by Syrian Authorities,”
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———. “Security Council Veto List (in Reverse Chronological Order).”
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February 16, 2012. https://news.un.org/en/story/2012/02/403592-gen-
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———. “Security Council Debates Situation in Syria,” January 31, 2012.
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bates-situation-syria.
———. “Syria: Ban Voices Deep Regret after Security Council Fails to
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———. “The ‘Ulamā’ and the Arab Uprisings 2011–13: Considering Yusuf al-Qa-
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(2014): 2–32.
 CHAPTER 8

(Un)Limited Force: Regional Realignments,

Israeli Operations, and the Security of Gaza

Colter Louwerse

Introduction
It is something of a misnomer to write about the security of the Gaza
Strip because, in many ways, Gaza is defined by the near-total absence of
security. In June 2017, Sara Roy, a Senior Research Scholar at the Center
for Middle Eastern Studies at Harvard University, warned in the London
Review of Books that “the now devastating impact of Gaza’s decade-long
isolation from the rest of the world” as an intentional result of Israel’s
blockade had meant that “an increasing number of people are reaching the
limit of what they can endure.”1 For decades, Gaza has been a paradigm of
human suffering. With almost 1.9 million residents packed into 365 square
kilometers, it is one of the most densely populated regions on the planet.2
Seventy percent of its populace consists of refugees or the descendants

1 Sara Roy, “If Israel Were Smart,” London Review of Books 39, no. 12 (June 15, 2017):
19–20.
2 “Palestine in Figures 2017. Ramallah: March 2018,” State of Palestine. Palestinian Central

Bureau of Statistics, March 2018, 8, http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Downloads/book2362.pdf.

C. Louwerse (*) 
Institute of Arab Islamic Studies, University of Exeter, Exeter, UK
e-mail: cl604@exeter.ac.uk

© The Author(s) 2020 217

P. O. Amour (ed.), The Regional Order in the Gulf Region
and the Middle East, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45465-4_8
218  C. LOUWERSE

of refugees, expelled from what is now Israel over the course of the
1947–1949 Arab–Israeli War.3 As many as 80% are dependent on humani-
tarian aid.4 Almost half are children under the age of 18.5
Discussion of Gaza’s security is even more complicated by the fact
that virtually all the decisions influencing the freedom of its populace
are determined outside of its geographical and political purview. While
Gaza has, since the implementation of the Oslo I agreement in May
1994, been under the nominally autonomous governance of either the
Palestinian National Authority (PNA) or Hamas since 2006,6 the Strip
has also been thrust into the unique position of being occupied by a mil-
itary power deployed outside of the territory under its control.7 Israel
removed its settlements in Gaza in a process of strategic disengagement in
2005. Nevertheless, human rights organizations and international bodies
almost universally maintain that Israel retains its legal obligations as a mil-
itary occupier, as it continues to control Gaza’s borders, airspace, water,
electricity, and people’s registry.8 That Israel no longer maintains a per-
manent military presence inside Gaza is widely regarded as legally irrele-
vant. “Modern technology now permits effective control from outside

3 “Where We Work: Gaza Strip,” UNRWA—United Nations Relief and Works Agency,

January 1, 2018, https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/gaza-strip; For details on the

1948 expulsion, see Benny Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited,
2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Ilan Pappé, The Ethnic Cleansing of
Palestine (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2007).
4 “Report on UNCTAD Assistance to the Palestinian People: Developments in the

Economy of the Occupied Palestinian Territory” (United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development [UNCTAD], July 10, 2017), 6, https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.
nsf/22f431edb91c6f548525678a0051be1d/9ef3a17ccd1df05a852581790069fff8?Open-
Document.
5 “State of Palestine,” Humanitarian Situation Report (UNICEF, December 2017), 2,

https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/UNICEF%20State%20of%20
Palestine%20Humanitarian%20Situation%20Report%20-%20Year%20End%202017.pdf.
6 Sara Roy, Failing Peace: Gaza and the Palestinian–Israeli Conflict (London: Pluto Press,

2007), 79–101, 141.

7 John Dugard, “Debunking Israel’s Self-Defense Argument,” July 31, 2014, http://amer-

ica.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/7/gaza-israel-internationalpoliticsunicc.html; Norman G.
Finkelstein, Gaza: An Inquest into Its Martyrdom (Oakland: University of California Press,
2018), 269.
8 See e.g., “Operation ‘Cast Lead’: 22 Days of Death and Destruction,” MDE

(Amnesty International, July 2, 2009), 80–81, https://www.amnesty.org/download/

Documents/48000/mde150152009en.pdf.
 8  (UN)LIMITED FORCE: REGIONAL REALIGNMENTS …  219

the occupied territory,” former UN Special Rapporteur for the Occupied

Palestinian Territories John Dugard typically observes, and this is what
Israel has established.9
Meanwhile, the Israeli blockade of Gaza—implemented in tangent
with Egypt but condemned internationally and by human rights organ-
izations as an illegal act constituting “collective punishment of a civil-
ian population”—severely restricts freedom of movement, prevents
Palestinians from accessing basic necessities, such as medical equipment,
sanitation equipment, and construction materials, and has effectively
crippled the Gazan economy.10 The grinding and monotonous insecu-
rity wrought upon Gazans by the blockade is punctuated by regularized
military assaults. Since Israel’s military withdrawal from ground positions
within Gaza in September 2005, Gaza has been subjected to a total of
seven Israeli Defense Force (IDF) “operations”: Operation Summer Rains
(June–November 2006), Operation Autumn Cloud (November 2006),
Operation Hot Winter (2008), Operation Cast Lead (2008–2009),
Operation Returning Echo (2012), Operation Pillar of Defense (2012),
and Operation Protective Edge (2014). In conjunction with the block-
ade, these Israeli assaults have pushed Gaza to the humanitarian brink. In
recent years, United Nations organs have repeatedly warned that Gaza is
on track to pass the threshold of unlivability by 2020.11
9 Dugard, “Debunking Israel’s Self-Defense Argument”; See also “Disengaged Occupiers:

The Legal Status of Gaza” (Legal Center for Freedom of Movement [Gisha], January 2007),
https://www.gisha.org/UserFiles/File/publications_english/Publications_and_Reports_
English/Disengaged_Occupiers_en.pdf; “Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding
Mission on the Gaza Conflict” (United Nations Human Rights Council [UNHRC] 27th
Session, September 25, 2009), https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/
G09/158/66/PDF/G0915866.pdf?OpenElement.
10 “Israel: Gaza Blockade Must Be Completely Lifted,” Amnesty International, June

17, 2010, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2010/06/israel-levantar-comple-

tamente-bloqueo-gaza/; “Gaza: Donors, UN Should Press Israel on Blockade. Punitive
Restrictions on Population Undermine Reconstruction,” Human Rights Watch, October
12, 2014, https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/10/12/gaza-donors-un-should-press-israel-
blockade; “Gaza Closure: Not Another Year!” International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC), June 14, 2010, https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/update/
palestine-update-140610.htm; and “Gaza Closure Defined: Collective Punishment” (Legal
center for Freedom of Movement [Gisha], December 2008), 27, 283, 404–5, https://
www.gisha.org/UserFiles/File/publications/GazaClosureDefinedEng.pdf.
11 “Report on UNCTAD Assistance to the Palestinian People: Developments in

the Economy of the Occupied Palestinian Territory” (United Nations Conference on

Trade and Development [UNCTAD], July 6, 2015), 11, https://unctad.org/en/
PublicationsLibrary/tdb62d3_en.pdf.
220  C. LOUWERSE

Living in what has been described as “the largest open air prison
in the world,” Gazans have been almost entirely deprived of agency.12
Israeli policy is the ultimate determinant of the relative freedom of the
Palestinian civilian population, and another Israeli operation poses
the most tangible threat to Gaza’s fragile life-supporting systems. As
such, rightward shifts in the makeup of the Israeli political echelon in
the wake of 2014s Operation Protective Edge—with unprecedentedly
hawkish figures at the helm of the Ministry of Defense and Department
of Justice—appear at first glance as the preeminent threat to Gaza’s
already precarious humanitarian condition.13 Israeli officials have repeat-
edly stated that the next round in Gaza is unavoidable, with Avigdor
Lieberman taking the view that there are “no innocent people in the
Gaza Strip,” and assuring Palestinians that the “next war on Israel, it will
be their last” because Israel “will completely destroy them.”14
However, perhaps counterintuitively, recent power shifts in the
regional and international system are a more significant determinant of
the relative safety of the Gazan population than the extreme hawkishness
of a right-wing Israeli government. This is because the primary determi-
nants of the scope, scale, and brutality of Israel’s assaults on the people
of Gaza have typically been external to the political and military decisions
of the Israeli government.
This chapter will argue that the most significant constraints on Israel’s
regular attacks on Gaza are those placed upon it by regional actors and
the international community. In the Gulf Region and the broader Middle
East region, these restraints stem primarily from the relative levels of

12 French President Nicolas Sarkozy, quoted in Jean-Pierre Filiu, Gaza: A History

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), xi, 341.

13 Mairav Zonszein, “Benjamin Netanyahu Just Formed the Most Right-
Wing Government in Israeli History,” The Nation, May 25, 2016, https://www.
thenation.com/ar ticle/benjamin-netanyahu-just-formed-the-most-right-wing
-government-in-israeli-history/.
14 Jack Moore, “Israeli Foreign Minister Says Future Lebanon and Gaza Wars Are

‘Inevitable’,” Newsweek, February 2, 2015, https://www.newsweek.com/israeli-for-

eign-minister-warns-future-lebanon-and-gaza-wars-inevitable-303841; “‘No Innocent
People in Gaza’ Says Israeli Defense Minister,” Middle East Eye, April 8, 2018, https://
www.middleeasteye.net/news/no-innocent-people-gaza-says-israeli-defence-minister.
 8  (UN)LIMITED FORCE: REGIONAL REALIGNMENTS …  221

political opposition to Israeli raw behavior against its neighbors by pow-

erful regional actors such as Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. These state
actors, in turn, place pressure upon Israel’s chief military and diplomatic
benefactor—the United States—to mitigate the IDF’s use of force. As
such, determining the precise political alignment of these crucial state
actors relative to Israel is essential to determining the relative freedom of
the Gazan population from the humanitarian crisis. As this chapter will
demonstrate, recent political realignments in the regional security system
in the Gulf Region and the broader Middle East, in conjunction with the
recent switchover in the United States’ presidential administrations, have
meant that if present trends continue, the Palestinians in Gaza will remain
exceptionally vulnerable to the depredations inherent to unhindered and
continued Israeli occupation, blockade, and assault.
The first part of this chapter will compare the differentiated regional
reactions to the 2012 and 2014 Israeli military operations in Gaza, in
order to illustrate the crucial role regional alignments have had in both
deterring and enabling Israeli assaults. The second part will analyze the
effect post-2014 regional realignments have had upon Gaza’s precarious
humanitarian condition. Finally, this chapter will conclude with a dis-
cussion of the potential impact current regional trajectories might have
upon Gaza’s future humanitarian condition.

Operation Pillar of Defense versus Operation

Protective Edge
Comparative review of the last two Israeli military operations, Operation
Pillar of Defense (2012) and Operation Protective Edge (2014), demon-
strates the role of the unfolding region system and the international
community in delineating the scope and scale of Israeli operations. The
comparison is especially valuable given the very short amount of time (less
than two years) that elapsed between the operations. Over that period,
there were few changes in Israel’s military or political command struc-
ture, and the IDF’s modus operandi remained mostly consistent over the
course of both operations. As one Israeli commentator put it, “Every two
or three years, on average, we have a war, and it doesn’t matter who the
prime minister and the defense minister are, or which parties they come
222  C. LOUWERSE

from.”15 Nevertheless, Operation Protective Edge wreaked magnitudes

more destruction upon Gaza than did its 2012 predecessor. The compar-
ative analysis of the operations conducted in the following sections illu-
minates regional political alignments as the independent variable limiting
Israeli destruction in 2012 and facilitating it in 2014.16

Operation Pillar of Defense (2012)

Situated between two Israeli operations characterized by four-digit casualty
figures and billions of dollars in damage caused by “unlawful and wanton
destruction” of Palestinian property,17 Operation Pillar of Defense is notable
for the relative dearth of devastation it inflicted upon Gaza. Triggered by
Israel’s assassination of Ahmed al-Jabari in Gaza,18 the operation lasted only
eight days (November 14–21, 2012), with 174 Palestinians killed, includ-
ing some 100 civilians (see Table 8.1). Four Israeli civilians and two soldiers
were killed in the same period.19
15 Kob Niv, “Israel’s Next War Won’t Be Avigdor Lieberman’s Fault,” Haaretz, May 25,

2016,     https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-dont-worry-there-ll-be-another-war-
1.5387429. While there was a change in Defense Minister between the operations (Moshe
Yaalon replaced Ehud Barak in March 2013), the Prime Minister (Benjamin Netanyahu),
Chief of Staff (Benny Gantz), Air Force Commander (Amir Eshel), and Chief of Shin Bet
(Yoram Coren), all carried over in the same roles.
16 See Philipp O. Amour, “ ­ Hamas-PLO/Fatah Reconciliation and Rapprochement within
the Unfolding Regional Order in the Middle East since 2010: Neorealist and Neoclassical
Realist Perspectives,” Journal of Social Sciences of Mus Alparslan University 6, no. 5 (April 13,
2018): 624, https://doi.org/10.18506/anemon.384773.
17 “Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict,” 202.

18 Aluf Benn, “Israel Killed Its Subcontractor in Gaza,” Haaretz, November 14, 2012,

https://www.haaretz.com/.premium-death-of-israel-s-subcontractor-1.5198285; The pri-

mary impetus of the assassination was the prevention of a Palestinian ‘peace offensive’, as
“hours before” he was assassinated al-Jabari “received the draft of a permanent truce agree-
ment with Israel, which included mechanisms for maintaining the cease-fire in the case of a
flare-up between Israel and the factions in the Gaza Strip.” Nir Hasson, “Israeli Peace Activist:
Hamas Leader Jabari Killed amid Talks on Long-Term Truce,” Haaretz, November 15, 2012,
https://www.haaretz.com/.premium-hamas-source-jabari-wanted-truce-1.5198436.
19 See also “Human Rights Violations during Operation Pillar of Defense (14–21 November

2012)” (B’tselem, May 2013), 29, https://www.btselem.org/download/201305_pil-

lar_of_defense_operation_eng.pdf; The precise number of casualties is debated. For
details on the discrepancies, see “Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights on the Implementation of Human Rights Council Resolutions S-9/1
and S-12/1” (United Nations Human Rights Council [UNHRC], March 5, 2013), 4,
 8  (UN)LIMITED FORCE: REGIONAL REALIGNMENTS …  223

Table 8.1  Palestinian casualties and destruction during Pillar of Defense versus

Protective Edge

Pillar of Defense (2012) Protective Edge (2014) Ratio

Duration (days) 8 51 1:6

Palestinians killed 174 2220 1:13
Children killed 33 551 1:17
Homes destroyed 382 18,000 1:47
aFigures from “Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the

Implementation of Human Rights Council Resolutions S-9/1 and S-12/1,” 4, 6

bFigures from Fragmented Lives, 6; “Occupied Palestinian Territory: Gaza Emergency Situation

Report,” Situation Report (OCHA, September 4, 2014), https://www.ochaopt.org/sites/default/

files/ocha_opt_sitrep_04_09_2014.pdf

It is furthermore notable that while Benjamin Netanyahu indicated

midway through Pillar of Defense that the IDF was “prepared for a sig-
nificant expansion of the operation,”20 he was shortly thereafter forced
to reverse himself. Despite being dared to follow through by the Hamas
leadership, the operation abruptly ended without an Israeli ground inva-
sion materializing.21 As Defense Minister Ehud Barak had described
Israel’s war aims in terms of delivering “a painful blow for Hamas” via
“serious damage on the rocket-launching network,” the fact that rock-
ets were still flying toward major Israeli cities up until a ceasefire agree-
ment was signed further indicates that Tel Aviv failed to fully carry out
its designs on Gaza.22 As such, the IDF’s conduct during the operation is

https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/
Session22/A-HRC-22-35-Add-1_en.pdf.
20 Harriet Sherwood and Peter Beaumont, “Israel Ready to Expand Gaza Offensive, Says

Binyamin Netanyahu,” The Guardian, November 18, 2012, https://www.theguardian.

com/world/2012/nov/18/israel-ready-expand-gaza-offensive; Though the ground inva-
sion never materialized, Israel did ramp up the scale of its attack toward the end; “80%”
of Palestinian civilian casualties occurred “during the last four days of the campaign.”
“Human Rights Violations,” 35.
21 Fares Akram, Judi Rudoren, and Alan Cowell, “Hamas Leader Dares Israel to Invade

amid Gaza Airstrikes,” The New York Times, November 19, 2012, https://www.nytimes.
com/2012/11/20/world/middleeast/israel-gaza-conflict.html?searchResultPosition=1.
22 “Israel and Hamas: Fire and Ceasefire in a New Middle East,” Middle East/North

Africa (International Crisis Group, November 22, 2012), 2, https://d2071andvip0wj.

cloudfront.net/133-israel-and-hamas-fire-and-ceasefire-in-a-new-middle-east.pdf.
224  C. LOUWERSE

best described as a “stalled juggernaut,”23 which appeared unable to turn

the full force of its military machine against the Gaza Strip.
The Israeli restraint that characterized Pillar of Defense had little to
do with Hamas military prowess or Israeli moral scruples. Instead, it had
to do with the regional political context of the operation. It was primar-
ily the intervention of external actors, particularly Egypt, Turkey, and
the United States, that limited the extent of the violence. The political
configuration of the Israel–Palestine conflict has always been character-
ized by a massive power disparity—at its heart, the conflict consists of
a regional nuclear power (i.e., Israel), backed unilaterally by the global
superpower, acting to prevent the self-determination of a stateless and
politically isolated population. While the Palestinian cause continues to
maintain immense popular resonance across the Gulf Region and the
broader Middle East, state-level support for Palestine rarely goes signif-
icantly beyond rhetoric. Since Egypt, the most militarily powerful Arab
state in the region, signed a peace agreement with Israel in 1978, no
Arab state has undertaken a large-scale military offensive against the IDF.
Nevertheless, in 2012, regional developments had converged, if momen-
tarily, to sufficiently deter the Israeli assault.
The most notable of these developments occurred in Egypt and
Turkey. The year 2011 bore witness to the Egyptian uprising, leading
to the toppling of President Hosni Mubarak and the coming to power
of the Hamas-sympathetic Muslim Brotherhood (MB) under Mohamed
Morsi in June 2012 until July 2013.24 The Morsi administration largely
tolerated the Gazan tunnel economy under the Egyptian border (the
“principle economic engine, accounting for 80–90 percent of [Gaza’s]
trade”) and took steps to increase movement through the Rafah cross-
ing.25 Moreover, Turkey had moved toward strengthening its relation-
ship with Hamas, after having cut off diplomatic ties with Israel in May
2010 as a result of the Mavi Marmara incident (during which Israeli

23 Finkelstein,
Gaza, 201.
24 “Hamas Supporters in Gaza Cheer Egypt’s Brotherhood Victory,” The Times
of Israel, June 18, 2012, https://www.timesofisrael.com/hamas-supporters-in-
gaza-cheer-egypts-brotherhood-victory/.
25 Sara Roy, The Gaza Strip: The Political Economy of d ­ e-Development, Expanded 3rd
(Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 2016), xxxv, xxxviii.
 8  (UN)LIMITED FORCE: REGIONAL REALIGNMENTS …  225

soldiers attacked a humanitarian aid ship bound for Gaza in international

waters, killing nine Turkish citizens).26
Qatar and Saudi Arabia similarly strengthened their ties with Hamas,
with both states pledging to increase aid and investment in the belea-
guered Gaza Strip.27 The collective result of the tolerance of the tunnel
economy and provision of financial aid was vast (if remedial) economic
growth. A building boom caused the GDP growth rate to rise to 23% in
2011, accompanied by a rapid fall in unemployment.28 Hamas’s polit-
ical fortunes were undeniably waxing; as Gabi Siboni, the IDF colonel
and political analyst at the Israeli Institute for National Security Studies,
observed: “Hamas was riding on a high wave of popular support through-
out the Arab World,” as “Egypt, Turkey, and Qatar competed with one
another in their support for Hamas in an effort to increase their influ-
ence in the Sunni sphere.”29 As such, the initiation of Operation Pillar of
Defense in late 2012 was met with harsh condemnation from these state
actors.
26 A United Nations Human Rights Council report found that “The circumstances of

the killing of at least six of the passengers were in a manner consistent with an extra-legal,
arbitrary and summary execution” and that “there is clear evidence to support prosecu-
tions” of Israeli soldiers for “crimes within the terms of article 47 of the Fourth Geneva
Convention” including “Wilful killing,” “Torture or inhuman treatment,” and “Wilfully
causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health.” “Report of the International
Fact-Finding Mission to Investigate Violations of International Law, Including
International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law, Resulting from the Israeli Attacks on
the Flotilla of Ships Carrying Humanitarian Assistance, A/HRC/15/21” (United Nations
Human Rights Council. 15th Session, September 27, 2010), 37, 53–54, https://www2.
ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/15session/A.HRC.15.21_en.pdf.
27 Jodi Rudoren, “Qatar’s Emir Visits Gaza, Pledging $400 Million to Hamas,” The New

York Times, October 23, 2012, https://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/24/world/mid-

dleeast/pledging-400-million-qatari-emir-makes-historic-visit-to-gaza-strip.html; “The Gaza
Strip: A Building Boom,” The Economist, August 18, 2012, https://www.economist.com/
middle-east-and-africa/2012/08/18/a-building-boom; and Roy, The Gaza Strip, xxxix.
28 Roy, The Gaza Strip, xxxix–xl, xliii–xlvi.

29 Gabi Siboni, “Operations Cast Lead, Pillar of Defense, and Protective Edge: A

Comparative Review,” in The Lessons of Operation Protective Edge, ed. Anat Kurzand and
Shlomo Brom (Tel Aviv: The Institute for National Security Studies, 2014), 29; It was pre-
cisely this political realignment that Israel attempted to thwart. As the International Crisis
Group concluded: “At the heart of Operation Pillar of Defense” was “an effort to demon-
strate that Hamas’s newfound confidence was altogether premature and excessive and that,
the Islamist awakening notwithstanding, changes in the new Middle East would not change
much at all. Its goal, in other words, was to reaffirm the rules of the game that would govern
the emerging Middle East.” “Israel and Hamas: Fire and Ceasefire in a New Middle East,” 8.
226  C. LOUWERSE

It was the forceful reaction of Turkey and Egypt, buttressed by other

regional international actors, which deterred Israel from launching a
ground invasion during Pillar of Defense. Mohamed Morsi labelled the
attack “unacceptable,” and the MB-led Freedom and Justice Party (FJP)
called for “swift Arab and international action to stop the massacres.”30
Similarly, Turkey’s foreign minister called for Israel “to put an immedi-
ate halt” to the assault and to end the “inhumane embargo on Gaza.”31
Both states elected to send their foreign ministers to Gaza, with Egypt
also withdrawing its ambassador from Israel.32 The Arab League joined
in the condemnation, sending a delegation to Gaza in a display of solidar-
ity with the Palestinians affected by the bombardment.33 The message to
Israel was clear: its neighbors had drawn a “red line” at a ground invasion,
and Gaza would not be left “on its own” as Israel attacked.34
While the formal position of the United States stridently defended
the Israeli resort to force in Gaza,35 reports indicated that the United
States (likely in response to Egyptian and Turkish pressure) had advised
Israel not to initiate a ground invasion and had successfully pres-
sured Israel to accept the terms of an Egyptian proposed ceasefire.36

30 “International Reaction to Gaza Violence,” Al Jazeera, November 15, 2012, https://

www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/11/20121114173652397372.html.
31 “FM Davutoğlu: Turkey Will Never Leave Gaza on Its Own,” Daily Sabah, November

21, 2012, https://www.dailysabah.com/turkey/2012/11/21/fm-davutoglu-turkey-will-

never-leave-gaza-on-its-own.
32 Raphael Ahren, “Protesting Israel’s Gaza Operation, Egypt Withdraws Ambassador

from Tel Aviv,” The Times of Israel, November 14, 2012, https://www.timesofisrael.com/
protesting-israels-gaza-operation-egypt-to-withdraw-ambassador-from-tel-aviv/.
33 “Arab League Chief, Ministers to Visit Gaza on Tuesday,” Reuters, November 18,

2012, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-palestinians-israel-gaza-ministers/arab-league-
chief-ministers-to-visit-gaza-on-tuesday-idUSBRE8AH0HD20121118.
34 “FM Davutoğlu: Turkey Will Never Leave Gaza on Its Own.”

35 “Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Shinawatra in a Joint Press

Conference,” The White House President Barack Obama, November 18, 2012, https://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/11/18/remarks-president-
obama-and-prime-minister-shinawatra-joint-press-confer.
36 Matt Spetalnick, “Obama: ‘Preferable’ to Avoid Israeli Ground Invasion of Gaza,”

Reuters, November 18, 2012, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-asia-obama-mideast/

obama-preferable-to-avoid-israeli-ground-invasion-of-gaza-idUSBRE8AH07Z20121118;
Anne Gearan, “Fighting in Gaza Leaves U.S. in Difficult Position with Turkey, Egypt,”
Washington Post, November 20, 2012, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
 8  (UN)LIMITED FORCE: REGIONAL REALIGNMENTS …  227

Other states normally supportive of Israeli actions also weighed in: the
United Kingdom publicly informed Israel that “a ground invasion is
much more difficult for the international community to sympathize with
or support, including the United Kingdom.”37 Finally, regional and inter-
national opposition to Operation Pillar of Defense was buttressed by
several other factors. The fear of another highly critical United Nations
Fact-Finding Report like the Goldstone Report—which had done irre-
versible damage to the IDF’s self-cultivated purity of arms image after
Operation Cast Lead (2008–2009)—combined with the existence
of large numbers of media reporters in Gaza broadcasting first-hand
accounts of the deleterious effects of the Israeli bombardment on the
region and international community, acted as a final barrier to a ground
invasion and persuaded Israel to end the operation prematurely.38
While Israel had initially sought to unilaterally impose its will upon
Gaza, the mutual ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas, nego-
tiated under Egyptian auspices, was unamicable to that aim. Hamas won
a small political victory in that the ceasefire agreement, as it effectively
required Israel to implement Hamas’s long-standing goal of lifting the
blockade: it demanded that Israel open “the crossings,” facilitate “the
movement of people and transfer of goods,” and “refrain from restricting
residents’ free movement.” While the ceasefire agreement also guaranteed

national-security/2012/11/19/873f3ab2-325e-11e2-9cfa-e41bac906cc9_story.html; and
Peter Baker and David D. Kirkpatrick, “Egyptian President and Obama Forge Link in Gaza
Deal,” New York Times, November 21, 2012, https://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/22/
world/middleeast/egypt-leader-and-obama-forge-link-in-gaza-deal.html. It is additionally
likely that the Obama administration’s hesitancy to greenlight a ground invasion had to do
with the close proximity of the operation to the 2012 United States election, with Obama
disinclined to allow what would likely be widely construed as a U.S. backed Israeli massacre
at the inception of his second term in office.
37 “Foreign Secretary Comments on Situation in Gaza and Southern Israel,” Foreign and

Commonwealth Office, November 18, 2012, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/

foreign-secretary-comments-on-situation-in-gaza-and-southern-israel.
38 Finkelstein, Gaza, 204–5; While it also condemned Palestinian armed groups for firing

rockets into Israel, the Goldstone report gave rise to vociferous Israeli condemnation for its
conclusion that Operation Cast Lead “was a deliberately disproportionate attack designed
to punish, humiliate and terrorize a civilian population, radically diminish its local economic
capacity both to work and to provide for itself, and to force upon it an ever-increasing sense
of dependency and vulnerability.” “Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on
the Gaza Conflict,” 408.
228  C. LOUWERSE

an end to the rocket fire from Gaza into Israel, Israel’s major demands—
most notably those related to Hamas’s arms smuggling through the
tunnels—were not included.39
Though crucial in limiting Operation Pillar of Defense, the extent
to which Turkey, Egypt, and the Arab League were willing to take risks
for Gaza should not be overstated. The MB in Egypt was in the pro-
cess of attempting to consolidate its precarious control in the wake of
the uprising and was thus careful to avoid any destabilization that might
occur from jeopardizing Egypt’s peace agreement with Israel.40 More
crucially, Egypt remained economically and politically beholden to
Israel’s major ally, as it received an annual 1.3 billion dollars in military
aid guarantees from the United States and was in the process of apply-
ing for a 4.8 billion dollar IMF loan,41 the success of which was highly
dependent on American consent. Likewise, Turkey, a NATO member
and a crucial United States ally in the region, was most likely keenly
aware that the continuation of its warm relationship with Washington
would at some point require a thaw in its icy deportment toward
Israel.42
The following section covers how these factors, when compounded by
major regional shifts, caused these states to significantly downgrade their
support for Hamas after 2013, consequentially enabling Israel to embark
on a far less restrained assault upon Gaza in 2014.

39 “Operation Pillar of Defense—Update No. 8,” The Meir Amit Intelligence and

Terrorism Information Center, November 22, 2012, https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/

en/20433/; “Israel and Hamas: Fire and Ceasefire in a New Middle East,” 3.
40 “Israel and Hamas: Fire and Ceasefire in a New Middle East,” 13.

41 Steven Lee Meyers, “Despite Rights Concerns, U.S. Plans to Resume Egypt Aid,”

New York Times, March 15, 2012, https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/16/world/mid-

dleeast/us-military-aid-to-egypt-to-resume-officials-say.html; Yasmine Saleh and Edmund
Blair, “Egypt Agrees Deal for $4.8 Billion IMF Loan,” Reuters, November 20, 2012,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-imf-idUSBRE8AJ0LK20121120.
42 See Norman G. Finkelstein, “Israel’s Latest Assault on Gaza—What Really Happened”

(New Left Project, January 10, 2013), http://normanfinkelstein.com/2013/01/10/

what-really-happened-in-gaza-by-norman-finkelstein/.
 8  (UN)LIMITED FORCE: REGIONAL REALIGNMENTS …  229

Operation Protective Edge (2014)

The period of regional political alignment in favor of Gaza was
­short-lived. Less than two years after Pillar of Defense was prematurely
aborted, the political landscape had shifted to such a degree that Israel
was able to commit its most extensive attack on Gaza since the beginning
of its military occupation in 1967. The attack was triggered by an emerg-
ing Palestinian peace initiative. In June 2014, acting under the pretext
of an attempted rescue of three teenage Israeli settlers kidnapped by a
rogue Palestinian militant cell, Israel attempted to break apart a newly
established unity government between Hamas and Fatah.43
The IDF launched Operation Brother’s Keeper in the West
Bank, arresting hundreds of Hamas members and killing up to nine
Palestinians.44 While Israel sought to provoke Hamas into rocket fire,
Hamas held back until July 7 (other armed groups in Gaza did not),
when the Israeli shelling of a tunnel within Gaza killed seven Hamas
members.45 The next day, Operation Protective Edge went into effect.
In sharp contrast with the short-lived Pillar of Defense, Protective Edge
ran a full 51 days (July 8–August 26, 2014), resulting in the deaths of
some 2220 Palestinians, including 551 children. A total of 71 Israelis

43 The unity government, without objection from Hamas, accepted the Quartet’s three

long-standing preconditions for negotiations: “recognizing Israel, renouncing violence,

and respecting previous Palestinian-Israeli agreements.” As the respected journalist Rami
Khouri pointed out at the time, “The Palestinian government’s adherence to the three
principles related to its ties with Israel — with the agreement of all major political groups
— may put new pressure on Israel to show if it, too, is committed to these three prin-
ciples.” As even the United States had “wisely and reasonably said it would judge the
Palestinian government on the basis of its policies,” Netanyahu—fearing international
pressure to initiate good faith negotiations with the new government—sought to thwart
its establishment by targeting Hamas. Rami Khouri, “The Palestinian Unity Government
Will Shape Its Own Fate,” Harvard Kennedy School. Belfer Center for Science and
International Affairs, June 4, 2014, 212–14, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/
palestinian-unity-government-will-shape-its-own-fate.
44 “Israel’s West Bank Crackdown,” Institute for Middle East Understanding (IMEU),

June 27, 2014, https://imeu.org/article/israels-west-bank-crackdown.

45 Christa Case Bryant, “Ending détente, Hamas Takes Responsibility for Today’s Spike

in Rocket Fire,” The Christian Science Monitor, July 7, 2014, https://www.csmonitor.

com/World/Middle-East/2014/0707/Ending-detente-Hamas-takes-responsibility-for-
today-s-spike-in-rocket-fire; “Hamas Vows Revenge on Israel After Seven Members Die in
Air Strike,” The Guardian, July 7, 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/
jul/07/hamas-vows-revenge-israel-seven-members-killed.
230  C. LOUWERSE

were killed in the same time period, six of them civilians, the rest sol-
diers.46 Indeed, Protective Edge inflicted upon Gaza over ten times the
casualties and nearly fifty times the residential destruction of Pillar of
Defense (see Table 8.1).
The lack of restraints on the Israeli war juggernaut was primarily due
to shifts in the regional security structure in favor of Israel and against
Hamas.47 The International Crisis Group concluded in March 2014 that
“since the November 2012 escalation […], Hamas’s fortunes [had] dra-
matically reversed”48 leaving Gaza in a “downward spiral of economic
strain and regional isolation.”49 By June 2014, Hamas’s former benefac-
tors, Egypt and Turkey, had effectively abandoned it, and it faced bitter
antagonism from the Gulf states and even from the Arab League more
generally.
The most significant blow to Gaza’s security was the 2013 ouster
of the MB in Egypt via a military coup. The new regime, led by Abdel
Fattah al-Sisi, the former Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, was
exceptionally hostile toward the MB in Egypt and, by extension, Hamas
in Gaza.50 Interrelatedly, in seeking to firmly reinstate Egypt as a reliable
ally of American hegemonic ambitions in the Middle East,51 the al-Sisi
government sought to court Israel. While the Morsi government had
pressured Israel to adhere to the terms of the 2012 ceasefire and ease
the blockade, the al-Sisi government did precisely the opposite, acting to
exasperate the deleterious effects of the Israeli siege of Gaza.52 Seeking to
re-cement control over the increasingly unstable Sinai Peninsula, Egypt

46 Fragmented Lives: Humanitarian Overview 2014 (United Nations Office for the

Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Occupied Palestinian Territory [OCHAOPT],

2015), 6, https://www.ochaopt.org/sites/default/files/Annual_Humanitarian_Overview_
2014_English_final.pdf.
47 Amour, “Hamas-PLO/Fatah within the Regional Order in the Middle East,” 626.
48 “The Next Round in Gaza,” Middle East/North Africa (International Crisis
Group, March 24, 2014), 9, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/
eastern-mediterranean/israelpalestine/next-round-gaza.
49 “The Next Round in Gaza,” 8.

50 “The Next Round in Gaza,” 9.

51 The United States praised the new military regime’s crackdown on “terrorism” and

released 575 million dollars in military aid to Egypt in the wake of the coup. “US Unlocks
Military Aid to Egypt, Backing President Sisi,” BBC News, June 22, 2014, https://www.
bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27961933.
52 “The Next Round in Gaza,” 5–6.
 8  (UN)LIMITED FORCE: REGIONAL REALIGNMENTS …  231

closed off the primary corridor for the supply of fuel and construc-
tion materials essential for Gaza’s economic reconstruction by flooding
the cross-border tunnels. It also drastically reduced Palestinian passage
through the Rafah crossing.53 Cairo additionally banned the MB and
Hamas in Egypt, and prevented a Hamas senior official from leaving
the country.54 These policies toward the MB and Hamas, which Egypt
justified under the pretext of maintaining internal security, were quickly
adopted by the Gulf states, with Saudi Arabia also moving to ban the
MB.55 Hamas was thus thrust into a position of unprecedented political
isolation in the Middle East. Although Hamas attempted to retain Iran
as a potential ally, it could not strengthen ties with that country without
undermining its relationship with the Syrian MB and enfeebling the sup-
port it received from the majority of Sunni Muslims in the Middle East,
including Palestinians. Having nowhere else to turn, Hamas’s rapproche-
ment with its long time factional rival Fatah, and its subsequent decision
to initiate a handover of control of the Gaza Strip to the PNA via a unity
government in April 2014, was one of last resort.56
The breakdown of the established political and civil order in the wake
of the Arab Spring, coupled with the descent into gratuitous violence in
states across the broader Middle East region, also contributed to Gaza’s
growing isolation. The novel Turkey–Qatar-led bloc witnessed a major
setback in the aftermath of the coup in Egypt (see Chapter 5). In ret-
rospect, the Hamas decision to leave the Iran-led bloc proved fatal for
the movement. While the world had been riveted on the wars in Gaza
in 2008–2009 and 2012, the plight of Palestinians under Israeli assault
in 2014 now had to compete for regional and international attention

53 Given that “the construction sector accounted for more than 80 per cent of Gaza’s

growth during the first quarter of 2013,” the flooding of the tunnels dealt a serious blow
to Gaza’s economy and humanitarian situation. By September 2013 OCHA reported that
travel through the Rafah border had decreased by 71%. “Occupied Palestinian Territory:
The Humanitarian Impact of Reduced Access between Gaza and Egypt,” Situation Report
(OCHA, September 23, 2013), https://www.ochaopt.org/sites/default/files/ocha_opt_
gaza_sitrep_2013_09_23_english.pdf; See also Roy, The Gaza Strip, xlii–xliii.
54 “The Next Round in Gaza,” 9.
55 “Saudi Arabia Designates Muslim Brotherhood Terrorist Group,” Reuters, March
7, 2014, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-security/saudi-arabia-designates-
muslim-brotherhood-terrorist-group-idUSBREA260SM20140307.
56 Nathan Thrall, “Hamas’ Chances,” London Review of Books, August 36, no. 16 (August

21, 2014).
232  C. LOUWERSE

with the horror of bloodbaths in Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Yemen. While
Turkey did not realign with Israel as openly as Egypt did, its preoccupa-
tion with the war in Syria left it largely disinterested in the fate of Gaza.
In large part, as a result of the domestic impact of the refugee crisis, the
European Union was also fixated on Syria. The result was a serious lack
of deterrent upon the Israeli resort to force.
Shortly after the hostilities began, Egypt surreptitiously aligned itself
with Israel’s military objectives. In sharp contrast with the mutuality that
characterized the Egyptian-negotiated ceasefire proposal in the wake of
Operation Pillar of Defense, the ceasefire Egypt proposed on July 14,
2014 (just prior to the Israeli ground invasion) effectively demanded
Hamas’s full capitulation to Israel’s demands. Whereas the 2012 cease-
fire agreement had incorporated a written demand for the lifting of
Israel’s illegal blockade, Cairo’s 2014 proposal now included a precon-
dition that “the security situation [become] stable on the ground,” prior
to the opening of the border crossings.57 The American political scientist
Norman Finkelstein has noted that: “Insofar as Israel designated Hamas
a terrorist organization, the security situation in Gaza could only stabi-
lize when Hamas either was defeated or disarmed itself, in the absence
of which the siege would continue.”58 Yet, Hamas’s rejection of the
Egyptian proposal as tantamount to total “surrender” effectively handed
Israel a pretext to escalate the hostilities to a ground invasion.59
Gaza’s plight was similarly exacerbated by the Arab League. The organ-
ization met only once over the entirety of the 51 day period and, when
it did, it undermined Hamas’s bargaining position: the League voted to
endorse the Egyptian ceasefire plan.60 The lack of meaningful regional
opposition to Operation Protective Edge translated into completely
unhindered United States support for the invasion. Throughout the oper-
ation, President Obama repeatedly declared that “Israel has the right to
defend itself,” additionally moving to resupply Israel with munitions, while

57 “Towards a Lasting Ceasefire in Gaza,” Middle East/North Africa (International Crisis

Group, October 23, 2014), 4–5, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/

eastern-mediterranean/israelpalestine/toward-lasting-ceasefire-gaza; Finkelstein, Gaza, 214.
58 Finkelstein, Gaza, 214.

59 “Israel Accepts Egypt Proposal to End Gaza Conflict,” BBC News, July 15, 2014,

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-28305830; Finkelstein, Gaza, 214–15.

60 Itamar Sharon, “Israel Expected to Accept Arab-Backed Truce,” The Times of Israel,

July 15, 2014, https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-expected-to-accept-arab-backed-truce/.

 8  (UN)LIMITED FORCE: REGIONAL REALIGNMENTS …  233

ignoring the pleas of human rights organizations to limit the violence via
an immediate arms embargo upon all parties to the conflict.61
As extensive as the Israeli use of force during Operation Protective Edge
was, it was not totally without limitations. Events transpiring during the final
day (August 3rd) of the Israeli ground invasion illustrate the crucial role of
the international community, and in particular the United States, in limiting
the extent of Israeli force. As Finkelstein has documented, Israel’s actions
finally shocked the international community into action, when Israel repeat-
edly shelled United Nations schools that were doubling as shelters, resulting
in extensive civilian casualties.62 On August 2nd Benjamin Netanyahu had
proclaimed that the ground invasion would continue for “as much time as
necessary” for Israel to accomplish its goal of exacting an “intolerable price”
upon Hamas.63 Yet, on August 3rd, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon,
acting under immense pressure from within the United Nations, condemned
the latest attack on a United Nations school as a “moral outrage and a crim-
inal act.”64 Now isolated in its unconditional support for the Israeli assault,
the United States finally changed its tune and condemned the attack as “dis-
graceful.”65 The withdrawal of unconditional White House support signaled
61 “Press Conference by the President. The White House Office of the Press Secretary,”
The White House President Barack Obama, August 1, 2014, https://obamawhitehouse.
archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/08/01/press-conference-president; “Israel/Gaza: UN
Must Impose Arms Embargo and Mandate an International Investigation as Civilian Death
Toll Rises,” Amnesty International, July 11, 2014, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/
news/2014/07/israelgaza-un-must-impose-arms-embargo-and-mandate-international-inves-
tigation-civilian-death-t/.
62 “Israel:In-Depth Look at Gaza School Attacks,” Human Rights Watch, September 11, 2014,
https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/09/11/israel-depth-look-gaza-school-attacks; “Report of the
Detailed Findings of the Independent Commission of Inquiry Established Pursuant to Human
Rights Council Resolution” (United Nations Human Rights Council [UNHRC]. 29th Session,
June 24, 2015), 111–19, https://www.undocs.org/A/HRC/29/CRP.4.
63 Griff Witte and Sudarsan Raghaven, “Netanyahu Says Israeli Military ‘Will Take as

Much Time as Necessary’ in Gaza,” The Washington Post, August 2, 2014, https://www.
washingtonpost.com/world/hamas-says-missing-israeli-soldier-in-gaza-hadar-goldin-
is-likely-dead/2014/08/02/92562694-56cd-48c0-921b-b851fb2eca09_story.html;
Finkelstein, Gaza, 229.
64 “Gaza: Ban Condemns Latest Deadly Attack Near UN School as ‘Moral Outrage
and Criminal Act’,” UN News, August 3, 2014, https://news.un.org/en/story/2014/
08/474302-gaza-ban-condemns-latest-deadly-attack-near-un-school-moral-outrage-and;
Finkelstein, Gaza, 228.
65 Donna Chiacu, “US Slams ‘Disgraceful Shelling’ of UN school in Gaza,” Haaretz, August

3, 2014, https://www.haaretz.com/u-s-slams-disgraceful-shelling-at-un-school-1.5257920;
Finkelstein, Gaza, 229.
234  C. LOUWERSE

to Israel that the game was up. That same day, Netanyahu announced an end
to the ground invasion.66 The operation continued for another three weeks
via airstrikes, with Israel targeting civilian structures as a means of increasing
its leverage during renewed ceasefire negotiations. Nevertheless, the end of
the ground invasion was indicative of Israel’s fundamental reliance upon the
goodwill of the United States for the continuation of its military assaults.67
As has been illustrated, regional realignments are the crucial varia-
ble limiting or facilitating the destructive capacity of the IDF in Gaza.
Had the drastic regional political realignments between November 2012
and July 2014 occurred just a couple of years earlier, the scope and scale
of Operation Pillar of Defense may have mirrored the vastly more cat-
aclysmic Operation Protective Edge. As the next section will show, the
augmentation and solidification of these new political relations to the
present has continued to bode ill for the people of Gaza.

Regional Realignments 2014–2019

If Gaza was left politically isolated during Operation Protective Edge,
recent trends toward Arab states’ normalization of relations with Israel
have only enhanced this isolation. A significant number of the Gulf states
have moved toward aligning themselves with Israeli policy in the region.
The crucial background to these developments is a deepening rift and
increasing rivalry between the progressively influential Iran-led, and the
Saudi-led, blocs explored in the first section of this book. In the con-
text of this regional bifurcation, Hamas is now viewed by many Sunni
states as including the “wrong” kind of Islamists, and it has been recast
as an Iranian proxy, with many Arab League members now more likely
to savor another Hamas military defeat than to oppose an Israeli assault.
Moreover, the two powers that acted to mitigate Israel’s depredations in
2012 are unlikely to do so again. As the following section will demon-
strate, since Protective Edge, both Egypt and Turkey have continued to
strengthen their ties with Israel at the expense of Gaza.

66 Amos Harel, “After Israel’s Unilateral Withdrawal from Gaza, What’s Next?” Haaretz,

August 3, 2014, https://www.haaretz.com/.premium-after-the-unilateral-withdrawal-whats-

next-1.5257875.
67 “Nothing Is Immune: Israel’s Destruction of Landmark Buildings in Gaza,” MDE

(Amnesty International, December 9, 2014), https://www.amnesty.org/download/

Documents/MDE1500292014ENGLISH.PDF.
 8  (UN)LIMITED FORCE: REGIONAL REALIGNMENTS …  235

Egypt and Turkey
Egyptian policy toward Gaza has continued along its post-2013 trajec-
tory, with the al-Sisi regime continuing to strengthen ties with Israel. In
late 2014, acting in part upon the request of Israel but against protests
from human rights organizations, Egypt continued to flood Gaza’s tun-
nels, additionally seeking to create a buffer zone between itself and Gaza
via mass eviction of civilians and the capricious destruction of hundreds
of homes along the Rafah border.68 Egypt has come to view Hamas
almost entirely as an extension of the MB and a severe national security
threat.
During the height of ISIS expansion in 2015, Cairo repeatedly
accused Hamas of arming and facilitating Salafi jihadists in the Sinai
Peninsula, a charge for which it produced little evidence, and which
Hamas categorically denied.69 As the International Crisis Group con-
cluded in August 2015, “Egypt is only more hostile toward Hamas and
would not oppose an Israeli war against it, even one aimed at toppling
the movement and reoccupying Gaza.” Cairo has enforced the block-
ade of Gaza even more stringently than has Israel.70 By February 2016,
Israeli officials proclaimed that the security cooperation between Israel
and Egypt was “better than ever.”71 Israeli–Egyptian economic coop-
eration has been “better than ever” as well; for example, in September
2018, the two states concluded a “landmark” 15 billion dollar deal for

68 “Steinitz: ‘Egypt Floods Hamas Tunnels, in Part Due to Israel’s Request’,” The

Jerusalem Post, February 6, 2016, https://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Steinitz-Egypt-

floods-Hamas-tunnels-in-part-due-to-Israels-request-444040; “Egypt: End Wave of Home
Demolitions, Forced Evictions in Sinai amid Media Blackout,” Amnesty International,
November 27, 2014, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2014/11/egypt-end-
wave-home-demolitions-forced-evictions-sinai-amid-media-blackout/.
69 “No Exit? Gaza & Israel between Wars,” Middle East/North Africa (International

Crisis Group, August 26, 2015), https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/162-no-exit-

gaza-israel-between-wars.pdf.
70 Some within the Egyptian security establishment have occasionally threatened to top-

ple Hamas itself. As one senior Egyptian official put it: “Gaza is next […] We cannot get
liberated from the terrorism of the Brotherhood in Egypt without ending it in Gaza, which
lies on our borders.” “No Exit? Gaza & Israel between Wars.”
71 Yossi Melman, “Security Establishment Furious with Minister After Making Egypt-

Israel Cooperation Public,” Jerusalem Post, February 6, 2016, https://www.jpost.com/

Israel-News/Security-establishment-furious-with-minister-after-making-Egypt-Israel-
cooperation-public-444063.
236  C. LOUWERSE

Israel to export natural gas to Egypt.72 As one International Crisis Group

analyst concluded in late 2017: “Egyptian–Israeli relations are today at
their highest level in history.”73
Meanwhile, Turkey, despite previously being one of the major bene-
factors of Hamas and estranged since 2010 from Israel after IDF forces
killed Turkish citizens during the Mavi Marmara incident, has renewed
diplomatic ties with Israel as of June 2016. The Turkish–Israeli recon-
ciliation agreement was in large part driven by a desire for the construc-
tion of a mutually beneficial gas pipeline that passed from Israel through
Turkey and to Europe. It also involved a Turkish pledge to clamp down
on Hamas: “[T]he Turkish government has committed that Hamas will
not carry out any terrorist or military activity against Israel from Turkish
territory.”74 Israeli concessions to Turkey regarding the humanitarian sit-
uation in Gaza were minimal. As Israeli officials “categorically rejected”
lifting the blockade on Gaza, this initial Turkish demand was subse-
quently dropped and replaced by a token gesture of allowing Turkey to
fund infrastructure projects in Gaza. Nevertheless, in the two years since
the Turkish–Israeli agreement was signed, living conditions for Gazans
have only continued their precipitous decline.75 Turkish–Israeli relations
have not become a bed of roses overnight and have remained strained
over conflicting geopolitical objectives in Syria. Moreover, Ankara has
occasionally led the charge in vocally condemning American–Israeli vio-
lations of international law at the expense of the Palestinians, most nota-
bly in regarding Trump’s decision to recognize Jerusalem as the Israeli
capital and in response to Israel’s April 2018 killing of Gazan protest-
ers along the Israeli border. However, Ankara has shown little indication

72 Ari Rabinovitch and Tova Cohen, “Pipeline Deal Brings Export of Israeli Gas to Egypt

within Sight,” Reuters, September 27, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-isra-

el-egypt-gas/pipeline-deal-brings-export-of-israeli-gas-to-egypt-within-sight-idUSKCN-
1M710F.
73 Quoted in Zena Tahhan, “Egypt-Israel Relations ‘at Highest Level’ in History,” Al

Jazeera, September 20, 2017, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2016/11/

egypt-israel-relations-highest-level-history-161107083926863.html.
74 “Israel-Turkey Gas Pipeline Could Be Ready in Four Years—Company,” Reuters,

March 2, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/israel-energy/israel-turkey-gas-pipeline-

could-be-ready-in-four-years-company-idUSL5N1GF3ZO; Barak Ravid, “Israel, Turkey
Reach Understandings on Hamas,” Haaretz, June 26, 2016, https://www.haaretz.com/
israel-news/.premium-israel-turkey-reach-understandings-on-hamas-1.5401406.
75 See e.g., “Report on UNCTAD Assistance to the Palestinian People,” 5–6.
 8  (UN)LIMITED FORCE: REGIONAL REALIGNMENTS …  237

that it is willing to translate words into action.76 In the final geopoliti-

cal and economic calculus, the tangible benefits to the Turkish national
interest that accrued from its rapprochement with Israel have out-
weighed any latent sympathy for the Palestinian cause.

Saudi Arabia and Qatar

Perhaps the most significant geopolitical realignment affecting Gaza
since Protective Edge has been the development of a Sunni, Saudi-led,
de facto alliance with Israel. The new Saudi–Israeli relationship is essen-
tially a marriage of convenience, held together by the strategic over-
lap of a perceived Iranian threat to both states. In 2018, IDF Chief of
Staff Gadi Eisenkot noted that there was “complete agreement between
[Israel] and Saudi Arabia” regarding a need for a “large, comprehen-
sive strategic plan to stop the Iranian threat.”77 Indeed, Saudi Arabia
outstrips even the United States in its opposition to the Iranian gov-
ernment, as leaked diplomatic cables have revealed that Israel and Saudi
Arabia have coordinated to escalate diplomatic pressure against Iran and
its allies.78 The relationship between the two states, once covert, has
become increasingly overt (if still unofficial) in recent years.79
In November 2017, the Saudi newspaper Elaph unprecedentedly gave
an interview to Israeli Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot—marking “the first
time any senior Israel Defense Forces officer, let alone the chief of staff,

76 Bethan McKernan, “Recep Tayyip Erdogan: US Recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s

Capital Makes It a Partner in Bloodshed,” The Independent, December 11, 2017,

https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/recep-tayyip-erdogan-us-je-
rusalem-israel-capital-partner-bloodshed-donald-trump-turkey-president-a8103096.
html; Noa Landau, “Erdogan Hits Back: Netanyahu Is a ‘Terrorist’ and Israel Is a
‘Terror State,’” Haaretz, April 1, 2018, https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/
erdogan-hits-back-netanyahu-is-a-terrorist-israel-a-terror-state-1.5963819.
77 Anna Ahronheim, “IDF Chief of Staff Eisenkot Met with Saudi Counterpart,”

The Jerusalem Post, October 17, 2018, https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/

Report-IDF-Chief-of-Staff-Eisenkot-met-with-Saudi-counterpart-569585.
78 Jonathon Cook, “Israel Instructs Diplomats to Support Saudis,” Al Jazeera, November

10, 2017, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/11/israel-instructs-diplomats-sup-

port-saudis-cable-171110134749905.html.
79 Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, “Palestinians Sidelined in S ­audi-Emirati Rapprochement
with Israel,” Journal of Palestine Studies 47, no. 4 (2018): 83–85, https://doi.
org/10.1525/jps.2018.47.4.79.
238  C. LOUWERSE

has been interviewed by a media organization in Saudi Arabia.” Eisenkot

announced that Israel was now prepared to engage in intelligence shar-
ing with “the moderate Arab nations” and commented that, in certain
areas, “there is complete agreement between us and Saudi Arabia.”80 In
December, it was revealed that the Saudi’s were playing a crucial role
in attempting to foist the Trump administration’s “peace proposal”—
projected to be unamicable to the interests of all Palestinians—upon
the Palestinian leadership in Ramallah.81 In March 2018, Saudi Arabia
decided to let commercial flights to Israel pass through its airspace for
the first time.82 In September 2018, Saudi Arabia announced that it had
purchased Israel’s Iron Dome Defense system via American mediation.
Concomitantly, even Saudi Arabia’s nominal support for the Palestinians
has foundered: “[T]he Palestinian issue is not at the top of the Saudi
government’s agenda,” explained Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman
in March 2018. “There are much more urgent and more important
issues to deal with, such as Iran.”83
This severing of regional support for Hamas has transformed into one
of the pillars of Saudi foreign policy since 2014, a project that reached
a pinnacle during the GCC crisis with Qatar over the summer of 2017.
Prior to the crisis, Qatar had maintained close ties with the MB in Egypt,
additionally seeking to position itself alongside Turkey and Iran as one of

80 Amos Harel, “Israeli Military Chief Gives Unprecedented Interview to Saudi Media:

‘Ready to Share Intel on Iran’,” Haaretz, November 17, 2017, https://www.haaretz.

com/israel-news/idf-chief-gives-unprecedented-interview-to-saudi-media-1.5466066;
Moshe Yaalon and Leehe Friedman, “Israel and the Arab States: A Historic Opportunity
to Normalize Relations?” Foreign Affairs, January 26, 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.
com/articles/israel/2018-01-26/israel-and-arab-states.
81 Samia Nakhoul, Stephen Kalin, and Suleiman Al-Khalidi, “Despite Furor Over

Jerusalem Move, Saudis Seen on Board with U.S. Peace Efforts,” Reuters, December 8,
2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-israel-saudi-insight/despite-furor-
over-jerusalem-move-saudis-seen-on-board-with-u-s-peace-efforts-idUSKBN1E22GR.
82 Gabriela Davidovich-Weisberg, “Netanyahu Suggests ‘Huge’ Developments
Could Follow Direct Flights to Israel over Saudi Arabia,” Haaretz, March 25, 2018,
https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/netanyahu-says-huge-implications-after-
flights-over-saudi-arabia-1.5938962.
83 Quoted in “Palestinians Must Make Peace or Shut Up, Saudi Crown Prince Said to

Tell US Jews,” The Times of Israel, April 29, 2018, https://www.timesofisrael.com/

palestinians-must-make-peace-or-shut-up-saudi-crown-prince-said-to-tell-us-jews/.
 8  (UN)LIMITED FORCE: REGIONAL REALIGNMENTS …  239

“the main paymasters and policymakers” of Hamas in Gaza.84 Combined

with Qatar’s continued relations with Iran, this policy rankled other
GCC members. In the wake of the Arab Spring, the GCC had come to
view the differentiated notion of Political Islamism of the MB to that
implemented in the Gulf as a threat to the status quo in the region.85
While Qatar has managed to circumvent the GCC-imposed blockade
due to its strategic alliances with Turkey and the United States, it has nev-
ertheless been compelled to abandon its close relationship with Hamas.
As the Palestinian lawyer and scholar Mouin Rabbani concludes in his
review of the crisis: “Israel appears to be a beneficiary as well. A restrained
Qatar that reduces support to Hamas is a welcome gain, but more impor-
tantly, Tel Aviv has been able to further consolidate its budding relation-
ship with other Gulf states.”86 Silent over the course of Protective Edge,
economically and diplomatically closer to Israel than ever before, and
participating in the infliction of a humanitarian disaster of their own in
Yemen, the KSA and its Gulf allies are increasingly unlikely to concretely
challenge Israeli depredations against the people of Gaza.

A Larger Trend
The geopolitical realignments of the major players Egypt, Turkey, and
Saudi Arabia are indicative of a larger trend toward a lack of concern for
Gaza. Even the recent record of the parties supposedly closest to Hamas
underwhelms. In 2012, Qatar had pledged 400 million dollars in recon-
struction funds to Gaza. However, only six years later, as the generators
that keep afloat Gaza’s barely functioning hospital and sanitation systems
began to shut down for lack of fuel in February of 2018, Qatar offered a

84 Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “Qatar’s Friends-with-Everyone Approach Rankles Some

of Its Persian Gulf Neighbors,” The Washington Post, October 4, 2014, http://www.
washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/qatars-friends-with-everyone-approach-
rankles-some-of-its-persian-gulf-neighbors/2014/10/04/b89977f8-4a7b-11e4-b72e-
d60a9229cc10_story.html; Brian Murphy, “Why Wealthy Qatar Keeps the Money
Flowing to Gaza,” The Washington Post, August 3, 2016, https://www.washington-
post.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/08/03/why-wealthy-qatar-keeps-the-money-
flowing-to-gaza/.
85 Mouin Rabbani, “Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf Cooperation Council Crisis,”

Jadaliyya, June 22, 2017, https://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/34390.

86 Rabbani.
240  C. LOUWERSE

mere 9 million dollars to temporarily stave off the crisis.87 The pittance
offered to Gaza during the crisis is exemplary of an overall trend of aid
cuts to the Strip. As Sara Roy has noted, although a full 3.5 billion dol-
lars was pledged for the reconstruction of Gaza after Protective Edge,
only slightly over a third (35%) of that amount has been distributed. Roy
furthermore points to both the unwillingness of both the regional and
international communities to challenge the political framework of “Israeli
occupation, assault, and blockade” as the root cause underlying the symp-
tomatic impediments to Gazan reconstruction put up by Israel.88
Even the Palestinian National Authority, which is vocally sympathetic
to the plight of Gaza but nevertheless in practice coordinates its efforts
to undermine Hamas with Israel, has now taken steps to exacerbate the
Israeli blockade of Gaza.89 In June 2017, the PNA refused to relinquish
funds necessary for paying for Gaza’s electricity bills, thereby allowing
Israel to cut Gaza’s electricity supply from 8 h down to 4 h per day.90
It further attempted to pressure Hamas into ceding control of the Gaza
Strip by cutting salaries to thousands of civil servants in Gaza and by
temporarily suspending crucial medical shipments.91 With even fellow

87 An additional 2 million dollars was pledged by the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

“UAE, Qatar Donate Funds to Stave Off Gaza Health Crisis,” Ynetnews.com, February 9,
2018, https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-5102687,00.html.
88 Roy, The Gaza Strip, 406.

89 Barak Ravid, “Fatah Asked Israel to Help Attack Hamas during Gaza Coup, WikiLeaks

Cable Shows,” Haaretz, December 20, 2010, https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-

news/palestinians/fatah-asked-israel-to-help-attack-hamas-during-gaza-coup-1.5096109;
David Rose, “The Gaza Bombshell,” Vanity Fair, March 3, 2008, https://www.vanity-
fair.com/news/2008/04/gaza200804; and Jared Malsin, “Whither Goldstone? Did the
PA Kill the UN’s Gaza Report?” Foreign Policy, October 27, 2010, https://foreignpolicy.
com/2010/10/27/whither-goldstone-did-the-pa-kill-the-uns-gaza-report/.
90 Barak Ravid and Amos Harel, “Israeli Cabinet Decides to Reduce Gaza Electricity

Supply at Palestinian President’s Request,” Haaretz, June 12, 2017, https://www.haaretz.

com/israel-news/.premium-israel-to-reduce-gaza-electricity-supply-at-palestinian-pres-
ident-s-request-1.5483120; Amira Hass, “Palestinians Also to Blame for Gaza Electricity
Crisis,” Haaretz, June 26, 2017, https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/palestini-
ans/.premium-palestinians-also-to-blame-for-gaza-electricity-crisis-1.5488522.
91 “Thousands Protest Palestinian Authority Pay Cut in Gaza,” Al Jazeera, April 8,

2017,   https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/04/thousands-protest-palestinian-au-
thority-pay-cut-gaza-170408125050217.html; “PA Cuts Off Medical Supplies to
Gaza,” Middle East Monitor, May 10, 2017, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/
20170510-pa-cuts-off-medical-supplies-to-gaza/.
 8  (UN)LIMITED FORCE: REGIONAL REALIGNMENTS …  241

Palestinian factions openly rooting for Hamas’s demise, the regional

­isolation of Gaza is unprecedented in the Strip’s history.

The Trump Administration

The bleak projection of Gaza’s future security is intensified when con-
sidering the 2016 United States presidential election. While the defining
features of Donald Trump’s foreign policy positions during his electoral
campaign were incongruousness and unpredictability, in the wake of his
election, a few remarkably consistent policy threads became readily appar-
ent. Perhaps most notably, over the course of its first year in power, the
Trump administration has demonstrated itself to be one of the most
pro-Israel in American history.92 More than any preceding president,
Donald Trump has stacked his administration with individuals with views
on the Israel–Palestine conflict as hardline as Netanyahu’s. Trump’s ambas-
sador to Israel, David Friedman, does not view Israeli settlements in the
West Bank as an obstacle to peace (let alone illegal under international
law) and his first ambassador to the United Nations, Nikki Haley, “made
the Israeli cause a personal hobbyhorse,” while the family of his Middle
East advisor and son-in-law Jared Kushner has donated tens of thousands
of dollars to organizations operating in settlements in the occupied West
Bank.93
The attendant consequence of the Trump administration’s uncriti-
cal orientation toward Israel is that the American threshold of tolerance
for Israeli-caused Palestinian deaths in Gaza has reached new heights.
While the collective outrage of the international community may have
compelled the Obama administration to finally condemn Israel’s

92 For more details, as well as some qualifications, see Colter Louwerse and Ron Dart,

“Donald Trump and the Christian Zionist Lobby: Letter from Canada,” Journal of Holy
Land and Palestine Studies 16, no. 2 (November 2017): 240–42, https://doi.org/10.3366/
hlps.2017.0167.
93 “Trump Taps David Friedman as U.S. Ambassador to Israel,” Haaretz, December 16,

2016, https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/trump-taps-david-friedman-as-u-s-ambassador-
to-israel-1.5474698; Adrian Hennigan, “What Does Nikki Haley Have to Say about
Israel?” Haaretz, March 8, 2018, https://www.haaretz.com/us-news/.premium-what-
does-nikki-haley-have-to-say-about-israel-1.5887006; and Judy Maltz, “Exploitable? Jared
Kushner’s Business Interests in Israel Revealed in Full,” Haaretz, February 28, 2018,
https://www.haaretz.com/us-news/.premium-jared-kushner-s-business-interests-in-
israel-revealed-in-full-1.5865165.
242  C. LOUWERSE

depredations against Gaza during Operation Protective Edge, the Trump

administration has already distinguished itself by its willingness to act
unilaterally in open defiance of the international community, especially
in relation to the Israel–Palestine conflict. Its strident defense of its deci-
sion to both recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and to move the
American embassy there, despite overwhelming international condemna-
tion, is demonstrative of this.94
While the United States has, for decades, consistently stood out-
side the international consensus on controversies involving the Israel–
Palestine conflict,95 the Trump administration’s uniquely high level of
contempt for international opinion, combined with its notably uncritical
support for Israeli violations of international law, bodes poorly for the
future security of Gaza. Provided Israel continues to calibrate its poli-
cies to minimize damage to core American foreign policy interests, the
United States cannot be relied upon to significantly limit the extent of
Israeli violations of Gazan human and civil rights, nor to pressure Israel
to alleviate Gaza’s crushing humanitarian crisis.

The (Few) Limits that Remain

Even now, an Israeli assault on Gaza would not be without limits, and
at least two factors currently deter another large-scale “operation.” First,
another assault is likely to push Gaza into a total humanitarian catastro-
phe, a scenario in which the international community—no matter its cur-
rent disinterest in the fate of the Palestinians of Gaza—would be forced,
via public pressure, to act against violations of international law. United

94 Mark Landler, “Trump Recognizes Jerusalem as Israel’s Capital and Orders U.S.

Embassy to Move,” The New York Times, December 6, 2017, https://www.nytimes.

com/2017/12/06/world/middleeast/trump-jerusalem-israel-capital.html; A UNGA res-
olution repudiated the Jerusalem move by affirming the occupied status of East Jerusalem
by an overwhelming vote of 163-6 (11 abstaining). “Permanent Sovereignty of the
Palestinian People in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Including East Jerusalem, and of
the Arab Population in the Occupied Syrian Golan over Their Natural Resources,” United
Nations General Assembly (UNGA). 72nd Session (United Nations General Assembly
[UNGA], December 20, 2017), https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/72/240.
95 For the intransigent American diplomatic record see e.g., Rashid Khalidi, Brokers

of Deceit: How the U.S Has Undermined Peace in the Middle East (Boston: Beacon Press,
2013); Noam Chomsky, The Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel and the Palestinians
(New York: South End Press, 1983), 1–89, 441–70.
 8  (UN)LIMITED FORCE: REGIONAL REALIGNMENTS …  243

Nations officials first warned in 2012 that if “present trends continue,”

Gaza will be “unlivable by 2020.” Since then, their prognosis has only
worsened.96 At the time of this writing, the humanitarian situation has
appeared to have reached a tipping point, and while the Israeli political
establishment remains in denial, high-level Israeli military officials have
begun sounding the alarm about rapidly deteriorating living conditions in
the Strip.97 With 96% of Gaza’s drinking water unfit to drink, the medi-
cal system undergoing complete collapse, and the populace already subject
to chronic electricity shortages, the destruction attendant upon another
Protective Edge style operation would consign to oblivion the fragile sys-
tems already struggling (and failing) to keep Gaza functional.98 As noted
above, previous Israeli assaults have been timed to thwart Palestinian
peace offensives and to prevent Hamas from gaining enough power
to challenge the diplomatic, economic, or military status quo. Yet now,
with Hamas confronted with survival challenges and many in Gaza cling-
ing to “naked existence,” Israel has Gaza right where it wants it. For the
moment, another bombardment hardly appears (from a strategic point of
view) necessary.99

96 See “Gaza: Ten Years Later” (United Nations Country Team in the Occupied

Palestinian Territory, July 2017), https://unsco.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/

gaza_10_years_later_-_11_july_2017.pdf; “Gaza Conditions ‘Unlivable’ 10 Years into Siege:
UN,” July 12, 2017, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/07/living-conditions-wors-
en-10-year-gaza-siege-170712045047448.html.
97 Jonathon Lis, “‘There’s No Humanitarian Crisis’ in Gaza, Israeli Defense Minister Says,

Contradicting Army Chief,” Haaretz, February 5, 2018, https://www.haaretz.com/isra-

el-news/lieberman-contradicts-idf-there-s-no-humanitarian-crisis-in-gaza-1.5790605; Yaniv
Kubovich and Jack Khoury, “Israeli Military Chief Warns: Gaza on Verge of Collapse, Brings
Both Sides Closer to War in 2018,” Haaretz, February 5, 2018, https://www.haaretz.
com/israel-news/.premium-israeli-military-chief-gaza-on-verge-of-collapse-bringing-war-
closer-1.5788886; and Yaniv Kubovich, “Israeli Defense Officials Warn Politicians: Trump’s
Cuts to Palestinians Could Harm Israel’s Security,” Haaretz, January 28, 2018, https://
www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-trump-s-cuts-to-palestinians-could-harm-israel-s-
security-idf-warns-1.5768092; It is likely that military officials’ concerns stem from practi-
cal considerations, as they fear that in the increasingly likely case that epidemic water borne
disease breaks out, it might spread to Israel. Shira Efron et al., “The Public Health Impacts
of Gaza’s Water Crisis: Analysis and Policy Options” (RAND Corporation, 2018), 41–46,
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2515.html.
98 “Treading Water: The Worsening Water Crisis and the Gaza Reconstruction

Mechanism,” OXFAM Briefing Paper (OXFAM, March 2017), 5, https://www-cdn.oxfam.

org/s3fs-public/bp-treading-water-gaza-reconstruction-mechanism-220317-en.pdf.
99 Roy, “If Israel Were Smart”; Roy, The Gaza Strip, 397.
244  C. LOUWERSE

Second, the IDF’s attention is currently focused on the country’s bor-

der with Lebanon and Syria, where it is struggling to prevent Hezbollah
and other Iranian-backed militias from establishing a military presence
within Southern Syria. Thus far, the IDF has been unable to prevent
Hezbollah from acquiring long-range weapons (despite carrying out over
100 airstrikes in Syria since 2017).100 Until receiving assurances from
Russia in July 2018 that Iranian-backed militias would withdraw from the
vicinity of the Israeli border, the IDF was also unable to prevent them from
setting up military infrastructure in its unilaterally declared 40 km buffer
zone in southern Syria.101 Israeli threats and actions directed at Lebanon
and Syria have routinely escalated, with the specter of a second round
of the 2006 Lebanon war continuing to loom. This has diminished any
motive for Israel to redirect the attention of its military away from the
Hezbollah challenge and toward another operation in Gaza.
This preoccupation with Southern Syria and Lebanon may not, how-
ever, deter Israel for long. If Israel feels that the situation in Syria has
eroded its self-branded deterrence capacity, it may turn its military loose
in Gaza so as to allegedly restore deterrence by reinstating the Arab
world’s dread of it, as it did during Operation Cast Lead in 2008–2009.102
As Israeli officials informed the International Crisis Group in 2009:
“A key lesson [Israeli Defense Minister Ehud] Barak drew from the 2006
Lebanon War is the crucial importance of who is seen as victor and who
as loser.”103 Israel had evidently come out as a “loser” during the 2006
Lebanon War, as it failed to accomplish its goal of eliminating Hezbollah’s
military capacities in Southern Lebanon.104 As such, in waging a war it

100 “Israel, Hezbollah and Iran: Preventing Another War in Syria,” Middle East/North

Africa (International Crisis Group, February 8, 2018), 6, 26, https://d2071andvip0wj.

cloudfront.net/182-israel-hizbollah-and-iran-preventing-another-war-in-syria_0.pdf.
101 Jack Khoury, “Iranian Forces Pulling Back from Israel Border, Says Russia,” Haaretz,

August 1, 2018, https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/iran/iranian-forces-withdraw-

to-a-distance-of-85-km-from-golan-heights-1.6337360.
102 Norman G. Finkelstein, Method and Madness: The Hidden Story of Israel’s Assaults on

Gaza (New York: OR Books, 2014), 11, 14–18.

103 “Ending the War in Gaza,” Middle East/North Africa (International Crisis Group,

January 5, 2009), 18, https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/b26-ending-the-war-in-gaza.

pdf.
104 Ze’ev Maoz, Defending the Holy Land: A Critical Analysis of Israel’s Security and

Foreign Policy (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2009), 623.

 8  (UN)LIMITED FORCE: REGIONAL REALIGNMENTS …  245

was guaranteed to win in Gaza in 2008–2009, Israel had sought to erase

“the memory of 2006.”105 Given that Israeli military officials today do
not anticipate a successful end to another escalation of hostilities with
Hezbollah, the possibility remains that Gaza will once again be repurposed
into an IDF punching bag in the future.106
Gaza’s security options are few, and its political leadership has struggled
to adjust to the new regional framework. The near-total abandonment of
Gaza by the conservative–moderate bloc (see Table 14.1) has forced Hamas
to reposition itself on the Iranian side of the regional divide, a move that has
only further estranged it from the United States and the Arab League, while
also playing into Israel’s attempts to portray its conflict with Hamas as part
of a larger proxy war against the alleged existential threat posed by Iran.107
Desperate to alleviate Gaza’s dire economic straits, Hamas has also been
compelled to capitulate to Egypt. In 2017, it distanced itself from the MB,
relinquished formal control of the Rafah crossing to the PNA, and agreed to
crack down on Islamist groups infiltrating the Sinai from Gaza.108
The one political strategy that shows promise, but which Hamas seems
reluctant to pursue given its formal commitment to armed struggle, has
been that of mass nonviolent resistance. Despite their regional abandon-
ment, the people of Gaza (and the Palestinian cause, more generally) ben-
efit from a mobilized international solidarity movement and from formal,
if ineffective, international support for crucial humanitarian and political

105 “Ending the War in Gaza,” 18; Finkelstein, Method and Madness, 9–29.
106 As one Israeli defense official mentioned, the Israel “cannot handle” over “100,000 mis-
siles fired at it… Residential towers in Tel Aviv will be toppled with many casualties. I doubt
Israeli society today knows how to handle that.” “Israel, Hezbollah and Iran,” 5–6, 6n23.
107 “Hamas Deputy Leader Says to Continue Iran Ties, Armed Fight,” Reuters, October 22,

2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-israel-palestinians-hamas-iran/hamas-deputy-lead-
er-says-to-continue-iran-ties-armed-fight-idUSKBN1CR0MP; Prior to Hamas’s reconciliation
with Iran in 2017, Iranian–Hamas relations had been strained over Syria. “No Exit? Gaza &
Israel between Wars,” 36n184.
108 In contrast with previous Hamas policy documents, Hamas’s relationship to the

Muslim Brotherhood went unmentioned in its 2017 political document. “A Document of

General Principles and Policies,” The Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), 2017, https://
hamas.ps/en/post/678/a-document-of-general-principles-and-policies; Lin Noueihed
and Nidal al-Mughrabi, “Seeking to Secure Sinai, Egypt Builds Closer Ties with Hamas,”
Reuters, February 21, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-palestinians-egypt-sinai/
seeking-to-secure-sinai-egypt-builds-closer-ties-with-hamas-idUSKBN16010C.
246  C. LOUWERSE

goals, foremost among them being the lifting of the blockade. The mass
protests (since 2018) along the Gaza border in support of the Palestinian
right of return are indicative of the strategic potential of nonviolence in
wresting tangible victories from the Israeli government. The image—
condemned by both human rights organizations and the international
media—of unarmed demonstrators and journalists being gunned down
by IDF sniper fire on account of their demand for elementary human
rights, has evoked international indignation at the plight of the Gazan
people.109
Viewed in conjunction with the Tel Aviv’s political and military eche-
lon’s attitude that “there are no innocent people in the Gaza Strip,” the
predominantly one-sided violence threatens to irrevocably tarnish Israel’s
depiction of itself as a benign and liberal occupier. As of this writing, the
people of Gaza have been unable to concretize the Great March of Return
into political or humanitarian gain. Yet, if that mass popular mobilization
were to be sustained, publicized, and directed at an end internationally
perceived as legally and morally legitimate, the people of Gaza might still
be able to shake off their imposed isolation and finally compel the regional
and international community to enforce limits on Tel Aviv’s use of unilat-
eral force in the Gaza Strip. Short of either this or an unexpected shift in
the makeup of the regional security structure, the security of Gaza is likely
to remain as susceptible to Tel Aviv depredations as ever before.

109 “Israel: Gaza Killings Unlawful, Calculated. Officials Green-Light Shooting of

Unarmed Demonstrators,” Human Rights Watch, April 3, 2018, https://www.hrw.org/
news/2018/04/03/israel-gaza-killings-unlawful-calculated; “Israel: Apparent War Crimes
in Gaza: Accountability Needed for Officials Who Authorized Lethal Force,” Human
Rights Watch, June 13, 2018, https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/06/13/israel-apparent-
war-crimes-gaza; “If the Heart Not Be Callous: On the Unlawful Shooting of Unarmed
Demonstrators in Gaza” (B’tselem, April 6, 2018), https://www.btselem.org/sites/default/
files/publications/201804_if_the_heart_be_not_callous_eng.pdf; “Six Months on: Gaza’s
Great March of Return,” Amnesty International, October 2018, https://www.amnesty.
org/en/latest/campaigns/2018/10/gaza-great-march-of-return/; and “Israel Courts
Catastrophe in Gaza Protests,” The New York Times, April 2, 2018, https://www.nytimes.
com/2018/04/02/opinion/gaza-protests-israel-hamas.html.
 8  (UN)LIMITED FORCE: REGIONAL REALIGNMENTS …  247

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Downloads/book2362.pdf.
256  C. LOUWERSE

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 8  (UN)LIMITED FORCE: REGIONAL REALIGNMENTS …  257

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-government-in-israeli-history/.
 CHAPTER 9

The Evolution of Iraq’s Hashd al-Sha’abi

(Popular Mobilization Forces)

Zana Gulmohamad

Introduction
The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) is an umbrella term for
non-monolithic majority Shi’ militias with divergent orientations, par-
ticularly between pro-Iran and Iraqi-first Shi’ militias. For example,
major pro-Iran militias, such as Badr and Asaib Ahl al-Haq, have closer
ties to Iran, whereas the populist cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and his militias
reject interference from Iran and the West. Therefore, the pro-Iran mili-
tias within the PMF are allied within the Iranian axis (al-Mihwar al-Irani)
or the axis of resistance (Mihwar al-Muqawama) explored in the first sec-
tion of this book. This axis includes four principal state and ­non-state
actors: Iran, pro-Iran Iraqi Shi’ militias, Syria, and the Lebanese
Hezbollah. They are the most powerful Shi’ and Shi’-leaning actors in
the region and form a land bridge between the four countries to the
Israeli–Lebanese border at Golan Heights. The Iran-led axis balances
­vis-a-vis the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and its regional allies in the
region, including Israel. Furthermore, Iran’s support for Shi’ movements

Z. Gulmohamad (*) 
University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK
e-mail: z.gulmohamad@sheffield.ac.uk

© The Author(s) 2020 259

P. O. Amour (ed.), The Regional Order in the Gulf Region
and the Middle East, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45465-4_9
260  Z. GULMOHAMAD

elsewhere in the region, such as in Bahrain, is also part of Iran’s strategy

to push back against its regional rivals.
The seeds of Iraqi Shi’ militias were planted more than a decade ago
and have since taken root and proliferated. They have grown to become
a well-equipped social–political movement and part of the Iraqi state,
which shapes Iraq’s polity and security. Iraqi Shi’ militias pursue the nar-
row interests of their leaders and sponsors–interests that are colored by
various versions of Islamic Shi’ religious doctrines in order to legitimize
their behavior. For just over three years, the PMF played a considera-
ble role in combating the Islamic State (IS), as the Iraqi Security Forces
(ISF) were unable to defend and retake national territory.
The PMF’s success in cooperation with the ISF against IS prevented
Baghdad’s fall. However, the Shi’ militias have been a destabilizing
factor in Iraq and the wider region, as a considerable number of them
have committed human rights violations and have ideological and polit-
ical ambitions and a de facto presence.1 Iraq’s Shi’ militias are actively
involved in the rapid and fluid shifts in Iraq’s political and security scene.
Militias in Iraq’s modern state have been present since the time of
the country’s monarchy. In the 1930s, King Faisal I had concerns about
armed tribes, and confrontations arose between the latter and govern-
ment forces.2 In 1933, the 100,000 rifles of the armed tribes exceeded
the 15,000 of the government forces.3 However, the flow of oil reve-
nues, particularly since the early 1940s, gave the Iraqi government the
ability to equip and expand their armed forces, thereby suppressing the
anti-government militias.4
The Ba’ath regime and Saddam Hussein were arming loyal
­state-backed militias, namely, Jaish al-Sha’bi (the 6th People’s Army),
before and during the Iraq–Iran War. The People’s Army was poorly

1 “Iraq: Militias Abuses Mar Fight against ISIS. Tikrit Homes Destroyed, Residents

Abducted,” Human Rights Watch, September 20, 2015, https://www.hrw.org/

news/2015/09/20/iraq-militia-abuses-mar-fight-against-isis.
2 Mohammad Tarbush, The Role of the Military in Politics: A Case Study of Iraq to 1941

(New York: Routledge, 2016), 16.

3 Omar Al-Nidawi and Michael Knights, “Militias in Iraq’s Security Forces: Historical

Context and U.S Options,” February 22, 2018, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/

policy-analysis/view/militias-in-iraqs-security-forces-historical-context-and-u.s.-options.
4 Al-Nidawi and Knights; Atif A. Kubursi, “Oil and the Iraqi Economy,” Arab Studies

Quarterly 10, no. 3 (Summer 1988): 283–98.

 9  THE EVOLUTION OF IRAQ’S …  261

trained, yet its number gradually exceeded that of the Iraqi Army (IA).
Post-1991, Saddam’s regime created state-backed militias, such as
Fedayeen Saddam (Saddam’s Men of Sacrifice) numbering 30,000 to
40,000. This small yet ruthless militia answered directly to Saddam’s
son, Uday.5 Many in the IA resented these militias.6 The state-backed
militias were the regime’s tools for suppression and security. In contrast
to Saddam’s era, the militias post-Saddam are more complex and have
divergent and occasionally colliding interests and loyalties, as the next
sections attempt to explore.
This chapter provides a survey on the structure and categorization
of the PMF, their military and operational capabilities, their supporters
and loyalties, and the different goals between the militias, including their
political ambitions. It looks at their ideological and political orientations
and their ties domestically (in Iraq) as well as regionally (the broader
Middle East). It comes to the conclusion that: (1) A number of pro-Iran
Shi’ militias have been deeply seated in Iraq for decades; however, the
rise of the IS provided the context for prominent Shi’ commanders, fig-
ures, and militias to shape Iraq’s security and military apparatus in a way
that is molding Iraq’s polity and interfering in its policy-making process;
(2) Pro-Iran militias have consolidated the militia presence in Iraq, Syria,
and elsewhere, and by their attitude and behavior, they have extended
Iran’s influence in the Gulf Region and the broader Middle East.

The Creation of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF)

In Arabic, the factions or militias of the PMF are called Fasail Hashd
al-Sha’abi and Haiat al-Hashd al-Sha’abi. Nonetheless, various nick-
names and titles resemble certain identities and trends; for example,
the term Milishiyat al-Shi’ia (Shi’ militias) has a pejorative connotation
equivalent to mobs, gangs, and unofficial armed groups that do not

5 Sharon Otterman, “Iraq: What Is the Fedayeen Saddam?,” Council on Foreign

Relations, February 3, 2005, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/iraq-what-fedayeen-

saddam.
6 Kamal Adeeb, A Summary of Iraq’s History from the Iraqi Revolt in 1920 to the

American Wars, Resistance, Liberation and Creation of the Second Republic (Beirut: Dar
al-Farabi, 2013), 118.
262  Z. GULMOHAMAD

adhere to the rule of law. In this chapter, the term “militias” is used to
represent the PMF’s factions without any negative or contemptuous
implications.
Amid the rise of IS, the meltdown of ISF, the fall of a third of Iraq
to the IS, and the threat to Baghdad, the Grand Ayatollah al-Sayyid Ali
Husseini al-Sistani, Iraq’s highest religious reference (Marjia al-Diniah
al-A’lia), issued a religious edict regarding the duty of jihad. This was
called the fatwa Wajib Jihad al-Kafai, and it triggered the birth of the
PMF. The fatwa, read by his spokesperson Abdul Mahdi al-Karbalai on
June 13, 2014, called upon “all able-bodied Iraqis to defend the country
and to volunteer in the security forces,” and it declared the war against
IS as a sacred defense (Difa’ Muqadas).7 Former Prime Minister (PM)
Nouri al-Maliki is a PMF founder, alongside a unanimous backing of
the Council of Ministers.8 Two days after the fatwa, Falih al-Fayyadh,
the federal government’s national security advisor, announced the cre-
ation of Haiat Modiriat al-Hashd al-Sha’abi, a committee for the direc-
torate of the PMF. In every Shi’-dominated governorate, masses of Shi’s
responded to the al-Sistani’s fatwa. The PMF offices, many of which
were affiliated to or controlled by the militias, organized and equipped
the recruits. Close to a million volunteers were registered.9
Currently, the number of militias is estimated at 67. Half of these
were preexisting militias and had operated before Ayatollah ­al-Sistani’s
fatwa. Some had even targeted the US-led coalition during Iraq’s occu-
pation. Just over half have ideological and logistical links and are loyal to

7 “The Statement of Iraq’s Religious Marjiyya Ayatollah al-Sistani on Jihad al-Kafai (In

Arabic),” Al-Hashd.net, June 13, 2014, http://al-hashed.net/2016/12/26/%D9%81%D

8%AA%D9%88%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A7
%D9%84%D9%83%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A-13-6-2014/; BBC News (Arabic),
“Iraq: Religious Leadership Announces al-Jihad (In Arabic),” YouTube, June 13, 2014,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nGeoCNVQlgg.
8 Zana K. Gulmohamad, “Iraq’s Shi’ Militias: Helping or Hindering the Fight against

Islamic State?,” The Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor XIV, no. 9 (April 29, 2016):
5–7.
9 “Maliki Orders the Formation of the Directorate of Hashd Al-Sha’abi to Manage

the Flow (In Arabic),” Qanat al-Alam, June 15, 2014, http://www.alalam.ir/
news/1603017/; Zana K. Gulmohamad, “A Short Profile of Iraq’s Shi’a Militias,”
Terrorism Monitor: In-Depth Analysis of the War on Terror 13, no. 8 (April 17, 2015): 3–6.
 9  THE EVOLUTION OF IRAQ’S …  263

the Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei and the regime, particularly the
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-Quds Force (IRGC-QF).10 Iraqi
officials indicated that the PMF fighters total around 110,000–122,000,
and the federal government in Baghdad is responsible for their salaries.11
For example, in 2017, the government paid the PMF 1.63 billion US
dollars.12
This chapter categorizes the PMF militias according to their loy-
alties and sponsors. Previously, the author (in 2015 and 2016) and
other experts divided the militias into three camps: pro-Iran militias,
­pro-al-Sistani or Hawza militias, and pro-Sadr and al-Hakim militias.13
However, this chapter presents two camps of militias, based on their cur-
rent religious loyalties and areas of sponsorship. The first group of mili-
tias are the pro-Iran Hashd al-Walai (in Arabic, al-Walai means loyal and
refers to the loyalty to Khamenei). This camp adheres to and/or favors
Khomeini’s version of governance and political system: the doctrine of
Vilayat-i Faqih (governance of the jurist). The second group includes
loyalties and sponsors that are based in Iraq, with various doctrines and
political factions affiliated with al-Hawza and al-Sistani’s institutions,
with the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), or with the Shi’ pop-
ulist figure Muqtada’s al-Sadr and his movement. This second camp’s
command structure has been close to the PM’s office since al-Abadi’s
appointment, yet they are incoherent and their cooperation depends
on battlefield dynamics. By contrast, the first camp operates under the
auspices of Iran, particularly the IRGC, and is close to al-Maliki.
All militias argue that they are Iraqi nationalist ones. Many mili-
tias claim that they represent the Iraqi people, are social–political

10 Jack Watling, “The Shi’ Militias of Iraq,” The Atlantic, December 22, 2016, https://

www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/12/Shi’-militias-iraq-isis/510938/.
11 Nicholas A. Heras, “Iraq’s Fifth Column: Iran’s Proxy Network” (MEI Policy Paper,

Middle East Institute, October 2, 2017), https://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/publi-

cations/PP2_Heras_IraqCT_0.pdf.
12 Renad Mansour, “More Than Militias: Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces Are Here

to Stay,” War on the Rocks, April 3, 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/04/

more-than-militias-iraqs-popular-mobilization-forces-are-here-to-stay/.
13 Mustafa Habib, “Divided Loyalties: Iraq’s Controversial Shiite Militias Fight among

Themselves,” Niqash: briefings from inside and across Iraq, June 30, 2015, http://www.
niqash.org/en/articles/politics/5033/Iraq; Gulmohamad, “Iraq’s Shi’ Militias,” 5–7; and
Gulmohamad, “A Short Profile of Iraq’s Shi’a Militias,” 3–6.
264  Z. GULMOHAMAD

movements, and have inherited Shi’ religious legacies.14 All Shi’ militias
possess and portray Shi’ Islamist narratives using various doctrines, while
trying to project the image of an Iraqi nationalist identity. Each camp has
its own interpretation and brand of Iraqi nationalism. For instance, pro-
Iran militias adopt the Shi’ transnationalism linked to Iran’s Khomeini,
whereas many emphasize patriotism to gain legitimacy among all Iraqis
in their fight against IS.15 These transnational narratives pose a chal-
lenge to the state and other non-Shi’ Iraqi communities who may have a
­different sense of Iraqi identity.
Since 2014, the controversial legal status of the PMF has faced criti-
cism from a number of Iraqi politicians and lawmakers, particularly the
Arab Sunnis and Kurds, over the PMF’s resources and the plans to turn
it into part of the state security structure.16 Initially, former PM al-Ma-
liki signed an official decree in 2014 to form the commission of PMF.
Critics alleged, however, that the decree violated article 9, paragraph B
of the Iraqi constitution, which clearly prohibits the formation of militias
outside the framework of the armed forces.17 In an attempt to fix this
legal issue, former PM al-Abadi approved (in February 2016) an official
government Executive Order 91, which underlined that the PMF would
be an independent military body, part of ISF, and attached to the PM.
In November 2016, the Iraqi Council of Representatives (ICR) passed
a law known as Qanoon Haiat Hashd al-Sha’abi, which officially insti-
tutionalized and accorded full legal status to the PMF as part of the ISF
to report directly to the PM. The law was supported by 208 out of a
total of 327 members of parliament (MPs), but rejected by many Arab
Sunnis.18

14 Ranj Alaaldin, “Containing Shiite Militias: The Battle for Stability in Iraq,” Policy

Briefing (Brookings Doha Center, December 12, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/

wp-content/uploads/2017/12/shiite_militias_iraq_english.pdf.
15 Dylan O’Driscoll and Dave van Zoonen, “The Hashd Al-Shaabi and Iraq:

Subnationalism and the State” (Middle East Research Institute, March 2017), http://
www.meri-k.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/PMF-Report-0.2.pdf.
16 “Sunnis and Kurds Oppose Hashd Law Passed by Iraqi Parliament,” Basnews,

November 11, 2016, http://www.basnews.com/index.php/en/news/iraq/314015.

17 Renad Mansour and Faleh A. Jabar, “The Popular Mobilization Forces and

Iraq’s Future” (Carnegie Middle East Center, April 28, 2017), http://carnegie-mec.
org/2017/04/28/popular-mobilization-forces-and-iraq-s-future-pub-68810.
18 “The Law of Hashd Al-Sha’abi (In Arabic),” Ministry of Justice, November 26, 2016,

https://www.moj.gov.iq/view.2899/.
 9  THE EVOLUTION OF IRAQ’S …  265

On March 8, 2018, former PM al-Abadi issued a decree to integrate

the PMF into Iraq’s traditional armed forces (al-Quwwat ­al-Musalaha
al-Iraqiya) through a process that would officially fall under Iraq’s
Ministry of Defense or Ministry of Interior.19 The PMF’s leaders rejected
the decree and instead offered their own proposal to be an independ-
ent security apparatus, separate from the aforementioned ministries. As
of now, the PMF remains independent and enjoys legal status; it is under
the National Security Council, which answers to the PM. Apparently,
the PMF leaders are not interested in integrating or assimilating into
the traditional ISF, as their current status gives them more power and
independence.20
Officially, the PMF, at the time of this writing, is under the com-
mand of PM Adel Abdul Mahdi, who is the Commander-in-Chief of
the Armed Forces. Until August 2018, the Chairman of the PMF was
Falih al-Fayyadh, who was also Iraq’s National Security Advisor. He was
initially appointed by Nouri al-Maliki and was also close to al-Abadi.
Fayyadh was a member of Iraq’s major ruling Islamic Dawah Party
before he created his own political platform, the Ataa Movement. One of
Fayyadh’s key goals was to promote and support the rights of the PMF
fighters.21 Fayyadh was sacked by PM al-Abadi on the grounds that he
was interfering in politics because he split from al-Abadi’s Nasir alliance
in the process of formulating the government.22 The Deputy Chairman
of the PMF is currently Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, who has strong and
historical ties with the IRGC-QF that go back to the mid-1980s.23
Ostensibly, the PMF is officially controlled by the government
and state; however, the pro-Iran militias have a considerable degree of

19 “The Prime Minister and the Commander in Chief Haider Al-Abadi Issues Regulations

for Hashd al-Sha’abi (In Arabic),” Iraq’s Prime Minister’s Office, March 8, 2018, http://
pmo.iq/press2018/8-3-201803.htm.
20 Mansour, “More Than Militias.”

21 “Fayyadh Announces Creating Ataa Movement (In Arabic),” Iraqi News Network,

November 25, 2017, http://aliraqnews.com/‫ضايفلا‬-‫نلعي‬-‫نع‬-‫سيسأت‬-‫ءاطعةكرح‬.

22 “The New Arab. Iraq PM Sacks Paramilitary Chief Who Joined Rival Pro-Iranian

Bloc,” The New Arab, August 31, 2018, https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/

news/2018/8/31/iraq-pm-sacks-paramilitary-chief-who-joined-pro-iranian-bloc.
23 Amir Toumaj, “Death of a General: What Shaban Nasiri Reveals about Iran’s

Secretive Quds Force,” War on the Rocks, March 23, 2018, https://warontherocks.
com/2018/03/death-of-a-general-what-shaban-nasiri-reveals-about-irans-secretive-qods-
force/.
266  Z. GULMOHAMAD

autonomy and their de facto behavior emerges from various internal and
external stakeholders, and partisan and ideological drivers. The PMF’s
bodies are responsive to the directives of an executive commission, the
Shura Council (Majlis Shura al-Muqawama al-Islamiyyia), which is
a key part of the PMF, is led by al-Muhandis and Hadi al-Amiri, and
includes 10 other key militia leaders from the aforementioned Iraqi and
pro-Iran camps. The purpose of the executive committee is to administer
and conduct day-to-day tasks without going back to the PM for permis-
sion.24 The PMF has created directories (Mudiriyat al-Hashd al-Sha’abi)
for specialized sectors or matters, such as directorates for overseeing the
planning and execution of military operations, intelligence, media, med-
ical matters, operations, and military engineering. The PMF has regional
committees, called offices of the PMF committee (Makatib Hai’at
Hashd al-Sha’abi), which are smaller and less powerful components than
the central administration and supervise provisional-level administrative
matters.
Regional committees are present in many Iraqi governorates, includ-
ing Anbar, Babil, Basra, Dhi Qar, Diwaniyah, Diyala, Karbala, Kirkuk,
Maysan, Muthanna, Salah al-Din, Najaf, Nineveh, and Wasit. Regional
committees are responsible for the affairs of each province and are
dependent on the executive committee of the PMF for resources.25
Al-Muhandis is the key figure in the PMF who shapes the operational,
administrative, and financial dynamics. The majority of the PMF websites
and social media platforms praise al-Muhandis, al-Amiri, and the spokes-
person Ahmad al-Asadi, who are the key commanders of the pro-Iran
militias. They appear to be the most admired leaders, rather than the
Chairman Falih al-Fayyadh. This promotion of its leaders indicates that
the pro-Iran camp has shaped the PMF’s orientations and trajectories.26

24 “Hashd Al-Sha’abi in Iraqi, It’s Creation and Future (In Arabic)” (Rawabet Center

For Research and Strategic Studies, August 28, 2018), http://rawabetcenter.com/

archives/31326.
25 Jessa Rose Dury-Agri, Omer Kassim, and Patrik Martin, “Iraq’s Security Forces and

Popular Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle” (Institute for the Study of War, December
2017), http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Iraq%20-%20ISF%20
PMF%20Orders%20of%20Battle_0_0.pdf.
26 James Garrison, “Popular Mobilization Messaging,” (ICCT Research Paper, The

Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism [ICCT], April 2017), https://icct.

nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/ICCT-Garrison-Popular-Mobilization-Messaging-
April-2017-1.pdf.
 9  THE EVOLUTION OF IRAQ’S …  267

The administrative structure has paved the way for the pro-Iran
and Iraq first militias to conduct more efficient joint operations.27
Nevertheless, despite the cooperation between the different militias,
rivalry exists between them due to their different ideologies, partisan-
ship, and external ties.28 The PMF’s chairman and other commanders
state that the PMF is under the PM’s power. However, the public state-
ments of many pro-Iran militia leaders, as well as the behavior and forces
within the PMF, contradict the PM’s general domestic policy and for-
eign policy. One example is the presence of PMF Shi’ militias in Syria
and their operational activities on the side of the Assad regime.
The following sections explore the most powerful pro-Iran Shi’ mili-
tias, the minority and micro-minority militias (affiliated to both Iraqi and
Iranian camps), then the non-pro-Iran Shi’ militias.

Iraqi Pro-Iran Shi’ Militias

This part analyzes the Iraqi pro-Iran militias that follow Iran’s Supreme
Leader Khamenei and that closely coordinate and take instructions from
Iran’s key security apparatus, particularly the IRGC. Iran has been the
key contributor in founding, funding, and logistically supporting and
developing these pro-Iran militias.

Badr Organization (Formerly Known as Badr Brigade)

Badr is the oldest current operative Shi’ armed group. It was created
in 1982 in Iran during the Iran–Iraq War with Badr Brigades or Corps
(Failaq Badr) and was an armed wing for ISCI (then known as the
Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, or SCIRI). Badr
was initially composed of Iraqi Shi’ defectors, Iraqi prisoners of war, and
refugees or individuals who joined SCIRI. Iran offered those who were
Shi’ or who would convert to Shiism to fight against Saddam’s regime

27 ­
Dury-Agri, Kassim, and Martin, “Iraq’s Security Forces and Popular Mobilization
Forces.”
28 Gulmohamad, “Iraq’s Shi’ Militias,” 5–7; Bashdar Ismaeel, “Dominance of

Militias May Haunt Baghdad. Kurdish Peshmerga Fighters Take Part in a Military
Exercise,” The New Arab, November 2, 2017, https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/
comment/2017/11/2/dominance-of-militias-may-haunt-baghdad.
268  Z. GULMOHAMAD

within Badr.29 Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim (1939–2003) was

an Iraqi religious cleric, political intellectual, and former leader of SCIRI
and its paramilitary wing Badr, who was assassinated in 2003 in Najaf.
The spiritual leader of SCIRI went to Iran in 1980 and had close ties
with and followed Ayatollah Khomeini’s doctrine of Vilayat-i Faqih,
although he had slightly different interpretations of some details of its
jurist council selection and qualities.30
Badr had historical links to the IRGC-QF and was funded and
equipped by Iran and trained by Iranian officers who were part of the
IRGC-QF.31 One figure who was a key architect of its military model
was General Shaban Nasiri, the founding father of the Guards Corps
who was killed in the west of Mosul in 2017 while advising Iraqi Shi’
militias.32 Since 2004, Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, a former ISCI and Badr
leader, has intended to integrate Badr into the ISF and turn it into a
political and civil organization.33 In practice, these intentions have been
emboldened. During the sectarian violence between 2006 and 2008,
Badr was involved in targeting senior Sunni clerics.34 Although the
schism between Badr and ISCI has grown since 2009 after the death of
ISCI leader Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, Badr officially defected from ISCI in
2012 to form a political faction with its preexisting armed militias. It is
led by Hadi al-Amiri, who is its General Secretary, and has changed its
name to the Badr Organization of Reconstruction and Development.35
Hadi al-Amiri is a veteran combatant who left Iraq in the 1980s and

29 Miran Hussein, Sectarianism and Shi’ Militias and Political Armed Groups in Iraq (In

Arabic) (Cairo: Dar al-Maktab al-Arabi llma’arf, 2015), 70; “Badr Corps,” Global Security,
November 24, 2014, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/badr.htm.
30 Robert Cleave, “Conceptions of Authority in Iraqi Shi’ism Baqir al-Hakim, Ha’iri and

Sistani on Ijtihad, Taqlid and Marja’iyya,” Theory, Culture and Society 24, no. 2 (2007):
59–78, https://doi.org/10.1177/0263276407074996.
31 Anthony H. Cordesman and Emma R. Davies, Iraq’s Insurgency and the Road to Civil

Conflict (London; Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2007), 38–39.

32 Toumaj, “Death of a General.”

33 Cordesman and Davies, Iraq’s Insurgency and the Road to Civil Conflict, 38;

“Interview with Abdul Aziz Al-Hakim,” Frontline, April 17, 2017, https://www.pbs.org/
wgbh/pages/frontline/gangsofiraq/interviews/hakim.html.
34 Cordesman and Davies, Iraq’s Insurgency and the Road to Civil Conflict, 38–39.

35 Phillip Smyth, “Should Iraq’s ISCI Forces Really Be Considered ‘Good Militias’?,”

Policy Watch (The Washington Institute, August 17, 2016), http://www.washingtoninsti-

tute.org/policy-analysis/view/should-iraqs-isci-forces-really-be-considered-good-militias.
 9  THE EVOLUTION OF IRAQ’S …  269

joined Badr; he was appointed military commander of Badr Corps in the

1990s. Post-2003, al-Amiri became increasingly prominent in Iraq and
played a role in reconsolidating ties between Badr and Iran after the split
from ISCI. This has enabled Badr to formulate its objectives and inter-
ests without ISCI, and Badr has since become closer to Iran.36 In 2005,
al-Amiri entered politics and was elected as an ICR member.
In 2010, al-Maliki appointed al-Amiri Minister of Transportation.
Another prominent Badr commander who assumed office is Baqir Jabr
al-Zubeidi; he occupied several ministerial posts, including Housing
and Reconstruction in the Iraqi transnational government, Minister
of Interior (2005–2006), and Finance Minister (2006–2010). The
Interior Ministry has been dominated by Badr commanders, includ-
ing Mohammad al-Ghabban (2014–2016) and Qassim al-Araji (2016–
2018). These governmental positions have provided Badr with resources,
power, and influence in policymaking, particularly in security affairs. Badr
began as an instrument to expand Iranian interests with compatible rev-
olutionary tendencies. Post-2003, the involvement of the Badr organiza-
tion in Iraqi politics and the resources they enjoyed from their network
within the Iraqi state structure empowered them in many dimensions.
Publicly, they became less extreme in their rhetoric; they have conserva-
tive Iraqi nationalist tendencies but are close to Tehran.
Al-Amiri has ambitions to shape policy and, as an Iraqi official,
he has interacted with Western actors and powers that traditionally he
likely would not have had relations with. For example, when al-Amiri
was Minister of Transportation, he accompanied former PM al-Maliki
on a visit to the White House in 2011.37 Al-Amiri has given interviews
with various media outlets (for example, France 24) and has met with
Western diplomats to show a diplomatic face for a long-standing Shi’
commander whose background is littered with anti-Western rhetoric.38

36 Guido Steinberg, “The Badr Organization: Iran’s Most Important Instrument

in Iraq,” SWP Comments (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik—German Institute for

International and Security Affairs, July 26, 2017), https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/
contents/products/comments/2017C26_sbg.pdf.
37 Glenn Kessler, “An Iranian ‘Terrorist’ in the White House?,” Washington Post,

December 20, 2011, https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/post/an-ira-

nian-terrorist-in-the-white-house/2011/12/19/gIQA6t2K5O_blog.html.
38 “Iraqi Militia Leader ‘Meets British Ambassador,’” The New Arab, October 4, 2016,

https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2016/10/4/iraqi-militia-leader-meets-
british-ambassador.
270  Z. GULMOHAMAD

However, on multiple occasions, al-Amiri has clearly requested the

withdrawal of US troops from Iraq.39
The Badr organization is considered the largest and best-equipped
Shi’ militia; it has heavy military hardware, including Russian and US
tanks, armored Humvees, and artillery, as well as military technology
capabilities that include a remote weapon station, drones, and com-
munication and surveillance capabilities.40 Although no concrete esti-
mates are available of their manpower, it stood at approximately 15,000
in 2004.41 Recently, independent sources have claimed that Badr has
around 20,000 fighters, while Badr declared it has 50,000.42 As the old-
est active militia, they are able to show a somewhat pragmatic attitude in
their engagement with other Iraqi actors, and they have access to state
resources, as mentioned above, as they are spread throughout the Iraqi
security establishment.
The Badr organization has become the most important component of
the PMF and they have played a key role in heading the Shi’ militias in
the fight against IS. Al-Amiri led a military operation to defeat the IS in
many battles, such as for Jurf al-Sakhar (Rocky Bank) in October 2014.
The once Sunni-dominated town, seized in June 2014 by the IS, is south
of Baghdad in the Babil Governorate, and Shi’ fighters have renamed it
Jurf Al-Nasr (Bank of Victory).43 Badr’s access to state resources and
its taking control of areas (parts of Diyala Governorate and Salah al-Din
Governorate) from IS have made it an even more powerful organization

39 Ahmad Majidyar, “Iran-Backed Badr Organization Calls on US Troops to Leave

Iraq” (Middle East Institute, November 30, 2017), http://www.mei.edu/content/io/

iran-backed-badr-organization-call-us-troops-leave-iraq.
40 Ned Park, Babak Dehganpishheh, and Isabel Coles, “How Iran’s Military Chiefs

Operate in Iraq,” February 24, 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-cri-

sis-committee-specialrepor/special-report-how-irans-military-chiefs-operate-in-iraq-idUSK-
BN0LS0VD20150224; Austin Bodetti, “Iraqi Militias Got Hold of American Tanks,”
The New Arab, accessed September 7, 2019, https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/
indepth/2017/9/4/how-iraqi-militias-got-hold-of-american-tanks.
41 Nadejda K. Marinova, Ask What You Can Do for Your (New) Country: How Host States

Use Diasporas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 247.

42 Steinberg, “The Badr Organization”; Michael Knights, “Iraq’s Popular
Demobilisation” (The Washington Institute, February 26, 2016), http://www.washing-
toninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/iraqs-popular-demobilisation.
43 Mustafa Habib, “Security or Demographics: Why Babel Province Has a Ghost Town,

Niqash,” Niqash: briefings from inside and across Iraq, August 30, 2017, http://www.
niqash.org/en/articles/security/5725/.
 9  THE EVOLUTION OF IRAQ’S …  271

politically and militarily. Before PM al-Maliki left office, he made

al-Amiri security commander of Diyala (al-Amiri’s hometown).
In practice, al-Amiri was commissioned by al-Maliki to operate as a
field commander wherever needed.44 Iran has played a role in strength-
ening pro-Iran militias, including Badr, particularly through Qasem
Soleimani, the Major General and Commander of IRGC-QF. Al-Amiri
and Soleimani have appeared together in media coverage of the Iraqi
battlefields and operational rooms against IS.
Badr had a major role in liberating Mosul from IS, in coordination
with the Iraqi Army, by cutting the city’s supply lines to Syria.45 Badr
also led the Shi’ militias in the mixed (Shi’ and Sunni) town of Tal Afar
west of Mosul. After taking control of the town, Badr infiltrated and
took control of its local government authorities.46 Badr forces and its
control of the Interior Ministry provided leverage in many battles, as fed-
eral police forces participated. For example, Abu Dargham al-Maturi is a
Badr commander and commander of Iraq’s 6th federal police division in
western Mosul.47 This illustrates Badr’s influence not only in the PMF
but also in conventional parts of the ISF.
During the Syrian civil war, Badr sent groups of fighters to Syria
to fight alongside the Syrian regime as part of the Badr military wing
in Syria, also known as the Forces of the Martyr Muhammad Baqir
Al-Sadr.48 Badr followers have utilized social media as part of their prop-
aganda war to circulate information about their casualties (martyrs) in
Syria. Zealous propaganda slogans also show great admiration for the

44 Kirk Sowell, “Badr at the Forefront of Iraq’s Shi’ Militias,” Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace, August 13, 2015, https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/61016; Kirk

Sowell, “Inside Iraqi Politics,” Uticensis Risk Services 111 (July 20, 2015), http://www.
insideiraqipolitics.com/Files/Inside%20Iraq%20No111.pdf.
45 Emily Anagnostos, “The Campaign for Mosul: March 17–29, 2017” (Institute for

the Study of War, March 17, 2017), http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/

campaign-mosul-march-17-29-2017.
46 Frauke Maas and Erica Gaston, “Iraq after ISIL: Tal Afar City,” Iraq after ISIL (Global

Public Policy Institute [GPPi], August 21, 2017), http://www.gppi.net/publications/

iraq-after-isil-tal-afar-city/.
47 Anagnostos, “The Campaign for Mosul.”

48 “New War, Old Faces,” The Syrian Observer, May 19, 2014, https://syrianobserver.

com/EN/features/32830/new_war_old_faces.html; “Badr Organization,” Jihad Intel

presented by Middle East Forum, accessed September 7, 2019, http://jihadintel.meforum.
org/group/85/badr-organization.
272  Z. GULMOHAMAD

Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei. Badr claims that around 1500 men
defend the Shi’ Shrine of Sayeda Zeinab in the Damascus suburbs.49
Badr and other pro-Iran militias, such as Iraq’s Kata’ib Hezbollah and
Lebanon’s Hezbollah, have also helped the minority Shi’ in Syria, espe-
cially those who follow Twelver Shiism, to set up local Shi’ militias;
these include, for example, the Imam al-Hijjah Regiment (Fawj al-Imam
al-Hijjah) in two villages (Nubl and Zahra) in Rif Hallab near Aleppo.50
In the context of Iraq’s 2018 parliamentary elections, Badr formed
the Conquest Alliance (Tahalf al-Fatah al-Mubin) with other Iraqi
pro-Iran militias and a few so-called “independent” traditional Shi’
­
Islamic and non-Shi’ (Shabak) parties headed by al-Amiri. The Al-Fatah
Alliance has become the second largest party on the list and, as a coa-
lition of several parties and wings of militias, won 48 seats. Badr alone
maintained 22 seats. The electoral list number is 109 and contains 18
factions that include but are not limited to: Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH)
and its political affiliation al-Sadiqoun, the Islamic Taliyah Party led by
Ali al-Yasseri and affiliated with the Khorasani Companies, and Kata’ib
Jund al-Imam and its political wing the Islamic Movement of Iraq led
by Ahmad ­al-Asadi, who is also the spokesperson of the PMF. Kata’ib
Hezbollah in Iraq joined the list and later withdrew, citing US leverage
and presence in Iraq. The alliance also contains traditional Shi’ factions,
such as ISCI led by Human Hamoudi.51
On September 3, 2018, al-Fatah, along with several winners of the
Iraqi parliamentary elections,—namely, Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law
Coalition and Falih al-Fayyadh who splintered from the Nasser alliance

49 “Badr’s Armed Wing in Syria, Labaik Ya Zainab (In Arabic),” Youtube, March 27,

2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vVMFOE1FzrM.
50 Phillip Smyth, “How Iran Is Building Its Syrian Hezbollah” (The Washington

Institute for Near East Policy, March 8, 2016), http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/

policy-analysis/view/how-iran-is-building-its-syrian-hezbollah.
51 Amir Toumaj and Romany Shaker, “Iranian Backed Iraqi Militias Firm Coalition

Ahead of Parliamentary Elections,” FDD’s Long War Journal, January 25, 2018, https://
www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2018/01/iranian-backed-iraqi-militias-form-coali-
tion-ahead-of-parliamentary-elections.php; “Fatah Coalition Headed by Al-A’meri Receives
Number 109 (In Arabic),” Baghdad Today, February 20, 2018, http://baghdadtoday.
news/ar/news/35759/‫†فلاحت‬-‫†حتفلا‬-‫†ةماعزب‬-‫†يرماعلا‬-‫†لصحي‬-‫†ىلع‬-‫†لسلستلا‬-
109-‫†نمض‬-‫†مئاوقلا‬-‫†ةكراشملا‬-‫في‬-‫†تاباختنالا‬-‫ ;ةلبقملا‬and “Kataib Hezbollah Will Not
Participate in the Election (In Arabic),” Al-Hayat News, March 2, 2018, https://allhayat.
net/?p=14102.
 9  THE EVOLUTION OF IRAQ’S …  273

(Haider Al-Abadi’s alliance) and other smaller factionsformed the

al-Binna bloc. This bloc is closer to Iran than the other major blocs.
Al-Binna played a role in negotiating with other political factions and
blocs to select the speaker, the president, and the PM. Since Iraq’s lat-
est parliamentary election, Badr and its leader Hadi al-Amiri have played
key roles in the public and political spaces; hence, they have influence
on a network of resources across state bodies. There are two major Shi’
blocs: al-Binna and Tahalf al-islah w ali’mar, a major bloc championed
by Saairon (Alliance Toward Reform–Forward) led by Muqtada al-Sadr.
Al-Abadi and Itilaf al-Nasr (Victory Alliance) are in Tahalf’s bloc, which
is less close to Iran. The following part discusses the second largest and
most powerful pro-Iran Iraqi Shi’ militia within the PMF.

Asaib Ahl al-Haq (The League of the Righteous)

AAH is the second most powerful pro-Iran Shi’ militia currently led by
Qais al-Khazali and is the second most powerful faction in the Fatah alli-
ance. AAH split from Muqtada al-Sadr’s Jaish al-Mahdi (JAM) in 2006
because of Iran’s interventions to weaken Muqtada and al-Khazali’s aspi-
rations for power. Al-Khazali was a student of Muqtada’s father and dis-
agreed with Muqtada al-Sadr’s decision to end the military operations
against US coalition forces.52 Former PM al-Maliki backed AAH, as they
were staunch rivals of Muqtada al-Sadr; for example, he allowed AAH a
military parade in June 2012, partly to show the power of the rising mili-
tia and to celebrate the US troops’ withdrawal.53 AAH targeted US-led
coalition troops before and after Al-Khazali’s defection from Muqtada
al-Sadr. For example, on January 20, 2007, AAH attacked Karbala provi-
sional headquarters and killed five US soldiers, and in May 2007, mem-
bers of the AAH stormed the Ministry of Finance and killed four British
hostages.54
52 Sam Wyer, “The Resurgence of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq,” Middle East Security Report

(Institute for the Study of War [ISW], December 2012), http://www.understandingwar.

org/sites/default/files/ResurgenceofAAH.pdf.
53 Kirk H. Sowell, “The Rise of Iraq’s Militia State,” Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace, April 23, 2015, http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/59888.

54 Michael Knights et al., “The Smart Way to Sanction Iranian Backed Militias in Iraq,”

Policy Watch (The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 17, 2018),
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-smart-way-to-sanction-
iranian-backed-militias-in-iraq.
274  Z. GULMOHAMAD

Al-Khazali formed a political affiliation called The Honest

­(al-Sadeqoon), which had one seat in the ICR, but after the 2018 parlia-
mentary election had increased this to 15 seats. AAH is part of the al-Fa-
tah Alliance and runs as an anti-establishment party.55 AAH, the ninth
largest party in the ICR, has grown in power and has become popular
within some Shi’ communities for several reasons, such as the significant
support it receives from the IRGC-QF, including funding, training, and
logistical support. Moreover, AAH pursues a similar model to that of
its partner and ally, Lebanon’s Hezbollah, in terms of attracting popu-
lar support from various communities, especially the disadvantaged, by
setting up offices that provide social services, aid, and religious schools
and by representing itself as the defenders of Shi’ communities during
the war against IS.
Since the departure of US troops in 2011, AAH has rebranded itself
as an Iraqi nationalist political organization committed to Islamic resist-
ance (in alliance with a cause of the resistance axis lead by Iran), and it
portrays itself in an intellectual and spiritual manner. AAH adheres to
Khomeini’s version of Vilayat-i Faqih and follows ayatollahs Hashemi
Shahroudi and Kazem al-Haeri.56 AAH has set up its own scholarly insti-
tutions and publications and built up ties with al-Hawza members. For
example, AAH’s institute Muasasat al-A’hd al-Sadiq is part of AAH’s
resistance cultural directory al-Mu’awnea al-Thaqafia l­i-al-Muqamuama,
which provides religious courses to students. According to their pro-
gram, they favor neither a parliamentary system nor an ethnoreligious
quota system based on political accord and a partnership agreement
between various Iraqi political factions. AAH advocates for majority
rule and presidency.57 These views put them at odds with Arab Sunni
and Kurdish factions, who assert that the partnership agreement between

55 “Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq” (Stanford University—Center for International Security and

Cooperation, March 24, 2017), http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-

bin/groups/view/143; Renad Mansour and Christine Van den Toorn, “The 2018 Iraqi
Federal Elections: A Population in Transition?,” LSE Middle East Centre Report (LSE
Middle Easy Centre, July 2018), http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/89698/7/MEC_Iraqi-elections_
Report_2018.pdf.
56 Alireza Nader, “Iran’s Role in Iraq: Room for Cooperation?,” Rand Corporation—

Perspective, 2015, https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE151.html; Wyer, “The

Resurgence of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq.”
57 “The Official Website for Asaib Ahl Al-Haq (In Arabic),” June 2017, http://ahlual-

haq.com/index.php/permalink/5229.html.
 9  THE EVOLUTION OF IRAQ’S …  275

various ethnic sectarian components in Iraq is necessary to avoid

­marginalization and conflict.
AAH has played a key role in fighting IS with other militias in Hashd
al-Sha’abi and with ISF around Baghdad, such as the Jurf al-Sakhar,
Diyala, Salah al-Din, and Anbar governorates.58 PM al-Abadi, and par-
ticularly the US, have tried to limit AAH and other types of military
involvement by pro-Iran militias in some of the Sunni-dominated areas,
such as in Ramadi, Tikrit, and Mosul. Yet, the involvement of AAH
continues.
AAH admitted to appearing in Syria in 2014 and has been one of
the leading Iraqi Shi’ militias operating alongside the Syrian regime
and Lebanon’s Hezbollah in Syria.59 Its operations in Syria emerged in
2013 under its branch known as Liwa Kafeel Zainab; it was reported
that their fighters have relatively good combatant skills.60 In December
2017, al-Khazali appeared on the Lebanon–Israel border area and
showed solidarity with Hezbollah and Palestine against Israel.61 AAH
supports Tehran’s transfers of weapons through Iraq and Damascus to
Hezbollah.62 US President Trump has pursued an anti-Iranian regime
policy in Iraq, and the congress bill, the Iranian Proxies Terrorist
Sanction Act, places sanctions on Iraqi militias that are backed by Iran
(AHH and Kata’ib Hezbollah [KH]). The bill was approved by the
House of Representatives and in 2018 was introduced in the Senate.63
In response, AAH have called on the federal government in Baghdad
to take action against US Congress, and their official statements have

58 Gulmohamad, “A Short Profile of Iraq’s Shi’a Militias,” 3–6.

59 Nicholas A. Heras, “Iraqi Shi’a Militia Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq Expands Operations to
Syria,” The Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor 12, no. 10 (May 15, 2014): 4–5.
60 Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi, “The Return of Iraqi Shi’i Militias to Syria,” Middle East

Institute, March 16, 2015, https://www.mei.edu/publications/return-iraqi-shii-mili-

tias-syria; “Terrorist Groups in Syria” (House of Representatives—Committee on Foreign
Affairs, November 20, 2013), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113hhrg85643/
pdf/CHRG-113hhrg85643.pdf.
61 Jonathan Spyer, “Who Is Qais Al-Khazali, and Why Should You Care?,” Middle East

Forum, December 15, 2017, http://www.meforum.org/7104/who-is-qais-al-khazali.

62 Michael Pregent and Erica Hanichak, “Countering Iran Means Sanctioning

Terrorist Militias,” The Hill, September 27, 2018, https://thehill.com/opinion/

international/408741-countering-iran-means-sanctioning-terrorist-militias.
63 ­
“S.3431-Iranian Proxies Terrorist Sanctions Act” (U.S. Congress, 2018, 2017),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/3431/text.
276  Z. GULMOHAMAD

promised revenge.64 Allegedly, in September 2018, AAH and KH

launched rockets at the US embassy in Baghdad and the US consulate
in Basra, while the White House has stated it will retaliate against Iran.65
AAH’s actions demonstrate their de facto autonomy from the federal
government of Iraq and their interests and agenda that are an extension
of Iran’s Khamenei. Badr and AAH are not the only pro-Iran militias.

Kata’ib Hezbollah
KH (Brigades of Party of God or Hezbollah Brigades) is a pro-Iran
Shi’ militia that operates mainly in Iraq but has a regional presence.
Their leader and founding father, Jamal Jaafar Ibrahimi, known by his
alias Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, is also the Deputy Chair of the PMF.
KH emerged in 2007 with solid ties to and close coordination with the
IRGC-QF and Qassem Soleimani, who has provided equipment and
funding. Al-Muhandis was born in Basra in 1954, and started his polit-
ical career as a member of the Islamic Dawa Party in the 1970s before
fleeing to Iran in the 1980s. During exile, al-Muhandis became a key fig-
ure in the Badr Brigade and participated in regional clandestine activities.
He also served as deputy to al-Amiri.66 Post-2003, al-Muhandi’s rela-
tionship with Iranian security circles developed and gained support for
establishing KH.67 KH, like other pro-Iran Shi’ militias, is loyal to Iran’s
Supreme Leader Khamenei and has adopted Vilayat-i Faqih.68

64 “Iraqi Shi’ Group Vows ‘Revenge’ after Fresh US Sanctions,” Press TV, June 2, 2018,

https://www.presstv.com/Detail/2018/06/02/563624/Iraq-Shi’-Asaib-Ahl-Haq.
65 Kirshnadev Calamur, “Trump’s Latest Warning to Iran Didn’t Come Out of

Nowhere,” The Atlantic, September 12, 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/

international/archive/2018/09/trump-warns-iran-Shi’-militia-iraq/569989/.
66 Dore Gold, The Rise of Nuclear Iran: How Tehran Defies the West (Washington, DC:

Regnery Publishing, 2009).

67 Richard R. Brennan et  al., Ending the U.S. War in Iraq: The Final Transition,
Operational Maneuver, and Disestablishment of United States Forces-Iraq (Santa Monica,
CA: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2013), https://www.rand.org/content/
dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR200/RR232/RAND_RR232.pdf.
68 “Kata’ib Hezbollah,” Jihad Intel presented by Middle East Forum, accessed

September 7, 2019, http://jihadintel.meforum.org/group/84/kataib-hezbollah.

 9  THE EVOLUTION OF IRAQ’S …  277

KH gained notoriety by targeting the US-led coalition forces in Iraq

with systematic attacks, guerrilla warfare, and explosives.69 In 2009, the
US Treasury Department blacklisted al-Muhandis and KH for com-
mitting, directing, and supporting significant harm against its coalition
and the ISF. Under Executive Order 13438, al-Muhandis and KH were
designated as a terrorist and foreign terrorist organization, respectively.
They were also listed by the US State Department under E.O. 13224
and in 2018 the US Congress introduced a sanction bill against them.70
KH has fought alongside other Shi’ militias against IS in numerous
battles, including Jurf al-Sakhar near Baghdad, Amerli and Samarra in
the Salah al-din governorate, and in areas and towns in Diyala, Anbar,
and Nineveh Governorates.71 KH is an elite, well-trained, and well-
equipped force. They have around 1000 core fighters, 10,000 mobi-
lized fighters through its subsidiary militia Saraya al-Difaa al-Sha’abi, and
1000 to 3000 likely operating in Syria.72 KH in Iraq possesses Russian,
Iranian, and even European light, medium, and some heavy weapons
from Iraq’s military stockpile. Some reports indicate that KH, Badr, and
AAH possess US military equipment, including M1 Abrams tanks and
M113 armored personal carriers.73
69 Thomas Strouse, “Kata’ib Hezbollah and the Intricate Web of Iranian Military

Involvement in Iraq,” The Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor VIII, no. 9 (March 5,
2010): 3–4.
70 “Treasury Designates Individual, Entity Posing Threat to Stability in Iraq,” U.S.

Department of the Treasury, July 2, 2009, https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/

press-releases/Pages/tg195.aspx; “Individuals and Entities Designated by the State
Department under E.O. 13224,” US Department of State, 2019, https://www.state.
gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/143210.htm.
71 Fergus Kelly, “Iraq’s Kataib Hezbollah Will Enter Syria and Battle ISIS in al-Buka-

mal—Spokesperson,” The Defense Post, November 4, 2017, https://thedefensepost.

com/2017/11/04/iraq-iran-kataib-hezbollah-isis-syria-al-bukamal/.
72 J. Matthew Mcinnis, “Iranian Deterrence Strategy and Use of Proxies” (American

Enterprise Institute, November 29, 2016), https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/

doc/112916_McInnis_Testimony.pdf.
73 Chad Garland, “Iran-Backed Militias Obtained 9 US-Made Abrams Tanks in Iraq,”

Military.com, February 19, 2018, https://www.military.com/daily-news/2018/02/09/

iran-backed-militias-obtained-9-us-made-abrams-tanks-iraq-report.html; Caleb Weiss,
“Iraqi Shi’ Militias Show US-Made Equipment on Road to Samarra,” The FDD’s Long
War Journal, March 4, 2016, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/03/
iraqi-Shi’-militias-show-us-made-equipment-on-road-to-samarra.php; and Amnesty
International, “Iraq: End Irresponsible Arms Transfers Fuelling Militia War Crimes,”
278  Z. GULMOHAMAD

Since 2013, KH, like AAH, has operated in Syria alongside the Syrian
regime. They were one of the first Iraqi Shi’ militias in Syria and con-
tributed to creating Shi’ militias there, such as Liwa Abu Fadl al-Abbas
(LAFA), the Kata’ib Hezbollah Syrian wing.74 KH’s military presence
and operations in Syria agitated the US and Israel, as they created a cor-
ridor of influence from Iran to Iraq and then to Syria and Lebanon via
their close ally, Lebanon’s Hezbollah. Israel’s airstrikes in Syria near the
Iraqi border in June 2018 targeted KH and other Shi’ militias. Around
52 KH were killed, and this sent a message to Tehran that they have to
leave Syria.75 KH’s regional activities include firing rockets at the KSA’s
borders, training Bahraini Shi’ militants, known as Saraya al-Ashtar, and
kidnapping Qatari citizens in order to pressure Doha.76 Al-Muhandis
denies the presence of his and the PMF’s fighters in Yemen fighting
alongside the Houthis. However, he stated there could be Iraqis in one
capacity or another there, and he confirmed the relationship between
the PMF and the Houthi movement.77 Apart from Badr, AAH, and KH,
there are other pro-Iran militias.

Amnesty International, January 5, 2017, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/

news/2017/01/iraq-end-irresponsible-arms-transfers-fuelling-militia-war-crimes/.
74 Matthew Levitt and Phillip Smyth, “Katiab Al-Imam Ali; Portrait of an Iraqi

Shiite Militant Group Fighting ISIS” (The Washington Institute, January 5, 2015),
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/kataib-al-imam-ali-
portrait-of-an-iraqi-shiite-militant-group-fighting-isis.
75 Seth J. Frantzman, “Israel Struck Iranian Backed Shi’ Militia in Iraq
with Russian Ok,” June 19, 2018, https://www.jpost.com/International/
Israel-struck-Iranian-backed-Shi’-militia-in-Iraq-with-Russian-approval-560360.
76 Michael Eisenstadt and Michael Knights, ­ “Mini-Hizballahs, Revolutionary Guard
Knock-Offs, and the Future of Iran’s Militant Proxies in Iraq,” War on the Rocks, May
9, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/05/mini-hizballahs-revolutionary-guard-
knock-offs-and-the-future-of-irans-militant-proxies-in-iraq/; David Andrew Weinberg,
“Bahrain and Iran Expel Each Other’s Diplomats,” Policy Brief (Foundation for Defence
and Democracy, October 5, 2015), http://www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/
david-weinberg-bahrain-and-iran-expel-each-others-diplomats/.
77 David Daoud, “PMF Deputy Commander Muhandis Details Hezbollah Ops in

Iraq,” FDD’s Long War Journal, January 9, 2017, https://www.longwarjournal.org/

archives/2017/01/pmf-deputy-commander-muhandis-details-hezbollah-ops-in-iraq.php.
 9  THE EVOLUTION OF IRAQ’S …  279

Other Pro-Iran Militias

Former PM al-Maliki officially permitted other pro-Iran Shi’ mili-
tias to operate against IS. These include: Kata’ib Jund al-Imam (led by
Ahmed al-Asadi, a former spokesperson of the PMF and current spokes-
man of the Fatah Alliance); Kata’ib al-Imam Ali (its political wing is the
Movement of Islamic Iraq, Harakat al-Iraq al-Islamiyah), which is led by
Shebl al-Zaidi and closely linked to KH; Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba;
and Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada.78 The latter three and Saraya al-Khoras-
ani have been active in Syria. Although they are splintered in Syria, they
use the term Heydariyoun (followers of the lion, a reference to Ali ibn
Abi Talib, the fourth Muslim caliph) to refer to themselves collectively.79
The pro-Iran militias are fighting alongside Bashar Assad’s armed forces,
Iranian advisors and elite fighters, and Lebanon’s Hezbollah against Arab
Sunni-armed groups, including the Free Syrian Army, IS, and Saudi-led
proxies in Syria. Iraqi Shi’ militias in Syria are bolstering the extension of
Iran’s axis with the aim of leveraging the Assad regime against opposi-
tional forces and proxy forces supported by KSA.
Shi’ militias have played a leading role alongside the ISF to regain territory
from IS. However, they faced some restraints in several key battles by the
former PM Haider al-Abadi and the US-led coalition because of their links
to Tehran, the IRGC-QF, the Iranian foreign intelligence agency, and the
Iranian Supreme Leader.80 All pro-Iran militias have openly announced their
rejection of the US-led coalition’s military involvement in Iraq; some have
even declared their intention and willingness to attack US forces.81
There are clear indications that pro-Iran Iraqi militias are embrac-
ing Lebanon’s Hezbollah model. Besides their affinity and loyalty to

78 Mansour and Jabar, “The Popular Mobilization Forces and Iraq’s Future.”
79 Ali Alfoneh, “Fractured Iraq Shi’ Militias in Syria,” The Arab Gulf States Institute in
Washington, August 22, 2018, https://agsiw.org/fractured-iraqi-Shi’-militias-in-syria/.
80 Jamal Ashtwee, “Iran’s Role in Mosul Operation Is Bigger Than of Iraq’s (In Arabic),”

Al-Riyadh, March 25, 2016, http://www.alriyadh.com/1541320.

81 Ahmad Majidyar, “Hezbollah: We’re Ready to Fight American Troops in Iraq,” Middle

East Institute, September 15, 2017, http://www.mei.edu/content/io/kata-ib-hezbollah-

we-re-ready-fight-american-troops-iraq; “Iraqi Shi’ite Militias Pledge to Fight U.S. Forces
if Deployed,” Reuters, December 1, 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-
crisis-usa-iraq/iraqi-shiite-militias-pledge-to-fight-u-s-forces-if-deployed-idUSKBN0TK-
5KQ20151201.
280  Z. GULMOHAMAD

Iran, Iraqi Shi’ militias have adopted Lebanon’s Hezbollah model as a

social–political movement, providing services for poor Shi’ communities
and becoming an economic, intellectual, and religious hub. Lebanon’s
Hezbollah has tried to be relatively pragmatic in their interaction with
other political components. For instance, they have tried to achieve a
majority in the government and to moderate some of their objectives,
while using force to influence politics.82 Likewise, the Iraqi pro-Iran mili-
tias are increasingly interfering in policymaking and attempting to chal-
lenge the moderate figures or those who oppose them in the government
and in the political process. At the same time, they seek to cut deals or
forge tactical relationships with non-Shi’ figures. The Iraqi militias have
so far successfully mimicked Lebanon’s Hezbollah’s effectiveness in pur-
suing multiple goals.83 The following part examines Iraqi non-Shi’ ethnic
and religious minority militias affiliated with and promoted by Shi’ mili-
tias that are part of the PMF.

The PMF’s Subsidiary Minority Groups

There are minority militias affiliated with PMF factions, including Arab
Sunni and micro-minorities (the term representing non-Shi’, Arab Sunni,
or Kurd) such as Christian, Yazidi, Shabak, Turkmen, and Kurd (Shi’)
militias. Segments of communities within these different ethnic–­religious
group militias have been supported by the PMF and their militias for
three main reasons. First, their inclusion depicts the PMF as desiring
to cross-sectarian and ethnic lines and to represent the entirety of Iraq
instead of only the Shi’ population. Second, they serve the PMF polit-
ical and security interests for the foreseeable future. Third, they help
to fill security vacuums in areas where Shi’ militias are thinner on the
ground and or are less welcome by locals. The affiliated minority and
­micro-minority militias do not have any military or tactical power on the
battlefield; therefore, they have been utilized as instruments to control
specific areas and political tools to serve PMF interests.

82 Krista E. Weigand, “Reformation of a Terrorist Group: Hezbollah as a Lebanese

Political Party,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 32, no. 8 (2008): 669–80, https://doi.
org/10.1080/10576100903039320.
83 Daniel L. Byman and Bernard Gwertzman, “Hezbollah: Most Powerful Political

Movement in Lebanon,” Council on Foreign Relations, May 29, 2008, https://www.cfr.

org/interview/hezbollah-most-powerful-political-movement-lebanon.
 9  THE EVOLUTION OF IRAQ’S …  281

Other non-Shi’ subsidiary militias within the PMF are Hashd

al-A’Shari or regional (al-Manatiqi) Arab Sunni tribesmen, who are
lightly equipped and weakly sponsored by the PMF under the super-
vision of Chairman Falih al-Fayyadh. Most of the minority and
­micro-minority militias are not affiliated with pro-Iran Shi’ militias, such
as Hashd al-A’Shari al-Anbari and the Lions of Nineveh forces in Rabia
located in the west part of Mosul.84 However, a number have links with
pro-Iran leaders and militias, such as Liwa Salah al-din that is close to
al-Muhandis and Quwat al-Shahid Omayyat al-Jibara that is closely
linked to Badr.85 Iraqi officials estimate that Hashd al-A’Shari totals
around 30,000 and includes at least two dozen militias.86 The Arab-
Sunni minority militias are officially linked to the PMF, as they control
their areas in coordination with the Shi’ militias, while the latter are una-
ble to control the large swathes of land that are inhabited by majority
Arab Sunnis. Although a couple of Hashd al-A’Shari leaders are affiliated
with the PMF, some disapprove of the PMF’s loyalty to Iran. Yet, as they
do not have any alternatives, being within the structure of the PMF pro-
vides them with resources and official approval to operate. Arab Sunni
tribal leaders have complained that their fighters, unlike the Shi’ militias,
have not received salaries or have been poorly equipped and supported.87
84 Zana Gulmohamad, “Unseating the Caliphate: Contrasting the Challenges of

Liberating Fallujah and Mosul,” CTC Sentinel 9, no. 10 (October 2016): 16–27.
85 Nour Samaha, “Iraq’s ‘Good Sunnis,’” Foreign Policy, November 16, 2016, http://

foreignpolicy.com/2016/11/16/iraqs-good-sunni/; Dury-Agri, Kassim, and Martin,

“Iraq’s Security Forces and Popular Mobilization Forces.”
86 Saleh Ibrahim, “Iraq’s New Militias Law Could Make Sunni Tribes More Powerful

(In Arabic),” An-Nahar, December 8, 2016, https://www.niqash.org/ar/articles/

politics/5421/.
87 Mahmoud Said, “Hashd Al-A’shari Its Creation, Aims and Future (In Arabic),”

June 26, 2017, http://www.roayahnews.com/articles/2017/6/26/1188/; “After the

Hopelessness from Baghdad.. Anbar Council: Hashd al-A’shari Calls the International
Community for Support to Be Able to Fight Daesh (In Arabic),” Al-Sharq al-Aw-
sat, September 17, 2015, https://aawsat.com/home/article/454486/%D8%A8%
D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A3%D8%B3-%D9%85%D9%86-
%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%C2%AB%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9
%86%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1%C2%BB-%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%AF-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AC%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%B9-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D9%8A-%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%A
7%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%A7-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%AD%D
8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%A9-%C2%AB%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4%C2%BB?
amp.
282  Z. GULMOHAMAD

The PMF’s micro-minority militias include Christian Chaldean,

Syrian, and Assyrian militias, such as the Brigades of the Spirit of God
Jesus Son of Mary (Kata’ib Rouh Allah Issa Ibn Miriam) that is part
of the Imam Ali Battalion.88 The latter pro-Iran Shi’ militias promote
Christian sub-armed militias allegedly to show that they are not against
Christians or any other ethnic–religious groups. Kata’ib Babylon is offi-
cially supported by the PMF and has close ties with pro-Iran militias.89
Several Iraqi-Turkmen militias are linked and supported by Shi’ militias;
these include the Turkmen Brigades that are affiliated with Badr, and
Liwa al-Hussein, a majority Shi’-Turkmen and minority Yazidi militia.90
An example of a Shabak militia is Liwa Shabak/Qwuat Sahl Nineveh,
which has a presence in the Nineveh plains, is linked to Badr, and oper-
ates under the patronage of the PMF.91 The Faily Kurd (Shi’) militias
affiliated with Badr operate in Diyala.92 These militias are small, so they
do not make strategic changes on the ground and do not represent their
entire communities; rather, they control small areas, such as towns and
villages in the Nineveh plains. The existence of various minority and
­micro-minority militias within the PMF and the Shi’ militia structure
provides an artificial image that the PMF is a cross-ethnic–religious mil-
itary umbrella that defends the entire country. The purpose of minority
and ­micro-minority militias being part of the PMF is largely for self-de-
fense against IS, as the PMF provides them with very limited support
that includes training for some militias, whereas the IA was unable to
offer protection. The next section discusses Iraqi Shi’ militias within
the PMF structure that neither adhere to Tehran nor follow the Iranian
Supreme Leader or Vilayat-i Faqih.

88 Gulmohamad, “Iraq’s Shi’ Militias,” 3–6.

89 Gulmohamad, “Unseating the Caliphate,” 16–27.
90 Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi, “Hashd Brigades Number Index,” October 31, 2017,

http://www.aymennjawad.org/2017/10/hashd-brigade-numbers-index.
91 Aaron Y. Zelin and Philipp Smyth, “Hiballah Cavalcade: Quat Sahl Ninawa: Iraq’s Shi’

Shabak Get Their Own Militia,” Jihadology, January 12, 2015, http://jihadology.net/
category/quwat-sahl-ninawa/.
92 Ahmad Umar, “Shi’ Kurds Volunteer in Hashd Al-Shaabi and Reject Peshmerga (In

Arabic),” Arabi 21, February 16, 2015, https://arabi21.com/story/809839/‫≠ةعيش≠داركأ‬

‫ةكرمشيبلا≠نوضفريو≠دشحلا≠ايشيليم≠†ب≠نوعوطتي‬.
 9  THE EVOLUTION OF IRAQ’S …  283

Iraqi Non-Khamenei Militias

The following Shi’ militias are part of the PMF and are not united in
doctrines, military command, or agenda. They do not adhere to Vilayat-i
Faqih or answer to Khamenei or Iranian decision-making circles, in con-
trast to the first category of militias analyzed above. While these militias
are formally under the umbrella of the PMF, they have their own lead-
erships that provides them with space to avoid or outmaneuver orders
from Iran and pro-Iranian leaders. Notwithstanding their efforts for
independence from Iran, there is a degree of coordination and some tac-
tical contacts between the following Shi’ militias and Iran, and particu-
larly between ISCI militias and Iran. Pro-Iran leaders within the PMF are
attenuative and try to assimilate the following forces.

Saraya al-Salam (the Peace Brigades or Regiments)

Saraya al-Salam (SS) is the armed wing of the pro-Muqtada al-Sadr
political parties and answers to the Shi’ populist, politician, and cleric
Muqtada al-Sadr. The SS has no allegiance to Qum (Iran) or Najaf
(Iraq).93 Muqtada al-Sadr is popular in many poor and neglected Shi’
communities and areas.94 Before SS, Muqtada al-Sadr’s movement
organized the Army of the Mahdi (Jaish al-Mahdi: JAM) in 2003, which
had logistical ties to Iran. JAM targeted the ISF, the US-led coalition
and Arab Sunnis, and was defeated in 2004 and 2008 by al-Maliki’s
government and the US forces, respectively. In 2008, Muqtada dis-
banded the militia but maintained a smaller militant group called the
Promised Day Brigade (Liwa al-Youm al-Mawu’d).95 Muqtada and his
Sadrist Movement (al-Tayyar al-Sadri) are populists; they have adopted
Iraqi nationalist, anti-interference, and anti-foreign intervention slogans
in Iraq and have been staunch and long-standing anti-American mili-
tants. Since Muqtada al-Sadr’s return from his self-exile to study in Iran

93 Mustafa Gurbuz, “The Popular Mobilization Forces and Iraq’s next Election,” Arab

Center Washington, DC, September 6, 2017, http://arabcenterdc.org/policy_analyses/

the-popular-mobilization-forces-and-iraqs-next-elections/.
94 Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

2007), 280.
95 Anthony H. Cordesman and Sam Khazai, Iraq in Crisis (Washington: Center for

Strategic and International Studies, 2014), 194, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/

s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/140513_Cordesman_IraqInCrisis_Web.pdf.
284  Z. GULMOHAMAD

(which lasted two to three years), he has pursued an anti-Iranian rheto-

ric, which has been toned down since he came first in Iraq’s 2018 parlia-
mentary elections with 54 seats for the Sairoon coalition.96 Historically,
the al-Sadr family has emphasized Iraqi nationalism, Arabism, and trib-
alism as defining attributes for the Iraqi Shi’. Muqtada al-Sadr’s unpre-
dictable attitude and populism is blended with Iraqi nationalism and
Shi’ Islamism.97 Muqtada has continued to carry on his father Ayatollah
Mohammad Sadiq al-Sadr’s movement and doctrine of Shi’ activism,
and, like his father, he believes in an articulate and outspoken approach
al-Hawza al-Natiqa, where clerics can be involved in politics and govern-
ance. Muqtada al-Sadr’s followers emerged under the name of the Group
of the Second Sadr (Jama’at al-Sadr al-Thani) and were later renamed
Sadr Trend.98
Although SS is supposed to be part of the PMF and played a role
in combating IS, it has its own de facto structure and command and
has been reluctant to completely integrate with the PMF, partly due
to its pro-Iran domination. SS is composed of divisions, brigades, and
battalions. The most powerful military unit within SS is the Rapid
Intervention Brigade (Quwat al-Tadakhul al-Sari’) that possesses
tanks, Humvees, and medium and heavy firepower.99 The exact num-
ber of those in SS is unknown; however, SS claims that, according to
their registration, they have more than 100,000 men. Nonetheless, they
are unable to equip a considerable number of those men due to a lack
of resources and logistics. Some of their military equipment is from
the Iraqi government, and most of their resources are domestically
generated.100
96 O’Driscoll and van Zoonen, “The Hashd Al-Shaabi and Iraq.”
97 Liora Lukitz, “The Shi‘is in Post-Saddam Iraq: A Common Political Front, but
Different Tactics?,” in Post-Saddam Iraq: New Realities, Old Identities, Changing Patterns,
ed. Amnon Cohen and Noga Efrati (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2011), 66.
98 Ibrahim Al-Marashi, “Iraq,” in Guide to Islamist Movements, ed. Barry M Rubin

(Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2010), 266.

99 Caleb Weiss, “Peace Brigades Parades ‘Rapid Intervention Brigade’ in Samarra,”

FDD’s Long War Journal, May 26, 2017, https://www.longwarjournal.org/

archives/2017/05/peace-brigades-parades-rapid-intervention-brigade-in-samarra.php;
Dury-Agri, Kassim, and Martin, “Iraq’s Security Forces and Popular Mobilization Forces.”
100 Gulmohamad, “A Short Profile of Iraq’s Shi’a Militias,” 3–6; Mansour and Jabar,

“The Popular Mobilization Forces and Iraq’s Future”; “Iraqi Cleric Sadr Scales Back His
Militia,” Reuters, June 28, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-election-sadr/
iraqi-cleric-sadr-scales-back-his-militia-idUSKBN1JO2O4.
 9  THE EVOLUTION OF IRAQ’S …  285

The SS political party propaganda and activities have become an

important element as a source of leverage in provincial and parliamentary
elections.101 SS, alongside other militias, have a presence in the south,
such as in Basra and Karbala. Through the PMF, SS has cautiously coor-
dinated with other militias, such as during military operations in Samarra
and Shirqat.102 However, SS has occasionally clashed with pro-Iran mili-
tias, namely, Badr and AAH. The official magazine of SS is Rusul and its
website portrays Muqtada in military uniform as a fighter and applauds
the role of the IA and SS without admiring the PMF. This illustrates the
schism between the PMF’s pro-Iran militias and SS’s de facto hierarchy
that answers to Muqtada.103
Before and during the military campaign against IS, Muqtada
announced several times that US forces are not welcome in Iraq and will
be targeted.104 This and other militia threats, however, did not deter the
US. Muqtada’s position toward Syria has fluctuated; he did not support
the flow of Iraqi fighters to Shi’ jihad in Syria, despite some SS mem-
bers fighting alongside other Iraqi Shi’ militias in Syria.105 Muqtada’s
political and military agenda are complementary and, similar to pro-Iran
militias, he seeks to shape Iraq’s policymaking from inside and outside
the government. However, the differences are that he does not adhere
to Iranian security circles and he projects an Iraqi first policy. In June
2018, Muqtada announced the scaling back or reduction of his SS mili-
tias’ presence, while indicating their continued presence in Baghdad and
the holy sites, including Karbala and Samara. This illustrates likely his

101 Dury-Agri, Kassim, and Martin, “Iraq’s Security Forces and Popular Mobilization

Forces.”
102 “Al-Muhandis Discusses with Saraya al-Salam Leadership the Preparation for

Mosul Operation (In Arabic),” Al-Hashd.net, September 28, 2016, http://al-hashed.

net/2016/09/28/‫جاحلا‬-‫سدنهملا‬-‫ثحبي‬-‫عم‬-‫ةدايق‬-‫ايارس‬-‫لسلا‬.
103 “The Official Facebook Page for Saraya Salam. The Military Media of

Peace Brigades Saraya Salam,” April 4, 2018, https://www.facebook.com/

‫مالعالا‬-‫يبرحلا‬-‫ايارس‬-‫مالسلا‬-381095892084387.
104 Bill Roggio, “US Troops ‘Are a Target for Us,’ Iraq’s Muqtada al Sadr Says,” FDD’s

Long War Journal, July 18, 2016, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/07/

us-troops-are-a-target-for-us-iraqs-muqtada-al-sadr-says.php.
105 Phillip Smyth, “The Shiite Jihad in Syria and Its Regional Effects,” Policy Focus (The

Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2015), https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/

uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus138-v3.pdf.
286  Z. GULMOHAMAD

tendencies to strengthen Baghdad without complete disarmament of his

loyal forces, as the latter could be quickly mobilized should he become
weakened or under political pressure.

Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq’s Brigades

The ISCI includes three main militias: Liwa Saraya A’shuwra, Liwa
al-Muntadhir, and Saraya Ansar al-A’qeeda.106 These militias are loyal to
­
various leaders within ISCI. The militias have debated on taking sides since
ISCI’s former leader, Sayyid Ammar al-Hakim, split from ISCI and created
his own political party: the National wisdom movement (Tayyar al-Hikma
al-Watani). After internal debate, Liwa Saraya A’shuwra, led by Kathem
al-Jabri, and Saraya Ansar al-A’qeeda, led by Jalal al-Din Ali al-Saghir,
remained with ISCI.107 Ammar al-Hakim, the former leader of ISCI is from
the al-Hakim family—one of the most highly regarded Shi’ clerical families
in Iraq that founded SCIRI (now ISCI). SCIRI was established in Iran as
an umbrella for Shi’ resistance. It received assistance and funding from Iran
and had close ties with Khomeini. Nonetheless, post-2003, they distanced
themselves from Iran’s doctrine but maintained their affinity with Iranian
leadership.
Ammar, the former leader of ISCI, formed a political party, the
National Wisdom Movement, in July 2017 because of friction with
senior ISCI members; this was partially because he took relatively inde-
pendent and progressive actions without consulting them or asking for
consent. Post-2003, ISCI has taken a pragmatic approach by working
with Western powers and maintaining historical ties and a friendly rela-
tionship with Iran’s leadership and Lebanon’s Hezbollah. ISCI’s current
militias neither follow Iran’s doctrine nor answer to the PMF’s pro-Iran
command; yet they collaborate on military operations with al-Sistani,
al-Sadr, and pro-Iran militias within the PMF framework. Post-2003,
ISCI experienced periods of losing key figures and factions, including
Badr and Ammar al-Hakim. Consequently, these have weakened their
impact on political and operational levels. This is one of the reasons that
explain their alliance with the pro-Iran militias’ coalition of ­ al-Fatah,
which is headed by ISCI’s former armed wing and leader al-Amiri in
Iraq’s 2018 parliamentary elections. Due to the fragmentation within
106 Gulmohamad, “A Short Profile of Iraq’s Shi’a Militias,” 5–7.
107 “SarayaAshuwra Fighters Free to Follow Hakim or ISCI (In Arabic),” KM Media, July
31, 2017, https://www.knoozmedia.com/241905/‫ايارس‬-‫ءاروشاع‬-‫ريخت‬-‫اهيلتاقم‬-‫نيب‬-‫تلالا‬/.
 9  THE EVOLUTION OF IRAQ’S …  287

ISCI’s leadership, the militias have been increasingly moving closer to

pro-Iran Shi’ militias’ command and Iran’s leadership. The next militia
emerged after Sistani’s fatwa and closely follows Najaf’s leadership, led
by al-Sistani and not by Tehran and Qum in Iran.

Hashd al-Sistani
This cluster of militias has several monikers, such as Hashd ­al-Sistani,
which means the crowd that follows al-Sistani, and pro-Hawza, which
refers to the Shi’ seminary in Najaf, where prominent Shi’ scholars are
based and Shi’ students are trained for religious purposes. Hashd al-
Sistani volunteers joined militias after Ayatollah a­l-al-Sistani’s fatwa in
2014, before which most of the aforementioned militias existed. Hashd
al-Sistani or Hawza militias do not have political ambitions, answer
to Najaf’s religious establishment led by al-Sistani, and are linked to
pro-Sistani institutions, including A’tabat al-A’basya, A’taba al-Alawi-
yya al-Muqadasa, A’taba al-Hussaniya al-Muqadasa, and Saraya al-A’taba
al-Hussaniya.108 In addition to these four militias that relate to and hold
similar names, there are other pro-Sistani militias, such as Al-Abbas fight-
ing division (Furqat al-Abbaas al-Qitaliya -FAQ), Liwa Ali Akbar, and
Liwa Ansar al-Marjia.109 These forces are an integral part of the PMF
and have close ties to the ISF and its command. The most highly skilled
militia within this category is FAQ, which has an intelligence section and
operates drones. They have just over 7000 active fighters and between
35,000 and 40,000 reserve members.110
Pro-Sistani volunteers reflect the vision of the moderate Marjia (reli-
gious reference) and, to a great extent, are aligned with the Iraqi state
and not with any Iranian doctrines or politics. After the territorial defeat
of the IS in Iraq, Hawza militias, such as FAQ, have been engaged in
social and cultural activities; for example, setting up conferences to call

108 Gulmohamad, “A Short Profile of Iraq’s Shi’a Militias,” 5–7.

109 Gulmohamad, 5–7; “Liwa Ansar Al-Marja’iyya,” Jihad Intel presented by Middle
East Forum, accessed September 7, 2019, http://jihadintel.meforum.org/group/206/
liwa-ansar-al-marjaiyya.
110 Michael Knights and Malik Hamdi, “The Al-Abbas Combat Division Model:

Reducing Iranian Influence in Iraq’s Security Forces,” Policy Analysis (The Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, August 22, 2017), http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/
policy-analysis/view/the-al-abbas-combat-division-model.
288  Z. GULMOHAMAD

on the government to provide services to disadvantaged families and

those who lost individuals in the war against IS.111
Pro-Sistani militias refuse to meet or take advice directly from Iranian
advisors unless in the presence of an Iraqi official,112 but they do coordi-
nate with pro-Iran militias through the PMF in order to conduct oper-
ations against IS.113 Pro-al-Sadr and pro-ISCI militias enjoy friendly
relations with p ­ro-Sistani militias.114 There are some tensions on the
administrative and logistical levels between pro-Sistani volunteers and
the PMF’s Deputy Chairman al-Muhandis. For example, the latter did
not pay the entire salary of the FAQ, forcing some of them to resign.
The FAQ Commander Maytham al-Zaidi was told by ­al-Muhandis that
because his fighters did not obey al-Muhandis, he should find the salaries
elsewhere. Eventually, al-Sistani’s foundations filled the financial gap.115
Although they coordinate on the battlefield, there is a clear schism
between the pro-Iran and pro-Sistani militias. Another dynamic of the
differences is that Ayatollah al-Sistani is not supporting the PMF and
militia leaders’ involvement in politics or participation in the Iraqi elec-
tions or allowing the use of the PMF’s resources and popularity for elec-
tion purposes.116 For instance, al-Fatah’s speaker stated, “although we
don’t rely on the PMF’s military apparatus, we rely on their reputation in
regard to the election.”117 Eventually, in order to color their involvement

111 “Al-A’taba al-A’Basiya al-Muqadasa. Qiadat Furqat al-A’bass Convene at Their

Periodic Meeting with Their Representatives from the Governorates (In Arabic),” March
31, 2018, http://www.alabbas.iq/view.php?act=news&id=445.
112 Alaaldin, “Containing Shiite Militias.”

113 O’Driscoll and van Zoonen, “The Hashd Al-Shaabi and Iraq.”

114 Alaaldin, “Containing Shiite Militias.”

115 Mustafa Habib, “Formerly Armed Angels? The Controversial Iraqi Militia That

Now Prefers Social Work to Politics,” Niqash: briefings from inside and across Iraq,
accessed September 6, 2019, http://www.niqash.org/en/articles/security/5873/The–­­
Controversial-Iraqi-Militia-That-Now-Prefers-Social-Work-To-Politics.htm.
116 Bilge Nesibe Kotan, “Why Ayatollah Sistani Opposes Hashd al Shaabi to Run for

Iraqi Elections?,” TRT World, December 15, 2017, https://www.trtworld.com/mea/

why-ayatollah-sistani-opposes-hashd-al-shaabi-to-run-for-iraqi-elections--13337; Usama
Al-Sistani Mahdi, “Weapons Should Be under the State’s Monopoly and Distance Hashd
from the Elections (In Arabic),” Elaph, November 30, 2017, http://elaph.com/Web/
News/2017/11/1179192.html.
117 “Al-Asadi to al-Mayadeen: American Threats Will Destabilize the Region

(In Arabic),” Al-Mayadeen, April 12, 2018, http://www.almayadeen.net/news/

politics/870898/.
 9  THE EVOLUTION OF IRAQ’S …  289

in politics, the PMF leaders will need to publicly shed their military uni-
forms and militia affiliations to participate in the elections. However,
behind closed doors, it is business as usual.

Conclusion
The rise of Hashd al-Sha’abi filled a security vacuum and demonstrated
the support for Shi’ communities in Iraq who, due to the IS, felt humili-
ated, threatened, besieged, and defenseless.118 However, the ascendance
of the PMF has also served as a political platform for the Shi’ factions
and militias to flex their muscle, politically and ideologically, as well as to
promote their various agendas. After more than three years of military
operations in Iraq, the country’s territories have recovered, partly due to
the PMF’s forces. However, human rights violations against Arab Sunnis
and minority groups by PMF militias include extrajudicial killings, tor-
ture, abduction, arson, and the looting of civilian and public property.119
This has significantly undermined PMF’s credibility as a force to main-
tain security and stability.
Due to the schism among the PMF groups and the interference and
influence of Iranians, especially the IRGC-QF, two hierarchies of com-
mand exist: informal and formal.120 Informal command applies to the
pro-Iran militias that answer to Khamenei and Iran’s security circles,
including Qasem Soleimani through Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis. The latter
leads the pro-Iran Shi’ militias, and while he does not have a close rela-
tionship with Muqtada al-Sadr’s or al-Sistani’s militias, he has a friendly
relationship with ISCI. The formal command applies to non-pro-Iran
militias that answer to Iraq’s armed forces’ Commander-in-Chief (the
PM) through Falih al-Fayyadh, the Chairman of the PMF, and their mili-
tia leaders and political wing elites.

118 Hassan Abbas, “The Myth and Reality of Iraq’s al-Hashd al-Shaabi (Popular

Mobilization Forces): A Way Forward” (Amman Office: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES),

September 2017), http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/amman/13689.pdf.
119 “Iraq: Ban Abusive Militias from Mosul Operation. Unpunished Killings, Torture Put

Civilians in Harm’s Way,” Human Rights Watch, July 31, 2016, https://www.hrw.org/
news/2016/07/31/iraq-ban-abusive-militias-mosul-operation.
120 Dury-Agri, Kassim, and Martin, “Iraq’s Security Forces and Popular Mobilization

Forces.”
290  Z. GULMOHAMAD

Although the pro-Iran militia leaders, including al-Muhandis, would

deny this, in practice it is an ongoing process and it is evident that their
loyalty is to their sponsor: Iran. Some of the non-pro-Iran militias have
no choice but to coordinate and collaborate with pro-Iran militias,
partly due to their limited materials, as the pro-Iran militias have exten-
sive resources and Iranian support. Pro-Iran militias, unlike pro-Sistani
militias, actively interfere in Iraqi policymaking, including foreign affairs.
The Shi’ house (al-Bayt al-Shi’’y) is fragmented, and this was evident
in the 2018 Iraqi parliamentary elections. The militias’ and their lead-
ers’ interests and goals are not limited to resources and the battlefield.
The pro-Iran militias are becoming increasingly represented in al-Fatah
or conquest alliance that is led by Badr and al-Amiri and represented the
second largest coalition in 2018 elections.
Muqtada al-Sadr is the winner and the kingmaker of the 2018 elec-
tion, and his Sairoon coalition includes Sadr’s new Integrity Party and
the Iraqi Communist Party, a rare coalition where Muqtada al-Sadr seeks
to depict a non-sectarian agenda. Two key figures from the Dawa Party
have formed rival coalitions: Former PM al-Abadi’s Victory Coalition
(Itilaf al-Nasr) came third with 42 seats, and former PM al-Maliki’s
State of Law Coalition (SLC) (Dawlat al-Qanoon) gained 25 seats.
­Post-election, alliances are forged, and deals are cut between rivals. After
the 2018 elections, Muqtada al-Sadr, al-Abadi, al-Hakim, and other non-
Shi’ parties and coalitions formed a bloc that is portrayed as non-Iran
leaning, whereas al-Fatah and al-Maliki’s SLC, Falih al-Fayyadh, and
other parties formed the al-Binna bloc, which is closely linked to Iran.
In the process of formulating the government, there is a competition to
appoint key loyalist figures in central and powerful positions, which leads
to a fragile government.
The recent US policy toward Iran, including its withdrawal from the
nuclear deal (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action), adding more
sanctions, and designation of the IRGC as a terrorist organization,
would most likely further polarize Iraqi factions, including the PMF mili-
tias. Pro-Iran militias might employ more confrontational behavior with
moderate Iraqi actors, consequently leading to further political instabil-
ity. However, the pro-Iran militia domination could face resistance from
Iraqi political and civil societies who do not welcome Iran’s interference
and influence in Iraq via the militias.
The militias’ sectarian politics and nature remains a challenge to
Iraq’s weak state institutions and for the country’s fragile security and
 9  THE EVOLUTION OF IRAQ’S …  291

the reconciliation efforts between communities. Therefore, reducing the

PMF’s influence and avoiding the return of another version of IS will
require strengthening of the national state institutions, fighting cor-
ruption and nepotism, focusing on providing services to citizens; and
strengthening the traditional armed forces, thereby avoiding any oppor-
tunity for the PMF’s militias to fill the security vacuum.
As this chapter has demonstrated, the PMF’s militias are not mono-
lithic in terms of ideology, loyalties, and goals; their actions have been
shaped by various visions and there are clear differences and tensions
between them. Pro-Iran militias have become an essential instrument for
Tehran to expand its leverage and influence and to execute its agenda,
not just in Iraq but in the Gulf Region (e.g., Bahrain, Yemen) and the
broader Middle East (e.g., Syria, Lebanon). The pro-Iran Iraqi mili-
tias push back against the KSA/UAE-led bloc (see Table 14.1) in favor
of Iran.

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296  Z. GULMOHAMAD

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 CHAPTER 10

Between the PYD and the Islamic State:

The Complex Role of Non-state
Actors in Syria

Naomí Ramírez Díaz

Introduction
The popular uprising in Syria in 2011 against the rule of Bashar
­al-Assad began as a popular, cross-sectarian, leaderless, and non-violent
movement for freedom and dignity, where sectors of the population with
very different ethnic and religious backgrounds played key roles. At a
later stage, however, the civil movement against the regime turned into
a military conflict in the form of a civil war and into a regional proxy
war as a result of the interference of regional and international state and
­non-state actors of different types. These overlapping levels of confronta-
tion made the political, social, and military scenario much more complex:
Syria ended up divided into different spheres of influence, dominated by
warlords and militias.
Among those major actors who managed, at some point, to bring
wide-scale areas under their control, two non-state actors acquired

N. Ramírez Díaz (*) 
Arabic and Islamic Studies, Independent Researcher,
Madrid, Spain

© The Author(s) 2020 303

P. O. Amour (ed.), The Regional Order in the Gulf Region
and the Middle East, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45465-4_10
304  N. RAMÍREZ DÍAZ

special relevance in the years between 2014 and 2017, which confirmed the
hypothesis that violent non-state actors had grown in importance on the
ground and, despite their present retreat, could still have an impact on
the future development in the broader Middle East.1 One of these actors
is the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD), with its armed wing,
the People’s Protection Units (YPG), a main component of the then
US-supported Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Another is the n ­ ow-defunct
self-declared Islamic Caliphate/Islamic State (IS), which we will refer to
as Daesh (an Arabic acronym used by the local population for Al-Dawla
al-Islamiya fi-l-Iraqi wa-l-Sham, the IS in Iraq and Syria or the Levant).
Although their origins, background, and human resources are very
different, the PYD-YPG and Daesh shared some characteristics regard-
ing policies and rhetoric that are worth highlighting. For instance, both
­non-state actors have usually been included in the loose concept of oppo-
sition to the Assad regime, even though their relationship with Damascus
has been very ambivalent, to say the least. In addition, both resorted to a
chauvinist rhetoric in their claims to authority (parallel to that of the sec-
tarian militias fighting on the side of the Assad regime), which alienated
the local populations and contradicted the basic principles of the uprising
that, ironically, had paved the way for their promotion. This has been
especially significant in the city of Raqqa, the first regional capital freed
from the Assad regime control. Both groups managed to take over it at
different times and used it as a scenario to display their muscle.
By controlling large portions of land and establishing some form of
government, both Daesh and the PYD-YPG gave shape to state-like
entities with different governmental and law-enforcing bodies. It is in
this sense that, throughout the text, I will try to show how important
­non-state actors became at some point in the Syrian conflict and how
they challenged the authority of both the Syrian regime and the main
political opposition body, namely the National Coalition of Syrian
Revolution and Opposition Forces (NC).
This chapter presents the argument that Daesh and the PYD, despite
their differences and apparently antagonistic ethos, managed to take
advantage of the victimization narrative in order to achieve their main
aim: the establishment of an autonomous state-like entity. To illustrate

1 Özden Zeynep Oktav, Emel Parlar dal, and Ali Murat Kurşun, eds., Violent Non-State

Actors and the Syrian Civil War: The ISIS and YPG Cases (London: Springer International
Publishing, 2018), 1.
 10  BETWEEN THE PYD AND THE ISLAMIC STATE …  305

this, I start by analyzing the factors that led to the rise of these two
non-state actors, their differences and similarities, and the actors
­
supporting them.

Non-state Actors with State-Like Characteristics

Defining what non-state actors are is problematic, but there is wide con-
sensus regarding the fact that groups belonging to civil society, such as
NGOs, political parties, or cultural associations, fit into this category.
This is because none of them are either states per se or actors whose
actions fall within the framework of state institutions.2 As such, any char-
acteristic that suggests otherwise will automatically put their ascription
at stake. Both Daesh and the PYD made advances toward some form of
para-state.3
In the case of Daesh, its strategy is widely believed to have been
inspired by Abu Bakr al-Naji’s The Administration of Savagery, whose
first step is the infiltration into a territory where the central government’s
authority is weak in order to establish sleeper cells in charge of ­collecting
information. After that, the brains behind this operation must set up
administration and dawa offices, until they are able to earn the local
population’s approval and take over the local administration.4 The expla-
nation behind this is the fact that Daesh’ cadres are usually foreigners and

2 Daphné Josselin and William Wallace, “Non-State Actors in World Politics: A

Framework,” in Non-State Actors in World Politics, ed. Daphné Josselin and William Wallace
(New York: Palgrave, 2001), 1–20; Andrew Clapham, “Non-State Actors,” in Post-Conflict
Peacebuilding: A Lexicon, ed. Vincent Chetail (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009),
200–212.
3 Stephen M. Walt, “ISIS as Revolutionary State: New Twist on an Old Story,” Foreign

Affairs, December 2015, 42; Mehmet Gurses, “Transnational Ethnic Kin and Civil War
Outcomes,” Political Research Quarterly 68, no. 1 (March 2015): 142–53, https://doi.
org/10.1177/1065912914554042; and Ekaterina A. Stepanova, Terrorism in Asymmetric
Conflict: Ideological and Structural Aspects (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 39–40.
4 Abu Bakr Al-Naji, “Idarat Al-Tawahhush (in Arabic),” accessed September 6, 2019,

https://www.cia.gov/library/abbottabad-compound/20/207DE0C1094BC68A7061
C96629DD5C1A_adara_twahsh.pdf. According to Al-Arabiya Institute for Studies, this
author’s real identity is Muhammad Khalil al-Hakaymah, author of several books and pam-
phlets on jihad.
306  N. RAMÍREZ DÍAZ

not local elements, as was the case in Syria.5 In the case of the YPG and
PYD, since they operated (at least in the early stages of the uprising) in
Kurdish majority regions or areas densely populated by Kurds, they did
not need to resort to what Akın Ünver calls “pre-territorialisation” meth-
ods to earn people’s approval.6 Nevertheless, they did offer Arabs and
other minority sectors of the population some governmental positions,7
in an attempt to show how committed to pluralism they were.8
Back to Daesh, during the “post-territorialisation” stage, the group’s
modus operandi was based on taking over the administration and estab-
lishing a system deeply rooted in an extreme interpretation of religion
preserved by means of the strict enforcement of religious rules.9 This
could only be achieved from a position of confrontation with society,
which was also the cornerstone of its relationship with Kurdish areas,
where the local authorities focused on the creation of safe zones far from
extremist interpretations of religion and governed autonomously. This
contrasted with Daesh’s preference for centralization, inherited from
the strong centralized policies of the Iraqi State under Saddam Hussein,
where they learned the ropes of state-building and consolidation. These
differences notwithstanding, in both cases, we were dealing with actors
that challenged traditional definitions of non-state actors by creat-
ing state-like entities and advancing toward some form of autonomy: a
formal State in the case of Daesh, and a widely autonomous
self-government in the case of the PYD.
Moreover, because Daesh and the PYD had more or less similar
aspirations at the time when they had a strong presence in the north and
north-eastern areas of Syria, they were somehow interdependent in the

5 Yassin al-Haj Saleh, “Tabaqat Daesh (in Arabic),” Al-Jumhuriya, February 12, 2016,

https://www.aljumhuriya.net/ar/content/%D8%B7%D8%A8%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AA-%
D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4.
6 Akın Ünver, “Contested Geographies: How ISIS and YPG Rule ‘No-Go’ Areas in

Northern Syria,” in Violent Non-State Actors and the Syrian Civil War: The ISIS and YPG
Cases, ed. Özden Zeynep Oktav, Emel Parlar Dal, and Ali Murat Kurşun (London: Springer
International Publishing, 2018), 40.
7 For example, in March 2016, Mansour Salloum, original co-president of Tell Abyad, was

elected to lead the Rojava Constituent Assembly.

8 Ghadi Sary, “Kurdish Self-Governance in Syria: Survival and Ambition,” Research Paper

(London: Chatham House, September 2016), 13, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/

default/files/publications/research/2016-09-15-kurdish-self-governance-syria-sary_0.pdf.
9 Ünver, “Contested Geographies,” 40.
 10  BETWEEN THE PYD AND THE ISLAMIC STATE …  307

sense that their projects were incompatible and that there was a zero-sum
confrontation between them: their state-like projects could not coexist,
but in order to push for their particular goals, they needed the other as
an alter-ego justifying each other’s presence and actions. Therefore, even
though their relationship appeared to be strictly confrontational, as sug-
gested by their in-fighting in northern Syria, it was up to a certain extent
relatively symbiotic.
In the following section, I will address the Kurdish case and its back-
ground and origins in a heterogeneous country like Syria, in order to
understand its role as a non-state actor.

The Origins of the Syrian Kurdish Question

Although the so-called Kurdish question has had an impact in recent
Syrian history, it is not a particular Syrian issue, but a broader regional
one, which affects Turkey, Iran, and Iraq as well, since those are the
countries where the territory claimed by Kurdish nationalists as h ­ istorical
Kurdistan is located, even if Kurdish populations are far from mono-
lithic.10 Nevertheless, it is in Turkey and Iraq that it has received more
attention until recent times, mainly due to its implications in a potential
redefinition of Middle Eastern frontiers. In this sense, we cannot tackle
this topic without referring to a broader regional context.
The dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the drawing of the c­ urrent
boundaries in the broader Middle East, based in theory on ethnic and
linguistic factors, among other things, disregarded the Kurdish peo-
ples in the region, who ended up divided into four separate states. While
Turkey got the largest proportion of Kurds, Syria not only got the small-
est, but its Kurdish population also did not occupy a continuum of land.11
In fact, according to William G. Elphinston, apart from some long-estab-
lished thousands of Kurds in Damascus, the Kurdish presence in Syria was
almost entirely the result of an arbitrary decision. In 1925, the Aleppo–
Baghdad railway was chosen as the frontier between Turkey and Syria, de

10 Rostom Mahmoud, “Al-Inqisam Wa Masirat al Taharrur Fi l Wijdan al Kurdi al Mu’asir

(in Arabic),” Al-Jumhuriya, January 20, 2016, https://www.aljumhuriya.net/ar/34490.

11 Yassin Al Haj Saleh, Al-thawra al-mustahila: al-thawra, al-harb al-ahliya wa al-harb al-amma

fi Suriya (in Arabic) (Beirut: Al-mu’assasa al-arabiya li-l-dirasat wa-l-nashr, 2017), 271–86.
308  N. RAMÍREZ DÍAZ

facto dividing some Kurdish areas between the two countries.12 After the
establishment of the French Mandate in Syria, however, this country became
a favorite safe haven for Kurdish refugees coming from Turkey,13 adding fuel
to the version later used by the successive Syrian governments to deprive its
Kurdish citizens of their rights.
After the French withdrawal from Syria in 1946, the Kurdish ­minority
seemed to adapt reasonably well to the new conditions14; but, in an
atmosphere of mounting pan-Arab exaltation, its presence was regarded
as non-desirable.15 In the early 1960s, the state deprived thousands
of Kurds of their Syrian nationality on the grounds that they or their
parents had been refugees from Turkey during the French Mandate.16 As
a result, Syria’s Kurdish population joined forces to resist the impositions
of the Baathist State from 1963 on.
Since the second half of the twentieth century, two main c­urrents
developed among Kurdish societies in the region. One of them was
nationalist and believed in the right of Kurds to achieve their goal
of an independent country. The other one, classified as democratic,
claimed that the very essence of the Kurdish question was rooted in
the economic, political, and sectarian complexities in the countries that
Kurdistan was divided into, which meant that Kurds could not achieve
any of their aspirations in those countries where the state was a mere
instrument in the hands of the authoritarian governing elite. In other
words, “the Kurdish wound is nothing else than part of the largest
wound of the peoples of those countries.”17

12 Willian Graham Elphinston, “The Kurdish Question,” International Affairs (Royal

Institute of International Affairs) 22, no. 1 (1946): 100, https://doi.org/10.2307/3017874.

13 Elphinston, 100.

14 Cecil J. Edmonds, “Kurdish Nationalism,” Journal of Contemporary History 6, no. 1

(1971): 103; Elphinston, “The Kurdish Question,” 100–103.

15 A few years after most Arab countries achieved their Independence from the French

and the English metropolis, the regimes that came to power had a nationalist character,
reinforced by Nasser’s rising star and experiences like the United Arab Republic between
Syria and Egypt, which lasted between 1958 and 1961.
16 Edmonds, “Kurdish Nationalism,” 103 This was the result of a tricky census carried out

in 1962, which deprived a large number of Kurdish citizens from their nationality. As a result,
they became either ajanib (foreigners) or maktumeen (non-existent, concealed), without rights.
17 Kevin Mazur and Kheder Khaddour, “The Struggle for Syria’s Regions,” Middle East

Report, no. 269 (Winter 2013): 5.

 10  BETWEEN THE PYD AND THE ISLAMIC STATE …  309

In Syria, the Assad regime (consolidated between 1970 and 1971) did
nothing to improve the situation. For instance, it developed a plan known
as the Arab belt, which guided the relocation of Arab tribes affected by the
flooding of their lands after the creation of the Tabqa Dam to areas of the
Jazira in order to prevent Kurds from establishing contact with their coun-
terparts in other countries. In addition, Kurdish villages were renamed
with Arab names and fertile private lands in the region were turned into
public property. Finally, Kurdish cultural displays and the teaching of their
language became legal offences. On the political side, Hafez al-Assad used
Kurds in Turkey against the Turkish state to gain leverage in certain issues,
such as water supplies and other regional matters.18
Syrian Kurdish parties (as opposed to vocal and independent activ-
ists) were largely disregarded by the regime, a situation that paradoxically
granted them wider action margins than those of other Syrian politi-
cal currents, within an environment of violent political suppression.19
However, if a specific actor was no longer useful, it would disappear. For
instance, some Turkish Kurds (e.g., members of the PKK) previously
used by Syria against Turkey were forced out by the Syrian regime after
the 1999 Adana agreement between Damascus and Ankara. The PKK
responded in 2003 with the establishment of the PYD as its political
branch in Syria.20 The regime found the perfect timing to remind Kurds
who called the shots in the country in 2004, in the aftermath of a football
match, when clashes broke out between the Kurdish and Arab supporters
of the two competing teams. The Kurds saw this clash as an opportunity
to press for their rights, and violent repression by the regime ensued.
In contrast to this case of lack of solidarity between Arabs and Kurds,
it is worth mentioning that the traditional political (Arab) opposition in
Syria, including the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood (SMB),21 have called

18 Naomí Ramírez Díaz and Imanol Ortega Expósito, “Relaciones sirio-turcas: la ­fallida
política exterior de Turquía para Oriente Medio,” Revista de historia actual 3, no. 2
(2016): 311–50.
19 Saleh, Al-thawra al-mustahila: al-thawra, al-harb al-ahliya wa al-harb al-amma fi

Suriya (in Arabic), 216–17.

20 “Syria’s Kurds: A Struggle within a Struggle,” Middle East & North Africa (Brussels:

International crisis group, January 22, 2013), 12, https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.

net/syrias-kurds-a-struggle-within-a-struggle.pdf.
21 Al-Qadiyya al-Kurdiyya: Ru’yat Jama’at al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin Fi Suriya (in Arabic)

(London, 2005).
310  N. RAMÍREZ DÍAZ

at different times for the recognition of Kurdish rights. This is always

within the framework of Syria’s territorial integrity and not as a separate
entity, a premise they have held onto until today.22
The following section will address the impact of all the above on the
Syrian uprising, as these events were very much related to the questions
of territorial unity and federalism.

How the Syrian Uprising Transformed

the Kurdish Plight in Syria

Against this background, it is interesting to review the role of Kurds in

the Syrian uprising and how it has transformed their demands and their
relationship with other social groups.
Apart from the negative experiences regarding popular mobilizations,
the Kurdish parties themselves were another factor that discouraged
demonstrations. The Kurdish leaders feared that the revolution would
fail and, more importantly, that young people would create a politi-
cal movement that might compete with the traditional parties. Many of
these parties still considered the option of negotiating with the regime,
as explained by eyewitnesses to the situation.23 Therefore, independ-
ent activists in some places (e.g., in Amouda) organized demonstrations
without political party approval, and many of them, in fact, decided to
leave those parties for what they perceived was an implicit opposition to
their cause.
Following the above-mentioned democratic current, the Kurds, and
especially those living in mixed areas like the above-mentioned Amouda,
took to the streets chanting for freedom.24 However, different factors
would eventually lead to a progressive distancing between Arabs and
Kurds in the country, such as the regime’s policy of supporting some

22 Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, Mithaq Watani ­ Li-Mu’ajahat Taqsim Suriya (Istanbul,

2017).
23 “Syria’s Kurds,” 9.

24 In an early study of the situation in Syria in 2011, a Kurdish interviewee explained

the following: “Kurds started demonstrating quite early because they wanted to prove to
the Arabs that they are not separatist and that this country is a country for all, and that all
Syrians, be they Kurds, Arabs, Muslims, Christians, Assyrians or whatever, are one body,
one flesh, in a united Syria.” In Naomí Ramírez Díaz, “The Syrian Revolution through
the Eyes of the Demonstrators,” Working Paper (Toledo International Center for Peace
(CITpax), 2011), 15.
 10  BETWEEN THE PYD AND THE ISLAMIC STATE …  311

regions to the detriment of others.25 In addition, some Kurdish party

interests, namely the creation of a state-like autonomous region, became
another obstacle to mutual collaboration.
The PYD was not a solo actor: the Kurdish National Council (KNC)
had done exactly the same. The KNC was a set of Kurdish parties estab-
lished in October 2011 to challenge the PYD’s grip on power and acted
under the orbit of Iraqi Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani. Therefore, what
people witnessed in the areas under the influence of either faction were
milder anti-regime slogans “No to the Baath and no to foreign interven-
tion.”26 This second half of the slogan is especially interesting, bearing in
mind that both were highly influenced by Kurds in neighboring coun-
tries, which apparently they did not perceive as foreign intervention due
to the transnational nature of the Kurdish cause.
Kurdish parties hoped to achieve greater autonomy and power upon
the regime’s withdrawal, without directly confronting it. Similarly,
the regime had placed its bet on dividing Syrians, and so, it had tried
to reach out to the different minorities in the country. For instance, the
regime’s spokesperson, Bouthaina Shaaban, promised in the wake of
March 2011, to study the cases of some 300,000 Kurds in order to grant
them their nationality, a right they had been deprived of since 1962.27
Moreover, the regime tried to establish contacts with the representatives
of the Kurdish community, who declined the offer—albeit, with some
hesitation.28
Following this same path of action, as the uprising gathered momen-
tum in 2011, the regime issued a law on decentralization (Decree 107),

25 “Syria’s Kurds,” 17–18.

26 “Syria’s Kurds,” 11.
27 This news piece sums up all the points and delivers similar numbers, among

others, by Amnesty International: Dahi Hassan, “Syrian Kurds in the Hope to Regain
Their Citizenship,” BBC News (Arabic), January 27, 2011, https://www.bbc.com/
arabic/middleeast/2011/04/110401_syria_kurds.
28 Interestingly, Jalal Talabani urged the Kurds not to conflate the fight for their legiti-

mate rights with the dream of a Great Kurdistan: “This is a regime that has repressed you
for 40 years, you tell me? Then why is it only now that you wish to rise? Listen carefully,
you as Syrian Kurds have rights within the Syrian state that you need to fight for, you must
go back now and work on getting them, but you must not confuse that with our dream of
greater Kurdistan.” On the contrary, Masoud Barzani, president of the Kurdish Region in
northern Iraq, “strongly backed the Syrian opposition, in alliance with Turkey.” See Sary,
“Kurdish Self-Governance in Syria,” 7–8.
312  N. RAMÍREZ DÍAZ

which some understood as the basis for future negotiations for the official
recognition of Rojava. As if following on this track, on July 18, 2012,
the regime unilaterally withdrew from the Afrin and Kobane regions and
part of the Jazira. As a result, the PYD remained de facto in charge of
those areas, without either a real agreement or a fight. This, however, was
not the case in Qamishli and other areas, where Syria’s oil is ­produced.
According to eyewitnesses, police presence was very much reduced
following the withdrawal from the other regions, but the regime main-
tained a presence and kept control over the airport and oil operations.
Therefore, a tacit agreement over how to administer the region most
likely had been drafted, as well as a pact of no aggression. This was the
only possible explanation for the fact that, while activists in other Syrian
cities, like Daraa, faced live fire, Qamishli or Amouda witnessed the arrest
of demonstrators who raised national demands, whereas the protests
advancing Kurdish national demands prompted almost no reaction from
the authorities.29
As a result, the PYD became the strongman in Syria’s “ungoverned
space,”30 but always within the scope of reach of Damascus. As straight-
forwardly explained by a Syrian official, the following statement sum-
marizes this peculiar symbiosis: “The Kurds go off track every once in a
while, before sooner or later requiring our support. At that point, they
are often ready to give Damascus what it’s been waiting for.”31
In 2013, the PYD established its control over three autonomous
regions in Syria in pursuit of “freedom, justice, dignity, and democracy”
and proclaimed “a new social contract, based upon mutual and peaceful
coexistence and understanding between all strands of society.” According
to this Charter of the Social Contract, everyone would have the right

29 Mazur and Khaddour, “The Struggle for Syria’s Regions,” 6–7.

30 According to the US Department of State, an “ungoverned space” is a place where
the state or the central government is unable or unwilling to extend control, effectively
govern, or influence the local population, and where a provincial, local, tribal, or auton-
omous government does not fully or effectively govern, due to inadequate governance
capacity, insufficient political will, gaps in legitimacy, the presence of conflict, or restrictive
norms of behaviour. Many times, like in this case, there is some form of symbiosis between
the non-State actors and the State and, the former can provide local security, and garbage
disposal, whereas a state can still be providing electricity.
31 Sary, “Kurdish Self-Governance in Syria,” 16.
 10  BETWEEN THE PYD AND THE ISLAMIC STATE …  313

to freedom of opinion and expression.32 Nevertheless, the document

included the following provision: “Freedom of expression and freedom
of information may be restricted, having regard to the security of the
Autonomous Regions.” That was indeed what the YPG, a police-like
body in charge of “security” in the areas under the PYD’s influence, had
been doing for several months: systematically suppressing anti-regime
protests.
When Kurdish groups unilaterally declared the establishment in
Rojava—under the name “Northern Syria”—of a federal system within
Syria in March 2016, the government was unshaken. It limited its
reaction to the issuance of a statement condemning any political move
that threatened the integrity of Syrian territory.33 In fact, critics of this
unilateral move have accused it of simply replacing Assad’s poster with
that of Öcalan’s—something replicated in Raqqa after taking it away
from Daesh (who had replaced Assad’s portrait with its characteristic
black flag) in 2017, thereby illustrating that the struggle against Assad’s
dictatorship had taken a back seat. Fighting for an autonomous state-like
entity had become the priority.

Kurdish Parties’ Ambivalent Relationship

with the Formal Arab Opposition

Syrian post-independence governments, in general, enforced

ambiguous policies with regards to Kurds in Syria and their inclusion in
governmental bodies. Therefore, Kurds (especially those coming from
the north-eastern areas of the country) tended to distrust the central
government. Even if at various points, since Bashar al-Assad’s advent to
power in 2000, the opposition has claimed to support Kurdish rights,
once the 2011 uprising had begun, differences emerged. The first
problem came with the creation of the precedent of the NC, the Syrian
National Council (SNC), and its closeness to Turkey: in February 2012,
armed PYD supporters attacked KNC demonstrators in Afrin, while
yelling, among other things: “Supporters of Erdoğan and Barzani have

32 “Charter of the Social Contract. Self-Rule in Rojava,” January 29, 2014, https://pea-

ceinkurdistancampaign.files.wordpress.com/2014/03/english-version_sc_revised-060314.
pdf.
33 Sary, “Kurdish ­Self-Governance in Syria,” 17.
314  N. RAMÍREZ DÍAZ

no business here.”34 However the resurrection of Arab national sen-

timents and the reinforcement of Islam as a binding factor were what
definitely troubled the relationship between the SNC (originally set up
and based in Istanbul, and allegedly dominated by the SMB as alluded
in Chapter 7) and the Kurds. As a result, the PYD decided to join the
National Coordination Body for Democratic Change (NCB), an alterna-
tive instance to the SNC.35
This reaction only added fuel to the popular idea that the PYD was no
real opposition. For members of the SNC, the Damascus-based National
Coordination Body was too soft with the regime and even had displayed
readiness for dialogue, a categorical “no” for the Coalition. Divergences
could only increase, and in 2012, when international powers pushed
for the formation of the NC, the KNC members joined the talks in
Qatar, whereas the PYD was not invited. According to official accounts,
Kurdish delegates put forward four conditions, among which was that
Kurdish rights be included in the constitution. The Coalition’s then-
leader, Ahmed Moaz al-Khatib, explained that any demands affecting
the constitution would only be discussed after the regime was ousted.36
Apparently, that was not enough for the Kurdish representatives. The
wide gap between Arabs and Kurds was reflected yet again during the
2017–2018 Astana conferences, where the PYD was excluded.
Moreover, the PYD’s anti-Islamist rhetoric has fueled the support of
Leftist groups worldwide, which still understand the situation in Syria as
a confrontation between the ideal of secularism and self-managed regions
and the backwardness of strict and barbaric interpretations of religion
represented by Daesh. The following section explains in more depth how
this has contributed to their goal of building their own state-like entity.

The Left’s Support for the PYD and Its Model

Abdullah Öcalan, the PKK imprisoned founding father and leader, is
considered a symbol among certain sectors of the Left worldwide for
various reasons, most importantly the fact that he rejects the idea of
nation-states, supports gender equality, and promotes self-organization

34 “Syria’s Kurds,” 32.

35 “Syria’s Kurds,” 37. Yet again, the rejection of foreign intervention is problematic here.
36 “Syria’s Kurds,” 40.
 10  BETWEEN THE PYD AND THE ISLAMIC STATE …  315

of independent, yet collaborative cantons, to challenge the traditional

centralist states in the broader Middle East, which, in his view, follow a
similar logic to that of theologically inspired states: “The nation-state has
allocated a number of attributes which serve to replace older religiously
rooted attributes like: nation, fatherland, national flag, national anthem,
and many others.”37
In order to achieve enduring peace with Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria,
he suggested overcoming the divisive idea of nation states, which pro-
mote a single and monolithic culture and population, instead of praising
diversity. Following his logic, the PYD has been calling for the loose con-
cept of democratic autonomy and, in fact, since December 2011, when
the People’s Council of Western Kurdistan was established as a “stand-in
elected local assembly designed to provide social services,”38 its propo-
nents and supporters have insisted that it was an ideal form of democracy
because it is decentralized, participation is more direct, and it promotes
full gender equality (in fact, the Women’s Protection Units, YPJ, have
been widely advertised).39 It is this imaginary state that has brought
volunteers from all over the world to fight alongside the Kurdish YPG
militias against the threat of Daesh.40 Solidarity has gone beyond expec-
tation, and other nationalist and secessionist plights over the planet have
expressed their uncritical support for the Rojava project. Lack of criticism
has prompted many groups to turn a blind eye on the fact that the USA
provided the SDF, mostly composed of the YPG, with military support,
which they took advantage of to control certain areas.
The successful 2014 Kobane battle was the key factor that allowed
the Kurds to increase their influence. Against the logic of bipolar and
binary understanding of the situation in Syria, whereby there would be
two separate camps—the regime, supported by Russia and other allies,
and Islamists and “terrorists,” supported by the USA and, more broadly,

37 Abdullah Öcalan, Democratic Confederalism (London: Transmedia Publishing Limited,

2011), 11.
38 “Syria’s Kurds,” 13, 19.

39 This is a good way of showing their alterity with Daesh, where women’s role remains

behind the scenes, and they are viewed as devoted mothers and wives.
40 Some of the alleged brigades inspired by the International Brigades of the Spanish

Civil War are the International Freedom Battalion (Tabûra Azadî ya Înternasyonal‎) and the
Lions of Rojava. The first claim to be fighting both against Daesh and Assad, whereas the
second focus on Daesh.
316  N. RAMÍREZ DÍAZ

NATO countries—these advances against Daesh positions were made

possible by the US military support, even if, paradoxically, the USA
represents the opposite side of the spectrum of what is understood as
the Rojava ideal. Moreover, its support for the Kurds went in detriment
of Turkey, a NATO member and long-term ally of the USA, with a clear
interest in having a say in Syria’s future.
More paradoxical, and complicating matters even more, the SDF
alliance with the USA was considered their main strength point and yet
the PYD also established a positive relationship with the Russians. It was
Russian air support that allowed the PYD to take over, among other
areas, Tel Rifat and the military Menneg airport. In the words of Doruk
Ergun, the PYD, in its plight for international recognition and legiti-
macy, presented a rare case of a violent non-state actor that “managed to
cooperate with both Russia and the United States at the same time” in
its quest for its own state-like entity.41
However, due to the fact that Turkey needed to look for new allies
after feeling abandoned by the USA, the Kurdish alliance with Russia
began to collapse when Ankara decided to move closer to the Russian
orbit to deal with the situation in Syria.42 The Astana conferences were a
good example of that.
From the preceding paragraphs, we can conclude that the Kurdish
plight in Syria is not new but dates back a century ago. This explains
the deeply rooted nationalist sentiments of some Kurdish parties, such
as the PYD, and sectors of society and their distrust toward neighboring
populations. The conflict in Syria presented an opportunity for Kurds to
get their rights back, but various factors undermined the potential collab-
oration between them and the Arab majority in the country. Therefore,
some parties decided to follow their own path and, in their quest for
more independence, managed to attract solidarity from different areas
of the world with their discourse of self-administration, freedom, and

41 Doruk Ergun, “External Actors and VNSAs: An Analysis of the United States, Russia,

ISIS, and PYD/YPG,” in Violent Non-State Actors and the Syrian Civil War: The ISIS and
YPG Cases, ed. Özden Zeynep Oktav, Emel Parlar Dal, and Ali Murat Kurşun (London:
Springer International Publishing, 2018), 149–72.
42 Fadel al-Homsi, “Hal Yatahaqqaq Al-Hulm al-Kurdi Fi Suria? (in Arabic),”

Al-Jumhuriya, February 1, 2017, https://www.aljumhuriya.net/ar/content/%D9%87%

D9%84-%D9%8A%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%
84%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%8A-%D9%81%D9%8A-
%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%9F.
 10  BETWEEN THE PYD AND THE ISLAMIC STATE …  317

equality, as opposed to retrograde visions of society represented by Daesh

and Islamist militias with authority over some areas of the country.
In this sense, this non-state actor made advances toward the creation
of de facto independent cantons, which lacked some of the characteris-
tics of a real state but which did have an administration, law-enforcement
bodies, ministerial departments, and very rudimentary and scarce service
provisions in a context of power vacuum. Therefore, the PYD ­carried
out its activity outside the framework of the central state but tried to
replicate its own state institutions. Does this evolution have anything
in common with that of Daesh? The following sections will address the
Daesh phenomenon.

How a Peaceful Uprising Brought Daesh

into the Scene

Saying that no one could have predicted that a peaceful uprising in Syria
would turn into a bloodbath falls within the category of wishful (yet par-
tially inevitable) thinking, and the author of these lines did not escape that
trend. Bearing in mind past episodes in Syrian history—the most infamous
of which is the Hama massacre in 1982, when entire neighborhoods were
reduced to ashes by the Syrian artillery in its aim to crack down the armed
insurgency of the Fighting Vanguard (FV)—the regime could easily resort
to disproportionate violence, and that is exactly what it did.
Although arms were scarce in opposition circles during the first
months of the 2011 Syrian uprising, the regime did not hesitate in
responding with live fire to the protests, causing the death toll to rise
exponentially. It was just a matter of time for the people to look for
means of self-defense. As time went by, the armed confrontation between
ill-prepared combatants of the FSA and the regime’s heavy artillery cre-
ated situations of insecurity and instability—and instability is, by defini-
tion, the natural environment where radical movements can evolve at a
faster pace, especially when they already have a long trajectory of organi-
zation, pseudo-governance, and lofty aspirations.43
The following sections will try to explain how Daesh expanded and
how it adopted state-like characteristics.

43 Al-Naji, “Idarat Al-Tawahhush (in Arabic)” explains in his book the ways in which the

Umma needs to be ruled as a pre-step to the full establishment of an IS.

318  N. RAMÍREZ DÍAZ

The Roots of Hate

The history of what came to be known as the IS, or Daesh, dates back
a few decades ago to the foundation of Jama’at al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad
in 1999 in Afghanistan and its ensuing expansion and transformation
into different groups, such as Al-Qaeda in Iraq in 2004 and the IS in
Iraq, just to list a few.44 This evolution depicts very clearly the transfor-
mation from what was meant to be a base (qa’ida in Arabic) into the
more ambitious achievement of a state-like entity in July 2014 in Mosul,
after Daesh had conquered large swaths of land in Syria and Iraq. Daesh
matched the global aspirations of Bin Laden, but also merged the
original base logic of Al-Qaeda with a centralized state mindset explicitly
avoided by Al-Qaeda’s founding father.45
Therefore, the IS could be considered somehow the unwanted son of
Al-Qaeda and yet its most talented heir until today. Every lesson it had
learnt from Iraq was put into practice in Syria and eventually d ­ eveloped
in better ways. Taking advantage of the strategies developed by ex-Iraqi
Baathists, Daesh was ready for expansion: Bilad al-Sham (which roughly
corresponds to the historical territory of Great Syria) seemed to be
the right place.46 Therefore, although Daesh was formally established
in 2013, its history in Syria dates back to 2011, when Al-Baghdadi
dispatched representatives to the country to meet the newly formed
Jabhat al Nusra (it would be announced on January 23, 2012), to tackle
operational collaboration across the Iraqi-Syrian border.47
A couple of months later, Abu Mohamed al-Adnani, Daesh’s
spokesman at the time, announced the unification of Jabhat al-Nusra and
the IS in Iraq in what came to be known as The IS in Iraq and Syria
(Al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi-l-Iraq wa-l-Sham). This unilateral decision
was rejected by Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, Jabhat al-Nusra’s leader, the
day after. Al-Qaeda’s leader, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, intervened to support

44 Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, A Theory of ISIS: Political Violence and the

Global Order (London: Pluto Press, 2018), 90; See also Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan,
ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror (London: Regan Arts, 2015).
45 Ould Mohamedou, A Theory of ISIS, 89.

46 Dabiq, a small town in northern Syria, is, according to Prophetic tradition, the place

where the final battle between Islam and disbelief will take place. In fact, Daesh named its
now defunct magazine after this town. Nevertheless, its control over the town did not last
long and it eventually retreated.
47 Ould Mohamedou, A Theory of ISIS, 97.
 10  BETWEEN THE PYD AND THE ISLAMIC STATE …  319

Jolani and declared that the entity still known as IS in Iraq would stay
in Iraq, whereas Al-Nusra would remain in Syria. However, Daesh had
already set foot in Syria and various factors facilitated its expansion.

Factors That Facilitated Daesh’s Emergence

as a Relevant Non-state Actor

As we said earlier, calling Daesh a non-state actor seems contradictory

with the very nature of a movement that established a para-state in north-
eastern Syria and large areas of Iraq, including the city of Mosul in its
heyday. In order to become powerful enough to fulfil its wish to become
a state, before Ramadan 2014, the group battled and managed to defeat a
coalition known as Jaysh al-Mujahidin in the area around Aleppo, as well
as the Supreme Military Command of the Free Syrian Army. After that, it
established control of key areas in ­north-eastern Syria, the most infamous
of which was the city of Raqqa.48 After that, its expansion seemed to be
unstoppable, and Raqqa would not be taken away from Daesh until late
2017, when the flags of the so-called IS were replaced by pictures of Öcalan
set up by the PYD-YPG under the umbrella of the SDF. Their zero-sum
confrontation had reached a new level. However, what prompted Daesh’s
advances and development into a state-like entity in the first place?
To begin with, Assad’s history of veiled collaboration with jihadi
groups is not new, and in fact dates back at least to the years of con­
frontation with the FV.49 More recently, but already before 2011, Assad
used Salafi groups to destabilize neighboring countries and imprisoned
them whenever he wanted as a way to present himself as the bulwark
against terrorism.50 Nevertheless, this had an important side effect: by
enabling them to establish contacts in prison, they ended up dominat-
ing the armed scene after being released.51 However, even if there are
48 Ould Mohamedou, 98.
49 Naomí Ramírez Díaz, The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria: The Democratic Option of
Islamism, 1 (London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2018), 49–75.
50 Fidaa Itani, Al-Jihadiyun Fi Lubnan: Min Quwat al-Fajr Ila Fath al-Islam (in Arabic)

(Beirut: Dar al-Saqi, 2008).

51 The story of the three “friends of Sednaya,” featuring prominent Islamist brigades’ lead-

ers explains how Assad resorted to Salafi jihadis in Syrian prisons to make his prophecy a self-
fulfilled one. Basel al-Junaidy, “Qissat ‘Asdiqa Sednaya al-Thalatha’: Aqwa Thalathat Rijal Fi
Suriya al-Yawm! (in Arabic),” Al-Jumhuriya, October 16, 2013, https://www.aljumhuriya.
net/ar/19328.
320  N. RAMÍREZ DÍAZ

several testimonies of this connivance, Assad’s director of general intelli-

gence, Ali Mamlouk, provided the most detailed account: “In principle,
we don’t attack or kill them immediately. Instead, we embed ourselves in
them and only at the opportune moment do we move.”52
Looking back to the origins of Daesh—where Saddam Hussein’s
ex-officials played a prominent role by providing the strategy, while the
fighters added the religious component—these claims are not surprising
at all. In fact, various testimonies from Daesh’s ex-captives suggest that
their connivance was even more explicit.53 This long history of shared
operations and the fact that a global terrorist threat would be very useful
for Assad to back the hypothesis that he was the only alternative in Syria,
explains why, when Daesh appeared, almost nothing was done to stop its
expansion before the International Coalition began its activity in 2014.54
In addition, having Daesh meant that someone else was doing the
dirty job of cracking down on the popular opposition that had escaped
the regime’s control.55 As a matter of fact, some of the areas bombed
from the air were residential areas and not, for instance, the provincial
governorate, which Daesh had claimed as its headquarters.
After the regime’s withdrawal from Raqqa (the first provincial ­capital
that escaped Assad’s grip) on March 4, 2013, the local council took
control of the city, albeit with some difficulties, exploited by Daesh
to achieve power gradually by carrying out some reforms, such as the
opening of an office in April 2014 for residents in Raqqa to address
their complaints.56 That was a very smart move since people were
complaining that many alleged members of the FSA, as well as members
of the local councils, were not behaving as expected. Daesh was careful
not to fall into practices such as theft or intimidation in the beginning to
avoid being rejected by the local population.

52 Weiss and Hassan, ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror, 112–13.

53 Mónica G. Prieto and Javier Espinosa, La Semilla Del Odio: De La Invasión de Irak al
Surgimiento Del ISIS (Madrid: Penguin Random House Grupo Editorial España, 2017),
417, 472–73.
54 al-Haj Saleh, “Tabaqat Daesh (in Arabic).”

55 Loubna Mrie, “Where Are the Syrians Kidnapped by ISIS?,” The Nation, March 9,

2018, https://www.thenation.com/article/where-are-the-syrians-kidnapped-by-isis/.
56 Aymeen Al-Tamimi, “The Evolution in Islamic State Administration,” Perspectives on

Terrorism 9, no. 4 (2015), http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/

view/447/html.
 10  BETWEEN THE PYD AND THE ISLAMIC STATE …  321

This office, in conjunction with the dawa bureau, functioned both as

a means of social outreach and as a tool to gather intelligence on Daesh
rivals.57 Therefore, Daesh’s strategy in Syria was a step-by-step process
to try to avoid a coordinated backlash from Syrian rebels similar to the
Sahwa movement in Iraq. It had to win over people’s hearts to avoid
being driven away.58
Daesh’s modus operandi reaped its fruits in the beginning. However,
when Daesh showed its real face and its aspirations, people began to
criticize its sectarian tone and militias refused to work with it.59 The
stroke that broke the camel’s back was Daesh’s assassination in early 2014
of Abu Rayan, a widely respected figure from one of the most prominent
factions at the time that could present a challenge to Daesh’ expansion:
Ahrar al-Sham. This, in addition to a simultaneous attack on the popular
rebel town of Kafranbel, in Idleb province, inaugurated a period of
infighting across north-eastern Syria between Daesh and other factions
(including Al-Nusra). However, this only strengthened Daesh, which
began to establish local administration and law-enforcement bodies in the
territories it controlled.60
What seemed to be just another greedy faction wanting to impose
its norms turned out to be a new form of authoritarianism, where
dissent was severely punished: Bashar al-Assad and Daesh seemed to be
two sides of the same coin. Other Islamist and jihadi factions did not have
the strength to challenge its power, another factor that led to its upsurge.
Syria is known for the moderation of its Islamist discourse.61 Despite
the precedent of the FV in the seventies and eighties, which was diffi-
cult to swallow for many Islamist actors such as the SMB themselves (of
whom the FV was an offshoot), and the Syrian background of an impor-
tant jihadi ideologue, Mustapha Setmariam or Abu Mus’ab al-Suri, those

57 Al-Tamimi, 411.
58 The usually praised Sahwa in Iraq was not a mere insurrection against the so-called IS
in Iraq: many of its integrants were former members of jihadi groups in the country who
had opted for a full aesthetic shift. Prieto and Espinosa, La Semilla DePrieto and Espinosa,
La Semilla Del Odio, 411.
59 Naomí Ramírez Díaz, “Against All Odds: Defining a Revolutionary Identity in Syria,”

in Mediated Identities and New Journalism in the Arab World, ed. Azi Douai and Mohamed
Ben Moussa (London: Palgrave, 2016), 83–99; Ünver, “Contested Geographies,” 40.
60 Al-Tamimi, “The Evolution in Islamic State Administration.”

61 Weiss and Hassan, ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror, 162.

322  N. RAMÍREZ DÍAZ

were the exception more than the rule. The history of the SMB them-
selves and their hesitation in the early months of the uprising (in order
not to play a detrimental role, in case the regime decided to use their
participation or support as some proof of Islamist identification) shows
how Syria was probably the least fertile ground for this kind of ­ideology
in the region.62 Nevertheless, the regime’s constant allegations and its
portrayal of the uprising as an existential threat for minorities added
fuel to latent sectarian tensions, and certain groups did not hesitate
to capitalize on that. This was a new version of Iraq’s descent into the
sectarian hell. Daesh knew how to manage that.
Syrian jihadis, like original Al-Nusra members, were more hesitant in
the beginning to show their true colors: this made Daesh more appeal-
ing to those seeking immediate revenge. It is in this sense that Syrian
writer Yassin al-Haj Saleh stated that groups like Jabhat al-Nusra, Ahrar
al-Sham, Jund al-Aqsa, or Jaysh al-Islam might be against Daesh politi-
cally but could still share its doctrinal and ideological model. This meant
it was difficult for them to oppose Daesh even when it attacked them.63
In other words, since Daesh promoted what it deemed the ideal
Islamic society and state, some groups struggled to detach from their
ideological grip—another factor that allowed Daesh to pursue its goal of
creating and maintaining a state-like entity. This is not to say that those
groups have not confronted Daesh, but they have only done so when
Daesh has severely threatened their interests, as it was the case with Abu
Rayyan. In any case, it was Daesh that most foreign jihadis joined, since
its propaganda and effective operations matched their pan-Sunni victimi-
zation narrative and were therefore especially appealing, as we shall see in
the following paragraph.
Certainly, the uprising never deemed it necessary to resort to sensa-
tionalist propaganda to convince anyone or earn their support, since they
believed in the noble character of their plight for freedom. However, just
like the Kurds received the support of Leftist groups and activists due
to the ideology they spread and their narrative of victimization, Daesh
received the support of individuals who identified with a group claiming
to fight for Islam and represent Sunni Muslims,64 especially those who

62 SeeRamírez Díaz, The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria.

63 al-Haj Saleh, “Tabaqat Daesh (in Arabic).”
64 Even if Sunni Muslims in Syria are the least cohesive social sector.
 10  BETWEEN THE PYD AND THE ISLAMIC STATE …  323

were willing to discover what their role in life was. By claiming to be

fighting the regime, Daesh’s capacity to attract supporters was, in reality,
similar to that of mobilized rebel transnational groups based on kinship,
whose comparative advantage is usually larger when extracting conces-
sions from the government.65 In this case, Daesh already had certain
concessions when the regime allowed it to expand and establish a para-
State with its infamous capital in Raqqa. However, its transnational scope
allowed Daesh to reap extra benefits: fighters from all over the world
joined its ranks. In fact, even some Kurds (usually considered secular in
their understanding of religion) felt its appeal. The reason behind this,
according to Hussain Jummo, an analyst of Kurdish politics, is that—just
as it was the case after Saddam Hussein’s Halabja massacre, when many
Kurdish families were left impoverished and were mostly assisted by Salafi-
leaning charities sponsored by individuals in the Gulf—in Syria, some
Kurds from Aleppo and Hasaka explained that they joined Daesh because
of the organization’s pan-Sunni, rather than pan-Arab, philosophy.66
That is, faced with the choice between pan-Arabism and p ­ an-Sunnism,
they more likely preferred the devil they did not know to the devil they
knew. This is a very important point when assessing the strength of Daesh
alliances with local tribes, where kinship was even more determinant than
religion (even if both are intertwined). As a matter of fact, Daesh’s tribal
strategy had some limitations, mainly the fact that it was still regarded
as a temporary governing force, with whom an alliance was established
out of convenience or brute necessity, calculating that its rule would
not last forever.67 That is, its state-like aspirations did not deceive local
actors.
Therefore, even though the pan-Sunni narrative was appealing,
its magnetism was much weaker in tribal areas. In general, it appealed
more to disaffected recruits, and that explains its success outside the
Middle East region among those who feel displaced. Moreover, Daesh’s
difficult-to-trace sources of income helped attract more adepts on the
battleground.68

65 Gurses, “Transnational Ethnic Kin and Civil War Outcomes,” 143.

66 Weiss and Hassan, ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror, 158.
67 Weiss and Hassan, ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror.

68 “The Financing of the ‘Islamic State’ in Iraq and Syria (ISIS),” In-Depth Analysis

(European Parliament, September 2017), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/

etudes/IDAN/2017/603835/EXPO_IDA(2017)603835_EN.pdf.
324  N. RAMÍREZ DÍAZ

In sum, Daesh exploited the regime’s crackdown on civilians, especially

in Sunni areas, to attract supporters. These included recruits even among
the Kurdish population, who preferred a Muslim reference to an Arab
one. This was beneficial both to the PYD’s aspirations, since they found
an alter ego to justify its campaigns in northern Syria, and to the regime’s
discourse, which explicitly indicated that its rule was the only possible
shield for minorities against violent interpretations of religion. Meanwhile,
Daesh kept conquering large swaths of land by means of initial social pen-
etration and, later, traditional warfare with superior techniques to those of
its opponents, mostly the Syrian rebel militias. In this sense, Daesh was a
non-state actor with state-like aspirations.

Conclusion
From the above review of the emergence of two prominent non-state
actors in Syria, we can draw some tentative conclusions. The first and
foremost is the fact that the Syrian conflict gave a boost to the rise of
non-state militant actors (to the two actors analyzed here, we must add
other armed factions, political groupings, and civil society activists whose
role has been engulfed by violence) as very prominent elements in Syria,
at least during their years of expansion. In the case explored here, both
actors played a crucial role in changing the conflict’s demarcation lines
while also challenging the often-cited Sykes–Picot borders, even if the
actual treaty that established today’s frontiers was that of Sèvres, in 1920.
While the Kurdish PYD attempted to create an autonomous state-like
region in Syria, the global terrorist threat of Daesh aimed at uniting the
Islamic Umma under a single authority, thereby merging various states
into the one and only “Islamic State” (in its heyday, it was able to blur
the lines between Syria and Iraq). These conflicting projects led us to
claim that both non-state actors had abandoned the “non-state” frame-
work and tried, at different levels, to institutionalize their power within
the framework of state-like entities.
Due to the zero-sum confrontation on the ground, this pair proved
to be especially interesting, representing confederalism versus central-
ism and secularism versus theocracy. This dichotomy also affected the
way the world saw the non-state actors analyzed in this chapter: Daesh is
undeniably a terrorist organization, but the view of the ­PYD-YPG (main
component of the SDF) still held in different leftist circles is romantic, to
say the least. Multiple reports by the same international Human Rights
 10  BETWEEN THE PYD AND THE ISLAMIC STATE …  325

organizations that have documented Daesh and Bashar al-Assad’s crimes

described similar YPG’s abuses against the Arab population in the areas
where they established their power.69 Raqqa is a good example, since the
three above-mentioned actors ruled over the city at some point.
According to those reports, ethnic cleansing (at different levels) was
being carried out in Syria by the main actors with a strong presence in
the country: Bashar al-Assad was targeting majoritarian Sunni areas,
Daesh was doing the same against religious and ethnic minorities, and
the Kurdish YPG militias were attacking Arab areas (and this provoked
similarly despicable reactions from other opposition brigades in the Afrin
area in early 2018). Therefore, as we stated in the beginning of this
chapter, defining Daesh and the PYD as opposition to the Syrian regime
is, in many ways, problematic, since they were more concerned with their
state-like consolidation projects than with confronting Damascus’ grip
on power. As a matter of fact, their direct clashes have been anecdotic,
and very few in number, if compared to their clashes with the rest of
the armed opposition. This obsession with conquest and domination was
exemplified very clearly in the taking over of the city of Raqqa, first by
Daesh and later by the YPG. Both groups claimed the city in the first
place by changing the official images and flags to those of their leaders,
as the first symbols representing their state-like entities.
In conclusion, both actors were in some way each other’s raison
d’être, since the existence of one somehow reinforced the existence of the
other. Permanent collusion seemed to be the best way to preserve their
relevance, although their aspirations to wider independence and power
consolidation in state-like entities have not been fulfilled. Their role
was very much reduced during 2019 and their prominence as non-state
actors put at stake. With the gradual retrieval of control over Syria by

69 Fred Abraham and Lama Faki, “Under Kurdish Rule: Abuses in PYD-Run Enclaves in

Syria” (Human Rights Watch, 2014), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/

syria0614_kurds_ForUpload.pdf; “Syria: ‘We Had Nowhere to Go’—Forced Displacement
and Demolitions in Northern Syria” (Amnesty International, October 13, 2015), https://
www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde24/2503/2015/en/; International, “Syria: ‘Left
to Die under Siege’: War Crimes and Human Rights Abuses in Eastern Ghouta, Syria”
(Amnesty International, August 12, 2015), https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/
mde24/2079/2015/en/; and International, “Syria: Harrowing Torture, Summary
Killings in Secret ISIS Detention Centers,” Amnesty International, December 19, 2013,
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2013/12/syria-harrowing-torture-summary-
killings-secret-isis-detention-centres/.
326  N. RAMÍREZ DÍAZ

the Assad regime and its allies, it seems that those ambitions will remain
unfulfilled. Yet, understanding the conditions that boosted their role in
Syria remains interesting as long as the situation in the country remains
as it is.

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 PART III

External Actors and Ecological Factors

in the Regional System
 CHAPTER 11

Domestic and External Factors

in the Syrian Conflict: Toward
a Multi-causal Explanation

Efe Can Gürcan

Introduction
The ongoing Syrian conflict since 2011 has triggered one of the worst
humanitarian emergencies and the largest refugee crisis in the post-World
War II era. The severity of this situation prompts observers to think
about the underlying causes that have led to such a wide-scale ­conflict.
From an International Relations (IR) perspective, one could grant
primacy to regional and international factors associated with the role of
geopolitics, proxy war, and foreign intervention. There is little doubt
that these factors have greatly contributed to the regionalization and
internationalization of Syrian conflict.
Nevertheless, one point remains to be clarified: what are some of the
major domestic factors that have rendered Syria vulnerable to these
influences in the first place? With this question in mind, the present

E. C. Gürcan (*) 
Istinye University, Istanbul, Turkey
e-mail: efe.gurcan@istinye.edu.tr

© The Author(s) 2020 331

P. O. Amour (ed.), The Regional Order in the Gulf Region
and the Middle East, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45465-4_11
332  E. C. GÜRCAN

chapter employs a multi-dimensional approach that combines the

traditional IR approach with political economy and political ecology. By
the traditional IR approach, I refer to the study of geopolitical factors lead-
ing to Syria’s ongoing conflict. Sunni sectarianism, Iranian activism, and
Kurdish autonomism are among the most pronounced geocultural fac-
tors that have shaped the Syrian conflict, whereas geopolitical factors are
perhaps most clearly identified with energy security, military alliances, and
the foreign-policy imperatives of key countries involved in the region.1 In
turn, what I call the domestic factors concern Syria’s politicoeconomic and
politicoecological transitions since the 1970s. Particularly, they are related
to the exhaustion of this country’s resource-based, or extractivist, develop-
ment model and to neoliberal restructuring and environmental deregula-
tion, all of which have converged to generate deep-rooted socioeconomic
tensions, thereby paving the way for the Syrian conflict.2
The main methodological guideline used for the present chapter is
process tracing. This method heavily relies on logical reasoning and
evidence gathering. In process tracing, therefore, the research process is
structured just as in detective work, which consists of piecing the clues
together based on historically important landmarks or critical junctures, as
well as the involved actors’ means, motives, preferences, perceptions, and
opportunities to have committed the homicide in question.3 For example,
critical junctures that have marked the historical development of Syria’s
politicoecological crisis include the 1970 military coup that enabled the
ascendancy of Hafez al-Assad’s moderate Ba’athism. The same goes for

1 Efe Can Gürcan, “Political Geography of Turkey’s Intervention in Syria: Underlying

Causes and Consequences (2011–2016),” Journal of Aggression, Conflict and Peace Research
11, no. 1 (2018): 1–10, https://doi.org/10.1108/JACPR-10-2017-0329.
2 Efe Can Gürcan, “Extractivism, Neoliberalism, and the Environment: Revisiting the

Syrian Conflict from an Ecological Justice Perspective,” Capitalism Nature Socialism 30, no.
3 (2018): 91–109, https://doi.org/10.1080/10455752.2018.1516794.
3 Andrew Bennett, “Process Tracing and Causal Inference,” in Rethinking Social Inquiry:

Diverse Tools, Shared Standard, ed. Henry E. Brady and David Collier, 2nd ed. (Plymouth:
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2010), 207–19; Alexander L. George and Andrew
Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge: MIT Press,
2005); Pascal Vennesson, “Case Studies and Process Tracing: Theories and Practices,” in
Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences: A Pluralist Perspective, ed. Della Porta
Donatella and Michael Keating (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 223–39;
and David Collier, “Understanding Process Tracing,” PS: Political Science and Politics 44,
no. 4 (2011): 823–30, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1049096511001429.
 11  DOMESTIC AND EXTERNAL FACTORS …  333

the nationalization of the petroleum sector in 1964 and the comple-

tion of the pipeline construction in 1968, which laid the foundations of
Syrian extractivism. Another critical juncture is the initiation of economic
liberalization in 1986, its acceleration in 2006, and the amplification of its
negative impact with the m ­ ulti-season drought in the period 2006–2011.
Likewise, Israel’s military interventionism in Syria and rivalry with Iran—
along with its interests in the Golan Heights and the Levant basin—can
be used to illustrate how process tracing would assess the involved actors’
means, motives, preferences, perceptions, and opportunities. Accordingly,
this chapter is organized into two sections that address the major domes-
tic and external factors in the emergence and spread of the Syrian con-
flict from 2011 to 2016, i.e., prior to Turkey’s strategic U-turn from
uncompromising enmity toward Russia and Iran, symbolized in the 2016
Russian/Iranian/Turkish backed ceasefire.

Internal Factors: Extractivism, Neoliberalism,

and the Environment

What are the domestic factors that have played a major role in ­rendering
Syria vulnerable to foreign intervention? My overall argument is that
the failure of Syria’s Baathist development project constitutes an impor-
tant root cause for Syria’s tragic destabilization, since it has created a
favorable environment for foreign intervention and the exploitation of
ethnoreligious differences by foreign powers.4
The development model pursued by contemporary Syria can be traced
back to the 1970s, following the military coup that brought Hafez
al-Assad to power. The Hafez al-Assad regime represented a moderate
form of Ba’athism, which consists of a secularly oriented and socialistic
form of Arab nationalism in Syria.5 While the emphasis on nationalization
and agricultural reform was retained, the economic model of moderate
Ba’athism developed a claim to a pluralistic economy based on partnership
between the public and private sector.

4 Gürcan, “Extractivism, Neoliberalism, and the Environment.”

5 Augustus Richard Norton and Deanna J. Lampros-Norton, “Militant Protest and Political
Violence under the Banner of Islam,” Armed Forces & Society 9, no. 1 (1982): 18, https://
doi.org/10.1177/0095327X8200900101; Alex J. Bellamy, Security Communities and Their
Neighbours: Regional Fortresses or Global Integrators? (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004),
122.
334  E. C. GÜRCAN

Hafez al-Assad’s Baathism failed in its attempt to create a competent

industrial sector, mostly due to the hindrance of an excessive ­ reliance
on oil revenues and other energy resources. This reliance was fueled
by the oil price boom, especially in the 1970s. Instead of building and
promoting a competent and diversified industrial sector, Syrian Baathism
opted for an extractivist model and turned into an oil exporter regime
following the nationalization of the petroleum sector in 1964 and the
subsequent completion of the pipeline construction in 1968, which con-
nected oil production of the Northeast region to the port of Tartous.
Although Syria’s oil reserves were minor in comparison with other oil
giants in the Arab world, the Baathist socialistic project was heavily
financed by oil revenues. The excessive emphasis on the oil sector—and
the increasing relevance of the natural gas sector since the 1980s—had
hindered the development of a competent and diversified industrial sector.
Consequently, much of the non-energy sector was only represented by the
food production and processing sector.6
In 1998 alone, the oil and mineral sector contributed almost 70% of
Syrian exports.7 According to the World Bank,8 oil rents accounted for
over 20% of Syria’s GDP (gross domestic product) in 2004. Not sur-
prisingly, therefore, Syria was among the countries with the highest rates
of energy and agriculture subsidies in the Gulf Region and the Broader
Middle East by 2000.9 Eventually, the depletion of Syrian oil reserves
in the 1990s revealed the poor sustainability of this extractivist model.
According to the US Energy Information Administration, Syria’s annual
unrefined oil production declined from 582,000 barrels per day in 1996
to 368,000 barrels per day in 2009.10 Notably, Syria’s oil production has

6 Thomas Collelo, Syria: A Country Study (Washington: GPO, 1987); Shamel Azmeh,

“Syria’s Passage to Conflict: The End of the ‘Developmental Rentier Fix’ and the
Consolidation of New Elite Rule,” Politics & Society 44, no. 4 (2016): 499–523, https://
doi.org/10.1177/0032329216674002.
7 Azmeh, “Syria’s Passage to Conflict.”

8 “World Bank Open Data,” 2016, https://data.worldbank.org.

9 Azmeh, “Syria’s Passage to Conflict.”

10 “International Energy Statistics,” EIA beta, accessed September 8, 2019, https://

www.eia.gov/beta/international/data/browser/#/?c=4100000002000060000000
000000g000200000000000000001&vs=INTL.44-1-AFRC-QBTU.A&vo=0&v=
H&end=2015.
 11  DOMESTIC AND EXTERNAL FACTORS …  335

also shown a considerable decline since the outbreak of the Arab Spring
first movement, from 383,000 barrels in 2010 to 340,000 in 2011 and
23,000 in 2014. In the wake of the civil war in Syria, the Assad regime
has been unable to generate sufficient oil revenue to ensure economic
and political stability.11
Besides extractivism, another development that has marked the course
of Syrian development is liberalization. Started in 1986, the early phase
of liberalization (ta’addudiyya, or economic pluralism) had already
eliminated certain subsidies, facilitated private investments, and allowed
for a gradual liberalization of prices, trade, and foreign exchange. The
new investment laws adopted in the 1990s were aimed at encouraging
the private sector, including rewards such as tax holidays. This process
gained momentum when Bashar al-Assad took power in 2000 with
a promise of economic and political reform. The objective of build-
ing a social market economy was introduced at the Baath Party’s 10th
Regional Congress in 2005. Syria then focused its efforts on attracting
foreign direct investment (FDI), which mostly originated from Arab
countries interested in speculative and non-productive sectors such
as real estate, finance, and tourism, to the detriment of the productive
sector and infrastructure investments. As part of the Five-Year Plan
(2006–2010), Syria eliminated the state monopoly on imports; liber-
alized prices (including those for diesel, gas, gasoline, and electricity),
deregulated the real estate market, licensed private banks, instituted the
stock exchange, and consolidated the regulations in favor of the protec-
tion of private property.12
It is possible to argue that agriculture was hit the hardest by this
economic restructuring, through the liberalization of agricultural prices and
the elimination of subsidies on energy and agricultural inputs. In fact, the
abolition of state farms had already begun in June 2000.13 Under the Five-
Year Plan, the price of diesel increased by almost 280% with the cancellation
of the subsidy on diesel in May 2008. Although the abolition of subsidies
on diesel and fertilizers was beneficial for the environment, the failure of

11 “InternationalEnergy Statistics.”
12 Omar S. Dahi and Yasser Munif, “Revolts in Syria: Tracking the Convergence between
Authoritarianism and Neoliberalism,” Journal of Asian and African Studies 47, no. 4
(2012): 323–32, https://doi.org/10.1177/0021909611431682.
13 Myriam Ababsa, “Crise Agraire, Crise Foncière et Sécheresse En Syrie (2000–2011),”

Maghreb—Machrek 1, no. 215 (2013): 101–22, https://doi.org/10.3917/machr.215.0101.

336  E. C. GÜRCAN

the regime to propose alternative policies that could alleviate agricultural

producers’ hardships aggravated the politicoecological crisis by undermin-
ing producers’ access to agricultural inputs at favorable prices. Syria’s cri-
sis eventually led to a rural exodus and massive migration to urban areas.
In view of these developments, it is not surprising to observe that the first
protests against the regime were triggered in Daraa, a city in the south of
the country, known as an agricultural center and a strategic support base for
the Syrian regime. Protests against the bankruptcy of new economic poli-
cies and corruption later spread to other rural centers like Homs, Idleb, and
rural areas in Aleppo and Damascus.14 A cautionary note, however, is war-
ranted. One should note that uprisings were also facilitated by the geograph-
ical features of these areas, which logistically facilitate foreign intervention
out of the regime’s direct reach. For example, Daraa is a border town next
to Jordan, a country known for its affiliation to the conservative–moderate
(KSA/UAE-led) bloc and its pro-Western foreign policy. This may have
allowed for the geographical access of ­anti-Assad foreign elements to Syria.
In the final analysis, Daraa’s contribution to the emergence and spread of
the Syrian conflict cannot be explained by a unicausal model that does not
also consider how this town’s politicoeconomic grievances and geographical
features combined to trigger the conflict.
The destabilizing effects of extractivist and neoliberal policies have
been amplified by major supra-seasonal droughts that are partly attrib-
uted to climate change. The cost of these droughts is beyond meas-
ure, considering that more than 46% of Syria’s population lived in rural
areas and 15% of the workforce was employed in agriculture before the
outbreak of the Syrian conflict.15 The 2006–2011 period was one of
multi-season drought—the worst droughts in Syria’s modern history—
and led to countless instances of crop and livestock devastation and the
dislocation of Syrians.16 Of particular relevance in this regard is that

14 Azmeh, “Syria’s Passage to Conflict”; Francesca De Châtel, “The Role of Drought

and Climate Change in the Syrian Uprising: Untangling the Triggers of the Revolution,”
Middle Eastern Studies 50, no. 4 (2014): 521–35, https://doi.org/10.1080/00263206.
2013.850076.
15 Nazih Richani, “The Political Economy and Complex Interdependency of the War

System in Syria,” Civil Wars 18, no. 1 (2016): 45–68, https://doi.org/10.1080/136982

49.2016.1144495.
16 Peter H. Gleick, “Water, Drought, Climate Change, and Conflict in Syria,”

Weather, Climate, and Society 6, no. 1 (July 2014): 331–40, https://doi.org/10.1175/

WCAS-D-13-00059.1.
 11  DOMESTIC AND EXTERNAL FACTORS …  337

the most vulnerable areas—including the war-torn northeast Syria—

are estimated to have lost three-quarters of their crops in the period
2006–2010. Herders’ livestock losses in northeast Syria were recorded
as 85%.17 Overall, it is estimated that the drought—combined with pol-
icy failures and other related factors—had affected 60% of Syria’s agricul-
tural land and killed 85% of livestock in the 2004–2008 period alone.18
According to UN estimates, by the end of 2011, two to three million
people had been affected by drought, resulting in at least one million
people falling into food insecurity and more than 1.5 million people
being dislocated to urban areas.19
The northern and eastern regions have had to bear the largest share
of the negative effects of droughts, the mismanagement of environmental
problems, and their culmination in a deep politicoecological crisis. Worthy
of emphasis here is that these regions constitute the center of the current
military conflicts. Importantly, more than half of the population of the
northeast depends on agriculture for livelihood. In fact, this area consti-
tutes Syria’s agricultural powerhouse, which contributed 80% of the coun-
try’s cotton production and about 50–60% of the wheat production prior
to the conflict.20 Although these regions provide strategic oil reserves for
the Syrian economy, 58.1% of the national population living in poverty
(according to 2004 data) is nonetheless concentrated in these regions.
This part of the population is also characterized by low levels of health
care and a high rate of illiteracy. Yet, the government seriously ignored
the outbreak of this politicoecological crisis until the end of 2009 and that
public media provided limited coverage on the progression of this cri-
sis. What is even more serious perhaps is that migrants flooding into the
southern urban areas received no significant public support. Instead, the

17 Christiane J. Fröhlich, “Climate Migrants as Protestors? Dispelling Misconceptions

about Global Environmental Change in Pre-Revolutionary Syria,” Contemporary Levant 1,

no. 1 (2016): 38–50, https://doi.org/10.1080/20581831.2016.1149355.
18 Richani, “The Political Economy and Complex Interdependency of the War System in

Syria.”
19 Gleick, “Water, Drought, Climate Change, and Conflict in Syria.”

20 Fabrice Balanche, “La Modernisation Des Systèmes d’irrigation Dans Le Nord-Est

Syrien: La Bureaucratie Au Coeur de La Relation Eau et Pouvoir,” Méditerrané 8, no. 119

(2012): 59–72.
338  E. C. GÜRCAN

regime merely provided them with minor funding, food aid, and transpor-
tation assistance so that they could return to their regions.21
The Syrian crisis is also reflected in the Baathist regime’s unsuccess-
ful planning and policy efforts, which find their sharpest expression
in the overexploitation of underground water resources and environ-
mental deregulation. In other words, Syria’s politicoecological crisis “is
far from a ‘natural’ characteristic of the country’s limited resources and
growing population,” since much of the problem “is attributable to
the government’s promotion of the irrigated agriculture sector.” 22
As such, it is acknowledged that agricultural subsidies were directed
toward industrial crops, such as cotton and wheat, which require exten-
sive amounts of water.23 Moreover, the regime failed to carry out the
modernization of its irrigation infrastructure with the aim of reducing
water consumption and making agricultural production more efficient;
this was attempted in 2005 but remained as a failed attempt.24 This is
further evidenced in that 90% of water resources in the Muslim–Arab
world, including Syria, is devoted to agriculture, while the world aver-
age is only 70%.25 Meanwhile, available estimates on Syria indicate that
50% of its irrigation depends on groundwater systems and that 78% of

21 De Châtel, “The Role of Drought and Climate Change in the Syrian Uprising,” 525.
22 Jessica Barnes, “Managing the Waters of Ba‘th Country: The Politics of Water
Scarcity in Syria,” Geopolitics 14, no. 3 (2009): 515, https://doi.org/10.1080/
14650040802694117.
23 Eran Feitelson and Amit Tubi, “A Main Driver or an Intermediate Variable? Climate

Change, Water and Security in the Middle East,” Global Environmental Change 44,
no. 1 (May 2017): 39–48, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2017.03.001; David P.
Forsythe, “Water and Politics in the Tigris–Euphrates Basin: Hope for Negative Learning?”
in Water Security in the Middle East: Essays in Scientific and Social Cooperation, ed. Jean
Axelrad Cahan (London: Anthem Press, 2017), 167–84, 978-1783085668; Gleick, “Water,
Drought, Climate Change, and Conflict in Syria”; and M. Salman and Wael Mualla, “The
Utilization of Water Resources for Agriculture in Syria: Analysis of Current Situation and
Future Challenges,” in International Seminars on Planetary Emergencies, 30th Session
(Fourth Centenary of the Foundation of the First Academy of Sciences: “Academia
Lynceorum” by Federico Cesi and Pope Clemente VIII, Erice, Italy: World Scientific,
2004), 263–74, https://doi.org/10.1142/9789812702753_0031.
24 Fabrice Balanche, “Géographie de La Révolte Syrienne,” Outre-Terre 3, no. 29 (2011):

437–58.
25 Michel Gueldry, “Changement Climatique et Sécurité Agroalimentaire Dans Le

Monde Arabe,” Politique Étrangère 3, no. 1 (2013): 161–74, https://doi.org/10.3917/

pe.133.0161.
 11  DOMESTIC AND EXTERNAL FACTORS …  339

groundwater extraction is carried out in an unsustainable way, resulting in

the over-pumping of water by wells.26
To finish with this section, it would be difficult to overemphasize the
importance of politicoeconomic and politicoecological factors in the
Syrian conflict. The evidence shows that one of the most important causes
of the Syrian tragedy relates to the outbreak of a politicoecological crisis
whose origins are to be found in the long-term consequences of Syria’s (a)
oil-centered extractivist model of development adopted since the 1970s
and its legacy reflected in the government’s failure to generate adequate
livelihood; (b) neoliberal restructuring that has widened inequalities and
bankrupted agriculture since 2000; and (c) e­ nvironment-blind policies that
have neglected the severity of droughts, encouraged cultivation of water-in-
tensive crops and the over-exploitation of water resources, and failed to
address the modernization of the irrigation infrastructure. Chapter 13 in
this book delivers further insights into the role of water shortage and man-
agement in the Syrian and Yemeni civil wars.

External Factors: Geopolitics

and Ethnoreligious Conflict

The arguments highlighting the role of ethnoreligious politics, geopolitics,

and foreign intervention in the Syrian conflict are perhaps better known
than Syria’s political ecology and political economy.27 First of all, the frag-
mented state of Syria’s ethnoreligious configuration is beyond question:
12% of the Syrian population belongs to the Alawi community, of which
President Bashar al-Assad is a member; 64% of the population is part of the
Sunni Arab community, while Christians, Kurds, and Druze represent 9,
10, and 3% of the Syrian population, respectively.28 Indeed, it is possible to
attribute the fragmented state of Syria’s ethnoreligious politics to the legacy
of Ottoman and French colonialism.29 Yet, the contemporary resurgence

26 Ababsa, “Crise Agraire, Crise Foncière et Sécheresse En Syrie (2000–2011)”; Gleick,

“Water, Drought, Climate Change, and Conflict in Syria.”

27 Gürcan, “Political Geography of Turkey’s Intervention in Syria.”

28 Christopher Phillips, “Sectarianism and Conflict in Syria,” Third World Quarterly 36,

no. 2 (2015): 357–76, https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2015.1015788.

29 Benjamin White, “The Nation-State Form and the Emergence of ‘Minorities’

in Syria,” Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism 7, no. 1 (2007): 64–85, https://doi.

org/10.1111/j.1754-9469.2007.tb00108.x; Omar Al-Ghazzi, “Syria,” in The Wiley Blackwell
Encyclopedia of Race, Ethnicity, and Nationalism, ed. John Stone et al. (Oxford, NJ: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2016), 1–4.
340  E. C. GÜRCAN

of sectarian and ethnopolitical conflicts is due in large measure to US mil-

itary intervention in Iraq, whereby Kurdish activists, among other groups,
in addition to terrorists, gained ground in the entire region.30 Moreover,
the influence of domestic factors on sectarianism also cannot be neglected.
Sectarianism has fed on the extension of the Alawite presence and the con-
trol of Assad’s family members within the regime, despite the regime’s
mobilization of significant support from Sunni merchants and the intermar-
riage of certain members of Assad’s family—including Bashar al-Assad him-
self—with members of Sunni families. Eventually, the Sunni resentment of
the expansion of Alawite political elites has rendered the authoritarianism
and corruption of the regime an aggravating factor for sectarianism.31
The implications of regional interventions for ethnoreligious con-
flicts are of an utmost importance for the diffusion of the Syrian con-
flict. For example, donations offered by foreign individuals and funding
of the Arab Gulf states (see Chapter 7) to various Islamist factions have
also played a crucial role in the emergence and spread of the Syrian con-
flict. These actors have mainly aimed at extending the regional Sunni
hegemony and proactively opposed Iran’s increased activism in Syria and
elsewhere.32 Rough calculations point to a spending of about $3 billion
by Qatar in the 2012–2013 period and over $10 billion by Saudi Arabia
and Kuwait in the 2013–2015 period alone.33 Similar to the Arab Gulf
states, Turkey has been contributing to the Syrian conflict by support-
ing Sunni sectarianism in order to motivate the pro-Turkish Sunni and
jihadist opposition in Syria, with the aim of expanding Turkey’s sphere of
influence (see Chapter 5).34
Turkey’s intervention in Syria has been extremely important in the course
of the Syrian conflict until 2016.35 Its Syrian intervention entails a mix of

30 Phillips,
“Sectarianism and Conflict in Syria.”
31 Azmeh, “Syria’s Passage to Conflict”; Phillips, “Sectarianism and Conflict in Syria.”
32 Hadi H. Jaafar and Eckart Woertz, “Agriculture as a Funding Source of ISIS: A GIS

and Remote Sensing Analysis,” Food Policy 64, no. 1 (October 2016): 14–25, https://
doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2016.09.002; Richani, “The Political Economy and Complex
Interdependency of the War System in Syria.”
33 Richani, “The Political Economy and Complex Interdependency of the War System in

Syria,” 13.
34 Gürcan, “Political Geography of Turkey’s Intervention in Syria.”

35 Gürcan.
 11  DOMESTIC AND EXTERNAL FACTORS …  341

direct and indirect methods, that is, c­ross-border military and intelligence
operations, as well as cooperation with T ­ urkey-aligned opposition groups
and jihadists in Syria. Following the outbreak of the Arab Spring and its
hijacking by Islamist movements and global great powers’ military inter-
ventions, Turkey’s active foreign policy took on a more militarized form.
Indeed, Turkey’s militaristic expansionism was also facilitated by other fac-
tors, such as the Kurdish awakening, the rise of the so-called Islamic State
(IS), and the anti-government civil unrest that erupted on May 28, 2013.36
Besides geostrategic engagements, Turkey’s intervention was also driven by
its energy ambitions. Due to excessive dependency on gas from Russia and
Iran, Turkey aspires to diversify its energy sources and eventually become
an energy hub that connects Eastern energy to Europe. However, Ankara
regards Syria as a great rival that shares the same aspiration of becoming a
regional energy hub.37

36 Bülent Aras, “Davutoğlu Era in Turkish Foreign Policy Revisited,” Journal of Balkan and

Near Eastern Studies 16, no. 4 (2014): 404–18, https://doi.org/10.1080/19448953.2014.

938451; Bilgin Ayata, “Turkish Foreign Policy in a Changing Arab World: Rise and Fall of
a Regional Actor?” Journal of European Integration 37, no. 1 (2014): 95–112, https://doi.
org/10.1080/07036337.2014.975991; Efe Can Gürcan and Efe Peker, “A Class Analytic
Approach to the Gezi Park Events: Challenging the ‘Middle Class’ Myth,” Capital & Class 39,
no. 2 (June 2015): 321–43, https://doi.org/10.1177/0309816815584015; Efe Can Gürcan
and Efe Peker, “Turkey’s Gezi Park Demonstrations of Summer 2013: A Marxian Analysis of
the Political Moment,” Socialism & Democracy 28, no. 1 (2014): 70–89, https://doi.org/1
0.1080/08854300.2013.869872; Efe Can Gürcan and Efe Peker, Challenging Neoliberalism
at Turkey’s Gezi Park: From Private Discontent to Collective Class Action (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2015); M. Sheharyar Khan, “The Transformation of Turkish Foreign
Policy towards the Middle East,” Policy Perspectives 12, no. 1 (2015): 31–50, https://doi.
org/10.13169/polipers.12.1.0031; Binnur Ozkececi-Taner, “Disintegration of the ‘Strategic
Depth’ Doctrine and Turkey’s Troubles in the Middle East,” Contemporary Islam 11, no.
2 (July 2017): 201–14, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11562-017-0387-5; Ömer Taşpınar,
“Turkey’s Strategic Vision and Syria,” The Washington Quarterly 35, no. 3 (2012): 127–40,
https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2012.706519; and Mustafa Türkeş, “Decomposing
Neo-Ottoman Hegemony,” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 18, no. 3 (2016):
191–216, https://doi.org/10.1080/19448953.2016.1176388.
37 Igor Delanoë, “The Syrian Crisis: A Challenge to the Black Sea Stability,” Policy Brief

(Istanbul: Center for International and European Studies, Kadir Has University, February
2014), https://www.khas.edu.tr/cms/cies/dosyalar/files/CIESPolicyBrief02.pdf; Gareth M.
Winrow, “The Anatomy of a Possible Pipeline: The Case of Turkey and Leviathan and Gas
Politics in the Eastern Mediterranean,” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 18, no. 5
(2016): 431–47, https://doi.org/10.1080/19448953.2016.1196012.
342  E. C. GÜRCAN

Finally, Turkey’s Sunni sectarianism goes hand in hand with its Kurdish
ethnopolitics. Turkey supported Sunni Kurds against the growing influ-
ence of the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD), which is accused by
Turkey of being affiliated with the outlawed and T ­ urkey-based Kurdistan
Worker Party (PKK).38 Turkish authorities fear that this situation could
also further undermine Turkey’s hegemony in the Iraqi Kurdistan in the
PKK’s favor and destabilize domestic politics in Turkey.39
The role of broader geopolitical factors in the transformation of the
Syrian conflict into a proxy war also cannot be ignored.40 For example,
Syria’s strategic position on energy routes and the discovery of abundant
natural gas reserves in the eastern Mediterranean in 2010 have attracted
regional players, such as Israel, Turkey, and Qatar, which have their own
energy projects and counter Iran’s regional influence.41 The discovery

38 Michael M. Gunter, “The Kurdish Spring,” Third World Quarterly 34, no. 3 (2013):

451–53, https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2013.785339; “The Rising Costs of

Turkey’s Syrian Quagmire,” Europe & Central Asia (International Crisis Group, 2014),
37, https://www.crisisgroup.org/file/1151/download?token=HV5pDXAW; “Turkey
and Iran: Bitter Friends, Bosom Rivals,” Middle East & North Africa (International Crisis
Group, December 13, 2016), 5, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/
gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/iran/b051-turkey-and-iran-bitter-friends-bosom-rivals.
39 Emel Parlar Dal, “Impact of the Transnationalization of the Syrian Civil War on Turkey:

Conflict Spillover Cases of Isis and Pyd-Ypg/Pkk,” Cambridge Review of International

Affairs 29, no. 4 (2016): 1396–420, https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2016.1256
948; Gunter, “The Kurdish Spring”; Gallia Lindenstrauss and Oded Eran, “The Kurdish
Awakening and the Implications for Israel,” Strategic Assessment 17, no. 1 (April 2014):
83–93; Alireza Nader et al., “Regional Implications of an Independent Kurdistan” (Rand
Corporation—National Defense Research Institute, 2016), https://www.rand.org/
content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1400/RR1452/RAND_RR1452.pdf;
Spyridon Plakoudas, “The Syrian Kurds and the Democratic Union Party: The Outsider
in the Syrian War,” Mediterranean Quarterly 28, no. 1 (2017): 99–116, https://doi.
org/10.1215/10474552-3882819; and Rod Thornton, “Problems with the Kurds as
Proxies against Islamic State: Insights from the Siege of Kobane,” Small Wars & Insurgencies
26, no. 6 (2015): 865–85, https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2015.1095844.
40 Gürcan, “Political Geography of Turkey’s Intervention in Syria”; Gerardo Otero and

Efe Can Gürcan, “The Arab Spring and the Syrian Refugee Crisis,” Monitor, Canadian
Centre for Policy Alternatives 22, no. 5 (February 2016): 16–17.
41 Delanoë, “The Syrian Crisis: A Challenge to the Black Sea Stability”; F. William

Engdahl, “The New Mediterranean Oil and Gas Bonanza (Part II: Rising Energy Tensions
in the Aegean—Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, Syria),” Global Research: Centre for Research on
Globalization, January 27, 2013, https://www.globalresearch.ca/the-new-mediterrane-
an-oil-and-gas-bonanza/29609; Pinar Ipek, “Oil and Intra-State Conflict in Iraq and Syria:
 11  DOMESTIC AND EXTERNAL FACTORS …  343

of large conventional gas reserves takes on a greater relevance to Syria’s

strategic position as a center of attention in geopolitical conflict in light
of the global integration of natural gas markets and a 25% increase in
global gas consumption in the last decade, which seems to support the
idea of a “Golden Age of Gas.”42
As part of Turkey’s energy aspirations, the Trans-Anatolian Natural
Gas Pipeline was initiated in March 2015. Its successful construction
would open up a gas corridor from Azerbaijan through Georgia and
Turkey to Europe.43 This project, however, was interfered by the Iran–
Iraq–Syria pipeline project.44 Interestingly enough, the Iran–Iraq–Syria
pipeline project was accepted in 2010 and formally announced in 2011,
right before the onset of the Syrian conflict.45 This project presented a
direct competition to the Qatar–Turkey pipeline project. The Qatar–
Turkey project was to connect Qatar’s natural gas to Turkey via Saudi
Arabia, Jordan, and Syria. Syria rejected this project in 2009 to protect
the interests of Russia, Syria’s main economic partner. As such, Syria’s
rejection is likely one of the main reasons for Qatar’s active involvement
in the Syrian conflict.46 Qatar does not conceal its ambition to become
the world’s leading liquefied natural gas exporter.47
In other words, regional players’ intervention seeks to prevent Syria
from engaging in energy cooperation with Iran and Russia and claim-
ing the abundant energy resources in the Levantine basin. Regional

Sub-State Actors and Challenges for Turkey’s Energy Security,” Middle Eastern Studies 53,
no. 3 (2017): 406–19, https://doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2016.1265511; and Winrow,
“The Anatomy of a Possible Pipeline,” 431–47.
42 Gavin Bridge and Michael Bradshaw, “Making a Global Gas Market: Territoriality and

Production Networks in Liquefied Natural Gas,” Economic Geography 93, no. 3 (2017):
2–3, https://doi.org/10.1080/00130095.2017.1283212.
43 Sami Nader, “Natural Gas Resources May Be Backstory in Syria War,” Center for

Geopolitical Analysis, October 11, 2013, http://icmu.nyc.gr/%20Natural-Gas-Resources-

May-Be-Backstory-in-Syria-War.
44 Delanoë, “The Syrian Crisis: A Challenge to the Black Sea Stability.”

45 Nafeez Ahmed, “Syria Intervention Plan Fueled by Oil Interests, Not Chemical

Weapon Concern,” The Guardian, August 30, 2013, https://www.theguard-

ian.com/environment/ear th-insight/2013/aug/30/syria-chemical-attack-war-
intervention-oil-gas-energy-pipelines.
46 Nader, “Natural Gas Resources May Be Backstory in Syria War.”

47 Engdahl, “The New Mediterranean Oil and Gas Bonanza. Part II.”
344  E. C. GÜRCAN

players most likely resort to destabilization attempts in the case of failed

deterrence.
No less important regarding geopolitics is that Western powers had
long been resentful of Syria’s foreign policy commitments and alliances.
Syria had opposed the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Prior to the invasion,
Syria had defied US sanctions by receiving Iraqi oil, facilitated sales of
arms to Iraq, and allowed the movement of thousands of Arab resistance
fighters across the Iraqi border. After the invasion, certain fleeing Iraqi
officials took refuge in Syria.48 These moves likely reflected Syria’s stance
for the “Arab nationalist identity rather than a pure calculus of interest,”
which displeased the United States and Europe by making Syria look like
“the last remaining voice of Arab nationalism.”49 Furthermore, the US
invasion of Iraq also consolidated Syria’s partnership with Iran against
the United States.50 For Iran, whose participation has been crucial in
the course of the Syrian conflict, sustained cooperation with the Assad
regime offers guaranteed access to Lebanon and the rest of the Middle
East, along with an opportunity to expand its regional Shiite influence
and constrain Israel’s regional power.51
Iran’s presence in Syria is also related to its concerns about Assad’s
possible departure, which could result in a Sunni government and, con-
comitantly, Iran’s regional isolation.52 Indeed, Hezbollah—which has
been present since the very beginning of the Syrian conflict and associ-
ated with Iran’s proxy war—would greatly suffer from these outcomes.
Finally, Syria is still home to the Russian naval facility in Tartous, which
provides Russia’s sole access to the Mediterranean for commercial and
military purposes.53

48 Raymond Hinnebusch, “Syrian Foreign Policy under Bashar Al-Asad,” Ortadoğu

Etütleri 1, no. 1 (July 2009): 7–26.

49 Hinnebusch, 18–19.

50 Hinnebusch, 18–19.

51 Türkeş, “Decomposing Neo-Ottoman Hegemony”; Ziya Öniş, “Turkey and the

Arab Revolutions: Boundaries of Regional Power Influence in a Turbulent Middle East,”

Mediterranean Politics 19, no. 2 (2014): 203–19, https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2
013.868392.
52 Barak Barfi, “The Real Reason Why Iran Backs Syria,” The National Interest, January

24, 2016, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-real-reason-why-iran-backs-syria-14999.

53 Sean Gordon, “Russian Resolve: Why Syria Matters to Putin,” The Globe and Mail,

April 8, 2017, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/russian-resolve-why-syria-

matters-to-putin/article34643406/.
 11  DOMESTIC AND EXTERNAL FACTORS …  345

Syria’s isolation from the West—as a key factor that has indirectly
fueled the Syrian conflict in 2011—was not merely rooted in the Iraqi
question, the Iran–Syrian alliance, and Russia’s involvement. In Syria’s
eyes, Lebanon is seen as a natural sphere of influence that is crucial to
Syria’s national security. It was known that Syrian opposition elements
took refuge in Lebanon. Moreover, due to its geographical location, the
Syrian regime cannot afford Lebanon to become an Israeli or Western
outpost that could also constrain the reach of Arab nationalism. The
Lebanon-based Shiite Hezbollah is of strategic importance for Syria in
its efforts to constrain Israel’s regional power and consolidate its alliances
with Iran. Moreover, the West was also troubled with the Syrian inter-
vention in Lebanon in 2005, which resulted in sanctions being placed on
Syria. Furthermore, Syria was blamed for the assassination of Lebanese
ex-Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri, who was an important ally of the
Saudi Arabia regime.54
Israel’s involvement in Syria is also worth addressing. Not only is
Syria a strategic gate for Iran, which seeks regional hegemony as Israel’s
archenemy, but Israel is also interested in dominating the gas and oil
resources in the Golan Heights and the Levantine basin by undermining
Syria’s national security.55

Conclusion
The Syrian case is illustrative of how extractivist development strategies
could inhibit industrialization and generate over-dependency on external
markets. Certainly, neoliberal restructuring has done nothing but exacer-
bate these outcomes by harming Syria’s social fabric and intensifying the
already-existing socioeconomic tensions. Furthermore, Syria’s misman-
agement of environmental problems demonstrates that the environment is
more than a mere development issue and that it also constitutes a national
security issue. In the future, the case of Syria is hoped to encourage multi-
disciplinary research on the politicoeconomic and politicoecological foun-
dations of national security.
As far as the external factors of the Syrian conflict are concerned, the
evidence suggests that the transformation of ethnoreligious tensions into

54 Phillips,“Sectarianism and Conflict in Syria.”

55 A. Murat Ağdemir, “Israel and the Gas Resources of the Levant Basin,” Ortadoğu
Etütleri 6, no. 2 (2015): 136–54.
346  E. C. GÜRCAN

a proxy war is strongly mediated by the regional policy imperatives of

key countries involved in the Syrian conflict. Particularly, geopolitical
factors—including energy security, military alliances, and foreign-policy
commitments—seem to have served as strong incentives for the Syrian
conflict. The centrality of geopolitical and geo-cultural factors in shap-
ing the Syrian conflict calls attention to the region’s need for constitut-
ing strong regional cooperation mechanisms, which would prioritize
key issues such as foreign interventionism, national sovereignty, military
cooperation, and energy security.
Eurasia and Latin America’s experience of regionalism—e.g.,
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Collective Security Treaty
Organization, Union of South American Nations, Bolivarian Alliance for
Our America—could provide crucial hints in constraining the Western
military aggression, while establishing stable institutionalized channels of
political, economic, military, and cultural cooperation between Turkey,
Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Iran, and Russia, among others.
Considering the entire picture, the research agenda ahead is to
explore how the new configuration of political geography—characterized
by the unexpected resilience of the Syrian regime, the advance of Russia
and Iran in Syria, and the current alienation of Turkey from the Western
alliance—will affect the course of regional distribution of power.

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 CHAPTER 12

Lending an “Old Friend” a Hand:

Why Does Russia Back Syria?

Umut Bekcan and Pınar Uz Hançarlı

Introduction
On April 14, 2018, the United States of America (USA), United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK), and France initiated a mili-
tary operation against the Assad regime in Syria in response to the claim
of chemical weapons used in the East Ghouta district of Damascus. One
government facility in Damascus and two others near Homs were tar-
­
geted, as these were believed to be involved in the use of chemical weap-
ons.1 Russia condemned this operation harshly, with President Vladimir
Vladimirovich Putin arguing that the military operation launched by
three Western powers had a destructive effect on the international sys-
tem. Furthermore, he claimed that the actions of the USA served to
deepen the humanitarian crisis by causing a new wave of refugees to flow

1 “Syria Airstrikes: US Warns It Is ‘Locked and Loaded’ If Assad Uses Chemical

Weapons Again—Latest News,” Telegraph, April 14, 2018, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/

news/2018/04/14/syria-airstrikes-donald-trump-set-make-announcement-military/.

U. Bekcan · P. Uz Hançarlı (*) 
Department of Political Science and Public Administration,
Pamukkale University, Denizli, Turkey
e-mail: puz@pau.edu.tr

© The Author(s) 2020 351

P. O. Amour (ed.), The Regional Order in the Gulf Region
and the Middle East, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45465-4_12
352  U. BEKCAN AND P. UZ HANÇARLI

from the Middle East. The president of the Defense Committee of the
lower house of the Russian Parliament (State Duma), Aleksandr Sherin,
meanwhile described this case as a “second Belgrade” and a declaration of
war against a sovereign state.2
The official representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Russian Federation, Maria Zakharova, argued that the Syrian people,
having first suffered the effects of the initial Arab Spring and then the
rise of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), now had their trauma
compounded by the US smart bombs against a state fighting terrorism
for years. In her view, the US’s former Secretary of State, having held up
a bottle of supposed anthrax before the United Nations (UN) in order to
defend the attack on Iraq 15 years prior, had produced another bottle as
a pretext for attack. Rather than a bottle, she accused the USA of instead
using the internet, photos, and videos broadcast in mainstream media to
produce a pretext for military action.3
According to Moscow, the attack was essentially an illegal act of
­aggression, as there was no evidence in the hands of USA and its allies
showing that the Assad regime had used chemical weapons. Syria, moreo-
ver, claimed that the aim of the attack was to prevent the investigation of
the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), as it
coincided with their visit to research previous claims of chemical weapon
usage in Douma.4
Leaving aside whether the US-led attack in Syria was right, legal,
or legitimate, Moscow’s position had already been one of support for
the Assad regime since the first outbreak of protests in March, 2011.
Moscow has maintained this approach robustly and without hesita-
tion. Moreover, on September 30, 2015, Russia entered the war upon
the invitation of Damascus and helped the Syrian regime to establish its
superiority in the Civil War.

2 Here, Sherin refers to NATO bombing of Belgrade as a violation of international law dur-

ing 1999 Kosovo crisis. There was no authorization by a resolution of UN Security Council
for this air operation of NATO.
3 Before the invasion of Iraq, Secretary of State of US, Colin Powell, claimed on 5

February 2003 that, there were moving biological weapons laboratories in Iraq in his UN
General Assembly speech. In order to enhance his argument, he held a bottle of anthrax
and showed it to the audiences. However, it was realized that this claim did not reflect the
reality. Ve A.B.D. Suriye’ye Saldırdı ODATV, “Ve ABD Suriye’ye Saldırdı,” ODATV, April
14, 2018, https://odatv.com/ve-abd-suriyeye-saldirdi-14041838.html.
4 ODATV.
 12  LENDING AN “OLD FRIEND” A HAND: WHY DOES RUSSIA BACK SYRIA?  353

Syria has been an important ally for Russia since Soviet times.
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union (USSR), relations between
these two lost their dynamism for a couple of years. The second half
of the 2000s saw a rekindling of joint activity. Unlike manifestations of
the Arab Spring movement in other countries, Moscow had paid close
attention to political and security developments in Syria since the Arab
Spring first movement. Moscow’s decision to throw its air force behind
the Assad regime was most likely made upon the calculation that the
benefits would outweigh the accompanying risks in terms of its national
agenda.5 The move represented Russia’s first military intervention
outside of Soviet geography in the post-Cold War period. The last exam-
ple was its Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in 1979.
Russian involvement in the Syrian civil war and its support for the
Assad regime fell in line with the country’s power politics and economic
interests that regards Russia as a reemerging international great power.
As the Civil War has progressed, Moscow has tried to both balance the
interventionism of the USA while legitimizing its own position within
the context of international law.
The factors for Russia’s backing Syria can be summarized as
countering Western influence, anti-interventionism within the context of
international law, and engaging in the struggle against radical Islamists.
Russian opposition against Western interventionism and influence in
Syria fall line with Moscow’s wish to be an important and powerful actor
in an unfolding multipolar international system. Besides, with its nearly
20 million Muslim population, Moscow considers the struggle against
fundamentalism as significant in terms of its national security and the
security of central Asia (Shanghai Cooperation Organization region).
The persistence of the Assad regime would keep mutual economic and
military relations with Syria, which also marks a continuation of historical
cooperation in the Russian national interest.
Against this background, this chapter addresses the following
questions: Why has Russia been so proactively involved in supporting the
Assad regime? How did it come to disregard the risks of this support? This
study begins with an analysis of Russia’s position toward the Arab Spring.
It then elaborates on the Russian approach toward the Syrian civil war and
explores the factors behind Moscow’s support for the Syrian regime.

5 Christopher Phillips, The Battle for Syria: International Rivalry in the New Middle East

(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016), 219.

354  U. BEKCAN AND P. UZ HANÇARLI

The Arab Spring Through Russian Eyes

Before moving on to examine Moscow’s pro-government stance in
Syria, one ought to take account of Moscow’s approach to the Arab
Spring uprisings in general. The international community was unpre-
pared for the uprisings that began in Tunisia in December 2010 and
which soon spread to Egypt, Libya, Syria, Bahrain, and Yemen. At first,
these uprisings did not generate a tangible difference in response from
Moscow and Western countries. However, in time, Moscow developed
a unique position, which, unlike that of the USA and France’s ideali-
zation of the Arab uprisings, involved endorsement of the demand of
the Arab people for a better and more equitable life and rejection of for-
eign involvement in overturning the existing regimes. Instead, Moscow
demanded the use of political dialogue in solving domestic issues.6
In March 2011, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov claimed in
an interview that nobody could have predicted the developments, and
he described the timing as “expected surprise” (“ozhidayemaya neozhi-
dannost”). The Uprising was expected, as these peoples were suffering
from a flood of long-accumulated socioeconomic problems. However,
the unknown was when or how popular anger would respond.7 The
Arab Spring was a result of bribery, corruption, poverty, unemployment,
authoritarianism, clan culture, and nepotism,8 and when the pressure of
government on the business sector and of foreign policy dependent on
the USA were added to these, political Islam weighed in with a response.
In the beginning, like most countries, Russia was only a specta-
tor of the uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, Yemen, and Syria.9 The
Libya case, however, marked a significant shift for Russia. The USA
and European countries intended to support the uprisings of dissidents

6 Naumkin Vitaly et al., Rossiya i Bolshoy Blizhniy Vostok (Moskva: Rossiya i Bolshoy Blizhniy

Vostok, 2013), 23, https://russiancouncil.ru/common/upload/russia_middle_east.pdf.

7 “İntervyu Ministra İnostrannıh Del Rossii S.V. Lavrova Rukovoditelyu Avtorskoy

Programmı ‘Aktualnıy Razgovor’ Telekompanii ‘3 Kanal’ V. Solovyevu, 13 Marta 2011

Goda,” The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, March 13, 2011,
http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/
id/215526.
8 Aleksandr Ilinykh, “Arabskaya Vesna i Rossiyskaya Politika Na Arabskom Vostoke v

Novıkh Usloviyakh,” İstoriko-Pedagogicheskiye Chteniya, no. 17 (2013): 103–4.

9 Vitaly et al., Rossiya i Bolshoy Blizhniy Vostok, 23–24.
 12  LENDING AN “OLD FRIEND” A HAND: WHY DOES RUSSIA BACK SYRIA?  355

against the Gaddafi regime. The UNSC decided to take all necessary
measures, including the use of force, to impose a no-fly zone over Libya
in order to protect civilians rebelling against Gaddafi (resolution number
1973).10 Less than 48 hours after the UNSC decision, NATO invaded
Libya. This sat uneasily with Russia, as it seemed a unilateral conflict had
been undertaken under the guise of humanitarian intervention, result-
ing in the murder of Gaddafi.11 Why Russia abstained rather than veto-
ing the decision has been disputed between commentators. While some
suggest that Russia intended to prevent a civil war like that experienced
in Yugoslavia, others interpreted Russia’s response as a fear that disor-
der in the region would raise oil prices, so abstaining was in the interests
of Moscow.12 Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, Prime Minister at the time
between 2008 and 2012, likened NATO’s Libya operation to a crusade
and disagreed with then-President Medvedev for the first time, when the
president argued that those types of comments were unacceptable and
could lead to a clash of civilizations.13
In Moscow’s view, the NATO invasion paved the way for a war that
would destroy the Gaddafi regime in the name of humanitarian protec-
tion. By October, Gaddafi was killed and his regime collapsed. In July
2012, Medvedev expressed regret, as he felt that Russia did not make
sufficient use of its right to veto, stating that: “Russia made a tragic mis-
take. If we knew that resolution 1973 would be interpreted in this way,
we would have instructed Russian officials at the UN differently.”14 With
these words, he forwarded the view that Russia had been cheated by the
West.

10 “The UN Security Council Resolution No 1973 (2011)” (United Nations Security

Council, March 17, 2011), http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/

RES/1973(2011).
11 Vladimir Putin, “Putin, Vladimir ‘Rossiya i Menyayushiysya Mir’, RG, February

27, 2012 (Accessed on 9 August 2019),” R.G., February 27, 2012, https://
rg.ru/2012/02/27/putin-politika.html; For the English version of the same article see
Vladimir Putin, “Russia and the Changing World,” RT, February 27, 2012, https://www.
rt.com/politics/official-word/putin-russia-changing-world-263/.
12 “Pochemu Rossiya Vozderzhalas Ot Aviaudarov Po Livii?” Inosmi, March 19, 2011,

http://www.inosmi.ru/africa/20110319/167498836.html.
13 “Medvedev Rejects Putin ‘Crusade’ Remark over Libya,” BBC News, March 21,

2011, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-12810566.
14 Igor Latunskiy, “Liviyskaya Lovuşka Dlya Başara Asada,” Pravda, July 10, 2012,

http://www.pravda.ru/world/asia/middleeast/10-07-2012/1121496-gafurov-0/.
356  U. BEKCAN AND P. UZ HANÇARLI

Russia took an important lesson from what happened in Libya and

did not wish to make the same mistake in Syria. The uprising against the
Assad regime soon evolved into a civil war within a staggeringly short
period of time. Western countries intended to follow the same course
that was applied in Libya. Regarding internal chaos in Syria, pressure
from the West on President Assad was compounded by sanctions against
the country, which Russia considered unacceptable. In this sense, one
can posit that Russia opposed military intervention in Syria as a direct
result of Libya, in what can be interpreted as a matter of prestige. What
happened in Libya showed Moscow that it could not trust NATO to
restrain itself to the spirit of resolutions. In a way, Libya was considered a
suitable confidence test. Furthermore, geographically, Libya was further
placed than Georgia or Syria, so a confrontation with the USA may have
been calculated as too risky in any case.15
Thus, Moscow’s support for the Syrian regime was also shaped by its
experience in Libya, and Russia realized that it had to have clear position
rather than abstention. From then on, Moscow started to show its con-
sideration and opposition toward US/Western attempts to intervene in
the Gulf Region and the broader Middle East.

Balancing the West
Russia clearly took up the mantle of the former USSR at its reestablish-
ment in the beginning of 1990s. However, its political and economic
influence became severely limited. In the 2000s, Putin’s leadership
saw the reemergence of the Russian power with a renewed interest in
involvement in international politics. During the Cold War, when it came
to the broader Middle East, the objective of the USSR was to contain

15 As Lukyanov said $4 billion business agreement with Libya was not worth to chal-

lenge the US and Europe. In addition to these, if the conflicting approaches of Medvedev
and Putin are taken into consideration, the reason for Russia’s abstention could be
understandable. In his view, Medvedev has a liberal character of treating and solv-
ing issues on a case-by-case basis. On the other hand, Putin is considerably more realist
in character thinking the external environment determines the behavior of states. There
is a system in which everything is connected to one another. If one part is affected, the
results can also be seen in other pieces. It is for this reason he stands against the inter-
ventionist behavior of the West. Fedor Lukyanov, “Za Çto Rossiya Srazheyetsya v
Sirii,” Global Affairs, August 10, 2012, http://www.globalaffairs.ru/print/redcol/
Za-chto-Rossiya-srazhaetsya-v-Sirii-15630.
 12  LENDING AN “OLD FRIEND” A HAND: WHY DOES RUSSIA BACK SYRIA?  357

Western interests in lieu of its own. Consequently, Russia has sought

to moderate the interventionist tendencies enacted by the West in the
region and in Syria, in particular.
Russia has criticized NATO’s perceived role as world police, and
even its existence in the post-Cold War period. NATO’s enlargement
into Eastern Europe has therefore set Russian policy-makers on alert.
Moreover, the involvement of NATO in the conflicts in the Balkans, in
Kosovo in 1999 for instance, has been flagged up by Russia as going
against NATO’s own founding principles.16 Moscow argues that the only
valid mechanism for deciding on the use of force is the UN Charter, and
that NATO and the European Union (EU) cannot replace the UN. In
Putin’s mind, the fall of the Berlin Wall was a historic event that per-
tained to an enlargement strategy to the east, creating new dividing lines
and walls.17 The color revolutions in Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004),
and Kyrgyzstan (2005) enabled pro-Western governments to come to
power in those countries, and Russia suspected the USA of having a role
aimed at rolling back Russian influence.
In response, in Georgia, Russia supported the breakaway of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia against pro-Western Mihail Saakashvilli and launched a
military operation against that country in 2008. Similarly, after the over-
throw of the Yanukovych government in Ukraine in 2014, the West was
considered responsible and the response came in the form of the annex-
ation of Crimea. Then, the attitude of the Russian President was most
likely to make Russia recognized as “a global superpower on equal footing
with the USA, not subordinate as it had been in the 1990s and 2000s.”
When it comes to broader Middle East, this effort for “co-equality” with
the USA required being an ally of national governments in the region “as
a legitimate and viable rival superpower.” Thus, the Russian presence in
Syria helped Putin to end the diplomatic isolation attempted on Russia in
the wake of the Ukrainian crisis.18

16 Christian Snyder, “Analysis: How a 1999 NATO Operation Turned Russia against

the West,” The Pittnews, September 7, 2017, https://pittnews.com/article/121917/

opinions/analysis-1999-nato-operation-turned-russia-west/.
17 “Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security

Policy,” President of Russia, February 10, 2007, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/

transcripts/24034.
18 Dimitri Trenin, “Putin’s Syria Gambit Aims at Something Bigger Than Syria,” The

Tablet, October 13, 2015, http://www.tabletmag.com/jewish-news-and-politics/194109/

putin-syria-trenin.
358  U. BEKCAN AND P. UZ HANÇARLI

Putin’s understanding was that the unipolar model offered by the

West was “not only unacceptable but also impossible in today’s world.”
This model, mainly synonymous with US alignment, was based on cross-
ing “its national borders in every way.” Russia was unhappy about the
US’s impositions of “the economic, political, cultural, and educational
policies.” Putin also criticized the West’s perception of democracy, as these
impositions were realized under the name of democracy, while, accord-
ing to Putin, the West was ignoring the basic principle of preserving the
interests and opinions of the minority. Moreover, the basic principles of
international law were another concern of Russia, as Putin forwarded the
notion that “independent legal norms are, as a matter of fact, coming
increasingly closer to one state’s legal system,” i.e., the USA.19
In one interview in August 2013, Putin argued that Russia was
against the West’s notion of democracy in Syria that ignores a fundamen-
tal cause for the violence there. Accepting the necessity for radical reform
and underscoring Russia’s support for Syria was not unconditional, and
Putin expressed his thought that the West was neglecting the history, tra-
dition, and religion of the region and interfering in the name of democ-
racy rather than for peace and stability.20 Except for the temporary good
relations in the first half of the 1990s, Russia has always been against the
expansionist policies of Western countries and has tried to balance poli-
cies of the Western bloc.

Russia’s Opposition to Interventionism

In 2000, in his first presidential address, Putin argued that the sover-
eign rights of states were being violated by the West under the pretext
of humanitarian intervention, and this stance has persisted throughout
the course of his presidency.21 Accordingly, Putin posits that the UNSC
should not have the right to interfere in foreign governments or support
any possible attempt to overthrow them, directly or indirectly. In the
post-Cold War period, the cases of intervention in Kosovo, Afghanistan,

19 “Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference.”

20 “Putin Talks NSA, Syria, Iran, Drones in RT Interview (Full Video),” RT World News,
June 12, 2013, https://www.rt.com/news/putin-rt-interview-full-577/.
21 Vladimir Putin, “Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation,”

President of Russia, July 8, 2000, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/21480.

 12  LENDING AN “OLD FRIEND” A HAND: WHY DOES RUSSIA BACK SYRIA?  359

Iraq, and Libya have threatened the international order, leaving Russia
reluctant in its place on the UNSC.22 Moreover, Putin has also criticized
the concept of the “Export of Democracy” attempted by Western powers
and declared that Russia had no involvement in the domestic politics of its
neighbors and other countries.23
The Syrian case was no exception to the Russian stance. When the
crisis began in 2011, Russia began by calling for an end to bloodshed,
followed by an announcement that this was an issue for Syrians to solve
peacefully and politically. Later, Moscow called for the circumvention of
foreign intervention.24 Therefore, the Moscow’s standpoint centered on
supporting reform policies in Syria. Furthermore, Moscow vetoed the
draft resolution of the UN Security Council several times, in order to
reject sanctions being launched against Syria. As a result, it prevented a
resolution that would increase tension and constitute a possible stepping
stone toward forcible regime change.25
Events deteriorated, in the view of Foreign Minister Lavrov, in
November 2011, with the suspension of Syria’s membership in the
Arab League, since that removed the chance of regional negotia-
tions being held in a transparent environment.26 Permanent Russian
Representative of the UN, Ambassador Vitaly Churkin, vetoed the draft
resolution in February 2012 that condemned the Syrian regime for vio-
lations of human rights on the basis that the resolution blamed one side,
was unbalanced, and did not reflect the realities in Syria.27 Churkin’s

22 Samuel Charap, “Russia, Syria and the Doctrine of Intervention,” Survival: Global Politics

and Strategy 55, no. 1 (2013): 36, https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2013.767403.

23 “Putin: Promoting Democracy, a Vaccination against Orange Revolutions,” Voltaire

Network, February 23, 2012, http://www.voltairenet.org/article172874.html.

24 Alexey Vasiliev, Russia’s Middle East Policy: From Lenin to Putin (London: Routledge,

2018), 463.
25 Column Lynch, “Russia, China Veto Syria Resolution at the United Nations,” The

Washington Post, October 4, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-se-

curity/russia-china-block-syria-resolution-at-un/2011/10/04/gIQArCFBML_story.
html; By February 2017, Russia vetoed 7, China vetoed 6 times, “Syria War: Russia and
China Veto Sanctions,” BBC News, February 28, 2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/
world-middle-east-39116854.
26 Ural Sharipov, “Bitva Za Siriyu,” Nauchno-Analiticheskiy Jurnal Obozrevatel 273,

no. 10 (October 2012): 66.

27 “Russia and China Veto Resolution on Syria at UN,” BBC News, February 4, 2012,

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-16890107.
360  U. BEKCAN AND P. UZ HANÇARLI

statement confirmed Russian support for the ceasefire plan of UN Special

Representative for Syria, Kofi Annan.28 Lavrov argued in defense of the
core of this plan, which included “six principles” based on eliminating
violence and initiating dialogue, in a process that would be led by Syria
for the benefit of the Syrian people. The implementation of this plan,
Lavrov believed, would establish a new order considering “the interests
of all groups” in the country.29 However, despite Russian support, the
plan did not succeed.30 In the meantime, Western countries paid little
attention to the draft constitution accepted in Syria after a referendum
on February 26, 2012.31
In his 2012 article titled “Rossiya i Menyayushiysya Mir/Russia and
the Changing World,” Putin claimed that internal reconciliation in Syria
needed the support of the international community, as the main Russian
concern was to avoid an all-out civil war. It was on this basis, he claimed,
that Russia was against the implementation of the UN Security Council
Resolution, believing that its ambiguity would allow only one side of the
domestic conflict to use violence:

(…) considering the extremely negative, almost hysterical reaction to the

Russian-Chinese veto, I would like to warn our Western colleagues against
the temptation to resort to this simple, previously used tactic: if the UN
Security Council approves of a given action, fine; if not, we will establish a
coalition of the states concerned and strike anyway.

Putin also argued that Western interventions would neither lead to a peace-
ful settlement nor benefit international security. To prevent these types of

28 See also UN Security Council resolution no 2042 calling Syrian government to halt

the use of heavy weapons within the context of the Annan Plan as it puts a framework for
political process, a ceasefire and withdrawal of both forces. “Security Council Unanimously
Adopts Resolution 2042 (2012), Authorizing Advance Team to Monitor Ceasefire in
Syria,” United Nations, April 14, 2012, https://www.un.org/press/en/2012/sc10609.
doc.htm This plan was considered a key solution in the region by Russia.
29 Sergei Lavrov, “On the Right Side of History,” Huffington Post, June 2012, http://

www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/sergei-lavrov/russia-syria-on-the-right-side-of-histo-
ry_b_1596400.html.
30 Paul Harris, “Syria Resolution Vetoed by Russia and China at United Nations,”

February 4, 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/feb/04/

assad-obama-resign-un-resolution.
31 The turnout for referendum was 57.4 and 89.4% of the voters said yes. Sharipov,

“Bitva Za Siriyu,” 71.

 12  LENDING AN “OLD FRIEND” A HAND: WHY DOES RUSSIA BACK SYRIA?  361

interventions, Putin stated that Russia would always be ready to use its
right to veto. What Russia was seeking in Syria was “a ­well-considered,
balanced and cooperative approach” that would lead to the protection of
civilians.32
Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov published an article in the
Huffington Post in 2012, also underlining the fact that developments
in Libya after the toppling of Gaddafi represented a possible outcome
in Syria. This kind of regime change was not to the benefit of people
­living in the region, he stated, as it had to be left to the Syrian people to
choose the leader and political system of their country. He added: “For
us, the issue of who is in power in Syria is not the major one; it is impor-
tant to put an end to civilian deaths and to start a political dialogue in a
situation where the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of
the country will be respected by all external actors.”33 Moreover, Lavrov
responded to a question posed at the Russia–EU Summit that December
by emphasizing that the number one priority in Syria was the cessation of
conflict and saving of lives; after that, parties overseen by UN observers
could negotiate the situation.34
Another consideration of Moscow emanated from the potential for
sectarian division in the wake of regime change in Syria spilling over
into Lebanon, Jordan, and any of the countries that shared a Kurdish
population with Syria. Moreover, the status quo along the Syria–Israel
­
border could be affected negatively. Attempts by the USA and EU to
­
affect the process in line with their interests were raising the risk of
potential large-scale conflicts in which chemical weapons would also be
used.35 Russia also opposed the draft resolution condemning joint oper-
ations launched by the Syrian army and Hezbollah in Al-Qusayr in June
2013, in line with its policy, by that point, of vetoing all kinds of UN
Security Council draft resolutions on Syria regarding ceasefires.

32 Putin, “Russia and the Changing World.”

33 Lavrov, “On the Right Side of History.”
34 “Iz Otvetov Ministra İnostrannıh Del Rossii S.V. Lavrova Na Voprosı SMI Po Itogam

Sammita Rossiya-ES v Bryussele (21 Dekabrya 2012 g.),” The Embassy of Russian

Federation to United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, December 24,
2012, https://www.rus.rusemb.org.uk/press/534.
35 Andrey Fedorchenko, “Blizhniy Vostok: Orientiry Rossiyskoy Vneshney Politiki,” January

3, 2013, https://mgimo.ru/about/news/experts/234357/.
362  U. BEKCAN AND P. UZ HANÇARLI

At this point, it would be misleading to discuss whether ­ chemical

weapons were used by any party. US President Barack Obama,
having formerly described the use of chemical weapons as a red line
for American neutrality, argued in June 2013 that Syria had indeed
used chemical weapons. Opposing this argument, in March 19, 2013,
Russia prepared a report for the UN claiming that opponents of Assad
used chemical weapons in an attack on Aleppo’s Khan Al Assal area.36
On 21 August, further use of chemical weapons led to mass killings in
the East Ghouta area of Damascus. Inevitably, those against the regime
were certain that the weapons were used by al-Assad, while supporters of
the regime blamed the opposition. For instance, the line given by Syrian
Minister of Information, Omran al-Zoubi, to deny government use of
chemical weapons was supported by Lavrov, who described it as a means
of breaking the deadlock by inviting American involvement.37
Meanwhile, the possibility of airstrikes became a talking point in the
West. Since there was no acceptable alternative for the regime in Syria,
the strike would not be aiming to overthrow al-Assad but to weaken
the regime against its opponents. Typically, Russia was opposed to UN
Security Council-sanctioned air strikes against Syria. As a diplomatic
alternative, Moscow proposed the supervision of Assad regime’s chem-
ical weapons by the UN. This resulted in Syria joining the Chemical
Weapons Convention on October 14, 2013.38 Damascus was given until
the end of 2014 to destroy its supplies. Syria’s signing of the Convention
on Chemical Weapons and its moves to eliminate chemical weapons led
to an understanding between Russia and the USA (and therefore the UN
Security Council) that possibly averted a military intervention. Concerns
shown by Western policy-makers for the likelihood of the capture of
those types of weapons by radical religious organizations also played a
role in conceding to Russia’s line. In accordance with the requirements
of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the USA confirmed that Syrian

36 “Russia: Syrian Rebels Made, Used Sarin Nerve Gas,” CBSNEWS, July 9, 2013,

http://www.cbsnews.com/news/russia-syrian-rebels-made-used-sarin-nerve-gas/.
37 “Kimyasal Gazı Kim Kullandı?” Deutsche Welle Türkçe, August 26, 2013, http://

www.dw.com/tr/kimyasal-gaz%C4%B1-kim-kulland%C4%B1/a-17045913.
38 “Syria’s Accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention Enters into Force,” OPWC,

October 14, 2013, https://www.opcw.org/news/article/syrias-accession-to-the-chemical-

weapons-convention-enters-into-force/.
 12  LENDING AN “OLD FRIEND” A HAND: WHY DOES RUSSIA BACK SYRIA?  363

weapons were destroyed in August 2014. However, this was not an end
point for this issue. In April 2018, the USA, UK, and France blamed
the Syrian regime for using chemical weapons against the people in
Douma.
Meanwhile, the war raged on, as did accusations of the use of chem-
ical weapons. As the conflict deepened still, so too did the involvement
and the rising success of militias carrying an ideology that at once united
the Syrian regime and Russia’s own domestic security concerns.

The Jihadist Threat

Russian Foreign Policy tried to adapt to the changing circumstances of
Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. It gave the image of readiness for coopera-
tion with new governments in which political Islam was given a voice. In
his article “Russia and the Changing World,” Putin expressed that Russia
had always enjoyed good relations with envoys of moderate Islam, whose
world view he posited was similar to that of Russia’s own Muslims, and
he declared a readiness to develop mutual relations further. In addition,
Putin underlined that Russia aimed to revive political and economic rela-
tions with the Arab world, not least with those experiencing internal
transformation.39 In other words, Putin signaled a reaching out to those
governments.40
Western countries appeared largely ignorant of the fact that many of
the arms sent to support the Syrian opposition as the conflict expanded
were, in many cases, sent to Jihadist organizations operating in Syria.41
However, Russia was strong in its condemnation of the chipping away
of the secular order instilled by the Assad regime. This was something
that could be expected from a state having a 14% Muslim population
and fearing any possible victory of Islamic fundamentalists in Syria, as

39 Putin, “Russia and the Changing World.”

40 See “The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Press Release No:
1715-10-09-2013,” The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, September
10, 2013, http://www.mid.ru/en/maps/ly/-/asset_publisher/wcPZCnhgb1aW/con-
tent/id/97270/pop_up?_101_INSTANCE_wcPZCnhgb1aW_viewMode=print&_101_
INSTANCE_wcPZCnhgb1aW_qrIndex=0; “Russia and Egypt in ‘Historic’ Talks’,” BBC
News, November 14, 2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24936509.
41 Vitaly et al., Rossiya i Bolshoy Blizhniy Vostok, 18.
364  U. BEKCAN AND P. UZ HANÇARLI

it could pave the ground for radicalization and violence within its own
border.42 According to Lavrov: “Syria is a multi-confessional state:
in addition to Sunni and Shia Muslims there are Alawites, Orthodox
and other Christian confessions, Druzes, and Kurds. Over the last few
decades of secular rule of the Ba’ath party, freedom of conscience has
been practiced in Syria, and religious minorities fear that if the regime is
broken down, this tradition may be interrupted.”43
The predominance of radical jihadist groups among the Syrian oppo-
sition was a major concern for Moscow regarding its domestic politics.
Russia had to combat those groups in the Second Chechen War and was
struggling with the same threat for its own and Central Asia’s security
within the context of Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which set the
fight against separatism, radicalism, and terrorism as one of its founding
goals. The existence of Russian radical Islamists among the Jihadists in
Syria further disturbed Kremlin chiefs. Russian and Arabic graffiti on
the walls of ruined houses around Damascus and Daraya, located in the
southwest of the country, such as “Today Syria, tomorrow Russia” and
“Chechens and Tatars, rise up!” and even “We will pray in your palace,
Putin!” also heightened the Russian concerns and was most likely a rea-
son for their intervention in Syria.44
Radical Islam’s coming to power deemed a concern for Russia, as it
could be a sign of fundamentalism exceeding its bounds. It was inter-
preted as potentially provocative not only for places where Russian
Muslims are most populous, but also in Krasnodar Krai in the North
Caucasus and the cities on the European side. The official Russian posi-
tion in Syria was to oppose other countries’ involvement in domestic
issues of Syria via military, political, and intelligence/communication
instruments.45
In an interview given by Putin in 2015, the President argued that it
was the Islamic State and al-Nusra that Assad was fighting against, and

42 Phillips,The Battle for Syria, 220.

43 Lavrov, “On the Right Side of History.”
44 There were more than 200 fighters according to Maksim Kupinov, “Segodniya Siriya,

Zavtra Rossiya,” June 14, 2013, http://www.segodnia.ru/content/123738.

45 It is possible to argue that anti-jihadist stance of Russia has been supported by the

European Far Right. Øyvind Strømmen, “Assad’s Far-Right Europe Corps?” Hate Speech
International Investigating Extremism, November 25, 2013, https://www.hate-speech.
org/other-volunteers/.
 12  LENDING AN “OLD FRIEND” A HAND: WHY DOES RUSSIA BACK SYRIA?  365

they were the ones controlling 60% of Syrian land. Upon the demand
of the Syrian government, Russia provided military and technical aid for
Assad’s struggle against these organizations.46 Because this struggle was
similar to the one Putin had suppressed in Chechnya, Putin did not hes-
itate to back Assad in order to prevent the spread of the radical Islamist
movement.47 In Moscow’s security understanding, Syria freed from the
threat of fundamentalism would be a more convenient country for devel-
oping mutual economic and military relations.
Russia’s image in the region was yet another consideration of its
involvement in the Syrian conflict. In retrospect, it is unreasona-
ble to argue that Moscow’s policy in the Syrian crisis led to a negative
image in the region or worsened its relations with core state actors in
the region.48 Evidently, Moscow’s support for the Assad regime is not
vigorous enough for specific regional powers in Gulf Region and the
broader Middle Eastern to stand clearly against Russia. The civil war
in Syria soon began to morph along Sunni-Shia lines, with Iran and
Hezbollah supporting the Assad regime, while Turkey, Qatar, and the
KSA backed the opposition, as explained in different chapters in this
book. Multi-confessional Iraq, already scared by inner conflict, aimed to
balance the USA and Iran. Jordan and Lebanon were equally cool with
the Russian role in Syria. Egypt, during the administration of Mohamed
Morsi, had held a harsh attitude toward Damascus under the govern-
ment brought in by its own popular demand; however, the coup d’état
since 2013 had brought a normalization of relations. In other words,
regional powers in the broader Middle East were divided in their atti-
tudes toward the Assad regime, but the role of Russia in the region did
not harm its relations with the KSA/UAE-led bloc. Yet, it most likely
brought Russia and the Iran-led bloc closer together. Interestingly,
Ankara’s balancing policy vis-à-vis the USA brought Turkey and Russia
closer during this period.

46 “Putin Rasskazal, Zachem Rossiya Podderzhivaet Rezhim Asada v Sirii,” VZ,

September 28, 2015, https://vz.ru/news/2015/9/28/769112.html.

47 Fiona Hill, “The Real Reason Putin Supports Assad,” Foreign Affairs, March 25,

2013, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/chechnya/2013-03-25/real-reason-putin-
supports-assad.
48 For other insights see Mark Katz, “Siriya Dlya Rossii Kak Afganistan Dlya SSSR?”

Global Affairs, September 5, 2012, http://www.globalaffairs.ru/print/number/Siriya-

dlya-Rossii-kak-Afganistan-dlya-SSSR-15655.
366  U. BEKCAN AND P. UZ HANÇARLI

Economic and Military Interests

During the Cold War, Syria was a staunch ally to the USSR. After the
Suez crisis of 1956, the USSR and Syria developed particularly good
relations in the face of Western expansionist policies in the Gulf Region
and the broader Middle East. After the withdrawal of UK and France
from the region, the aim of the USA was to become an influential
player in containing communism, as outlined in the 1957 Eisenhower
doctrine. The USSR, in turn, supported actions aimed at bolster-
­
ing countries against US encroachment by harnessing its own capacity
to provide economic and military aid. This affinity was interpreted by
the USA and Turkey, the US regional bulwark against the USSR, as a
sign that Syria would soon become a satellite of the USSR. These two
alliances came to the brink of war at the end of August 1957. After this
crisis, the relationship between Syria and the USSR began to develop in
every realm: politically, economically, and militarily.
Hafez al-Assad’s leftist-inclined regime represented a strategic ­fortress
beyond the Soviet bloc, nestled between Western allies Turkey and
Israel. The year 1971 saw the establishment of the Tartous Soviet naval
base, built as the result of an agreement between the USSR and Syria
for procurement and renovation of Soviet submarines and surface ves-
sels. As the main arms supplier of Syria, the USSR sent weapons bought
by Damascus to Tartous. The docks of the base were used by the Soviet
Fifth Mediterranean Squadron for loading fuel and supplies, but they
could also dock nuclear submarines. Since the collapse of the USSR, the
Tartous naval base has been used by the Russian navy as well, yet it was
not as active as in the Soviet times.
Tartous also had a geostrategic dimension. The 1936 Montreux
Convention brought military restrictions to the Bosporus as the
international shipping channel that allows direct access to the
­
Mediterranean from Russia and the Black Sea. After a 1982 amendment
to the Convention, Turkey retained the right to close the Bosporus, at
its discretion, both in peacetime and war. This decision increased the
importance of the Tartous naval base as the only Russian military base in
the Mediterranean. Russia has continued to use the base as a part of its
 12  LENDING AN “OLD FRIEND” A HAND: WHY DOES RUSSIA BACK SYRIA?  367

greater power aspiration and as an influencing factor for its diplomacy in

the region.49
After the dissolution of the USSR, Russian interest in the Middle East
decreased.50 This lack of interest had consequences for Syria. Having
renounced socialism, the ideological affinity providing the impetus
for bilateral relations disappeared. Another impetus for cooling of ties
came with the collapse of the marriage of convenience that brought
both countries together due to a shared interest in containing Western
influence, as Russia sought means of rapprochement toward the West
throughout the 1990s.
As anti-Westernism returned to the agenda of both countries in the
wake of the later invasion of Iraq, the grounds for a rekindling of the
relationship were set. With Putin newly having taken office during this
time, various cooperation agreements were signed between both nations,
including the Double Taxation Treaty and Agreement for Cooperation
in Tourism. Several Russian companies provide technical assistance for
the construction of Syrian facilities, in addition to the supply of various
equipment and materials. In 2001, Moscow and Damascus also signed a
contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Road, which would
help increase the exchange of commodities between the two countries.51
Following Bashar al-Assad’s visit to Moscow in 2005, relations began to
thrive. An amount corresponding to 73% of the $13.5 billion in Syrian
debt owed from the Soviet period was written off. Syria would pay off
the rest of the debt in the following 10 years by commodities, not by
payments.52

49 Ron Synovitz, “Why Is Access to Syria’s Port at Tartus so Important to Moscow?”

June 19, 2012, https://www.rferl.org/a/explainer-why-is-access-/24619441.html;

Assad was also satisfied with the presence of the base in the region. He was considering
that Russia had to be expanded and more powerful in order to achieve regional stability.
“Esad: Rusya, Suriye’de Büyük Bir Askeri Üs Kurabilir,” Sputniknews, March 26, 2015,
https://tr.sputniknews.com/ortadogu/201503261014653529/.
50 “Russian Naval Base at Tartus/Tartous,” Global Security, accessed August 9, 2019,

https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/syria/tartous.htm.
51 Walter Yeates, “Putin’s World: The Economic Ties between Russia and Syria,”

Huffington Post, May 22, 2017, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/putins-world-

the-econmic-ties-between-russia-syria_us_5921c6a4e4b0b28a33f62d33.
52 Inozemtsev Vladislav, “Zachem Nam Siriya?” Vedomosti, December 24, 2012,

https://www.vedomosti.ru/opinion/articles/2012/12/24/zachem_nam_siriya.
368  U. BEKCAN AND P. UZ HANÇARLI

The Syrian Civil War reminded Russian companies of the loss they
had suffered in the Iraq market after that invasion, and they did not
want to be exposed to the same outcome in Syria.53 There were two sig-
nificant motivations to support the Assad regime on the part of Russia:
arms and energy. The arms trade is one of the key pillars of the economic
relationship, worth $15.5 billion in 2015. It also balanced the nega-
tive effects of Russia’s own economic deficits.54 More broadly, Russian
exporters felt that a regime change would cause loss of a market to the
West, as not only Iraq, but Libya, were also important for Russia in this
regard, once again, in terms of arms. While Gaddafi had imported over
$2 billion worth of arms from Russia from 2005 to 2010, this number
decreased after a new government came to power, as new contracts were
signed with France. Therefore, Moscow’s policy behavior toward the
Syrian conflict was motivated by economic interests to support the Assad
regime in order to protect its weapons sales to Syria.55
Keeping Assad in power would also save Moscow’s receivables, as
Syria has amassed at least $4 billion worth of debt in unpaid arms con-
tracts since 2011.56 In turn, Syria, which has a $5 billion arms market
with $20 billion worth of Russian investment, supported the latter’s
military intervention in Georgia. In 2008, in an interview given to the
Russian news agency Itar-Tass, Bashar al-Assad said that the approach

53 Russian’s commercial influence in Iraq became limited and the US gained a privileged

position in obtaining the oil in Iraq. Before the war, Russia was an important trade partner of
Iraq with its 40% share in Iraqi foreign trade. In 2002, within “oil-for-food” framework, an
economic cooperation program had been prepared between these two countries. Overthrow
of Saddam regime led to economic loss of Russia. Democracy did not come to Iraq, on the
contrary, instability and the threat of fundamentalist terrorism increased in Iraq and in the
region inherently. Radical groups became part of power relations. Alexei Podtserob, “Rossiya
i Krizisnıye Situatsii Vokrug İraka: İstoriya i Sovremennost,” Vestnik MGİMO Universiteta
14, no. 5 (2010): 168; Eldar Kasayev, “Irak: İnvestitsionnıy Klimat i İnteresı Rossii,” İndeks
Bezopasnosti 15, no. 1 (2009): 59–61; and Vagif Guseynov, “Blijniy Vostok: Neobhodimost
Rossiyskogo Prisutstviya,” Rossiya i Musulmanskiy Mir, no. 4 (2008): 139.
54 Phillips, The Battle for Syria, 221.

55 Ken Ifesinachi and Adibe Raymond, “The United States and Russian Governments

Involvement in the Syrian Crisis and the United Nations’ Kofi Annan Peace Process,”
Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 5, no. 27 (December 2014): 1159, https://doi.
org/10.5901/mjss.2014.v5n27p1154.
56 James O’Toole, “Billions at Stake as Russia Backs Syria,” CNN Money, February 10,

2012, http://money.cnn.com/2012/02/09/news/international/russia_syria.
 12  LENDING AN “OLD FRIEND” A HAND: WHY DOES RUSSIA BACK SYRIA?  369

of the USA and other Western countries toward Abkhazia and South
Ossetia could be seen as an example of a double standard, and that since
Russia inherited its peace-keeping mission in the Caucasus, Moscow’s
intervention in Georgia was legitimate and justifiable.57
This economic and political affinity was an adequate motive for
Russia to support the al-Assad regime and not to lose an important ally.
When the civil war began in 2011, Syria was the second-largest arms
importer from Russia, constituting 15% of total sales.58 In addition to
these sales, the public use of Russian arms in Syria would serve as an
advertisement method and help Moscow find potential customers else-
where.59 In line with this argument, according to sources within the
Russian government, a military presence in Syria could pave the ground
for new contracts with Algeria, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Pakistan worth
$6–7 billion.60 Given this environment of arms trading and close mil-
itary relations, after the involvement of Russia in the Syrian civil war,
the Khmeimin airbase was opened in Syria as a Russian facility, and, in
January 2017, an agreement was signed by these two countries that gave
the right to use of Khmeimin and Tartous as military bases for 49 years
to Russia.61
Energy also plays an important role in Russia’s economic relations
with Syria. Many Russian companies have been investing in Syrian oil
and gas exploration and production activities. Nuclear energy is another
issue, as, in 2010, Russian companies announced their intended involve-
ment in Syria’s first nuclear power plant. In 2012, Gazprom took over oil
and gas operations from a Croatian company previously active in Syria.62

57 Sergey Markedonov, “Pochemu Rossiya Zashishayet Siriyu Asada?” April 1, 2012,

http://noev-kovcheg.ru/mag/2012-04/3092.html.
58 Ifesinachi and Raymond, “The United States and Russian Governments,” 1158.

59 Phillips, The Battle for Syria, 221.

60 Alec Luhn, “Russia’s Campaign in Syria Leads to Arms Sale Windfall,” The

Guardian, March 29, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/29/

russias-campaign-in-syria-leads-to-arms-sale-windfall.
61 “Moscow Cements Deal with Damascus to Keep 49-Year Presence at Syrian Naval

and Air Bases,” TASS—Russian News Agency, January 20, 2017, http://tass.com/
defense/926348.
62 Azoulas Bagdonas, “Russia’s Interests in the Syrian Conflict: Power, Prestige, and

Profit,” European Journal of Economic and Political Studies 5, no. 2 (2012): 64.
370  U. BEKCAN AND P. UZ HANÇARLI

In the following year, Syria signed an agreement with Russia regarding oil
exploration in order to promote its economy and political stability.63

Conclusion
Throughout the 1990s, Russia, as the successor of the defunct USSR, was
forced to deal with the economic and political fallout of its one regime
change. Vladimir Putin’s later coming to power marked the beginnings of
a Russia reemerging domestically with more bids for power in the inter-
national system. Moscow became willing to engage head-to-head with
Western countries. The most explicit example of this renewed power is
undoubtedly the Syrian Civil War: Moscow’s position resists the unilater-
alism of the USA and other Western countries in affecting regime change
as a means of shoring up interests. Moscow used its right to veto in the
UNSC and consistently emphasized the principle of non-intervention
in states’ affairs, with reference to the UN Charter. No doubt, on this
occasion, the principle fell in line with Russia’s own interests.
Moscow’s security stance is that regime change by foreign intervention
and occupation may pave the ground for instability in the respective country,
as beyond evident in Iraq, Yemen, and Libya. Moreover, fundamentalists are
among the ones demanding the overthrow of the Syrian regime. In Moscow,
policy-makers regard instability in the broader Middle East (which allows
fundamentalist gains) a political threat for the Caucasus, Central Asia, and
Russia.64 But neither are more immediate and temporal concerns far from
view. Putin has aimed to deal with this threat beyond Russian territory.
Russia has been on good terms with Syria since Soviet times and
controls a military naval base, in addition to important economic and
­
military interests. Learning similar strategic lessons from the cases of Iraq
and Libya, Russia has never wished to lose these privileges under any cir-
cumstances, least of all regime change. Therefore, according to Russian
point of view, non-regime change and non-foreign interference like in
Iraq and Libya are essential to maintain Russia’s strategic interests in
Syria. Russian support for Syria needs to be seen within this framework,
along with that of balancing the influence of Western encroachment that
threatens both country’s interests.

63 “Syria Signs Offshore Oil and Gas Exploration Deal with Russia,” RT, December 25,

2013, https://www.rt.com/business/syria-oil-gas-russia-795/.
64 “Syria Signs Offshore Oil and Gas Exploration Deal with Russia.”
 12  LENDING AN “OLD FRIEND” A HAND: WHY DOES RUSSIA BACK SYRIA?  371

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 CHAPTER 13

Contribution of Water Scarcity

and Sustainability Failures to Disintegration
and Conflict in the Arab Region—
The Case of Syria and Yemen

Mohammad Al-Saidi

Introduction
The Arab region is naturally characterized by an arid and semi-arid
­climate, making it among the most water-scarce regions of the world.
Water policy failures arise from increasing scarcity, but they are also a
consequence of a lack of organizational and institutional capacities to
tackle them. While water, rather than oil, might be the most valuable
future resource in this region, the state of water management and infra-
structure is in bad shape in terms of overall performance, with imminent
political and economic risks. This chapter presents the argument that
past policy failures in tackling the sustainable use of key natural resources
such as water have contributed to political crises, conflicts, and state dis-
integration across the region. It presents evidence supporting this thesis

M. Al-Saidi (*) 
Center for Sustainable Development, College of Arts and Sciences,
Qatar University, Doha, Qatar
e-mail: malsaidi@qu.edu.qa

© The Author(s) 2020 375

P. O. Amour (ed.), The Regional Order in the Gulf Region
and the Middle East, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45465-4_13
376  M. AL-SAIDI

from Syria and Yemen, while it provides critical discussion of the growing
body of literature linking conflicts to natural resource use and sustaina-
bility failures.
Overall, the point is argued that the mere existence of resource scar-
city (e.g., water scarcity) or increased variability (e.g., climate-induced
droughts) does not drive conflicts, although these features can lead to
heightened political instability. Moreover, the decades-long failure to
address these environmental problems represents a genuine, long-term,
and increasingly important contributor to conflicts and disintegration in
the broader Middle East. In this sense, this chapter institutes a redefini-
tion of the contribution of the “environmental factors” to conflicts and
the nature of their “causation” mechanism. It indicates that the totality
of unmanaged environmental problems and public policy failures, rather
than singular environmental events, is what causes conflicts and signifi-
cantly heightens the potential for disintegration of state systems.
According to the World Bank’s 2007 Development Report, the
region of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) suffers from three
types of scarcity: a scarcity of physical resources, a scarcity of organ-
izational capacity, and a scarcity of accountability for achieving sus-
tainable outcomes. The first type includes the physical availability of
water resources. The second type stems from public agencies that have
overlapping and unclear functions or difficulties in coordinating different
water uses or that play multiple roles as service provider, planner, and reg-
ulator. The third kind of scarcity refers to the lack of a sound institutional
environment. In order to promote such an environment, it is necessary to
demand accountability, transparency, and inclusiveness as well as to develop
good governance mechanisms.1
Water governance failures have become more evident in the Arab
region; however, physical water scarcity is also increasing due to eco-
nomic, demographic, and climatic pressures. One way to analyze this
type of scarcity is by examining the Water Stress Index (WSI)—an index
based on the approximate minimum level of water required per capita
to maintain an adequate quality of life in a moderately developed coun-
try in an arid zone. It was calculated by Falkenmark as about 100 liters

1 “Making the Most of Scarcity: Accountability for Better Water Management Results in the

Middle East and North Africa” (Washington, DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development/The World Bank, 2007), xxi–xxix, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
INTMNAREGTOPWATRES/Resources/Making_the_Most_of_Scarcity.pdf.
 13  CONTRIBUTION OF WATER SCARCITY AND SUSTAINABILITY …  377

per day (36.5 cubic meters per year) as the minimum requirement per
person for good health. Furthermore, based on experience from devel-
oping countries, roughly 5–20 times this amount is needed to satisfy
the requirements of agriculture, industry, and energy production.2 It
is important to mention that water consumption for agriculture is very
high in arid areas and can reach more than 90% of total consumption
in some Middle Eastern countries. Based on the WSI, countries with
renewable freshwater availability above about 1700 cubic meters per cap-
ita annually suffer only occasional or local water problems. Below this
threshold, however, countries will experience periodic or regular “water
stress.” When freshwater availability falls below 1000 cubic meters per
person annually, countries experience chronic “water scarcity,” as the lack
of water begins to hamper economic development and human health and
wellbeing. Those countries with annual renewable freshwater supplies
below 500 cubic meters per person experience “absolute scarcity.” Using
this simple index, all Arab countries, except for Iraq, fall under the 1700
cubic meter threshold and are hence under either water stress or water
scarcity.3
The static perspective of the WSI does not account for population
growth or a country’s capacity to adapt to increasing scarcity, which are
important factors regarding the link between water scarcity and conflicts.
Scholars have thus considered other indicators, such as future water stress
under population growth, the ratio of annual water demand (withdrawals)
to annual renewable water availability (supply), spatial variability in water
resources within countries, or the total water supply originating from out-
side a country’s borders.4 Other measurements also include a country’s
adaptive capacity through development of comprehensive “vulnerability”
indices that consider availability, economic and institutional factors, and

2 Malin Falkenmark, “The Massive Water Scarcity Now Threatening Africa: Why Isn’t It

Being Addressed?” AMBIO 18, no. 2 (1989): 112–18.

3 “Making the Most of Scarcity,” xxi–xxix.

4 See e.g., Peter H. Gleick, “Water and Conflict: Fresh Water Resources and

International Security,” International Security 18, no. 1 (1993): 99–104, https://doi.

org/10.2307/2539033; Peter H. Gleick, Elizabeth L. Chalecki, and Arlene Wong,
“Measuring Water Well-Being: Water Indicators and Indices,” in The World’s Water, 2002–
2003: The Biennial Report on Freshwater Resources, ed. Peter H. Gleick (Washington: Island
Press, 2002), 87–112.
378  M. AL-SAIDI

coping measures (such as water storage),5 or by dividing the WSI by the

Human Development Index (HDI).6 For decades now, using these multi-
dimensional measurements, Arab countries have featured among the coun-
tries with the scarcest water. Contemporary water stress indices, which use
key elements of the earlier mentioned measurements, estimate that all Arab
countries, except for Egypt, will already be in a state of “extremely high”
water stress by the year 2040.7
Furthermore, the water-related vulnerability of Arab countries does
not only arise from internal scarcity factors. For example, one external
driver of vulnerability is the dependence on water resources originat-
ing outside a country’s territories. This is the case with Egypt, which
depends on the Nile River for its water. This means for Egypt that 97%
of its water originates from outside its borders. Other countries such as
Syria, Sudan, Iraq, and Jordan, have varying degrees of dependence, at
79, 77, 66, and 36%, respectively. This dependence on external water
sources has, in the past, been a source of transboundary water-sharing
disputes among riparian nations in the Eastern Nile (Egypt, Sudan, and
Ethiopia), the Jordan River (Israel and Jordan), or the Euphrates–Tigris
River (Turkey, Syria, and Iraq). Although these disputes have not yet
resulted in direct state conflicts, tensions are growing given the rise in
national ambitions of upstream countries for river development, e.g., the
increased river utilization in Ethiopia or Turkey.
Overall, although water scarcity and vulnerability may be the obvi-
ous underlying problems, the incapability of Arab countries to adapt to
these conditions is the real issue. This is true with regard to the failing
capacity to adapt to the impacts of climate pressures on water resources.8

5 Paul Raskin, “Water Future: Assessment of Long-Range Patterns and Problems.

Background Document to the Comprehensive Assessment of the Freshwater Resources of

the World Report (WMO, 1997),” Stockholm Environment Institute, October 30, 2008,
https://www.sei.org/publications/water-futures-assessment-long-range-patterns-problems-2.
6 Leif Ohlsson, “Environment Scarcity and Conflict: A Study of Malthusian Concerns”

(Doctoral, University of Gothenburg, 1999), http://hdl.handle.net/2077/13417.

7 Tianyi Luo, Robert Young, and Paul Reig, “Aqueduct Projected Water Stress Country

Rankings,” World Resources Institute, August 2015, https://www.wri.org/resources/

data-sets/aqueduct-projected-water-stress-country-rankings.
8 Jeannie Sowers, Avner Vengosh, and Erika Weinthal, “Climate Change, Water Resources,

and the Politics of Adaptation in the Middle East and North Africa,” Climatic Change 104,
no. 3–4 (February 2011): 599–627, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-010-9835-4 .
 13  CONTRIBUTION OF WATER SCARCITY AND SUSTAINABILITY …  379

The region can expect significant climatic pressures in the upcoming dec-
ades, in terms of reduced rainfall, temperature variability, sea-level rise,
and the loss of agricultural production.9 Alongside water stress, these
additional risks have caused c­ limate-induced migration movements10 and
might cause more pressures in the future. Furthermore, there are emer-
gent problems arising from increased integration between water use and
the use of other resources, as the next section shows. However, these new
challenges are not yet addressed in current policies, and while the impacts
of these challenges are uncertain, they can increase resource insecurity in
new groups of countries in the Gulf Region and the broader Middle East.

Emergent Challenges from Resource-Use Integration

Alongside scarcity and vulnerabilities in the water sector, water issues in the
Arab region are becoming entwined with land- and ­energy-management
issues. Traditionally, land and water issues are prominent and closely inter-
linked in the big agricultural societies of the Arab world. Agricultural crop-
ping patterns and irrigation practices, for example, are usually two separate
land management issues, but both have a huge impact on conservation
and sustainability in the water sector. Equally important is the agricultural
trade policy in these countries. With increasing water scarcity, reducing the
internal water footprint in these countries can serve as a viable solution
and a way out of scarcity. This is achievable through an increase in imports
of water-intensive products. This issue of virtual water—the water foot-
print in agricultural trade—is often weighed against food supply security

9 For adaptation measures to climate-change risks in the Arab region see “Adaptation

to a Changing Climate in the Arab Countries: A Case for Adaptation Governance and
Leadership in Building Climate Resilience,” MENA Development Report (The World Bank,
June 11, 2013), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/740351468299700935/
pdf/Adaptation-to-a-changing-climate-in-the-Arab-countries-a-case-for-adaptation-
governance-and-leadership-in-building-climate-resilience.pdf; For risks and adapta-
tion measures in the Arabian/Persian region, see Mohammad Al-Saidi and Nadir Ahmed
Elagib, “Ecological Modernization and Responses for a Low-Carbon Future in the Gulf
Cooperation Countries,” Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change (May 2018):
e538, https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.528.
10 Quentin Wodon et al., eds., Climate Change and Migration: Evidence from the Middle

East and North Africa (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2014), http://documents.
worldbank.org/curated/en/748271468278938347/pdf/893710PUB0978000Box-
385270B00PUBLIC0.pdf.
380  M. AL-SAIDI

constraints and other political considerations, such as the welfare of farm-

ers nationally. However, after a long period of agricultural expansion, some
Arab countries still have large internal agricultural water footprints, some-
thing that is contrary to the water scarcity situation in these countries.
In addition to the above, water and energy management issues are
also closely linked. On the one hand, energy policies have an influence
on water use. For example, energy subsidies for diesel have contributed
to the spread and affordability of water-development practices through
(illegal) well-drilling. On the other hand, water is used for energy pro-
duction across the Arab region, and this use will increase with new
hydropower projects. However, this water use is not significant in the
region. In the United States, for example, 45% of the water withdrawal
is used for electricity production.11 By comparison, the electrical energy
production system in the broader Middle East is less reliant on freshwa-
ter due to the availability of abundant fossil fuel resources.12
In the Arab region, the integration between water, energy, and land
use is expected to increase, given the current socio-economic growth
patterns. With increased reliance on water-intensive electricity and
­electricity-intensive water production, the water and energy infrastructures
are going to become increasingly coupled.13 For example, increased tem-
perature due to climate change is expected to increase the requirements for
cooling in buildings. Cooling, which is already a higher energy-use s­ector,
can also use significant amounts of water, especially with the advance-
ment of the more energy-efficient (but water-intensive) district cooling
systems.14 Furthermore, energy use for water production is increasing,

11 Ron Pate et al., “Overview of Energy-Water Interdependencies and the Emerging

Energy Demands on Water Resources” (Albuquerque, New Mexico: Sandia National

Laboratorie, 2007), https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1267289.
12 Afreen Siddiqi and Laura Diaz Anadon, “The Water-Energy Nexus in the Middle

East and North Africa,” Energy Policy 39, no. 8 (August 2011): 4529–40, https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.enpol.2011.04.023.
13 For patterns of increased integration in water and energy productions in the

broader Middle East, see Amro M. Farid, William N. Lubega, and William W. Hickman,
“Opportunities for Energy-Water Nexus Management in the Middle East & North Africa,”
Elementa Science of the Anthropocene 4 (2016): 1–17, https://doi.org/10.12952/journal.
elementa.000134.
14 Ben Richard Hughes, Hassam Nasarullah Chaudhry, and Saud Abdul Ghani, eds., “A

Review of Sustainable Cooling Technologies in Buildings,” Renewable and Sustainable Energy

Reviews 15, no. 6 (August 2011): 3112–20, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2011.03.032.
 13  CONTRIBUTION OF WATER SCARCITY AND SUSTAINABILITY …  381

whether due to the increasing costs of groundwater abstractions or to the

reliance on alternative water sources, such as desalination. Increased water
scarcity means that desalination has become a key future water supply
source for many countries, even those that have traditionally been using
surface or groundwater resources. Here, the total electricity demand for
desalination in the MENA region will triple by 2030 compared with 2007
levels.15 Desalination provides a quick fix for domestic water supplies, but
it makes this supply vulnerable to the security of a few large-scale plants.
Another example of water–energy integration and accompanying
problems is water reuse, which is also on the rise as an important option
for the use of marginal water (i.e., water of lesser quality such as  waste-
water, or water produced in the oil and gas industries) instead of fresh
water for agriculture.16 This option can be expected to result in increased
energy use, and it requires a greater level of technological sophistica-
tion. One way to solve this is by linking water reuse and production to
the promotion of renewable energies, which can also benefit low-car-
bon development in the region. This coupling of water and energy sys-
tems through clean technologies and ecological innovations can already
be witnessed in the case of the Gulf countries. In fact, decreasing the
high consumption of energy and water, increasing energy efficiency, and
developing renewable energies are on the political agenda for countries
of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). In these countries, which have
very high levels of water scarcity but are quite rich economically, the
water and energy sectors are prime examples of ecological modernization
and technology dependency.17
In the GCC region, through energy subsidies, water and energy ser-
vices are provided at very low prices, often free of charge. These subsidies
account for over 8.5% of the region’s GDP and 22% of the governments’

15 “Water Desalination Using Renewable Energy,” Technology Brief (International

Renewable Energy Agency [IRENA], March 2012), http://www.irena.org/-/media/

Files/IRENA/Agency/Publication/2015/IRENA-ETSAP-Tech-Brief-I12-Water-
Desalination.pdf.
16 See J. Jed Brown, Probir Das, and Mohammad Al-Saidi, “Sustainable Agriculture in

the Arabian/Persian Gulf Region Utilizing Marginal Water Resources: Making the Best of
a Bad Situation,” Sustainability 10, no. 5 (April 2018): 1–16, https://doi.org/10.3390/
su10051364 .
17 Al-Saidi and Elagib, “Ecological Modernization and Responses for a Low-Carbon

Future in the Gulf Cooperation Countries.”

382  M. AL-SAIDI

revenues.18 However, the availability of energy, together with the high

dependency of food imports and a relatively high socio-economic
stability, make the GCC region less vulnerable to current and future
water supply problems than are the big agricultural countries in the
broader Middle East.19 Yet, this is a short-term notion of water supply
security that does not take into account the cost of energy and emis-
sions, nor does it incorporate issues such as the risk of accidents or tech-
nological failures. Water supply security in the GCC is contrasted with
large energy intensities in both the water and agricultural sectors20; and
besides, large agricultural Arab countries, such as Egypt, Yemen, or
Syria, might not have the economic means to adequately compensate for
increasing water scarcity through reuse systems or desalination plants.
To compound these issues, the rise of renewable energies poses
another risk to freshwater supplies that requires careful consideration.
For example, renewable energy use in agriculture (e.g., through solar
irrigation systems) has resulted in the overuse of groundwater resources
in the case of India.21 However, renewables can be combined with more
sustainable food production systems. Some of the newer systems (e.g.,
greenhouses, vertical farming, aquaculture hydroponics, aquaponics,
etc.) are less water-intensive but more energy-intensive than traditional
farming. The transition toward these forms of sustainable agriculture
requires significant investments and the abolition of market distortions
or disincentives for water and energy savings. Until now, however, local

18 Joshua Meltzer, Nathan Hultman, and Claire Langley, “Low-Carbon Energy

Transitions in Qatar and the Gulf Cooperation Council Region” (Brookings institute,
February 2014), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/low-car-
bon-energy-transitions-qatar-meltzer-hultman-full.pdf.
19 Mohammad Al-Saidi et al., “Water Resources Vulnerability Assessment of MENA

Countries Considering Energy and Virtual Water Interactions,” Procedia Engineering 145
(2016): 900–7, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.proeng.2016.04.117.
20 Mohammad Al-Saidi, Andres Jimenez, and Deniz Oezhan, “Assessment of Energy

Use Patterns for Water and Food Production in the MENA Region,” in International
Energy and Sustainability Conference (IESC) (Cologne, Germany, 2016), https://doi.
org/10.1109/IESC.2016.7569506.
21 Nitin Bassi, “Solarizing Groundwater Irrigation in India: A Growing Debate,”

International Journal of Water Resources Development 34, no. 1 (2017): 132–45, https://
doi.org/10.1080/07900627.2017.1329137.
 13  CONTRIBUTION OF WATER SCARCITY AND SUSTAINABILITY …  383

agriculture in Arab countries has thrived on subsidized energy prices,22

and for the larger part, the absence of water pricing systems.
Overall, countries in the broader Middle East have been producing
more from a single resource, which negatively impacts resource availabil-
ity and the quality of other resources used as input. This is increasingly
becoming the case, with this trend being manifested in new production
systems for water, energy, and food. The failures of these countries to
decouple production systems of energy and food from increases in water
use or the production of water from the use of fossil fuels will have tangi-
ble negative consequences. As will be discussed in the next section, water
sector reform represents the centerpiece of these failures, with divisive
water sustainability politics hindering any major progress.

The Public Policy Burden of Water Politics

During the early 1990s, freshwater scarcity became obvious, and govern-
ments started to change their public policies in order to promote sustain-
able water management. This came after decades of politicizing water use
for agricultural growth and development. Before water shortages became
evident in the 1990s, state ideologies in many Arab countries had for
decades revolved around the notion of water development rather than
sustainable management. The lack of integrated and long-term planning
of water resources meant that water-management decisions were made
ad hoc and with no calculation of risks from demographic or economic
factors. Only when the cost of water scarcity became evident through
droughts and water shortages did the urgency of management reforms
translate itself into water sector policy and legislation.
Water-sector policymakers and donors started to promote the idea of
sustainability in the management of water resources rather late in the day,
i.e., only when Arab countries started to witness the impacts of the water
development strategies of the 1960s to the 1970s. In fact, over the centu-
ries, the history of public water policies in the Arab world accommodated

22 See e.g., Omar Saif, Toufic Mezher, and Hassan A. Arafat, “Water Security in the GCC

Countries: Challenges and Opportunities,” Journal of Environmental Studies and Sciences

4, no. 4 (December 2014): 329–46, https://doi.org/10.1007/s13412-014-0178-8.
384  M. AL-SAIDI

concerns about both scarcity and development.23 According to the World

Bank (2007), this history can be divided into three phases.24 The first
phase evolved over the millennia when societies across the Middle East
grew and developed their ways of coping with the variability and scar-
city of water resources. These societies became prosperous and developed
the most elaborate institutions and structures, which helped the region to
harbor some of the world’s oldest and most accomplished civilizations.
The second phase, which is described in this chapter as the “water
resources development phase,” emerged only during the twentieth cen-
tury, as population and economic growth drove governments to focus on
securing water supplies and to expand services. Here, the state was actively
involved in the collective development of water resources through massive
development projects and by supporting farmers. In fact, the rivers in this
region became the most heavily dammed in the world. Irrigation networks
became extensive, and the low-cost drilling technology of the 1960s led to
intensive tapping into aquifers by private citizens.
The current, third phase, which this chapter describes as the “liber-
alized and sustainable resources management phase,” began in the early
to mid-1990s. A series of policy changes to the management of water
sources has been initiated since the mid-1990s. Several Arab countries
started to reorganize their water and sanitation sectors by establishing
separate ministries responsible for water planning, by adopting legislation
such as water laws, and by institutionalizing water-sector strategies.
Although the water resources development phase has been formally
replaced by the contemporary phase of liberalized and sustainable water
management, both ideologies are reflected in some of today’s public pol-
icies. Many Arab countries have moved to adopt the Dublin Principles of
1992, which promoted water as an economic good and introduced other
principles of participatory management and the integration of water

23 For the history of agricultural policies in the Arab region, see “Making the Most of

Scarcity,” xxi–xxix; Mohamed Bazza, “Overview of the History of Water Resources and
Irrigation Management in the Near East Region,” Water Science and Technology: Water
Supply 7, no. 1 (2007): 201–9, https://doi.org/10.2166/ws.2007.023; Hussein A.
Amery and Aaron T. Wolf, eds., Water in the Middle East: A Geography of Peace (Austin,
TX: University of Texas Press, 2000).
24 “Making the Most of Scarcity,” xxi–xxix.
 13  CONTRIBUTION OF WATER SCARCITY AND SUSTAINABILITY …  385

sector decisions.25 From these principles, the management paradigm of

Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) was developed and
promoted for developing countries by donor organizations and scholars
alike. IWRM was implemented in many Middle Eastern countries and
has resulted in new, but sometimes quite weak, institutions. However, it
has also generated resistance from agricultural actors and a high level of
insecurity and institutional conflicts.26 Nonetheless, this integrated man-
agement paradigm introduced, for the first time, a promising solution
for water overuse and quality deterioration. Although the holistic idea
of IWRM is highly conceptual, it offered new political economic instru-
ments for the region, e.g., adequate water pricing, decentralization of
water management, commercialization of water utilities, management of
the water demand side, and consolidation of water institutions.
The importance of this ideology in advocating a coherent, bal-
anced, and coordinated water policy should not be underestimated. The
idea that one cannot talk of scarce water resources without mention-
ing wasteful demand patterns, or that one cannot manage urban water
supply without linking it to agricultural and irrigation, was arguably
not self-evident for practitioners in the water sectors in Arab countries.
After decades of high population growth, urbanization, and agricultural
expansion, Arab countries have just started to work out a solution to the
threats concerning their water supplies. IWRM thus created many new
institutional arrangements, as well as increased participation and cooper-
ation, whether at the basin level or at least between national and interna-
tional stakeholders.
Overall, water policies, legislation, and strategies were easier to adopt
than were reforms aimed at water pricing, private sector participation,
regulation, and economic incentives. Still, even today, water prices in
many countries are too low to accommodate the economic value of water

25 N. Vijay Jagannathan, Ahmed Shawky Mohamed, and Christopher J. Perry,

“Introduction: Beyond WRM—Unbundling Water Management in MNA Countries,”

in Water in the Arab World: Management Perspectives and Innovations, ed. N. Vijay
Jagannathan, Ahmed Shawky Mohamed, and Alexander Kremer (Washington, DC: World
Bank, 2009), https://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTMENA/Resources/Water_Arab_
World_full.pdf.
26 See the overview provided in Mohammad Al-Saidi, “Conflicts and Security in

Integrated Water Resources Management,” Environmental Science and Policy 73 (July

2017): 38–44, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2017.03.015.
386  M. AL-SAIDI

or to curb excessive consumption.27 At the same time, a minority of Arab

countries have adequate regulatory instruments for the water sector.28 In
many countries, enforcement of crucial aspects of sustainable water man-
agement, such as licensing and monitoring of groundwater wells, is still
weak.
A new generation of water managers across the Arab world has
become increasingly aware of the rising scarcity and the integrated man-
agement approach to water policy, but policymakers are still either una-
ble or unwilling to support a sustainable and integrated water policy.
This is due to strong resistance to crucial reforms, such as decentraliza-
tion of water institutions, establishment of adequate water pricing pol-
icies for the urban and agricultural sectors, or adoption of basin plans
with adequate regulation and protection rules. Stakeholders from the
agriculture- or energy-related sectors still advocate that their priori-
ties should be promoted by the state, as their sectors are more worthy
of development. They cite the economic contribution of their sectors,
regardless of their water demand and use patterns. In addition, policies
across the water, energy, and land sectors are rarely coherent. For exam-
ple, promoting food security or local agriculture often comes at the cost
of freshwater resources, while increasing access to cheap energy might
lead to over-pumping of groundwater. While the Arab region has long
relied on food imports to compensate for the countries’ internal water
deficits,29 these imports are vulnerable to price volatility on the global

27 See for the case of water pricing in Yemen a review of the similar experience from

(Arab) developing countries Mohammad Al-Saidi, “Urban Water Pricing in Yemen: A

Comparison of Increasing Block Tariffs to Other Pricing Schemes,” Water International 42,
no. 3 (2017): 308–23, https://doi.org/10.1080/02508060.2016.1269283.
28 See the survey of regulatory experiences in the Arab world in Esther Gerlach,

“Regulatory Design and Practice in the MENA Region and beyond: A Review and
Performance Monitoring Arrangements for Water Service Providers” (Deutsche Gesellschaft
fuer Internationale Zusammenarbeit [GIZ] GmbH, August 2010), http://www.
water-impact-guidebook.net/fileadmin/0_guidebook/resources_exercises/A-Enabling_
Environment/7-Regulatory_Design_and_Practice-MENREM_Survey_Report.pdf.
29 Hassan Hakimian, “Water Scarcity and Food Imports: An Empirical Investigation of

the ‘Virtual Water’ Hypothesis in the MENA Region,” Review of Middle East Economics
and Finance 1, no. 1 (2003): 71–85.
 13  CONTRIBUTION OF WATER SCARCITY AND SUSTAINABILITY …  387

food markets. In the past, this led policymakers to increase regulations

for the protection of domestic food markets through subsidies and other
market distortions.30
In turn, increasing local agriculture and water-intensive cropping pat-
terns result in increased water use and, often, water over-abstraction.
The recognition of the need to incorporate comprehensive water man-
agement policies to address these issues of pricing, footprints, demand
management, or integration across sectors did not immediately translate
into actions in terms of public policies. Instead, water scarcity-related
and land-related problems continued and are increasingly linked to the
eruption of armed conflicts, as in the cases of Syria and Yemen.

Water Scarcity as a Driver of Political Disintegration?

The cases of Syria and Yemen show how sustainability failures are decades
in the making and are strongly manifested in the water sector. Although
scholarly debates center on the validity and magnitude of the contribu-
tion of water-related disasters to conflicts, particularly in Syria, they dis-
guise the real problem of inadequate public policies to address water
sustainability. These cases represent a common narrative in the broader
Middle East region of depleted water resources resulting in economic and
socio-political pressures, which some scholars link to specific conflicts. This
represents a difficulty in linking environmental problems to multi-faceted
conflicts. However, the Syrian and Yemeni cases show that consideration
of the overall context of sustainability failures, particularly in the water sec-
tor, is essential to understand recent political disintegration.

The Case of Syria

Syria has recently been much analyzed regarding the contribution of
environmental factors to its current armed conflict, and particularly the
role of drought and climate variability, as discussed in Chapter 11 in this
book. In fact, the contribution of this recent drought might be a small

30 Elena Ianchovichina, Josef L. Loening, and Christina A. Wood, “How Vulnerable

Are Arab Countries to Global Food Price Shocks?,” The Journal of Development Studies
50, no. 9 (2014): 1302–19, https://doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2014.928698; Eckart
Woertz et al., “Food Inflation in the GCC Countries” (Gulf Research Center, May 2008),
https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/111316/food_inflation_3609.pdf.
388  M. AL-SAIDI

part of the puzzle of the long litany of bad water and land policies. A
long time before the current conflict started, the growth and misalloca-
tion of vital natural resources, such as water, caused political tensions and
environmental pressures. Syria’s groundwater resources, as well as its sur-
face water resources, are both heavily exploited for agricultural, munici-
pal, and industrial use. With precipitation that can reach up to 1400 mm
in the mountainous areas, groundwater aquifers, and a system of 16
main rivers and tributaries (including six international rivers), Syria has
historically had fewer water concerns than its southern Arab neighbors;
nevertheless, Syria’s groundwater resources are currently overexploited.
At the same time, with a 70% dependency ratio on the inflow of sur-
face water arising from outside the country, this inflow is limited through
(often-disputed) international agreements with upstream countries, par-
ticularly Turkey and the Lebanon.31
Overexploitation of groundwater resources in Syria has resulted from
decades of public policies to expand irrigated agriculture and improve
food security. Starting in the 1960s, the government developed agricul-
tural plans and incentives, including price guarantees for certain crops,
low-interest loans, subsidies for machinery and fertilizers, and heavily
subsidized diesel prices (at times, 20% of the global market price).32
Barnes has analyzed how water scarcity in Syria has been brought about
by governmental policies that promoted water-intensive agriculture. The
ruling Ba’ath party, together with powerful agricultural unions, pursued a
policy of self-sufficiency in main food products by expanding irrigated agri-
culture. Groundwater exploitation and overuse increased in many regions,
resulting in the potential for water-use conflicts in certain “spatial and tem-
poral spaces of scarcity.” Barnes advocated considering these internal politics
of water scarcity when studying conflicts in the region, rather than focusing
on international or inter-state wars.33
The case of agricultural policies in Syria is common in the Arab world
and shows the dominant role of agriculture (around 88% of total water

31 “Syrian Arab Republic,” Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

(FAO), 2018, http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/countries_regions/SYR/.

32 Aden Aw-Hassan et  al., “The Impact of Food and Agricultural Policies on
Groundwater Use in Syria,” Journal of Hydrology 513 (2014): 204–15, https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.jhydrol.2014.03.043.
33 Jessica Barnes, “Managing the Waters of Ba’th Country: The Politics of Water Scarcity in

Syria,” Geopolitics 14, no. 3 (2009): 510–30, https://doi.org/10.1080/14650040802694117.

 13  CONTRIBUTION OF WATER SCARCITY AND SUSTAINABILITY …  389

withdrawals in Syria) and the role of (unsustainable) water-development

policies in producing scarcity. However, economic, demographic, and cli-
matic pressures growth should not be neglected. In Syria, for example,
between 1993 and 2003, total water withdrawals, as well as withdraw-
als for agriculture, increased by around 30%, while this rate was 39% for
municipal and 89% for industrial water use.34 Together with mismanage-
ment of agricultural water, pressures from rapidly rising demands from
industries and populations, and increasing climatic variability, might lead
to a “perfect storm” of instability in some areas.
After water resources development became the paramount objective of
water policies, Syria started, in the late 1990s, with the development of
IWRM plans, including demand-management options.35 However, apart
from the National Water Law of 2005, up until the start of the conflict
in 2011, the water sector had undergone few reforms in terms of insti-
tutions, unbundling of functions, regulatory arrangements, or economic
instruments.
After the start of the civil war in 2011, some scholars sought more
concrete links between this conflict and environmental factors. In par-
ticular, the recent drought in Syria (2006–2011) and its impact on crop
failures, loss of livelihoods, and rural–urban migrations have been much
publicized in media and academic literature. For example, Gleick laid out
the argument how these climate variability factors, which can be inter-
preted as “early signs of climatic changes” in the region, resulted in
population displacements and food insecurities. The latter might have
fueled the recent conflict,36 but Gleick also alluded to the overall con-
text of ineffective water policies and demographic factors which, together
with climatic variability as well as non-environmental factors, should be
considered in any explanation of the current conflict. In fact, this line of
argument is important for contemporary conflict analyses in the region

34 “Syrian Arab Republic.”

35 See the survey of IWRM reforms in the Arab countries in UN Water, “Status Report
on Integrated Water Resources Management and Water Efficiency Plans. Prepared for
the 16th Session of the Commission on Sustainable Development” (UN Water, May
2008), http://www.unwater.org/publications/status-report-integrated-water-resource-
management-water-efficiency-plans-csd-16/.
36 Peter H. Gleick, “Water, Drought, Climate Change, and Conflict in Syria,”

Weather, Climate, and Society 6, no. 3 (July 2014): 331–40, https://doi.org/10.1175/

WCAS-D-13-00059.1.
390  M. AL-SAIDI

and should not be misinterpreted as defining a recent water event or a

set of policies as causes of conflicts. Instead, it goes along with the afore-
mentioned notion on how the politics of the water–energy nexus might
have caused vulnerabilities and misallocations that arguably create addi-
tional instabilities in the region.
Other scholars (notably Femia and Werrel, Kelly et al., and Werrell
et al.)37 expressed the same notion as Gleick—that environmental factors,
and specifically the climatic variable of drought, “contributed” to the cur-
rent conflict. However, this assentation has been strongly refuted by Selby
et al., who has provided evidence indicating that this drought might have
not “led to” or triggered large migration, and therefore is not a signifi-
cant factor in the uprising in Syria.38 This refutation ignited a fierce debate
between the proponents of two theses, namely “drought as a (significant)
contributing factors to the Syria’s uprising” vs. “no clear or reliable link
between the drought and the uprising.”39 In fact, these two theses are
not exactly opposite to each other. Drought could have been one of many
important contributing factors, despite the difficulties of quantifying and
identifying the entire causation mechanism. This debate has been quite
valuable in generating data-based evidence, opinions, and counterargu-
ments about the complex set of conflict drivers in the Syrian case.
As the next underrepresented case of Yemen shows, several factors
related to water and land-use issues might have a role to play in the

37 See Francesco Femia and Caitlin Werrell, “Syria: Climate Change, Drought and Social

Unrest,” The Center for Climate and Security (CCS), February 29, 2012, https://clima-
teandsecurity.org/2012/02/29/syria-climate-change-drought-and-social-unrest/; Colin P.
Kelley et al., “Climate Change in the Fertile Crescent and Implications of the Recent Syrian
Drought,” in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 112 (2015), 3241–46,
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1421533112; and Caitlin E. Werrell, Francesco Femia,
and Troy Sternberg, “Did We See It Coming? State Fragility, Climate Vulnerability and the
Uprisings in Syria and Egypt,” SAIS Review of International Affairs 35, no. 1 (Winter–
Spring 2015): 29–46, https://doi.org/10.1353/sais.2015.000.
38 Jan Selby et al., “Climate Change and the Syrian Civil War Revisited,” Political
Geography 60 (September 2017): 232–44, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2017.05.007.
39 Peter H. Gleick, “Climate, Water, and Conflict: Commentary on Selby et al. 2017,”

Political Geography 60 (September 2017): 248–50, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pol-

geo.2017.06.009; Colin P. Kelley et al., “Commentary on the Syrian Case: Climate as a
Contributing Factor,” Political Geography 60 (2017): 245–47, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
polgeo.2017.06.013; and Jan Selby et al., “Climate Change and the Syrian Civil War
Revisited: A Rejoinder,” Political Geography 60 (September 2017): 253–55, https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2017.08.001.
 13  CONTRIBUTION OF WATER SCARCITY AND SUSTAINABILITY …  391

recent conflict, although the public policy failures in the water sector
might be the key environmental issue driving instability and disintegra-
tion in Yemen.

The Case of Yemen

Yemen suffers from a triple set of problems, namely water scarcity, eco-
nomic underdevelopment, and state fragility. It has a largely desert cli-
mate, only around 2.8% of arable land, and water in Yemen is scarce.
The annual precipitation is between 500 and 800 mm in the Western
Highlands, and less than 50 mm on the coasts of the Red Sea and the
Gulf of Aden in the South.40 Surface water is the most important water
source in Yemen. It consists of seasonal spate-water and springs that
recharge groundwater resources. Groundwater is especially important for
Yemen’s agriculture. The expansion of agriculture has meant that deep
groundwater aquifers are being used to cover an annual water deficit of
around 900 MCM, leading to a decline in aquifers of about 1–7 meters
annually.41 The water situation in Yemen reached crisis mode in 2014,
even before the current armed conflict started. Aquifers are depleted at
high rates (e.g., four times the natural recharge rate in the capital city of
Sana’a), water quality is deteriorating, and the predominantly rural and
peasant communities are experiencing more land and water conflicts.42
At the same time, alternatives such as desalination are difficult due to
their high cost, and particularly pumping costs from coastal areas to the
populated mountainous interior part of Yemen.
There are multiple drivers of water scarcity in Yemen, including a
rapid increase in population and, importantly, the uncontrolled and

40 Nicole Glass, “The Water Crisis in Yemen: Causes, Consequences and Solutions,”

Global Majority E-Journal 1, no. 1 (June 2010): 17–30.

41 Qahtan Yehya A.M. Al-Asbahi, “Water Resources Information in Yemen,” in

International Work Session on Water Statistics (Vienna: Intersecretariat Working Group on

Environment Statistics [IWG-ENV], 2005), http://www.yemenwater.org/wp-content/
uploads/2015/04/pap_wasess3a3yemen.pdf.
42 For an overview of the dire water scarcity situation in Yemen at the start of current

conflict, see Matthew I. Weiss, “A Perfect Storm: The Causes and Consequences of Severe
Water Scarcity, Institutional Breakdown and Conflict in Yemen,” Water International 40,
no. 2 (2015): 251–72, https://doi.org/10.1080/02508060.2015.1004898.
392  M. AL-SAIDI

mismanaged growth of agriculture. Agriculture still accounts for 15% of

the GDP and employs 75% of the rural workforce,43 while it accounts for
around 90% of total water use.44 In fact, the expansion of agriculture was
supported by governmental policies since the 1970s up until the water
sector reforms of the 1990s. During this period, cheap loans for farmers,
protected markets, low diesel prices, remittances from migrant workers
(particularly in the GCC countries), and resource capture by powerful
politicians and tribal leaders, fueled a significant agricultural expansion,
resulting in decreased groundwater levels, increased conflicts, and emerg-
ing water shortages in cities.45
Groundwater depletion led to a rise in the cost of pumping and caused
a deterioration in groundwater quality, including seawater intrusion in
the coastal plain areas. Particularly problematic was the expansion of the
growth of the mild stimulant Qat, which evolved to become the main
agricultural product in the Highlands and the Eastern Plateau. Even by
the 1980s, Qat had become an important source of revenue for the state,
accounting for around one-third of the GDP.46 Today, Qat production
consumes a large amount of groundwater and represents a major eco-
nomic problem in terms of household expenditures, work productivity,
and the demise of previously exported cash crops, such as coffee.
Local conflicts in Yemen are dominated by water and land disputes.
These conflicts arise from the interplay of tribal privileges, weak state struc-
tures, and private agriculture.47 Tribes exert control over surface resources
in the form of springs, spates, and run-offs. For centuries, they successfully
managed conflicts as they arose. However, with agricultural expansion and

43 Weiss.

44 Al-Asbahi, “Water Resources Information in Yemen.”

45 Christopher Ward et al., “Yemen’s Water Sector Reform Program—A Poverty and
Social Impact Analysis (PSIA),” October 2007, http://www.yemenwater.org/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2013/01/PSIAEnglishFullReport.pdf.
46 Daniel Martin Varisco, “The Qat Factor in North Yemen’s Agricultural Development,”

Culture, Agriculture, Food and Environment 9, no. 34 (March 1988): 11–14, https://doi.
org/10.1525/cuag.1988.9.34.11.
47 Christopher Ward, Water Crisis in Yemen: Managing Extreme Water Scarcity in the

Middle East (London; New York: I.B. Tauris, 2014); Gerhard Lichtenthäler, Political Ecology
and the Role of Water: Environment, Society and Economy in Northern Yemen (Surrey: Ashgate
Publishing, 2011).
 13  CONTRIBUTION OF WATER SCARCITY AND SUSTAINABILITY …  393

increasing scarcity, the control of privately owned groundwater wells for

both agriculture and potable water use has resulted in ecological failures
of the state and the new elites to replace the traditional conflict-resolution
systems.48 In this complex governance system, the boundaries between pri-
vate and public water suppliers are fluid. In the North of Yemen, where
tribal structures still dominate life, traditional leaders and sheikhs some-
times hold public offices, while also acting as private agents supplying
water for higher prices. Inequitable distribution of assets and political
power based on state patronage systems encourages the disparity of water
control. While local water conflicts in Yemen have become a serious con-
cern, with around 2500 deaths annually, the c­onflict-resolution mecha-
nisms are still fragmented between formal, traditional, and tribal laws.49
The contribution of water-related conflicts to the current civil war in
Yemen is still poorly researched, probably due to a lack of access and the
scarcity of reliable data. Arguably, however, the potential contribution of
water as an intermediate variable in the current national-level conflict is
multifaceted and requires more detailed analysis. One indication about
this role can be mentioned here, though: the potential contribution of
water issues to the rise of the Houthi movement in their home region.
The Houthis represent a religious-political group that emerged in the
late 1990s and originated from the Saada governorate (around 1 million
people). As a rebel movement, they participated in several wars with the
government during the 2000s and, after participating in the 2011 peace-
ful uprising, overthrew the government in 2014. In 2015, after the inter-
vention of a coalition of Arab states led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
(KSA) to topple the Houthis and their allies (the former president Saleh),
the current war ensued. The political underpinning of the Houthis is still
heavily debated in political and academic discourses; e.g., it is considered
a political proxy of Iran, a disenfranchised local movement, or a political
instrument of the former president, among others. When studying the
rise and appeal of the Houthi movement, the question must be posed
regarding the extent to which water scarcity played a role.

48 See Scott Moore, “Parchedness, Politics and Power: The State Hydraulic in Yemen,”

Political Ecology 18, no. 1 (2011): 38–50, https://doi.org/10.2458/v18i1.21705.

49 Patrick Huntjens et al., “The Political Economy of Water Management in Yemen:

Conflict Analysis and Recommendation” (The Hague Institute for Global Justice, 2014),
http://www.thehagueinstituteforglobaljustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Water-
Management-in-Yemen.pdf.
394  M. AL-SAIDI

One indication of the potential contribution of water scarcity is the

tragic situation of the Saada groundwater basin. Over the centuries, this
inter-mountain basin helped create one of Yemen’s most productive agri-
cultural plains. Some scattered literature and data exist that support the
thesis of a link between the decline of the Saada basin and political tensions
in this region. Ward explained the factors that led to a significant increase
in profitability and the expansion of agriculture in the region during the
1980s and 1990s: population growth in the basin (from 40,000 in 1975
to 180,000 in 1997), easing of cultivation restrictions, public policies (fruit
import ban), changing cropping patterns (Qat cultivation), and tube-
well-based irrigation.50
This expansion was also fueled by capital remittances from workers in
neighboring Gulf countries. After around 1 million workers were expelled
from the Gulf due to Yemen’s support of Iraq during the 1991 Gulf War.
Some of these workers returned to the basin and invested heavily in agricul-
ture. As a result, the water table declined sharply, resulting in bitter conflicts
that spilled into political and religious strife in the region.51 Al-Sakkaf et al.
have already reported an extensive decline in groundwater levels during the
1980s and 1990s, with significant escalation of the number of drilling wells
(e.g., a doubling of the number of wells between 1984 and 1986).52 They
predicted the exhaustion of this aquifer by 2032; however, in fact, between
1983 and 2001, groundwater extraction grew by 100%, from 45 to 90
million cubic meters, while recharge dropped by 30%, to 7 million cubic
meters, resulting in the exhaustion of the active zone of the aquifer as early
as 1998.53
There is currently no reliable way to attribute the potential impact of
the decline in groundwater levels to the rise of Houthis, to the different

50 Christopher Ward, “Water Conflict in Yemen: The Case for Strengthening Local

Resolution Mechanisms,” in Water in the Arab World: Management Perspectives and

Innovations, ed. N. Vijay Jagannathan, Ahmed Shawky Mohamed, and Alexander Kremer
(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2009), 233–67, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/
en/590691468052797602/pdf/495930WP0Water1Box341965B01PUBLIC1l.pdf.
51 Ward, 233–67.

52 Rafik A. Al-Sakkaf, Yangxiao Zhou, and Michael J. Hall, “A Strategy for Controlling

Groundwater Depletion in the S’adah Plain, Yemen,” Water Resources Development 15,
no. 3 (1999): 349–65, https://doi.org/10.1080/07900629948862.
53 Ben Smith, “NCAP Yemen: Results from Sadah Basin,” we Adapt, January 2012, https://

www.weadapt.org/knowledge-base/national-adaptation-planning/yemen-sadah-basin.
 13  CONTRIBUTION OF WATER SCARCITY AND SUSTAINABILITY …  395

armed struggles in the region, or to the overall conflict. However, the

evidence presented above gives some idea of the economic and social
pressures around the time of the conflicts, and hence some important
intermediate variables for the eruption of the conflict. Furthermore, the
exact causation mechanism, whether it be the loss of livelihoods, migra-
tion movements, or former farmers joining rebels, can only be quali-
tatively correlated. In fact, it is doubtful that a direct mechanism can
explain the current national conflict, since factors other than the decline
in groundwater levels play a role. For example, Al-Weshali et al. provided
survey data and anecdotal evidence from several groundwater basins,
including Saada, showing that the reductions in diesel subsidies in the
period after the 2011 uprising reduced crop yields by 40–60% in the sur-
veyed regions and might have contributed to the post-2011 turmoil by
invoking protests led by the Houthis.54
In fact, local or national conflicts associated with groundwater decline or
phasing-out subsidies show how sustainability failures and bad water poli-
cies create misallocations and, in hindsight, fail to solve the problems caused
due to path dependency and power interplays. Since the late 1990s, Yemen,
with noticeable help from its donors, realized the paramount importance
of reforming the water sector by introducing IWRM and curbing water
abstractions. However, the adopted institutional reforms (a new water law,
a well-licensing system, a water ministry, a national water resources agency,
etc.) had a bias toward a reorganization of the urban sector55 and did not
result in effective groundwater management and regulation.56

Conclusions: Water Conflicts, Policy Reforms,

and Failures

The cases of Yemen and Syria show that the current debate about water con-
flicts remains a controversial topic. In this context, it is useful in this section
to differentiate the argument about water conflicts and expand it beyond the

54 Adel Al-Weshali et al., “Diesel Subsidies and Yemen Politics: Post-2011 Crises and Their

Impact on Groundwater Use and Agriculture,” Water Alternatives 8, no. 2 (2015): 215–36.
55 See Mohammad Al-Saidi, “Institutional Reforms in the Urban Water Supply Sector of

Yemen,” in Social Water Studies in the Arab Region: State of the Art and Perspectives, ed.
Manar Fayyad et al. (Berlin, 2015), 75–91, https://www.sle-berlin.de/files/sle/publika-
tionen/160118DigitalWaterBookFINAL.compressed.pdf.
56 See Weiss, “A Perfect Storm”; Ward, Water Crisis in Yemen.
396  M. AL-SAIDI

contribution of a specific environmental factor (e.g., water scarcity or climate

change) or a specific event (e.g., drought in Syria, or subsidy reductions in
Yemen). The contribution of these singular events is often scrutinized regard-
ing the conclusiveness of presented evidence; e.g., did a historic drought or
a decline in groundwater levels cause, lead to, or contribute to the Syrian or
Yemeni conflict? In fact, it is common, and often constructive, in the study of
water conflicts to question and criticize the magnitude and evidence of singu-
lar environmental problems causing conflicts.
At the same time, some scholars go beyond this criticism to doubt the
scientific merit of any non-conclusive evidence on environmental factors
and conflicts or to question the legitimacy of the scientific method used
if it is not perfectly quantifiable or falsifiable. This chapter presents the
argument that the real problem lies in defining the nature of the environ-
mental factors and the nature of the causation mechanism. On the one
hand, methodologically well-developed and argued evidence of a single
(natural resource) policy failure or a specific environmental event causing
conflict is quite valuable and should not be discounted. These singular
cases are numerous and are referred to in the pro and contra debates of
the above-mentioned studies on water conflicts. On the other hand, evi-
dence based on singular factors (drought, pricing reforms, etc.) leading
to a specific causation (e.g., migration, regime change, etc.) is, by nature,
restrictive and susceptible to legitimate criticism.
For example, the impact of water scarcity on migration and conflicts
might be overstated in the case of the Middle East in general,57 and in the
particular case of the Syrian drought.58 For some scholars, inter-state water
wars in the region seem far removed from the political and economic real-
ity of the region.59 In fact, there is much merit in this observation, since
water remains a marginal issue in the current state politics. Water issues
are often dealt with locally, while rising water scarcity nationally is mostly

57 Jan Selby and Clemens Hoffmann, “Scarcity, Conflict, and Migration: A Comparative

Analysis and Reappraisal. Environment and Planning,” Environment and Planning C:

Government and Policy 30, no. 6 (2012): 997–1014, https://doi.org/10.1068/c11335j.
58 See Kelly et al., “Climate Change in the Fertile Crescent.”

59 Jan Selby, “The Geopolitics of Water in the Middle East: Fantasies and Realities,”

Third World Quarterly 26, no. 2 (2005): 329–49, https://doi.org/10.1080/014365904

2000339146.
 13  CONTRIBUTION OF WATER SCARCITY AND SUSTAINABILITY …  397

managed through technical and financial means (e.g., demand management,

alternative resources, desalination, reuse, and harvesting infrastructure).
Furthermore, water might not be a driver of conflict, but instead could be
used ex post as a weapon of war, as is the case in Syria and Iraq.60 In fact,
water remains very difficult to qualify as a major driver of national or inter-
state conflicts. The recent climate change-induced drought in Syria shows
that water was an intermediate variable that is less important than the institu-
tional and economic structures or the adapative capacity of a country.61
Overall, the value of studies linking conflicts to single environmental
factors needs to be seen in the context of a debate about the significance
of the environmental dimension as a whole in the current turmoil in the
region. In fact, water conflict studies rarely claim to provide exclusive
conflict explanations or claim importance over other factors, although
they (often unintentionally) overstate evidence and, by the nature of
such focus studies, introduce a bias toward one factor over others. At the
same time, it is not possible to bring all possible conflict-causing factors
to the same quantification and abstraction level.
Case studies on water conflicts are still valuable for academic debates
about the broad drivers behind the uprisings, conflicts, instability, and
changes in the broader Middle East. These debates exist in other fields,
where they have highlighted the contribution of inequality, social media,
youth populations, and regional rivalry. Numerous studies on singu-
lar cases and issues were produced following the Arab Spring in 2011.
However, none of these studies claim that a certain social media plat-
form, a specific type of inequality, or a particular economic policy is the
primary or major cause of conflicts. On the other hand, these studies
with mixed approaches and tools have greatly enriched our understand-
ing of the trajectories and causes of conflicts in the region. At the same
time, the contribution of these broad drivers to uprisings and conflicts
seem to be well received and acknowledged.
The contribution of environmental factors to the current state of con-
flicts in the Arab region needs to be better appreciated as one important,

60 See Marcus DuBois King, “The Weaponization of Water in Syria and Iraq,” The Washington

Quarterly 38, no. 4 (2015): 153–69, https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2015.1125835.

61 Eran Feitelson and Amit Tubi, “A Main Driver or an Intermediate Variable? Climate

Change, Water and Security in the Middle East,” Global Environmental Change 44 (May
2017): 39–48, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2017.03.001.
398  M. AL-SAIDI

but broad, line of conflict drivers. The essence of this group of drivers
lies in the policy failures to introduce sustainability and improve the
adaptive capacity in a region plagued with natural scarcity and environ-
mental risks. Evidence of these failures is omnipresent and goes beyond
the water sector. More importantly, resources such as water, energy, and
arable land have been managed with great recklessness, despite being
the most valuable commodities in this arid region. The examples of sus-
tainability failures in the Arab regions have been extensively discussed in
the academic literature. These failures are tangible, given the omnipres-
ent factors such as generous energy subsidies, water-intensive cropping
patterns, underdeveloped capacities/infrastructure for resource use and
recycling, structural/market barriers for the use of renewables, low land
productivity or water-use efficiency, large ecological footprints, and rais-
ing of fossil fuel consumption for desalination.
The cases of Yemen and Syria show how the failures of sustainability
policies and water sector reforms is driving water scarcity and increasing
the society’s vulnerability to conflicts, some of which are occurring on an
unprecedented scale. When water policy reforms were introduced, they
were largely water-sector driven and ineffective in curbing overuse in
other sectors. Furthermore, these reforms often brought about institu-
tional conflicts, which limited their success.
In fact, water management institutions are not hollow organizations
subject to a common set of reform pressures. They harbor interest-driven
professionals who help construct the laws and create the regulations. The
institutionalization process of water reforms can become an essentially
political process, the outcome of which depends on the relative power of
the actors who strive to steer this process. This is true for the implemen-
tation of water sustainability reforms in many Arab countries. IWRM has
achieved a degree of awareness about the problem and the concept of its
solution. It was unable to resolve the underlying conflict between, on the
one hand, those water users who believe water should be developed to
promote economic growth and welfare, and, on the other hand, water
managers who advocate sustainable and efficient allocation of water
resources in order to curb water conflicts and minimize growth risks.
At the same time, it is difficult for IWRM, or any water management
paradigm, to resolve conflicts between water-use sectors such as the
agricultural and urban sectors, because those conflicts are not only ide-
ologically based, but also have historical, socio-economic, and political
dimensions. Until today, powerful interest groups (e.g., farmers) and
 13  CONTRIBUTION OF WATER SCARCITY AND SUSTAINABILITY …  399

governmental agencies (e.g., irrigation and agricultural stakeholders) cite

the intrinsic value of their sectors or their contributions to employment
or food security in order to advocate remaining with the status quo of
water resource “development” rather than “management.” One can still
witness large-scale projects to “green the desert” using valuable ground-
water resources (e.g., President’s Sisi “one million feddan” project in
Egypt). Water-intensive crops, such as bananas or citrus, are also still
grown despite increased water scarcity (e.g., in the Jordan Valley).62
Public policies regarding sustainable and integrated water manage-
ment are therefore lagging behind the reality of increasing scarcity and
rising costs of water supply. At the same time, water-sector reforms, or
the issue of sustainability at large, have not been at the forefront of pub-
lic policies in the Arab region. Arguably, these policies lacked a politi-
cal commitment toward sustainability, but were instead oriented toward
identifying whatever means would provide jobs and growth and supply
infrastructure, while reducing poverty in the short term. Furthermore,
past reforms in the water sectors have focused more on institutions and
frameworks, and less on broadening the spectrum of participation, par-
ticularly by including new crucial societal groups, such as the private sec-
tor, citizens associations, and political parties.

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 CHAPTER 14

Regional Rivalries and Security Alliances

in the Gulf Region and the Middle East

Philipp O. Amour  

In its three parts, this book has explored the regional system in the Gulf
Region and the broader Middle East. The opening chapter introduced
the concept of the Gulf Region and the broader Middle East as a dis-
tinct entity and as a regional system, thereby providing (together with
this chapter) a theoretical framework for regional interactive poli-
tics. Part I of the book examined the major power subsystems across
the broader Middle East and the implications of their intense power
rivalry and ideational polarization on regional interactions in broad
terms of their attitudes: conservative-moderate, conservative-resistance,
­moderate-resistance, and Israel-led attitudes, as illustrated in Table 14.1.
The chapters in Part II showed the ways in which Turkey, Qatar, and
Israel project specific patterns of political and ideational processes
outward from their national borders in the form of engagement, rivalry,
or alienation. Part III covered specific external actors (e.g., Russia) and
ecological factors, illustrating their role in regional dynamics.

P. O. Amour (*) 
Department of International Relations, Sakarya University, Sakarya, Turkey
e-mail: dr@philipp-amour.ch
URL: http://www.philipp-amour.ch

© The Author(s) 2020 407

P. O. Amour (ed.), The Regional Order in the Gulf Region
and the Middle East, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45465-4_14
Table 14.1  Regional subsystems in the Gulf Region and broader Middle East
Attitude toward Attitude toward Attitude regarding By leadership Major involved actors formal/ International
408  P. O. AMOUR

Western states Political Islam liberalism informal alliance backer

(Conservative-) Anti-Muslim- Conservative- Saudi/UAE-led KSA, UAE, Egypt, USA

moderate Brotherhood (moderate) Bahrain,Yemeni Islah Party,
Iraqi Islamic Party, Haftar’s
Libyan National Army
(Conservative-) Case-dependent Conservative- Iran-led Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, Islamic (Soviet
resistance (resistance) Jihad (Hamas 1991–2011), Union)/Russia
PMF, Houthi movement
Moderate-resistance Pro-Muslim- Reform-minded Turkey/Qatar-led Turkey, Qatar, Tunisia (2011– Russia/USA
Brotherhood 2014), Egypt (2012–2013),
Libya’s Government of
National Accord (GNA),
Ennahda, SNC, FJP, FSA,
JCP (Hamas 2012–2016)
Moderate Anti-Muslim- Reform-minded Israel-led Approaching countries from USA/Russia
Brotherhood the conservative- moderate
power bloc
 14  REGIONAL RIVALRIES AND SECURITY ALLIANCES …  409

The chapter authors undertook a methodical approach, explicitly or

implicitly, to examine their subject at the regional system level, looking
at the interplay of a combination of cluster of factors: power dynamics,
ideational factors, and domestic influences. As stated in the introductory
chapter, the focus of this book is the period since the first Arab Spring
movement; however, some authors also looked at earlier historical peri-
ods for deeper exploration.
The following sections attempt to trace the regional system across
the Gulf Region and the broader Middle East in relation to its order, by
elaborating on some of the most important patterns of regional dynam-
ics and political processes, as well as major ideas and transnational core
causes. In addition to tracing the regional system in retrospect, this chap-
ter delivers outlooks in prospect. However, due to the rapidity and flu-
idity of regional events, these outlooks are inconclusive, and developing
crystal-clear scenarios is not possible.

The Regional Order in the Broader Middle East

The regional order (or distribution of power) reflects the first dimen-
sion of a regional system. In abstraction, the regional order is the most
important dimension for recognition of a regional system, as order pre-
supposes the further two dimensions: a system’s regional dynamics and
its major transnational causes. If a regional order does not exist, the
other two dimensions cannot exist. At this point, it should be clear that
this book distinguishes regional order from a regional system, where the
former is a component of the latter.
Part I of this book explored the major subsystems in the region.
The conclusion is that since the creation of the inter-state system in the
broader Middle East, the regional system has contained three principal
subsystems. First is the conservative-moderate subsystem, which includes
most Arab monarchies, such as the KSA, the UAE, Bahrain, and Jordan,
among others. Egypt is among the republics allied with this subsystem
(since the Mubarak era). The conservative-moderate subsystem includes
the wealthier Middle Eastern countries that possess capabilities for power
accumulation and increasing force projection capabilities. At the regional
level, the KSA and the UAE are the key guarantors of this power subsys-
tem. The USA is the international backer. The regime type (the majority
are monarchies) and political conservativism toward the status quo across
410  P. O. AMOUR

the broader Middle East have formed the subsystem’s alignment choices
in the broader Middle East.
Second is the conservative-resistance subsystem, which includes most
powerful Shi’ or Shi’a-leaning systemic actors, including Iran, Syria,
Hezbollah, PMF, the Houthi movement, and Islamic Jihad (Sunni
movement). Iran has been the key state in creating, backing, and logis-
tically supporting these proactive and assertive non-state militant groups
in the field. As with the previous power subsystem, the security dilemma
dynamics, psychological factors, and ideational/ideological orientations
account for this subsystem’s security and policy choices in the broader
region. At present, Russia acts as the key international guarantor of this
subsystem’s endurance and security.
Both of these power subsystems, the KSA/UAE-led and the Iran-led,
have long-established regional politics; they have created a predictable
distribution of power in the region since the 1980s. The constellation
of the regional system between them was, however, in retrospect, one of
restraint rather than aggression.
The third regional power subsystem is that formed by Israel, in alli-
ance, at different times, with the Pahlavi dynasty, Turkey, and Kurdish
groups.1 The USA has been the enthusiastic international supporter of
this subsystem. Since the first Arab Spring movement, Israel and coun-
tries from the ­ conservative-moderate subsystem have moved closer
together, not just ideationally but also in various forms of strategic
collaboration.
In the wake of their strategic involvement in the region, both great
powers the USA and Russia (previously the Soviet Union) have not just
exported weaponry and goods to their allies, but have also shared ideas,
mindsets, and ideologies in the broader Middle East.
This polarity of the regional order has been dominant in the ­twenty-first
century. However, as Chapter 5 demonstrated, a further subsystem has
arisen since the first Arab Spring movement and now challenges these
long-established subsystems: this is the so-called ­ moderate-resistance
subsystem that includes Turkey, Qatar, and other states such as Tunisia
(2011–2014 & 2020), Egypt (2012–2013), and Libya’s Government
of National Accord (GNA), as well as non-state militant actors, such as
(in part) Hamas. This Turkey/Qatar-led power subsystem is approaching

1 See e.g., Ofra Bengio, “Surprising Ties between Israel and the Kurds,” Middle East

Quarterly 21, no. 3 (Summer 2014): 1–12.

 14  REGIONAL RIVALRIES AND SECURITY ALLIANCES …  411

both the USA and Russia due to its diversified ideas, narratives, and trans-
national causes. This policy approach can be seen as a balancing act with
leverage possibilities, while containing the potential for tension. Clearly, the
US strategic relations toward the KSA/UAE-led subsystem are steadier and
less fragile than those with Turkey. A similar argument can be made about
Russia’s relationship toward Iran and Syria.
The interrelationship of domestic influences, transnational causes, and
geopolitical balancing can account for the units’ regional policy within
the Turkey/Qatar-led subsystem. Close relations with Turkey seem to
confirm Qatar’s balancing attempts vis-à-vis other regional powers in
the Gulf Region and Turkey’s ideational attractiveness for the first Arab
Spring revolutionary forces. This, in turn, is an advantage for Ankara,
allowing it to boost its popularity across the broader Middle East and
shape its brand as a role model. The narratives of being supporters of
revolutionary shifts, tolerant of ethnic and confessional diversity, wel-
coming to migrants and asylum-seekers, and defender of Pan-Islamic and
humanist values are ones that Turkey and Qatar both attempt to capital-
ize on in their interactions in the Gulf Region and the broader Middle
East.
When balancing calculations inwardly and outwardly, state actors and
non-state militant actors in the Gulf Region and the broader Middle East
are influenced by ideological considerations, as well as their expectations
and aspirations in relation to gaining more power. Against this back-
ground, the regional order and, as such, the regional system is becoming
increasingly multipolar since the first Arab Spring movement. The for-
eign policy of regional great powers has steadily reiterated their drive to
achieve and hold status in their relationship with regional rivals. Most
chapters in this book conform to this notion of the multipolarity of the
regional system in the broader Middle East according to formal/infor-
mal partnerships, in addition to foreign policy stances toward Western
countries. Chapter 3, however, is an exception in that it suggests a bipo-
larity of the regional order encompassing two alignments: the status quo
and the revisionist.
The first of the two long-established subsystems mentioned above,
the KSA/UAE-led one, is described as ‘conservative-moderate’.
‘Conservative’ describes the regime type as being opposed to liberalism
and democratization and its preference for the maintenance of the sta-
tus quo. The second word, ‘moderate’, refers to the subsystem’s benev-
olent policy attitudes and behaviors toward Western states, and the USA
412  P. O. AMOUR

in particular. The Iran-led system is labeled ‘conservative-resistance’

because of its robust attitudes and behaviors toward Western countries,
and again toward the USA in particular. These descriptions date from
the twentieth century. The description of the Turkey/Qatar-led subsys-
tem, as ‘moderate-resistance’, appears to build on these associations by
indicating that the subsystem is open toward liberalism and democratiza-
tion while searching for independence from the global great powers includ-
ing the USA.
These three descriptions appear to describe the power subsystems
in relation to their stance toward political development (state level) or
toward Western powers, in particular the USA (international level). As
Chapter 2 demonstrated, there is another way to describe these sub-
systems. For instance, the conservative-moderate subsystem can be
described as anti-Muslim-Brotherhood, due to its ideological opposition
to and outlawing of the MB, whereas the moderate-resistance subsys-
tem can be described as a pro-Muslim-Brotherhood subsystem, for its
backing and alliance formation with non-state actors or states run by
characteristically Islamist political parties.2
Iran does not have a region-wide and coherent policy vis-à-vis move-
ments of Political Islam; rather, its policy is case dependent. While it sup-
ports these movements in Lebanon and Yemen, it opposes similar groups
in Syria. The logic behind Iran’s behaviors is less ideological; it is more
oriented to what is in the best interests of Iran and its subsystem. Unlike
the other descriptions, the MB description addresses a transnational
political ideology, that of Islamism, which is, however, limited to the case
of the MB and thus bears further analysis. While all these descriptions
are useful when describing the different subsystems in general or from
specific angles, none of them, I believe, describes the subsystems com-
pletely accurately. Table 14.1 lists the descriptions and distinct affiliations
of the different subsystems.

2 Philipp O. Amour, “Revolutionary Changes, Power Dynamics, and Regional Rivalries

since the Arab Spring: An Introduction,” in The Middle East Reloaded: Revolutionary
Changes, Power Dynamics, and Regional Rivalries since the Arab Spring, ed. Philipp O.
Amour, St. James’s Studies in World Affairs (Washington: Academica Press, 2018), 1–21;
Philipp O. Amour, “The Arab Spring Movement: The Failed Revolution. Preliminary
Theoretical and Empirical Deliberation,” in The Middle East Reloaded: Revolutionary
Changes, Power Dynamics, and Regional Rivalries since the Arab Spring, ed. Philipp
O. Amour, St. James’s Studies in World Affairs (Washington: Academica Press, 2018),
199–224.
 14  REGIONAL RIVALRIES AND SECURITY ALLIANCES …  413

What is the future for the regional order in broader Middle East? The
continuity of this multipolar regional system depends on the preservation
of the regional great powers’ status, per se, and on their ability to con-
tinue to provide their allies with strategic assurance.
The endurance of the long-established subsystems seems secure in
the foreseeable future. Regional great powers of Iran and the KSA/
UAE have succeeded in their strategic objectives of containing a degra-
dation of their own subsystem and containing a strategic upgrade of their
rival. However, it would be misleading to argue that there is a simple
and unchanging relation between these two power subsystems. As far as
the conservative-moderate subsystem is concerned, it has embarked on
tackling the Turkey/Qatar-led subsystem through economic pressure
(Turkey) and economic and political isolation (Qatar).
Despite crucial tensions in the Gulf Region, there are few indications
that the regional great powers or their international backers are inter-
ested in an all-out war in the region. State actors and non-state actors
from different power subsystems seem aware of the material and imma-
terial costs of this type of massive and all-out war and thus appear to
oppose it strategically. As Parts I and II of this book have demonstrated,
the authoritarian leadership in the region lacks the willingness to esca-
late the Arab–Iranian rivalry (sometimes called the Gulf Cold War) into
a direct ‘hot war’. However, while direct violent confrontations between
the relevant regional great powers are unlikely in the foreseeable future,
the conflict is likely to intensify in the form of proxy wars and destabiliz-
ing crises.
There is a long history of cooperation and engagement within the
two long-established subsystems, based largely on shared ideas and sub-
systemic causes, mutual regional geopolitical interests, and mutual rivals.
Both of the long-established power subsystems are likely too big to fail
and too rooted as regional configurations to be deconstructed from the
arena of the state or regional level in the foreseeable future. As Parts II
and III of this book have noted, units of a power subsystem will regard
a regime shift in their own orbit as a precursor to their own downfall.
This explains the interference of GCC-led forces in Bahrain against the
local uprising in the context of the first Arab movement, or the mili-
tary participation of Hezbollah and Iranian forces onsite in Syria to hin-
der an ouster of the Syrian regime. As the case of Syria demonstrates
(Chapter 12), a regime whose survival is challenged tends to ask regional
allies and the international patron to interfere in regional dynamics to
414  P. O. AMOUR

stop this process, thereby leading to the downsizing or fall of the whole
power subsystem. While the possibility of a fall of a subsystem is low, it is
not considered impossible.
Disintegration may, of course, come from the outside and involve the
international level. Nevertheless, a global power is unlikely to initiate an
all-out war in the region under the current strategic constellation; hence,
the USA and Russia stand on opposing sides of the regional subsystems.
Both global great powers appear to oppose a direct confrontation. The
constraints imposed on Iran and Hezbollah by the Trump administration
may lead to the weakening of related subsystemic actors (with implica-
tions for domestic stability and the legitimacy of related actors) but they
are unlikely to lead to a regime’s disintegration. In terms of the structure
of the regional order, the USA and Russia do not seem to have shown
any interest in changing the order of the regional system, per se.
Whatever happens, the current regional dynamics make it certain
that there will be further complications for the subsystems in the future.
The Assad regime appears to be surviving the war due to the interfer-
ence of, above all, Russian and foreign forces, including the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force (IRGC-QF), Hezbollah, and
Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). This intervention, or sur-
vival, will come with a strategic price for the parties involved. The higher
this price, the higher will be the possibility of a shift at the leadership
level in Syria. It remains to be seen if this dynamic will initiate internal
changes in Syria on the macro level, with ramifications for the Assad
administration in the foreseeable future and the Baath party in the longer
run.
Currently, the KSA and the UAE are pulled together into an alliance
in order to balance against a strong mutual peril: Iran. However, judging
from their policies in Yemen and Libya, both countries seem to have dif-
ferent ambitions and distant regional objectives that have the potential to
collide. It remains to be seen if these two countries will manage to pur-
sue foreign policy along a mutual regional course, as happens currently,
or if their ambitious drive for more power will split them in the distant
future. A testing point, and perhaps a defining moment, of these KSA/
UAE relations will be if and when the crown princes in the KSA and the
UAE become the new leaders of their countries, and to what extent they
decide to pursue mutual regional policies.
For the Turkey/Qatar-led subsystem, the challenges appear greater.
This subsystem shows different qualities that may permit different
 14  REGIONAL RIVALRIES AND SECURITY ALLIANCES …  415

developments. Hence, Turkey subjects itself to regular elections, and its

regime type permits a modification in the political elite that may decide
to redefine regional foreign policy attitudes and behaviors, including
alliance building and assurance, as well as power projection choices and
patterns. A new political elite in Ankara might adopt one of several for-
eign policy options to either maintain the current subsystem with Qatar,
disregard it and draw closer to the conservative-moderate subsystem, or
eventually rearrange its diplomatic priorities and consider an alliance with
the USA and Europe as it had prior to 2002.
In conclusion, it appears unlikely that any one of the three l­ong-
established subsystems will disintegrate in the foreseeable future, while the
novel Turkey/Qatar-led subsystem may further weaken, reform itself into
a new constellation, or even lose regional might in the future. The sec-
ond Arab Spring movement does not appear to have boosted the Turkey/
Qatar-led subsystem. These lines of argument explain, in part, Turkey’s ori-
entation in the Horn of Africa and the Mediterranean becoming an increas-
ingly important focus for Ankara’s foreign and security policy.

Systemic Units: State Actors and Non-State

Militant Actors
There is more to the regional order than the subsystems; it also depends
on the state actors (including regional great powers) and non-state mil-
itant actors forming them and shaping their regional orientation and
course of action.
A regional order traditionally enables systemic actors with power pro-
jection arenas across the region. As different chapters in Parts I and II
of this book have demonstrated, specific countries across the broader
Middle East, including Egypt, Iran, Israel, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey,
and the United Arab Emirates, hold regional great power status in terms
of natural, tangible, and/or intangible sources of power (see Table 1.1
in Chapter 1: Introduction). These states have a large balancing capacity
(for hot war and cold war) due to their size of territory, size of popula-
tion and military and/or strong economies, increasing capacity for arma-
ment, and ideological/informational and communication output. Since
the first Arab Spring movement, these regional great powers have played
an increasingly proactive, assertive, and bellicose role in regional interac-
tions, with ambitious foreign policy agendas to form and influence major
developments on the regional stage.
416  P. O. AMOUR

Table 1.1 provides a basic statistical snapshot of countries in the Gulf

Region and the Middle East. It does not include all countries included
in the broader Middle East for the purpose of this book. In terms of
geographic size, Algeria, Egypt, Iran, the KSA, and Libya are among
the largest countries, while Bahrain and Qatar, by contrast, are among
the smallest land territories. In terms of population size, Algeria, Egypt,
Iran, and Turkey are the most populated countries, while Bahrain and
Qatar are the least populous countries. The economies of Qatar, Israel,
and the UAE have the highest rates of GDP per capita, while Yemen,
Syria, and Egypt are among the region’s poorest countries. The ability of
­higher-income countries in the broader Middle East to generate revenue
in order to buy weaponry, train soldiers, and build infrastructure is a fur-
ther important power indicator.
The literacy rate ranges from about 90% in the KSA, Qatar, Israel,
Turkey, and the UAE to lows of 54% in Yemen and 44% in Iraq. Smaller
states appear to have higher literacy rates than some of the larger ones,
and this pool of educated human agency contributes to offset the
supremacy of larger states in terms of size of territory and population.
A look at the military expenditure demonstrates the big players in
this regard. The KSA spent far more than any other country in this area.
Iran, Israel, Turkey, and the UAE are among the countries that account
for the region’s largest military expenditure. This high military budget
projects the threat that a state leadership perceives and the amount of
potential force it may be willing to use outwardly. The strength of the
economy and the threat perception of the political elite influence the
level of military expenditure. A constant increase in military expenditures
in the broader Middle East since 2010 is demonstrated in Table 14.2.
This tendency is likely to endure in the future.
The statistical information in Tables 1.1, 14.1, and 14.2 demonstrates
that countries in the Gulf Region and the broader Middle East do not
measure up equally in terms of size of population, size of territory, or
finances.
Generally, most Arab Gulf states are able to generate revenue in order
to enlarge and develop their hard- and soft-power armament arsenal.
Whereas Arab Gulf states depended on Egypt or Iraq for their deterrence
capabilities (e.g., vis-à-vis Iran) during the twentieth century, countries
in the Gulf Region (i.e., the KSA and the UAE) have increasingly devel-
oped their own power projection capabilities and have become inde-
pendent of those two countries. The KSA and the UAE have invested
Table 14.2  Military expenditure in the Gulf Region and the broader Middle East in US$ billion

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

Levant 137 143 147 159 174 185 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
and Gulf
Region
North 11.5 12.7 15.8 17.1 19.9 20.8 21.2 21.6 21.1 19.9 22.2
Africa
Sub- 24.4 25 24.8 24.3 25.8 26.1 22.5 21.5 21.7 19.3 18.4
Saharan
countries

Source Stockholm International Peace Research Insitute (For specifications of the figures see: “Military Expenditure by Region in Constant US Dollars,
1988–2018” [Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (sipri), 2019], https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Data%20for%20world%20
regions%20from%201988–2018%20%28pdf%29.pdf)
14  REGIONAL RIVALRIES AND SECURITY ALLIANCES … 
417
418  P. O. AMOUR

much of their national wealth in defense to secure their military and

strategic preparedness both inwardly and outwardly. Like the UAE,
Turkey has also been increasingly merging its resources and creating mil-
itary capabilities independent of those of the international great powers.
Iran has apparently expanded its underground facilities. Qatar, a smaller
power in some dimensions, is notably a soft power due to its mobilizing
projection capabilities marked through Aljazeera satellite channels and its
unique transnational brand.
While this book does not include Egypt and Iraq in Part II (both used
to play a more active role in the regional system during the twentieth
century), some insights can be garnered about them. Egypt and Iraq are
both declining powers, for several reasons. Primarily, the leaderships in
Egypt and Iraq are currently focused on domestic challenges of regime
security and economic development rather than on extending their eco-
nomic and military capabilities across the region. Aware of the severe
economic, financial, and security challenges they face domestically, the
political elite in Egypt and Iraq currently have less ambition to project
their military capabilities in foreign conflicts compared to their actions in
the twentieth century. Second, neither country has the power supremacy
it used to have in earlier stages vis-à-vis other regional countries, due to
the power upgrade of Arab Gulf states as demonstrated in Table 14.2.
A combination of the geopolitical, ideational, and normative beliefs men-
tioned in this book has emboldened the Gulf countries to adopt a more
assertive and determined security and foreign policy agenda.
Currently, the KSA and the UAE are attempting to bring in a new
era in which Arab monarchies in the Gulf have the lead in regional pol-
itics across the broader Middle East. Since 2014/2015, regional power
rivalry and ideational polarization have reached a critical stage for the
conservative-moderate subsystem, marked by a major change in the
security doctrine from a distant or active role in the regional system to
a proactive, assertive, and bellicose one. This change in the security and
foreign policy attitudes and behaviors of the KSA and the UAE is related
to a combination of factors. First, external pressures emerged from the
disengagement of the Obama administration and its perceived reluctance
to become involved in Gulf and Middle Eastern affairs. This moved par-
ticular Gulf countries to engage themselves virtually and on the ground
in regional affairs in political, economic, diplomatic, militant, or infor-
mational forms. The Iran nuclear deal, P5 + 1, and the rapprochement
of Iran toward the West most likely created dissatisfaction in the KSA
 14  REGIONAL RIVALRIES AND SECURITY ALLIANCES …  419

and the UAE, thereby promoting their shift in regional course. Second,
geopolitical imperatives arising from an expansion of the Islamic State
(on the frontline for the KSA), Houthis (in Yemen), and Hezbollah (in
Lebanon and Syria) intensified the perceived need for self-defense against
a policy of Islamist/Shi’ encirclement. Third, the status ambitions of
the KSA (following a shift in leadership) and other Gulf countries, such
as the UAE, across the region are reinforced and influenced by secu-
rity regime alarms and questions of national identity. Thus, a combina-
tion of these factors has emboldened the Gulf States, the KSA, and the
UAE to pursue power in a more assertive and bellicose fashion, which in
turn shapes not just their neighborhood policy but policies beyond their
approximate sphere of influence, as noted below.
One implication of these regional dynamics since 2014 has been a
change in the power center of the regional system from the Levant (his-
torically since 1948) to the Gulf Region, where principal regional great
powers are located. There, major conflicts are currently rooted, attempts
are made to push the systemic boundaries, and major military actions
and ideational/informational balancing are embarked on in the Gulf
Region inward or outward across other subsystems, thereby affecting the
whole regional system. Thus, the Gulf Region is the center of gravity for
regional economic, political, and military power.
State actors are not the sole players in the region. The Arab Spring
movements and subsequent power rivalry and ideological polarization
have also served as catalysts and opportunities for emergence (e.g., IS
and PMF, discussed in Chapters 9 and 10) or expansion (Hezbollah and
the Houthi movement) of non-state militant actors. Among the regional
great powers, Iran, above all, has demonstrated its strategic capac-
ity in the formation, inclusion, and mobilization of non-state militant
actors as indispensable tools (of the conservative-resistance subsystem)
to increase its influence across the region, enlarge its advantage over
other regional powers, and combat rival incursions. As demonstrated in
the various discussions on Hezbollah and the PMF, non-state militant
actors help regional great powers transcend any strategic implausibility
and geographical confusion they may face across the broader Middle
East. Indeed, bearing in mind their role and impact in the regional sys-
tem, non-state militant actors have embarked on a strong push toward
increasing hard and soft power capabilities and now display state-like
qualities in their governance and foreign policy behavior.
420  P. O. AMOUR

Beside regional great powers and non-state militant actors, this book
consider a further category. A ‘regional superpower’ within a regional
system denotes a state that possesses nuclear capability, can project
power across the wider region, and enjoys region-wide recognition of its
superpower status. Superpower status and capabilities provide the abil-
ity to choose among different options. A regional superpower may per-
sist on its own, with no formal alliance. During a systemic shake-up, the
regional superpower may conduct a policy of wait and see, as long as its
borders and existence are not threatened. It may support one subsystem
to the detriment of another, as implied in Chapter 8. Across the broader
Middle East, Israel is the sole regional superpower.
As Chapters 11 and 12 noted, the regional order is not decoupled
from the international system. In their relations with their international
backers, systemic actors have responsibilities as well as advantages. This
relationship is occasionally asymmetrical in that the systemic actor loses
some of its independence in relation to the international backer, so that
it has to apply policies that are not in keeping with its normal way of
operating.
The region’s power rivalry and ideational polarization have
re-animated major alignments, with global great powers interfering
­
across the broader Middle East, as evident, for example, in Syria, where
the USA and Russia face each other and their proxies in the region in the
form of a return to Cold War hostilities.
The interesting question is: How do regional dynamics and political
processes affect the regional system?

Regional Dynamics and Political Processes

Regional dynamics and political processes are the second dimension of
the regional system that I use in this chapter to tie the arguments in the
preceding chapters together. Patterns of cooperation and engagement,
alienation, rivalry, polarization, conflict, and war help us to define the
general characteristics of the regional system. These interactive relations
take place in times of both balance and chaos in the regional system;
however, they are likely to differ in scope and intensity.
The regional system thrives on these regional dynamics and political
processes, which occasionally surprise and inspire state and non-state
actors, as the implications of the first and second Arab Spring movements
or the emergence, expansion, and degradation of IS have demonstrated.
 14  REGIONAL RIVALRIES AND SECURITY ALLIANCES …  421

Dealing with regional interactive events, state and non-state actors put
into play their hard power and soft power resources, partly through
proxies, in order to support or withstand the strategic push across the
regional system. The following assumptions do not attempt to cover all
these patterns.
In a regional system, state and non-state actors enjoy formal or infor-
mal cooperative collaboration with other higher or lower actors, as noted
in the different chapters of this book. The states in the regional system
cooperate or collaborate with one another to various extents and vary-
ing levels of enthusiasm. Non-cooperative collaborations, or the lack of
visible/open diplomatic or economic interchanges, are also a matter of
consideration in a regional system, as demonstrated by the case of Israel
in Chapter 8.
Obviously, as different chapters have demonstrated, the
­intra-subsystemic relations are characterized by strategic cooperation and
engagement. The nature of these intra-subsystemic relations is related to
the symmetry of power among the different actors, so a more power-
ful actor is less dependent on regional policy and a less powerful actor
is more submissive to a higher authority within the subsystem.3 As with
the regional order, it is rare for subsystems to be equal in power to one
another. Hence, competition on material aspects and immaterial aspects
(e.g., ideational, ideological, religious) is also a feature of a subsystem.
The coherency of these intra-subsystemic relations is more likely to
endure, whether in times of balance or chaos, if the different actors share
similar ideas, ideologies, and subsystemic causes, if they have mutual stra-
tegic objectives and mutual rivals, and if the high-ranking decision mak-
ers (domestic influences) guarantee alliance assurance. By contrast, the
relation between two power subsystems is most likely marked by power
rivalry, ideational polarization, violent and non-violent conflict, and pos-
sibly war, depending on geo-cultural and geopolitical factors that go
beyond the scope of this chapter.
Most systemic units in the broader Middle East are authoritarian.
Bearing in mind their dominant regime type and the on-going ­persistent
regional rivalry and polarization, regional state actors and non-state

3 See Philipp O. Amour, “Hamas-PLO/Fatah Reconciliation and Rapprochement within

the Unfolding Regional Order in the Middle East since 2010: Neorealist and Neoclassical
Realist Perspectives,” Journal of Social Sciences of Mus Alparslan University 6, no. 5 (April
13, 2018): 621–31, https://doi.org/10.18506/anemon.384773.
422  P. O. AMOUR

militant actors demonstrate an anarchical ‘self-help’ orientation, in which

they look out for themselves and are egoist in their policy objectives.
Hence it is not surprising that regional dynamics are so fluid and unpre-
dictable. Moreover, taking into consideration the insights from Part III
of this book, ecological factors and natural resources are also likely to
foster further regional rivalry and inter-state conflicts in the future.
One of the major assumptions of this chapter is that, as demonstrated
in the preceding chapters, wide-scale region-shattering eruptions are
associated with a cycle of micro and macro conflicts involving different
state actors and non-state militant actors in a regional system. For almost
every regional strategic action, there is an equal and opposite strate-
gic response. In that type of strategic environment, state and non-state
actors often recognize the urgency of the unfolding dynamics in differ-
ent and colliding ways. Survival challenges of the systemic actors harden
the conflictual and anarchic nature of the regional system in an unprece-
dented way. These dynamics result in a so-called win–lose (or z­ ero-sum)
environment, in which the win of one regional player is the loss of
another. In this zero-sum environment, the lust of regional great powers
for conquest of the regional system will most likely dominate regional
events.
One implication of the current regional chaos (and, as such, the zero-
sum game) across the broader Middle East has been a horizontal pro-
liferation of the numbers of regional state actors and non-state militant
actors who possess weaponry, as well as a vertical proliferation character-
ized by the growth of already modern arsenals among regional actors.4
Islamic State is an example of the horizontal proliferation of weaponry,
while Iran, Turkey, and the UAE, among others, are examples of the ver-
tical proliferation mentioned earlier in this chapter that decreases their
dependency on international allies.
A second implication of this regional rivalry between regional great
powers across the broader Middle East is an increase in power projec-
tion capabilities across the broader system. Indeed, major state actors and
non-state militant actors have demonstrated their military power not just
by design and equipment, but through foreign military engagements (or
alliance assurance), as in the case of Egypt (e.g., in Libya), Iran (e.g.,
in Syria, Yemen and Lebanon), Israel (e.g., in Syria and Gaza Strip),

4 See Elizabeth G. Matthews and Rhonda L. Callaway, International Relations Theory: A

Primer (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2016), 16–21.

 14  REGIONAL RIVALRIES AND SECURITY ALLIANCES …  423

the KSA (e.g., in Bahrain and Yemen), Turkey (e.g., in Syria, Qatar and
Libya), the UAE (e.g., Bahrain, Yemen and Libya), Hezbollah (e.g.,
Syria, Iraq), and PMF (e.g., Syria and possibly Yemen). Power projec-
tion operations of systemic actors in neighboring and distant countries,
as the cases above demonstrate, aim not just at providing assurance to
allies. They also attempt to either divert regional dynamics from their
allegedly authentic course (potentially leading to alliance disintegration)
to minimize the actor’s strategic misfortune, or to impact the interactive
outcome (e.g., maintain the status quo) to increase the actor’s strategic
fortune. Note that foreign involvements such as these are driven in part
by regime security considerations (as a policy course for leaders to pro-
mote their legitimacy and to deflect from domestic challenges), in part
by a drive for material power projection, and in part by ideational factors,
including national narratives and transnational causes.
In the context of their power politics, regional great powers have
demonstrated their power projection capabilities beyond the power
center of the Gulf Region (and the Levant) in an attempt to expand
their military foothold in Africa, the Gulf, the Red Sea, and the Eastern
Mediterranean. An example is the Horn of Africa. Since the second dec-
ade of this century, the Horn of Africa has become a theater for rivalry
between the three regional subsystems (the KSA/UAE-led, Iran-led,
and Turkey/Qatar-led subsystems). The UAE opened a military base in
Eritrea in 2015 and is attempting to open a new one in Somaliland. As
the Gulf Crisis in 2017 worsened relations between the parties involved,
it boosted their efforts to gain material and immaterial influence in
the Horn of Africa to diversify their economies, increase their military
influence, and further attract ideationally foreign constituencies beyond
their classical area of influence. The KSA also has plans to open military
bases in the Horn of Africa region. Turkey opened a military base in
Mogadishu in 2017 and is attempting to run the port on Sudan’s Suakin
Island (2017 Suakin agreement with Khartoum). Regional great powers
play out their competition in the Red Sea corridor, including the Horn
of Africa, and in the Eastern Mediterranean. By doing so, regional great
powers are attempting to influence regional dynamics within and beyond
their direct regional security arena.5

5 See e.g., “Why Are Gulf Countries so Interested in the Horn of Africa?” The Economist,

January 16, 2019, https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2019/01/16/

why-are-gulf-countries-so-interested-in-the-horn-of-africa.
424  P. O. AMOUR

Another assumption of this chapter is that wide-scale region-

shattering eruptions have the effect of redefining intra-subsystemic rela-
tions. Subsystemic survival challenges may bring allies closer together
and move fully formed partnerships forward, as demonstrated between
the KSA and the UAE (conservative-moderate subsystem), Iran
and Syria (conservative-resistance subsystem), or Turkey and Qatar
­(moderate-resistance subsystem). By contrast, however, systemic actors
may consider their role in the emerging developments and decide to
abandon l­ong-established ties, as evident in the case of Hamas breaking
its allegiance with the Syrian regime in 2012 (and, as such, with Iran as
well) and the aftermath of the formation of the Turkey/Qatar-led sub-
system.6 In this win–lose environment, (unexpected) new alliances may
emerge and in some cases then dissolve if events in the region do not
give them time to develop gradually. The case of Egypt is an example
of this, as the Morsi administration drew closer to the Turkey/Qatar-led
subsystem before it was ousted by the military, which repositioned Egypt
in the KSA/UAE-led subsystem once again.
In sum, the outcomes of alliance building, endurance, or disintegration
are established in retrospect, rather than when interactive regional events
are unfolding. Until the new operational system is in place, the regional
system is chaotic. During this period, systemic actors that the regional
system had been invested in for decades assume different power qualities
and ideological/tactical orientations. Thus, an analysis at the interplay of
a combination of a cluster of factors that include the distribution of power
dynamics, ideational factors, and domestic influences is required to estab-
lish the foreign policy options and behavior of state and non-state militant
actors in terms of whether they maintain alliances or depart from them.
As detailed in different parts in this book, the scope and extent of
conflicts across the broader region have intensified since the second dec-
ade of the twenty-first century. What does the future hold for regional
political patterns? Until the configuration of the unfolding regional sys-
tem takes shape, it is likely that regional relations will be hardened and
regional conflicts will proliferate significantly, leaving systemic actors with
little choice but to draw closer to other systemic actors, unless they are
strong enough to withstand the gravity of regional rivalry. In this polar-
ized and polarizing win–loss environment, state and non-state militant

6 Robert M. Danin, “Hamas Breaks from Syria,” Council on Foreign Relations, accessed

June 1, 2019, https://www.cfr.org/blog/hamas-breaks-syria.

 14  REGIONAL RIVALRIES AND SECURITY ALLIANCES …  425

actors can hardly (co-)exist in isolation from other systemic units, nor
can they remain divorced from ideological and political regional con-
texts. Interactive regional events involve systemic actors and force them
to act or react whether through choice, obligation, or pressure. This
notion applies, above all, to the systemic units close to the regional
power center and to the less wealthy systemic units that depend on exter-
nal funding from regional great powers. The arenas of confrontations
will continue to be cold wars, proxy hot wars, small conflicts, and desta-
bilizing crises. It is most unlikely that direct raw confrontations between
regional great powers will take place.

Ideas, Ideologies, National Narratives,

and Transnational Causes

Transnational causes underpin the regional order of a regional sys-

tem. They serve as the foundation for regional ideational polarization
and interrelated power rivalry. They animate regional politics and fuel
regional dynamics and political processes to the level needed to evolve,
consolidate, and reconstruct a regional order, or vice versa. As time
goes on, transnational causes draw subsystemic actors closer and bind
them together, or they move them apart. Indeed, the relation between
transnational causes and the other two dimensions used to explain the
regional system (the regional order; and regional dynamics and political
processes) is a two-way relationship. Ideas, ideologies, normative beliefs,
and transnational causes shape the deep characterization of a regional
system as they bridge the micro level (domestic and foreign constituen-
cies) to the macro level (regional order) with the help of political pro-
cesses and regional dynamics. In terms of ideas and transnational causes,
the Gulf Region and the broader Middle East is a heterogeneous entity.
The existence of different power subsystems in the Gulf Region and
the broader Middle East reflects the divergence of ideas and political
stances to such an extent that they lead to ideological and normative, as
well as cause-related, polarization. Regional polarization represents the
strain of a multipolar set of colliding ideas, political ideologies, national
objectives, and partisan identities. A wide-scale region-shattering erup-
tion boosts and appears to escalate regional polarization among and
between the respective regional actors and subsystems. As time goes
on, regional dynamics boil down to national narratives and cross-border
transnational causes. State actors and non-state militant actors, aware of
426  P. O. AMOUR

this development, become determined to form and influence compel-

ling national narratives and transnational causes that appeal to domestic
and foreign constituencies, including the public, political parties, interest
groups, and the elite. The political establishment attempts to unify its
power subsystem in a common (subsystemic) cause.
The regional order involves allies and rivals whose national narratives
and perceptions/representations of regional dynamics differ from one
another. A wide-scale region-shattering eruption will most likely increase
the level of political disillusionment, panic, and deception and, as such,
the power rivalry between and among state actors and non-state militant
actors. This constellation mirrors the ideas and subsystemic causes of
one power bloc versus the counter-ideas and counter-causes of its rival.
In part, it reflects the collective concept of the enemy and provides use-
ful bogeyman for the objective of public legitimacy and opinion mobi-
lization. In this sense, regional subsystems require transnational causes
not just to represent their national narratives and regional objectives and
reach a public legitimacy among domestic and foreign constituencies,
but also to delegitimize rivals across the region.
Nevertheless, representing a transnational cause does not automati-
cally turn a systemic unit into a regional great power. The regional great
powers in the Gulf Region and the broader Middle East are materially
similar states, and yet they behave differently in the regional system
due to their divergent ideologically constructed identities. The regional
rivalry between the power poles is therefore between different ideas,
ideologies, national narratives, and subsystemic causes. In this regard,
above all, the KSA/UAE, on the one hand, and Iran and Hezbollah, on
the other hand, have established themselves as arch-rivals since the first
Arab Spring movement. In fact, mutual antipathies exist across all power
subsystems.
The regional great powers in the Gulf Region and the broader Middle
East are equipped with financial means to arm themselves with soft
power infrastructure (communications and informational infrastructure)
that projects their national narratives and regional causes beyond their
borders and enables them to generate widespread political and reputa-
tional hostility toward their rivals. Soft power infrastructure directed
at foreign audiences and elites has proven to be an important tool for
power projection capabilities for proactive and assertive state actors and
non-state militant actors across the Gulf Region and broader Middle
East. Regime-monopolized soft power is used intentionally in national
 14  REGIONAL RIVALRIES AND SECURITY ALLIANCES …  427

and pan-national communication and informational infrastructure to

glamorize the regime’s own leaders as heroes and their rivals as villains,
to cast oneself (as a nation) as a victim and at the same time a defender
of national objectives and (pan-Arab/pan-Islamic) regional causes
­vis-à-vis the regional villain.
The most mentioned regional great powers in the broader Middle
East perform important roles in the official bodies of Islamic and Arab
countries (e.g., the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, GCC, Arab
League), and this increases their capabilities to expand their areas
of influence.7 Regional rivalry since the first Arab Spring movement
has emerged on different occasions so that these intergovernmental
organizations have failed to form viable regional governments or a viable
regional collective organization with independent enforcement mecha-
nisms that can be used to enforce conflict management and resolution in
the region.
Arab countries allegedly share specific ideas, ideologies, and
­normative beliefs, in addition to transnational causes, such as Arabism,
the Palestine cause, the Zionist threat, and the Iran (or Shi’) threat.
These causes drove the motor of regional dynamics and political pro-
cesses during the twentieth century. Since the first Arab Spring move-
ment, however, most of these transnational causes (including Arabism,
the Palestine cause, and the Zionist threat) have lost their appeal due to
the urgency of many other national narratives and domestic challenges
across the region and due to the promotion of the higher causes, like
the Iran/Shi’ threat and the MB threat, by specific countries in the
region.8 Israel allegedly shares the Iran threat cause, the MB threat
cause, and the opposition against political self-determination, with coun-
tries from the conservative-moderate subsystem. Both subsystems share
a mutual aversion toward the conservative-resistance subsystem and
­moderate-resistance subsystem.9

7 Bahgat Korany and Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, eds., The Foreign Policies of Arab States

(Cairo: Westview Press; American University in Cairo Press, 1984), 2.

8 See Philipp O. Amour, “Did a Palestine Spring Take Place? The Lost Decade in

Palestine,” Turkish Journal of History 67, no. 1 (June 2018): 151–76, https://doi.org/10.
26650/TurkJHist.2018.384983.
9 See Philipp O. Amour, “Israel, the Arab Spring, and the Unfolding Regional Order

in the Middle East: A Strategic Assessment,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 44,
no. 3 (July 3, 2017): 293–309, https://doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2016.1185696.
428  P. O. AMOUR

Shi’-populated systemic actors allegedly share specific ideas, ideolo-

gies, and normative beliefs, as well as transnational causes (e.g., the KSA/
UAE-threat, Sunni/Wahhabi threat, the right to s­ elf-determination cause,
and the right to self-resistance cause). As demonstrated in various chapters
throughout this book, Iran and Syria have allied themselves with groups
furthering national liberation and with those dominated by Shi’ members.
Several transnational causes have been described in different chapters of
this book. A perplexing realization for people in the Middle East is that
the principal actors in this power bloc have opposed revolutionary under-
takings during both Arab Spring movements in Syria and Lebanon (and
in Iran) and have delegitimized their cause for political self-determination
and for resistance as a ­counter-revolution and as a conspiracy of foreign
powers, while supporting similar revolutionary aspirations in rival orbits.
The Turkey/Qatar-led subsystem allegedly shares ideas, ideologies,
and normative beliefs, as well as transnational causes, with both sides. It
reveals revisionist aspirations and realist strategies; a stance that gives rise
to opportunities and constraints at the same time. This equation makes
this power subsystem more innovative and ideationally mobile across the
other subsystems; however, it increases the potential for collision with
other subsystemic causes should the respective regional great powers
(i.e., Turkey and Qatar) become unable to adapt satisfactorily to shifting
power settings and complex interplays in the region. If their realpolitik
behavior overshadows their revolutionary idealism/pragmatism, it will
frustrate their transnational supporters and delegitimize their deeds in
the broader region. This remains a possible policy option should the cost
of Turkey’s and Qatar’s regional policy (vis-à-vis the other subsystems)
increase in the form of economic hardships or regional isolation, as men-
tioned above.
The Iran, KSA, and UAE intensification in regional interactions
(referred to by some scholars as Sunni-Shi’ rivalry), Qatar’s strategic and
ideational balancing, and the Turkish soft power and hard power engage-
ment in the region have become the most pronounced drivers for tack-
ling systemic boundaries across the region. The existence of sections in
the different subsystems with transnational causes that differ from those
of the masses (for example groups that have a religious alliance with
rivals of their own countries) increases polarization and has potential
implications for domestic instability (e.g., in Iraq, Lebanon, or Bahrain).
On the strategic front, regional state and non-state militant actors use
 14  REGIONAL RIVALRIES AND SECURITY ALLIANCES …  429

and instrumentalize minorities or sectarian fragments of the people in

rival countries to put pressure on their rivals and gain leverage in transna-
tional issues.
Since the first Arab Spring movement, a soft power war of ideologi-
cal balancing in terms of national narratives and subsystemic causes has
been playing out across the Gulf Region and the broader Middle East.
In its wake, old established causes have lost importance (­Pan-Arabism/
Pan-Islamism) or credibility (e.g., resistance, self-determination, control
of holy sites) among wide sections of people, in favor of new priorities
(national, local) and causes (national particularism, sectarianism). At this
point it is fair to say that all involved state actors and non-state militant
actors have lost loyal followers and supporters, not just within their own
orbit of influence but across the broader region. In other words, the
regional chaos since the first Arab Spring movement has altered people’s
ideas, ideologies, and normative beliefs regarding core issues and causes,
such as whether or not the USA and Russia are regarded as indispen-
sable external interlocutors, and regarding their military intervention in
the region (pro versus con, legality versus illegality), their ideologies and
forms of government (e.g., liberalism, democracy versus Islamization and
caliphates), and transnational causes (e.g., Western threat, Zionist threat,
Islamist threat, struggle, and self-determination).
Each interface or confrontation between rival ideas, ideologies, and
normative beliefs, as well as national narratives and subsystemic causes,
presents a test of an elemental proposition. People in the broader Middle
East remain puzzled by the set of ideas, ideologies, and causes that have
polarized the region, either by being put into question or eradicated and
replaced with new ones. The way people regard core issues and causes is
not settled yet and is still fluid. For wider segments of the population,
these unfolding aspects are barely lived and remain untested. Some peo-
ple feel adrift, with their beliefs coming into question; others embark
effortlessly upon new ones, while still others undergo a process of oblite-
ration of their core belief system.
Nevertheless, the current policies of the proactive, assertive, and
­bellicose state actors and non-state militant actors demonstrate that a
shift in ideas, as well as ideologies and normative beliefs, seems to add
up to a distinctive grand vision of the future that currently guides their
security and foreign policy behavior across the Gulf Region and broader
Middle East.
430  P. O. AMOUR

Two questions emerge in connection with this third dimension

of analysis of the regional system: Does the alleged Shi’ threat and
neo-Ottomanism challenge exist, above all, at the level projected by the
conservative-moderate bloc and by Tel-Aviv across their orbits? And
­
does the KSA/UAE-led power bloc allegedly pose a threat to the Arab
Spring uprisings and pursue a policy of strategic and ideological push
vis-à-vis other power blocs to the level projected by their rivals? The
answer to the first question is yes to the existence of the threat per se.
Systemic units trigger a power rivalry and ideational polarization across
the regional system to maintain their domestic regime and their regional
might during wide-scale region-shattering eruptions. In this context, the
existence of the threat becomes omnipresent, prevailing, and inevitable
across the regional arena.
However, the answer to the second question is negative. During an
extended period of rivalry and polarization, as the Gulf Region and
broader Middle East is currently witnessing, systemic units’ interests
in the unfolding regional dynamics ahead of them are profound and
ambiguous. In the wake of this regional power rivalry and ideational
polarization, the worsening security situation makes constituencies and
high-ranking decision makers feel more threatened. Thus, the deci-
sion-making process of systemic units likely becomes, in part more arro-
gant and presumptuous as a result of deception, (mis)perception, and
framing. Moreover, the behavior of systemic units in this zero-sum envi-
ronment becomes increasingly secretive, unpredictable, and harsh.10
Regional powers with projection capabilities subscribe to ideas, ide-
ologies, national narratives, and subsystemic causes (all of which are
underpinning threats) in their rhetoric and public discourses as a tool
to represent and justify their own domestic politics and regional pol-
icies toward their allies and against their rivals at home and abroad.
Misinterpretation and exaggeration of these ideas and transnational
causes/threats are thus found across the broader Middle East, and this
‘misinterpretation’ is sometimes a deliberate policy choice. In other
words, the level of the purported (relative) threat as represented by
involved leaderships and their followers does not always coincide with

10 See e.g., Marijke Breuning, Foreign Policy Analysis: A Comparative Introduction (New

York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Derek Beach, Analyzing Foreign Policy (Basingstoke,
Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), https://www.macmillanihe.com/page/detail/
analyzing-foreign-policy-derek-beach/?sf1=barcode&st1=9780230237391.
 14  REGIONAL RIVALRIES AND SECURITY ALLIANCES …  431

the effective (absolute) initial threat posed by their rivals across the
regional system. Instead, the purported/assumed threat is the sum of the
initial threat and the elite’s threat perception (of that initial threat).
Compared to the former two dimensions alluded to earlier in this
chapter (regional order as well as regional dynamics and political pro-
cesses), the perceptual variables are more concerned with the third
dimension: ideas and transnational causes. Thus, by contrast with the
more measurable first two dimensions, transnational causes reflect esti-
mated positions, as they are difficult to measure.

Sectarian Division
Perceptual variables are predominant in the dimension of the regional
system concerned with ideas and transnational causes. Fixed or objective
realities are not regarded as such, but are only taken seriously if major
segments of the people across the broader region perceive them as such.
Regional powers have incorporated the Sunni/Wahhabi threat
versus Shi’/Iranian threat, or Sunni/Wahhabi threat versus the
neo-Ottomanism threat, and vice versa, into their mainstream dis-
­
course and across their areas of influence and beyond, thereby laying
the groundwork for increasing sectarian conflicts in the future. Indeed,
proactive, assertive, and bellicose state actors and non-state militant
actors attribute a unique and distinct character to their national identity
and religious orthodoxy—be it Sunni, Shi’, Wahhabi, Hanafi, or Maliki.
These actors promote this identity in order to increase their power base.
In most of these countries, the identity discourses project the notion of
great power status, in association with the right of defense and offense
vis-à-vis perceived villainous systemic actors, in addition to the control
of frontline smaller states and failed states. The Qatar crisis and foreign
interventions in Syria, Yemen, and Libya can be interpreted, in part, to
this factor.
One needs to bear in mind that the KSA and Iran claim to be the
guardians of Sunni Islam and Shi’ Islam, respectively, as well as the pro-
tectors of various holy places. The origin of this position goes back to the
primordial conflict between Sunnis and Shi’is and to colliding religious
imperatives. Still, religious (sectarian) polarization does not occur solely
between Sunni-oriented and Shi’-oriented systemic actors. Competition
is also taking place within the Sunni orbit, involving religious higher
orders in the KSA versus Egyptian Al-Azhar or in the Jordanian
432  P. O. AMOUR

Hashemites. Within the Shi’-dominated power bloc, Qum (Iran) and

Najaf (Iraq) seem to unite and at the same time divide Shi’ followers and
supporters for allegiance.
Thus, I argue that there is a (perceived) sectarian conflict across the
Gulf Region and broader Middle East, with all its biases, misinformation,
and knowledge bent to this alleged reality. As a result, sectarianism is one
way to explain the observed regional power rivalry and ideological polar-
ization. Researchers should, however, not overemphasize the influence of
sectarian division and conflict when attempting to understand regional
interactive dynamics. The different chapters in this book present a more
sophisticated notion of the extended regional rivalry and polarization, in
which sectarianism reflects one aspect of the regional system. Currently,
national legitimization; territorial disputes (e.g., between the UAE and
Iran); safe access to geopolitical routes and natural resources, and power
ambitions on all sides have nourished the sectarian conflict.
This sectarian dynamic/competition is one that is most likely to
endure in the future. Bearing in mind the earlier assumption that
regional rivalry and conflict will increase, it is likely that the perceived
sectarian conflict will harden across the region as well. Sectarian divisions
and trans-sectarian causes will likely plant more seeds in the regional
events and political processes and deliver strong fuel for oppositional
activism and inter-state conflict in the future.
My final assumption in this chapter is that region-shattering chaos
most likely will not destroy the regional system, per se. Even when
regional chaos seems to be settling down, it will still be bedeviled by
contrasting ideas and transnational causes, and so the process will take
a lot longer than observers would anticipate. This seemingly novel
emergent regional system will most likely not be completely new,
but will have elements of the earlier state. Historical analogies from
other regional systems demonstrate that the ostensibly final stages of
region-shattering chaos occasionally bring about a fundamentally novel
regional system. This book has demonstrated that systemic state actors
and non-state militant actors are struggling for survival or consolidation,
or are bidding for more power. The book has also demonstrated that
regional interactive events have not put an end to the regional system per
se or to the continuity of the regional order.
Region-shattering chaos will more likely put an end to the cur-
rent operational system and lead to alterations in the structure of the
 14  REGIONAL RIVALRIES AND SECURITY ALLIANCES …  433

regional system (e.g., bipolar/multipolar), the composition of alli-

ances, the distribution of power (e.g., downgrade or meteoric rise of
power status), the modus operandi between and among state actors and
non-state militant actors, and the obliteration of the core ideas, nor-
mative beliefs, and transnational causes. The more chaotic a regional
system is, the more likely non-state militant actors are to challenge state
boundaries and squander valuable resources. Foreign players are more
likely to proactively enter the regional arena. The outcome of these
developments is likely to be anything but predictable to the general
observer.
One of the certainties of systemic chaos is that it will leave anar-
chy in its wake. Thus, writing about future outlooks while the dynam-
ics are immediate, fluid, and complex is only possible in installments.
Regional appearances can be deceptive. The second Arab Spring move-
ment (2018–2020) has demonstrated that the systemic chaos still pre-
vails and the regional order is still unfolding. No balance has yet been
achieved in the regional order or the regional system in the Gulf Region
and the broader Middle East. Instead, the system is still moving toward
that state.
The interplay of the cluster of factors, the distribution of power
dynamics; the role of the immaterial power of ideas (ideologies and
normative beliefs, national narratives, and transnational causes); and
domestic influences all contribute to a fuller and more encompassing
understanding of the regional system in the Gulf Region and the broader
Middle East and how it is formed and disintegrated, shaped and influ-
enced, and operated and manipulated.
Factorial research encompassing different clusters is time consuming
and demanding in terms of resources. This type of research requires
methodological conformity and the establishment of theoretical and
empirical correlations, as well as great care in defining terminology.
If the various clusters of factors are not distinctly analyzed and con-
nections between them are not adequately drawn then there is a good
chance that the analysis will be wide in scope but superficial in depth.
The author recommends the use of a combination of a cluster of fac-
tors in relation to the regional level of analysis in order to arrive at a
fuller and more encompassing understanding of the Gulf Region and
broader Middle East—an understanding that is more necessary now
than ever.
434  P. O. AMOUR

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 Index

0-9 Agricultural expansion, 380, 385, 392

1999, 202
A Ahmad al-Asadi, 266, 272, 279
Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, 151
Abdullah bin Jassim al-Thani, 198
Abdul Majeed al-Zindani, 43
Abkhazia, 357, 369
Abu Bakr al-Naji, 305
Abu-l-A‘la Maududi, 108
Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, 265, 276,
289
Abu Mus’ab al-Suri, 321
Abu Rayan, 321
Accountability, 376
Adana agreement, 309
Afghanistan, 145, 146, 148, 353, 358
Africa, 176, 179, 190, 191
African Union (AU), 168, 179
African Union Mission in Somalia
(AMISOM), 169, 178, 186, 188,
189, 191
Afrin, 312, 313, 325
Agreement, 197
Agricultural sectors, 382, 386
Agriculture, 334–339, 377, 381–383,
386–389, 391–394
Ahmed Moaz al-Khatib, 314
Ahmed Yassin, 108, 109
Ahrar al-Sham, 321, 322
Airstrike, 362
Alawi/Alawis/Alawism, 104, 105,
339, 340
Al-Baghdadi, 40, 318
Aleksandr Sherin, 352
Aleppo, 272, 319, 323, 336, 362
Algeria, 5, 9, 13
Al-Hakim, 263, 286, 290
Ali Abdullah Saleh, 116, 117
Ali Akbar Salehi, 119
Alignments, 62, 63, 65, 66, 68, 75,
77, 79, 80, 84, 86–88
Ali Khamenei, 99, 102, 103, 115,
118, 119
Ali Shariati, 98, 108
Al-Islah, 70
Al-Itihaad Al-Islamiyah, 177

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), 435

under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020
P. O. Amour (ed.), The Regional Order in the Gulf Region
and the Middle East, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45465-4
436  Index

Al Jazeera, 139, 144, 199, 202 Ataa Movement, 265

Al-Khalifa, 196, 197 Availability, 377, 380, 382, 383
Alliance/Alliances, 2, 3, 5, 9–11, Axis of moderation, 96
14–20, 23, 30, 31, 33, 36–38, Axis of refusal, 97
41, 43, 49, 52 Axis of resistance, 95–98, 100, 107,
Al-Qaeda, 49 114, 119, 121–123
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula Ayatollah Ali Sistani, 115, 262, 263,
(AQAP), 117 286–289
Al-Sahwa, 70 Ayatollah Hussein-Ali Montazeri, 102
Al-Saud, 197 Ayatollah Khomeini, 71, 72, 99, 101,
Al-Shabab, 177, 178, 184, 185 102
Al-Thani, 196, 197, 200, 202, 210 Azerbaijan, 343
Al Udeid, 146, 198
Amal Movement, 111
Amouda, 310, 312 B
Ankara, 167–169, 173, 174, 179–191 Ba‘abda Declaration, 114
Anti-Muslim-Brotherhood, 16, 17 Baathism, 100, 105, 107, 122,
Anwar al-Sadat, 106 332–334
April 2012, 209 Baathist, 308, 318
Arabian Peninsula, 4 Baathist Syria, 100, 106
Arab-Israeli War, 108 Baath Party, 335
Arab League, 205, 206 Ba’ath regime, 208, 260
Arable land, 391, 398 Bab Al-Mandeb, 22
Arab nationalism, 68–71, 73, 82 Badr, 259, 267–273, 276–278, 281,
Arab nationalist camp, 68, 70 282, 285, 286, 290
Arab Spring, 1, 4–6, 10, 15, 16, Badr Brigade, 115
18, 20, 29, 30, 34, 35, 38, 41, Bahrain, 4, 13, 20
51–53, 61–64, 70, 74, 76–81, 83, Balance, 414, 420, 421, 433
88, 89 Balance against, 65
Arab Spring movement, 410, 411, Baqir Jabr al-Zubeidi, 269
415, 419, 420, 426–429, 433 Bases, 189–191
Arab unity, 108 Bashar al-Assad, 119, 203, 205,
Arab Uprisings, 133, 137, 147–151, 206, 303, 313, 321, 325, 362,
153, 155, 195, 196, 198, 202, 367–369
203, 205, 206, 210, 211 Basij, 101, 103
Armed Forces, 138, 140 Basra, 266, 276, 285
Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH), 259, Benghazi, 204
272–278, 285 Beqaa Valley, 111
Assad regime, 41, 43, 45, 69, 78, 80, Black Sea, 366
87 Bloc, 9, 16–20
Association of Militant Clergy, 102 Border, 198
Astana conferences, 314, 316 Bosporus, 366
 Index   437

Branch, 30, 32, 42, 44, 46, 48 Daraa, 312, 336

Branding, 138, 143, 144 Daraya, 364
Britain, 196–199 Davutoğlu, Ahmet, 141, 142
Democratic Front for the Liberation of
Palestine, 110
C Democratic Union Party (PYD), 19,
Cameron, 205 21
Camp David, 135 Demographic, 376, 383, 389
Capitalism, 141 Deterrence, 122
Caucasus, 364, 369, 370 Devotees of Islam, 99
Cause/s, 3, 5, 7, 9, 10, 12, 14, 15, Disaster and Emergency Management
17, 18, 20, 21, 409, 411, 413, Authority (AFAD), 143
421, 423, 425–433 Disintegration, 375, 376, 387, 391
Chaos, 420–422, 429, 432, 433 Disorder, 61, 62
Chemical, 205 Djibouti, 5, 167, 175
Chemical weapons, 205, 351, 352, Doha, 195, 196, 198, 200, 210, 211
361–363 Douma, 352, 363
Christians, 339 Drought, 333, 336, 337, 339, 376,
Climate, 375, 378, 380, 391, 396 383, 387, 389, 390, 396, 397
Climate change, 336 Druze, 105, 112, 339
Climate variability, 387, 389
Cold war, 415, 420
Colonialism, 68, 70 E
Color revolution, 357 East African Community (EAC), 168,
Communication, 182, 184 169, 186, 191
Comoros Islands, 5 Ebrahim Raisi, 104
Conservative-moderate, 407, 409– Economic growth, 384, 398
413, 415, 418, 424, 427, 430 Egypt, 5, 13, 16, 17, 19, 20
Conservative-resistance, 95, 407, 410, Egyptian military, 38, 45, 47
412, 419, 424, 427 Eisenhower Doctrine, 67, 68, 366
Constitution, 139 Elections, 207, 208
Corruption, 107, 110, 177, 178 Elite, 415, 416, 418, 426, 431
Coup/s, 97, 105, 120, 198 Emir, 203
Crimea, 357 Energy, 334, 335, 341–343, 368, 369
Energy resources, 22, 23
Energy routes, 342
D Energy security, 332, 346
Dabiq, 318 Environment/Environmental, 22, 23,
Daesh, 304–306, 313–325 170, 171
Dahlan, 36 Environmental conflicts, 376, 396,
Damascus, 205, 336, 351, 352, 362, 398
364–367 Environmental policies, 339
438  Index
Envoy, 208
Eritrea, 167, 175
Eruptions, 422, 424, 430
Ethiopia, 167, 175, 177, 188, 189
Ethnopolitical, 340
Ethno-religious conflicts, 340
Eurasia, 346
Europe, 341, 343, 344
Exploration, 369
External, 345
External factors, 22
Extractivism, 333, 335
F Government, 304, 305, 308, 312,
Fada’iyan-e Islam, 99
Fadaiyun Islam (FI) party, 72
Failed state, 176
Falih al-Fayyadh, 262, 265, 266, 272,
281, 289, 290
Fatah Al-Sham, 49
Fatwa, 262, 287
February 2011, 206
Fedayeen Saddam, 261
Federation of Islamic Organizations in
Europe, 33
Fertile Crescent, 4
Fifth Mediterranean Squadron, 366
Financial, 38, 43, 50
First Arab Spring movement, 409–
411, 415, 426, 427, 429
Foreign audience, 426
Foreign influence, 70
Foreign intervention, 331, 333, 336,
339
Foreign policy, 2, 14, 17, 19, 20, 23,
195, 198, 199, 210, 211
Fossil fuel, 380, 383, 398
France, 22
Freshwater, 377, 380, 382, 383, 386
Fundamentalism, 353, 364, 365
Funds, 107, 110, 115
G
Gaddafi, 355, 361, 368
Gas, 369
Gaza, 109, 110, 122, 217–223,
225–232, 234–237, 239–246
GCC crisis, 46
Geo-cultural factors, 332, 346
Geopolitical/Geopolitics, 331, 332,
339, 343, 344, 346
Georgia, 343, 356, 357, 368, 369
Ghannouchi, Rachid, 33, 43
Ghouta, 205, 351, 362
Globalization, 141
Golan Heights, 333, 345
313, 323
Great Power, 171–174, 185, 190, 191
Green Movement, 102, 103, 123
Guarantor, 198
Guardianship of the Jurist, 100, 101,
112
Gulf, 4, 17, 18, 22
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC),
46, 47, 49, 50, 64, 65, 73, 75,
78–82, 88, 381, 382, 392
Gulfization, 62, 63, 76, 79, 81, 82, 88
Gulf of Aden, 391
Gulf of Aqaba, 22
Gulf Region, 1–8, 10, 13–18, 20–23,
62–64, 76, 82, 83, 85, 86, 89,
196, 199, 202, 203, 209, 210
Gulf sovereign wealth funds, 143
H
Hadi al-Amiri, 266, 268, 273
Hafez al-Assad, 100, 105, 107, 111,
201, 332–334
Haider al-Abadi, 263–265, 273, 275,
279, 290
Hajj Amin al-Husseini, 104, 107
Hallab, 272

Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber al-Thani,
203
Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, 138, 198,
203
Hama massacre, 317
Hamas, 96, 97, 100, 109, 110,
120, 218, 224, 225, 227–236,
238–241, 243, 245
Hammam Saeed, 43
Hasaka, 323
Hasan al-Banna, 98, 107, 108
Hashd al-Sha’abi, 261, 262, 264, 275,
289
Hawar Islands, 145
Hawza, 263, 287
Hedging, 35, 152, 195, 196
Hegemony, 95, 98, 115
Hezbollah, 96, 97, 100, 109–114,
116, 118–121
Hizbullah Brigades, 115
Homs, 336, 351
Horn of Africa, 167–169, 174–176,
178, 180, 181, 186, 187, 190,
191
Houthi movement, 116
Houthis, 41, 44, 45, 393–395
Humanitarian, 167–169, 179–184,
186, 187, 189, 191
Humanitarian crisis, 351
I Islamic Jihad, 96, 100, 108, 111
Identity, 111, 116, 122
Idleb, 321, 336
Incirlik, 146
India, 207
Information, 182, 305, 313
Intention, 167
Intergovernmental Authority on
Development (IGAD), 168, 169,
186, 191
Index   439
International order, 359
International Organization of the MB,
33
International politics, 356
International relations, 198
International system, 351, 353, 370
Intervention/Interventionism,
353, 355, 356, 358–362, 364,
368–370
Intifada, 97, 109, 110
Iran, 4–6, 10, 13, 17–19, 21, 95–98,
100–103, 106–108, 110, 111,
113–123, 259–261, 263, 264,
267–269, 271, 273–276, 278–
281, 283, 333, 340–346
Iran-Iraq-Syria pipeline, 343
Iran–Iraq War, 107, 109
Iran-led, 408, 410, 412, 423
Iraq, 4, 5, 13, 18, 21, 260–263, 265,
267–273, 275–280, 283–287,
289–291, 352, 359, 365, 367,
368, 370
Iraqi-first, 259
Islah Party, 32, 42–45
Islamic, 31, 32, 35, 37, 40, 51
Islamic Action Front Party (IAFP),
32, 43
Islamic Awakening, 118, 119
Islamic Centre, 108
Islamic Dawah Party, 265
Islamic discourses, 34
Islamic Republic Party (IRP), 102
Islamic resistance, 121
Islamic Resistance Movement, 109
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
(IRGC), 101–104
Islamic State (IS), 17–19, 21,
260–262, 264, 270, 271, 274,
275, 277, 279, 282, 284, 285,
287–289, 291
440  Index

Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham Khan Al Assal, 362

(ISIS), 30, 40–42, 44, 48, 49, Khatami, Mohammad, 103
52, 53 Khmeimin airbase, 369
Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq Khomeini, 99
(ISCI), 115 Khordad uprising, 99
Islamism, 122, 123, 137, 211 King Abdullah, 110
Islamist/s, 32, 35, 353, 364, 365 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), 5,
Islamist forces, 65, 80 10, 13, 16–20, 196, 198–203,
Ismaelis, 105 209–211
Israel, 4, 6, 7, 10, 13, 14, 17, 19, 20, King Hussein, 110
217–230, 232–246, 333, 342, Kobane, 312
344, 345 Kobane battle, 315
Israeli Defense Force (IDF), 219, 221, Kosovo, 352, 357, 358
223–225, 227, 229, 234, 236, KSA/UAE-led, 410, 411, 423, 424,
237, 244–246 430
Istanbul, 208 Kurdish Democratic Union Party
(PYD), 304–306, 309, 311–317,
324, 325, 342
J Kurdish National Council (KNC),
Jabhat al-Nusra, 318, 322 311, 313, 314
Jaish al-Sha’bi (People’s Army), 260 Kurdistan Worker Party (PKK), 140,
Jalal Al-e Ahmad, 97 342
Jaysh al-Islam, 322 Kurds, 101, 306–311, 313–316, 322,
Jazira, 309, 312 323, 339, 342
Jihadists, 364 Kuwait, 5, 13
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Kyrgyzstan, 357
(JCPOA), 41, 103, 104
Jordan, 4
Jund al-Aqsa, 322 L
June 2016, 236 Land, 379, 380, 386, 388, 391, 392,
398
Latin America, 346
K Lavrov, Sergey, 354, 359–362, 364
Kafranbel, 321 Lebanon, 4, 5, 17, 18, 95–97, 105,
Karbala, 266, 273, 285 107, 110–114, 120, 122
Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH) in Iraq, 272, Legitimacy, 97, 100, 122
275–279 Levant, 4, 7, 17
Kenya, 167, 175, 177 Leverage, 309
Khafji, 140 Liberalism, 141
Khalifa Haftar, 36, 80 Liberalization, 333, 335
Khamenei, 263, 267, 272, 276, 283, Libya, 5, 13, 354–356, 359, 361, 363,
289 368, 370

Libyan Government of National
Accord (GNA), 408
Libyan National Army (LNA), 408
Local conflict, 392
Location, 173
Logistical, 38, 43
M Muhammad bin Thani, 197
Madrid peace conference, 110
Mahdi, Adel Abdul, 265
The Mahdi Army, 115
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, 102, 103,
119
March 2014, 34, 39, 46, 49
Maronite Christians, 111–113
Mauritania, 5
Mavi Marmara, 224, 236
Mediterranean, 23, 366
Medvedev, 355, 356
Menneg airport, 316
Middle East, 61–63, 65–67, 74, 76,
78, 79, 81–83, 85–89, 196, 199,
203, 209, 210
Military alliances, 332, 346
Military coup, 38, 45, 47
Military operation, 351, 357
Militias, 259–264, 267, 268, 272,
275, 280–283, 286, 287,
289–291
Milli Görüş, 141
Minister, 355, 362
Moderate-resistance, 155, 156, 407,
408, 410, 412, 424, 427
Mogadishu, 167, 177, 178, 181–183,
185, 189–191
Mohamed bin Salman (MBS), 73, 80,
82, 88, 89
Mohamed Morsi, 34, 36–38, 46–48,
151, 224, 226, 230
Mojtaba Mir-Louhi, 99
Montreux Convention, 366
Index   441
Morocco, 5, 13
Moscow, 352–357, 359, 361, 362,
364, 365, 367–370
Mosul, 268, 271, 275, 281
Movements, 30–35, 37, 38, 41, 42,
45, 52, 53
Mubarak, 35
Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, 108
Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, 108
Multinational Force in Lebanon
(MNF), 111
Muqtada al-Sadr, 259, 273, 283, 284,
289, 290
Musa al-Sadr, 105, 111
Muslim Brotherhood (MB), 16–18,
20, 30–32, 34–40, 42–50, 52, 53
Mustafa Sabbagh, 209
Mustapha Setmariam, 321
N
Najaf, 266, 268, 283, 287
Narratives, 411, 423, 425–427, 429,
430, 433
Nasrallah, Hasan, 114, 119
Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 134, 201, 202
National Coalition of Revolutionary
Forces and the Opposition, 209,
304
National Coordination Body for
Democratic Change (NCB), 314
National interests, 353
Nationalist, 32, 36
NATO, 204, 205, 316
Natural resource, 375, 376, 388, 396
Naval facility, 344
Navvab-e Safavi, 99
Neo-Principalists, 103
Nepotism, 107
Netanyahu, Benjamin, 223, 233
Nineteenth century, 86
442  Index
No-fly zone, 206
Non-state militant actors, 1–5, 8–12,
15, 18–22, 324, 410, 411, 415,
419, 420, 422, 424–426, 428,
429, 431–433
North Africa, 5, 6
Northeast Syria, 337
North Korea, 95
North Syria, 307, 313, 324
Nouri al-Maliki, 262, 265, 272
November 2011, 206
Nuclear deal, 78, 79
Nusra Front, 50
O Physical resource, 376
Obama, Barack, 205, 362
October 2011, 204, 208
Oil, 355, 368–370, 375, 381
Oman, 5
Omran al-Zoubi, 362
Operation Autumn Cloud, 219
Operation Brother’s Keeper, 229
Operation Cast Lead, 219, 227, 244
Operation Hot Winter, 219
Operation Pillar of Defense, 219,
221, 222, 225, 227, 228,
232, 234
Operation Protective Edge, 219–222,
229, 232–234, 242
Operation Returning Echo, 219
Operation Summer Rains, 219
Organizational capacity, 376
Organization of Islamic Cooperation
(OIC), 168, 169, 186–188, 191
Oslo, 218
Oslo Accords, 135
Ottoman Empire, 197, 199
P 282, 285, 286, 288–291
Palestine, 4, 7, 217, 224, 241, 242
Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO), 69, 73
Palestinian, 219–222, 224, 226, 227,
229, 231, 236–239, 241–243,
245, 246
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), 97,
108–110
Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood
(PMB), 108, 109
Palestinian National Authority (PNA),
73, 75, 79
Party of Justice and Development
(PJD), 32, 34
People’s Protection Units (YPG), 304,
313, 315, 325
Polisario Front, 81
Political disintegration, 387
Political Islam, 30–36, 38–40, 43,
45–53
political parties, 32, 34
Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine, 110
Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF),
19, 21, 115, 259–267, 270–273,
276, 278–291
Population growth, 377, 385, 394
Port, 47, 190, 423
Port of Tartous, 334
Postcolonial, 30, 32
Power, 2, 3, 5, 7–23, 218, 220, 224,
234, 241, 243
Power center, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 17
Power projection, 7, 11, 14, 15, 21,
415, 416, 422, 423, 426
Power relations, 30, 31
President, 198, 203, 205, 206
Production, 377, 379–383, 392
Pro-Iran militias, 259, 261, 263–267,
271, 272, 275, 276, 278–280,
Pro-Muslim-Brotherhood, 16

Proximity, 170
Proxy, 62, 69, 81, 85
Proxy war, 331, 342, 344, 346
Puntland, 177
Putin, 351, 355–360, 363–365, 367,
370
PYD-YPG, 304, 319, 324
Q 419, 420, 422, 423, 425–428
Qaddafi, 64, 70, 78, 80, 204
Qais al-Khazali, 273
Qamishli, 312
Qasem Soleimani, 103, 271, 289
Qatar, 5, 13, 16–20, 132–134,
137–156, 195–203, 205, 206,
208–211, 340, 342, 343
Qatar crisis, 49, 51–53
Qatar Foundation, 139
Qatar Fund for Development, 144
Qatari MB, 35
Qatar Investment Authority (QIA),
143
Qatar University, 202
Quasi-state, 21
Quds Force, 101, 103, 104, 111, 121
Qum, 283, 287
R Religion, 97, 98, 104, 123, 306, 314,
Radical, 353, 358, 362, 364, 365, 368
Rafah, 224, 231, 235, 245
Rafiq al-Hariri, 345
Rafsanjani, Akbar Hashemi, 99, 102
Ramadan, Said, 107
Raqqa, 304, 313, 319, 320, 323, 325
Rashid Rida, 108
Rational interests, 34
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, 36, 48, 51,
141, 167
Red Sea, 391
Refah party, 74
Index   443
Reformist, 102, 103, 123
Reform-minded, 408
Refugees, 351
Regime, 351–356, 359, 361–366,
368–370
Regional developments, 34, 38, 40
Regional dynamics, 1–3, 5, 7–10, 15,
16, 19, 20
Regional great power, 411, 413, 415,
Regionalism, 346
Regional order, 2, 9, 10, 16, 30, 31,
52, 53
Regional power, 3, 23, 168, 171–174,
185, 190
Regional rivalry, 421, 422, 424, 426,
427, 432
Regional Security, 168, 170, 175, 182,
185, 186, 191
Regional Security Complex (RSC),
169–175, 178, 180, 185, 186,
188–190
Regional Security Complex Theory
(RSCT), 169–171, 173–175,
185, 190, 191
Regional superpower, 420
Regional system, 1–4, 6–12, 15–17,
21–23, 133, 153, 155
Relations, 196, 198, 199, 201, 209
323, 324
Rentier state, 37
Resistance, 259, 274, 286, 290
Revolution/s, 63, 64, 67–70, 72, 77,
78, 83, 84, 86
Revolutionary Guard Corps, 81
Rhetoric, 304, 314
Risk, 46, 49
Rivalries, 5, 6, 9, 10, 15, 23
Riyadh, 201
Rojava, 312, 313, 315, 316
Rouhani, Hasan, 103, 104
444  Index
Russia, 7, 22, 23, 333, 341, 343–346,
351–370
Russian, 353, 355–357, 359, 360,
364–370
S Shi’ militias, 259–261, 264, 267, 268,
Saada governorate, 393
Saakashvilli, Mihail, 357
Saddam Hussein, 101, 114, 201, 261,
267
Salafi/Salafism, 32, 71, 235
Samarra, 277, 285
Sarkozy, 205
Saudi royal house, 37, 45
Sayyid Qutb, 71
Scarcity, 375–379, 383, 384, 386,
389, 393, 398, 399
Second Arab Spring movement, 415,
420, 433
Sectarian/Sectarianism, 332, 340, 342
Sectarian conflict, 137
Secular, 32, 33
Security, 2, 7, 9, 15–20, 22, 217, 221,
230–232, 235, 241, 242, 245,
246
Security and foreign policy, 3, 23
Security interdependency, 63, 64, 79
Seif, Riad, 209
Sèvres, 324
Shah, 99, 100, 106
Shanghai Cooperation Organization,
346, 353
Sharia, 202
Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber al
Thani (HBJ), 141, 143
Sheikh Jassim, 197
Sheikh Khalifa, 138–140
Sheikh Muhammad Ibn Abdul
Wahhab, 200
Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani,
152
Shiism, 41
Shiite Crescent, 136
Shiite militias, 41
Shiite minority, 72, 77
Shiites, 40, 41
Shi’-leaning actors, 259
270–273, 275–283, 285, 289
Shirqat, 285
Sinai Peninsula, 230, 235, 245
Sissi regime, 43, 46
Skirmishes, 198
Society of Militant Clerics, 102
Soft power, 168, 169, 175, 179–181,
184, 185, 189–191
Somalia, 5, 20, 167–169, 173,
175–178, 180–191
Somaliland, 177, 185, 189
Somali National Army (SNA), 188,
189, 191
South Africa, 204, 207
South Ossetia, 357, 369
State Duma, 352
Statehood, 175
Status quo alignment, 62, 63, 67–69,
73, 74, 76, 79, 82, 86–89
Status quo power, 64, 66, 68, 71, 76,
84, 88
Straits of Hormuz, 22
Suakin, 190
Sub-Saharan countries, 5, 6
Subsidies, 334, 335, 338
Subsystem, 2, 9–11, 16–19, 21, 407,
409–415, 418–421, 423–428
Sudan, 5, 9, 17
Suez Canal, 22
Suez crisis, 69, 366
Super Power, 171, 172, 174, 185, 186
Support, 33, 36, 38, 41, 43, 45–48,
50, 51, 53
Supreme Council for the Islamic
Revolution in Iraq, 115

Supreme Leader, 99, 102
Sustainability, 376, 379, 383, 387,
395, 398, 399
Sykes-Picot, 324
Syria, 4, 9, 13, 17–23, 97, 100, 104–
108, 110, 112–115, 118, 119,
121–123, 259, 261, 267, 271,
272, 275, 277–279, 285, 291,
303, 304, 306–309, 312–325,
351–354, 356–370, 376, 378,
382, 387–390, 395–398
Syrian crisis, 149, 154, 155
Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), 304,
315, 316, 319, 324
Syrian Muslim Brotherhood (SMB),
42, 45, 195, 196, 201, 203,
208–211
Systemic change, 76
Systemic unit, 2–4, 8–11
T agreement, 236
Tabqa Dam, 309
Tacit security regime (TSR), 66, 87
Taif Agreement, 112, 113
Takfiris, 120
Tal Afar, 271
Tartous, 23, 344
Tartous naval base, 366
Technologies, 381, 384
Tel Rifat, 316
Terror, 39, 43
Threat, 30, 35–38, 40–44, 47, 48,
52, 53
Tourism, 367
Trade, 196, 202
Trade policy, 379
Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline,
343
Transformation, 133, 135, 138, 141,
142, 156
Index   445
Transitional Federal Government of
Somalia, 176
Transnational, 30, 33, 38, 43, 45, 52
Transnational identities, 64, 86, 87
Transparency, 376
Tribes, 260
Tripolar, 133, 155
Trump administration, 238, 241, 242
Tudeh Party, 97
Tunisia, 5, 9, 16, 17
Tunisian Ennahda, 30, 32, 34, 43
Tunnel, 224, 225, 228, 229, 231, 235
Turkey, 4, 6, 13, 16–20, 132–134,
137, 138, 140–156, 307–309,
313, 315, 316, 333, 340–343,
346
Turkey/Qatar-led, 408, 410–415,
423, 424, 428
Turkish Corporation and Development
Agency (TIKA), 143, 182
The Turkish-Israeli reconciliation
Turkish Justice and Development
Party (AKP), 141
Twelver Shiism, 100, 116
Twentieth century, 1, 6, 15
Twenty-first century, 1, 7, 14
U
Uday, 261
Uganda, 167, 175
Ukraine, 357
Ulama, 200, 201
Umma, 112
Underdevelopment, 391
Unemployment, 32, 107
UNGA Resolution, 207
United Arab Emirates (UAE), 5, 13,
16–19
United Arab Republic, 69, 134
446  Index
United National Leadership of the
Uprising (UNLU), 110
United Nations Security Council
(UNSC), 204–207, 210, 355,
358, 359, 370
United States of America (USA),
22, 196, 198, 199, 201, 205,
209, 210, 351–354, 356–358,
361–363, 365, 366, 368, 370
Uprising, 83–85, 88, 89
Urban/Urbanization, 385, 386, 389,
395, 398
US President, 362
V Yasser Arafat, 110, 112
Vilayat-i Faqih, 72, 263, 268, 274,
276, 282, 283
Vulnerability, 377–379, 390, 398
W Yusuf al-Qaradawi, 33, 108, 121, 201,
Wadi Araba Agreement, 135
Wahhabi/Wahhabism, 37, 196, 198,
200, 203, 211
War, 102, 108, 112, 117, 121
Wasatiyya parties, 32, 37
Water, 23, 338, 339, 375–393,
395–398
Water management, 375, 383–387,
398, 399
Water scarcity, 376–383, 388, 391,
393, 394, 396, 398, 399
Water storage, 378
Water Stress Index (WSI), 376–378
Weapons, 107, 110, 112, 117, 122
West, 95, 96, 98, 102, 106, 109, 110,
118, 355–358, 362, 367, 368
Western influence, 68–70
White Revolution, 99
Y
Yanukovych, 357
Yemen, 5, 9, 13, 17, 18, 23, 97, 100,
114, 116–118, 376, 382, 387,
390–396, 398
Yom Kippur War, 122
Yunus Emre Institute, 144
202
Z
Zero problems with neighbors, 145
Zero-sum, 307, 319, 324, 422, 430