Regional Nuclear Governance in the Middle East

Master of Global Affairs
Department of Public Policy and Administration
The American University in Cairo

School of Global Affairs and Public Policy
Towards A Regional Governance Of The Nuclear

Fuel Cycle In The Middle East
A project submitted to the

Public Policy and Administration Department
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Global Affairs

Concentration: International Security
By
Yomna Ismail Ahmed
Spring 2016
The American University in Cairo
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy
Department of Public Policy and Administration
Towards A Regional Governance Of The Nuclear

Fuel Cycle In The Middle East
Yomna Ismail Ahmed
Completed under the supervision of Dr. Allison Hodgkins
ABSTRACT
This purpose of this project is to explore the possibilities and opportunities of regional
governance regime for the nuclear fuel cycle in the Middle East. This study argues
that a cooperative, regional framework in accordance to international criteria is the
ideal solution to the technical, economic, and political challenges confronting the
generation of nuclear power generation in the region. The project begins by
discussing various existing frameworks for managing the nuclear full cycle, and how
they could be applied to the nuclear energy situation in the region. The paper then
examines the different obstacles to establishing such a framework in the region, as
well as proposing potential solutions. The study concludes by presenting a model for
a regional nuclear fuel cycle, which is feasible and sustainable from the viewpoint of
nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear security, legal conventions and treaties,
international acceptance and assurance of fuel supply. This project presents a number
of recommendations to the governments, researchers, regional organizations and non-
governmental organizations of how to promote the nuclear energy industry’s
measures attributing importance to incentives for the regional cooperation
participating countries, and therefore, nuclear security and weapons free zone in the
Middle East.
Keywords: Nuclear fuel cycle; regionalization; regional governance; EURATOM;

ABACC; IAEA; multilateral nuclear approaches; nuclear non-proliferation; Middle
East
2
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
First and foremost, I would like to express my highest and sincere gratitude to God
who gave me the strength to accomplish this degree and whose many blessings have
made me who I am today.
I would like to express my gratitude to my thesis supervisor Dr. Alison Hodgkins for
her continued understanding, encouragement and patience throughout my master
years. She gave me the freedom to explore on my own and at the same time the
guidance to recover when my steps stumbled.
I would like to express my deepest gratitude and appreciation to Dr. Ibrahim Awad
whose expertise, understanding, motivation and support added considerably to my
graduate experience. It was an honor to meet such a respectful professor and mentor
whose knowledge is the widest I have ever seen.
I would also like to thank Dr. Hassan Elbahtimy who graciously helped me with his
knowledge, guidance and constructive feedback and provided me with his kind
support. I thank him for taking time out from his busy schedule to be my external
reader.
A very special thanks goes out to Ambassador Nabil Fahmy, Dean of the School of
Global Affairs and Public Policy for his valuable insights and guidance.
I must also acknowledge the support, kindness, dedication and generosity I have
received from all the officials I met in Jordan.
Finally, special and sincere thanks to my family who stood by me through my

bittersweet journey, believed in me and helped me overcome challenges to bring out
the best from within me.
To my father, who has taught me the importance of education and inspired me to

purse this master degree and provided me with all the support, care and unconditional
love since the day I was born.
To my mother, who has sacrificed the most so I could accomplish my goal, believed
in me and in my ability to accomplish whatever I set out to reach and stood by me
every step in the way.
To my brother, my person and my buddy whose kindness, patience, dedication and

commitment have always inspired me.
To my adorable son, Ziad, who brought hope, joy, aspiration and smile into my life
again, pushed me to become a better mum and a better person and gave me all the
strength at times I thought that it was impossible to continue.
You are my true blessing in life and I promise I will always make you proud. This
master is for you all!
3
“In loving memory of Mr. Elsayed Taha”
4
LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE 1 THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE COUTESY OF IAEA. .....................................11
FIGURE 2 DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITY IN MULTILATERAL NUCLEAR FUEL

CYCLE COOPERATION BETWEEN IRAN AND ARAB STATES AS SUGGESTED BY
THE RESEARCHER. ...............................................................................................52
FIGURE 3 DEVELOPED BY THE RESEARCHER. ............................................................59
FIGURE 4 SPILLOVER EFFECTS OF EACH MODEL AS ILLUSTRATED AND DEVELOPED

BY THE RESEARCHER ...........................................................................................67
5
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
ABACC Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of

Nuclear Materials
AAEA Arab Atomic Energy Agency
AP Additional Protocol (IAEA INFCIRC/540(Corr.))
BTWC Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
CTBT Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
CWC Chemical Weapons Convention
DPRK Democratic People's Republic of Korea
ENR Enrichment and Reprocessing Technology
EURATOM European Atomic Energy Community
EURODIF European Gaseous Diffusion Uranium Enrichment
Consortium
HEU Highly enriched uranium
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
INFCE International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (1977-1980)
INFCIRC Information Circular
LEU Low-enriched uranium
LWR Light-water reactor
MNA Multilateral nuclear approach
MOX Mixed-oxide fuel
NNWS Non-nuclear-weapons states
MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime
MWe Megawatt electric
NCA Nuclear cooperation agreement
NPP Nuclear power plant
NPT Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NSG Nuclear Suppliers Group
NWS Nuclear-Weapon-State under the NPT
PU Plutonium
PWR Pressurized water reactor
RSAC Regional systems of accounting for and control of nuclear
material
SCCC Common System of Accounting and Control (ABACC)
SESAME Synchrotron-Light For Experimental Science and
Applications in the Middle East
U Uranium
UN United Nations
URENCO Uranium Enrichment Company
UNESCO UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
6
Table of Contents
ABSTRACT.....................................................................................................................................2
ACKNOWLEDGMENT ................................................................................................................3
LIST OF FIGURES ................................................................................................................................ 5
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS .......................................................................... 6
INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................................... 8
CLIENT DESCRIPTION ........................................................................................................................ 12
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM ...................................................................................................... 13
LITERATURE REVIEW ........................................................................................................................ 15
METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................................................... 27
RESEARCH LIMITATIONS .................................................................................................................. 30
NUCLEAR PROGRESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST ............................................................................... 31
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK ............................................................................................................ 39
PROSPECTIVE MODELS ...................................................................................................................... 44
CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................................... 62
SPILLOVER EFFECTS ........................................................................................................................... 67
RECOMMENDATIONS ......................................................................................................................... 69
BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................................................... 71
APPENDICES .......................................................................................................................................... 76
7
Introduction
Nuclear power is one possible method of meeting the increasing, global demand for
energy. However, in politically unstable states and regions like the Middle East and
parts of South East Asia, fear of nuclear materials being diverted to non-peaceful uses
has limited the potential for an expanded nuclear energy industry. Several discussions
have been raised on revisiting the multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle
especially with the emergence of secret nuclear supply links that provide nuclear fuel
to covert nuclear facilities. In fact during the past few years, the multilateral approach
to the nuclear fuel cycle has been recognized as a potential peaceful cost-effective
mechanism for strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime and addressing the
growing demand for energy. The multilateral nuclear fuel cycle approach has the
potential to gain international favor over unilateral development of nuclear fuel cycle.
The study explores the feasibility of establishing a regional governance of

nuclear fuel cycle and how can it be implemented and managed in the Middle East
region. This study examines the obstacles and windows of opportunity for reaching
comprehensive, regional, nuclear cooperation in the Middle East. Since there is no
specific definition of a multilateral nuclear approaches framework, lessons from the
Europe Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and other models from Latin
America such as ABACC as well models from Asia are drawn and then consider its
applicability to the Middle East region.
The study develops possible models for regional nuclear fuel cycle
cooperation in accordance to criteria adopted from the past proposals and reports
including nuclear non-proliferation, safeguards, safety, host site selection,
transportation, public opinion, international acceptance, geopolitics, export control,
access to technology, legal aspects and economics. However, given the specific nature
of the Middle East region and the scope of this study, two fundamental features were
selected and then adopted in the proposed model.
The literature review covers the multilateral cooperation in nuclear energy at

both the regional and international levels. This essential part of the research identifies
8
the main factors and measures that should be considered in the establishment and the
implementation of regional fuel cycle integration in the Middle East.
This study comprises an analysis of primary data sources collected from

interviews with a number of governmental and international and national
organizations officials, as well as an assessment of secondary sources related to the
question of the multilateral management of the nuclear fuel cycle. In addition, the
study utilizes relevant international treaties, conventions and agreements at both
regional and international levels.
The regional governance of the nuclear fuel cycle management represents an

effective solution to the threat of nuclear proliferation as each member to the regional
framework would be checking on the others, thus creating more effective verification
system, security and safety as well as providing access to crucial nuclear fuel cycle
services. At present, there is an increased interest of inexperienced developing
countries in nuclear energy that need to be addressed and solved. From a national
perspective, the security of future fuel supply is a vital factor in assessing nuclear
power’s sustainability. The global abundance of naturally occurring uranium makes
nuclear power attractive from an energy security standpoint.1 However, in most cases
uranium enrichment is needed before such uranium can be used, which is one of the
most difficult hurdles for nuclear development.
This study aims at finding solutions to the unanswered questions of

implementation process of the nuclear fuel cycle in the Middle East through regional
cooperation. Despite the ongoing debate and on and off discussions about the need of
internationalization of the nuclear fuel cycle, this subject is rarely discussed in the
literature in particular with regards to the Middle East region. By connecting the
points that have been covered in the literature and filling in the literature gap, this
study is able to find answers to the possibility of creating a regional cooperation on
the management of the nuclear fuel cycle in the Middle East. The study answers
questions related to the Middle Eastern States’ responsibilities while considering
legitimate interests. Additionally, questions about factors that should be considered

1
Nahyan, A. B., Araj, K. J., Fahmy, N., & Chongkum, S. (2008). Why go nuclear?
9
and measured in the implementation process such as which countries will host such
facilities and which countries will finance the project are also answered.
Further, this study makes an important contribution to the fields of arms

control, strategic studies, war and conflict studies, international cooperation,
governance of nuclear energy for peaceful uses and security studies in general. This
interview-based study will open new scope for future studies on the militarization of
nuclear fuel cycle in the Middle East. The study aims at preparing a well-structured
feasibility analysis and aims to be a road map to governments and policy-makers of
regional and international organizations such as Arab Atomic Energy Agency and
International Atomic Energy Agency and to the global nuclear industry on how
regional governance of nuclear fuel cycle can be implemented, installed and managed
among the Middle Eastern States.
In addition, this study explores the regionalization of nuclear fuel cycle as a

mean of promoting cooperation and non-proliferation in the Middle East. The
advantages and the hurdles are analyzed. The experience of EURATOM Treaty is
examined as well as possible reactions from the leading supplier countries are
assessed in light of establishing a regional cooperation on the management of the
nuclear fuel cycle. The study stimulates additional research in this topic and provides
a set of useful recommendations to address the major findings of the study, which is
going to be useful contribution to the implementation process of the nuclear fuel cycle
regionalization in the Middle East.
Background: The Nuclear Fuel Cycle
What is the nuclear fuel cycle and why is it important to have a regional governance
regime controlling it? Briefly, the nuclear fuel cycle (NFC) is a collective series of
activities associated with energy generation from nuclear reactions taking place in
nuclear power plants.2 The cycle has a “front end” which is composed of the

2 Retrieved from: https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/nfc0811.pdf
10
following steps: mining and milling, conversion, enrichment and then fuel fabrication.
The cycle ends with what is called a “back end” in which uranium that has been used
in reactors to produce energy undergoes an additional steps that include temporary
storage, reprocessing, and recycling before nuclear wastes are disposed. Figure 1
shows the complete nuclear fuel cycle including the most critical stages, uranium
enrichment and spent nuclear fuel reprocessing. Most power generating reactors use
fuel from the primary component U-235. Some reactors use natural uranium as fuel
without being enriched. While other reactors particularly those established in Europe
like France use converted mixed oxide fuel (MOX) consisting of plutonium as the
main fuel of fissile material.3
Figure 1 The Nuclear Fuel Cycle Coutesy of IAEA.
Natural uranium or the product of a uranium mill (uranium oxide) is not

directly usable as fuel for a nuclear reactor and additional processing is required. Only
0.7% of natural uranium is capable of producing a fissile chain reaction that results in
producing energy.4 However, once uranium has been enriched to between 3.5% and
5% U-235 it can be used to produce energy. Moreover, according to the 2001 IAEA

3
Retrieved from: http://www.armscontrol.ru/pubs/en/Diakov-NucFuelCycle.pdf
4 http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/conversion-
enrichment-and-fabrication/uranium-enrichment.aspx
11
safeguards glossary, if uranium has been enriched to more than 20% it is considered
suitable enough to produce a compact explosive device.5 In addition, if uranium has
been enriched to reach 90% U-235 it is considered as a “weapons-grade” material that
can be used in producing nuclear weapons.6 That is why uranium enrichment
represents a critical stage of the nuclear fuel cycle in which most of the international
community fears that any country develops it to produce enriched uranium beyond
20%. Moreover, the journey from zero enrichment to 20% enrichment is more
difficult than from 20% to 90% and requires more work. Therefore, the task of
producing weapons relevant materials gets progressively easier. On the other hand,
plutonium does not exist naturally but only in trace amounts in nature as it is
produced in a nuclear reactor operating on either low or natural-enriched uranium. As
produced by irradiating uranium, plutonium contains different percentages of isotopes
238, 239, 240, 241 and 242 but most importantly plutonium containing isotope of
239, which is considered a special fissionable material.7
The reprocessing of spent fuel also represents a crucial stage as it considered

a threat to the non-proliferation norms. In the reprocessing process, plutonium and
uranium are separated from other nuclear waste in the spent fuel which are then can
be used as fuel for reactors and also for making bombs.8 Despite having the right to
establish a complete nuclear fuel cycle under article IV of the NPT, concerns that it
could lead to a buildup of plutonium stockpiles still exist especially in a region like
the Middle East where the fear of nuclear terrorism and state-led proliferation is much
greater.
Client Description
This study and its findings would be beneficial to research institutions and regional
organizations specializing in security studies regional cooperation and nuclear power.

5 Retrieved from: https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/iaea_safeguards_glossary.pdf
6
Retrieved from: http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Nuclear-Fuel-
Cycle/Introduction/Nuclear-Fuel-Cycle-Overview/
7 Retrieved from: https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/iaea_safeguards_glossary.pdf
8 Retrieved from: http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/fuel-
recycling/processing-of-used-nuclear-fuel.aspx
12
Regional organizations like the League of Arab States and Arab Atomic Agency as
well as international organizations like the IAEA would benefit as clients of this study
because of the relevance concerning cooperation and development of the nuclear
power in the region.
In this regard, the Arab Institute for Security Studies is one of the most
important and active non-governmental organizations that would find the results of
this study relevant to its mission and add its analysis to their work and research. The
Arab Institute of Security Studies was established in 1995 and located in Amman,
Jordan and carries its activities with local, regional and international agencies. The
Arab Institute for Security Studies (ACSIS) believes that security not only limited to a
military term but also includes environment, water, food, disarmament and refugees.
Therefore, the institute holds an annual inter-regional conference to set an exposure to
the international arena and get updated and reliable views from wide spectrum of
disciplines. The disarmament and arms control are two of the most vital issues that
ACSIS is mainly concerned with. The institute calls for the non-proliferation of
weapons of mass destructions and the establishment of a Weapon of Mass Destruction
Free Zone in the Middle East.
Establishing a nuclear fuel cycle governance regime can be a way of

promoting nuclear energy projects, strengthening non-proliferation regimes and
establishing a Weapon of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East. The
conclusion could add to their continuous activities in the field in order to be delivered
to the region’s decision makers, civil societies and authorities. The recommendations
of this study would help in stimulating more research and work and reactivate the role
of the region’s institutions concerned with nuclear energy development and
cooperation.
Statement of the Problem

The Middle East has a growing demand for energy for economic growth to match the
needs of its growing population, but fossil fuels and other sources are non-renewable
13
and polluted. Nuclear energy is one solution, however it has legal, financial, technical
and mostly political difficulties, which are likely to limit the development of such
needs unilaterally. Those political complications are related to regional conflict,
regional rivalries and political instability in different states. Additionally, the fear of a
Middle Eastern country to posses a ‘latent capacity’ for nuclear weapons development
casts a serious challenge to non-proliferation efforts. Article IV of the NPT allows the
use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes but it is still challenging. Nuclear energy
as one solution to the energy problem would have to be done in a way that deals with
the political side. A regional model would deal with all of these issues and likely to
lay the possible foundation for a regional security community.
The issue also stems from the fact neighboring countries like Iran has nuclear
enrichment capabilities as well as Israel, which has nuclear capabilities for nuclear
weapon programs. These facts possess threat to the peaceful stability of the region
and create more distrust and tension among other regional states and may encourage
states to acquire nuclear weapons. In fact, by 2020 some countries in the Middle East
are going to start national programs for the construction of nuclear power stations.
However, due to each state’s inability to acquire a unilateral nuclear fuel cycle with
facilities for uranium enrichment or spent nuclear fuel reprocessing to guarantee the
supply of nuclear fuel needed to generate electricity, a cooperative solution is highly
needed now before the international legal dynamics of non-proliferation norms
change. This is likely due to the fact that the Middle East states would face difficulties
securing nuclear fuel cycle sensitive technology from foreign exporters since the US
specifically has been successful in requiring its trade partners to commit to giving up
their rights of enrichment and reprocessing technology, which is now called the “gold
standard” model used in the US nuclear agreement with the UAE.
One solution to the problem is the establishment of regional governance of

the nuclear fuel cycle such as the one existing in Europe for example, however, this
solution is not simple and easy as it may seems. The Middle East region is not only
politically unstable, it is compromising of ethnic and sectarian divisions in large parts
of the states that may present both an obstacle and a window of opportunity to unite
these divisions under one regional ambitious project. Additionally, given the recent
negotiations between Iran and the P5+1, one can imagine a regional governance of
14
nuclear fuel cycle between the Arab States and Iran is applicable. However, the
situation of Israel as a non-NPT member and its covert nuclear activities create a
challenge in reaching a regional cooperation between the Arab States, Iran and Israel.
In all cases, there is no active discussion of this possibility, or efforts to consider the
possibilities or the potential of having a multinational nuclear fuel cycle in the Middle
East. This study seeks to address this gap in the policy and academic discourse.
Towards this end, the main research questions to be addressed in this proposed
study are:
Research Main Questions:
• Does every country in the Middle East region needs to independently

develop its own nuclear fuel cycle?
• How effective, proliferation resistant and feasible is the regional
governance of the nuclear fuel cycle in the Middle East region?
Research Specific Questions:
• What are the potential models or configurations of introducing a

regional governance of nuclear fuel cycle in the Middle East?
• What are the challenges facing the regional governance of the fuel
cycle in each of the potential models?
• How can these challenges be overcome in order to reach a regional
governance regime?
• What are the benefits of each of the potential models on the
participating states?
Literature Review
The nuclear fuel cycle is the process by which natural uranium is used and processed
to generate fuel in a nuclear reactor and eventually disposed of as nuclear waste. The
15
cycle contains stages from the simple mining stage, conversion, enrichment, fuel
fabrication, reactor, and storage through reprocessing. The importance of the nuclear
fuel cycle and the reason why it has great concerns to posses by each county is the
fact the enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing are the two stages that present the
greatest proliferation risks.9 Due to the capability to utilize parts of a civilian fuel
cycle for military purposes, a country that is involved in uranium enrichment or spent
fuel reprocessing as part of its civilian nuclear energy program also posses a ‘latent
capacity’ for nuclear weapons development, which casts a serious challenge to non-
proliferation efforts.10 Since fuel cycle technology, especially uranium enrichment, is
of dual-use nature, and may thus be diverted to nuclear weapons production; it is of
great significance that there is sufficient transparency in all fuel cycle activities.11
This can be achieved especially in a politically unstable region like the Middle East,
through a multilateral cooperation in the management and installment of the nuclear
fuel cycle.
Multilateral nuclear approaches (MNAs) correspond to “a concept of

international and/or multilateral control of nuclear material and/or nuclear fuel cycle
facilities. It is a strategy for contributing to and promoting the sustainability of
peaceful use of nuclear energy while enhancing nuclear non-proliferation, by ensuring
nuclear fuel cycle services, and risk control and reducing risk regarding nuclear
safety”12 Scholars and experts explained that one of basic challenges for guaranteeing
effective and efficient functions of the multilateral nuclear approaches (MNA) to
nuclear fuel cycle facilities is “harmonization between a MNA framework and
existing nuclear cooperation agreements (NCA).”13 However, according to experts
there is no specific description of a multilateral nuclear approaches (MNA)
framework but it is commonly known that “a number of states’ engagements in

9
International Panel on Fissile Materials, "Global Fissile Material Report 2007: Developing
the technical basis for policy initiatives to secure and irreversibly reduce stocks of nuclear
weapons and fissile materials," (2007), 117.
http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/gfmr07.pdf. Accessed 10 June 2008.
10
Jo Dong-Joon and Gartzke Erik, "Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation," The
Journal of Conflict Resolution 51, no. 1 2007), 173.
11
Ibid
12
Tazaki, M.; Kuno, Y. The Contribution of Multilateral Nuclear Approaches (MNAs) to the
Sustainability of Nuclear Energy. Sustainability 2012, 4, 1755–1775.
13
Tazaki, M.; Kuno, Y. Harmonization between a framework of multilateral approaches to
nuclear fuel cycle facilities and bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements. Sustainability 2013,
5, 3802–3818.
16
civilian nuclear activities and facilities, including enrichment and reprocessing (ENR)
facilities, and plutonium (MOX fuel) and spent fuel storage.”14
Regional multilateral cooperation on nuclear fuel cycle issues can help to

improve energy security for the participating states, “relative to a scenario in which
several nations pursue nuclear fuel cycle development on their own.”15 Scholars have
shown that regional multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle could be
effective in reducing the threat of nuclear proliferation while providing access to these
crucial nuclear fuel cycle services especially in volatile regions like the Middle East.
According to Shaker (2010) the advantages of this regionalization of the nuclear fuel
cycle are numerous like economies of scale, better guarantees of effective
international control by the IAEA, strengthened nonproliferation norms and better
bridges between the developed and less-developed countries in nuclear technology.
Thus, cooperation on nuclear fuel cycle activities could take place between all of the
countries of Arab world and the Middle East if Iran would be included in such
cooperation. According to experts, cooperation choices can include relatively
moderate types of activities such as straight scientific, educational, and technical
exchanges and collaborations through the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) or other international agencies, sharing information and data on nuclear “best
practices”.16 Moreover, cooperation options can also be extended to include more
complex practices such as groups for purchasing of raw uranium or of enriched fuel
and enrichment and spent-fuel management facilities.
Multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle management seek to provide

access to crucial nuclear fuel cycle services while mitigating the threat of proliferation
that stems from the unilateral development of this technology. The use of
multinational facilities instead of a multiplicity of national facilities would ensure
effective international control by the IAEA through reducing the number of plants to
be placed under safeguards, hence, increasing the feasibility of continuous inspection

14
Ibid.
15
David, H; Peter, H; Jungmin, K &Tadahiro, K. (2011). Future regional nuclear fuel cycle
cooperation in East Asia: Energy security costs and benefits. Energy Policy, Volume 39,
Issue 11, November 2011, Pages 6867–6881.
16
Ibid.
17
while possibly reducing costs of these inspections.17 The main goal of this multilateral
approach is to establish regional cooperation in the installation and use of nuclear fuel
cycle facilities in different Middle Eastern States that complement each other, rather
than compete with each other.18 In a case of a multinational enrichment or
reprocessing facility, in which ownership, control or operation are shared among a
number of states that can watch each other, all of its participants are under a greater
degree of peer scrutiny making it more difficult and risky to cheat.19 The main
objectives of the use of multinational facilities in the region are to avoid possible
interruption of external foreign fuel supply due to political or economical conflicts, to
avoid the duplication of all components of the fuel cycle which could add additional
costs to the nuclear option, the reduction of risk of spread of sensitive components of
the fuel cycle (as enrichment and reprocessing of spent fuel) and to add more
transparency for the peaceful uses of the fuel cycle installations which would add
more trust to the nuclear programs of different countries in the region.20
Indeed, multinational or regional fuel cycle clusters have several non-

proliferation benefits as states may have more self-assurance that their fuel supply is
assured if they are part owners prohibiting any political interference with supplies.
Additionally, multinational nuclear cooperation may also decrease the state’s desire to
invest in national facilities unilaterally.21 The proliferation concerns that rise from the
development of nuclear fuel cycle activities such as uranium enrichment and
reprocessing of spent fuel in particular prompted former director general of the IAEA,
Mohamed Elbaradei to propose the creation of a multinational or regional nuclear fuel
cycle in his 2003 article in “The Economist”.22 According to his article, there are
three vital areas of importance: how to guarantee the supply of fuel for nuclear-
generated electricity; how to set up one or more international repositories for spent

17
Shaker, M. I. (2010). Nuclear power in the Arab world & the regionalization of the nuclear
fuel cycle: An Egyptian perspective. Daedalus, 139(1), 93-104.
18
Retrieved from
https://www.iaea.org/safeguards/symposium/2014/home/eproceedings/sg2014-
papers/000341.pdf
19
Scheinman, L. (2004). “The Nuclear Fuel Cycle: A Challenge for Nonproliferation”,
Disarmament Diplomacy, no.76, The Acronym Institute.
20
Ibid
21
Internationalization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Goals, Strategies, and Challenges.
Washington, D.C.: National Academies, 2009. Print.
22
Mohamed Elbaradei, “Towards a Safer World,” The Economist, October 2003, retrieved
from http://www.economist.com/node/2137602
18
nuclear fuel; and how to bring about multilateral oversight to sensitive parts of the
front-end of the nuclear fuel cycle.23 As a result, an IAEA expert group released a
report on multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle in 2005, which had great
influence on the decision of the 2007 LAS Council to undertake joint cooperative
activities for the sake of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy development.24 This 2007
decision of the LAS Council had no followers in the Arab region until now and no
Arab government took an advantage of this useful decision.
Pellaud Report:
In 2004, Mohamed Elbaradei formed an expert group after calls for strengthening
non-proliferation norms to face the threats of diffusion of sensitive nuclear
technologies. The expert group’s task was to come up with better solutions to control
the sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle in addition to proposals for possible
multilateral nuclear approaches. The Expert Group composed of representatives of 26
countries and was headed by Bruno Pellaud, the former Head of the IAEA safeguards
(IAEA 2005). In 2005, the Expert Group came up with recommendations and
proposals that were summarized in INFCIRC/640 that gave a motivation to develop
further successive studies and examinations of multilateral nuclear approaches.
Additionally, MNAs were examined based on two fundamental features, assurance of
nuclear supply and activities and assurance of nuclear non-proliferation. The
INFCIRC/640 report proposed types of frameworks for the font-end and back-end of
the nuclear fuel cycle. The three options of the MNA framework are categorized as
follows:
I. Assurances of services not involving ownership of facilities

II. Conversion of existing national facilities to multinational ones
III. Construction of new facilities.25

23
Ibid
24
25 Tazaki, M, and Kuno, Y. (2013). "Harmonization between a Framework of Multilateral
Approaches to Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities and Bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreements."
Sustainability 5.93,802-818.
19
As a result of this report, the objective of strengthening non-proliferation
norms and maintaining fuel supply assurance can be achieved by adopting Type I in a
gradual phase into Type III. The INFCIRC/640 report evaluates the advantages and
disadvantages of each element of nuclear fuel cycle from both the front-end and back-
end such as uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing for each option of the
multilateral nuclear fuel cycle framework (IAEA 2005). These elements are evaluated
based on features that include the values of assurance of supply, nuclear non-
proliferation, siting selection, access to technology, safeguards provisions and
multilateral involvement.
According to these nuclear energy developments and needs, Mohamed

Elbardei in his 2007 introductory statement to the IAEA Board of Governors argued
that:
The increase in global energy demand is driving an expected expansion in the

use of nuclear energy. This means an increase in the demand for fuel cycle
services. It also means an increase in the potential proliferation risks created
by the spread of sensitive nuclear technology, such as that used in uranium
enrichment and nuclear fuel reprocessing. The convergence of these trends
points clearly to the need for the development of a new, multilateral
framework for the nuclear fuel cycle. In my view, such a framework could best
be achieved through establishing mechanisms that would assure the supply of
fuel for nuclear power plants—and over time, by converting enrichment and
reprocessing facilities from national to multilateral operations, and by
limiting future enrichment and reprocessing to multilateral operations.
Controlling nuclear material and the use of nuclear energy is a complex
process.26 And it is clear that an incremental approach, with multiple
assurances in place, is the way to move forward.27
There have been few studies addressing the features of such multilateral
nuclear approach in East Asia and identified the challenges and proposed some of the
possible solutions. However, there are numerous characteristics needed to create
sustainable and feasible regional multilateral nuclear cooperation such as assurance of
supply, structure and organization of an MNA framework, finance, economics,

26
UN Document A/59/565, December 2, 2004. Retrieved from
http://www.amacad.org/content/publications/pubContent.aspx?d=813#A7
27
Mohamed Elbaradei, “Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors”, Vienna, 11June
2007, retrieved from www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2007/ebsp2007n007.html
20
industrial operation, decision-making process, political responsibility, choice of host
states of MNA facilities, liability, transportation and others.
Shaker (2010) addressed basic points that need to be considered when

thinking about the regionalization of the nuclear fuel cycle in the Middle East. These
questions include; gradual buildup of a nuclear fuel cycle, the need for a supply
mechanism, the material to be assured, modalities of assurance’s mechanism,
conditions governing eligibility for benefiting from assurance mechanisms, the role of
the nuclear industry and possible role(s) for the IAEA. In light of the latter point, The
UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, established by former UN
Secretary-General Kofi Annan, produced the 2004 report “A More Secure World: Our
Shared Responsibility” in which they urged that:
Negotiations be engaged without delay and carried forward to an early

conclusion on an arrangement, based on the existing provisions of Article III
and IX of the IAEA Statute, which would enable IAEA to act as a guarantor
for the supply of fissile material to civilian nuclear users. Such an
arrangement would need to put the Agency in a position to meet, through
supplies it authorized, demands for nuclear fuel supply of low enriched
uranium and for reprocessing of spent fuel at market rates and to provide a
guarantee of uninterrupted supply of these services, as long as there was no
breach of safeguards or inspection procedures at the facilities in question.
Shaker (2010) also addressed other points that considered specifically related
to sensitive technologies of the nuclear fuel cycle. These points include uranium
enrichment, reprocessing of nuclear spent fuel, spent fuel disposal and storage.
Regarding the last point, the spent fuel disposal and storage, Shaker mentioned that,
“at present, there is no international mechanism for spent fuel disposal services; all
undertakings are strictly national. The final disposal of spent fuel is thus a candidate
for international approaches. The IAEA is encouraged to continue its effort in that
direction.”28
Some scholars have examined a successful framework in Europe

(EURATOM) as they considered it a model they can draw lessons from. According to
Mallard and Foradori (2014), EURATOM-like organization would be a great step for

28
21
the Middle East and a great model for other regions that must deal with issues of
global legal complexity (e.g., how they can harmonize regional and global orders so
that they can pursue the same goals with different but compatible means).29 Mallard
(2008) and Shaker (2010) proposed that success could be achieved if similar model
would be implemented in the Middle East region avoiding the weaknesses and pitfalls
in the EURATOM Treaty.30 The most important element of the Convention was “to
guarantee nuclear materials supply” by all party states. Additionally, the Convention
had the needed safeguards systems, which can be adopted and developed to match the
Middle East region in which all member states have the trust and ensure that the used
nuclear materials are being used only for peaceful purposes. According to Shaker
there are two important features of EURATOM that need to be examined when it
comes to establishing a regional governance system of the nuclear fuel cycle in the
Middle East: joint enterprises and joint finance. Joint financing of large nuclear
projects through EURATOM loans is guaranteed under Article 172.4 of the
EURATOM Treaty and implemented through the decisions reached by the Council.
Although there are no new loans given to a member state, the first loan was given in
1977 to help financing many enrichment and reprocessing projects within the region’s
countries. All loans are now fully repaid but one can argue that this Treaty has helped
the development of the nuclear fuel cycle industry at the beginning of its conclusion
(Jorant 2013). Joint Enterprise according to Shaker, was innovatively created
originally to facilitate the establishment of a European multinational cooperation of
the nuclear fuel cycle. Even though there is a pitfall in the concept in which large
multinational enrichment industries like the EURODIF in France and URENCO in
Almelo have by-passed the joint enterprise and have been used mainly for political
reasons, changes could be made in the new proposed multilateral cooperation in the
Middle East to avoid this drawback.31
Over the past five years, at least thirteen countries in the region ranging from
Morocco and Egypt to Qatar and Saudi Arabia, have declared new or renewed plans

29
Mallard, G., & Foradori, P. (2014). The Middle East at a Crossroads: How to Face the
Perils of Nuclear Development in a Volatile Region. Global Governance, 20(4), 499-515.
30
31 Shaker, M. I. (2014). Regionalizing Nuclear Energy in the Middle East: Making Progress
on the Nuclear- and WMD-free Zone. Global Governance.
22
to start the use of nuclear energy. Under Article IV of the Treaty of the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the spread of nuclear power for peaceful
purposes should not be a reason for specific concern. Indeed demanding that NPT
parties have the right to pursue programs for the peaceful use of nuclear energy is
correct, as mentioned in Article IV of the NPT, “All the Parties to the Treaty
undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible
exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also
co-operate in contributing alone or together with other States or international
organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to
the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the
world.”32 However, in the complicated and unstable Middle East context, a likely
nuclear revival represents a potential non-proliferation concern for the region’s states.
According to Mallard and Faradori, “the prospects of a nuclear renaissance in this
region underline the urgency of holding renewed discussions on a nuclear governance
framework that can help buttress confidence and stability in the region.”33 In the same
vein, Tazaki and Kuno point to the political instability of the region, as well as
political conflicts between the member states and other states that were seen as
challenges hindering the creation of MNAs. They argued that there are no simple
measures to overcome such challenges, but further case-by-case measures, including
“the direct involvement of international organizations, supplier states and nuclear
weapon states, in MNAs, as well as the application of regional safeguards and
regional systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material (RSAC) within
MNAs, may contribute toward mitigating the political challenges.”34
Few scholars have adopted the idea of creating a regional authority over the
nuclear fuel cycle management in the Middle East as a solution to Iran continuous
nuclear unresolved conflict in the region. Since the beginning of the negotiations until

32
Retrieved from: http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2005/npttreaty.html
33
34
Tazaki, M.; Kuno, Y. (2014). Feasibility Analysis of Establishing Multilateral Nuclear
Approaches (MNAs) in the Asian Region and the Middle East. Sustainability, 6(12), 9398-
9417.
23
now, Iran has only attached to a single red line, which has been reflected in its
persistence on having full nuclear fuel cycle in the country. Having the nuclear fuel
cycle means that the country would have all stages of nuclear fuel production from
extraction of uranium ore all the way to the production of the “yellow cake” followed
by production of UF6 after which the UF6 would be fed into fuel rods that will be
subsequently used as fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor or Bushehr nuclear power
plant.35 The full nuclear fuel cycle means that uranium enrichment is a crucial part of
Iran's nuclear activities today and will remain so in the future. According to Seyed
Mousavian, “with fourteen countries now operating or building enrichment plants,
boosting interest in nuclear energy among Middle East countries, a successful
resolution of the Iranian nuclear crisis could provide a model for dealing with other
countries with breakout capability and contribute positively to non-proliferation.”36
Nuclear energy will likely to play a substantial role in the economies of the
countries of the Middle East region for years to come. Building- up and strengthening
the non-proliferation nuclear trust in the Middle East region will promote a wider use
of nuclear energy for peaceful applications. However, the extent of that role, and how
the various cost, safety, environmental, and proliferation-risk issues surrounding
nuclear energy are not at all certain. Regional multilateral cooperation on nuclear fuel
cycle issues can help to overcome energy security challenges for the participating
states. To establish strong, sustainable, and feasible institutions of nuclear governance
in the Middle East region, and to overcome possible conflicts between national,
regional, and global levels, each participating country should adapt the experience of
EURATOM as well as develop that model to the cultural, economic and political
patterns of institution building in the Middle East.37 Furthermore, scholars have
argued that the EURATOM Treaty provides appealing technical provisions,
particularly regarding safeguards against the diversion of fissile materials by state and

35
Retrieved from https://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/2015_03/Features/Securing-Irreversible-
IAEA-Safeguards-to-Close-the-Next-NPT-Loophole
36
Mousavian, S. (2014). After the Iran Nuclear Deal, The Cairo Review of Global Affairs.
Retrieved from
http://www.aucegypt.edu/Gapp/CairoReview/Pages/articleDetails.aspx?aid=619
37
24
non-state actors, confidence-building measures and fuel supply assurances for state
actors. 38
Mallard (2008) argues that by pointing out the pitfalls, other regional attempts
can develop a stronger legal framework. In this regard, one pitfall of the EURATOM
Treaty is the “joint enterprise” concept under Chapter 5, which allowed large
multinational enrichment industries like EURODIF chose to ignore it, as the treaty
did not make it mandatory for states to use the EURATOM Community framework
for nuclear R&D cooperation.”39 Mallard also points out the differences between the
political context of the early Cold War, in which the EURATOM was shaped, and the
one now, after the Arab spring. This means that for the Middle East region, the goals
of cooperation and means will require a different path. However, multinational
provisions included in the EURATOM treaty would result in stronger non-
proliferation effects than that existed in the loose international cooperation norms.40
The legal sovereignty as mentioned by Mallard of EURATOM, “allowed EURATOM
and the IAEA to harmonize their systems of controls, rather than subordinate one
system of control to the other.”41 In other words, EURATOM allows its states to
negotiate among each other before entering into any agreements with international
organizations. Thus, one can conclude that if Israel wishes to join this regional
cooperation, it will need to become a full party to the NPT, and submit its nuclear
programs to IAEA supervision. In this way reaching an agreement on the
establishment of a legal authority like the EURATOM in the Middle East would be a
tangible step towards the establishment of a WMD free zone in the region.
Middle East states might advance confidence building and trust in the nuclear
energy industry by sharing nuclear technology for peaceful purposes under the NPT.
The IAEA and UNESCO have adopted similar inter-governmental technological and
research project in 2002, the Synchrotron-light for Experimental Science and

38
Mallard, Grégoire. "Can The EURATOM Treaty Inspire The Middle East?" The
Nonproliferation Review 15.3 (2008): 459-77.
39
Shaker, M. I. (2014). Regionalizing Nuclear Energy in the Middle East: Making Progress
on the Nuclear- and WMD-free Zone. Global Governance.
40
Ibid
41
Perils of Nuclear Development in a Volatile Region. Global Governance, 20(4), 511.
25
Applications in the Middle East (SESAME).42 This UNESCO sponsored project was
initiated by a gift from Germany and building works started in 2003. SESAME is
located in Jordan and bringing scientists and researchers form countries like Israel,
Iran, Jordan, Turkey, Egypt, Cyprus and Palestine altogether in such an inspiring
model of scientific and technological cooperation. The organization conducts many
activities including molecular environmental science, micro-electromechanical
devices, x-ray imaging, materials characterization, and clinical medical applications.43
SESAME has a council governing the center. The council includes members from
Bahrain, Cyprus, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Pakistan, Palestine and Turkey. In
addition to the members, the council has observers like France, Germany, Greece,
Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Portugal, Russia, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and USA. Four
different committees advise the council: the beamlines advisory committee, scientific
advisory committee, technical advisory committee and training advisory committee.44
The aim of this project is building scientific and cultural links between neighboring
countries, promoting mutual understanding and trust through international
cooperation and advancing a regional scientific community.45
While the existing literature has addressed the regionalization of the nuclear
fuel cycle, along with its preconditions, features, challenges and benefits from a
comprehensive point of view, it has not taken a specific regional perspective. This is
an important oversight; as there remain serious questions about managing sensitive
materials and technology in terms of assurance of supply, trust issues, nuclear
security, non-proliferation norms, policies of leading supplier states and the
management of back-end as well as front-end fuel cycle in the Middle East. Thus, this
project will make a modest attempt to fill that gap by presenting a model of
cooperation in the Middle East that can be presented to the regional and international
community.

42 Retrieved from: http://www.sciencediplomacy.org/perspective/2012/synchrotron-light-and-
middle-east
43 Retrieved from: http://www.unesco.org/new/en/natural-sciences/science-technology/basic-
sciences/international-basic-sciences-programme/sesame/
44
Retrieved from: http://mag.digitalpc.co.uk/fvx/iop/esrf/sesamebrochure/
45 Retrieved from: http://www.unesco.org/new/en/natural-sciences/science-technology/basic-
sciences/international-basic-sciences-programme/sesame/
26
Methodology
This study comprises an analysis of primary data sources collected from interviews
with a number of governmental and international and national organizations officials,
as well as an assessment of secondary sources related to the question of the
multilateral management of the nuclear fuel cycle. These sources extend beyond the
available academic and scholarly works on multilateral nuclear cooperation, arms
control and strategic security management to include independent reviews, guidelines
and interviews at both national and international levels.
In addition, the study examines relevant international treaties, conventions and

agreements at both regional and international levels. This section highlights relevant
terminology, definitions, and outline prospective sources, reports, documents, and
resources.
Most importantly, this study uses primary data collection and data analysis of
semi-structured in-depth interviews with governments, academics and officials of
both international and national organizations who work in the nuclear energy, global
governance, international security and international cooperation fields. The in-depth
interviews are based on open-ended questions to smooth the process and get the
interviewees more engaged in the discussion by reassuring them to express their true
opinions, information and concerns based on their own experience. This is especially
important for the analysis of this study that aims at reviving the multilateral
approaches to nuclear fuel cycle initiatives as well as assessing the feasibility of such
cooperation in the Middle East region. Open-ended questions also help the study with
setting useful recommendations as such questions allow the respondents to explore
issues that can be overlooked by the researcher or not mentioned in the set questions.
Moreover, using open-ended questions go further to include findings that will
stimulate further research in the topic. Open-ended interview questions have the
advantage of offering a wide range of answers that help to capture the essence of
interviewees’ responses rather than influencing the responses by adhering to one set
of predetermined questions.
27
The interviews conducted with a wide range of officials and researchers who
have contributed to the idea of the multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle.
The primary goal is the depth of the information of these interviews. The selection of
the interviewees is based on their contribution to the multilateral nuclear energy
cooperation and security. The purposive interviewed sample cover governmental
officials from Egypt and other Middle East countries, international and regional
nuclear agencies like the IAEA and AAEA, EURATOM officials as well as
academics that contributed to the field. This sample is selected to cover all functions
and stages relevant to the regionalization of the nuclear fuel cycle.
The process of data collection and data analysis through the semi-structured
interviews is lead by a set of questions, which then aims at deepening the discussion.
This set of interview questions used according to the context of the main
responsibilities and contributions of the interviewees to the regionalization of the
nuclear fuel cycle. There are two or more types of sets of question, mainly one
concerning the international aspect of the topic and another concerning the national
and the regional aspect. Questions directed to the officials from Europe are designed
to assess the European legal framework and regulations of the European model to
gain a better understanding of both the obstacles and the benefits of that particular
model. Their views on the possibility to have a similar model in the Middle East are
also discussed in an open discussion. On the other hand, questions directed to the
officials working in regional organizations and non-governmental organizations are
designed to better understand the actual legal regulations and relationships with other
regional states in order to assess the a regional view and capacity of having a regional
cooperation in the management of the nuclear fuel cycle. Questions about the Current
Status of existing facilities and experience of Nuclear Fuel Cycle in the Middle East
region are addressed in the interviews as well. Their views on the political will and
the usual obstacles are also discussed in an open discussion. At the other end,
questions directed to experts working in international organizations are designed to
evaluate the international treaties’ role in organizing and controlling as well as
offering assistance to the Middle Eastern states to reach the desired goal.
28
Furthermore, the study uses secondary data from scholarly journals, academic
books, articles, published reports, previous proposals and agreed guidelines. It also
examines and relies on international and regional agreements, conventions and
treaties in analyzing the data. The study begins by examining the nuclear energy
process in the Middle Eastern countries individually. Then it looks into the
infrastructure, economic, technological, political, environmental and social dynamics
in the region. The study goes over the role of the Arab Atomic Energy Agency as a
regional organization concerned with peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including
development and technological applications. This is examined through assessing the
regulations and the agreements holding countries together and organizing nuclear
activities. In addition to the literature, open-ended interviews are conducted with
experts and officials of the Arab Atomic Energy Agency to assess the potential
capacity of having a regional cooperation in the installation of the nuclear fuel cycle
facilitates.
Additionally, the study analyzes the European model (EURATOM) in many

aspects; what kind of agreements do they have, what kind of bilateral agreements do
they have, what kind of multilateral agreements do they share, what kind of
agreements they have with international actors like the IAEA, their relationships with
leading supplier countries like the USA, their relationships with each other politically,
economically, technologically and environmentally, what kind of trust issues they
have and what is the public opinions do they get. Then the study uses the information
gathered about the European model and other regional models like ABACC and
interview questions and interpret them to better understand the mechanism of the
model and how they have reached to establish it. This data is compared to the Middle
Eastern model data collected in accordance to a set of determined requirements.
These requirements are identified from the well-known INFCIRC/640 report (Pellaud
Report) and based on the specific situation and context of the region I selected certain
elements necessary for the establishment of a multilateral nuclear cooperation in the
Middle East.
The last step in the methodological approach of the study will present three
models that can be considered by governments and officials of the nuclear
organizations at both international and regional levels. The examination of each
29
model is based on INFCIRC/640 report and the requirements for each model are
selected in accordance to the specific context of the Middle East region and for the
sake of this project the requirements examined are assurance of supply, nuclear non-
proliferation and nuclear safety.
First, a small note on the terminology mentioned in this study. The

International Expert Group noted in their report that there is a distinction between
multilateral, multinational, regional and international.46 However, in this study the
terms will be used interchangeably as they all refer to any approach that refers to the
management of the nuclear fuel cycle that goes beyond the national authority.
Research Limitations
There are some limitations to this study due to the sensitivity of the topic of research
in the region at this time; interviewees may be reluctant to give accurate perception.
The interviews intended to conduct will go through sensitive and confidential
information that the interviewees may fear of being published. They may be also
reluctant to express their own judgments, opinions or feelings towards the topic itself
or towards their contributions to the topic discussed. This particular limitation is what
the researcher considers as a threat to trustworthiness. This threat may influence the
researcher judgments and analysis of the information getting from the respondents.
Informed consent may mitigate some of these concerns, but not all. Additionally,
there might be a resistance to provide official documents from governments and
national energy organizations because of the sensitivity and security reasons.
While acknowledging such limitations, there is still sufficient information and

credible sources to complete a thorough feasibility study and present an effective
comprehension of the management and implementation of the nuclear fuel cycle in
the Middle East.

46
IAEA, Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle, Expert Group Report submitted
to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, document INFCIRC/640,
22 February 2005, pp.19–20.
30
Nuclear Progress in the Middle East
Over the past few years, about thirteen countries in the region showed interest in
pursuing nuclear energy projects. From Morocco, Algeria and Egypt to Saudi Arabia
and UAE announced new or renewed plans to establish nuclear power plants.
Legitimate reasons push the region’s countries to seek alternatives power options. The
demand for electricity is rising; shortage of oil and gas along with the need to reduce
carbon emission, nuclear option seems ideal. The Middle East context is unique in its
political, geographical, economical and technological characteristics. It has
similarities and differences at the same time and with having Iran and Israel who are
much advanced in their nuclear capabilities, their Arab neighboring countries face a
challenge bringing their ambitious nuclear plans to Iran and Israel level. Additionally,
to overcome the fears coming from the nuclear development in this region, the
establishment of WMD free zone is the ideal solution to all the security concerns of
all parties.47
Jordan
According to Jordan’s Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC) programme report, the

nuclear law was modified in 2007 resulting into two independent commissions,
Jordan Atomic Energy Commission and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (JNRC).48
JAEC projects include nuclear power plant project, uranium exploration and HRD
such as education, research reactor and subcritical assembly.49 Due to high growth of
electricity consumption, high dependency on imported fuel, scarcity of unilateral
energy resources, harmful environmental effects and the fact that 40% of government
budget goes to cover energy needs, Jordan is pursing now the nuclear energy option.
In order to overcome these factors, nuclear power seems a viable option for Jordan.
Having nuclear power ensures security of supply and reduces dependency on

47
48 Toukan, K. (2015). Jordan’s Nuclear Energy Programme Report, Jordan Atomic Energy
Commission.
49 Toukan, K. (2015, November). [Personal interview].
31
imported oil and gas if Jordan uses its stocks of uranium. It also produces electricity
at a competitive and steady price while guarantees a steady cash flows to investors.
Moreover, it supports economic growth of the country as more local companies
involve in nuclear project, the more local supply chain it will create as well as the
creation of quality jobs. Nuclear power also increases domestic added value due to the
potential exports of electricity to neighbouring countries and supports development of
high-tech industries.
In March 2014, the Jordan French Uranium Mining Company (JFUMC) for the
first time, a uranium deposit is classified as a “resource” in Jordan as JFUMC claimed
28,400 tons of U3O8. There are three areas of uranium mineralization in Jordan;
Central Jordan where JFUMC announced that 28,500 MT of U3O8 exists there, Al-
Hasa where more than 30,000 MT of U3O8 discovered in Qataraneh Phosphate and
lastly South Jordan where an estimated 100,000 MT of U3O8 are there. There are still
work going on the way to continue uranium exploration effort where additional
resources are expected to be discovered and in areas where are still untouched.
Jordan completely built a 5 MW upgradable to 10 MW research and training

reactor (JRTR) at the Jordan University for Science & Technology in Irbid. The
construction permit was issued in 2013 and it is considered a training center as it
provides for 9+ first principle nuclear experiments for nuclear engineering students. It
will use 19% enriched fuel and is considered an open pool, heavy water reactor and
H2O cooled.
Jordan intends that the first nuclear power plant will consist of a Generation III
or III+ unit with an option for second unit with capacity ranging from 700 to 1,200
MWe per unit.50 The inland nuclear power plant will rely on reclaimed and treated
wastewater as its cooling water, which will be similar to Palo Verde plant in Arizona,
USA. The anticipation need is 20 M m3/1,000 MWe unit per year. In 2014, a project
development agreement (PDA) has been signed between JAEC and RUSATOM
Overseas, the agreement defines the responsibilities and activities required by both
parties in phase one (pre-investment phase) of the project. An inter-governmental

50
Toukan, K. (2015). Jordan’s Nuclear Energy Programme Report, Jordan Atomic Energy
Commission.
32
agreement (IGA) has also been signed in March 2015, the agreement is a government
level agreement that defines a framework in terms of cooperation on the
implementation of the project between both governments. There is still more room for
small reactors to be established in land away from water or offshore nuclear power
plant for example.
Government of Jordan decided in 2013 on several decisions: to adopt nuclear

energy as one of the options for producing electricity, to establish a company that is
fully owned by the government to manage the project, to select Amra site as the
preferred site and carry out site characterization for the construction of the nuclear
power plant, to select ROSATOM Overseas as the preferred bidder and strategic
partner and to designate JAEC to negotiate with the Russian partner the
implementation of the project. Despite the importance and the need for these nuclear
projects, economic deficiency and political pressure as well as the assurance of fuel
supply may prevent or at least interrupt the completion and operation of these nuclear
power plants.
Egypt
Egypt had its nuclear power plans since 1954. However, due to many obstacles did
not come to fruition until November 2015 when the government signed a deal with
Russia to build its first nuclear plant in Dabaa, on the northern coast. Dabaa was also
the preferred site that was selected by the government in 1983. Egypt’s nuclear
energy program started when it acquired its first research reactor ETRR-1 from the
former Soviet Union in 1958 at Inchass in Nile Delta. Several nuclear power plants
were then only proposed and in 1976, the Nuclear Power Plants Authority (NPPA)
was established to oversee any nuclear power projects. The nuclear projects were
suspended after Egypt-Israel war in 1967 the weakened economic situation of the
country. In 1981, Egypt signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty but did not
ratifying IAEA Additional Protocol until now because of Israeli nuclear weapons
33
program. Later on in 1992, Egypt acquired 22MW multi-purpose research reactor
ETRR-2 from Argentina.51
In February 2015, ROSATOM Overseas and NPPA signed an agreement to

build two-unit of pressurized water AES-2006 nuclear power plant with desalination
facility.52 In November, an intergovernmental agreement was signed with Russia to
build and operate four reactors at Dabaa. The agreement includes fuel supply, used
fuel reprocessing, training of scientists and staff and development of monitoring
infrastructure.53 Reports say that another financing agreement was signed so Russia
would loan Egypt to cover 80% of the costs with repayment over 22 years.
United Arab Emirates
The nuclear energy history in the UAE has been recent and dates only few years ago.
In order to meet its growing electricity demand that is growing by 9% per year, the
UAE announced its interest in nuclear power as environmentally assuring and
commercially competitive option. As a result, the UAE established a Nuclear Energy
Program Implementation Organization that launched the Emirates Nuclear Energy
Corporation (ENEC) as an Abu Dhabi public entity responsible of implementing
nuclear power plans within the UAE.54 In 2009, ENEC signed an agreement with
Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) to build four Korean designed Advanced
Power Reactor 1400 MWe (APR)-1400 nuclear reactors at one preferred site
“Barakah”. The nuclear plants will be mostly financed by the state without outside
loans however with some Korean equity partners. The UAE’s plan is to have the four

51
Retrieved from: http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Others/Emerging-
Nuclear-Energy-Countries/
52Retrieved from:
http://www.rosatom.ru/en/presscentre/highlights/c5ad7a804aa37da1b1fcbf8d686b7041
53
Retrieved from: http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Others/Emerging-
Nuclear-Energy-Countries/
54
Retrieved from: http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-T-
Z/United-Arab-Emirates/
34
nuclear plants ready for running, producing electricity and exporting to Gulf
neighbours via regional power grid by 2020.55
In 2012, ENEC signed six different contracts for each stage of the front-end
fuel cycle; the supply of natural uranium, conversion and enrichment services and
some enriched uranium product. Regarding the waste management, UAE adopted a
“dual-track” strategy meaning developing a national storage and disposal system as
well as leaving the window open for a regional cooperation as an option.56
Saudi Arabia
In 2010, a royal decree stated, “the development of atomic energy is essential to meet
the Kingdom's growing requirements for energy to generate electricity, produce
desalinated water and reduce reliance on depleting hydrocarbon resources."57 Saudi
Arabia developed its own nuclear energy plans few years ago because it realized its
high growth in domestic energy consumption and dependency on oil and gas like its
neighbouring country the UAE. In the same year, the King Abdallah Center for
Atomic and Renewable Energy (KA-care) was founded to oversee the state’s nuclear
power projects and represent Saudi Arabia at the IAEA. With the help of international
companies overseas, three sites were chosen for nuclear power plants to be built;
Jubail on the Gulf; and Tabuk and Jizan on the Red Sea.58 In 2011, the KA-care
announced its plan to build 16 nuclear power reactors over the next 20 years. In the
same year Saudi Arabia signed some cooperation agreements with Argentina and
South Korea in nuclear R&D, nuclear safety, waste disposal, training and construction
nuclear power plants and research reactor. In 2015, it signed with France to make a
feasibility study for building two EPR nuclear power reactors and ROSATOM
Overseas for construction of nuclear power plants, fuel cycle services, production of
radioisotopes, used fuel and waste management in addition to training and education.

55
Ibid
56
Ibid
57
Retrieved from: http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-O-S/Saudi-
Arabia/
58
Ibid
35
It is worth to note that Saudi Arabia signed the IAEA safeguards agreement but never
signed the additional protocol.59 All these bilateral agreements with other actors does
not guarantee the sustainability of the nuclear energy projects in the country nor does
it guarantee the assurance of supply and political stability. What does this entail? It
entails as discussed in later sections that without being a member in a regional
cooperation specialized in the management of nuclear fuel cycle or at least being a
partner to already existing enrichment facilities to guarantee the flow of fuel cycle
materials, these facilities will not be able to remain sustainably operative.
Iran
Iran’s interest in nuclear energy is dated back in the history Since the 1950s and has
been still expanding until the date. The program was first started with the help of the
USA as part of the Atoms for Peace program. The country had signed the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapon state in
1968 and ratified it in 1970. Bushehr, was the first nuclear plant established in Iran
after the Shah had “unveiled ambitious plans to install 23,000MWe of nuclear power
in Iran by the end of the century.”60 During the 1970s, the political instability, due to
the Iranian Revolution and the Iran-Iraq war as well as the cutting-off of the
international cooperation, has limited the nuclear plan’s progress. However, during
the 1990s Iran began to regain its expansion and started its unilateral nuclear fuel
cycle through the development of uranium mining, conversion and enrichment
experiments. Russia and Iran signed a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement in 1992
in which Russia agreed to complete the construction of Bushehr power plant, however
soon later Russia backed up its nuclear cooperation due to the American political
pressure. In 2002, Iran declared some of its unannounced nuclear facilities such as
Natanz Enrichment Complex and a 40MW heavy water research reactor at Arak
under construction. In 2003, the IAEA carried out several inspections and in
November that year announced the contradiction between Iran’s new declaration and

59
Ibid
60
Joseph Cirincione, Jon Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar, "Iran," in Deadly Arsenals:
Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats (Washington, DC, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 2005), p. 298.
36
the agency’s previous information and requested from the Director General to take the
necessary steps to confirm Iran’s previous and present nuclear activities. In order to
avoid going to the UN Security Council, Iran decided to cooperate with IAEA and
voluntary suspended its enrichment and conversion activities and also voluntary
signed NPT Additional Protocol after its negotiations with the EU-3.
In 2005 after the June election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as Iran's President,

Iran declared its uranium conversion activities resumption at Esfahan to the IAEA,
resulting in a resolution that found Iran in non-compliance with its safeguards
agreement.61 Iran’s decisions in the following years were against the IAEA norms and
P5+1 negotiations; Iran inaugurated a heavy water production plant at Arak,
continued to operate its enrichment facility and to install 18 cascades at the FEP's
3000-machine hall.62
On 15 July 2015, Iran and P5+1 signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action. The plan is about taking several measures to limit Iran’s enrichment
capabilities. The agreement conditions state that Tehran agreed not to enrich uranium
over 3,67% for 15 years including safeguarded R&D exclusively in the Natanz
Enrichment facility while at Fardow enrichment facility Tehran will give up its
uranium and R&D enrichment activities for 15 years and will keep its centrifuges
only for the production of isotopes for medical and peaceful industrial purposes.63
The agreement allows IAEA for inspection of the entire fuel cycle from uranium
mining through waste disposal for about 25 years at some facilities. Iran has also
agreed to stop producing weapons grade plutonium at Arak facility and all spent fuel
from Arak will be shipped out of Iran for the reactor’s lifetime.64 In addition, Iran
agreed not to build any additional heavy water reactors or accumulation of heavy
water for 15 years. Moreover, Iran agreed to ratify the additional protocol of the NPT
and its safeguards agreement. Iran will have a procurement channel monitored by a

61
Retrieved from: http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/iran/nuclear/
62
Ibid
63
Retrieved from:
http://sputniknews.com/politics/20150714/1024587268.html#ixzz3vRmqY6uL
64
Ibid
37
joint commission that will allow Iran to get the materials needed to operate its nuclear
facilities under the guidelines established by international nuclear supply regimes.65
Israel
Israel possesses advanced covert nuclear weapons programme and significant arsenal
of short- and medium-range ballistic but no one can determine the status of Israel's
chemical or biological weapons programs.66 Israel owns a 5 MWt research reactor at
Nahal Soreq near Tel Aviv since 1960 with USA supply as well as 70 MWt French-
built heavy water reactors at Dimona in the Negev, which is operated mainly for a
military purposes as well. It is important to note that Israel is not an NPT member
until now which makes it difficult for its neighboring countries to accept and is
considered an obstacle towards creating a WMD free zone in the Middle East. Israel
also is not a party to any of the major treaties like Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention (BTWC) and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). It has on the
other hand, signed, but not ratified, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
(CTBT) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).67 Israel has been reluctant to
negotiate establishing WMD Free Zone in the Middle East despite the international
and regional efforts towards that. It has asserted a pre-condition of a comprehensive
peace in the region in order to fully engaged in the negotiations of the WMD Free
Zone.
Due to the covert nuclear activities of Israel, no one can determine the nature
of its civil nuclear power programs. However, reports state that Israel Electric
Corporation (IEC) selected a site in the southern Negev at Shivta in 1980s for a
nuclear power plant and France would have provided it with the needed equipment. In
2007, the National Infrastructures Ministry and Atomic Energy Commission
discussed the issue again but with Jordan in mind for collaboration in which the latter
was not welcoming. Ultimately, after the Fukushima incident in 2011 Prime Minister

65
"Full Text of the Iran Nuclear Deal." Washington Post. Retrieved from:
http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/documents/world/full-text-of-the-iran-nuclear-deal/1651/
66 Retrieved from: http://www.nti.org/learn/countries/israel/
67 Ibid
38
Benjamin Netanyahu said, “I don't think we're going to pursue civil nuclear energy in
the coming years.”68
Conceptual Framework
Energy demands are increasing due to economic expansion, population growth,
industrialization and urbanization but sources of energy like wind, coal, solar, oil and
fossil fuels are unsustainable, unreliable and costly. Nuclear energy option is one
solution and just one of the states’ resource-conserving schemes but has financial,
technical and mainly political problems. Those political problems are related to
regional conflict, regional competitions and political instability in different states.
Nuclear energy has political and technical folds. Political and nuclear are interrelated
in a way that cannot be separated when we talk about reaching a nuclear cooperation
agreement. Nuclear energy is one solution to the energy problem but would have to
be done in a way that deals with the political side. A regional model would deal with
all of these issues and lay the possible foundation for a regional security community.
With the increased global tendency towards more regional economic

cooperation, consortium security measures that go beyond national boundaries, a
possible solution to these problems in the Middle East is the formation of a regional
nuclear governance of the nuclear fuel cycle. The NPT allows regional nuclear
cooperation for peaceful purposes but it is challenging yet given the case of Iran for
example. In this regard, the study proposes three models or configurations of
introducing regional nuclear governance regime as concrete policy proposals that can
be presented to policy-makers of international, regional, national and non-
governmental organizations as well as officials and researchers. Each model has its
challenges as well as its benefits on the participating countries. The study argues that
each of the proposed models of the regional governance of the nuclear fuel cycle has
its own positive spillover effects despite all the barriers that could be in the way.

68
Israel Prime Minister Netanyahu: Japan situation has "caused me to reconsider" nuclear
power Piers Morgan on CNN, published 2011-03-17, accessed 2015-12-05.
39
Before discussing the three proposed models of this study and illustrating their
preconditions, requirements, challenges and benefits, it makes sense to look at two
popular examples of regional nuclear cooperation EURAROM and ABACC and look
deeply into their successful safeguards system. I will explore IAEA safeguards
agreements with regional safeguards such as European Atomic Energy Community
(EURATOM) and bilateral safeguard systems between Argentina and Brazil as in
ABACC. Then I will highlight two international enrichment centers that worked as an
incentive for countries not to develop unilateral enrichment facilities, EURODIF and
URENCO. Finally, I will briefly discuss East Asia’s attempts in reaching a regional
nuclear cooperation because of its unstable relationships and trust issues between the
region’s countries that in some way are similar to the political dynamics among of the
Middle East region.
Past and Present Approaches:
“EURATOM sought to build confidence between the members not only

through its own verification system but also by providing a framework for practical
cooperation between the parties (Gregoire Mallard, 2010).”
Even though EURATOM framework should not be exactly replicated today,

yet, it is wise to use it as a model and use some of its tools to create a new regional
regulatory framework in other regions like the Middle East. One of the most
important benefits of creating a regional governance of the nuclear cycle in the
Middle East is building trust and confidence between the members which is a must
now to face the division that has been originated from the strained relationship and
the mistrust between the region’s states for years. According to Mallard, EURATOM
treaty could represent an example for states pursing regional nuclear governance,
which would supervise the establishment and the development of nuclear energy
industry in the Middle East (Mallard, 2008). After World War II, EURATOM
pursued building confidence between the member states through an agreed
verification system, schemes for joint development of research and construction or
operation of nuclear power plants, and assurance of nuclear supply as well as
safeguards system. There are two layers working towards implementation of
EURATOM Safeguards, the European Commission and operators. The European
40
Commission inspectors perform measurements to ensure that declarations concern the
correct type and quantities of nuclear materials, video surveillance systems, apply
seals to suspend nuclear materials that will not be used immediately and perform
annual verifications of inventories (European Commission, 2014).
The Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear

Materials (ABACC) was established under the agreement between Argentina and
Brazil in 1991. ABACC comprises of a four-member Commission assigned equally
by the two countries and a Secretariat with headquarters in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
(NTI, 2015). It is in charge of “administration and application of the Common System
of Accounting and Control (SCCC), which is a full-scope safeguards system applied
to all nuclear activities covering all nuclear materials in both countries (NTI, 2015).”
As a first bilateral agency dealing with safeguards ABACC has established the
Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC) to confirm
that nuclear materials used in all nuclear activities in both countries are used
exclusively for peaceful purposes in which Argentinean officers are participating in
IAEA inspections in Brazil and vice versa. ABACC signed an agreement
(INFCIRC/435) with the IAEA to submit all its nuclear activities under the IAEA
safeguards and if one of the two countries was found in non-compliance, the IAEA
could refer this case to the UN Security council. In 2011, Nuclear Supplier Group
(NSG) recognized the Quadripartite Agreement as an alternative to the Additional
Protocol (NTI, 2015). When compared to IAEA and EURATOM safeguards system,
ABACC is considered more official than technical in the way the office and
organization work.
URENCO is a joint British-Dutch-German uranium enrichment centrifuge

consortium located within its borders in area called Almelo and operate its facilities in
mining, conversion, enrichment and fabrication. URENCO has four operational
enrichment plants in the UK (URENCO UK), Germany (URENCO Deutschland), the
Netherlands (URENCO Nederland) and the US (URENCO USA). They established a
joint committee comprising representatives of the governments of the signatory states
where they discuss all issues concerning the safeguards system (as established by
IAEA and EURATOM), security procedures, exports of the technology and Enriched
Uranium Product (EUP) and other related non-proliferation issues (URENCO, 2016).
41
This approach represents one of the types in multilateral nuclear approaches in which
all partners operate the facility and share knowledge of the enrichment technology.
URENCO partners also participate in research and development, manufacture and
other enrichment industry management (Müller, 2016). However, like in the case of
URENCO, if new enrichment plants were to be established in other states like France
and USA that are already scheduled for construction using URENCO centrifuges,
these centrifuges would be “black box” and the United States and France would have
no access to technology as well. This would be an ideal approach for the ARAB states
cooperation when it opens the door for other countries to join the committee that
would be established but at the same time new plants that would be established in
later stages would be also “black box” sustaining non-proliferation norms while
developing more nuclear energy producing plants.
On the other hand, EURODIF represents another approach in which the

enrichment facility located in France is operated by the country itself while its
partners Belgium, Spain, and Sweden share in the decision-making but do not operate
the facility with France and also have no access to the enrichment technology. This
approach can be reflected in the second (Arab states and Iran) and third model (Arab
states, Iran and Israel) proposed in this study in which all participate in the decision
making and obtain enrichment services from Iran’s facilities as well as Israel if the
latter agreed on the prerequisites of the proposed multilateral nuclear cooperation in
the Middle East. They would be all partners but do not operate the existing
enrichment facilities (without giving their right in enrichment later on) in which the
centrifuges will be in “black boxes” so that other member states will have no access
to the centrifuge technology.
The East Asian experience is different in many aspects mostly because of the
unstable political relationship and mistrust among its countries, which somehow
similar to the Middle Eastern situation, the focus of this study. In the East Asia region
there are four states with existing nuclear energy programs, China, Japan, South
Korea, and Taiwan and North Korea with its secret nuclear program. East Asia states
share the need for a stable energy supply but also share territorial disputes and
compete for regional economic expansion and security interests. Unlike Europe, East
Asia is unique in its culture, history, economic situation, regional relations and
42
nuclear programs and needs a different regional governance scheme in which
appropriate steps need to be taken first before entering into a cooperation framework.
In contrast to EURATOM, there has been no regional framework for nuclear
governance cooperation in East Asia despite the advanced nuclear industry and
experts’ efforts. The nuclear programs in the region have accomplished independently
through bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements such between Japan and the United
States, South Korea and the United States as well as Taiwan and the United States.
However, in the past years many experts called for regional nuclear cooperation and
presented many proposals like ASIATOM and PACATOM. The outcomes of these
proposals suggest that nuclear cooperation needs to take intermediate steps in which
areas like nuclear safety obtains top priority and the most probable area for regional
nuclear cooperation. In the same vein, in 1997 and on behalf of the South Korean
government, a proposal was officially made for the establishment of the Asia Nuclear
Safety Consultation Organization (ANSCO) aiming to achieve highest level of
nuclear safety, which cannot be achieved without multilateral cooperation in the
region. The proposal intended to cover main nuclear issues like nuclear safety of
facilities and technologies, nuclear emergency, nuclear liability and radioactive waste
management. ANSCO proposal was not the first or the last, other region’s countries
made many different proposals but all confirmed the importance of a regional nuclear
cooperation and all shared the same regional nuclear priorities. These proposals
proved that regional nuclear cooperation framework should be adopted according to
the region’s political relations, nuclear situation and economic standards in order to
resolve nuclear energy concerns appropriately and secure stable source of energy for
these countries. One successful model like the EURATOM given the time, nuclear
situation and smooth political relations among its member states, cannot be exactly
replicated in unstable regions like East Asia and Middle East.
Pre-requisites for Nuclear Security:
Regarding nuclear security, which is one of the MNA establishment requirements due
to the nuclear terrorism threats especially in an unstable region like the Middle East.
Nuclear terrorism occurs when nuclear materials are diverted outside the host states
and in order to prevent this threat, MNA member states should take security measures
especially that the NPT does not mention nuclear security or safety in its provisions.
43
Currently, some states in the Middle East region have not yet ratified nuclear safety-
related international conventions. Therefore, in all the three models proposed in this
study, states must comply with the following international nuclear safety norms
developed by the IAEA to sustain strong nuclear safety qualities:
Ø Convention on Nuclear Safety (INFCIRC/449)

Ø Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety
of Radioactive Waste Management (INFCIRC/546)
Ø Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (INFCIRC/335)
Ø IAEA Safety Standards
Ø Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological
Emergency (INFCIRC/336)
Ø Participate in Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
(CPPNM) for the protection of nuclear material during transportation
Ø Ratify revised CPPNM for the protection of nuclear material and power
facilities
Ø Participate in Nuclear Terrorism Prevention Convention to prevent terrorism
using nuclear and radioactive substances.69
In addition to the above conventions, all regional member states need to

establish joint nuclear safety standards and handle nuclear safety peer reviews among
the member states to maintain nuclear safety of their facilities. Moreover, in all three
models, the law concerning nuclear security of the partner, host or site state, which
they belong to be followed.70
Prospective Models
In this chapter, three models that foresee the establishment of a regional governance
of the nuclear fuel cycle in the Middle East region are discussed. In each case, it is

70 Ibid.
44
assumed that regional governance regime member states have the political will to
establish full nuclear fuel cycle cooperation. First, I will present a quaternary
consortium model that consists of cooperation between Egypt, Jordan, UAE and
Saudi Arabia suggesting an international fuel bank created under the IAEA’s
supervision with nuclear fuel in storage. The second model is cooperation between
the four previously mentioned Arab states and Iran. Finally, I will present a model of
cooperation between the four Arab states, Iran and Israel. These three models are
purposely discussed in that order, as I believe that this is the order in which a
multilateral nuclear cooperation in the Middle East suppose to occur. It will begin by
the establishment of ARABATOM organization then develop in to MEATOM
organization. In accordance to the features and their prerequisites, the technical
feasibility of each multilateral nuclear cooperation case is analyzed, challenges are
identified and possible solutions to overcome challenges are proposed as well. All
participating countries will have to put all their activities under the IAEA inspections
so that all the international community would be confident that the nuclear activities
are in compliance with the non-proliferation norms.
1. Arab States Model: Arab MNA (ARABATOM)
The first model assumes that only those Arab states with either existing nuclear
energy projects or plans to establish such projects by 2020, will be members of the
regime. The states that are currently ready for this kind of cooperation are Egypt,
Jordan, UAE and Saudi Arabia. The model does not exclude other Arab states,
however it is only a nucleus that will be boost later on as more Arab countries like
Algeria for instance join ARABATOM. “The idea of regional fuel bank is a must and
it is justified by economic basis because to establish fuel bank you have to have more
than 20 reactors for the project to be economically feasible.”71
In total, Arab states will have more than 20 nuclear power reactors and can
compliment each other with other resources. Even though Arab states are considered
newcomers to the nuclear fuel cycle activities and do not have the experience in that
field, a multilateral cooperation regime would benefit them in a number of ways.

45
Shaker wrote “thus, as all countries would start from the same position, every
individual state would have an equal say at each step along the way toward complete
multilateral mastery of the nuclear fuel cycle (Shaker, 2014).” It would be a slow
process but it will eventually proceed into building a big market that has many
financial and political rewards to the region, as it will create a demand as it has a
regional fuel bank, research and sources. Arab states would jointly form an MNA and
transfer their existing facilities and currently under construction facilities to MNA
facilities. ARABATOM would reduce the gap between the developed and less
developed countries in nuclear activities, as all member states would benefit from
economies of scale, nuclear technology and decision-making. Additionally, every
state would be checking on each other to reduce the risk of the Sensitive Nuclear
Technologies (SNTs) being diverted from peaceful to military purposes. This regional
control would be complementary to the international control by the IAEA, which will
strengthen non-proliferation norms. Even though regional fuel bank can start without
the WMD free zone in the Middle East, it is still a step towards the establishment of
the zone in the near future. This model will offer nuclear fuel to other IAEA member
states in good standing in the open market through an international fuel bank that will
have its fuel in storage. Additionally, for the benefit of the establishment of such
regional fuel bank, additional partners might be needed to offer their financial
support.
a) Nuclear Non-Proliferation:
All four Arab States are NPT members. Egypt and Saudi Arabia have not yet ratified
the IAEA Additional Protocol. However, for the sake of the non-proliferation regime
especially in a region where Iran and Israel are neighbors having nuclear activities
undergoing, it is necessary for the member states to establish a regional safeguards
system equivalent to the AP, such as those adopted by ABACC pre-dated the
compliances of Brazil and Argentina to the NPT. As such, a regional safeguards
organization should be established under a regional agreement and its headquarter
should be hosted in one of the four mentioned states preferably in a state with large
number of facilities for example Egypt or Jordan. This organization will allow
confidence and trust building and development of further cooperation in other
provisions such in technical, economic and security issues similar to already
46
established safeguards organizations in the example of EURATOM and ABACC.
This regional safeguards organization will coordinate its activities with the IAEA
safeguards entity but will have its own measures, management, activities and results.
b) Assurance of Supply:
Since the four states currently have no significant nuclear capacities, it is necessary to
conclude an agreement with other states that have ENRs capacities through NCAs.
On the other hand, although the establishment of new enrichment facilities and
completion of Arab states’ existing enrichment and expected reprocessing capacities
is not economically rational, it would promote to the assurance of supply in the future.
In this regard, each state has signed NCAs individually with different NSSs in their
planned nuclear projects. As mentioned in earlier section, UAE’s nuclear enrichment
fuel services supplies are ensured by the US. Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia have
concluded NCAs with Russia, ROK and France. The nuclear activities of other states
would not be affected by the US except the UAE, which gave its right to enrich
uranium under the terms of its NCA with the US. ARABATOM as a multilateral
nuclear cooperation consortium can guarantee its fuel supply from the IAEA
international fuel bank that was recently approved in August 2015 in Kazakhstan, as
an option in case of emergency. The IAEA has set a criteria needed to be met in order
for members to use instead of the commercial market. The criteria include the supply
of LEU to a nuclear power plant is disrupted; the Member State is unable to secure
LEU from the commercial market, State-to-State arrangements, or by any other such
means; and the Member State has in place a comprehensive safeguards agreement
with the IAEA and is in compliance with this agreement (IAEA report, 2015).
Kazakhstan’s IAEA fuel bank and Assurance of Supply
In 2015, the IAEA has signed a host-state agreement with the ex-soviet nation
to locate the first internationally controlled bank of low-enriched uranium in
Kazakhstan. This location was chose particularly because it’s well-known Ulba
Metallurgical Plant, which according to the IAEA has “handled and stored nuclear
47
material, including LEU, safely and securely for more than 60 years.” The bank will
provide each state with fuel that is suitable for its power reactor and design.
This fuel bank serves as a fuel supplier for all IAEA member states without
risking an unsteady supply because of the transportation, routes or any unpredictable
circumstances thus preventing nuclear proliferation and ensuring steady fuel supply.
It is worth to note that this LEU bank according to the IAEA “is fully funded by
voluntary contributions including $50 million from the US-based Nuclear Threat
Initiative (NTI) organization, $49 million from the USA, up to $25 million from the
European Union, $10 million each from Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, and
$5 million from Norway.” This bank will be fully operational in 2017 and will
contain up to 90 metric tons of LEU enough to operate a 1,000 MWe (megawatt
electric) light-water reactor (IAEA, 2015). The bank is managed by the IAEA and it is
the first of its kind to not be under the control of an individual country but it is fully
open to the IAEA inspectors.
This LEU fuel bank would serve as a back up or an emergency system to
ensure stable and cost-effective nuclear fuel supply needed for any civilian nuclear
programs without affecting the international commercial market and without having
to construct enrichment facilities themselves (NTI, 2015). This in fact the most
important feature of Kazakhstan LEU fuel bank mainly for the establishment of a
regional nuclear cooperation in the Middle East context where enrichment and
reprocessing of SNTs are limited with the exception of Iran and Israel. If an Arab
State cooperation were to be established and enrichment and supply sources were to
be problematic, Kazakhstan’s LEU IAEA fuel bank would be an ideal choice.
Since Kazakhstan is the world’s largest producer of uranium ore, it signed an

agreement with the IAEA to host the first internationally controlled bank of low-
enriched uranium to ensure the non-proliferation norms and provide fuel supplies for
power stations. The IAEA will manage and operate the bank while the country’s legal
and regulatory requirements will govern it to ensure the fuel bank’s safety and
security. This storage facility will be fully operational in 2017 and will be located at
the Ulba Metallurgical Plant in the northeastern industrial city of Ust-Kamenogorsk.
48
The bank will provide each state with fuel that is suitable for its power reactor and
design.
Having the right to receive LEU from the IAEA LEU bank is not problematic
to this model of cooperation, as the bank will not “require giving up the right to
establish or further develop a national fuel cycle or have any impact on it.”72
However, according to Khaled Toukan the Chairman of Jordan Atomic Energy
Commission, there are several Arab countries in particular Jordan which can be the
main source of this material as Jordan has more than 42,000 tons of yellow cake
uranium in Jordanian phosphate deposits, which are have not been tapped because of
the limited economic and technological capabilities in the Kingdom. Arab countries
have to be sure that they have security of fuel supply so that they don’t be subject to
monopoly and political embezzlement by fuel providers. While the goal of this
cooperation remains to ensure an independence of fuel supply, both IAEA
international LEU fuel bank and Kazakhstan fuel bank would still be options to
guarantee the flow of the supply. As mentioned in an IAEA document, “Effective
assurances of supply would have to include back-up sources of supply in the event
that an MNA supplier is unable to provide the required material or services (IAEA,
2005).”
1.1 Summary of Model One:
To establish the proposed multilateral nuclear cooperation, the followings need to be

addressed to ensure nuclear fuel cycle sensitive materials and technologies:
1. Participation of other states with enrichment and reprocessing capacities.

2. Ensuring fuel supply from other states through NCAs or from the IAEA
international bank in Kazakhstan.
3. Establishment new enrichment facilities.
4. Completion and Enlargement of existing ENR limited capacities in states
like Egypt.

49
The biggest challenge to this model is the political acceptance, mainly the
establishment of new ENR capabilities in such politically unstable environment.
Without the consent of the P5+1, this model would not see the light. Thus, an MNA
with IAEA involvement in addition to regional safeguards complimentary to the
existing IAEA safeguards system is a possible solution that would enhance the
transparency and confidence and security building measures.
Other MNAs pre-requisites or challenges like transportation, siting,

economics and degree of multilateral involvement are possible to overcome and
solved by creating a treaty with provisions and legal framework agreed upon by all
member states increasing equality among members and promoting joint decision-
making. Since Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and UAE share land and sea routes in
addition to the Suez Canal that connects the two continents together without crossing
into the territory of any other states, transportation should cause no major problems.
2. Model two: Arab States with Iran
If an Arab states nuclear cooperation was to be founded, it is expected to delay the

establishment of reprocessing facilities without giving up their right permanently. As
such, a reliable partner with existing facilities and nuclear activities is needed and Iran
is the one. This model of cooperation is proposed to solve long-term nuclear dispute
in the Middle East region and release the tension between the countries as well as to
build trust and confidence among them. This framework is based on already existing
capabilities, in which Iran will be cooperating in the nuclear activities with its
neighboring countries. Iran is already an active participant in the nuclear fuel
production community. Arab States have planned nuclear projects, Jordan has
uranium reserves and Egypt has some trained and experienced scientists. In other
words, the Arab States, “would be sharing with Iran the ownership and the
management of its sensitive technologies without having necessarily access to the
technologies themselves, which will remain private domain of Iran (Pilat, 2015).”
Every individual state will be responsible for different stage of the nuclear fuel cycle
and each state will be checking on others as part of the agreement, thus strengthening
nonproliferation norms. If Iran is allowed to enrich uranium under this model of
50
cooperation, all its activities will be under the IAEA’s supervision and in any case of
non-compliance with the terms of the model’s agreement, the case will be referred to
the UNSC to play its authoritative role in implementing sanctions against Iran. The
model can be seen as a cooperation between two actors, Iran and the Arab States
collectively as an individual actor under the umbrella of the League of Arabs (LAS)
or another new organization that would be established for that purpose
(ARABATOM) as proposed in the first model. This model of cooperation to produce
low enriched uranium resembles both EURODIF in France and URENCO in
Netherlands in which existing enrichment facilities provide fuel supply to its
neighboring countries without compromising the ownership of its facilities.
In this proposed model Iran will be the host of the enrichment facilities and its
partners could obtain enrichment services from Iran’s facility. While other
cooperation members play role on the decision-making commission, they do not
operate the facility and have no access to the technology. It would be challenging for
Iran to accept this model as it already has an enrichment technology and facility itself
however, turning into a regional nuclear supplier state is clearly a great incentive.
Despite the challenges in making this model of cooperation appealing to Iran, this
study believes that it would produce positive outcomes for both Iran and Arab states.
Iran would share the financial burdens with its partners instead of standing alone with
all the expenses, thus giving an opportunity to develop and enhance its enrichment
technology. Additionally, Iran would gain an international prestige being recognized
as a reliable exporter of enrichment services in the region and possibly in the future
could also gain more economic revenues from exporting LEU to other countries as
well as securing fuel for its future nuclear power plants. Iran should think of this
regional governance of the nuclear fuel cycle as a way of ensuring enough prosperity
when it comes to its growing population as well as a way of ensuring enough uranium
reserves to match Iran’s desire to continue in developing the entire fuel cycle given
the uncertain current situation of its nuclear fuel self-sufficiency.
Even if Iran has a capacity to enrich uranium as an individual state,

regionalization of the nuclear fuel cycle is preferable and more acceptable in the
international community as it realizes both the development of peaceful uses of
51
nuclear power and nuclear non-proliferation. In this sense, Iran will share the
management and the ownership of its sensitive technologies with Arab states without
compromising its technology to being transferred to other joint stakeholders (black-
box).
Figure 2 Distribution of responsibility in multilateral nuclear fuel cycle cooperation between Iran and Arab
states as suggested by the researcher.
As mentioned in the first model members of the ARABATOM are all members of the
NPT as well except that Egypt and Saudi Arabia have not yet ratified the IAEA
Additional Protocol. Iran also signed the NPT many years ago and submitted all its
nuclear facilities under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards
in particular after the P5+1 agreement in which Iran allowed tighter control and
enhanced international verification on its nuclear programmes. For the sake of non-
proliferation, it should be concluded in the agreement that significant amount of the
52
low-enriched uranium are not be stored in Iran, but exported to other cooperation
partners for conversion and fuel fabrication. Thus, decreasing the possibility of Iran
developing a covert nuclear weapons program.
In this model, Iran is the only country with enrichment facilities, materials and
knowledge. Iran would be responsible for the enrichment process and providing other
partners with a sustainable fuel supply without compromising its enrichment
technology to diversion. In all cases, member states represented by a commission
would conclude agreements with third-state parties, international organization like
Kazakhstan’s IAEA fuel bank or conclude an agreement with a national or private
centers like EURODIF or URENCO to ensure supply as an option.
2.1 Summary of Model Two:
In contrast with model one, the assurance of nuclear fuel cycle services supply within
this regional nuclear cooperation model would be available given credits to Iran’s
enrichment capacity. This supply assurance could be achieved without third-state
party involvement if wanted. Additionally, there would be an economic rationale for
the Arab states to acquire a share in already existing enrichment facilities in Iran and
receive assurance of fuel supply in exchange if Iran agrees. This is an advantage in
which the use of such facilities has an economic benefit when compared with
establishing completely new ENR facilities. However, non-ENR technology holder
states would not access such technologies “black-box” protecting the technology from
diversion, thus enhancing non-proliferation norms.
Similar to model one, political and international acceptance and geopolitics

are the main challenge facing this MNA model. In order to ensure stable fuel supply
and services with this model, member states need to avoid being entangled in any
conflicts or disputes between Iran and other states within the region and from outside
as well. The possible solution to overcome this challenge is to guarantee an
emergency option for fuel supply and services from other nuclear fuel supplier state
or international bank as proposed in the ARABATOM model. Alternative
53
transportation routes need to be guaranteed in the model treaty so as not to depend
fully in one transportation scheme.
3. Model three: Arab States, Iran and Israel
In this model, I will examine the opportunity of having a regional cooperation with
ARABATOM, Iran and Israel. Now why Israel? And under what conditions can it
Israel takes part of the regional governance of nuclear fuel cycle in the Middle East?
Ever since it’s beginning as a weapon of war, nuclear bombs have become the
symbolic reminders that sovereignty, deterrence and safety lie in their possession.
The Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty, which came into force in 1970, was
the result of this dilemma. Non-nuclear states are prohibited from acquiring a nuclear
weapons capacity, however, they are allowed to receive technology for peaceful
purposes “on a non-discriminatory basis” at a market price. In reality, this nuclear
superiority continues to create exemptions. Countries have received nuclear
technology in violation of signatory obligations. “The supposed limitations imposed
by the NPT on non-nuclear weapons states have been deemed insufficient.”73
Israel has claimed several times that in order to the Middle East to be free of
weapons of mass destruction, a lasting peace deal with Palestine and a non nuclear
capacity Iran are prerequisites for ensuring that. Israel is the first country to introduce
nuclear weapons in the Middle East but it was used for aggressive military expansion
purposes. It used this nuclear threat as a stick against all Arab states in order to
impose its policies of expansionism and aggression since early 1970s. It also used its
nuclear capability to threaten Arab countries and to impose its condition as far as
peace process and against any Arab country that wants to embark nuclear energy so
that it would be viewed as a suspect.74
In December 2014, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution calling for

Israel to join the NPT and put its nuclear reactor at Dimona in the Negev Desert under

73
http://www.globalresearch.ca/voiding-the-nuclear-weapons-non-proliferation-
treaty-npt-israel-and-nuclear-exceptionalism/5431822
54
IAEA supervision. The UN General Assembly has passed an Arab-introduced
resolution of 1995 calling on Israel not to develop, produce or possess nuclear arms
and criticizing the country for not being part to the NPT. The resolution appeals to
Israel to "accede to that treaty without further delay, not to develop, produce test or
otherwise acquire nuclear weapons, to renounce possession of nuclear weapons," and
put its nuclear facilities under the safeguard of the International Atomic Energy
Agency. The resolution, initiated by Egypt, was approved by 161 nations with only
five voting against it and 18 abstentions.75 Israel should take part in the P5+1
negotiations in which it would announce its readiness to put all its nuclear facilities
under the IAEA inspections and join the NPT in return for signing a Middle East
Nuclear Free Zone.
In order for Israel to join the negotiations on the establishment of a Middle

East nuclear fuel cycle, it has to sign the NPT and all relevant treaties, abide by the
IAEA standards and join other countries in their to negotiation about the
establishment of the WMD-Free Zone in the Middle East as well as the establishment
of a Palestinian state and maintaining the identity of Jerusalem now and in the
future.76 But what assurance could give the Israelis the will to move forward? It is to
start by signing a fissile material ban of treaty that could be on a regional level and
controlled by a regional agency in cooperation with the IAEA. Additionally, nuclear
freeze could be a first step towards a nuclear disarmament as in the French experience
in which they do not produce fissile material for nuclear warhead anymore and all
enrichment facilities are completely civilians so the Israelis could do the same and say
we will put all what we had produced, identify them as civilians, under international
control so now we cannot produce nuclear weapons and we will let your inspectors
into our facilities, which is considered a huge gesture. Now what will they ask in
return? They will ask for many gestures like the recognition of the Israeli state for
instance before they can talk about nuclear disarmament.77

75
http://www.globalresearch.ca/voiding-the-nuclear-weapons-non-proliferation-treaty-npt-
israel-and-nuclear-exceptionalism/5431822
76 Shaker, M. (2015, December). [Personal interview].
77 Mallard, G. (2015, December). [Personal interview].
55
On the other hand, there is an opposite opinion to Shaker and most of the
politicians and researchers which is according to Ayman Khalil the Director of Arab
Institute for Security Studies, in order to create a solution outside the box it is not
necessarily be a theoretical one. In other words, Israel could be a member of the zone
and a partner to any regional governance of nuclear fuel cycle regime without being
NPT member first. Evidently, there is no provision in a legal treaty that states that, so
why this precondition prevents Israel from joining the regional cooperation.78 In
reality however, this is cannot be done because of the persistence of all the Arab
countries that in order for Israel to join any regional nuclear cooperation it needs to be
a member of the NPT and not vise versa.
By getting Israel abide by the mentioned conditions in order to be part of this

regional nuclear cooperation, the Middle East will be free of WMDs and the existing
political tension will be reduced as well as putting the region as a frontier in the
nuclear market.
Why Israel should sign the NPT?
Israel is no longer under a threat; as demonstrated in the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative in
which the Arab stares were willing to normalize relations with Israel in exchange for
full withdrawal from the territories captured in 1967. Also, instead of being a
threatening stick against the Arab states and Iran, its nuclear arsenal may trigger a
nuclear arms race in the region.
Paragraph 14 of the binding U.N. Security Council Resolution 687 that called
for the disarmament of Iraq also specified the establishment of a zone free of
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) in the Middle East (UNSC document, 1991).
All countries that joined the US-led coalition to overthrow Saddam Hussein and free
Kuwait assumed that after the abolition of Iraqi WMDs, Israel would be required to
get rid of its nuclear weapons. As a result, Israel and other countries that have not
implemented that paragraph have eventually violated that binding resolution.79 The

78 Khalil, A. (2015, November). [Personal interview].
79
http://www.globalresearch.ca/voiding-the-nuclear-weapons-non-proliferation-treaty-npt-
israel-and-nuclear-exceptionalism/5431822
56
1995 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference also called for "the
early establishment by regional parties of a Middle East zone free of nuclear and all
other WMDs and their delivery systems". The international community persisted to
ignore these resolutions by not asserting Israel to announce its nuclear activities and
give up its nuclear weapons warheads and submit all its nuclear activities under the
IAEA control. Additionally, the 2000 NPT Review Conference called on "India,
Israel and Pakistan to accede to the Treaty as Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS)
promptly and without condition". However, few efforts have been made towards
pushing Israel, India and Pakistan to comply as non-nuclear weapon states.
The agreement made by Iran, Britain, France and Germany on Iran's accession
to the Additional Protocol and suspension of its enrichment activities for more than
two years also called for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction throughout
the Middle East.80 However all these agreements and efforts have been unproductive
due to the Israeli’s consistent and persistent denial of its nuclear activities.
As mentioned in the previous two models, ARABATOM and Iran are all members of
the NPT except in this model where Israel is not. Israel has limited enrichment
activities primarily serving weapons programs and not for civilian nuclear producing
power plants. All of the proposals now under deliberation have a requirement that the
member country be in full submission with its international responsibilities according
to the NPT and the IAEA’s safeguards scheme. In some cases, countries like India
have safeguards on portion of its nuclear activities under the Indo-US nuclear deal so
that they would able to receive sustainable fuel supply. While this deal is considered
an exemption to the NGS rules, it made India the only known country with nuclear
weapons which is not a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty yet allowed to receive
nuclear fuel from the international market. However, in this model Israel has to
adhere by the NPT and IAEA international obligations required for granting them
advanced consent by nuclear supplier states (NSSs) and for the engagement in
enrichment and reprocessing activities. The followings are required by all

80
http://www.globalissues.org/news/2015/09/05/21462
57
participating states proposed in this model to maintain their non-proliferation
characteristics, and therefore, engage in nuclear fuel cycle sensitive activities:
1. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

2. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards including: IAEA
comprehensive safeguards (INFCIRC/153) and Additional Protocol (AP,
INFCIRC/540).
3. If not adhered to AP, equivalent safeguards similar to the one implemented
by the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear
Materials (ABACC).81
If all the above have been accomplished, a regional safeguards organization

could be established like in model 1 and 2 in which trust and confidence are built
working together with the IAEA safeguards system.
This model would not differ in its fuel supply guarantees as Iran and Israel both have
enrichment capabilities with different degree of enrichment level, however Israel
lacks enrichment capabilities on industrial scale that is needed for nuclear power. In
this model of cooperation, the regional Commission would be responsible for
ensuring that all the member states receive an equitable non-discriminative supply of
fuel sensitive materials either from within the community itself or from a third-state
parties. A fuel supply agency should be established to oversee the supply and demand
market and negotiate all the agreements and avoid the EURATOM Treaty pitfall of
bypassing member states like France the status of joint enterprise.
3.1 Summary of Model Three:
The great advantage of this ARABATOM-Iran-Israel model is in addition to the

assurance of fuel supply and services like in model one and two, is the emerging of a

58
new cooperative era in the Middle East in which Israel is cooperating and sharing
with its neighboring countries its nuclear activities under the international control.
This MNA would pave the way towards the establishment of a WMDFZ in the
Middle East and strengthening non-proliferation norms. This model is the ideal in
terms of its goals and objectives.
On the other hand, the first and biggest challenge is to convince Israel to sign
the NPT and adhere to the international laws and treaties in addition to submitting its
covert nuclear activities under the IAEA control. The establishment of ARABATOM
may lead Israel to overthink the idea because of the pressure that would arise from
Arab states cooperation or the Arab states-Iran cooperation but it may not be enough
to convince Israel of all the pre-conditions of this model. However, if Israel and other
states in this MNA achieved an agreement on all the pre-requisites, provisions on
non-compliance need to be bluntly addressed. In case of political conflicts within the
MNA, the Commission needs to urgently work in order to prevent any conflict from
disturbing and affecting the assurance of supply. International inspections as well as
routinely state-to-state inspections must be performed to avoid any hidden activities.
To efficiently prevent the fuel supply and services from being diverted,
ARABATOM-Iran-Israel model’s safeguards system needs to target both reported
and non-reported nuclear materials and activities unlike EURATOM in which the
safeguards system only targets the reported activities and check if they are used for
the intended purpose or not.
4. Summary of the three models’ findings:

Figure 3 Developed by the researcher.
59
3. Could Turkey be a member in any of the prospective models?
One should ask why Israel and not Turkey for example. Some scholars argue that
Turkey should have a special status when one of the three models gets established
because its proximity to the regional states as well as its active role in the discussions
about the security of the Middle East.82 Others believe that the current political
situation in the region and Turkey’s role in creating more political unrest would
prevent such admission to any of the regional proposed cooperation models at the
present time. Additionally, the presence of US tactical nuclear arsenals and defense
missile structures within Turkey’s boarder as well as its membership in the NATO are
also other barriers to its acceptance in the WMD Free Zone in the Middle East.83
However, this does not mean that once any of the three mentioned models gets
established, Turkey can be a partner in any regional cooperation in the future.
Turkey tended in the past to pursue scientific cooperation projects with the
more developed states to its west rather than to its east and south, this tendency
intensified because of the restriction made by scientific organizations like the Arab
Atomic Energy Agency to include members outside the Arab states.84 However, there
are good indications that this tendency has changed and signs of cooperation began to
appear. For instance, Iran and Turkey already cooperated in energy issues in which
Iran is Turkey’s second-largest natural gas supplier. Both countries signed various
agreements in 2009, assigning three of Iran’s South Pars gas fields to the Turkish
Petroleum Corporation for the more effective transport of Iranian gas to Europe
through Turkey.85 Turkey is also a member of the Jordan-based Synchrotron-light for
Experimental Science and Applications in the Middle East (SESAME) project, which
brings scientists from the region to participate in scientific and technological
researches.

82 Shaker, M. I. (2014). Regionalizing Nuclear Energy in the Middle East: Making Progress
on the Nuclear- and WMD-free Zone. Global Governance, 20(4), 517-528.

83 Ibid
84 Lorenz, T., & Kidd, J. (2010). Turkey And Multilateral Nuclear Approaches In The Middle
East. The Nonproliferation Review, 17(3), 513-530. Doi: 10.1080/10736700.2010.516999

85 Ibid
60
Turkey has a wide experience in specific nuclear fuel cycle stages and in fuel
fabrication in particular combined with the help of the IAEA upgrading its
infrastructure for fabrication. Thus, Turkey would be well positioned to host a joint
fuel fabrication plant in any of the three regional governance models previously
proposed. Additionally, Turkey with its history and experience in the nuclear field can
add tremendously to any model of cooperation as it holds one of the largest
concentrations of nuclear expertise in the university division in the Middle East
(Lorenz, 2010). Turkey has a political active role in Iran’s nuclear problem pushing
for prolonged diplomatic efforts rather than economic sanctions in addition to its
active role in the discussions about the security of the Middle East, indirectly increase
confidence building in the region. In any of the proposed regional governance models,
Turkey can serve as a host of a regional fuel fabrication facility while each of the
other member states can host a different stage of the nuclear fuel cycle. It would make
much more sense to Turkey’s nuclear industry to cooperate with the Middle East
countries rather than the Western countries for productive nuclear joint venture with
benefits like sharing economic burdens, pooling natural resources and gaining from
other countries’ nuclear technologies and facilities.
61
Conclusion
This paper had for principal aim to explore how a regional governance of nuclear fuel
cycle can be achieved in the Middle East, but also to modestly fill a gap in the Middle
East’s multilateral nuclear cooperation implementation literature.
The findings of this study proves that multilateral nuclear cooperation play
vital role in guaranteeing that states keep nuclear weapon, sensitive nuclear
technology and weapons-usable materials out of the hands of terrorists. Without
sacrificing the know-hows of the nuclear industry a country has, it has been proved
that it is possible to share technology and security practices without revealing
sensitive information. Trust and confidence between cooperating decision-makers and
authoritarians are essential and this cannot happen overnight as it takes time, work
and determination. Strong support from governments, civil societies, policy-makers
and public is needed to keep the momentum of work going and contribute to the
progress of such sensitive project. A regional nuclear cooperation would have great
effect in minimizing the proliferation risk, increasing protection of nuclear facilities
throughout the region and enhancing economic, technological and security advantages
to all the member states in addition to satisfying the nuclear energy demands more
efficiently in the Middle East. The study argues that regional governance of the
nuclear fuel cycle is more strategic than unilateral development of nuclear fuel cycle.
This study illustrated the opportunities and challenges related to the prospective
models of regional governance of the nuclear fuel cycle in the Middle East. Despite
the challenges, the study finds that it is timely and effective to conclude a multilateral
nuclear cooperation regime for managing the nuclear fuel cycle sensitive materials
and technology as a foundation to making progress in the establishment of a WMD
Free Zone in the Middle East. However, without radical changes of policy from the
states involved, this regional framework would face a lot of difficulties to be realized.
There are four conditions necessary in order for a regional governance of the
nuclear fuel cycle in the Middle East to be acceptable by the international community
and achievable by the member states:
1. Multilateral and bilateral dialogues: Involvement of all regional parties at
62
the negotiation table as well as the international community including
nuclear supplier states.
2. Gradual build up phase with intermediate steps: cooperation should
initially begin with members with good political relationships like the
Arab states then other partners like Iran, Israel or Turkey could join them
later after rounds of expected discussions and negotiations.
Implementation could begin with components that are currently feasible
and should not be delayed until other options are being discussed and
refined.
3. Full transparency: to gain international trust and confidence on the
intentions of the member states behind this regional cooperation,
discussions and plans should be communicated to the international
community in full transparency.
4. Involvement of IAEA: any cooperation plans should be developed in
consultation with the IAEA, which would later have an oversight role
concerning all aspects like nuclear safety and nonproliferation.
In all case studies, the political instability of member states and the region as
well as political conflict between nuclear supplier states and some regional states
posed the biggest challenge to the establishment of a regional governance regime of
the nuclear fuel cycle. There is definitely no simple solution overcome this challenge,
however case-by-case measures like the application of regional safeguards
organization, involvement of international organization like the IAEA, involvement
of international fuel bank and/or nuclear supplier states would help alleviate the
political challenges. It is important to mention that any regional nuclear governance
regime of the nuclear fuel cycle in the Middle East would not smoothly established
without the consensus of the P5+1 and in order to attain that agreement intermediate
steps need to be taken first to establish a legal structure first and before the technical
one. Efforts and lots of negotiations would be taken place to convince the
international community that these attempts are for peaceful purposes and all the
proposed activities would be under the international control.
Based on the analysis of this study and the three models that were proposed,
the Arab States cooperation model seems more realistic to achieve in the short-term
63
future. Why I believe this is more achievable? Because the Arab States already had
and still have the political will to cooperate, they share partially the same geopolitics,
nuclear energy starting point, environment and public acceptance. Even though there
are some economic and technological inconsistencies that could not be denied or
neglected, I believe that these differences could be overcome by developing a
governance regime in which each of these Arab countries fill in the gap of others and
complete each other in harmony without having an inter-Arab competition. Given the
nuclear energy agreements that the Arab States have established to start their own
nuclear power plants and given the fact that these states have already research nuclear
power plants like Egypt, a Quadripartite nuclear fuel cycle cooperation serving as a
nuclei in the region seems more possible to be achieved. It can also be an incentive
for other countries to join and share nuclear fuel in accordance to the provisions of the
ARABATOM Treaty. Furthermore, I believe that the creation of the ARABATOM
would put a pressure on Israel to join the NPT and think as one member of this region
that has to cooperate not to compete in such sensitive issue.
A regional fuel bank without Israel can be seen as an only power development
project that lacks political goals and security solutions. However and on the other
hand, this does not necessarily undermine the importance of a regional project that
brings all the Arab states that already share many similarities and goals together again
aiming for one goal, one interest and one ambition. An Arab states nuclear fuel cycle
governance regime is a first step towards building trust among the states and their
societies. A regional fuel bank can start without a free zone however; you cannot have
a free zone without being an NPT member to say the least. I believe that if you cannot
reach an agreement now regarding the WMD Free Zone in the region, regional
governance of the nuclear fuel cycle is a vital and essential step towards creating one
in the near future as it paves the way towards more serious discussions and
resolutions to many hanging issues between the Arab states, Iran and Israel. An Arab
States fuel bank would create a demand on nuclear related materials from the
international market since it would have materials, research, manpower and resources
and facilities. The Arab State model can be and should be expanding over time to
include more regional partner.
While a model of nuclear cooperation between Arab states and Iran can be
64
perceived as an anti-Israel coalition, there are some other issues that cannot guarantee
a success in bringing Iran to the negotiations table such as the regional relations with
its neighboring Gulf states, technical issues and the international acceptance.
However, after Iran’s recent agreement with the P5+1 many politicians consider it a
great step for all the international community and the Middle East in particular.
According to the provisions of the agreement, Iran has to submit all of its nuclear
activities and facilities under the international control for at least 15 years. This may
indicate the new will and transformed attitude of the present Iranian government to
cooperate in nuclear power projects and negotiate with its neighboring countries in
various issues. It may not be the ideal solution to the political and ethnic problems in
Iran and neighbouring states, but it may be technical, economic and nuclear security
solution.
The third proposed model consisting of Arab States, Iran and Israel could be
viewed as unrealistic and hard to achieve security solution mainly because of the
long-term political dispute between each and every party of the model. However, I
proposed this model and believed that for the sake of non-proliferation and the
establishment of Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East, this
multilateral nuclear cooperation needs Israel. I also believe that this model of
cooperation would gain more international acceptance and appear more appealing to
the international community than the other two models, thus gaining more support in
terms of financing and fuel supply from international commercial market. An
encouraging living evidence of the regional willingness to cooperate in the nuclear
field is SESAME or Synchrotron-light for Experimental Science and Applications in
the Middle East. This proves that these countries are capable of cooperation in other
issues despite the mistrust and the tension.
Turkey with its active role in the region’s politics and its good-standing
relationships with some of the region’s countries especially Iran, Israel and Saudi
Arabia, could play a vital role in the regional governance of the nuclear fuel cycle in
the Middle East. I believe that Turkey could join any of the proposed models in
particular the model with Iran among its members. It also could join the Arab states
model at a later stage and gain a special status when the model gets established, thus
creating pressure on Israel to join and adhere to the necessary preconditions.
65
In all the proposed models, spent fuel reprocessing outweighs the potential
benefits and in principle is not necessary for nuclear power generation. However,
spent fuel dispositions could be stored in an agreed international nuclear waste
stations without giving up the right of reprocessing in the future.
In conclusion, all models are feasible to different degree, gradual build up

process with intermediate steps to reach this regional framework could be effective
and feasible and also capable of expanding to include more countries in later stages.
However, in order for the Middle East to gain an advanced, self-sufficient and
influential place in the international nuclear community, it has to develop a complete
fuel cycle that is owned and operated by its members. There may be no other way
should accomplish this objective as opposed to incorporating Arab countries (Egypt,
Jordan, UAE and Saudi Arabia) with Iran, Israel and Turkey. Such a regional fuel
cycle, with a supply of uranium from Jordan, enrichment in Iran, fuel fabrication in
Turkey, reprocessing in Israel, conversion and other cycle stages in the rest of the
Arab states, joint education, research and expertise, would benefit the entire region
involved in this endeavor. Countries’ efforts towards realizing this regional project, if
successful, prove to be the beginning of a long rewarding road to confidence building
and trust in the Middle East in order to cooperate and work together to resolve other
issues and prevent a downward twist of exploitation of nuclear energy for non-
peaceful purposes. Ultimately, nuclear confidence building is associated to the wider
security and cooperation agenda in the region most importantly, the establishment of
a WMD-free zone in the Middle East.

66
Spillover Effects
•  Way to Arab •  Pressure on

Union.... Israel to join/
Iran open to
the world
ARABATOM
ARABATOM with Iran
ARABATOM, ARABATOM,
Iran, Israel Iran and
•  Complete and Turkey Israel •  Way to
regional fuel WMD Free
cycle/ Zone/
independent security
market building

Figure 4 Spillover effects of each model as illustrated and developed by the researcher
Despite the challenges, the study argues that each model has a positive spillover effect
on the member states. The ARABATOM model could lead to the creation of an Arab
Union similar to the European Union and how it got established in the same way from
a regional technological cooperation. The second model, the ARABATOM with Iran,
has a positive spillover in creating pressure on Israel and other non-cooperative
countries to cooperate and join the framework. It can also create a new Iran open to
the world, bringing the Arabs and Iranians closer back together settling religious and
ethnic disputes between the parties. The third model, with increased transparency
measures, could gain many benefits regarding security building. It could also be a
step towards the establishment of WMD Free Zone in the Middle East. The fourth
model, the most desired and preferred model, could lead to a complete open front-end
fuel cycle with an independent regional market creating demands for fuel supply,
technology and expertise as well as economic profits.

67
All the models have a positive spillover effect in building confidence and
trust among the member states and within the region, which can open new avenues of
cooperation in other issues as well.

68
Recommendations
Driven from the above analyses and findings, this study suggests a set of
recommendations that could be useful for decision and policy makers, governments,
inter-governmental organizations, NGOs and researchers to develop a feasible
regional nuclear fuel cycle scheme centered on the Middle East.
For LAS:
• State clearly that the Arab States’ goal of this multilateral nuclear
cooperation is to generate electricity and to prevent nuclear weapons
from being used by a state or a non-state actor as well as the
establishment of Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the
Middle East.
• Set up forums where regional countries engage in dialogue on nuclear
energy, nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear security, reprocessing of
spent fuel, waste management, economic cooperation and public
awareness.
• Revitalize the role of the League of Arab states and focus the light on
the issues of nuclear energy development and cooperation between the
member states and also with other non-Arab states in the region.
• Restructure the Arab Atomic Energy Agency (AAEA) and recreate a
unit that is specialized in the research and development related to
nuclear security and technology to produce a feasibility studies of the
establishment of nuclear fuel cycle cooperation between the member
states.
• Allocate a budget for nuclear energy development research in the
League of Arab States.
• Serious series of discussions and dialogues between Iran and its Arab
neighbors regarding Iran’s agreement with P5+1. Involvement of
Iran’s neighbouring countries in the future’s negotiation table.
69
For inter-governmental organizations and NGOs:
• Create initiatives on a civil society non-governmental level to be

presented to the League of Arab States and open liaison offices in each
member state of the regional cooperation to have a direct contact with
the AAEA in order for the message to be delivered and then adopted
by the governments.
• Initiate awareness campaigns about the importance and the need of
nuclear energy industry to educate the public and eliminate their fears
assuring them that nuclear energy is one option and not the only option
for creating long-term prosperity and sustainability to them.
For research centers and experts:
• Encourage joint nuclear security research and development projects to

develop new technologies and approaches like the technological
research organization in Jordan SESAME.
• Further research on back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle is needed given
emphasis on the nuclear waste management.

70
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75
APPENDICES
IRB Approval
76
List of Interviewees
(In Alphabetical Order)
• Dr. Ayman Khalil, Director of the Arab Institute for Security Studies.
Interview conducted at the Arab Institute for Security Studies, Amman,
Jordan, November 24, 2015.
• Dr. Gregoire Mallard, Associate Professor, Department of Anthropology and

Sociology. Interview conducted at the Graduate Institute of International
and Development Studies, Geneva, Switzerland, December 9, 2015.
• Dr. Khaled Toukan, Chairman of Jordan Atomic Energy Commission and

Acting Director of SESAME, and the Jordan representative to SESAME
Council. Interview conducted at Jordan Atomic Energy Commission, Amman,
Jordan, November 22, 2015.
• Ambassador Dr. Mohamed Shaker, Chairman of the Egyptian Council for

Foreign Affairs. Interview conducted at the Egyptian Council for Foreign
Affairs, Maadi, Egypt, December 3, 2015.
• Al-Sharif Nasser Bin Nasser, Managing director for Middle East Scientific
Institute for Security. Interview conducted at Royal Scientific Society, the
Middle East Scientific Institute for Security, Amman, Jordan, November 32,
2015.
Note: All interviews conducted, audiotaped, and transcribed by researcher. All

interviewees signed an informed consent and agreed to use and mention their names
in the research.
77

Regional Nuclear Governance in the Middle East

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Master of Global Affairs

Department of Public Policy and Administration

The American University in Cairo

Towards A Regional Governance Of The Nuclear

A project submitted to the

Master of Global Affairs

Yomna Ismail Ahmed

Towards A Regional Governance Of The Nuclear

Yomna Ismail Ahmed

Completed under the supervision of Dr. Allison Hodgkins

Keywords: Nuclear fuel cycle; regionalization; regional governance; EURATOM;

Finally, special and sincere thanks to my family who stood by me through my

To my father, who has taught me the importance of education and inspired me to

To my brother, my person and my buddy whose kindness, patience, dedication and

FIGURE 2 DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITY IN MULTILATERAL NUCLEAR FUEL

FIGURE 3 DEVELOPED BY THE RESEARCHER. ............................................................59

FIGURE 4 SPILLOVER EFFECTS OF EACH MODEL AS ILLUSTRATED AND DEVELOPED

ABACC Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of

The study explores the feasibility of establishing a regional governance of

The literature review covers the multilateral cooperation in nuclear energy at

This study comprises an analysis of primary data sources collected from

The regional governance of the nuclear fuel cycle management represents an

This study aims at finding solutions to the unanswered questions of

Further, this study makes an important contribution to the fields of arms

In addition, this study explores the regionalization of nuclear fuel cycle as a

Background: The Nuclear Fuel Cycle

Figure 1 The Nuclear Fuel Cycle Coutesy of IAEA.

Natural uranium or the product of a uranium mill (uranium oxide) is not

The reprocessing of spent fuel also represents a crucial stage as it considered

Establishing a nuclear fuel cycle governance regime can be a way of

Statement of the Problem

One solution to the problem is the establishment of regional governance of

Research Main Questions:

• Does every country in the Middle East region needs to independently

Research Specific Questions:

• What are the potential models or configurations of introducing a

Multilateral nuclear approaches (MNAs) correspond to “a concept of

Regional multilateral cooperation on nuclear fuel cycle issues can help to

Multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle management seek to provide

Indeed, multinational or regional fuel cycle clusters have several non-

I. Assurances of services not involving ownership of facilities

According to these nuclear energy developments and needs, Mohamed

The increase in global energy demand is driving an expected expansion in the

Shaker (2010) addressed basic points that need to be considered when

Negotiations be engaged without delay and carried forward to an early

Some scholars have examined a successful framework in Europe

on the Nuclear- and WMD-free Zone. Global Governance.

In addition, the study examines relevant international treaties, conventions and

Additionally, the study analyzes the European model (EURATOM) in many

First, a small note on the terminology mentioned in this study. The

While acknowledging such limitations, there is still sufficient information and

According to Jordan’s Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC) programme report, the

Jordan completely built a 5 MW upgradable to 10 MW research and training

Government of Jordan decided in 2013 on several decisions: to adopt nuclear

In February 2015, ROSATOM Overseas and NPPA signed an agreement to

United Arab Emirates

In 2005 after the June election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as Iran's President,

With the increased global tendency towards more regional economic

Past and Present Approaches:

“EURATOM sought to build confidence between the members not only

Even though EURATOM framework should not be exactly replicated today,

The Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear

•  Way to Arab •  Pressure on