BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS vs. HON.

JOSELITO DELA ROSA

G.R. NOS. 95122-23 31 May 1991
FACTS
 July 1960 - Santiago Gatchalian, an illegitimate child to a Chinese father (Pablo
Pacheco) and a Filipino mother (Mariana Gatchalian), was recognized as a native born
Filipino citizen following the citizenship of his mother. He also declared that he has 5
children with his Chinese wife Chu Gin Tee. One of them was Francisco, William
Gatchalian’s father.
 27 June 1961 – 12-year old William, together with his father Francisco, arrived in
Manila from Hong Kong. They had with them certificates of Registration and Identity
issued by the Philippine consulate in Hong Kong and they sought admission as Filipino
citizens.
 6 July 1961 – Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 (BSI1) admitted William and his
companions as Filipino citizens.
 24 January 1962 – Secretary of Justice issued Memorandum No. 9 setting aside all
decisions purporting to have been rendered by the Board of Commissioners (BOC) on
appeal or on review. The Secretary of Justice asked the BOC to review all the cases
where entry was allowed on the grounds of the entrant being a Filipino citizen. Among
those cases was that of William.
 6 July 1962 – The BOC reversed the initial decision of the BSI1 and ordered the
exclusion of William Gatchalian. A warrant of exclusion was issued alleging that the
BOC decision was final and executory.
 1973 – Respondent Gatchalian, as well as the others covered by the July 6, 1962 filed
a motion for re-hearing with the BSI.
 15 March 1973 – Acting Commissioner Victor Nituda issued an order reaffirming the 6
July 1961 decision to admit Gatchalian as a Filipino citizen. The warrant of arrest was
also recalled.
 7 June 1990 – Acting NBI Commissioner wrote to the Secretary of Justice
recommending that William be charged with violation of the Immigration Act of 1940
(Commonwealth Act. No. 613).
 15 August 1990 – order to arrest Gatchalian was issued. He later was released upon
posting a Php 200,000 bond.
 BOC contends that William’s arrest follows as a matter of consequence the Warrant of
Exclusion issued on 6 July 1962.
 On the other hand, William argues that the Mission Order of Warrant of Arrest does
mention that it is issued pursuant to a final order of deportation or warrant of exclusion.
ISSUES
 W/N William Gatchalian is a Filipino citizen based on the validity of his parents’
marriage abroad. (i.e. w/n he has been an alien the whole time he has been residing in
the Philippines)
 W/N the warrant of arrest by the Board of Commissioners and the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation was valid.
 W/N the prescriptive period to deport Gatchalian, assuming he was an alien, has
elapsed.

HELD
 YES. His grandfather, Santiago Gatchalian, was born of a Filipina mother, despite
being an illegitimate child. His father, Francisco Gatchalian, and he were certified as
Filipinos by the Philippine Consulate in Hong Kong. However, this was contested by the
BOC after the review.

Harvey vs. Defensor-Santiaqo

G.R. No. 82544, June 28, 1988

FACTS:
The Immigration Law empowers the Commissioner of Immigration to issue warrants for
the arrest of overstaying aliens is constitutional. The arrest is a stop preliminary to the
deportation of the aliens who had violated the condition of their stay in this country.

Petitioners Andrew Harvey and John Sherman, are both American, while Adriaan Van
Elshout is a Dutch citizen.

Petitioners were among the twenty-two (22) suspected alien pedophiles who were
apprehended after three months of close surveillance by CID agents. Two (2) days after
apprehension seventeen (17) of the twenty-two (22) arrested aliens opted for self-
deportation and have left the country. One was released for lack of evidence; another
was charged not for being a pedophile but for working without a valid working visa.
Thus, of the original twenty-two (22), only the three petitioners have chosen to face
deportation.
Warrants of Arrest were issued by respondent against petitioners for violation of
Sections 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Revised
Administrative Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not the warrant of arrest is valid.

HELD: Yes, the warrant of arrest is valid. The Supreme Court decided in the case of
Vivo vs. Montesa that "the issuance of warrants of arrest by the Commissioner of
Immigration, solely for purposes of investigation and before a final order of deportation
is issued, conflicts with paragraph 3, Section I of Article III of the Constitution" (referring
to the 1935 Constitution) is not inviolable herein. Respondent Commissioner's Warrant
of Arrest issued did not order petitioners to appear and show cause why they should not
be deported. They were issued specifically "for violation of Sections 37, 45 and 46 of the
Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code." Before that,
deportation proceedings had been commenced against them as undesirable aliens and
the arrest was a step preliminary to their possible deportation.

Also, the requirement of probable cause, to be determined by a Judge, does not extend
to deportation proceedings."  There need be no "truncated" recourse to both judicial and
administrative warrants in a single deportation proceeding. The foregoing does not
deviate from the ruling in Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board reiterated in Vivo vs.
Montesa, that "under the express terms of our Constitution (the 1935 Constitution), it is
therefore even doubtful whether the arrest of an individual may be ordered by any
authority other than a judge if the purpose is merely to determine the existence of a
probable cause, leading to an administrative investigation." For, as heretofore stated,
probable cause had already been shown to exist before the warrants of arrest were
issued.

VIVO V. MONTESA.
G.R. NO. L-24576. JULY 29, 1968

FACTS:
In 1959, private respondents arrived in the Philippines from Hongkong. Upon their
arrival, they sought admission as Filipino citizens. A board of special inquiry conducted
an investigation as to the respondents’ citizenship.
December 1959 - After the investigation, the board of special inquiry found them to be
the legitimate sons of Isaac Calacday, a Filipino citizen. Thus, they were admitted into
this country.
February 1963 - However, Isaac Calacday confessed before an immigration official that
the respondents were not his sons. He retracted his confession in March, 1963, in an
investigation in the Department of Justice.
9 May 1963 – Petitioner, as the Commissioner of Immigration, issued warrants of
arrest1 against private respondents for having entered the Philippines "by means of
false and misleading statements and that they were not lawfully admissible at the time
of entry, not being properly documented for admission."
The warrants directed any immigration office or officer of the law to bring the
respondents before the Commissioner, for them to show cause, if any there be, why
they should not be deported. Manuel Calacday was subsequently arrested. The others
remained at large.
CFI
Respondents filed a petition to (1)restrain the arrest of those petitioners who have not
been arrested; (2)to release Manuel Calacday who had been arrested; and (3)to prohibit
the deportation of all the petitioners. CFI ruled in favor of the private respondents. It
ordered the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the petitioners from
arresting and detaining the petitioners. CFI also ordered the release Manuel Calacday
and those detained by virtue of the order of arrest issued by the petitioner.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON the CFI has jurisdiction to restrain the deportation proceedings of the
Calacdays. (NO)
2. WON the Commission of Immigration can issue the said warrants. (NO)

RULING:
1. NO – CFI is without jurisdiction to restrain the deportation proceedings of the
Calacdays. These proceedings are within the jurisdiction of the Immigration authorities2
 When the petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed, the deportation
proceedings against the private respondents had started but had not been
completed. The Board of Commissioners has not rendered as yet any decision.
The respondents Calacdays, therefore, are not yet being deported. Before the
Board reaches a decision, it has to conduct a hearing where the main issue will
be the citizenship or alienage of the respondents. Therefore, there is nothing so
far for the courts to review.

2. NO – The commission cannot issue warrants of arrest.

 The power to determine probable cause for warrants of arrest is limited by the
Constitution to judges exclusively.  In Morano vs. Vivo, the Sc distinguised
between administrative arrest in the execution of a final deportation order and
 arrest as preliminary to further administrative proceedings. The Court remarked
in said case: "Section 1(3), Art. III, CONSTI, does not require judicial intervention
in the execution of a final order of deportation issued in accordance with law. The
constitutional limitation contemplates an order of arrest in the exercise of judicial
power as a step preliminary or incidental to prosecution or proceedings for a
given offense or administrative action, not as a measure indispensable to carry
out a valid decision by a competent official, such as a legal order of deportation,
issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, in pursuance of a valid legislation."

DELA CRUZ vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 200748 July 23, 2014

FACTS:

Complainants alleged that a certain Ariel Escobedo was picked up by several unknown
male persons believed to be police officers for allegedly selling drugs. Complainants
were instructed to proceed to the Gorordo Police Station. They met “James” at the
Police Station, who demanded from them P100,000.00 which was later lowered to
P40,000.00, in exchange for the release of Ariel. 

The accused was nabbed after an entrapment operation was conducted. The accused
was later brought to the forensic laboratory where he was required to submit his urine
for drug testing. The test yielded a positive result for presence of dangerous drugs.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the drug test conducted upon the petitioner is legal. (NO)

HELD:

The drug test in Section 15 does not cover persons apprehended or arrested for any
unlawful act, but only for unlawful acts listed under Article II of the law. The drug test
was in violation of the petitioner’s right to privacy and right against self-incrimination. It
is incontrovertible that petitioner refused to have his urine extracted and tested for
drugs. 
 BELTRAN V. SAMSON
G.R. NO. 32025 SEPTEMBER 23, 1929
FACTS:
This is a petition for a writ of prohibition, wherein the petitioner complains that the
respondent judge ordered him to appear before the provincial fiscal to take dictation in
his own handwriting from the latter. The order was given upon petition of said fiscal for
the purpose of comparing the petitioner’s handwriting and determining whether or not it
is he who wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified.
There is no question as to the facts alleged in the complaint filed in these proceedings;
but the respondents contend that the petitioner is not entitled to the remedy applied for,
inasmuch as the order prayed for by the provincial fiscal and later granted by the court
below, and again which the instant action was brought, is based on the provisions of
section 1687 of the Administrative Code. Of course, the fiscal under section 1687 of the
Administrative Code, and the proper judge, upon motion of the fiscal, may compel
witnesses to be present at the investigation of any crime or misdemeanor. But this
power must be exercised without prejudice to the constitutional rights of persons cited to
appear.
And the petitioner, in refusing to perform what the fiscal demanded, seeks refuge in the
constitutional provision contained in the Jones Law and incorporated in General Orders,
No. 58.
Therefore, the question raised is to be decided by examining whether the constitutional
provision invoked by the petitioner prohibits compulsion to execute what is enjoined
upon him by the order against which these proceedings were taken.
ISSUE:
Whether the complainant be compelled to write down what the fiscal dictates and used
the said handwritten letters to compare the latter with the letter-evidence against the
complainant.
HELD:
No, writing is something more than moving the body, or the hands, or the fingers; writing
is not a purely mechanical act, because it requires the application of intelligence and
attention; and in the case at bar writing means that the petitioner herein is to furnish a
means to determine whether or not he is the falsifier, as the petition of the respondent
fiscal clearly states. the court said that, for the purposes of the constitutional privilege,
there is a similarity between one who is compelled to produce a document, and one
who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases, the witness
is required to furnish evidence against himself. But even supposing it is impossible to
obtain specimen or specimens without resorting to the means complained herein, that is
no reason for trampling upon a personal right guaranteed by the constitution. It might be
true that in some cases criminals may succeed in evading the hand of justice, but such
cases are accidental and do not constitute the raison d’ etre of the privilege. This
constitutional privilege exists for the protection of innocent persons.