Given that the army was consistently losing, the war effort switched to emphasize three

elements: military intelligence, the air force and the Janjaweed. The latter were
armed Baggara herders whom the government had used to suppress a Masalit uprising from
1986 to 1999. The Janjaweed became the center of the new counter-insurgency strategy.
Though the government consistently denied supporting them, military resources were poured into
Darfur and the Janjaweed were outfitted as a paramilitary force, complete with communication
equipment and some artillery. The military planners were aware of the probable consequences of
such a strategy: similar methods undertaken in the Nuba Mountains and around the southern oil
fields during the 1990s had resulted in massive human rights violations and forced
displacements.[55]

2004–2005[edit]
In 2004, Chad brokered negotiations in N'Djamena, leading to the April 8 Humanitarian Ceasefire
Agreement between the Sudanese government, the JEM, and the SLA. One group that did not
participate in the April cease-fire talks or agreement, the National Movement for Reform and
Development, split from the JEM in April. Janjaweed and rebel attacks continued despite the
ceasefire, and the African Union (AU) formed a Ceasefire Commission (CFC) to monitor its
observance.

Darfur refugee camp in Chad, 2005

In August, the African Union sent 150 Rwandan troops to protect the ceasefire monitors.
However, it soon became apparent that 150 troops would not be enough, and they were
subsequently joined by 150 Nigerian troops.
On 18 September, the United Nations Security Council issued Resolution 1564 declaring that the
Sudan government had not met its commitments and expressing concern at helicopter attacks
and assaults by the Janjaweed. It welcomed the intention of the African Union to enhance its
monitoring mission and urged all member states to support such efforts.
During April, 2005, after the Sudan government signed a ceasefire agreement with Sudan
People's Liberation Army which led to the end of the Second Sudanese Civil War, the African
Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) force was increased by 600 troops and 80 military observers. In
July, the force was increased by about 3,300 (with a budget of 220 million dollars). In April, 2005,
AMIS was increased to about 7,000.
The scale of the crisis led to warnings of an imminent disaster, with United Nations Secretary-
General Kofi Annan warning about the risk of genocide. The scale of the Janjaweed campaign
led to comparisons with the Rwandan genocide, a parallel denied by the Sudanese government.
Independent observers noted that the tactics, which included dismemberment and killing of
noncombatants, including young children and infants, were more akin to the ethnic
cleansing used in the Yugoslav wars and warned that the region's remoteness meant that
hundreds of thousands of people were effectively cut off from aid. The Brussels-
based International Cri