Irst LL Ndia OOT Ourt Ompetition: N HE ON BLE IGH Ourt F Arnataka

VLM1903
FIRST ALL INDIA MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019
M.F.A. No.____/__
IN THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT

OF
KARNATAKA
KAMINI......................................................................................................................APPELLANT
V.
RAJA........................................................................................................................RESPONDENT
[MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT]

1ST ALL INDIA MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS........................................................................................................i
INDEX OF ABBREVIATIONS..............................................................................................iii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES...................................................................................................iv
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION.........................................................................................vi
STATEMENT OF FACTS....................................................................................................vii
STATEMENT OF ISSUES.....................................................................................................ix
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS..............................................................................................x
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED...................................................................................................1
[1] SECTION 14 OF THE HINDU MARRIAGE ACT IS A MANDATORY PROVISION.............1
[1.1] KARNATAKA HIGH COURT HOLDS THE PROVISION MANDATORY.............................1

[1.2] NEED FOR PRESENCE OF EXCEPTIONAL HARDSHIP OR EXCEPTIONAL
DEPRAVITY…………………………………………………………………………........2
[1.3] APPELLATE COURT CAN INTERFERE WITH THE LOWER COURT’S DISCRETION
OF ADMITTING THE DIVORCE PETITION..............................................................................3
[2] RESPONDENT’S MENTAL DISORDER OF SCHIZOPHRENIA WOULD NOT AMOUNT

TO A GROUND FOR DIVORCE............................................................................................4
[2.1] MERE BRANDING OF A PERSON AS SCHIZOPHRENIC WILL NOT SUFFICE.....................4
[2.1.1] SUPREME COURT STATES TEMPORARY-ILL HEALTH IS NOT A GROUND FOR

DIVORCE.............................................................................................................................7
[2.1.2] CAPACITY TO MANAGE ONE’S OWN AFFAIRS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED..................8
[2.2] BURDEN OF PROOF IS ON THE APPELLANT..................................................................8

[2.3] FACT OF RESPONDENT’S MENTAL ILLNESS WAS NOT CONCEALED.............................9
[3] APPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO DIVORCE ON THE GROUNDS OF MENTAL
AND PHYSICAL CRUELTY...................................................................................................9
i
[3.1] CRUELTY NOT SUFFICIENTLY PROVED………………………………………………10
[3.2] CRUELTY NOT TO BE JUDGED FROM A SOLITARY INCIDENT………………………...11
[3.3] FUTURE POSSIBILITY OF CONSUMMATION OF MARRIAGE SHOULD BE
CONSIDERED……………………………………………………………………………….11
[3.4] REFUSAL TO CONSUMMATE MUST EXTEND OVER A LONG PERIOD……………………13
PRAYER…………………………………………………………………...………………..14
ii
INDEX OF ABBREVIATIONS
1. ¶ PARAGRAPH
2. & AND
3. AIR ALL INDIA REPORTER
4. Anr. ANOTHER
5. Art. ARTICLE
6. Hon’ble HONOURABLE
7. i.e. THAT IS
8. Ors. OTHERS
9. Sec. SECTION
10. SC SUPREME COURT
11. SCC SUPREME COURT CASES
12. UOI UNION OF INDIA
13. V. / Vs. VERSUS
14. D.M.C DIVORCE AND MATRIMONIAL

CASES
15. D. L.T. DELHI LAW TIMES
16. H.L.R HINDU LAW REPORTER
17. All ER ALL ENGLAND LAW REPORTS
iii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
1. Sri Sharma H. Kashinath v. Shobha, A.I.R. 2010 Kar 168.

2. Sawita Devi v. Pran Nath, A.I.R. 1967 J&K 89.
3. Meghnatha v. Susheela, A.I.R. 1957 Mad 423.
4. Saudamuni Lenka @ Mohapatra v. Khageswar Lenka, (2001) Femi Jures C.C. 246
(AP).
5. Veena Rani v. Mohinder Kumar, 2001 (1) H.L.R. 495 (P&H).
6. Nirmala Manohar v. Manohar Shivram, A.I.R. 1991 Bom 259.
7. Pramatha Kumar Maity v. Ashima Maity, A.I.R. 1991 Cal 123.
8. Roshan Lal v. Kamlesh, 2000 (2) H.L.R. 651 (P&H).
9. Ram Narain Gupta v. Ramwshwari Gupta, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 2260.
10. Chinmoy Chakrabarty v. Bharati Chakrabarty, 1990 (2) H.L.R. 128.
11. Panduranga Shet (B. N.) v. Vijayalakshmi (S. N.), A.I.R. 2003 Kant 357.
12. Satish Kumar Puri v. Shashi Bala, 2004 (1) H.L.R. 89 (P&H).
13. Ayyala Somayajula Satyanandam v. Usha Devi (AS), (1998) 1 H.L.R. 295 (AP).
14. Hemant Kumar v. Ashabai, 1994 (2) H.L.R. 615 (MP).
15. Pronab Kumar Ghosh v. Krishna Ghosh, A.I.R. 1975 Cal 109.
16. Rita Roy v. Satish Chandra Roy, A.I.R. 1983 Cal 138.
17. Whysall v. Whysall, (1959) 3 All ER 389.
18. Joginder Kaur v. Surjit Singh, A.I.R. 1985 P&H 128.
19. Vinita Saxena v. Pankaj Pandit, (2006) 3 S.C.C. 778.
20. Harmanjit Kaur v. Bhupinder Singh Gill, 2003 (2) H.L.R. 661.
21. Trimlesh Bharti v. Shravan Kumar, II (2005) D.M.C. 550 (U’chal).
22. Kamalshri v. Pramod Kumar, I (2004) D.M.C. 789.
23. Sharada v. Dharmpal, 2004 (1) L.J.R. 540.
24. Usha Gupta v. Santosh Kumar Gupta, I (1996) D.M.C. 90.
25. Kollam Chandra Shekhar v. Kollam Padma Latha, (2014) 1 S.C.C. 225.
26. R. Lakshmi Narayan v. Santhi, A.I.R. 2001 S.C. 2110.
27. Lissy v. Jaison, 2000 (2) H.L.R. 88 (Ker) (FB).
28. Bani Devi v. Banerji, A.I.R. 1972 Del 50.
29. Ajitrai Shivprasad Mehta v. Bai Vasumati, A.I.R. 1969 Guj 48.
30. Krishna Bhat v. Srimathi, 1995 A.I.H.C. 4330 (Kant).
iv
31. A.S. Mehta v. Vasumati, A.I.R. 1969 Guj 48.

32. Hema Reddy v. Rakesh Reddy, (2003) I D.M.C. (AP-DB).
33. Rekha v. Ravindra Kumar, A.I.R.1994 N.O.C. 330 (MP).
34. Chiranjeevi v. Smt. Lavanya, A.I.R. 2006 A.P. 269.
35. A. Jayachandra v. Aneel Kaur, (2005) 2 S.C.C. 22.
36. Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh, (2007) 4 S.C.C. 511.
37. Dastane v. Dastane, (1975) 2 S.C.C. 326.
38. Sulekha Baragi v. Kamala Kanta Baragi, A.I.R. 1980 Cal 370.
39. Bipin Chandra v. Prabhavati, (1956) S.C.R. 838.
40. Naval Kishore Somani v. Poonam Somani, A.I.R. 1999 AP 1.
41. C. R. Centhilkumar v. K. Sutha, (2008) 2 C.T.C. 745.
42. Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli, A.I.R 2006 S.C 1675.
43. Suman Singh v. Sanjay Singh, 2013 S.C.C. Del 2138.
44. Maya v. Brij Nath, A.I.R. 1982 Del 240.
45. Birendra Kumar v. Hemlata Biswas, A.I.R. 1921 Cal 459.
46. Suvarnababen v. Rashmikant Chinubhai Shah, A.I.R. 1970 Guj 43.
47. Yuvraj Digvijay Singh v. Yuvrani Pratap Kumari, 1970 A.I.R. 137.
48. Vidhya Viswanathan v. Kartik Balakrishnan, (2014) 15 S.C.C. 21.
49. Sheldon v. Sheldon, (1966) 2 All ER 257.
BOOKS
1. DESAI, KUMUD, INDIAN LAW OF MARRIAGE & DIVORCE (8th ed., Lexis Nexis 2011).
2. BHARIHOKE, NEERA, M. N. SRINIVASAN’S COMMENTRY ON HINDU LAW (6th ed., Delhi
Law House 2019).
3. MULLA, DINSHAW FARDUNJI, HINDU LAW (23rd ed., Lexis Nexis 2018).
4. MAYNE, JOHN D., MAYNE’S TREATISE ON HINDU LAW & USAGE (Ranganath Misra &
Vijendra Kumar eds., Bharat Law House 2010).
STATUTES
1. THE HINDU MARRIAGE ACT, 1955
v
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The appellant has approached this Honourable High Court under Section 28 of the Hindu
Marriage Act, 1955 (according to which a direct appeal lies to the High Court from the
Family Court) read with Section 96, Order 41, Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908.
And, we submit to the same.
vi
STATEMENT OF FACTS
BACKGROUND
Kamini, daughter of Yogish and Ambika from Kudala, Karnataka was married to Raja, son of
Ramachandra and Uma from Kurupura, Karnataka on January 2010. It so happened that both
of them graduated from the same college though acquired Engineering Degree in different
courses. While the marriage proposal was made, Kamini expressed her will to pursue higher
studies or take up a job and the same was respected by Raja and his parents. Thus, the
marriage happened with the consent of both the parties.
On the wedding night, Raja did not talk to Kamini, instead took some pills and slept. Even
during the day, he was lost in his own world. Next day, Raja spent the whole time sleeping.
The day after that, when Kamini enquired Raja’s mother about his behaviour, she furiously
told Kamini not to ask many questions. Next day, Raja revealed that he would become
nervous once in a while and on such occasions uses medicines to take rest. For, the next few
days Raja continued to take pills and sleep, while Kamini’s expectation of their first night
was unfulfilled.
On the occasion of Kamini questioning Raja as to why he was unaffectionate towards her, he
broke down and mentioned that he was afraid to make amorous advances to her. Later,
Kamini and Raja visited Dr. Prema, a psychiatrist who suggested remedial measures and
prescribed some medicines, after listening to the medical history of Raja, who was earlier
treated by Dr. Ananth for schizophrenia. Dr. Prema asked them to visit again post three days.
However, during the said three days, even with medication, Raja did not perform his marital
duty to Kamini.
When Kamini enquired Raja’s parents about his previous medication, they flew into a rage
and abused Kamini without any rhyme or reason. Raja, suddenly came on Kamini and beat
her mercilessly, and unmindful of where he was hitting her. Then, all of a sudden, he stopped
beating her and went to the store room, where he consumed Baygon spray. He was rushed to
the hospital by his father. Kamini, inspite of objection from Raja’s parents, packed her things
and returned to her parents’ house. All of this happened in a month’s time.
PROCEEDINGS
On deciding to end the marriage which was arranged and conducted according to the Hindu
Marriage Act, 1955, Kamini issued a legal notice to Raja, for which there was no response
vii
from him. Kamini then filed the petition for divorce against Raja in the Family Court at
Kudala, Karnataka.
Kamini made the following contentions in the trial court:
 There was suppression of the fact of previous chronic mental illness of Raja, and such
mental illness of schizophrenia with suicidal tendency was incurable.
 Raja was impotent and incapable to consummate; thus, the marriage was not
consummated.
 Raja and his parents treated Kamini with mental and physical cruelty.
On the above grounds, Kamini claimed for divorce.
Raja made the following contentions in the trial court:
 Kamini and Raja knew each other during college days and the marriage was done in
the hope that Raja would be able to get over his illness, thus there was no suppression
of fact.
 Kamini and her parents consented to the marriage, upon knowing that Raja was the
sole successor for his parents’ entire wealth.
 Raja denied that his illness was incurable, that he was impotent or that he consumed
poison.
 The petition being filed within one month of marriage was premature.
Dr. Prema was examined to prove impotency and schizophrenia. Records from Dr. Ananth’s
clinic were produced along with evidence to prove the handwriting of late Dr. Ananth. An
application requesting physical examination of Raja to report on impotency and incurability
of mental illness was opposed by Raja, following which the court rejected the application.
The domestic servant who witnessed Raja beating Kamini and consuming Baygon spray was
summoned. Medical evidence to show that Raja was treated for attempting to commit suicide
was produced. After examination in chief of Raja, he did not turn up for being cross
examined, in spite of the court giving him several opportunities. Court treated the evidence as
incomplete and closed the case. The trial court rejected the petition holding that impotency
and incurability of mental illness was not proved by medical evidence and that there was no
sufficient proof of cruelty. After fighting the case for five years, Kamini was now constrained
to file an appeal before the High Court of Karnataka.
viii
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
I.
Whether Section 14 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 is a mandatory provision?
II.
Whether the respondent’s mental disorder of schizophrenia would amount to a ground for
divorce in this case?
III.
Whether the appellant is entitled to divorce on the grounds of mental and physical cruelty?
ix
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1. WHETHER SECTION 14 OF THE HINDU MARRIAGE ACT, 1955 IS A MANDATORY
PROVISION?
Section 14 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 is a mandatory provision. A division bench of
this very High Curt has held that it is the mandate of the legislature that a Court should not
entertain a petition for dissolution of marriage by decree of divorce unless on the date of
presentation of the petition, one year has elapsed since the date of marriage. The proviso to
Section 14 allows entertaining of petitions within one year’s limit, only when it is a case of
“exceptional hardship” to the petitioner or “exceptional depravity” on the part of the
respondent. Also, the Appellate Court shall not interfere with the discretion of the district
court unless the Court has proceeded on a wrong principle of law or fails to have regard to a
material consideration or some gross injustice has occurred.
2. WHETHER THE RESPONDENT’S MENTAL DISORDER OF SCHIZOPHRENIA WOULD AMOUNT

TO A GROUND FOR DIVORCE IN THIS CASE?
Appellant cannot be granted divorce on the ground of mental illness of the respondent as per
Section 13(1)(iii) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. Because, the mere branding of a person
as schizophrenic will not suffice and the petitioner must prove that the mental illness is
incurable and it is to such an extent that the petitioner cannot be reasonably expected to live
with the respondent. While examining the incurability and extent of mental illness of a
person, the capacity to manage one’s own affairs must be considered. Moreover, the fact of
mental illness of the respondent was not concealed during the marriage proposal.
3. WHETHER THE APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO DIVORCE ON THE GROUNDS OF MENTAL AND

PHYSICAL CRUELTY?
The appellant is not entitled to divorce on the grounds of mental and physical cruelty, as the
appellant has failed to sufficiently prove cruelty by the respondent. The appellant’s allegation
is based on an isolated incident and is not of a continuous nature. With regards to allegations
of mental cruelty owing to non-consummation of marriage, the future possibility of
consummation should be considered and such non-consummation of marriage would amount
to mental cruelty only if it extends over a long period.
x
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
[1] SECTION 14 OF THE HINDU MARRIAGE ACT IS A MANDATORY PROVISION
Section 14 of the Act says that,
No petition for divorce to be presented within one year of marriage,

(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, it shall not be competent for any court to
entertain any petition for dissolution of a marriage by a decree of divorce, unless at the
date of the presentation of the petition one year has elapsed since the date of the marriage:
Provided that the court may, upon application made to it in accordance with such rules as
may be made by the High Court in that behalf, allow a petition to be presented before one
year has elapsed since the date of the marriage on the ground that the case is one of
exceptional hardship to the petitioner or of exceptional depravity on the part of the
respondent, but if it appears to the court at the hearing of the petition that the petitioner
obtained leave to present the petition by any misrepresentation or concealment of the
nature of the case, the court may, if it pronounces a decree, do so subject to the condition
that the decree shall not have effect until after the expiry of one year from the date of the
marriage or may dismiss the petition without prejudice to any petition which may be
brought after the expiration of the said one year upon the same or substantially the same
facts as those alleged in support of the petition so dismissed.
(2) In disposing of any application under this section for leave to present a petition for
divorce before the expiration of one year from the date of the marriage, the court shall
have regard to the interests of any children of the marriage and to the question whether
there is a reasonable probability of a reconciliation between the parties before the
expiration of the said one year.
[1.1] KARNATAKA HIGH COURT HOLDS THE PROVISION MANDATORY
In its Judgement in the case of Sri Sharma H. Kashinath v. Shobha1, the division bench of the
Karnataka High Court held that,
“A bare reading of Section 14 of the Act would leave one with no doubt that it is the mandate
of the legislature that a Court should not entertain a petition for dissolution of marriage by
decree of divorce unless on the date of presentation of the petition one year has elapsed since
the date of the marriage. With great respect, we are unable to agree with the view taken by
the Calcutta High Court to hold that the provision should be understood to be directory and to
1
A.I.R. 2010 Kar 168.
1
read a different intention to the statutory provision than what is spelt out by the statute itself.
The proviso no doubt enables the High Court to frame rules indicating the circumstances and
subject to fulfilment of the same a petition can be entertained even before the expiry of the
period of one year from the date of the marriage. We are apprised that no such rules have
been framed by this High Court. Learned counsel for the appellant would draw our attention
to the judgments of other High Courts wherein the view expressed is that Section 14 of the
Act need not be construed strictly and a little leeway can be provided to entertain a petition
for dissolution of marriages even when it is presented within a period of twelve months from
the date of the marriage etc. With respect to the learned Judge of these High Courts, as
already indicated above, we are unable to agree with this interpretation of Section 14 of the
Act. Section 14 of the Act serves a salient purpose and the legislature has with intention
introduced this provision in addition to provisions of Section 13 of the Act and other
provisions enabling a spouse to the marriage to seek dissolution of marriage. The opening
sentence in the section which begins with a non obstante clause leaves us with no doubt that
Section 14 of the Act should prevail and the settled principle of interpretation of statutes
being that Courts should adopt a plain and literary understanding of the statute and not to
resort to interpretation either to nullify the intention of the legislature or to rewrite the
statutory provision, with respect to the other High Courts which have taken a contrary view,
we disagree with such views, hold that the legislative intent in the section cannot be avoided
by resort to a process of interpretation to hold the section to be merely a directory provision,
but on the other hand are of the view that it is only a mandatory provision and the intention
and object of the legislation should be respected.
Section 14 has been enacted to discourage young spouses from taking recourse to legal
proceedings in a frivolous, hasty, rash or irresponsible manner so that the ship of marriage
may not be wrecked in the first storm of married life2. Hence Section 14 is a mandatory
provision and the court should adhere to the same.
[1.2] NEED FOR PRESENCE OF EXCEPTIONAL HARDSHIP OR EXCEPTIONAL DEPRAVITY
The proviso in graphs a very important qualification on the general rule laid down in the
Section that no petition for dissolution of marriage by a decree of divorce can be entertained
by the court before the statutory period. It enables the court in the exercise of his discretion to
2
Sawita Devi v. Pran Nath, A.I.R. 1967 J&K 89.
2
grant leave to present such petition before the expiry of 1 year's limit in case of 'exceptional
hardship' to the petitioner or 'exceptional depravity' of the respondent.3
Allegations which, though tentatively may be sufficient to uphold a prayer for a decree for
divorce may not necessarily constitute exceptional hardship within the meaning of the
section. The trial court must indicate reasons and circumstances which it found to be of
exceptional hardship so as to entertain a divorce petition within one year of marriage.4
The Madras High Court in Meghnatha v. Susheela5 propounded two propositions:

(i) It would be a case of exceptional hardship to the petitioner and exceptional depravity on
the part of the respondent, if respondent has committed more than one matrimonial offence,
and
(ii) It would also be exceptional hardship to the petitioner where respondent though has
committed one matrimonial offence, his conduct is reprehensible.
In Saudamuni Lenka @ Mohapatra v. Khageswar Lenka6 a petition for divorce was filed by
the husband within one year of marriage in the usual course and the family court passed the
decree. On appeal, the same was set aside as there was no pleading regarding "hardship"
much less "exceptional hardship"; nor was there any evidence to show any "exceptional
depravity" on the part of the wife. The court remarked that the trial court acted illegally at
accident its jurisdiction in entertaining the petition under Section 13 before the statutory
period of one year after marriage.
Since, there is no sufficient proof of exceptional hardship to the petitioner or exceptional
depravity on the part of the respondent7, such a petition for divorce cannot be filed in the first
place.
[1.3] APPELLATE COURT CAN INTERFERE WITH THE LOWER COURT’S DISCRETION OF
ADMITTING THE DIVORCE PETITION
The Appellate Court will not interfere with the discretion exercised by the district court
unless that Court has proceeded on a wrong principle of law or fails to have regard to a
material consideration or some gross injustice has occurred.8
3
MULLA, DINSHAW FARDUNJI, HINDU LAW 987 (23rd ed., Lexis Nexis 2018).
4
Chandrima Guha v. Sumit Guha, 1994 (2) H.L.R. 244 Cal.
5
A.I.R. 1957 Mad 423.
6
(2001) Femi Jures C.C. 246 (AP).
7
Factsheet pg. 6, ¶ 1, line 15.
8
supra note 4.
3
In the current case, the lower court has committed gross injustice by admitting a premature
petition for divorce, wherein there was no sufficient proof9 of exceptional hardship to the
appellant or exceptional depravity on the part of the respondent.
[2] RESPONDENT’S MENTAL DISORDER OF SCHIZOPHRENIA WOULD NOT AMOUNT TO A
GROUND FOR DIVORCE
According to Section 13 (1) (iii) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955,
(1) Any marriage solemnised, whether before or after the commencement of this Act,
may, on a petition presented by either the husband or the wife, be dissolved by a
decree of divorce on the ground that the other party
(iii) has been incurably of unsound mind, or has been suffering continuously or
intermittently from mental disorder of such a kind and to such an extent that the petitioner
cannot reasonably be expected to live with the respondent.
In this clause,
(a) the expression mental disorder means mental illness, arrested or incomplete
development of mind, psychopathic disorder or any other disorder or disability of
mind and includes schizophrenia;
Thus, for relief under this clause the appellant has to prove that (i) the respondent has been of
unsound mind, (ii) that the same is incurable, (iii) mental disorder is of such a kind and to
such extent that the appellant cannot reasonably be expected to live with the respondent.10
[2.1] MERE BRANDING OF A PERSON AS SCHIZOPHRENIC WILL NOT SUFFICE
Mere presence of mental disorder of schizophrenia cannot amount to a ground for divorce.
The respondent’s mental illness is neither incurable, nor it is to such a degree that renders it
impossible for the appellant to live with the respondent.
All mental abnormalities are not recognized as grounds for grant of decree.11 If the mere
existence of any degree of mental abnormality could justify dissolution of marriage, few
marriages would indeed, survive in law.12
The context in which the ideas of unsoundness of "mind" and "mental disorder" occur in the
section as grounds for dissolution of a marriage, require the assessment of the degree of the
9
supra note 6.
10
KUMUD DESAI, INDIAN LAW OF MARRIAGE & DIVORCE 185 (8th ed., Lexis Nexis 2011).
11
Veena Rani v. Mohinder Kumar, 2001 (1) H.L.R. 495 (P&H).
12
NEERA BHARIHOKE, M N SRINIVASAN’S COMMENTRY ON HINDU LAW 545 (6th ed., Delhi Law House 2019);
Nirmala Manohar v. Manohar Shivram, A.I.R. 1991 Bom 259; Pramatha Kumar Maity v. Ashima Maity, A.I.R.
1991 Cal 123; Roshan Lal v. Kamlesh, 2000 (2) H.L.R. 651 (P&H).
4
"mental disorder". "Schizophrenia" it is true, is said to be difficult mental affliction. It is said

to be insidious in its onset and has hereditary pre-disposing factor. It is characterized by the
shallowness of emotions and is marked by a detachment from reality. In paranoid states, the
victim responds even to fleeting expressions of disapproval from others by disproportionate
reactions generated by hallucinations of persecution. Even well-meant acts of kindness and of
expression of sympathy appear to the victim as insidious traps. In its worst manifestation, this
illness produces a crude wrench from reality and brings about a lowering of the higher mental
functions. But the personality disintegration that characterises this illness may be of varying
degrees. Not all schizophrenics are characterised by the same intensity of the decease. The
mere branding of a person as schizophrenic therefore will not suffice. For purposes of Section
13(1) (iii) "schizophrenia" is what schizophrenia does.13
Insofar as the ground of mental disorder is concerned what is required under law and as
indicated in Section 13(1) (iii) is that a person should be suffering from such mental disorder
and to such an extent that the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with the
respondent. It is not the mere mental disorder in itself that entitles for relief under Section
13(1) (iii) of the Act. Mental disorder should be of such a degree that it is impossible to lead
normal marital life or it is unreasonable to expect a person to put up with a spouse with such
condition.14 If a mental disorder of the spouse is not of such a kind that the wife cannot be
reasonably expected to live with him, she is not entitled to divorce.15
Each case of Schizophrenia has to be considered on its own merits.16 Two elements are
necessary to get decree of divorce. The party concerned must be of unsound mind or
intermittently suffering from schizophrenia or mental disorder. At the same time, that disease
must be of such a kind and of such an extent that the other party cannot reasonably be
expected to live with him. So, only one element of the clause is insufficient to grant a
decree.17
In the English case of Whysall v. Whysall18, it was held that a spouse is ‘incurably of unsound
mind’ if he or she is of such mental incapacity as to make normal married life impossible and
13
Ram Narain Gupta v. Ramwshwari Gupta, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 2260; Chinmoy Chakrabarty v. Bharati
Chakrabarty 1990 (2) H.L.R. 128.
14
Panduranga Shet (B. N.) v. Vijayalakshmi (S. N.), A.I.R. 2003 Kant 357; Satish Kumar Puri v. Shashi Bala,
2004 (1) H.L.R. 89 (P&H).
15
Ayyala Somayajula Satyanandam v. Usha Devi (AS), (1998) 1 H.L.R. 295 (AP); Hemant Kumar v. Ashabai,
1994 (2) H.L.R. 615 (MP).
16
Pronab Kumar Ghosh v. Krishna Ghosh, A.I.R. 1975 Cal 109.
17
Rita Roy v. Satish Chandra Roy, A.I.R. 1983 Cal 138; Joginder Kaur v. Surjit Singh, A.I.R. 1985 P&H 128.
18
(1959) 3 All ER 389.
5
there is no prospect of any improvement in mental health, which would make this possible in
future.
Doctor’s evidence merely proving that the spouse is suffering from Schizophrenia is not
sufficient. Mental disorder should be of such a degree that it is impossible to lead a normal
life.19 Even assuming for argument sake without going to the controversy as to whether the
respondent is suffering from schizophrenia has been proved or not, and accepting one of the
doctor's opinion that it is so and that the respondent is suffering from schizophrenia, the next
question will be as to whether the petitioner has been able to prove that it was impossible or
unreasonable for the petitioner to be expected to live with such a person.20 The medical
evidence regarding the requisite degree of mental disorder is relevant though not conclusive.
Supreme Court also observed that when there was sufficient evidence for the court to
conclude that the slight mental disorder of the wife was not of such a kind and to such an
extent that the husband could not reasonably be expected to live with her, divorce could not
be granted.21
With a view to bring a case within the ambit of section 13(1)(iii) of the Act, it is to be
established by the person seeking divorce that the other party is of incurably unsound mind
and is suffering from mental disorders which have completely arrested the development of
the mind. As held by Madhya Pradesh High Court22, the following elements or symptoms are
required to be present:
(i) failure to maintain social contact with external relation;
(ii) failure to have a distinction between what is going on in the mind of the patient
and what is going on in the external world;
(iii) there should be depravity of reason;
(iv) disordered working of the nervous system; and
(v) there should be disorder in social relations.
However, this is not the case with the respondent herein; none of these symptoms are shown
in the respondent. He is an independent, well educated, responsible man leading a normal
life. And the same is evident from the fact that the respondent has passed out of Engineering
College with a degree.23 He took the decision of settling down with his parents. 24 It should
19
Vinita Saxena v. Pankaj Pandit, (2006) 3 S.C.C. 778; Panduranga Shet (B. N.) v. Vijayalakshmi (S. N.),
A.I.R. 2003 Kant 357; Harmanjit Kaur v. Bhupinder Singh Gill, 2003 (2) H.L.R. 661; Trimlesh Bharti v.
Shravan Kumar, II (2005) D.M.C. 550 (U’chal); Kamalshri v. Pramod Kumar, I (2004) D.M.C. 789.
20
Panduranga Shet v. Vijayalakshmi, A.I.R. 2003 Kant 357.
21
Sharada v. Dharmpal, 2004 (1) L.J.R. 540.
22
Usha Gupta v. Santosh Kumar Gupta, I (1996) D.M.C. 90.
23
6
also be noted that, while the marriage proposal was made, the respondent was considerate
about the appellant’s willingness to pursue higher studies or to take up a job.25
[2.1.1] SUPREME COURT STATES TEMPORARY-ILL HEALTH IS NOT A GROUND FOR
DIVORCE
The Supreme Court in Kollam Chandra Shekar v. Kollam Padma Latha26, held that
temporary ill-health including schizophrenia, a mental illness, cannot be a ground for divorce
under section 13(1)(iii) of the Hindu Marriage Act. Pointing out that the respondent had not
only completed MBBS but also had done a postgraduate diploma in Medicine and that she
was continuously working as a Government Medical Officer, the Bench said: “Had she been
suffering from any serious kind of mental disorder, particularly, acute type of schizophrenia,
it would have been impossible for her to work in the post. The appellant-husband cannot
simply abandon his wife because she is suffering from sickness.” If he felt that she “is still
suffering, then she must be given the right treatment. Marriage is highly revered in India and
we are a Nation that prides itself on the strong foundation of our marriages, come hell or high
water, rain or sunshine. Life is made up of good times and bad, and the bad times can bring
with it terrible illnesses and extreme hardships. The partners in a marriage must weather these
storms and embrace the sunshine with equanimity. Any person may have bad health, this is
not their fault and most times, it is not within their control.”
Supreme Court observed that to brand the wife as unfit for marriage and procreation of
children on account of the mental disorder, it needs to be established that the ailment suffered
by her is of such a kind or such an extent that it is impossible for her to lead a normal married
life.27
It is found that about one-third of such sufferers recover fully; another one-third is able to
lead near normal lives with the help of anti-psychotic drugs in tablets or injection form. Most
of the remainder can lead ordinary lives only with medication and occasional
hospitalization.28
24
25
26
Kollam Chandra Shekhar v. Kollam Padma Latha, (2014) 1 S.C.C. 225.
27
R. Lakshmi Narayan v. Santhi, A.I.R. 2001 S.C. 2110.
28
Ram Narain Gupta v. Rameshwari Gupta, 1998 S.C.C. (4) 247.
7
[2.1.2] CAPACITY TO MANAGE ONE’S OWN AFFAIRS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED
The expression “incurably of unsound mind” was interpreted to mean a person who is not
capable of managing himself or herself or his or her affairs as any ordinary reasonable person
could do.29 In Ajitrai Shivprasad Mehta v. Bai Vasumati30, the Court observed that the test to
be applied is whether by reason of his mental condition, he is capable of managing himself
and the affairs and if not, whether he can hope to be restored to a stage in which he will be
able to do, and the test of the capacity is that of a reasonable person. This is not the case with
the respondent herein. As already stated, the respondent has successfully completed his
education, that too in a Professional Course as Engineering, which is a four year long,
exhaustive and demanding course. A man who is incapable of managing his own affairs
cannot be expected to complete a four year long Professional Course.
[2.2] BURDEN OF PROOF IS ON THE APPELLANT
In Krishna Bhat v. Srimathi31 it was held that, “The question to be considered in the appeal is
whether the appellant has established the ingredients of Section 13(1) (iii) of the Hindu
Marriage Act. To succeed in such a case the applying spouse should establish that the
respondent is incurably of unsound mind or the applicant may lead such evidence as to show
that the respondent suffers from mental disorder of a kind continuously or intermittently
which establishes that the appellant cannot be reasonably expected to live with the
respondent. From the wordings of the section it admits of no doubt that the burden of proving
of existence of sufficient degree of unsoundness of mind is entirely on the appellant. The
standard of proof in such case is very high.”
The onus of proving that the respondent is of incurably unsound mind or that he is suffering
from mental disorder is on the appellant. It must be proved by cogent and clear evidence
beyond reasonable doubt.32
Though the respondent is suffering from schizophrenia, there is nothing to show that he is
suffering from serious degree of the disease. The Appellant has failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that the respondent is suffering from serious mental illness. No such
evidence was produced by the appellant in the lower court, which shows that the respondent
29
Lissy v. Jaison, 2000 (2) H.L.R. 88 (Ker) (FB); Bani Devi v. Banerji, A.I.R. 1972 Del 50.
30
A.I.R. 1969 Guj 48.
31
1995 A.I.H.C. 4330 (Kant).
32
A.S. Mehta v. Vasumati, A.I.R. 1969 Guj 48; Hema Reddy v. Rakesh Reddy, (2003) I D.M.C. (AP-DB);
Rekha v. Ravindra Kumar, A.I.R.1994 NOC 330 (MP).
8
is suffering from incurable unsoundness of mind of such degree that it is impossible for the
spouse to live with him.
[2.3] FACT OF RESPONDENT’S MENTAL ILLNESS WAS NOT CONCEALED
The appellant and the respondent knew each other since college. There was no suppression of
fact. The marriage was done in the hope that through the appellant’s support and
companionship, the mental illness of the respondent will be cured.
Hence, the Appellant cannot claim for a decree under Section 13(1) (iii) of the Hindu
Marriage Act.
[3] APPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO DIVORCE ON THE GROUNDS OF MENTAL AND

PHYSICAL CRUELTY
Mental cruelty is a state of mind and feeling of one of the spouses due to the behaviour or
behavioural pattern by the other. Unlike the case of physical cruelty, mental cruelty is
difficult to establish by direct evidence. It is necessarily a matter of inference to be drawn
from the facts and circumstances of the case. A feeling of anguish, disappointment and
frustration in one spouse caused by the conduct of the other can only be appreciated on
assessing the attending facts and circumstances in which the two partners of matrimonial life
have been living. The inference has to be drawn from attending the facts and circumstances
taken cumulatively. In case of mental cruelty, it will not be a correct approach to take an
instance of misbehaviour in isolation and then pose that question whether such behaviour is
sufficient by itself to cause mental cruelty.33
Cruelty can be physical or mental. Cruelty which is a ground for dissolution of marriage may
be defined as wilful and unjustifiable conduct of such character as to cause danger to life,
limb or health, bodily or mental, or as to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of such a
danger. The question of mental cruelty has to be considered in the light of the norms of
marital ties of the particular society to which the parties belong, their social values, status,
environment in which they live. Cruelty, as noted above, includes mental cruelty, which falls
within the purview of a matrimonial wrong.34
Mental cruelty as a course of unprovoked conduct towards one’s spouse which causes
embarrassment, humiliation and anguish so as to render the spouse’s life is miserable and
33
Chiranjeevi v. Smt. Lavanya, A.I.R. 2006 A.P. 269.
34
A. Jayachandra v. Aneel Kaur, (2005) 2 S.C.C. 22.
9
unendurable. The plaintiff must show a course of conduct on the part of the defendant which
so endangers the physical or mental health of the plaintiff as to render continued cohabitation
unsafe or improper, although the plaintiff need not establish actual instances of physical
abuse.35
[3.1] CRUELTY NOT SUFFICIENTLY PROVED
It is settled law that in all matrimonial cases burden of proof is on the petitioner. Particularly
in cases of cruelty it is for the petitioner to prove the element of legal cruelty. 36
In Dastane v Dastane,37 the Apex Court submitted that the petitioner must prove that the
respondent has treated her with cruelty and when the petitioner has not discharged her burden
of proving the allegations, the court below was right in dismissing her petitions.
In a case of divorce on the ground of cruelty, the petitioner is required to prove cruelty of the
nature which gives rise to a reasonable apprehension in his mind that it would be harmful and
injurious to life.38
A three Judge bench of Supreme Court speaking through J. B.P Sinha, laid down that in a
divorce proceeding, the petitioner had to establish beyond reasonable doubt. In this case for
the first time, the Supreme Court laid down the rule that the standard of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt is required in matrimonial proceedings.39
The Andhra Pradesh High Court is of the view that it is essential for the petitioner, who
claims relief, to prove that a particular part of the conduct or behaviour resulted in cruelty to
him. No prior assumptions can be made in such matters. Meaning, thereby that it cannot be
assumed that particular conduct will under all circumstances amount to cruelty vis-à-vis the
other party. The aggrieved party has to make specific case that the conduct of which
exception is taken amounts to cruelty.40
The appellant approached the Family Court seeking divorce alleging that the respondent had
treated her with cruelty. In accordance with the above-mentioned judgements, it is the
appellant who had to prove that the respondent had treated her with cruelty. However, the
35
Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh, (2007) 4 S.C.C. 511.
36
NEERA BHARIHOKE, M N SRINIVASAN’S COMMENTRY ON HINDU LAW 555 (6th ed., Delhi Law House 2019).
37
(1975) 2 S.C.C. 326.
38
Sulekha Baragi v. Kamala Kanta Baragi, A.I.R. 1980 Cal 370.
39
Bipin Chandra v. Prabhavati, (1956) S.C.R. 838.
40
Naval Kishore Somani v. Poonam Somani, A.I.R. 1999 AP 1.
10
appellant has failed to sufficiently prove her case in the Trial Court which led to the court
holding in favour of the respondent.41
[3.2] CRUELTY NOT TO BE JUDGED FROM A SOLITARY INCIDENT
Cruelty is to be judged not from a solitary incident, but on an overall consideration of all
relevant circumstances.42
The married life should be reviewed as a whole and a few isolated instances over a period of
years will not amount to cruelty. The ill conduct must be persistent for a fairly lengthy period,
where the relationship has deteriorated to an extent that because of the acts and behaviour of
a spouse, the wronged party finds it extremely difficult to live with the other party any longer,
may amount to mental cruelty.43 No decree for divorce on one isolated incident can be
passed.44 In Suman Singh v. Sanjay Singh45 it was held that the cruelty alleged must be of a
recurring and a continuous incident which was not in the present case. It was an isolated
event which was not continuous or recurring.
In Maya v. Brij Nath46, it was held by the Court that cruelty has not been defined but it was
well settled that the conduct should be grave and weighty so as to make cohabitation virtually
unendurable. It must be more serious than the ordinary wear and tear of marriage. It was held
that a cumulative conduct taking into consideration the circumstances and background of the
parties has to be examined to reach a conclusion whether the act amounts to cruelty.
The cruelty alleged by the appellant cannot be taken into consideration for the grant of
divorce as the said incident was not of a continuous nature and was an isolated incident. The
respondent had not treated the petitioner with cruelty since the time they got married. The
respondent never exhibited any cruel behaviour towards the appellant prior to the said
incident.
[3.3] FUTURE POSSIBILITY OF CONSUMMATION OF MARRIAGE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED
Impotency is ordinarily understood to mean incapacity which admits of neither copulation

nor procreation, capacity for sexual intercourse seeming to the matter chiefly regarded in the
adjudged cases on the subject. Hence impotency has been taken to mean physical and
41
Factsheet pg.6, ¶ 2, line 15.
42
C. R. Centhilkumar v. K. Sutha, (2008) 2 C.T.C. 745.
43
Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh, (2007) 4 S.C.C 511; Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli, A.I.R 2006 S.C 1675.
44
Suman Singh v. Sanjay Singh, 2013 S.C.C. Del 2138.
45
Id.
46
A.I.R. 1982 Del 240.
11
incurable incapacity from entering into the marriage, that is, incapacity to consummate the
marriage.47
In Halsbury’s Law of England, ‘impotent’ was termed to be such a state of mental or physical
condition which makes consummation of the marriage a practical impossibility.
The essential ingredient of impotency is the incapacity for accomplishing the act of sexual
intercourse and in the context, it means not partial or imperfect, but normal and complete
coitus. This incapacity may arise either from a structural defect in the organs of generation
which is incurable and renders complete sexual intercourse impracticable or from some
incurable mental or moral disability vis-a-vis the other spouse resulting in inability to
consummate marriage.48
What is meant by impotent: Impotence means the incapacity to perform full and natural
sexual intercourse. It may be due to an organic defect or due to invincible repugnance or
hatred for sexual intercourse in general or with reference to a particular person or due to some
loathsome and incurable disease like syphilis which incapacitates the individual from having
sexual intercourse. It need not be due to physical incapacity and may be caused by the mental
or physical condition which would render normal intercourse impossible though such mental
condition may not amount to unsoundness of mind, insanity or idiocy."49
According to Skopec, most patients with schizophrenia do not differ from controls in terms of
actual sexual behaviour.50
Most studies show that individuals with schizophrenia do not differ much from the general
population in terms of sexual desire. It appears that schizophrenia does not interfere with a
person’s overall sex drive.51
Respondent mentioned that he was getting treated by Dr. Ananth, another psychiatrist since
few years after he entered engineering college.52 This shows that he was getting treatment for
Schizophrenia and it was under control as he was taking medications for the same and he
47
Birendra Kumar v. Hemlata Biswas, A.I.R. 1921 Cal 459.
48
Suvarnababen v. Rashmikant Chinubhai Shah, A.I.R. 1970 Guj 43.
49
JOHN D. MAYNE, MAYNE’S TREATISE ON HINDU LAW & USAGE 207 (Ranganath Misra & Vijendra Kumar
eds., Bharat Law House 2010).
50
Skopec HM, Rosenberg SD, Tucker GJ, Sexual Behavior in Schizophrenia, MED ASPECTS HUMAN SEX
(1976).
51
Boer, Marrit et al, The Facts About Sexual (Dys)function in Schizophrenia: An Overview of Clinically
Relevant Findings, SCHIZOPHRENIA BULLETIN (2015).
52
12
would get over his illness once he has a companion for life. This implies that his illness was
under control. The respondent does not fall within the provided definitions of impotency.
Supreme Court observed that the court has to see whether the marriage can be consummated
in the future and if it comes to a conclusion that there is a possibility then petition should be
dismissed.53
Since the respondent’s illness was under control, it is not impossible to consummate the
marriage in the future.
[3.4] REFUSAL TO CONSUMMATE MUST EXTEND OVER A LONG PERIOD
“Undoubtedly, not allowing a spouse for a long time, to have sexual intercourse by his or her
partner, without sufficient reason, itself amounts mental cruelty to such spouse.54
"The persistent refusal of sexual intercourse may amount to cruelty, at any rate when it
extends over a long period and causes grave injury to the health of the other. One must of
course, make allowances for any excuses that may account for it, such as ill-health, or time of
life, or age, or even psychological infirmity. These excuses may so mitigate the conduct that
the other party ought to put up with it. It after making all allowances however, the conduct is
such that the other party should not be called upon to endure it, then it is cruelty."55
The above judgement given in Sheldon v. Sheldon was upheld in Samar Ghosh v. Jaya
Ghosh.56
First of all, in the present case the appellant and the respondent were together for only a
month. Within the span of a month the appellant came to the conclusion that the respondent
was impotent. This Hon’ble court should consider that a month’s time is not a considerable
time to come to a conclusion that respondent is impotent.
Secondly, according to the holding in Sheldon v. Sheldon, the respondent’s psychological

infirmity is one such allowance that should be considered and thus not amounting to cruelty.
Thus, the respondent cannot be granted divorce on the grounds of mental and physical
cruelty.
53
Yuvraj Digvijay Singh v. Yuvrani Pratap Kumari, 1970 A.I.R. 137.
54
Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh, (2007) 4 S.C.C. 511; Vidhya Viswanathan v. Kartik Balakrishnan, (2014) 15
S.C.C. 21.
55
Sheldon v. Sheldon, (1966) 2 All E.R. 257.
56
supra note 53.
13
PRAYER
Wherefore, in light of the issues raised, authorities cited and arguments advanced, the
Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka be pleased to:
Dismiss the Appeal.
AND/OR
Pass any other order it may deem fit, in the interest of Justice, Equity and Good Conscience.
All of which is most humbly and respectfully submitted.
Counsel on behalf of Respondent
Sd/-
14

Irst LL Ndia OOT Ourt Ompetition: N HE ON BLE IGH Ourt F Arnataka

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VLM1903

FIRST ALL INDIA MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019

IN THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT

[MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT]

[1] SECTION 14 OF THE HINDU MARRIAGE ACT IS A MANDATORY PROVISION.............1

[1.1] KARNATAKA HIGH COURT HOLDS THE PROVISION MANDATORY.............................1

OF ADMITTING THE DIVORCE PETITION..............................................................................3

[2] RESPONDENT’S MENTAL DISORDER OF SCHIZOPHRENIA WOULD NOT AMOUNT

[2.1] MERE BRANDING OF A PERSON AS SCHIZOPHRENIC WILL NOT SUFFICE.....................4

[2.1.1] SUPREME COURT STATES TEMPORARY-ILL HEALTH IS NOT A GROUND FOR

[2.2] BURDEN OF PROOF IS ON THE APPELLANT..................................................................8

[3] APPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO DIVORCE ON THE GROUNDS OF MENTAL

AND PHYSICAL CRUELTY...................................................................................................9

[3.1] CRUELTY NOT SUFFICIENTLY PROVED………………………………………………10

[3.2] CRUELTY NOT TO BE JUDGED FROM A SOLITARY INCIDENT………………………...11

[3.3] FUTURE POSSIBILITY OF CONSUMMATION OF MARRIAGE SHOULD BE

[3.4] REFUSAL TO CONSUMMATE MUST EXTEND OVER A LONG PERIOD……………………13

3. AIR ALL INDIA REPORTER

10. SC SUPREME COURT

11. SCC SUPREME COURT CASES

12. UOI UNION OF INDIA

13. V. / Vs. VERSUS

14. D.M.C DIVORCE AND MATRIMONIAL

15. D. L.T. DELHI LAW TIMES

16. H.L.R HINDU LAW REPORTER

17. All ER ALL ENGLAND LAW REPORTS

1. Sri Sharma H. Kashinath v. Shobha, A.I.R. 2010 Kar 168.

31. A.S. Mehta v. Vasumati, A.I.R. 1969 Guj 48.

Kamini made the following contentions in the trial court:

On the above grounds, Kamini claimed for divorce.

Raja made the following contentions in the trial court:

Whether Section 14 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 is a mandatory provision?

1. WHETHER SECTION 14 OF THE HINDU MARRIAGE ACT, 1955 IS A MANDATORY

2. WHETHER THE RESPONDENT’S MENTAL DISORDER OF SCHIZOPHRENIA WOULD AMOUNT

3. WHETHER THE APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO DIVORCE ON THE GROUNDS OF MENTAL AND

[1] SECTION 14 OF THE HINDU MARRIAGE ACT IS A MANDATORY PROVISION

Section 14 of the Act says that,

No petition for divorce to be presented within one year of marriage,

[1.2] NEED FOR PRESENCE OF EXCEPTIONAL HARDSHIP OR EXCEPTIONAL DEPRAVITY

The Madras High Court in Meghnatha v. Susheela5 propounded two propositions:

ADMITTING THE DIVORCE PETITION

[2.1] MERE BRANDING OF A PERSON AS SCHIZOPHRENIC WILL NOT SUFFICE

"mental disorder". "Schizophrenia" it is true, is said to be difficult mental affliction. It is said

[2.1.2] CAPACITY TO MANAGE ONE’S OWN AFFAIRS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED

[2.3] FACT OF RESPONDENT’S MENTAL ILLNESS WAS NOT CONCEALED

[3] APPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO DIVORCE ON THE GROUNDS OF MENTAL AND

[3.1] CRUELTY NOT SUFFICIENTLY PROVED

[3.2] CRUELTY NOT TO BE JUDGED FROM A SOLITARY INCIDENT

[3.3] FUTURE POSSIBILITY OF CONSUMMATION OF MARRIAGE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED

Impotency is ordinarily understood to mean incapacity which admits of neither copulation

[3.4] REFUSAL TO CONSUMMATE MUST EXTEND OVER A LONG PERIOD

Secondly, according to the holding in Sheldon v. Sheldon, the respondent’s psychological

Dismiss the Appeal.

All of which is most humbly and respectfully submitted.

Counsel on behalf of Respondent

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