The Sociological Quarterly 18 (Spring 1977): 165-175

Max Weber, Interpretive Sociology, and the

Sense of Historical Science: a Positivistic
Conception of Verstehen
THOMAS
BURGER,
Southern Illinois University at Carbondale

Weber’s advocacy of understanding and an interpretive sociology is shown to be a consequence

of the anthropological premises of his theory of concept formation in history. These premises,
which are implied in his Rickertian conception of value-relevance as the foundation of historical
knowledge, are that men are interested in understandable historical developments because of
their practical involvement in society-they rely on historical knowledge in their efforts to make
sense out of the present. While acknowledging this indispensable function of history Weber
insists, however, that historical knowledge can strictly justify neither the meaning given to the
present nor man’s conduct in practical affairs. This is why, in opposition to the mainstream of the
Verstehen tradition, he argues against a valuing historical and social science. Yet this separation
of values and facts does not entail an option for an irrational decisionism in value matters. On the
contrary, it provides the very basis for their rational discussion. Those who impute to Weber the
position that empirical knowledge has nothing to contribute to a social praxis but instrumental
recommendations do not realize that this makes nonsense of his justification of historical
knowledge.

MAXWEBERhas been both praised and criticized for his advocacy of Verstehen
(understanding) and an interpretive sociology which occupies a prominent place in
discussions of his work (Warriner, 1969; Wax, 1967; Munch, 1975). Regretfully,
many contributions to the social science literature which deal with this issue exhibit
a rather myopic quality. This is not because the specific questions raised could in
any absolute way be said to be unimportant or irrelevant, but rather it is the
consequence of a general misconception about the thrust of Weber’s arguments in
favor of Verstehen. This misconception manifests itself in the widespread
acceptance of a taken-for-granted framework which seems to be considered
satisfactory in identifying the focus of Weber’s pronouncements, and adequate for
an exhaustive discussion of his intentions. In a summary fashion, this framework
may be described as a combination of two assumptions: (1) according to Weber,
social science requires, or is characterized by, a specific method, i.e., Verstehen,
and (2) Weber’s argument is mainly directed against a behavioristic sociology and
any form of psychological reductionism.
Although it can be shown that Weber never subscribed to the first assumption,
and that the second requires careful specification to fairly represent his position,
such arguments will receive only minor attention here. Instead, this paper attempts
to show that the acceptance of these two premises as an adequate basis for a
discussion of Weberian Verstehen has diverted attention from an important
philosophical issue which historically has been connected with this conception. It
has served to focus the interest on two central problems, namely that of knowledge
of man’s “inner” states, and that of the logic of explanation. In either case Weber
had little, and at any rate nothing particularly original, to say. The larger issue,
within which these questions arose for Weber, and in whose context alone certain
Reprints of this article may be obtained by writing Thomas Burger, Department of Sociology,
Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, Carbondale, IL 62901.
166 THE SOCIOLOGICAL QUARTERLY

features of his reasoning become explicable (e.g., the frequent association in his
methodological writings of Verstehen and “cultural significance”) was discarded
from consideration. This issue is concerned with what might be called the
“practicality” of historical and sociological knowledge, that is, its function for
man’s practical existence in society. Its neglect becomes truly astonishing with the
realization that the notion of Verstehen was originally introduced into the
methodology of the historical and social sciences (by the German historian Johann
Gustav Droysen [1960, 19671) precisely in an effort to place an idea of practical
knowledge in opposition to the positivistic conception of a merely contemplative,
theoretical knowledge. The problem of developing a conception of knowledge
whose relation to practical life goes beyond instrumental considerations has been
the central concern of the Vrrstehen tradition. Innumerable statements by
Verstehen proponents testify to this concern; knowledge of human phenomena, as
they envisage it, is to be not merely instrumentally applicable but also constitutive
in the reasoned selection of goals themselves. Needless to say, Weber diverged
from this view. His arguments on Verstehen are embedded in a positivistic
perspective on the relationship between science and practical action. These
arguments are of more than mere historical relevance. In view of the recent
resurgence of interest in questions relating to the practical nature of social science
(Gadamer, 1974; Habermas, 1971), it seems worthwhile to give an outline of
Weber’s position, a positivistic view of historical Verstehen.
The importance which Weber attached to the requirement of understanding and
the establishment of an interpretive sociology is quite obvious. He admitted, of
course, that his defipition of sociology as limited to the treatment of meaningful
action processes could not be forced upon anyone (Weber, 1968:13). Yet he also
argued over and over again that the connection of the historian’s scientific aims with
the understandability of human action is basic to the methodology of the historical
sciences (Weber, 1922:84, 88-9, 99, 415; Weber, 1968:8, 10-1, 13, 15). An inquiry
into the reasons of Weber’s insistence on the importance of understanding leads to
the heart of his methodology of social science, namely the theory of concept
formation in history. This theory, which with some difficulty can be distilled from
his methodological essays, was largely borrowed by Weber (as he himself
acknowledged, 1922:3-4, n. 2) from the philosopher Heinrich Rickert (1863-1936)
who expounded it mainly in his book Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen
Begriffsbildung (The Limits to the Concept Formation of Natural Science [ 19021).
Rickert was preoccupied with the traditional problem of 19th-century German
theory of historiography, namely the questioned scientific status of history; thus his
explicit concern was to demonstrate that, contrary to the Positivists’ assertions,
historical knowledge in its traditional form could claim scientific status. He
attempted to do this by arguing that the Positivists’ conception of scientific
knowledge was founded on the mistaken and metaphysical assumption that only the
general features of phenomena (their laws) were worth knowing. Rickert conceded
that if this were a correct doctrine, then indeed only nomological knowledge could
be considered genuinely scientific. He insisted, however, that with the formulation
of a more adequate conception of knowledge the investigation of individual series of
events and unique constellation of facts (i.e., history) could be shown to be equally
justifiable as a scientific undertaking. In Rickert’s view, knowledge is a representa-
tion or “picture” of empirical reality in the human mind. Since reality is infinite,
and the mind is “limited” (Rickert 1902:34), this picture must necessarily be
 Positivistic Conception of Verstehen 167
selective or “abstract.” The validity of a scientific representationof the world thus
is a function of the validity of the standard of selection, orprinciple of abstraction,
in accordance with which it has been assembled. Rickert attempts to show that
there are two valid principles of abstraction (for a detailed analysis, cf. Burger,
1976:21-56), one leading to a knowledge of the general features of the world (its
laws), the other leading to a knowledge of a few selected portions of the world in
their concreteness. The former underlies natural science, the latter (which is here
called the “standard of value-relevance”) is the basis of history as a science. The
validity of these standards rests on the fact that all natural scientists and historians,
respectively, are agreed on their use because they consider the resulting knowledge
worthwhile.
When the methods of abstraction are considered without regard to their negative
feature of eliminating part of reality as not worth knowing, but with regard to their
positive function of leading to the assembly of a picture of the world, they can be
considered methods of “concept formation.” A concept, for Rickert and Weber, is
aformed (“abstract”) image of empirical reality in the mind. It is formed in that it is
not a mirror reflection but composed through abstraction. Depending on the kind of
abstraction used in the formation of a concept, it is then possible to distinguish
“general” concepts and “individual” ones. The formation of general concepts
(laws) is the goal of the natural sciences, the formation of individual concepts is the
goal of history. In Rickert’s and Weber’s terminology, then, an historical account
(of, e.g., the decline of the Roman empire), no matter how long and complex,
constitutes one individual, or “historical,” concept.
The relevance of the Rickert-Weberian theory of concept formation for
Verstehen and the practicality of knowledge becomes apparent through the
description of the peculiar fashion in which the principle of historical concept
formation is conceived by Weber and Rickert to operate. (It may be useful to
indicate here that it is crucial to a correct understanding of Weber’s methodological
writings to realize that “social science,” “cultural science,” and “history” are
used synonymously. Failure to do so is a common feature of the secondary
literature and mars, for example, Parsons’ interpretation [Parsons, 1949591-61.)
As indicated, they claim that this principle is a standard whose application leads to
the establishment of knowledge which all historians consider useful. Its application
allows the identification of both the concrete phenomena which are to be known in
their uniqueness, and the particular component parts whose constellation consti-
tutes this individuality. This principle of “value-relevance’’ (Weber, 1922:86,96),
which guarantees the objectivity and scientific status of historical knowledge,
decrees that the only facts of empirical reality which are worth knowing in their
unique particularity are those which have a particular significance with regard to the
cultural values of the society or cultural community in which the historian lives
(Weber, 1949:78). The specifics of this principle are taken for granted by Weber,
who never explicates them, and Rickert’s description is less than clear. Yet its
correct understanding is absolutely essential if any sense is to be made out of
Weber’s methodological writings. Unfortunately Weber’s interpreters, with the
possible exception of von Schelting (1922), have been rather unsuccessful on this
score (Runciman is the latest example [1972]). This is perhaps the main reason for
their failure to see the larger issues involved in his advocacy of Verstehen.
Expressed in its simplest form, the point which Rickert and Weber want to make
is this: men are “cultural” beings, i.e., value-implementing beings; for this reason
168 THE SOCIOLOGICAL QUARTERLY

they are interested in their past; this interest focuses on a circumscribed part of the
past only; therefore history as a science is possible. It is by the notion of
value-relevance that Rickert and Weber link these claims, and they do so by
developing the implications of their conception of man as a cultural being. For
them, this conception refers to the circumstance that the social arrangements within
which men live are not “natural” in the sense that their emergence, maintenance,
and change or destruction could be explained by reference to man’s biological
make-up or other factors in principle beyond his control. The particular forms
which they take are not fixed as is, for instance, the social organization of an anthill
or beehive. Rather, the existence of the particular forms of human social life is due
to the fact that men develop ideas concerning desirable or obligatory ways in which
their coexistence should be structured. These ideas Rickert and Weber call
“(general) cultural values,’’ and they refer to such things as family, state, church,
science, and the economy. What they seem to have in mind is that there are certain
kinds of activities, like procreation, settlement of disputes, worship, accumulation
of cognitive knowledge, and satisfaction of personal needs (all of which involve
social interaction), whose regulation is not “automatically” accomplished by
hereditary properties of man’s “nature,” but “artificially,” or perhaps better,
“man-made,” through institutional arrangements. (Cf., Weber’s remarks on “the
relative role in the early stages of human social differentiation of purely
mechanical-instinctive differentiation as compared to that.. .which was consciously
and rationally created” [Weber, 1964:12, 1968: 171). General cultural values are
ideas concerning the regulation of sectors of activity whose pursuit is amenable to
institutional control. Thus, whatever institutions there exist, they are always
“embodiments” of certain ideas, and their development, maintenance, and change
must be viewed as being due to attempts by human individuals to implement their
relevant ideas (Weber, 1922:116,1949:150-1). These ideas are called values because
adherence to them is not merely contemplative or otherwise without practical
consequence, but involves the recognition that the actor who holds them somehow
has the duty or task to attempt their practical implementation.
Man as a social being cannot help but spend a large part of his existence in
societally regulated contexts. His life chances are deeply affected by the prevailing
forms of this regulation. Man is therefore not indifferent toward them, but has ideas
and preferences with regard to their existence and development; that is, he tries to
implement (more or less forcefully and successfully) value-ideas. These sectors of
activities in which everyone, qua social being, is involved and about whose
regulations everyone holds ideas and consequently tries to implement (this includes
preference for the sratus quo) may be called the “common concerns” of a society.
The holding of value-ideas with regard to these concerns, in which man is
existentially involved as a practical actor, defines him as a cultural being. It is this
existential involvement which makes man attach importance to the particularities
of a given situation in which he has to act, and notjust the general features (Weber,
1949:74,81). For the same reason, of course, he is not indifferent to occurrences
which have repercussions on this situation.
The fact that man is a cultural being is of double significance for the historical
(social) sciences. On the one hand, it means that, due to man’s attempt to
implement value-ideas, there exists a set of phenomena which can be viewed as
embodiments ofgeneral cultural values. It is important to note here that such values
 Positivistic Conception of Verstehen 169
are not embodied by every feature of concrete cultural phenomena. For example,
not every feature of concrete domestic life is an actualization (implementation,
realization) of a cultural value about family organization. Rather, a particular
notion about family life is manifested in only a limited number of structural features
of concrete families. On the other hand, with regard to the acquisition of
knowledge, men’s existential involvement in common concerns means that they
will consider those things worth knowing which have (had) an impact on their
collective condition. These historical developments (which are always unique)
have brought about the unique aspects of the present state of affairs. Thus Weber
says of cultural phenomena that “their existence and the form which they
historically assume touch directly or indirectly on our cultural interests ,” and that
“they arouse our striving for knowledge from viewpoints which are derived from
the value-ideas which make that portion of reality.. .signifcant for us” (Weber,
1949:8 1).
Rickert’s and Weber’s arguments amount to the claim, then, that all historians,
since they are valuing beings involved in areas of common concern, consider the
same parts of empirical reality worth knowing in their uniqueness. They are
interested in the activities, and their results, of past human beings whose efforts to
implement their cultural values constitute the unique historical developments of
which the present state of affairs is the outcome (Weber, 1949:150). These
phenomena are “culturally significant” or “value-relevant ,” that is, deemed
important to know because of their impact on a situation in which men (including
the historians) are at present existentially involved as valuing practical beings. If
men did not hold some values with regard to the areas of common concern, what
goes and went on in these areas would not be interesting in its individual
uniqueness.

To be sure, without the investigator’s value-ideas there would be no principle of selection of

facts and no meaningful knowledge of reality in its individuality. Just as without the investi-
gator’s belief in the significance of some cultural contents any attempts to establish
knowledge of reality in its individuality is absolutely senseless, the refraction of values in
the prism of his mind gives direction to his work (Weber, 1949:82).

Thus, only because all members of a society or cultural community have values
concerning, for example, the organization of the exercise of power are they
interested in the individual particularity of the present political situation and its
historical development. This is what Weber has in mind when he says that the
“transcendental presupposition” of all historical knowledge is that men are cultural
beings (1949:Sl). Their valuing involvement in the present provides the reasons for
their interest in the past.
Yet why does man’s valuing involvement in contemporary affairs provide the
reason for his interest in the past? Weber gives no answer, but there is only one
reasonable conjecture. This is that Weber shares the belief which underlies all
19th-century German historiography, namely that an awareness of their historical
situation aids men in making sense out of the present, and in making reasonable
decisions. It also explains why the application of the standard of value-relevance as
a principle of abstraction leads to knowledge of individual historical developments,
i.e., past sequences of man’s attempt to implement value-ideas (rather than to
knowledge of any number of disconnected phenomena in their particularity).
170 THE SOCIOLOGICAL QUARTERLY

Historians, by selecting those phenomena for incorporation into a picture of

empirical reality which constitute the uniqe and significant historical antecedents of
the present, provide a knowledge generally desired by people who must make
practical decisions in, and sense out of, the common world in which they live. This
is what gives this knowledge its objectivity.
From the foregoing discussion it is evident that concept formation in history
involves understanding in the sense of identifying what goes on in other persons’
minds. The use of the principle of value-relevafice as a standard of abstraction
results in the selection, above all, of two kinds of facts: (1) the ideas which
motivated people, and (2) the activities which they carried out because of what
motivated them. For this reason the historian is required to understand both
motives and actions (Weber, 1922:83,100-1 n. 2, 1949:65,74). The connection
between the historian’s interest and the understandable parts of empirical reality,
which Weber had to account for (cf. above, p. 166), therefore is provided by the
principle of value-relevance. It supplies the justification for his contention that
history
...is “history” in the true meaning of the term only when it is guided by ...cultural values ... ;
when its cognitive aim therefore is not to find laws ...but to give a causal explanation of
historical cultural “facts.” By the definition of “culture” this always means that it
culminates in focusing our inquiries on a set of inter-relations in which understandable
human conduct, or, more generally, “behavior,” plays arole and is thought to be influenced.
For, these are the aspects to which our “historical” interest is attached (Weber, 1922:83).
It is now the fact that history centers on understandable human conduct which is
constitutive for an interpretive sociology. Weber conceives it to be the main task of
sociology to provide the generalizations which historians need for their explana-
tions (1968:19-20). Sociology therefore is, on the one hand, a theoretical,
generalizing or “natural” science (in Weber’s terminology), not an individualizing,
historical or “social” science. This is not altered by the fact that, for reasons too
complex to mention here, sociological generalizations cannot be considered
“laws” but are “ideal types.” On the other hand, if historians deal with phenomena
that must be understood, and if sociology is to supply the generalizations needed for
historical explanations, then it follows that this sociology must be “interpretive,”
that is, these generalizations must refer to understandable parts of reality. In
practice this means that every single one of Weber’s ideal types causally links more
or less explicitly certain (emotional, but mostly intellectual) considerations of
actors to their activities described in terms of their social-structural features.
Weber’s advocacy of an interpretive sociology is thus essentially dependent on
considerations concerning the sense of writing history (for a critique, cf. Torrance,
1974:151), and not due to a conviction that behaviorism in any absolute sense is
inadequate for a satisfactory explanation of human conduct (Weber, 1968:7-8,13).
Furthermore, as his line of argument clearly shows, he sees no incompatibility of
understanding and generalization. Not only is this explicitly stated by Weber
(1922:79; 1949:74), but if this were not so then his effort to construct ideal types
would be a rather meaningless exercise. It must be added that the contrast between
explaining and understanding, which is sometimes made by Weber, is not one
concerned with the logic of explanation. This becomes apparent through a variety
of considerations. First, whenever Weber makes this contrast (1922: 136; 1949:74),
he refers to the natural scientist’s explanations versus the historian’s understand-
 Positivistic Conception of Verstehen 171
ing of individual relationships. The former concentrates on the general features of
a phenomenon, the latter on those which in their conjunction define its (meaning-
ful) individuality. Since these features include understandable elements (from
which, in the Weberian scheme of things, the natural scientist must abstract),
historians have to explain unique phenomena with the help of generalizations con-
taining variables which refer to understandable features of the phenomena.
Another relevant point is Weber’s contrast of understanding and observation
(Weber, 194993). This indicates that “understanding” for him designates the
phenomenological peculiarity of information about human “inner” states when
it is compared to the “grasping” (Begreifen) of events of “external” nature
(Weber, 1922:70 n. 2,93). However, this information, like any other kind, must be
treated by the same scientific methods. In other words, Verstehen for Weber
is by no means a distinctive method. In his view there are only two scientific
methods. These are the two methods of concept formation (methods of abstrac-
tion); in addition, there are intellectual procedures like analysis, induction, or
synthesis. Yet all these apply equally to understandable and meaningless data. A
final important consideration in this context concerns Weber’s insistence that
explanation involving understanding must be causal explanation, and that this
requires the application of generalizations (Weber, 1922:89,134; 1949:86).
The requirement of Verstehen in the historical sciences and sociology, then, is
not used by Weber in order to advance a claim for their peculiar status with regard to
the logic of explanation. Rather, his arguments go into an entirely different
direction. Weber’s advocacy of understanding is based upon the following: the
historical and generalizing social sciences in their specific particularity exist and are
legitimated as a response to a peculiar interest growing out of man’s social
existence. This is the interest in having knowledge of the unique sequence of mean-
ingful events (human activities) which has brought about the existentially signifi-
cant features of the present state of affairs. Faced with the requirement of having to
direct their practical lives, of having to give activities a meaning, and to make rea-
sonable decisions, man believes and hopes to find some guidance through the
knowledge of the past, and by discovering a meaning in it (or imposing it upon it).
And since in its relevant aspects the past is a man-made unique development, its
knowledge must be interpretive and individualizing.
In adopting these general considerations Weber was hardly original. Most
19th-century German historians and philosophers of history argued along such
lines. However, on the question of the exact relation between man’s social praxis
and historical knowledge, Weber embraced a less commonly held view. As amatter
of fact, his position went directly counter to that of the two perhaps most influential
theorists of history, namely Johann Gustav Droysen and Wilhelm Dilthey. For
these thinkers believed it possible to arrive, through practical reasoning (as
opposed to mere theoretical contemplation aimed at, and content with, explana-
tion), at generally binding prescriptions for the present on the basis of a
consciousness of the past and a discovery of its meaning. This practical reasoning
they called “Verstehen ,” and their contrast between “explanation” and “under-
standing,” or natural science and history, was above all intended as a contrast
between theoretical and practical reasoning. Weber, although believing in the
practical relevance of history, could not accept this line of thought. He argued that
there was no way in which value judgments could be derived from factual
statements alone in a logically conclusive fashion, and that expertise in empirical
172 THE SOCIOLOGICAL QUARTERLY

matters did not entail special authority in normative matters. He insisted that
entirely different criteria of validity are appealed to in each type of reasoning since
they are aimed at completely divergent goals. Therefore, the particular value of
each is best served by keeping them separate (Weber, 1949:12). There is nothing in
either the social phenomena themselves (including their meanings) or in man’s
relation to them which requires the combination of a valuing treatment with an
empirical investigation. The distinction between historical and natural scientific
knowledge therefore could not lie in the alleged fact that the former provided a
secure foundation for the derivation of generally valid normative propositions.
In denying the legitimacy of value judgments in the name of empirical science
(Weber, 1949:25), and by insisting that arguments of fact and moral arguments be
kept apart, Weber by no means exempted the realm of practical decisions from
reasonable discussion, as is so often claimed (Janoska-Bendl, 1965:15; Habermas,
1970:40;cf. Roth, 1965). He was quite aware that “[rational] thought is not confined
to science ...” (in Baumgarten, 1964:399). Nor did he hold that moral decisions are
immune (or ought to be immune) to factualconsiderations (Habermas, 1970:25). He
merely argued against their combination with institutionalized empirical science,
holding that their proper place was in the political arena rather than in academia.
From this it is not possible to conclude that he was so naive as to believe that
political discussion was particularly rational. What he did believe, however, was
that the lack of a rational political practice could not be repaired by including value
judgments in science. Rather he feared that without the institutional separation of
politics and science, everything that prevented rational discussion in the former
would come to prevent it also in the latter. He held, therefore, that failing the
existence of a valid link between facts and values (Weber, 1949:32-3), rationality in
both areas would be served best.by such a separation. The sense of his insistence on
ethical neutrality is the hope that this at least could prevent the usurpation of the
authority of empirical science for a strict justification of normative claims (Weber,
1949:19, 57).
Had Weber really believed that the realm of practical decisions is not amenable
to reasoned discussion, then it would be hard to explain how he could have
advocated an ethics of responsibility (von Schelting, 1934:7-10, 54-5, 207-8;
Schluchter, 1971). Yet, above all, his justification of historical knowledge would
not make any sense whatsoever; for obviously his whole point is the legitimation of
history on the basis of its relevance to practical pursuits (Goddard, 1973:2; Dawe,
1971:42), especially the necessity to give the present a meaning (Weber, 1949:18).
Of course this does not amount to an elaborated conception of practical reason. Yet
neither does it amount to its denial (Sharlin, 1974:352)nor bring with it its empirical
impossibility. What Weber’s position insists on is one particular feature of the
relationship between empirical knowledge and practical pursuits: that the former
cannot fully justify the latter (Hufnagel, 1971:216-7;Bruun, 197253-4). This does
not exclude the more than instrumental relevance of empirical science to practical
action (as the postulators of a science-transcendent “interest in technical control”
seem to believe), and thus does not “undialectically” (Habermas, 1970:25; Sallach,
1973:132) presuppose the disjunction of science and the ends of practical life. On
the contrary, it presupposes their conjunction. Accordingly, Weber reiterates that
the aim of social science (in his understanding of the term, i.e., history, not
sociology [Rex, 1971:181) is not only to give an account of the historical emergence
of the unique features of the present situation, but also to provide an assessment of
 Positivistic Conception of Verstehen 173
their cultural significance (Habermas, 1970:87-8).Thus in the essay on “Objectiv-
ity” he proclaims: “We want to understand in its characteristic particularity the
reality of the life surrounding us, in which we move-the interconnections and
cultural significance of its component phenomena in their present form, as well as
the causes of their having developed historically so and not otherwise” (Weber,
1949:72). This cultural significance of phenomena emerges through an assessment
in all ramifications, of their causal impact on areas of common concern, i.e., sectors
of activity with regard to which members of society hold general cultural values. As
the conditions of, factual constraints on, and possibilities for, the actualization of
ideals in the present phenomena acquire a certain meaning for those who hold those
ideals. Anyone who adheres to an ethics of responsibility feels obligated to rethink
his preferences in the light of this information which influences him

...in the sense that it, as we say, extends his own inner “life” and his “mental and spiritual
(seistig) horizon,” and makes him capable of comprehending and thinking through the
possibilities and nuances of life-style and to develop his own self intellectually, aesthetically,
and ethically (in the widest sense) in a differentiated w a y - o r , in other words, to make his
“psyche” more “sensitive to values,” so-to-speak... Here, however, we reach the
outermost edge ofwhat can still be called “treatment ofthe empirical world in thought” [i.e.,
“empirical science”]; there is here no longer a concern with “historical work” in the logical
sense of the word (Weber, 1949:144-5).

Interpretive historical knowledge, then, for Weber is “theoretical” knowledge in

that it does not yield generally binding normative propositions. This does not limit
its relevance to technical questions only. Reasonable decisions require an
awareness of the possibilities and limitations under which practical actions
necessarily take place. In this sense most “merely contemplative” knowledge has
practical implications, and not inevitably unreflected ones (Albert, 1968:29-79).Of
course, this kind of practicality outside science does not satisfy those who believe in
the possibility of a positive determination, and in afashion that is valid for all, of the
value-element underlying all social conduct (Habermas, 1970:17, 39).
Weber’s insistence on a value-free social science does not involve the
“decisionism” in value-matters of which he has often been accused (Habermas,
1963:242-3),but the negation of an objective meaning of history. It is an illegitimate
logicaljump to infer from this that an ethical neutrality stance in science empirically
entails or amounts to favoring a social praxis without a reasoned discussion of
values, a praxis to which empirical science merely contributes instrumental
knowledge. What the value-free stance does entail is a praxis of scientists, namely
the refusal to consider any value-decision as proven correct or valid by empirical
evidence. Thus it poses, without solving it, the problem of the institutionalization of
a rational praxis by denying that the organization of science is its proper
institutional locus. Yet is is crucial to realize that while posing this problem, it does
not create it (Hufnagel, 1971:330-4). This problem does not arise because of a
“positivistically restricted conception of reason” (Habermas, 1964), but because
normative arguments can never be conclusively based on facts; they can only be
persuasive (a term which seems more fitting than “dialectical”). It is impossible to
demonstrate the good, and therefore each person must ultimately find it for himself
and make, in this sense, a personal decision (Dawe, 197157). It is obvious that
intimidation and the exercise of authority are constantly used (or abused) means of
174 THE SOCIOLOGICAL QUARTERLY

influencing this process. Yet it is an illusion to think that the inclusion of value
discussions in science would control their use.
In Weber’s view, then, this insight into what institutionalized science can and
cannot do ought to be considered the main precondition of any reasonable
discussion of practical matters at all. The idea of “reasonable discussion” includes
that heterogeneous things be kept apart. Once it is realized, therefore, that value
judgments cannot be derived logically from statements of fact only, empirical
science ought to be separated from practical discussion. The former can add
nothing to the validity of norms, whose appeal lies in their persuasiveness, and the
latter need not become any less rational because of this separation. Thus this
separation means neither the refusal of a rational discussion of values, nor an
elimination of empirical knowledge from it. Rather, it means the recognition that for
the solution of practical tasks, historical and systematic empirical knowledge
cannot provide any conclusive or valid guidance, but can only be suggestive. This
makes it no less enlightening. The fact is that the relative logical indeterminacy of
the link between theory and practice (which is, in Habermas’ language, “neither
exclusively logical nor exclusively empirical” [ 1970531) cannot be bypassed by a
somehow conceived dialectical reason. This does not weaken the importance of the
former for the latter but clarifies its contribution. De fact0 men overwhelmingly
turn to history in their efforts to make sense out of the present, and this function is
the whole point behind the interpretive investigation of the past. Yet there must be
no exaggerated ideas about the way in which it can help men to make up their minds
(Dawe, 197156). This is the sober message of Weber’s advocacy of Verstehen
without value judgments.

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