Name: Cabatic, Danica Aira R.

Course & Section: Bachelor of Arts in Foreign Service 201

Full name of Course: International Organization

Professor: Sir. Jumel G. Estrañero

NATO and Libya: An indefensible intervention into a sovereign state

Introduction

The involvement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Libya has sparked
heated controversy. This was mostly owing to NATO's contradictory activities throughout the
intervention, as well as the extent to which the operation may be regarded effective. Before
NATO’s true role can be analyzed, it is necessary to define the terms Responsibility to Protect
(R2P) and regime change. Regarding of one's feelings regarding General Gaddafi (from a
Western democratic), NATO's intervention in the Libyan civil war assisted in regime transition.
This dissertation examines the political factors that caused an organization normally associated
with peacekeeping to ostensibly modify its operational mission to one that actively aided the
rebel cause (Green, 2019).

The globally acknowledged meaning of Responsibility to protect emerged from the 2005
United Nations World Summit, when it was stated as follows: “Each every state is responsible
for protecting its people against genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against
humanity... We acknowledge that obligation and will act accordingly… The international
community, through the United Nations, is also responsible for assisting in the prevention of
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. In this situation, we are
prepared to take collective action through the Security Council in a prompt and decisive way… If
peaceful methods are insufficient, and state authorities are clearly failing to protect their citizens
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity” (UN General
Assembly, 2005).

These definitions give the foundation for NATO's action, but the background for the
intervention is as significant since it gives the reason that international organizations used to act
(Koenig.). Following the uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia, Muammar Gaddafi, the dictator of Libya,
faced a similar upheaval. Within a week of the protests, Gaddafi vowed to hunt down anybody
who defied his authority "inch by inch, room by room." House by house, alleyway by alleyway,
individual by individual (Gaddafi, M. 2011). This statement, along with the growing possibility of
a civil war in Libya, caused the United Nations to request assistance from the international
community. Following that, NATO started Operation Unified Protector, with the stated goals of
"enforcing an arms embargo, maintaining a no-fly zone, and defending civilians and civilian-
populated regions from assault or threat of attack” (NATO, 2015). This is the first indication that
NATO looked to have a mission centered on Responsibility to Protect, yet the outcome of the
action contradicts this perspective.

Body

The UN Security Council enacted Resolution 1973 on March 17, 2011, authorizing a
military action in Libya. The resolution's implementation began barely two days later and was
overseen by NATO. Officially, the goal was to protect people who were at risk of being
subjected to horrific crimes perpetrated by the Gaddafi dictatorship. The intervention was the
first to be carried out in accordance with the principle of Responsibility to Protect (Bellamy
2011). The battle in Libya finished at the end of the year, Gaddafi was killed, the dictatorial
regime's 42-year reign came to an end, and NATO's military mandate expired. However, ethical
dilemmas surrounding the intervention had been weighing on the ‘international community,' both
in terms of Jus Ad Bellum and Jus in Bello. (Rose 2016).

According to Sofie Rose “Killing as a means to save from killing”. In the previous few decades,
we have seen catastrophe unfold while apathy has maintained, like in Rwanda and Srebrenica.
Without a doubt, there was a duty to respond to the situation in Libya, but whether the
techniques by which the intervention was carried out were justifiable, or even useful to utilize,
might be questioned. This ethical quandary pertains to Jus in Bello and the contradiction of
employing violence to rescue from violence. Given that the Gaddafi dictatorship was murdering
people, one may argue that NATO's bombardment and therefore death of loyalists was
legitimate. The issue is that war does not discriminate. You can never be certain that a certain
soldier in the air is specifically targeting and killing the perpetrators of the atrocity. As a result,
you cannot be certain that the violence you did was justified (Ibid).

If the NATO intervention in Libya is considered only through the lens of the
Responsibility to Protect, experts like as Pattison argue that the Gaddafi government's conduct
satisfied the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty standard,
therefore justifying a NATO intervention (Pattison 2011). As previously said, Gaddafi has made
his feelings about the protests quite known, calling on his loyalists to "go out and purify the city
of Benghazi” (Aljazeera 2011). This was demonstrated by the Gaddafi regimes "following
indiscriminate bombing of Misrata, emphasizing that action for the protection of Libyan people
was indeed legitimate” (Rice 2011).

The UN Security Council released three major comments in the run-up to NATO's action
in Libya, demonstrating the change of its opinion on the country. These were a non-binding
press statement on 22 February, followed by two resolutions voted under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter on 26 February and 17 March, in escalating escalation. Taken together, these moves
demonstrate a Security Council reaction notable for its quickness, broad no-fly zone
authorization, and shift in policy toward the International Criminal Court (ICC). On Libya,
Ambassador Rice observed, "I can't recall a moment in recent memory when the Council
responded so rapidly, firmly, and unanimously on a critical problem of international human
rights” (UN Security Council 2011).

Analysis

Resolution 1973 establishes a no-fly zone, which is an unusual action for the Security
Council to employ. There have been two earlier examples involving the implementation of no-fly
zones, one in Iraq in 1991 and one in Bosnia in 1992. The Security Council has relied on
previous instances' experiences to construct a mandate that is both legally sanctioned and
explicit about its civilian protection purposes. Resolution 688 on Iraq was used to justify
successive no-fly zones, yet there is no specific mention of it in the text (Wheeler 2000). In
reality, the Security Council had already specifically authorized a no-fly zone in Bosnia, but this
decision was rationalized as required for the delivery of humanitarian supplies rather than for
civilian safety (United Nations Security Council 1992). In contrast to these previous precedents,
Security Council Resolution 1973 on Libya is the first time the Security Council has authorized a
no-fly zone with the specific goal of safeguarding people. The common phrase used in
resolutions is to "defend people under immediate threat of physical violence," which is
remarkable for its consistency (Holt, Taylor and Kelly 2009). In contrast, the term ‘to defend
civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of assault' is used in 1973, eliminating the
word ‘imminent' and introducing a broader definition of ‘civilian populated regions.' According to
Schmitt, the addition of "civilian inhabited places" indicates that regions other than those where
civilians are in imminent danger can be guarded (Schmitt 2011).

Although NATO's primary intention may have been to defend people, there is a large
amount of evidence that the operation was aimed at regime change. This is clear from some of
the military acts authorized and carried out by NATO. For example, the bombing of Gaddafi's
soldiers at Sirte. This was considered as mainly unnecessary, given the Gaddafi force
constituted a small danger to the local populace, who backed the Gaddafi administration (Prince
and Harden 2011). As a result, the tactical choice was centered on reducing the Libyan army's
manpower rather than the welfare of the Libyan people. Furthermore, the Deputy Foreign
Minister of Libya, Khalid Kaim, was reported in the New York Times as saying that “airstrikes in
and around Ajdabiya had killed government forces who were not advancing but just stationary”
(Fahim and Kirkpatrick 2011). This is another incident of NATO soldiers bombing the Libyan
Army; as Kaim observed, ‘the American and European forces were overstepping United Nations
and NATO mandates by giving close air assistance to the rebels rather than just creating a no-
fly zone or defending civilians' (Ibid). Furthermore, Bats claims that these military activities led to
“emerging powers complaining that the West hijacked the operation” (Berdal 2013). It was
alleged that ‘NATO assisted through coordinated bomb-strikes, but recognized that the tactics
by which they did so were complicated and indirect (Sotloff 2011). NATO was also said to be
sending intelligence and reconnaissance information to the rebels, according to Britain (Castle
2011). Furthermore, ‘if monitors spotted the rebels shooting on population centers, they would
be warned to halt; the Libyan government received no such advantage,' according to
Wedgwood (Wedgwood and Dorn 2015). The failure of NATO and the rebel groups to negotiate
a ceasefire with the Gaddafi regime exemplified NATO's priority for regime change above
Responsibility to Protect.

This is controversial, particularly in reaction to a ceasefire, because if accepted, it would

bring relief to Libyan citizens suffering by the civil conflict. As a result, this would align with the
goals of the Responsibility to Protect. As a result, NATO's priority was regime change rather
than Responsibility to Protect.

Recommendation

It may be too late for Gaddafi to learn from these events, but it is not too late for others.
A North Korean foreign ministry spokesman provided one such lesson, accusing the US of
removing nuclear weapons capability from Libya through discussions as a prelude to war
(Mamdani 2011). The subsequent action was about more than merely policing Libyan airspace
in order to save civilians on the ground. NATO partners have worked together to ensure that,
regardless of its name, the regime that follows its humanitarian mission in Libya would lack a
viable means of national defense. There will be no easy remedy for the Libyan people. The
post-invasion Libyan state would not only lack the resources to preserve its sovereignty
internationally, but it will also need to accommodate a deeply split population through gradual
coalition-building if Libyan society is not to dissolve into an Afghan-style civil war. That required
task will have to be political rather than military in nature. The first requirement for such work to
begin is the conclusion of the NATO invasion and a truce.

Conclusion

To conclude, the NATO involvement in Libya was highly contentious owing to the failure
to clearly define the genuine goals. Although the action was framed under the Responsibility to
Safeguard, it is apparent that regime change was NATO's aim; yet, this does not imply that
NATO failed to protect the whole Libyan populace. The 'international community' lacked the
authority to act in Libya to defend people. Furthermore, realists argue that this goal may be
readily abused by governments as a front for pursuing their own national interests. On the other
hand, means that this is a risk worth taking because the person always comes before the state-
so intervening to safeguard human rights was truly a responsibility. The no-fly zone and other
harsh restrictions had been in effect for five months prior to the fall of the Gaddafi government. It
is too early to call the operation a success; yet, it is obvious that the UN-mandated actions
reduced Libyan state terror and skewed the balance of power in favor of the Transitional
National Council. As unsettling as that may seem, R2P proponents have always maintained that
nothing in the doctrine guarantees a good conclusion, whether in the military phase of the
operation or in the institution-building that follows the intervention.

The purpose of this paper has not been to assess the effects of the two UN resolutions.
Rather, I wanted to know what the Libya instance teaches us about the status of intervention.
The possible leadership shortage in a post-American world has been recognized in early
analyses. According to a Foreign Policy article, ‘there will always be crises that demand
multilateral action,' and this stark truth begs the issue of ‘when the BRICS10 will be prepared to
step up to the plate and set idealism above self-interest’ (Wagner and Jackman 2011). The
reasons for BRIC restraint in 1973 are several, including realistic reservations about the
effectiveness of force and a possible gap between political aim and the type of military
operations that were appropriate.

Way ahead

This research is suitable for students or researchers who has the same topic or idea like
mine. Some people may be interested about knowing war against NATO and Libya, this paper
would be a great help to them. As a future researcher, knowing about what is happening around
us will give you more knowledge and can help us be responsible for our country. Being aware to
your surroundings is the first step for us to care for our country and while knowing about this we
can spread awareness to other people who has no idea on what is really happening. And that is
the purpose of this study.
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Message for professor

Good day sir! It’s been a whole semester since we meet through online class, though we
haven’t meet personally it’s been an honor to meet a professor like you. A professor that
has the same vibes like us, especially when we talked about the Korean drama you
wanted us to watch. It is my first time to encounter like that because none of my
professors would talk us about Korean drama that we teenagers love to do. Thank you
sir for your very long patience every time we want you to extend the deadline hehe.
Thank you for understanding us and thank you for the consideration you are giving to us.
I know despite the difficult activities, it is for us to learn and become a better person and
a better diplomats someday. So again, thank you sir! For everything you’ve done for us.
We will never forget you. Take care always sir. See you soon! Cheers!

To: Sir. Stranger