Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute

GAUḌAPĀDA AND SAṄKARA: (A Study in Contrast)

Author(s): A. G. KRISHNA WARRIER
Source: Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Vol. 48/49, Golden Jubilee
Volume 1917-1967 (1968), pp. 179-186
Published by: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute
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 GAUpAPÂDA AND S ANKARA:
( A Study in Contrast)*

BY
A. G. KRISHNA WARRIER
The authorof the Màndûkyakârikàhas been respectfully referredto,
twice,1by the author of the Brahmashtrabhàsya as sampradäyavidah,and
Vedàntàrthasampradãyavidah àcàryãh.This simplefactmay set up a presump-
tion that,in fact,both thesecelebratedmastersof Advaita have taught the
same kind of Advaita. Indeed, several modern exponents of Advaita have
said as muchin so manywords. For instanceProf.T. R. V. Murti affirms :*
"Gaudapãda and Sankara revolutionizedthe Vedãnta thoughtbyestablishing
nondualismdialectically; theycharacterizephenomena as false appearance
(maya) and formulatethe doctrineof three truthsand two texts." Again,
elsewhere,* he notes : " It was leftto Gaudapãda and his illustrioussuccessor
Šaňkara to revolutionizeVedãnta by introducingthe theory of appearance
( vivaría)." In a similar vein, Dr. T. M. P. Mahadevan also has recorded
his convictionthatboth Gaudapãda and Sankara are advocates of the same
typeof Advaita.4 I propose in thispaper to contrast,in one importantres«
pect, the philosophicalsystemadumbratedin theGPK withthatelaboratedby
Šaňkara and show that the differences betweenthetwo have far-reaching con-
sequences. Gaudapãda mainlyis interested in delineating the nature of the
real and, therefore, consistently with it, shows little concern for the life of
man in the world. Saàkara, on the otherhand, developsa systemof thought
whose immensesweep and flexiblestructureprovidefor the developmentof
all enlightenedhuman interests.
The most vital philosophical differencebetween Gaudapãda and
áaňkara is thatwhereasthe formeraffirms onlytheimmutableAbsoluterejec-
tingall else as illusory,5the latterhas, witha more penetratingand compre-
* TheListofAbbreviations is givenat theend.
1. BSB. 1.4. 14: 2. 1. 9. 2. HPEW, 1.p. 213. 3. CPS. p. 56.
4. Q. p. 240; Sri Sawid ynaki>asarasvatî, the authorof the Mániñkyaraha •
ayavivrti;Mysore, 1958,advancesarguments to showthattheauthorsof theBSB and'
QPKB areone; pp. 6 ff.
5. Somewriters do notdistinguish between the illusoryand the pheootnenal.
Forinstance, Dr.Radhakrishnan saysonp. 273ofH PEW,i, thattheVaitathyapraka*
ranain GPK explainsthephenomenal natureoftheworld; onthe samepage he also
notesas Gaudapada'sviewthatthemultiplicity oftheworldis like the illusionof a
oircleoffirewhena firebrand is whirledquickly. Similarlyin ST K} Dr.Devaraja
refersto theworldas illusory orphenomenal, andin A V Sri Venkatarama Iyer,too,
doesthesame( p. 48). In thispaper,illusory Ì9 usedto denotetheprätibhäsika , em-
piricalto denotevyãt'ahãrikai andthetransphenomenal to denotepãramãrthilso,

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 ISO A. G. KRISHNAWAKRIEtt

hensiveawarenessof the complexproblemsof life,distinguished three orders

or degreesof reality,viz., the illusory,the empirical,and the transpheno-
menal. Dr. Mahadevan seeks to minimise1 the importanceof thesedistinc-
tionsarguingthat " thereis onlyone truth,thepãramãrthika,of which the
vyãvahàrika is a semblanceor appearance," He proceeds to observe that a
sectionof the same, i. e., the relativeexperienceas a whole,havinga "less
"
degreeof realitythan the so-callednormalwakinglife is the pràtibhàsika.
At the moment we may note that Gaudapàda does not make even these
ratherfragiledistinctions;but dismisses,instead,the totalityof life,the sky
and starsand the entirefurniture of themind,as so much dream stuff.He
contendsthatthereis total identitybetween dream cognitionsand those of
wakefullife- svapnajãgaritasthãne hyekamahurman'isiriah} His argumentsin
favourof thisthesis have been exhibitedas followsby Jacobi:3 Thingsseen
in thewakingstateare not true- thisis the pratijhà; because theyare seen-
thisis the hetu; as thingsseen in a dreamare not true,so the propertyofbe-
ing seen belongs,in like manner, to thingsseen in the wakingstate-this is
the hetapanaya; therefore thingsseen in the waking state also are not true-
thisis the nigamana. The worldexistsonlyin the mindof man.4 It is not as
thoughGaudapàda is unawareof any distinctionbetweendreamand waking
experiences. For instance,he pointsout thatthe dreamobjectsexistonlyso
long as they are perceived, that their esse is percipi; whereas the objects
cognizedin the wakefulstateare dvayakãla,or mutuallydetermined.5Never-
theless,he lumpsboth dreamand wakingobjects togetheron thegroundthat
theyare all imagined alike - kalpitàhèva te sarve. This is dogmatic, if any-
thingis, and is stronglyreminiscentof the mentalismof the Vijnànavãdi
Buddhists.6

It may be remarkedin passingthat the crucial objection against the

equation betweenwakingand dreamis based on the fact that the laws of
wakinglifeare so differentfromthe lawlessness of dreams, and that man's
ethicalendeavourand religiousvalues are bound up withhis wakinglife. To
thisit is no answerto urgethat "when thedelusionofdualityis dispelled the
1. O. p. 207f. Ou theotherhand,cf.pp.48flf ofA V, andp. 118ofMK,andpp.
666ffof AS.
2. OPK, 2. 5.
3. JAOS, xxxiiiPart1,April1913.
4. OPK, 4. 47.
6. OPK, 2. 14. *Mutually determined ' meansthatthe
objectandthesubject,
and
yrãhya grãhaha , to
refer each other. Cf.AS, p. 24. Butthecommentator ofOPK
explainsthe phrasedifferently ~ parasparaparicGhedyapariGchedakatvaiphãhyãnãr/i
bhedãnãm.
(J, Sarvamcittadrsy amavastuha m- GPK, 4. 36.

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GAÜDAPADA
AND SAÑKÁBA 18i

šó-calledfactsof the externalworldwill turn out to be illusory; " 1 forthe

dispellingof the delusionin questionis impossiblewithoutendowingwaking
lifewithmore realitythanthatassociated withdreams. Of course,religious
sàdhanais bound up with wakefullife; discrimination,purity,holiness2are
values incapable of realization except throughprolonged and systematic
efforts3in wakefullife. Therefore,obviously,it is illogicalto take forgrant-
ed a positionas yetunrealizedand dismisswakefullifeand dream as equally
illusory. This pointmay be made in yet another way. The relevantresem-
blance betweenwakefullifeand dreamis just in respect of their difference
fromparamàrtha . This cannotmake themequal any more than the common
difference,say,fromthe buffalo,makes a horse and bull equal in all respects.
" The
empiricaldifference betweenwakingand dream is not denied by Gau-
"
dapàda, urges Dr. Mahadevan,4 but the affirmation' svapnajãgarite ..
ekam clearlyprovesthe contrary. Indeed, the entire second chapterenti-
tled vaitathyaestablishesthe factthatforGaudapàda dream and phenomena
of wakefullifeare equally false. This unmistakablepenchant of Gaudapàda
forblurringthevitaldistinctionsbetweendreamand wakinghas correctly led
severalthinkersto dub hima subjectivist.6
t
In sharpcontrastSaňkara repudiatesthe contentionthat the waking
experiencesare on a par withthose of the dream state. "There7 are", he
"
maintains, externalobjectsapart fromtheirideas in the mind of the per-
cipient,because such objectsare experienced.Denial of the objects of cogni-
tionsis inadmissible.A man whileenjoyinga heartydinnermay as welldeny
both the act and the satisfactionborn of it.99 The contentionthata cognition
has no objective condate8 provokesSañkara to retort,bàdhamevambravisi
niramkusatvãtte tundasya .9 Common sense rightlydistinguishesbetweena
solid wall outsideand the idea thereofwithinthe mind; one is the object of
the other. Were the experienceof externality whollybaseless,how could the
mentalisteven talk of an apparentexternality, bahirvad?10"None compares
l. Ö, p. 124.
2. Cf.Sankara'sdiscussion ofSddhanacatustayaiu inhiscommenton BS91.1.1.
3, YS, 1. 14- sa tudirghahãlanairantaryasathãrãsevito
drdhabh
ùmili.
'
4. O. p. 125.
5. OPK, 2. 5.
6. Dr. Radhakrishnanin IP, ii, p. 450; J. Sinha,Historyof Indian Philo-
II, p. 446.
sophy,
7. BSByII. 2. 28.
8. As GP assertsin GPK, 2. 9 - drstamvaitathyametayoh.
9. i Indeedyouspeakthusas youhavean unbridledtongue' - BSB. 11.2.28.
10. yadantarjñeyarñpamtadbahirvadavabhüsate /
so^rtho vijñcinarñpatvdt
tatpratyayataytìpica//
Diiinãga,Alambanaparihsã,

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l82 A. O. KBÍSSNAWABBÍBÍt

Visnumitrato the son of a barrenwoman ! Philosophers,then, must build

theirsystemsof thoughton the terrafirmaof human experience.Theymust
needs concede the existenceof objectspresentedin theirrespectivecognitions.
Thus is establishedthefactof the existenceof externalobjects. To start,on
the other hand, from the presumptionof its impossibilityis irrational."
And, so on.1

Now, thisspiritedassertionof theempiricalrealityofwakingexperien-

ces is by no means an impulsiveact on Sankara's part; nor has it been dicta-
ted by the exigenciesof dialectical controversy withthe Bauddhas. It is the
logical consequence of his deliberate philosophical construction,of the
theoryof adhyàsa or superimposition, withwhose classical formulationhis
Brahmasùtrabhàsya begins. Here we shall stressthe followingpoints :
I
( i ) The startingpoint of Sankara's philosophyis the recognitionof
lokavyavahàraor the sphereof empiricalfacts,and not its dismissal as mere
dream stuff.

( ii ) This impliesthatwhile,on the one hand, the superimposedrope-

snake may be dismissedas illusory,the empiricalworld cannotbe so treated.
a realist. Even the rope-snakeis
( iii ) Sañkara is, epistemologically,
not a mereidea in the mind of the percipient.It is presentedto him,out
there,as an inexplicable,anirvacanlya,object, and may be sublated only
throughthe cognitionof its empiricallystable substrate,the rope.
( iv ) Incomparablygreaterthan the reality of the illusorysnake is
that of the empiricalworldwhose stabilityis coterminouswith the perci-
pient's lifein thatworldwhose substrateis Brahman. Thus from an analysis
of adhyàsa,as Sañkara has formulated2it, emergeshis theoryof the three-
fold reality,the illusory,the empirical,and the transphenomenal.3Whereas
the illusorynatureof therope-snakeis detectedand sublatedin the sphereof
the empiricalreality, the falsityor mithyàtvant of the world groundedin
Brahmanis, normally,4 not. It is this circumstancethatmakes ethical and
religiouslifeboth possible and necessarywitha view to realizing the non-
dual world-ground, and the cancellationof the empiricalmanifold. Such a
1. BSB, 2.2.28& 29.
2. Theadhyãsabhãfya in BSB.
3. The threefold realityiu Sankara'sPhilosophy maybe distinguished from
thethreelaksanasor svabhãvcw and pari-
of a thing,viř: parikalpita,paratantra%
nifpanna, as workedoutin theMahftyãna. Thesereferto theway onechoosesto re*
g^rdanygivenobject,eitheras purelyimagined bythemindor imaginedwithrefe-
renceto itsimaginary causes,too,oras totallydevoidofall characteristics,
as <simya.'
Cf.Aá, pp. 176,177,and l'i8.
4, fiO,VII. 3.

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 AND SANKARA
GAUDAPÃDA 183

procedureimpliesthatthe criterionof realityin Advaita is abàdhyata or un-

sublatability.1The illusorysituationor adhyàsa provides2the key to unlock
the mystery of life. We arriveat theinsight that as the illusoryrealityof
the rope-snakeis to the empiricalrealityof the rope, so is the empirical
realityof the entireworld to the transphenomenalreality of its ground or
Brahman; thatthe empiricalrealityis a mean proportionalbetweenthe illu-
sory realityand the transphenomenal reality.3 Once this insightis securely
held and acted upon, thereunfoldvistas of purposefullife as varied in its
activitiesas rich in its contents. The most formidableobjection against
Gaudapada's philosophyis thatsuch a possibilityis altogetherexcludedby its
dogmaticidentification of wakefullifeand dream.
Dr. Radhakrishnan states the objection to Gaudapâda forcefully,
"
thus The causticcriticmay observethata theorywhichhas nothingbetter
:
to say thanthatan unrealsoul is tryingto escape froman unreal bondage in
an unrealworldto accomplishan unreal supremegood may itselfbe an un-
"4
reality. Swami Nikhilananda makes an ineffectualprotest5against this
criticismpleadingthatthe distinctionŠaůkara makes betweenthe wakingand
dream statesis fromthe empirical standpoint.Of course, this is the case.
Once the AdvaiticAbsolute is realized,i. e., fromthe transphenomenalpoint
of view,no distinctionis possible or necessary. Then one is krtakrtya.Life
as we know it is lived mainlyon the empiricallevel,and its problems,ethical
and religious,are to be tackledand solved there. The objection, irrefutable
as we see it, against Gaudapàda is that, due to his refusalto draw a line
betweenwakingand dream,he rules out the very possibilityof purposeful
life. In its exclusive preoccupationwith the transphenomenalreality,his
Advaita ceases to caterto the lifeof man herebelow, a lifethathe dismisses
as no betterthana dream.
A laterAdvaiticsage has, withremarkableperspicacity,observedthat
the world-illusionor maya, whenceemancipationis sought,may be viewed
fromthreepointsof view :-
tucchãnirvacaniyã ca vãstaví cetyasau tridhä/
màya jneyã tribhirbodhaih srautayauktikaìaukikaih //6
The process of liftingthe last mentionedawareness,bodha,forwhich
theworldof pluralityor màyà alone is real, to the level of the first,whereit
1. AS, p. 50 : trikãlãbãdhyatvarupamsattvam.
2. P. T. Raju, IdealistThoughtof India, pp. 100ff.
3. ekameva hiparamãrthasatyam brahma: vyaoahãravisayatn 8a tyam
ãpeksikam
satyamuchyate
mrgatrsnikãdyanrtãpeksayodakãdi . TUB, 2. 6.
4. IP, ii,p. 463; QPK%II. 32.
5. TheMãU withGPK andSfonkara's Commentary, pp.xxviiff(Mysore,1944),
6, PD,V I, 130,

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184 A. G. KRISHNAWARRIBE

vanishesaltogetherand transphenomenal Real alone abides,has to be accom-

plished in time,in the sphere empiricalreality.Dubbinglifea dreamhardly
of
helps.1As philosopher.Sañkara's achievementis thathe furnished,
a through
his schemeof three-fold reality,a wide frameworkforliving a full lifewith
Self-realizationas its goal.2 Thus fall into theirproper perspectiveand
order the Yogas, karma, bhakti and jnãna, which the aspirants,variously
gifted,may pursuefortheirself-fulfilment.Only in the system of Sañkara
will the words, uttisthata,jàgrata, prãpya varànnibodhata ,3 make sense.
" Arise fromthe dream, theblind that constitutethe
wanderings major part
of worldlylife, the lifeof the blindled by the blind."4 Having arisen, as
Sañkara points5out, one has to seek out competentguides from whom to
learn. These activities,of course, fall withinthe sphereof empiricalreality
and not in thatof dream. For, the Sruti proceeds to describe thepath of
the sàdhaka as " ksurasya dhàrà. . . .durgam pathas. ."6 Whereas Gauda-
pàda declareswithan air of finality :

svapnamàyeyathadrstegandharvanagaramyathà/
drstamvedàntesuvicaksanaih// 7
tathàvisvamidam
f
Sañkara's world is one in whicha vitaldistinctionhas to be made bet-
ween the floatingappearancesof dreamand the sternerstuffof wakefullife,
whose sphereembracesartsand sciences,ethicsand religion.In his commen-
r
taryon BS I. 1. 4,8 Sankara quotes withapproval the idea that so long as
man is embodied, the world in which he lives mustbe takenseriouslyand
objectively.9His worldis an orderedwhole endowedwitha stable, knowable
nature. This is provedby the factthatinsteadof treatingit as a privateillu-
soryentitysuperimposedon Brahman,Sañkara makes fsvarabolh the nimi-
ttam and Upãdànam of the world.10 Further,this objective status of the
i
world in Sañkara's philosophymakes it a potent means for reachinglife's
supremegoal. Being sustainedby its divineground,and transphenomenally
1. GP's distinctions regardingadhikãra,madein GPKf3. 16, demanda three-
foldrealitythatSañkara'ssystem provides.
2. Cf. Yadi hi nãmariipe na vyâkriyeté
tadã asyãtmano prajññnaghanákhyam
nirupãdhikam rüpamna pratikhyãyeta ; BUBt2. 5. 19; MK, pp.67,68.
3. KU, 1.3. 14.
4. KU, 1.2.5.
5. KUB, 1. 3. 14.
6. KU, 1. 3. 14.
7. GPK, II. 31.
8. tattusamanvayãt .
9. pramãnam tvãtmaniêcayãt.
10. BS, I. 1.2 ; I. 4. 23. Dr. Mahadevan'ssuggestionthatGP contemplates
an
seemsto have no basis in fact. How, in that case, could he have
lávarasrçtivãda
writtenChapters II andIV ofGPK ?

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 AND ¿ANEABA
GATTÇAPÃDA 185

non-differentfromit,1 the worldmay reveal to the sàdhaka a kingdom of

ends which, eventually,culminatein the eternalvalues of truth,beauty, and
goodness. The distanceSañkara has travelledin this respect from Gauda-
pàda's positionmay be brieflyindicated. From GPK we learnthattheworld
is the erroneousconstructionof the divineätmä throughhis own mãyã; this
8
suggestsa drsti-srsti-vãdaapproach to theproblemof reality. In Sañkara's
philosophy,on the contrary,this is replaced by a srsti-drsti-vãda, sincethe
materialand efficient
cause of the world is as
ïs'vara, stressed
earlier. Without
such an objectivestatusfortheworld,lifein it mustneeds prove futile.

That theline of thoughtindicatedabove is no idle fancy,but a logical

developmentof Sañkara's Advaita, built on thefoundationof his three-fold
reality,may be illustratedwith referenceto certain inspiringutterancesof
Swami Vivekananda, the founderof the school of neo-Vedãnta. He had
occasion to make a typicalaffirmationlike the following: 3 " The great idea
of thereal and basic solidarityof the whole universehas frightenedmany
even in thiscountry... I tell you, nevertheless,that it is the one greatlife-
givingidea whichthe whole world wants fromus today and whichthemute
masses of India want fortheiruplifting; fornone can regeneratethis land of
ours withoutthe practicalapplicationand effective operation of thisideal of
of
the oneness things. One who should see God in everybeing; one whose
heartwould weep forthe poor, for the weak, fortheoutcast, forthe down-
trodden,for everyonein thisworld,insideIndia or outside..." Empirical
expression,in conduct, of the ethicalforce implicitin the idea and realiza-
tion of spiritualunity is inconceivablewithout investingthe worldwith a
higherorderof realitythan dreamsmay claim.
to agree withthe
In the lightof the factsset forth above it is difficult
" thereis no difference whatsoeverbetweenwhat
judgementthat doctrinally,
is taughtby Gaudapàda in the Kãrikã and what is expoundedby Sañkara in
his extensiveworks."4 No doubt these Àcàryasare at one in maintaining that
the immutableÃtmanis the supremereality.5 On the other hand, the most
outstandingdifferencebetween the two is the foundation of Sañkara's
Advaita,viz., the sattãtrayavãda,or the doctrineof three-foldreality,which
is conspicuousby its absence in GPK. To hold, therefore, that Gaudapäda
was the model philosopher6whom Sañkara set out to follow and that the
1. BS, II. 1. 14.
2. Cf.G.R. Mal kaní,MAV,pp. 209ff.foran accountofdrstisrstivãda.
3. Complete III, pp. 188,189,2Q7.
Works,
4. G,p. 240.
5. Cf.GPK, IV. 71 : etattadutlamam satyamyatrakimcinna
jayate/l
6. Gtp.240.
APORI24

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186 A. O. KRISHNAWAEEIBE

two,together,revolutionizedVedãnticthoughtare not borne out by thefacts.

By virtueof his insightsand genius, Saňkara constructedhis philosophyon
the foundationof the sattãtrayavãdaimplicitin the major upanisads. An
adequate considerationof the relevantfacts makes this conclusioninesca-
pable and irrefutable.

ABBREVIATIONS

AS The Agama Sastra of GP. Ed. etc. by V. Bhattacharya.

Calcutta, 1943.
AS Advaitasiddhi.Bombay, 1937.
AV Advaita Vedânta.M. K. VenkataramaIyer, Bombay, 1964.
BG Bhagavad-Gitã.
BS Brahmasutras.
BSB Sañkara's Brahmastitrabhãsyam.
CPB The CentralPhilosophyof Buddhism.T. R. V. Murti.
London, 1960.
G Gaudapàda, a studyin Early Advaita.T. M. P. Mahadevan.
Madras, 1960.
GP Gaudapàda.
GPK Gaudapàdakàrikà.
GPKB Gaudapàdakãrikàbhãsya by Saňkara.
HPEW. i. Historyof Philosophy,Eastern& Western.Vol. I.
London, 1957.
IP. ii IndianPhilosophy.Vol. II. S. Radhakrishnan. London, 1962.
JAOS Journalof theAmericanOrientalSociety.
KU Kathopanisad.
KUB Sañkara's commenton KU.
MàU Màndùkyopanisad.
MAV Metaphysicsof Advaita Vedânta.G. R. Malkani.
Amalner,1961.
MK Methodsof Knowledge.Swami Satprakasananda. London, 1965.
PD Pañcadabl.
STK An Introduction
to Sañkara's Theoryof Knowledge.
N. K. Devaraj. Bañaras, 1962.
TUB of Saňkara,
Taittirlyopanisadbhäsyam
YS Yogasiitras,

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