Springer Journal of Indian Philosophy: This Content Downloaded From 128.197.26.12 On Sun, 18 Sep 2016 23:37:39 UTC

THE BUDDHIST THEORY OF RELATION BETWEEN PRAMĀ AND PRAMĀṆA: A Comparative
Estimate in Relation to the Sāṁkhya-Yoga, the Advaita, the Mīmāṁsaka and the Jaina
Theories
Author(s): NANDITA BANDYOPADHYAY
Source: Journal of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 7, No. 1 (MARCH 1979), pp. 43-78
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/23440362
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N ANDIT A BANDYOPADHYAY
THE BUDDHIST THEORY OF RELATION
BETWEEN PRAMÂ AND PRAMÀNA
A Comparative Estimate in Relation to the Samkhya-Yoga,

the Advaita, the Mïmâmsaka and the Jaina Theories
SECTION-I
The Buddhist theory
The Buddhist maintains that pramâna is nothing but the know

itself, and that there is no fundamental difference between a p
pramâna. This has been often considered to be a distinguishing
Buddhist epistemology. Here in this article, along with a detail
tion of the Buddhist theory, we shall make an attempt to show
identity of pramâ and pramâna, on close scrutiny, does not sta
exclusive feature of the Buddhist theory of cognition alone. T
Yoga, the Advaita Vedânta and some Mfmâmsakas also, despite
disclaimer, finally cannot dispense with this relation of identit
other.
The generally accepted concept of pramâna is, however, deriv

grammar. Every product requires several means of production.
production, the function of which is immediately followed by t
called Karana or the instrument of that product (sâdhakatamam
yad-vyâpârâdanantaram phalanispattih). Our knowledge, also be
must require some instrument for its production. The product
pramâ and the instrument of that knowledge is pramâna. The d
the word 'pramâna' runs thus: — 'pramfyate anena iti pramâna
'lyuf here is in the sense of 'karana'. Thus according to the Nai
the Bhâtta Mïmârhsakas the relation of 'pramâ'' and 'pramâna' i
of the relation of causality, 'pramâna' being the instrumental
'prams' its effect. Since the effect is consequent to the cause,
and the effect must be different from each other. Thus 'pram
instrumental cause, differs from the resulting knowledge, 'p
rila, the Mimâmsaka, accepts this conventional concept of 'pr
on grammatical derivation and refutes the theory of identity a
Buddhists:
visayaikatvamicchams tu yah pramanam phalam vadet /
Journal of Indian Philosophy 7 (1979) 43-78. 0022-1791/79/0071-0043$03.60.

, Dordrecht, Holland, and Boston, U.S.A.
Copyright © 1979 by D. Reidel Publishing Co.
NANDITA BANDYOPADHYAY
sadhyasadhanayor bhedo laukika stena badhitah //

(Sv. Chow. ed. pratyaksa, p. 117)
: — "He who, wishing for the identity of the object, declares the
knowledge itself to be the instrument of knowledge, contradict
accepted difference between the product and the means."
Just as an axe being the instrumental cause of cutting is not id
the act of cutting, so 'pramâna', the instrumental cause of 'pram
different from the effect 'pramâ'. Yet this concept of 'pramâna
backed by the rules of grammar, involves some difficulty. Jayan
Naiyâyika, seems to apprehend this difficulty when he asserts t
single cause, but the totality of causal conditions should be cons
means of production. Two different definitions of 'Karana' are p
among the Naiyâyikas. One of these definitions is: — 'Vyâpàrava
kâranarh karanam'. The instrument is that specific cause the fu
of which immediately produces the effect. Such a definition fol
grammatical concept of 'Karana'. Bhartrhari, while drawing a l
tion between hetu and karana, clearly declares that a 'karana' mu
savyâpâra:
Kriyâyâh parinispattir yadvyâpârâd anantaram /

vivaksyate yadâ tatra karanatvam tadâ smrtam //
(Vp. Poona ed. III/7/90)
: — [When the speaker intends to convey that the accomplishme

immediately follows the operative behaviour (vyâpàra) of someth
the character of being an instrument is traditionally assigned to
The other definition is: - 'phalâyogavyavacchinnam kâranam
we accept this definition the 'karana' should be a cause which i
the effect, i.e., which is invariably followed by the effect. Kara
are mutually pervasive. In other words, 'karana' is the immediat
presence of which the absence of the result is ruled out. 'Phala'
invariably related to 'karana' as 'karana' is to 'phala'. Jayanta arg
that instrumentality or karanatva cannot be assigned to a single
tion. If such an assignment is done, the definition of 'karana' ex
'karakas' other than 'karana'. The definition then suffers from the
overextension.
THE BUDDHIST THEORY OF PRAMÂNA
Suppose in the thick darkness of a new-moon night heavily laden with

ceaseless torrential rain your eyes chance upon a female figure with a sudden
flash of lightning. Here the flash of lightning, as the immediate cause of your
cognition of the lady, has the legitimate claim to the excellence (atisaya)
which is the mark of an instrumental cause. Again, suppose in a profusely
illuminated hall you are waiting for a lady. Suddenly the expected lady enters
the hall and catches your eye. Here the immediate cause of visual perception
is the lady herself, the very object of perception. In this case, the object
(,karmakâraka) itself is turned into 'karana' bearing the excellence of immedia
in relation to the product, the visual cognition. In a similar way the 'kart? or
the nominative case may also assume the character of 'karana', if his sudden
presence immediately causes the necessary cognition in himself. All this show
that the overall excellence involved in the concept of 'karana' may be right
fully claimed by other cases also. Hence it is more reasonable to assume that
pramàkaranatva is not limited to a single causal condition, but to the colloca
tion of all the causal conditions, which being fulfilled the cognition is bound
to follow. Jayanta observes: —
tasmât phalotpâdâvinâbhâvasvabhâvatvam avas'yatayâ

káryajanakatvam atis'ayah, sa ca sâmagryantargatasya na kasyacid
ekasya kârakasya kathayitum pâryate, sâmagryâs tu so'tisayah
suvacah, sannihitâ cet sàmagn sampannam eva phalam iti
saivltis'ayavatf
(Nm. Chow. ed. p. 13)
Here Jayanta means that 'pramâna' is the totality of causal conditions which
unfailingly produces the cognition. If this theory of 'pramâna' advanced by
Jayanta is accepted, it is bound to modify to a great extent the conventionally
accepted notion that the sense-organ or its contact with the object is the
'karana' of perceptual cognition.
The Buddhist logicians, while explaining and defining 'pramâna', do not
stick to the grammatical derivation of the word. Every knowledge manifests a
certain object. Thus every knowledge is characterised by an objective bias
(visayonmukhatâ), as Prajñákara has described it. The object's being cognized
means its appearance in cognition. Knowledge takes the form of that cogniz
able object. When we perceive 'blue' a corresponding form of the object 'blue
is stamped upon our knowledge. It is this objective 'equiformity' (arthasârûpya
that measures or determines the limit of the perceptual judgment - 'this is
blue', and thus eliminates the objects other than 'blue' from the
ception. The cognition of blue which is thus measured is called
and the objective equiformity of that cognition which acts as t
determinant is called paricchedaka. When one makes a distinct j
is blue', the cognition is at once withdrawn from all that is non
fixed to the particular object 'blue' alone. This act of determin
tion (to a particular object) is called Vyavasthâpanâ by the Bud
cognition which is thus fixed is described as vyavasthâpya. Then
arises — 'which is the vyavasthapaka' or 'which does fix the kno
particular object'. The sense-organ, say the eye, cannot be the
because despite the sameness of the visual organ different cogn
different objects (visaya-bhedâdhigama) are produced. It is from
that Dharmakirti repudiates the pramánatva of sense-organs: —
sarvasâmânyahetutvâd aksânâm asti nedrs'am /

tadbhede' py abhinnasya tasyedam iti tat kutah /
Prajfiâkara explains:
sarvasya hi nilapîtâdivisayasya sâmânyena

hetutvâd aksarh na bhedakam
: — [When the same sense-organ is the common cause of all the different
cognitions of all the different objects such as blue, yellow, etc., the sense
organ cannot be called the differentiator of the different cognitions in relation
to the different objects. 'Pramâna' is that which measures or sizes up a cogni
tion. That means that it should be able to fix or limit a particular cognition to
a particular object so that we can say "this is a blue-cognition; this is a yellow
cognition" and so on. Obviously the sense-organ cannot be credited with this
discriminatory power of limitation. But without this limitation all cognitions
would have been inextricably mixed up so that we could not have said 'this is
the cognition of that'. This loss of identification is as good as the loss of
cognition itself.] — (Pv. B. on the same verse p. 345).
The Naiyayikas appear to argue in this way: — When we say that a sense
organ is the instrument of some perceptual knowledge we mean that the
instrument is only one of the causes of knowledge, but is not the whole cause.
The sense-instrument has a function or operative behaviour which is its
contact with an object. Hence the object itself is as much a cause of know
ledge as the instrumental sense-organ or its object-contact. So despite the
sameness of the sense-organ (or of the type of contact) cognitions are bound
to differ with presentations of different objects. But these cognitive differ
ences accounted for by differences of presented objects in no way compromise
the instrumentality of sense-organ or of the sense-object contact.
But this argument, though apparently plausible, leaves the Buddhist con
tention unanswered. It is assumed that cognitions are different because objects
are different. But how do you know that the objects are different? Until and
unless you know this difference you cannot talk of it as causing the cognitive
difference. To know something to be different is nothing but to feel like
something being different figuring in my knowledge. I feel something as blue
appearing in my knowledge and likewise I feel something as yellow. My know
ledge in the two cases is stamped with two distinctive forms which pronounce
to me the distinction between the two objects.
According to the Naiyâyikas there are six different types of sense-object
contact corresponding to different types of objects. But how do you know
that the contacts are different before you know that the objects are different?
Again how is it that the contact may be of the same type though the objects
of knowledge are different? Neither the difference and identity of the con
tacts, nor the difference and identity of the objects can be known before the
objects themselves are identified in knowledge. This identification can be
done only through arthasarüpya, i.e., objective equiformity or the object
form printed upon knowledge. The sense or the sense-object contact may
help the object to imprint its form upon knowledge. But you can feel your
way to the object only through this form in knowledge, not through any
sense or sense-object contact. This shows that the sense or the sense-object
contact in itself does not go to cognitively determine the objective differences
appearing in knowledge. Different forms of object-appearance directly felt in
knowledge give us the unfailing impression that the objects are different. The
sense-organs or their object-contacts may differ in as many ways as you like,
but these differences remain epistemically indifferent to the differences in
objects which are cognitively determined only by their different presentations
in knowledge. This argument is compressed by Dharmaklrti in the following
verse of the Pramânavârtika: —
sarvâtmanâpi sambaddham kais'cid evâvagamyate /

dharmaih, sa niyamo na syât sambandhasyávisesatah //
(Pv. 2/316 Benares)
The object-form presented in knowledge points to the object ly

knowledge. This form-correspondence between knowledge and
technically called arthasarüpya or equiformity (of knowledge
know an object is to have it manifested in knowledge. This man
done through the equiformity between knowledge and object. D
of objects figuring in cognitions lead one to ascertain that ther
with blue, or, there is contact with yellow. Prajñakara thus obs
'arthasannikarso'pi nâkâram anabhipatya jfiâyate'
Hence this objective equiformity of knowledge is the vyavasthâ

determines the objective difference of our cognitions. It is in th
arthasarüpya or objective equiformity of knowledge is called '
thus identifies the object to which the knowledge gets fixed an
is the measure of knowledge. Knowledge, thus measured, measu
Arthasarüpya is thus the measure of both knowledge and object
of pramâ and pramâna, in the view of the Buddhists, is not a r
causality, but a relation between a vyavasthapaka or paricched
measures and a vyavasthâpya or paricchedya which is being me
a relation between the ground and the grounded, the determin
determinable.
Dharmottara while commenting on Dharmaklrti remarks: —
na câtra janyajanakabhâvanibandhanah sadhyasadhakabhâvah,

yenaikasmin vastuni virodhah syât, api tu vyavasthâpyavyavasthâ
pakabhâvena /
tata ekasya vastunah kiñcid rüparh pramânam kificit pramâna
phalam iti na virudhyate /
vyavasthâpanahetur hi sárüpyam tasya jñánasya,
vyavasthâpyam ca niladisamvedanarüpam /
(Nb pp. 81-83, K.J.R.I. ed.)
Durveka thus clears the meaning of the relation of 'vyavasthâpyavyavasthâ

pakabhâva': —
vyavasthâpyam visesarüpena niyámyam,

vyavasthâpyate visistenâtmanâ niyamyate anena
iti vyavasthânimittam vyavasthâpakam abhipretam.
(niyâmyam = to be controlled, fixed, limited)
Another reason for accepting the objective equiformity of knowledge as the

'pramâna' or 'vyavasthâpaka has been provided by the expression 'bhavdde
vâsya tadbhâve' in the following observation of Dharmakirti in Pramânavârtik
visayâkârabhedâc ca dhiyo'dhigamabhedatah
bhâvâdevâsya tadbhâve 11 (Pv. 1/6 Benares)
Though the eye is open one may not perceive the object 'blue'. Thus the sense
organ is not pervaded by the product, namely, the cognition of blue. But if
there is the form of 'blue' imprinted on cognition, the product, i.e., the
cognitive determination of a particular cognizable object, is bound to be there,
since the objective equiformity being intrinsic to knowledge has no separate
existence beyond it. The definition of 'karana' as 'phalayogavyavacchinnatva
is sought to be explained by the Naiyâyikas as phalâvyabhicâritva or phalavya
pyatva, i.e., the characteristic of being pervasible by effect. This pervasibility
by effect certainly belongs to the objective equiformity of knowledge, and not
to the sense-organ. The Naiyâyikas who choose the definition 'phalayogavya
vacchinnam karanam karanam' mean to say — that which has immediate and
invariable connection with the effect is the siidhakatama kàraka or karana. In
this sense even the grammatical definition of 'karana', i.e., 'sâdhakatamam
karakam karanam' is well-deserved by the objective equiformity of cognition.
Utmost immediacy is hardly different from simultaneity and simultaneous
determination of knowledge is most apparent in the objective equiformity of
cognition which, in final analysis, is identical with the cognition itself.
Prajfiâkara thus brings out the implication of Dharmakïrti's observation: —
tadbhâve âkârabhâve asyâdhigamasya phalasya

bhâvâd eva, na khalu caksurâdibhâve'sya phalasya
bhâva eva, âkàrasya tu bhâve bhâva evâvyatirekâd iti
sâdhakatamatvam iti pratipâdayisyate /
(Pv. B. p. 23, K.J.R.I.)
In absence of this objective equiformity the so-called product, namely, cogni

tion of the object can never be achieved. What the Indian logicians take to be
the relations of anvaya and vyatireka, i.e., the positive and contra-positive
invariable relations between two terms, can be easily seen prevailing between
the cognition and the objective equiformity of cognition. Manorathanandin
thus explains Dharmakïrti's remark "tat tasya sâdhanarh yâ kriyâ yatah" (Pv.
2/301 Benares)
yâ kriyâ yatah padârthâd avyavadhânena

bhavati sa tasyâh karanamucyate,
tatas cendriyàdeh pramitim pratyavyavahita
sâdhakatvâbhâvân na pramânam /
When one says — 'I see colour with eyes (caksusá rüparYi pasyâm
'pramanatvcC which primarily belongs to the objective equiform
sârûpya is only secondarily imposed on the optical organ as a m
ferred epithet. Since arthasarüpya of knowledge is caused by th
pramânatva, a property of the effect, is transferred to the cause
thus comments on Dharmakïrti: —
katham tarhi caksusá pasyati rflpam iti,

kârane kâryopacàrâd evamucyate
(Pv. B. p. 23, K.J.R.I.)
This point has been made clear by Dharmakïrti when he remarks: -
sarvesâm upayoge'pi kârakânâm kriyâm prati /

yadantyam bhedakam tasyâs tat sâdhakatamam matam //
(Pv. B. 3/312 K.J.R.I.)
: — The sâdhakatama kâraka, i.e. the most excellent of all the cases is that
which is immediately and invariably related to the effect. Excellence or
'prakarsa' here stands for immediacy. In spite of the presence of the sense
organ, the perception of an object kept at a very distant place cannot be
produced, since in that case the form of the object cannot be stamped upon
knowledge. But if it is kept in a nearer spot the form of the object gets
impressed upon cognition and at that very moment the object becomes per
ceived. Thus the objective equiformity of knowledge is most immediate to
knowledge and hence the definition of karanatva or instrumentality should be
primarily applied to it. It is this most immediate one which Dharmakïrti has
described as antya bhedaka, the last differentiator. Prajñákara thus brings out
the implication of Dharmakïrti's remark:
sâdhakatamam hi karanam ity asya ca sarvakârakopayoge'pi

kriyâyâm kathani prakarsa? na hi kriyânirvartanam eva,
kriyânirvartanabhàve' pi tatránantaryam yasya
kriyâm prati tad eva sâdhakatamam /
THE BUDDHIST THEORY OF PRAMÀNA
satsv apmdriyâdisv adûradesatâdinâ yadi pratiniyatâkâratâ na

prâtiprâpyeta na tadâkârârthaparicchedavyavasthâ /
tadanantarabhâsinf sa kriyeti tad eva karanam /
(Pv. B. p. 344-345, K.J.R.I.)
It is the cognitive object-form that determines knowledge as capturing the

object. This object-form assures me that I know the object. As long as the
form of the object remains confined to the external thing it cannot be looke
upon as given to knowledge. But when the external object confers its form
upon cognition it (the form) becomes the cognitive object-form which alone
finally helps in manifesting the object as known to the knower. Properly
speaking, this cognitive object-form does not produce knowledge, but serves
as the epistemic ground of knowledge. In short, I can know an object only in
so far as I can 'feel' like having the form of the object in my knowledge. This
explains the objective basis of a cognition. In this way the equiformity (havin
the same form) between knowledge and its object should be considered as the
most immediate ground determining a particular knowledge as having a parti
cular object. In this sense arthasârûpya or objective equiformity should be
considered as pramana par excellence. But the objective-form of knowledge
cannot be sundered apart from knowledge itself. It is the most intrinsic and
essential property of knowledge. It follows hence that the difference between
pramâ and pramana, between knowledge and its instrument, is not real, but
is only an intellectual and analytical construction. The same knowledge when
analytically taken in its object-form, figures as pramana or instrument to
itself, and when the same is taken as a total monolithic unit of internal realit
manifesting an object, it is called pramâ or valid knowledge. This is really
called vyavasthâpyavyavasthâpakabhâva or paricchedyaparicchedakabhâva,
i.e., the relation between the fixer and the fixed, between the measure and th
measured. The object-form in knowledge fixes the knowledge as being related
to the object. It sizes up the subject-object relation. Hence the relation
between pramana and pramâ is not a relation of causal sequence between
an antecedent and consequent, but an analytically constructed relation
between two aspects of an identical cognitive fact. This Buddhist conception
of 'pramâ' and 'pramana' has been succinctly put by Manorathanandin in his
commentary on Pramânavârtika: —
dhíyo'msayor âkârâdhigamalaksanayoh sâdhyasâdhana

samsthitih kriyâkaranavyavasthâ; tadvyavasthâsra
yatvenâkâravas'enâdhigativisesavyavasthânât nâsty atra

kârya-kâranâtmakah kriyâkaranabhâvah, kintu
vyavasthâpyavyavasthâpakabhâvah, sa ca tâdâtmye'
py aviruddhah /
(Pvt. p. 194 Beneras)
It is undeniable that the difference of sense-organs causes the di

cognitions. When one perceives — 'this is hot', the perception of
duced by the tactual sense-organ (sparsendriya). Again the perc
'blue' is produced by the optical sense {caksurindriya). But supp
ceives'blue', and then perceives 'yellow'. Here the sense 'eye' can
mine the objective difference of knowledge. That which invaria
this difference is the objective equiformity of knowledge. It is
the forms of objects figuring in knowledge that one can ascertai
the contact of eye with blue', or, 'there is the contact of eye wi
Similarly when one says — 'this cognition of blue is due to the
with the object 'blue', or, 'this cognition of 'hot' is due to the co
tactual organ with the object 'hot',' he also does so only throug
equiformity of knowledge. Manoratha observes: -
tathá hi yady api pratyartham pratmdriyam ca

jñánánam asti bhedah, tathâpi visayasàrûpyabhâve
sa eva viseso' sakyanirdesah // (Pvt. p. 191)
The form of an object, as appearing in knowledge, is nothing different from

knowledge itself. Hence the same knowledge which is called 'pramâ' is also it
"pramana — 'dhîr eva pramânam'. Thus the Buddhists go to establish the
relation of identity between pramâ and pramâna: —
tasmat prameyâdhigateh sâdhanarh meyarupatâ /

sâdhane'nyatra tat kâryasambandho na prasidhyati //
sa ca tasyátmabhütaiva tena nârthântaram phalam //
(Pv. 2/306—307 Beneras)
: — Since the objective equiformity of knowledge is intrinsic to knowledge,

the result (phala), 'pramâ', is no other than the 'pramana' itself (nârthântaram
phalam). It is only from this analytical point of view that one should make a
distinction between pramâ and pramâna.
Kumârila contends: - The result 'cognition' {pramâ) is nothing else but the
cognitive determination of a particular object {pariccheda). So pariccheda is

knowledge itself. So pariccheda itself is an effect produced by the senses
which hence should be called the real paricchedakas: —
paricchedaphalatvena vrttasyânantarasya nah /

pramânatvam bhavej, jnâne pramâne tu pararh phalam //
(Sv. Chow. ed. Pratyaksa p. 118)
If the cognition of blue itself is taken to be the pramâna or paricchedaka

then some other cognition such as the consequent qualified knowledge of the
substratum and its adjective 'blueness' should be regarded as its effect.
Obviously here Kumârila means to say that if nirvikalpa or indeterminate
knowledge is taken as 'pramânathen savikalpa or determinate knowledge
should be accepted as ipramâ\ Pârthasârathi thus explains the import of
Kumârila's observation: —
paricchedasya jñanasya phalatvenânantara

vrttasyendriyâdeh prámanyam, jñanasya tu
pramânatve pararh vis'esyâdijnânam phalam iti.
Anyway, Kumârila seeks to discover a causal relation between pariccheda and

paricchedaka. Kamalasïla, while commenting on the Tattvasarhgraha of
Sântaraksita, presents an effective answer to this contention. Difference in
the forms of objects appearing in cognitions determines the difference in
cognitions. Difference in cognitions in its turn leads one to determine that
there are different objects like blue, yellow etc. Thus after ascertaining the
object of his intention a person who cognizes a particular object may proceed
to acquire it. The knowledge which impels one to proceed for an object that
is capable of producing some effective purposive action (arthakriyasarnarthe
ca pravartakam) is called 'pramâna' by the Buddhists. But it is only through
its objective equiformity that knowledge exercises its impelling power. Thus
avisamvâditva, the definition of pramànatva in the sense of arthakriyâsamarthe
pravartakatva, can be successfully applied to the objective equiformity of
knowledge. Dharmakïrti, while going to establish dhlpramânatâ, i.e., the
concept of cognition itself being its pramâna, argues that it is knowledge or
the objective equiformity of knowledge which determines man's leaning or
aversion to an object: —
grhitagrahanân nestam sâmvrtarii, dhipramânatâ /

pravrttes tat-pradhânatvâd dheyopâdeyavastuni.. //
(Pv. 1/5 Benares)
Nobody controverts the fact that the cognition of the particula

is produced by the eye or its contact with the eye. But that wh
responsible for the cognitive determination of a particular objec
of that object impressed upon knowledge. So the distinction of
pramâna in the primary sense of the word goes to arthasârûpya
equiformity of knowledge, and this pramanatva involves no cau
However, taking resort to the relation of causality one may imp
sense-organ the characteristic of being a pramana only in a seco
The grammatical concept of kartr, the nominative cause, or o
instrumental cause, necessarily entails the concept of vyâpâra, i
through which 1 kartr' and 'karana' can operate and produce an
vyâpâra itself again is to be produced by the nominative or the
cause. The relation of causality implies a notion of sequence. Th
who consider momentary particulars (svalaksanas) only to be r
accept the concept of vyâpâra as intermediating between lkart
the one hand and the 'phala' (result) on the other, because the
particular which is supposed to be the kartr or karana is lost at
supposedly producing its vyâpâra. How is the said particular ex
produce its vyâpâra at a time when it does not exist? So the rela
causality in the classical sense is considered unreal by the Buddh
"Kalpitah karmakartrádih paramârtho na vidyate". Its relative v
recognised only as a concession to the popular belief and pract
of man. From the standpoint of ultimate reality every moment
is nirvyâpâra. The knowledge being produced and taking the for
object is said to manifest, determine or size up the object (visay
iva) and thus seems to have a function (savyâpâram iva), though
cannot be so. So the relation of pramâna, from the final Buddh
reality, is only a conceptual construct introduced by the analyt
man. Santaraksita thus goes to establish the pramanatva of arth
na vyavasthâsrayatvena sâdhyasâdhanasamsthitih /
nirâkâre tu vijñáne sa sarhsthâ na hi yujyate
(Ts. G.O.S. p. 399)
Kamalas'îla clearly explains: —
nïlâspadarh samvedanarh na pitasyeti visayâvagativyavasthâyâ

arthasârupyam eva nibandhanarh nânyad iti
vyavasthâpyavyavasthâpakabhâvena sàdhyasâdhanavyavasthâ,
notpâdyotpâdakabhâvena; yasmân na pâramârthikah
kartr-karanâdibhâvo'sti, ksanikatvena
nirvyâpâratvât sarvadharmânâm / jñanarh hi visayâkâ
ram utpadyamânam visayam paricchindad iva savyâpâram ivâbhâti
The expression 'savyâpâramivâbhâtf is, however, borrowed from the followin

observation of Dharmaklrti himself: —
dadhânarh tac ca tam âtmanyarthâdhigamanâtmanâ /

savyâpâram ivâbhâti vyâpârena svakarmani //
tadvasât tadvyavasthânâd akârakam api svayam /
(Pv. B. p. 342 K.J.R.I.)
: — Suppose a person perceives something blue, and then again he perceives

something yellow. One may say - 'his perceptual cognition ranges from blue
to yellow'. It may be argued that the knowledge here possesses the function
of rejecting one thing and accepting another. But the cognition of 'blue' and
that of 'yellow' are two totally different cognitions. The cognition of a parti
cular object 'blue' cannot forsake its own object in favour of taking another
object 'yellow'. Knowledge here, though seeming to have a function, has no
function at all. The objective equiformity of knowledge is not different from
knowledge itself. Thus arthasârûpya also possesses no vyâpâra or function
through which it would produce a product. It is, therefore, not a means or
cause which is bound to have a vyâpâra. Yet arthasarüpya is pramana, since it
fixes knowledge to a particular object. It is only from the pragmatic point of
view that a sense-organ is said to produce knowledge through its vyâpâra.
From the ultimate point of reality there cannot be a relation of the product
and the productive means,'— the relation which is entailed in the concept of
vyâpâra.2
Kumârila has expressed his contention in the following verse: —
chedane khadiraprâpte paláse na chidâ yathâ /

tathaiva paras'or loke chidayâ saha naikatâ //
Sv. p. 117, Chow. ed.
Here in this verse, the word 'chedana', as it has been explained by Kamalasïla,
does not mean the act of cutting, but stands for the instrument
Kumârila contends: —
When an axe, the instrument of cutting, enters a 'khadira' tree the result 'cutting' occurs
in that tree alone and not in a 'palàs'a' tree. Thus it is established in human experience
that the object of the result 'cutting' (i.e. the tree) and the object of the instrument of
cutting must be the same. This sameness of object has been referred to as visayaikatva by
Kumârila and the Buddhists. Similarly, it is also established in human experience that the
instrument of cutting must be different from the resultant act of cutting. One who
identifies 'promana i.e., the instrument of cognition with the result 'prama' i.e. cognition
itself, surely goes against the empirically established view about the relation between
'sâdhya', the result, and isâdhana\ the means.
This purport of Kumârila's contention has been effectively brought out by

Pârthasârathi who observes: -
Visayaikatvavat kriyàkârakayoh svarüpabhedo'pi

lokasiddha eva /
(Pârthasârathi's commentary on Sv. p. 117, Chow. ed.).
An interesting answer to this contention has been offered by Santaraksita.

The act of cutting is nothing else than the penetration of the instrument 'axe'
into the object to be cut. This penetration again, being an essential and
intrinsic property of the penetrating object, i.e. the instrument of cutting, is
hardly different from it. This means that 'kriya' and 'karana\ which are
popularly accepted as different, are virtually identical. Then what does go
wrong with the Buddhists when they speak of the 'pramâ' and the 'pramana'
as being one? Santaraksita thus observes: -
vislisyamànasandhau ca dârvâdau parasus cchidâ /

pravisannucyate tena tatraikatvam avasthitam //
(Ts. G.O.S. ed. p. 399)
Kamalasîla explains clearly: —

parasunâ ca vrksâdes'c chidâ nirûpyamânâ
chedyadravyânupravesalaksanaivâvatisthate,
sa cânupraves'ah paras'or âtmagata eva dharma iti
paramârthatas' chidayâ sahaikatvam iti nâsti virodhah /
This concept of the identity of 'kriyâ' and 'karana' however, has been derived
from the following observation of Dharmakïrti who regards the relation
between an act and the means of that act to be a purely conceptual construct
(kalpita): —
kriyâkaranayor aikyavirodha iti ced asat /

dharmabhedâbhyupagamâd vastvabhinnam itfsyate //
(Pv. p. 348 K.J.R.I.)
The raising and falling of an axe which are only different contacts of the axe
with different parts of space are nothing different from the axe itself. The
penetration of the axe also does not exist beyond the axe. Thus, in the final
analysis, the result, i.e., the penetration of the axe into the object to be sun
dered and the said function (vyâpâra), i.e., the raising and falling of the axe do
not really differ from the axe. Yet in deference to the popular belief these
characteristics, (dharma) namely, the raising and falling of the axe and its
penetration into the object to be cut are supposed to be different from the
axe. So Prajñákara observes: —
yadi paramârthatah kriyâkaranayor aikyam na

yuktam ity ucyate tad ayuktam / na hi kârakâtmikâ
kriyâ kârakàtmatârh virunaddhi / na hi vyâpârah
padârthato bhidyate / notpatananipatane paras'uto
vyatiricyate tasyaivâparâdes'asamginy utpattis tathâ
vyapades'avatr / na ca sa svarûpâd aparâ
atha vyavahàrikf kriyâ vi rod hi ni" kârakaikatvena
tadetad isyata eva dharmabhedâbhyupagamâd, vikalpa
parinisthito hi dharmabhedo' bhyupagamyata eva /
(Pv. B. on Ibid.)
Kumârila has advanced another significant argument against the Buddhist

theory of pramâna. According to the Buddhists every knowledge is self
conscious. They consider self-consciousness or svasaihvedana to be a type of
direct perception. 'Svasamvedana' or self-consciousness, in the opinion of the
Buddhists, is nothing but self-manifestation or self-effulgence of knowledge.
Kumârila, the Mîmâmsaka, does not take knowledge to be self-effulgent. He is
so unwilling to accept svasamvedana as a type of cognitive product. Self
consciousness being the manifestation of cognition, has knowledge itself for
its object and thus thoroughly belongs to the sphere of knowledge only. The
form of object, on the other hand, solely belongs to an external object. How
can then the form of an object (visayâkâra) be the pramâna of self
consciousness which according to the Buddhists is a kind of perception?
There is no question of visayâkâra being identified with self-consciousness or
svasamvedana. Hence Kumârila observes: —
svasamvittiphalatvam tu tannisedhán na yujyate /

pramâne visayâkâre bhinnârthatvarh prasajyate //
(Sv. Chow. ed. p. 118)3
Kamalasïla thus brings out the implication of KumSrila's conte
idam aparam uktam kumàrilenaiva: — svasamvedanasy

nisedhât tasya pramánaphalatvam ayuktam, visayâkâra
ca prâmânye sati pramânaphalayor bhinnavisayatvam
prasajyate, tathâ hi — visayâkâro vâhyavisayah,
svasamvedanan tu jñánasvarüpavisayam iti /
(Com. on Ts. G.O.S. ed. p. 400)
The answer to this contention is given by Sântaraksita in the f
sarvavittiprasangena sa niseddhum na s'akyate /

bhinnârthatvarh na cehâsti svavid apy arthavin mata //
(Ibid., p. 401)
: — A thing being itself non-manifest cannot manifest others. A light which is

self-manifest reveals other objects. Knowledge is described as manifesting its
object. If knowledge itself remains unmanifest at the time of manifesting
others the very manifestation of its object becomes impossible. If it is so
nothing can be known at all. This point has been well brought home by
Dharmaklrti himself when he observes: —
apratyaksopalambhasya nârthadrstih prasidhyati /

(Pramânaviniscaya)
A cognition while manifesting an object also manifests itself at the same time.
It does not depend on any other thing for its own manifestation. Any know
ledge of any object is self-effulgent or self-conscious. Thus self-consciousness
of the cognition of an object is nothing other than that cognition itself. Here
in this sense self-consciousness of the cognition of an object is said to be pro
duced by the same object: — 'svavidapyarthavin mata'. It is not the form of
an object in itself that is called 'pramana' by the Buddhists. But the form of
an object as being impressed upon knowledge is taken to be 'pramana' by
them. The objective equiformity of a cognition is, however, intrinsic to the
cognition itself. Then there is no contradiction in the objective equiformity
being the 'pramana' of self-consciousness or svasamvedana.4
Consciousness and self-consciousness are not two different consciousnesses.

Self-consciousness is not really consciousness of consciousness, but is the self
expression of the same consciousness. So the object of self-consciousness is
the same as the object of consciousness itself. Hence arthasârûpya or objective
equiformity may easily be accepted as pramâna of self-consciousness.
Kumarila again argues: — Any qualified knowledge which is produced
(janyavisistajñana) is to be preceded by the primary knowledge of the adjec
tive (visesana): — 'vis'istajfiânam visesanajfianapürvakam'. The knowledge —
'here is a man with a club (dandi purusah)', is a qualified knowledge, the
adjective 'club' qualifying the substantive 'man'. The knowledge of the adjec
tive 'club' must precede this qualified knowledge. The cognition in the form
of the judgment, 'this is a man' is also a qualified knowledge, since herein the
substantive expressed by the word 'this' is qualified by the property of 'man
ness' or 'manusyatva'. This judgment also being a qualified knowledge must
be preceded by a primary knowledge of the adjectival property, though the
adjective then may not be ascertained as an adjective — (vis'esanam visesanatayâ
na bhâsate).
An indistinct cognition of pure adjective precedes and produces the distinct
knowledge, i.e., the judgment in this case. This indefinite and indistinct pre
ceding knowledge is called âlocanajnâna (nirvikalpajññna) by the Bhâtta
Mlmâmsakas and is accepted by them to be the 'pramâna' of the resultant
judgment (savikalpa).5
The Buddhists contend: — The term visesana is a relative one which neces
sarily implies the relative concept of a visesya. The qualificatory term becomes
meaningless without the knowledge of it as qualifying the other term. So
there cannot be the pure knowledge of a visesana which is not mixed up with
the knowledge of a visesya. Again, a qualified knowledge involves both the
concepts of an adjective that qualifies and a substantive that is qualified. Then
what is the need of recognising an additional knowledge of the pure adjective?
Prajñakara comments: —
na hi visesyoparüdharüpam anterana visesanatvam nâma,

nâpi tadupârûdhatvagraham vinâ vis'esanatvagrahanam /
tadâkâragrahane ca visesyam api grhrtam eveti katham
tato visesyadhïr aparâ sâdhyâ syât?6
Dharmaklrti and his commentator Prajñakara advance another significant

argument against the above view of the Mïmàrhsakas. The qualified judgment
'this is a man' has a qualified object, i.e., 'this being qualified by

(visistajñánam visistavisayam). The so-called indistinct pure kn
visesana has only the vise sana as its content. Then the object of
the instrument, becomes different from the object of 'pramW,
determinate cognition. Prajñakara, while going to comment on
remark — 'nesto visayacchedo'pi kriyâsâdhanayor dvayoh', obs
kifi ca vis'esanabuddhirvis'esane, vis'esye tadbuddhir iti

visayabhedah kriyâsâdhanayoh prâptah
(Pv. B. K.J.R.I. 3/315)
One thing must be borne in mind. The objective difference of d

tions cannot be ascertained at the stage of primary perception (
It is only at the stage of distinct judgment (savikalpajñána) th
tain 'it is blue' or 'it is yellow'. From this aspect the adhyavasáy
judgment should be taken as vyavasthâpaka that determines th
difference of different cognitions. Dharmottara thus comment
Nyâyabindu: —
niscayapratyayenâvyavasthâpitam sad api nilabodharüp

vijñánam asatkalpameva / tasmân niscayena nilabodhar
vyavasthâpitam vijfiânam nîlabodhâtmanâ sad bhavati /
tasmâd adhyavasâyarh kurvad eva pratyaksam pramânam
(Nb. K.J.R.I. p. 84)
Yet the judgment determines the objective difference of cognit

through the particular form of a particular object appearing in
Thus the objective equiformity stands as the basis of determini
tive difference of knowledge, (i.e. the vyavasthâpaka in the sense
panahetu). Thus the arthasârûpya of knowledge well deserves t
pramâna. Dharmottara observes: —
janitena tvadhyavasâyena sarüpyavasan nUabodharüpe

jflâne' vasthâpyamàne sârûpyam vyavasthàpanahetutvât
pramânam siddham bhavati — (Ibid., p. 85).
Pramana or instrument of knowledge, according to the Buddh

ontological category, but a logical and epistemological category
figuring as the determinant of knowledge, as limiting knowledge to a particul

object, as fixing knowledge by identifying the object, can belong only to the
stage of judgment (savikalpa), and not to the primary stage of perception
(nirvikalpa). Yet this arthasârûpya first emerges in the very primary stage
itself, though in an indeterminate way, because there cannot be any know
ledge whatsoever without taking the form from the object. When the objec
tive determination is done in the stage of judgment, then arthasarüpya,
initially emerging in the non-judgment primary stage, is credited afterwards
with the character of 'pramana' by virtue of the objective determination that
follows in the next stage of judgment-knowledge. In this way the future is
logically credited to the past. Hence the nirvikalpa (or arthasarüpya emerging
first in nirvikalpa) may also be called pramana. Thus all these talks of 'pramâ'
and 'pramana' belong to the field of logical and analytical construction, and
not to the range of reality. Here we are considering 'pramana'' from the stand
point of instrumentality, not from the standpoint of validity. Why the
Buddhists do not recognize savikalpa or perceptual judgment to be 'pramana'
or knowledge is a long consideration beyond the scope of the present disserta
tion.
The Buddhist idealists of the Vijñanaváda school who deny the existence
of external world consider momentary consciousness alone to be the ultimate
reality. It is only because of an eternal perverted disposition (anâdivâsanâ) to
take the wrong to be the right that the corresponding form of an object seem
to appear in knowledge, though there is no such external object in reality.
There is no external thing which is to be grasped in knowledge (grâhyavisaya)
There is again no sense-organ (grâhaka) that grasps an object. In other words
there is no difference among the three, namely, the sense {grâhaka), know
ledge (samvitti) and its object (grâhya), for there is no reality except know
ledge or momentary consciousness itself. Hence Dharmakïrti concludes: —
avibhâgo'pi buddhyâtmâ viparyâsitadarsanaih /

grâhyagrâhakasamvittibhedavâniva laksyate //
(Pv. 2/354 Benares ed.)
The Sautrântikas accept the external world to be real; but they also assert tha
any knowledge of any object is at the same time self-conscious or self-effulgen
Since the cognition of an object is not basically different from its self
consciousness, there is no difficulty in accepting arthasarüpya or the objectiv
equiformity of knowledge as the 'pramana' of self-consciousn

idealists, however, do not accept the reality of external world
that self-consciousness or svasamvedana is the only knowledge,
nothing but the manifestation of the momentary knowledge w
sidered by Vijfiânavâdins to be the sole and ultimate reality. It
only that can reveal itself. The objects like pitcher etc. cannot
selves. Hence knowledge must possess some capacity to manifes
capacity or yogyatâ which the things like pitcher etc. do not p
through this capacity to reveal itself that self-consciousness or
tion of knowledge becomes possible. This yogyatâ or capacity, b
to self-conscious knowledge, cannot be a separate entity. Thus
accepts self-consciousness to be the 'pramâ' or knowledge and
the pramâna, the relation of identity between pramâ and pram
easily established. This point has been brought to notice by Sán
he observes: -
visayldhigatis' câtra pramânaphalam isyate /

svavittir va pramânam tu sârûpyam yogyatâpi va //
(Ts. 1344 G.O.S. p. 398)7
SECTION-II
The Sâmkhya theory of pramâ and pramâna
The Sâmkhya theory of knowledge is based on the twin concep

reflection. According to the Sâmkhya theory the process of
tion runs as follows: —
Intelligence or buddhi is the first evolute of prakrti, the pr

site matter, which consists of three types of fundamental mat
namely, sattva, rajas and tamas. Suppose one perceives a pitch
the visual organ and intelligence (buddhi) come into contact w
'pitcher'. The sense-organ acts as a carrier which carries intelli
given object. Intelligence is assumed to be an elastic thing whic
to the object through the medium of the senses. On reaching
intelligence undergoes a transformation or modification appro
itself the shape or form of the object. Such a modification of
technically called vrtti in Sâmkhya philosophy. Buddhi and it
modification, being material in essence, have no power to manifest an object.

But to be known is to be manifested in knowledge; and only consciousness,
being self-manifest, has the capacity to manifest an unconscious object. This
being so, to make a thing known it is not enough for intelligence to take the
shape of the knowable thing. It has got to do something more, to simulate
consciousness in some way or other. Buddhi, though a state of matter, is
marked with the preponderance of sattvaguna which lends to it a peculiar
property of translucence that enables it to catch the reflection of purusa, the
principle of pure consciousness. When purusa is reflected in buddhi modified
into the shape of the object presented to it, buddhi shines in the reflected
glory of purusa and usurps the role of consciousness. Then the object-shaped
modification (vrtti) of buddhi is illumined by the reflected consciousness.
This illumination or manifestation is called perceptual knowledge which
appears in the form of the conscious judgment — 'this is a pitcher'. This
empirical judgment does not touch or influence purusa, the transcendental
consciousness, in the least. Purusa, the unchanging, unattached, unrelated and
unqualified pure consciousness, is not at all charged with any burden of
experience. Yet buddhi simulates piirusa so effectively that its unconscious
object-shaped modification appears as conscious judgment; and purusa being
thrown into the unnoticed background, its distinction from buddhi also
remains unnoticed. In this way thinking, feeling and willing, indeed the whole
range of experience is falsely ascribed to purusa who as pure consciousness is
never subjected to any subject-object relation. This false ascription is an
unwanted favour done to purusa who, however, is completely indifferent to it.
Now the modification of buddhi into the shape of the object (vrtti) is called
pramana or the instrument of knowledge and the false favour done to Purusa,
in the form of the unconscious object-shaped modification appearing as
conscious judgment (such as 'this is a pitcher') through the reflection of
purusa, captured by translucent but unconscious buddhi, is called prama or
'bodha', the product, the resultant knowledge. Vâcaspati, no doubt, in this
context tries to make a distinction between pramana (the means) and phala
(the result, product). The relevant text of Vâcaspati's TattvakaumudT runs
thus: —
Upattavisayânâm indriyânâm vrttau satyârh buddhes tamo

'bhibhave sati yah sattvasamudrekah, so'dhyavasâya iti,
vrttir iti ca, jflânam iti câkhyâyate, idarii tat pramânam /
anena yas cetanâsakter anugrahah, tat phalam, pramâ,

bodhah / buddhitattvam he prâkrtatvâd acetanam iti ta
'dhyavasâyo'py acetano ghatâdivat / evarii hi buddhitatt
sukhâdayo'pi parinâmabheda acetanâh / purusas tu suk
nanuasangi" cetanah / so'yarh buddhitattvavartinâ jñána
khâdinâ tatpratibimbitas tacchâyâpattyâ jfiânasukhâdim
bhavatrti cetano'nugrhyate / citicchâyâpattyâ câcetanâ
buddhis tadadhyavasâyas ca cetana iva bhavatrti
(Stk. Chow, with the comm. of Vamsîdhara, pp. 127—
But is there any material difference between pramâna and phal

of knowledge? A real distinction between pramâna and phala i
on the basis of a causal sequence in which pramâna is the ante
product the consequent. But it is impossible in this case, since i
assumed that the modification of buddhi is the antecedent and its illumination
by the reflection of purusa the consequent. Modification and reflection are

two parallel processes pertaining to buddhi and both are ceaseless and contin
uous. There cannot be a single moment at which an objectified modification
remains unillumined by Purusa's reflection. A modification of buddhi is born
with illumination. That means there cannot be any unknown modification of
buddhi. This has been clearly stated in the Yogasütras: -
sadâ jfiâtâs' cittavrttayas tatprabhoh purusasyàparinàmitvât

(Ys. 4/18).
Hence knowledge in this theory cannot be conceived as a product consequent

upon vrtti, and vrtti cannot be conceived as an antecedent to knowledge. So
in this Sàmkhya theory of knowledge the same buddhi, taken in its aspect of
object-shaped modification, is called pramâna, and taken in its aspect of
illumination by Purusa's reflection, is called pramâ, the cognition; and these
two aspects always stand synchronised with each other.
That this, in final analysis, turns out to be the epistemic thesis of Sâmkhya
philosophy is suggested by Vâcaspati himself in his commentary on
Yogabhâsya. The author of Yogabhâsya observes: —
indriyapranâlikayà cittasya bâhyavastuparâgât

tadvisayâ sâmânyavisesâtmano'rthasya vis'esâvadhâra
napradhânâ vrttih pratyaksam pramânam, phalam avis'istah
pauruseyas cittavrttibodhah
(Ys. 1/7 Chow. ed. pp. 27—28)
Vacaspati comments: —
na hi purusagato bodho janyate'pi tu caitanyam eva

buddhidarpanapratibimbitam buddhivrttyârthâkârayâ
tadâkâratâm âpâdyamânam phalam / tac ca tathábhütam
buddher avis'istarh buddyâtmakam, vrttis ca buddhyâtmiketi
sâmânâdhikaranyâd yuktah pramânaphalabhâvah
(Ibid. p. 29)
Vacaspati takes pauruseya in the secondary sense of being falsely ascribed to

purusa, and not in the primary sense of belongings to purusa. Bodha, the
'result' and vrtti, the means, are really buddhi in essence. Thus sâmânâdhik
aranya or co-locativity (belonging to the same substratum) between phala and
karana is achieved. It has been shown why knowledge, the so-called result,
cannot be a consequent in relation to an antecedent vrtti. The two are the
simultaneous and synchronized aspects of the same buddhi. Hence the differ
ence between pramâ and pramàna is not material, but merely analytical and
conceptual. Vrtti is the ground in which bodha is grounded. The grounded is
not the consequent product of an antecedent ground.
Vijñanabhiksu, in opposition to Vacaspati, subscribes to an ancient theory
of reciprocal reflection on the authority of some Purâna texts. This theory
has been clearly stated even by such an ancient writer as Kamalasila in his
commentary on Sântaraksita's Tattvasamgraha -
buddhidarpanárüdham arthapratibimbakam
dvitîyadarpanakalpe pumsi sariikramati
(Ts./V 297 p. 114, G.O.S.)
The real epistemic reason for this hypothesis of double reflection has been
explained for the first time by the anonymous author of Yuktidïpikâ, an
earlier commentary on Sâmkhyakârikâ. In order to evade a very near approach
to the Buddhist theory of identity between pramâ and pramâna he has
suggested two different locations for adhyavasâya (vrtti) and anugraha (i.e.,
bodha or knowledge of the object ascribed to Purusa): —
Buddhyâsrayam hi pramânam adhyavasâyâkhyam,
purusàsrayam phalam anugrahalaksanam /

na ca bhinnâdhikaranayor ekatvam bhavitum arhati
(Yd. Pandey's ed. p. 35).
Needless to say that the object-shaped buddhi can find a locatio

only in the form of an image. Vijfianabhiksu explains that this
in the form of a conscious perceptual judgment such as 'this is a
image-judgement is the resultant pramâ and the original vrtti is
the question arises: — if purusa is the substratum of experience
uneasy prospect of undergoing transformation (vikâritva, parin
Vijfianabhiksu replies that an image being unreal (tuccha) does
change in purusa. If we accept this reply a serious consequence e
Pramâ, the so-called product, becomes unreal while pramana is
tion between pramana, the instrumental cause, and pramâ, the p
out to be a relation between the real and the unreal. To avoid this unwelcome
consequence one has to fall back upon the view of the Advaitist author of
Pane apàdikâviv arana that an image, being identical with the original, is not
unreal. But that is only another way of accepting the position that pramâ and
pramana are essentially identical. Thus the hypothesis that buddhi is reflected
in purusa cannot escape the identity proposed by the Buddhists.
Even granting this hypothesis one may question — what is then the need of
the second hypothesis that purusa is also reflected in buddhi? Vijfianabhiksu
replies that this second reflection is necessary for the cognition of purusa by
buddhi in the form of ego (aham). But Purusa is here not cognised as an
unqualified solitary figure, but as an experiencing subject in the form of
introspective judgments such as 'I know', 'I feel happy' and so on. But this is
just the form of anugraha, the false ascription of experience to Purusa, which
according to Yuktidïpikâ is located in Purusa itself. According to Vijfianabhiksu,
however, it is located in buddhi, which means that the non-introspective
judgment belongs to purusa in the form of the image of buddhivrtti, while the
introspective judgment belongs to buddhi in the form of the image of purusa.
Even then these two judgments must be simultaneous, because there is no
reason why the reflection of purusa in buddhi will be delayed, coming only
after the reflection of buddhi in purusa. One should not expect that this delay
will be done in deference to the need of satisfying the clumsy hypothesis of
Vijfianabhiksu. If the reciprocal reflections are simultaneous the non
introspective and introspective judgments must be simultaneous. That means
that these two should be mixed up as one judgment. Hence Vacaspati's

position in favour of a single reflection and a single perceptual judgment is far
more rational.8
SECTION-III
Pramâ and pramâna in the Advaita theory
The Advaita theory of knowledge bears a good deal of similarit

Sâmkhya theory. Here too, intelligence (buddhi or antahkaran
be an elastic and translucent material substance which goes out
given object, gets modified into the shape of the object and act
ment (pramânavrtti) to the manifestation of the object in the f
perceptual judgment. Whatever difference is discernible from t
theory does not belong to the process of perception itself, but
colouring by the technical niceties of Advaita metaphysics.
According to Advaita metaphysics an unreal material world is
on the One Reality, the principle of pure consciousness, the Br
a material object is nothing but a false projection of that One C
In conformity with this basic hypothesis a material object of k
called visayacaitanya or prameyacaitanya (consciousness falsely
superimposed object). Buddhi or antahkarana is looked upon as
âvacchinnacaitanya (consciousness falsely limited by superimp
karana). In this aspect it is called the knower {pramâtr), the em
jiva. In another hypothesis the Jlva is consciousness reflected i
is otherwise called pramâtrcaitanya. Antahkaranavrtti, i.e., the
of buddhi in the form of the object, is considered to be antahk
vacchinnacaitanya, i.e., consciousness falsely limited by the sup
antahkaranavrtti. Hence it is called pramânacaitanya, for this v
as the instrument of knowledge which is nothing but the mani
hitherto non-manifest object. Thus the situation settles down to
The knower (pramâtr), the instrument of knowledge {pramana)
of knowledge (prameya visaya) are basically the same consciou
conceptually differentiated into and distributed in three differ
namely, pramâtr, pramâna and prameya in accordance with the
limiting conditions (upâdhi). For a slight modification of this a
involving the process of perception one may refer to Madhusüd

Siddhântabindu (pp. 56—58, B.O.R.I.).
The process of perceptual knowledge has been explained in V
hâsâ in the following way: —
: - Just as the water of a tank finding passage through a drain pours into
a quadrangular or some other shape according to the shape of the field,
karana stretches out to an external object through the passage of a sens
the shape of the same object. In the process the two superimpositional s
consciousness circumscribed by antahkarana and visaya (object) merge i
able identity. This merger emerges in the form of a perceptual judgment
pitcher'. This knowledge is nothing but the manifestation of the erstwh
object in the personal awareness of ¡iva, the empirical self, (see Vpari.
Venkateswar Press, Bombay).
Yet here the object 'pitcher' is not expressed as consciousness,

material object, though from the basic Advaita standpoint the p
unreal object superimposed on consciousness, and as such falsely
nonlimitable. Since the object is expressed in awareness as a mat
and not as the substratum on which it is falsely imposed, it fol
the substratum-consciousness does not stand as the object of aw
so because the basic cosmic illusion (mülSvidya) screening the s
consciousness through the false projection of the material objec
removed by the empirical knowledge. What is removed is only
partial nescience (tulavidya) which has so long screened the kn
consciousness of the material object. It is the temporary ignora
object which is removed giving place to the manifestation of th
removal of temporary ignorance is done by the antahkaranavrt
acts as the instrument to the knowledge of the object. Hence th
considered to be the pramâna (the instrument of knowledge).
But the question remains: - Both antahkaranavrtti and the m
of knowledge are material substances. As long as the basic cosm
persists their materiality also is bound to persist. Now a materi
the Advaita hypothesis, can neither manifest itself, nor can ma
thing else. Then how is the manifestation of the material pitch
the instrumentality of the material buddhivrttP. Here the theor
comes to the rescue. Buddhi, though a material substance, poss
translucence due to the ascendancy of sattvaguna. So it has th
catch the reflection of Transcendental Consciousness (Brahmac
Cosmic Consciousness in its aspect of illumining and manifestin
object through conferring its reflection is technically called Witness

consciousness or Sâksicaitanya. Enlightened by the reflection of Witness
consciousness buddhi or antahkarana appears as the conscious fiva, the
empirical self. In that case, when buddhi extends up to an external object,
this extension also remains enkindled by the same spiritual reflection. Buddhi
in its state of being moulded after the knowable object, i.e., in its stage of
vrtti or object-shaped modification, is also enlightened by the same reflection.
Thus this enlightenment of buddhivrtti encompassing the object is the same as
knowing the object, which is the same as emergence of the object in the
awareness of jlva.
Madhusudanasarasvatï in his Siddhantabindu raises the question how buddhi
being a material substance can be the substratum of knowledge (i.e., conscious
ness) and replies by appealing to the theory of reflection: —
tathâpi drsyasya ghatadivajjadatvena

katham pramâs'rayatvam iti cen na, darpanadivat
svacchatvena cit-pratibimbagrâhakatvâc cittâ
dâtmyâdhyâsâd va.
(Sb. B.O.R. p. 21)
The epistemic situation culminating in the emergence of an object in aware

ness has been clearly and tersely expressed by Vidyâranya in the following
verse of PañcadasT : —
buddhitatsthacidâbhâsau dvâv api vyapnuto ghatam /

tatrâjnânam dhiyâ nas'yed âbhâsena ghatah sphuret 11
(Pd.N.S. 7/91)
The commentator Râmakrsna explains: —
dhiyâ buddhivrttyâ pramânabhOtayâ ajfiânam nas'yati;

jfiânâjfiânayor virodhât, âbhâsena cidâbhâsena ghatah
sphuret; jadatvena svatahsphuranâyogât /
Both buddhi and the reflection of consciousness in it encompass the same

object 'pitcher'. The objectwise modification of buddhi removes the veil of
nescience (ignorance) covering the knowledge of the object and so buddhivrtti
is pramana, the instrument of knowledge.
Nescience (ignorance) which screens knowledge, and the knowledge itself,
being two contradictories, cannot stand together. So to facilitate the dawn of
knowledge the veil of ignorance is to be first removed. This re

by buddhivrtti. With this removal of the veil the material objec
which has no capacity for self-manifestation, is manifested or i
the reflection of consciousness (cidâbhâsa) captured in buddhiv
this manifestation of the object is nothing but the illumination
shaped modification of buddhi. We have already seen that 'vis
and 'vrtticaitanya' merge into an identity. This identity is mat
in the state of buddhi taking the shape or stamp of the object.
tion of the object-shape in buddhi by cidâbhâsa and the manife
object by the same cidâbhâsa are one and the same. It is to be
that buddhi and its objectwise modifications do not remain even
moment unillumined by the reflection of consciousness. In this
Advaita thesis tallies with the Yogasütra quoted before: -
sadâ jñatas cittavrttayas taprabhoh purusasyâparinâmitv
On the basis of this thesis it must be accepted that buddhi's mo

the mould of the object and the illumination of the same by ci
not related as antecedent and consequent, but are the two sim
synchronised aspects of the same buddhi. It is only another way
that pramâ and pramana have no material difference. The same
pramâna, taken in its aspect of objectwise modification, and is
knowledge, taken in its aspect of illumination by cidâbhâsa.
SECTION-IV
The Mîmâmsaka view
Kumârila in Slokavârtika on Sabarabhâsya under the pratyaksasütra' of

Jaimini has elaborately discussed the relation between pramâna and its result.
In this context, as we have seen before, he has rigidly maintained the distinc
tion between 'phala' and 'karanrf and assailed the Buddhist theory in this
regard. Yet it is very doubtful if he stands squarely by the Nyâya definition of
pramâna as pramâkarana. He does not give separate definitions of pramâ and
pramana. No doubt he takes the term pramâna in the instrumental sense; yet
it is not clear whether he rigidly entertains pramâ as a product of pramâna. It
appears that in his own view pramâna is knowledge itself. In the context of
svatahprâmânya he observes: —
tasmâd drdham yad utpannarh nâpi sarhvâdam rcchati /

jñánantarena vijñanam tat pramânam pratïyatâm //
(Sv. 2/80 Chow. ed.)
[So let that knowledge be accepted as pramâna which is produced with a

of certitude (firmness) and which does not seek verification by another k
ledge.]
It should be noted that this verse appears in the discussion on the Mîmâm
saka theory of svatahprâmânya according to which validity of knowledge is
self-evident and so it is not ascertained by another verificatory knowledge.
Hence the expression 'nâpi samvâdamrcchati' should not be emended as 'na
visamvâdamrcchatï (f.n. Prakarampañciká, B.H.U., p. 119).
In the text of Prakarampañciká on the same page the word 'avisamvàdi'
appearing in the Bhatta definition of pramâna should be taken as meaning
abâdhita (uncontradicted). 'Avisamvàdi' appears in Dharmakïrti's definition
of pramâna in Pramânavârttika, which suggests that ascertainment of validity
depends on conformity with arthakriyâkâritva (empirical and objective veri
fication). So Pârthasârathi has retained the reading 'nâpi samvâdamrcchati
and consistently explains it to bring out the sense of 'svatahprâmânya'. AU
knowledge is taken as valid as long as a contradiction is not found. Contradic
tion proves invalidity. But to prove validity no verification is necessary. This is
the theory of 'svatahprâmânya' or self-validation of knowledge.
Some may argue that the word pramâna in the above-quoted kârikâ of
Kumârila means yathârtha (valid) and does not convey the technical sense of
instrumentality. But this argument does not seem convincing in the face of
the following observation of Pârthasârathimis'ra in SâstradTpikâ: —
sütrakárena kâranadosabâdhakajfiânarahitam agrhîtagfahi

jñánam pramânam iti pramânalaksanarh sücitam /
(Sd. Chow. ed. p. 123)
[Here in the autpattikasütra the author of the sütras introduces the definition
of pramâna as being that knowledge which does not recapture an already
captured object (of another knowledge) and which is free from any fault of
the cause and from challenge by any contradictory knowledge.]
Here Pârthasârathi clearly mentions that it is the definition of pramâna. He
does not say that it is the definition of pramâ. It is clear then that in the final
view of the Kumârila School the real pramâna is considered to be the
knowledge itself, and not such non-cognitive factors like the sense-org
the sense-object contact. Thus the pramâ of the Nyâya School turns o
the pramâna In the Bhàtta School. If one still insists that in the above-
Sâstradïpikâ text also the word pramana stands for knowledge and not
instrumental, the following verse of Slokavârtika together with Pârth
commentary should set the doubt at rest: —
tena janmaiva visaye buddher vyâpâra isyate /

tad eva ca pramârûpam tadvatí karanañ ca dhïh
(Sv. 4/56 Chow. ed. p. 113)
Pârthasârathi comments: —
janmaivâsya kriyeti nâ'kriyâtvam, tad eva

cârthaprakâs'anaphalavis'esât pramâ,
tadyogâd dhïh karanam, ca-s'abdât pramânarii cocyate.
This has been said in the course of explaining the pratyaksasütra of Jaimini -
satsamprayoge purusasyendriyânâm buddhijanma

tatpratyaksamanimittam vidyamânopalambhanatvât
(Md 1/1/4)
Buddhijanma has been explained as jâyamânâ buddhi (knowledge coming into

being). The problem arises here in this way: You say that knowledge in the
state of being born is pramana and so it is a karana. But a karana being a
karaka must have a function (vyâpâra) other than its coming into being. But
buddhi or knowledge being a momentary phenomenon cannot have any addi
tional moment of function. Moreover knowledge does not possess any
activity. A karaka possesses function because it is an active element. But
knowledge being non-active cannot be a karaka and cannot have any function.
Kumârila replies that this concept of karaka does not apply to knowledge
which is an exception to the rule. In the case of knowledge its very coming
into being is its vyâpâra and no other vyâpâra is possible for it. So it is wrong
to say that knowledge is inactive, for its functional activity consists in its
being born. It comes into being along with manifesting its object. That means
that the manifestation of the object constitutes its action of being born which
is the vyâpâra. Thus this vyâpâra (coming into being), conceived as manifest
ing the object is also conceived as the result of knowledge. This aspect of
object-manifestation should be called pramâ. In that case knowledge itself,
attended with the manifestation of the object, which is nothing but its func
tion of being born (tadvati dhih), should be called the instrument of object
manifestation and hence also should be called pramana. It is easy to see how
this interpretation of Kumârila is a very close approach to the Buddhist view
of basic identity between prama and pramana. Manifestation of the object
constitutes the very essence of knowledge. So when it is said that knowledge
itself is conceived as the instrument to the resultant object-manifestation, the
relation between pramâ and pramana forsakes the nature of causal sequence.
Thus the difference between pramà and pramana turns out to be a mere
matter of conceptual analysis and not a matter of material distinction.
After this interpretation of the view of Jaimini and Sabara K urna rila pro
ceeds to state the Nyâya-Vaisesika view and in this context elaborates the
difference between pramana and phala in various ways. The criticism of the
Buddhist view also comes in this context. So there is reason to suppose that
the elaboration of the difference between pramana and phala and the criticism
of the Buddhist view of identity between the two have been done by
Kumârila from the Nyâya-Vais'esika standpoint. Anyway the verse that we
have just quoted above and Pârthasàrathi's explanation thereof unmistakably
point to a fundamental and essential identity between pramâ and pramana.
In this context one should not fail to note the following observation in
Nârayana's Mânameyodaya: —
ilia ca pramâsabdena laksanayâ tat-káryabhütasya

prâkatyasyâpi pratipâdanât prâkatyarûpapramâ-kara
natvena jñanasyapi pramânatvam âhuh / etâvatâ ca
vayam phalapramâmvàdina iti gîyâmahe /
(Mm. pp. 5-6, Adyar ed.)
This seems to bear a reference to Kumârila's verse that we just discussed above.
Prakatya means manifestation of the object by knowledge (arthaprakaiana
acc. to Pârthsârathi). Since this prakatya is not something essentially different
from knowledge itself we, the Mïmârhsakas, are also called the advocates of
the doctrine that phala itself is the pramana (i.e., knowledge itself is an instru
ment to itself, taken in the aspect of object-manifestation) - this is the
purport of Nârayana's observation.
Sâlikanâtha, the most distinguished disciple of Prabhâkara, states in the
following way the definition of pramana according to Kumârila, which he
rejects: -
drdham avisamvadi agrhftarthagrahakam pramanam

(iti pramâna-laksanam nopapadyate)
(Pp. p. 119, B.H.U.)
It is clear that Sâlikanâtha also thinks that knowledge itself is p

according to Kumarila. The view of the Prabhâkara school is sta
Sâlikanâtha in a very simple definition: —
pramânam anubhütih' (Ibid., p. 124)
'pramâna is knowledge itself. This simple definition is proposed

to the Prâbhâkara School, all knowledge is basically valid.
Meghanâdârisûri, an elder teacher of the Râmânuja School of
given the following definition of pramâna in his Nayadyumani:
anyapramânânapeksam arthaparicchedakam jfiânam pra
He himself explains: —
paricchedah sphürtih; vyavahârayogyatâ

iti yâvat / tadâpâdakam arthaparicchedakam /
(Md. p. 181 Madras ed.)
[Pramâna is that knowledge which does not depend on another

which manifests the object. 'Pariccheda' is manifestation which
of an object to be used in practice. An object can be of practic
so far as it is determined through its manifestation in knowled
ledge that ensures this capacity for the object by revealing it t
Hence pramâna is knowledge itself.]
SECTION-V
The Jaina view
The Jaina logician Mânikyanandin in his Parïksâmukhasûtra defines pramâna

as: —
svâpûrvârthavyavasâyâtmakam jfiânam pramânam iti
The commentator Anantavirya explains: —
prakarsena sams'ayâdivyavacchedena mïyate paricchidyate

vastutattvam yena tat pramânam, tasya ca jñánam iti
visesanam / ajñánarüpasya sannikarsâder Naiyâyikâdi
parikalpitasya pramânatvavyavacchedârtham uktam /
(Pm. ed. S.C. Ghosal text p. 3)
[Pramâna is that knowledge which is of the nature of a determined self

expression and also of a determined expression of an object that was not
known before. Pramâna is certain knowledge. The sense of certitude is con
veyed by the preposition pra and thus uncertain knowledge like doubt etc. is
debarred from the scope of the definition. Knowledge itself is the instrument
by which an object is determined or measured. In the definition the word
jñána stands as an adjective to pramâna. This adjective is meant to assert that
what is not of the nature of knowledge such as sense-object contact etc.,
which the Naiyâyikas and others consider to be the instrument of knowledge
is excluded from the scope of pramâna. ]
The second sütra of Parîksâmukha runs thus: -
hitâhitaprâptiparihârasamartham hi pramânam, tato

jfiânam eva tad iti
The wise and intelligent people do not seek knowledge for any love of know
ledge itself, but for achieving something good and avoiding something evil.
Good and evil come from the objects of the world. Knowledge reveals an
object in its true nature. It correctly identifies the object. This revelatory
identification helps the knower to accept what is good and reject what is bad.
Thus the very knowledge of an object should be considered an instrument in
respect of correctly revealing and identifying an object.
This long discussion may help the discerning and interested students of
Indian logic and philosophy to see for themselves that the Buddhist theory of
the self-instrumentality of knowledge is not an exclusive peculiarity of
Buddhist epistemology, but is shared by many other schools of Indian philos
ophy. The Buddhists and the Naiyâyikas, however, stand at two opposite
poles of rigidity. The Buddhists are as much uncompromising in their assertion
that pramâ and pramâna are essentially identical as the Naiyâyikas are in their
position that the two are essentially different.
Jadavpur University,
Calcutta
NOTES
1 Sântaraksita observes:
vyavasthâyam tu jâtâyâm kalpyatâm anyathàpi hi/

utpâdyotpâdakabhâvena sarhsthànavidhir ucyate //
(Ts. G.O.S., p. 400)
Kamalasïla thus elaborates the idea:
yathâ Kumàrilena paricchedaphalatvetyâdinâ grantheno

tpâdyotpâdaka-bhàvena pramânaphalavyavasthâ krtâ,
tathâsmâkam avirodhiny eva / yathoktam âcâryena -
- 'tatrâpi hi pratyaksatvopacâro'viruddhas ca
ksurâdisu tatkâranesy iti / etâvat tu brùmah —
avasyam àdau vyavasthâdvârenaiva sâdhyasâdhanasamsthâ
kartavyâ, na hyavyavasthàpya samvid-bhedam visayabhedena
niyamena pravrttir yuktâ, samvidbheda-vyavasthâyâs ca
sârûpyam eva nibandhanam iti sâmarthyâd evâyàtam
sârûpyasya sâdhakatamatvam, sàrûpyâd eva ca jñánasya
pravartakatvam, pravartakasya ca pramânatvam pravrttikâmena
nirùpyate, na vyasanitayà, yathoktam - 'arthakriyàrtharh
hi sarvah pramânam apramânam cânvesate preksâvân' iti,
yato yenaivâmsena pravartakatvam jñánasya bhavati sa
eva darsanïyah, na cotpâdyotpâdakabhâvena pramànaphala
vyavasthàyâih pravartakàmsah sârûpyam gamyate / tatas'ca
nisphalam evotpâdadvârena pramânavyavasthânam syât /
ata evâcâryenaitaddvàrena pramânavyavasthânarh pravrtty
ahgam iti matvaivopacàra âsritah / tasmàj jâtâyârii tu
vyavasthâyam sànyathâpy utpâdyotpâdakabhàvena kalpyatâm
tathàpy adosa eveti (Ts. G.O.S. p. 400)
2 tathâ hi caksur vijñánam pîtam apahâya yadà nïlàdau vart

'sya vyâpâra iva laksyate / yadi nïlasamvedanam nîlarûpam
svarüpam anyasya bhavatïti tena prthagbhütarn yuktyâ vyâ
cârthâpattir eva /
(Prajñákara, Pv. B. pp. 343-44, K
3 visayâkâro hi pramânam te, pramânam ca prameyavisaya
visayàkàro visayavisayah, svasarhvittis tu vijñánavisayeti visay
(Pârthasârathi's com. on Sv. Chow. e
4 apratyaksopalambhasya nârthadrstih prasidhyati iti sarvâ
sakyate svasarhvittir niseddhum / nâpi bhinnavisayatvapras
apy arthasamvittir istâ, tatkàryatvât, na tu tanmayatvena, sv
virodhah /
(Ibid., Kamalas'ïla's comm.)
5 vis'esane tu boddhavye yad àlocanamâtrakam / prasïite niscayam pascât tasya
prâmânyakalpanâ //
(Sv. 4/71, p. 117; Chow. ed.)
Pârthasarathi comments: -
sarvatraiva tâvad indriyârthasamprayogânantaram

anis'cayâtmikâ buddhii âlocanamâtrarupâ jâyate /
sâ ca pascan niscayam prasûte / tatrâlocanam pramânam,
tasya tu niscayah phalam iti /
6 Prajñákara's commentary on the following verse: -
etena sesam vyàkhyâtam visesanadhiyâm punah atádrüpye

na bhedo'pi tadvadanyadhiyo'pi va
(Pv. B. K.J.R.l. 3/314)
7 Kamalaslla clearly explains the idea: —
vâhyârthe prameye visayàdhigamah pramànaphalam, sarüpyam

tu pramânam / svasarhvittàv api satyarh yathâkânasya
prathanàt / jñanátmani tu prameye svasamvittih phalam,
yogyatâ pramânam savyâpara-pratftatâm upâdâya jflânasyaiva
sâ tâdrs'ï yogyatâ / yena tad evâtmânam vedayate na
ghatâdaya iti yogyatayâ karana-bhùtayàtmaprakâs'akarh
laksyate jnânam iti yogyatâyâh svasarhvedane pràmânyam /
8 See Yogavàrttika, pp. 21-22, 29-30, Chow. ed. Ys.
ABBREVIATIONS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY
A.S. - Anandasram Series, Poona.

B.H.U. - Benares Hindu University.
B.O.R.I. - Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona.
Chow. - Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Benares.
D.C. - Deccan College, Poona
G.O.S. - Gaekwad's Oriental Series, Baroda.
K.J.R.I. - Kashiprasad Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna.
Md., SB. — Mïmâmsâdarsana with Bhasya of Sabarasvâmin, A.S. 1953.
Mm. - Mânameyodaya of Nàrâyana, Adyar, Madras, 1933.
Nb. - Nyayabindu of Dharmaklrti with Comms. of Dharmottara and Durveka
Misra, K.J.R.I., 1955.
Nd. - Nayadyumani of Meghanâdàrisùri, Govt. Oriental Manuscripts Library,
Madras, 1956.
Nm - Nyàyamanjarî of Jayanta, Chow, 1936.
N.S. - Nirnaya Sagar Press, Bombay.
Pd. - Pañcadasloí Vidyâranya with comm. of Ràmakrsna N.S. 1949.
Pm. - Parîksàmukhasûtra of Mànikyanandi with Prameyaratnamâlà comm. of
Anantavîrya, S.C. Ghosal's ed. Calcutta, date of publication not found.
P.P. - Prakarampañciká of Sâlikanâthamisra, B.H.U., 1961.
Pv, Pv.B. - Pramanavarttika of Dharmaklrti with Bhásya of Prajñákara, K.J.R.I. 1953.
Pv., Pv.t - Pramanavarttika of Dharmaklrti with Comm. of Manorathanandi, Dwarika
Das Sastri, Benares, 1968.
Sb. - Siddhântabindu of Madhusüdana Sarasvatï, Vasudeva Sastri Abhyankara's
ed. B.O.R.I., 1962.
Sd. - Sâstradïpikâ of Pàrthasârathimisra,

Tarkapàda, Chow, date of publication not found.
Sk. - Samkhyakarika of Is'varakrsna with Samkhyatattvakaumudi of Vàcaspati
and Tattvavibhara Comm. of Vamsîdharamisra, Chow. 1921.
Sv. - Slokavarttika of Kumârila with Comm. of Pàrthasârathimisra, Chow; 1898.
Ts., Tsp. - Tattvasamgraha of Sàntaraksita with Comm. of Kamalasïla, G.O.S., 1926.
Vp. - Vàkyapadîya of Bhartrhari, Book III Pt. I. K.A.S. Iyer's ed. D.C. 1963.
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THE BUDDHIST THEORY OF RELATION BETWEEN PRAMĀ AND PRAMĀṆA: A Comparative

THE BUDDHIST THEORY OF RELATION

BETWEEN PRAMÂ AND PRAMÀNA

A Comparative Estimate in Relation to the Samkhya-Yoga,

The Buddhist theory

The Buddhist maintains that pramâna is nothing but the know

The generally accepted concept of pramâna is, however, deriv

Journal of Indian Philosophy 7 (1979) 43-78. 0022-1791/79/0071-0043$03.60.

sadhyasadhanayor bhedo laukika stena badhitah //

Kriyâyâh parinispattir yadvyâpârâd anantaram /

: — [When the speaker intends to convey that the accomplishme

Suppose in the thick darkness of a new-moon night heavily laden with

tasmât phalotpâdâvinâbhâvasvabhâvatvam avas'yatayâ

sarvasâmânyahetutvâd aksânâm asti nedrs'am /

sarvasya hi nilapîtâdivisayasya sâmânyena

sarvâtmanâpi sambaddham kais'cid evâvagamyate /

The object-form presented in knowledge points to the object ly

'arthasannikarso'pi nâkâram anabhipatya jfiâyate'

Hence this objective equiformity of knowledge is the vyavasthâ

Dharmottara while commenting on Dharmaklrti remarks: —

na câtra janyajanakabhâvanibandhanah sadhyasadhakabhâvah,

Durveka thus clears the meaning of the relation of 'vyavasthâpyavyavasthâ

vyavasthâpyam visesarüpena niyámyam,

Another reason for accepting the objective equiformity of knowledge as the

tadbhâve âkârabhâve asyâdhigamasya phalasya

In absence of this objective equiformity the so-called product, namely, cogni

yâ kriyâ yatah padârthâd avyavadhânena

katham tarhi caksusá pasyati rflpam iti,

This point has been made clear by Dharmakïrti when he remarks: -

sarvesâm upayoge'pi kârakânâm kriyâm prati /

sâdhakatamam hi karanam ity asya ca sarvakârakopayoge'pi

satsv apmdriyâdisv adûradesatâdinâ yadi pratiniyatâkâratâ na

It is the cognitive object-form that determines knowledge as capturing the

dhíyo'msayor âkârâdhigamalaksanayoh sâdhyasâdhana

yatvenâkâravas'enâdhigativisesavyavasthânât nâsty atra

It is undeniable that the difference of sense-organs causes the di

tathá hi yady api pratyartham pratmdriyam ca

The form of an object, as appearing in knowledge, is nothing different from

tasmat prameyâdhigateh sâdhanarh meyarupatâ /

: — Since the objective equiformity of knowledge is intrinsic to knowledge,

cognitive determination of a particular object {pariccheda). So pariccheda is

paricchedaphalatvena vrttasyânantarasya nah /

If the cognition of blue itself is taken to be the pramâna or paricchedaka

paricchedasya jñanasya phalatvenânantara

Anyway, Kumârila seeks to discover a causal relation between pariccheda and

grhitagrahanân nestam sâmvrtarii, dhipramânatâ /

Nobody controverts the fact that the cognition of the particula

nïlâspadarh samvedanarh na pitasyeti visayâvagativyavasthâyâ

The expression 'savyâpâramivâbhâtf is, however, borrowed from the followin

dadhânarh tac ca tam âtmanyarthâdhigamanâtmanâ /

: — Suppose a person perceives something blue, and then again he perceives

chedane khadiraprâpte paláse na chidâ yathâ /

This purport of Kumârila's contention has been effectively brought out by

Visayaikatvavat kriyàkârakayoh svarüpabhedo'pi

An interesting answer to this contention has been offered by Santaraksita.

vislisyamànasandhau ca dârvâdau parasus cchidâ /

Kamalasîla explains clearly: —

kriyâkaranayor aikyavirodha iti ced asat /

yadi paramârthatah kriyâkaranayor aikyam na

Kumârila has advanced another significant argument against the Buddhist

svasamvittiphalatvam tu tannisedhán na yujyate /

Kamalasïla thus brings out the implication of KumSrila's conte

idam aparam uktam kumàrilenaiva: — svasamvedanasy